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The effects of affect
A plea for distance between the human and non-human
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Abstract
Agreeing with Elizabeth Meyer to put aesthetics back on the landscape agenda, this article takes issue with recent turn to the theoretical discourse of affect that advocates a continuity between
object and subject, between the human and non-human. In this article we focus on the effects of
the notion of affect in ecological landscape design and argue for an environmental aesthetics
that sustains distance by discussing the concepts of ‘disinterestedness’ and the sublime. An
aesthetics sustaining distance between subject and object could offer ways to ‘free’ the beholder
and create space to reflect actively and critically about the connection between the human and
non-human. As much an attempt to inject the political as an attempt to question organicist
tendencies in landscape theory and design, this article focuses on the effects of affect,
foregrounding the risks of shuffling human/non-human aesthetics and ethics.

**Keywords**
Aesthetics, non-human, the political, disinterestedness, sublime

**The effects of affect**

**A plea for distance between the human and non-human**

‘We must deal with the idea of distance itself. If we try to get rid of distance too
fast, in our rush to join the nonhuman, we will end up caught in our prejudice, our
concept of distance, our concept of “them”. Hanging out in the distance may be
the surest way of relating to the nonhuman.’

**Introduction**

Elizabeth Meyer’s credit is to have put aesthetic questions back on the landscape agenda
in times when hegemonic debates in sustainable landscape and urban design shun any
explicit reference to the notion of aesthetics. In her much noticed text *Sustaining beauty. The performance of appearance. A manifesto in three parts* (hereafter referred to as
*Manifesto*), she argues that a designed landscape’s appearance can perform in the sense
that it ‘can lead to attentiveness, empathy, love, respect, care, concern and action’ of the
beholder. According to Meyer, a landscape’s appearance should therefore have as much weight in debates about sustainability as the performance of its ecological systems. In her
recent publication *Beyond “Sustaining Beauty”. Musings on a Manifesto* (hereafter referred to as *Musings*), she turns to theories of affect to refine her arguments. Affects would be
touching us and moving our hearts by connecting the mind with the body, and at a larger
scale, the subject and object, the beholder and the beholden, human and non-human actors,
thus overcoming the dichotomy of culture and nature. This dichotomy is often held
responsible for unsustainable and unethical behaviour towards the environment, fostering
anthropocentric hubris, letting us forget that we are part of ecological systems and deeply entangled with and co-dependent on the non-human world.

Sharing Meyer’s original motivation to emphasize the aesthetic dimension of environmental design and its potential to move us into action, we are, however, concerned about the political salience of affective theories, or more so: we take issue with the a-political implications of the turn to theories of affect, which we believe to run counter to Meyer’s intention. This article does not argue against theories of affect and empathy in themselves. Rather, our entry into the debate are current tendencies in landscape architecture that rely too easily on affect as a way to behave more ethically towards the environment, risking to (further) de-politicize design. As such, our critique of Meyer’s ideas is not directed towards her work or her intentions, but more an opportunity to discuss what is problematic with the structure of recent discourse in ecological landscape design that turns to theories of affect forwarding fluent transitions between the human and non-human. Fundamentally agreeing with Meyer to put aesthetics back on the landscape agenda, we argue for an environmental aesthetics that sets up a distance, or indeed an uneasy relation of disturbance between the human ‘I’ and non-human ‘other’, instead of an intimate closeness and continuity between object and subject.

First, we will explain the recent turn to affect theory that advocates a continuity between object and subject, between the human and non-human, and which shifts from an aesthetics of incommensurability and individual contemplation to an aesthetics of reconciliation and collective participation. We will argue that this development may jeopardize the distance between the sensitive and rational in the experience of design, resulting in a de-politicized participation instead of a potential critical, political act. In the second part of the article, we explore how to recover distance through alternative aesthetic theories. While ‘sustaining beauty’ - or better a focus on affect theory - is a way to ‘persuade’ the beholder to behave more sustainably and care for its equal non-human cohabitant in a so-called more-than-human world, an aesthetics sustaining distance between the object and subject could offer ways to ‘free’ the beholder and create space to contemplate, or indeed critically reflect more actively about the connection between the human and non-human. If we take the quality of distance as key to the aesthetic experience, we might rebalance current trends in social theory and ecological landscape design moving towards organicist reasoning considering society as a socio-ecological system ruled by such ‘natural’ laws as co-evolution and self-regulation. As much an attempt to inject the political as an attempt to question organicist tendencies in landscape theory and design, this article focuses on the effects of affect, foregrounding the risks of shuffling human/non-human aesthetics and
ethics.

