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Reference:

Hanegraaff Marcel, Beyers Jan, De Bruycker Iskander.- Balancing inside and outside lobbying : the political strategies of lobbyists at global diplomatic conferences

European journal of political research - ISSN 1475-6765 - (2016), p. 1-21

Full text (Publisher's DOI): <http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1111/1475-6765.12145>

To cite this reference: <http://hdl.handle.net/10067/1330620151162165141>

Balancing Inside and Outside Lobbying
The Political Strategies of Lobbyists at Global Diplomatic Conferences

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Key words

outside lobbying, transnational advocacy, WTO Ministerial Conference, UN Climate Conferences

Hanegraaff, M., J. Beyers, and I. De Bruycker (2016) Balancing Inside and Outside Lobbying: The Political Strategies of Lobbyists at Global Diplomatic Conferences *European Journal of Political Research* DOI: 10.1111/1475-6765.12145.

Abstract. This article seeks to explain the use of inside and outside lobbying by organized interests at global diplomatic conferences. At first sight, the lobbying at these venues is puzzling, as it does not seem to be a very fruitful way to acquire influence. Especially the use of outside strategies is perplexing because most aspects of international negotiations fall outside of the purview of national constituencies. We argue, however, that the presence of outside lobbying is not so puzzling if lobbying is seen both as a way to attain influence and as a way to pursue organizational maintenance goals. Empirically we draw on interview data with 232 interest group representatives that participated at either the 2012 session of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference in Geneva, or the 2011 (Durban) and 2012 (Doha) United Nations Climate Conferences. Our analysis demonstrates that organizational needs, and especially the competition actors face in obtaining resources, significantly affects the relative focus of organized interests on inside and outside lobbying.

Introduction

At the 2011 session of the WTO Geneva Ministerial Conference, roughly fifty protesters from the NGO-network *Our World Is Not for Sale* were chanting protest slogans and waving banners outside in the rain. They were stationed about half a kilometer away from the entrance to the conference venue. The policymakers attending