**The effects of affect**

*The affective turn*

In her *Manifesto*, Meyer makes a claim for ‘reinserting the aesthetic into discussions of sustainability’ to redress the bias within sustainable landscape design towards the ecological sciences. Insisting that landscape design is ‘a cultural act’, she assigns a specific role to the aesthetic and to beauty in the widest sense: A designed landscape’s appearance can perform in the sense that it can ‘persuade’ or educate the observer or user to, ultimately, behave more sustainably. She emphasizes, however, that she would ‘not believe that design can change society’, rather that ‘it can alter an individual’s consciousness and perhaps assist in restructuring her priorities and values’. Seven years after the publication of her *Manifesto*, Meyer revised her ideas in her *Musings*. In the following, we will give a brief account of our reading of Meyer’s concern, focusing on two related themes which will form the basis of our critique and discussion:

1. social aesthetic: the contribution of aesthetics to a collective sustainable ethos and
2. engagement with the world: from an egocentric, humanist relation to an entanglement in a biocentric, multispecies environment.

Meyer recasts the aesthetic experience as ‘a new social aesthetics’, i.e. the collective aesthetic experience in and of public spaces. To explain how this ‘orchestration of perception, sensorial culture, [and] affective intensities’ comes about, Meyer turns to theories of affect. She describes affects as impressing on the emotion. Most crucially, however, she argues that ‘affects connect the mind and body’. How then do, according to Meyer, affects work on the individual and collective to prompt sustainable attitudes and actions? Roughly spoken, they make us realize on a deep level, in ‘a mode that combines feelings and knowledge’, how entangled we are in a network of and with other human and non-human beings. Two closely interrelated aspects are important to Meyer in this respect. Firstly, she emphasizes that such an understanding of aesthetic experience would be incompatible with a conceptualization that assumes that aesthetic judgments are disinterested. Meyer dissociates herself from what she identifies as a Kantian conception of aesthetics arguing that such disinterestedness only results in ‘self-absorbed reverie’. Since she wants to mobilize the aesthetic experience ‘to touch us and move our hearts’, leading to ‘recognition, empathy, love, respect and care for the environment’, she has little use for a conception of aesthetics that she assumes to imply ‘a separation from the world’. Secondly, the direction, as it were, into which Meyer hopes the aesthetic experience
would move the many individuals of a society is a less anthropocentric one: The role she ascribes to aesthetic environmental experiences lies in ‘re-centering human consciousness from an egocentric to a more biocentric perspective’. Meyer argues that the experience of being part of, connected to, and depended on the world around us, which well-designed landscapes can provide, can ‘break the barrier between subject and object’. This, in turn, could lead to attentiveness, empathy, love, respect, care, concern and action on the part of those who visit and experience designed landscapes towards the non-human environment.

As such Meyer’s writing is related to recent literature in Science and Technology Studies (STS), social theory and geography focusing on the interconnectedness between human and non-human actors, advocating a more-than-human agenda, or even cosmology, where new ontologies set up a relational symmetry between ‘the social’ and ‘the natural’ leading to a new ordering of socio-natural relations of co-evolving socio-ecological systems. Within these systems, the environmental aesthetics of affect conflate with environmental ethics, feeling with thinking, thus setting up an experience of being part of a multispecies world in which subject and object, human and non-human are deeply intertwined, moving us to mind-sets and modes of strong involvement with, and care of, companion species.

Engaging with theories of affect, Meyer is making explicit (and discussible) what we believe to be a more widely spread tendency within ostensibly progressive strands in landscape and urban design as well as architectural and urban theory drawing on recent literature in the social sciences. As an entry into the deliberation of the effects of affect, we turn to those discourses in landscape architecture that explicitly foreground co-evolutionary socio-ecological systems between human and non-human actors, namely Landscape Urbanism and Ecological Urbanism. These isms, or more broadly environmental designs, have recently been described and critiqued for the lack of distinction between the rational and sensitive, outside and inside, thus evacuating explicit reflection from the equation, or indeed excluding political agendas in the experience of the landscape as well as in the design process.

De-politicization and non-human flirtation
In the past two decades or so, design discourses have challenged the concept of distance. As a reaction against the earlier top-down, reductionist and authoritarian practices in engineering and planning, design has increasingly turned to bottom-up spatial logics and systems inherently embedded in the site instead of in the distant mind of the designer. More specifically, Landscape Urbanism and Ecological Urbanism predominantly focus on
un- and recovering relations with bio-physical ‘natural’ processes to set up complex co-adaptive, self-regulating socio-ecological systems, or indeed interdependencies between human and non-human actors and agency.23 However, as Antoine Picon argues in his concluding article reflecting on the AD issue Territory: Architecture beyond Environment, without boundary between man and his environment there is no outside from which to contemplate, making a separation or distance between perception and understanding irrelevant. This collapse between outside and inside forces designers ‘to associate intimately the rational and the sensitive, the planning and the aesthetic dimensions’.24 Picon argues that this evolution is intimately tied to the performalist turn in architecture and ‘the current importance of the notion of “affect” and the new continuity that is supposed to exist between object and subject. Although intrigued and hopeful about post-human agendas and associated theories of affect in design, Picon states that it is not without ambiguities: ‘What are the political forces at work in the new fields explored by designers today? A temptation could be to see no political force at work at all, but processes of emergence that are not related to actors in the traditional sense. The risk would then be to return to a magical world animated by forces that escape human characterisation, a magical but also mythical world in which tales replace arguments.’25

Inspired by Picon’s warning, the authors are concerned about the political implications of a post-human world in which there is no outside from which to design, in which the fading or levelled distance between the designer and the environment ‘forecloses the potential of the first causing the latter to change’, thus foreclosing the distance between the analysis and its potential to become a political project, or indeed a territorial project geared at societal transformation.26 In Landscape Urbanism and Ecological Urbanism, ‘socio-nature is generally stripped down to a biological perspective, assuming that a just and sustainable social structure will emerge from the enhancement of natural formation processes’.27 Societal development is implicitly considered as ‘naturally guided by non-deterministic, co-evolutionary and co-adaptive interactions’.28 The idea of entangled socio-ecological systems ruled by the laws of self-regulation and co-adaptation, with caring, protecting and respecting as collective ethos, replaces contested interests and political struggle with processes geared at consensus and participation. Political geographers Erik Swyngedouw and Henrik Ernstson explain that eradicating the distance between the human and non-human sets up a ‘relational straitjacket’ leaving no space for the constitutive outsider, thus off-staging the political.29 The collapsing distance between object and subject, between imagination and
reason, between aesthetics and ethics thus fundamentally de-politicizes the experience of the landscape as well as its design (see for a critique of the collapse of ethics and aesthetics Treib in this issue).

Being aware that affect theory is no monolithic endeavor, we focus on those effects of affect related to Meyer’s belief that landscape design cannot change society in combination with the idea that beauty emerges from a reconciliation between imagination and reason.

The point we want to make in this paper is that the attack on the subject-object division in the wake of a turn to theories of affect runs the risk of excluding an explicit discussion of intentions and ideas about societal change and choice in design, as well as foreclosing critical reflection and contestation residing in the experience of the landscape. This brings us to the central questions of the paper, namely: Can landscape architecture afford the de-politicizing effect of affect? In extenso, we foreground the risks of shuffling human/non-human aesthetics and ethics in post-human agendas. As Nigel Thrift notes, ‘classical ethical questions like “What have I done?” and “What ought I to do?” become much more difficult when the “I” in these questions is so faint’. Putting it more polemically, the seemingly soft eco-sensitive attitude of thinking-with, living-with, and designing-with the non-human, is currently leading to de-politicized stances advocating the systemic rather than the intentional, even to statements like ‘Make Kin Not Babies’ by prominent social theorists such as, in this case, Donna Haraway. In her recent writing, Haraway blatantly questions ‘decolonial feminist reproductive freedom’ in a multispecies world, and argues that ‘it cannot be just a humanist affair, no matter how anti-imperialist, antiracist, anticlassist and pro-woman.’ Haraway’s entry of ‘staying with the trouble’, as an alternative to superficial techno-managerial fixes to environmental problems or an effortless defeatist attitude that all is lost, is a pertinent one. However, if we accept a more-than-human agenda forwarding new cosmologies of socio-natural order, we might be in the danger of flirting with eco-fascism. That is to say that, in the specific context of ecological design aligning with a more-than-human agenda, the risk of further de-politicizing design as well as going into ethically questionable territory is not to be taken lightly. Timothy Morton warns: ‘If we aestheticize this acceptance [of evolution/extinction], we arrive at fascism, the cult of death. Instead, ecological criticism must politicize the aesthetic’. In an effort to inject the political into the design debate as well as to question organicist, evolutionary tendencies, we will explore alternative aesthetic theories predicated on distance and incommensurability between object and subject, between human and non-human. In what follows, we will defend the idea of distance in two interrelated strands that respond both to Meyer’s arguments. We argue, first, for a certain understanding of
disinterestedness as a base for aesthetic experience, and revisit then the sublime as conceptualized by Kant and Lyotard. This is not an end in itself. Rather, we are convinced that the distance we plead for is what keeps theorizing about landscape experience and design from slipping into ideologically dangerous waters, and consider it a way into re-politicizing landscape design and theory.

**An apology of distance: disinterestedness and the sublime**

Meyer ardently rejects the notion of disinterestedness, which she takes to be a cornerstone of Kantian aesthetics, as it would imply a separation from the world. We will argue, however, that her understanding of disinterestedness is an ‘Unkantian’ notion of disinterestedness, i.e. a misreading of Kant’s idea. We will present a different interpretation of disinterestedness, not as in-difference to the world but as freedom from any material, sensory, or moral and conceptual determinations.

The notion of disinterestedness in Kant operates, first, as ‘the logical condition which distinguishes judgements of taste from both judgements of the agreeable and the good, both of which involve appreciating objects in relation to an ‘interest’. Philosopher Emily Brady also emphasizes that the notion of disinterestedness is not merely a concept that works negatively. Rather, it would also work positively to encourage ‘open receptivity to aesthetic qualities because it frees up the mind from personal preoccupations’ (ibid.: 140). These preoccupations or interests would otherwise cloud our aesthetic judgement.

‘Disinterestedness as the basis of aesthetic appreciation defines a standpoint that backgrounds the concerns of self-interest and utility in relation to nature andforegrounds its aesthetic qualities as valuable in their own right.’

Aesthetic appreciation ‘does not require that we set aside who we are, it requires only that we set aside what we want.’ Political theorist Mustafa Dikeç emphasizes the political implications of this abstraction from private interests and motivations when he stresses that it liberates our judgements from the confines of our own subjectivity.

Furthermore, there is no conflict between disinterestedness and engagement with the aesthetic object. Brady shows that disinterestedness does precisely not involve a separation from the world. Rather, since disinterested appreciation is ‘a state of will-lessness in which we are cut off from desire and fully absorbed by the object’, it ‘enables object-directed appreciation’. This involves ‘immersion rather than spectatorship’. Brady shows that even though Kant characterizes judgements of taste by passive delight or contemplative pleasure, object-directed immersion would involve ‘the active use of the capacities of perception, thought and imagination’. This is because for Kant the passivity of the
aesthetic response refers only to the inactivity as regards any interest; it does not preclude active contemplation.

This active contemplation resulting from the notion of disinterestedness and indeed distance between subject and object is essential in Kant’s aesthetic theory, including the category of beauty. The beautiful consists in the harmonious ‘free play’ of the imagination that characterizes the aesthetic response. The freedom of the mental powers refers, first, to the very nature of imagination’s activity as free. Although Kant uses the term “contemplation”, to describe this mode of attention, it is an active state of mind, as this remark of his underlines: ‘We linger in our contemplation of the beautiful, because this contemplation reinforces and reproduces itself.’ The freedom of the imagination refers, second, to ‘the freedom from cognising the object’. That means we do not seek determinate knowledge about the object when judging aesthetically; we abstract from the function or purpose of the object. ‘Aesthetic judgements demand, in other words, freedom of the imagination from any conceptual determination.’ No rule or concept governs the free play of imagination and understanding; they have entered a non-hierarchical relationship. Emphasizing the political implication of this collapse of hierarchy and lack of conceptual determination, Dikeç argues that this would signal ‘a moment of freedom in the way I relate to the world, where I can judge an object or event in its particularity – in its, and my, freedom’.

This liberating moment is amplified in one particular kind of aesthetic experience: the sublime: ‘Here imagination is active in trying to grasp the magnificent size or power of awesome natural objects, although in the end it fails to apprehend the object because it is stretched to its capacity, pushed beyond its limits.’ Whereas in the beautiful, the free play of the mental powers is a harmonious one, the sublime calls forth a free play in which imagination and reason conflict. Simply put, in the experience of the sublime, the senses and imagination are incapable of taking in the overwhelming dimensions or power of the landscape, and the faculty of reason must be engaged. The imagination crashes in trying to grasp nature’s overwhelming size (the mathematically sublime) or power (the dynamically sublime). This generates, on the one hand, a feeling of being overwhelmed, but on the other it awakens ‘the feeling of a supersensible faculty in us’. In the case of the mathematically sublime, we are made aware of reason’s capacity to provide an idea of the infinite, and in the case of the dynamically sublime, we are reminded of ‘the idea of humanity in our subject’, i.e. our sense for moral conduct and our freedom from our internal nature. Central to the Kantian sublime is showing that even when faced with an overwhelming power, the experience cannot defeat our capacity to think and act freely and
autonomously.\textsuperscript{54} Dikeç extends this liberating effect of the sublime to politics, which is, to him, about forms of perceiving the world and how we relate to it.\textsuperscript{55} The disruptive effect of the sublime ‘invites reflexivity about the givens of our situation, a reflective withdrawal from the normalised spaces and practices by opening up new spaces’. Dikeç states that this disruption does not imply a separation from the world, as Meyer argues, but instead an ‘engagement with it in a reflexive way, exposing and questioning its constitution of the common and ordering principles’, thus opening up a space where the political can be played out.\textsuperscript{56}

Instead of engaging with the world by means of normalised practices like care, empathy, and concern, in which we are caught up uncritically, the sublime is about engaging with dissensus, disruption and indeed the political. In Kantian aesthetics, the construction of ideas, or indeed the notion of authorship, is put entirely on the side of the subject, of the human. In theories of affect, with no distance between human and environment, but only the intricate web of human/non-human relations, the freedom in the way to relate to the world, to think about our relation to the non-human, is foreclosed. As such, affect can only result in a de-politicizing acting of care and nurture for companion species, in a relation of co-dependency, whereas the sublime experience has the potential to instigate a critical, political act, \textit{outside} normalised space. In this way, the sublime experience could also be a way to create an opening for the constitutive outsider, for the ‘always-immanent possibility of forms of acting that undermine, transform, or supersede existing relational configurations,’ as argued by Swyngedouw and Ernstson.\textsuperscript{57}

\textbf{An explorative conclusion: the sublime in landscape design}

Although Dikeç is critical about Lyotard’s postmodern sublime, Lyotard’s theorization could be useful in the context of ecological landscape design.\textsuperscript{58} Different from Kant, the postmodern sublime does not hold the promise to think totality, to comprehend nature’s size or power, or more generally foreground the potential of our reason to find Truth. On the contrary, the postmodern sublime avoids both dystopian and utopian images of nature, and instead questions the very idea of nature, or even more so, human/non-human relations. Lyotards ‘postmodern sublime’ is, however, similar to Kant in that it sets up an incommensurability between reality and concept to confront us with the limits of our senses and in doing so, generates freedom. But instead of staging the promise of thinking totality, the postmodern sublime is geared at deconstructing systems of meaning.\textsuperscript{59}

‘the postmodern would be that which, in the modern, puts forward the unpresentable in presentation itself; that which denies itself the solace of good
forms, the consensus of good taste which would make it possible to share collectively the nostalgia for the unattainable’.

In a similar vein, Timothy Morton argues for the inclusion of the aesthetic dimension, and the conceptualization of the non-representable or postmodern sublime more specifically, in order to do ecocritique, or indeed think critically and ethically about our relation with the non-human:

‘To do ecocritique, we must consider the aesthetic dimension, for the aesthetic has been posited as a nonconceptual realm, a place where our ideas about things drop away … Art gives what is nonconceptual an illusive appearance of form…to encapsulate a utopian image of nature which does not really exist – we have destroyed it; which goes beyond our conceptual grasp. On the other hand, a nonconceptual image can be a compelling focus for an intensely conceptual system – an ideological system. The dense meaninglessness of nature writing can exert a gravitational push.’

As an alternative to (modern) nostalgia or the (affective) evocation of care, Morton proposes ‘dark ecology’ as the politicized version of the sublime, or indeed deconstruction, referring to an ethics that refuses ideal form, thus creating an atmosphere of tension and anticipation; a thick space where something is about to happen confronting us with both the freedoms and constrains of critical choice constantly negotiating the distance between the human and non-human.

As an entry to relate the sublime experience of dark ecology to landscape design, we return to Elizabeth Meyer; not to Sustaining beauty but to an essay describing landscapes that ‘seemed less about reconciliation than indeterminacy’. In her essay Seized by sublime sentiments of 1998, about Richard Haag’s Gas Works Park and Bloedel Reserve, she explains how the postmodern sublime destroys form by foregrounding unsettling disturbance and discordance, reflecting ‘American society’s growing self-awareness of the naiveté of finding balance, sustainability, and harmony in its models of development and ecological process’. Both designs forward human and non-human interactions as disturbances, not as continuities, implying how human, mostly technological, action has altered ecological systems and, vice-versa, how natural events impact human existence. By means of discordant time scales juxtaposing deep time and evolution with present ruin and growth, Haag shows how closely related humans and non-humans are and simultaneously confronts us with the impossibility to grasp that relation, thus evoking a sublime experience.

In this explorative conclusion, we do not advocate a revisiting of post-industrial landscape
design and land art of the 70s and 80s, nor do we think that all landscape design should engender sublime sentiments. But in the case of landscape design aspiring to move us into action, shouldn’t we then, instead of turning to theories of affect, return to the question that Elizabeth Meyer posed twenty years ago:

‘Can a work of landscape architecture, operating at the edge of creation and destruction, regeneration and decay, offer a more complex disciplinary mythology than redemption and the promise of healing for itself? Can this sublime engender a different land ethic?’

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5 Ibid., 15.
6 Ibid., 8.
7 Ibid., 10.
9 Ibid., 37.
10 Ben Highmore cited in Ibid., 38.
11 Ibid., 38.
12 Ibid., 37.
13 Ibid., 37.
16 Ibid., 32.
19 See Latour, Facing Gaia, op.cit. (note 19) and Haraway, Staying with the Trouble, op.cit. (note 19).
20 For examples in landscape architecture, see Rod Barnett, Emergence in Landscape Architecture (London: Routledge, 2013); Sandra Kopljar, ‘How to think about a place not yet: Studies of affordance and site-based methods for the exploration of design professionals' expectations in urban development processes’, PhD dissertation (Lund University, 2016), 56ff; Barbara Prezelj and Heidi Sohn, 'Towards an


24 Picon, ‘What Has Happened to Territory?’, op. cit. (note 23), 98.

25 Ibid., 99.


27 Ibid., 377 f.


31 Ibid., 13.

32 Haraway, Staying with the Trouble, op. cit. (note 19), 164.

33 Ibid., 6.


36 Brady, Aesthetics, op. cit. (note 36), 129.

37 Ibid., 141.

38 Ibid., 132; italics in original.


40 Brady, Aesthetics, op. cit. (note 36), 140.

41 Ibid., 141.

42 Ibid., 133; our italics.

43 Immanuel Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1990), §9.

44 Brady, Aesthetics, op. cit. (note 36), 133.

45 Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, op. cit. (note 44), §12.

46 Brady, Aesthetics, op. cit. (note 36), 133.

47 Dikeç, Space, Politics and Aesthetics, op. cit. (note 40), 36.

48 Ibid.


51 Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, op. cit. (note 44), §23ff.; see for the sublime in Kant’s Kritik der Urteilskraft e.g. Brady, The Sublime, op. cit. (note 51), 55ff.

52 Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, op. cit. (note 44), §25.


54 Dikeç, Space, Politics and Aesthetics, op. cit. (note 40), 112.

55 Dikeç, Space, Politics and Aesthetics, op. cit. (note 40).

56 Ibid., 107.

58 Ibid., 116.
62 Ibid., 93, 186.
64 Ibid., 15.
65 Ibid., 9.
66 Ibid., 23.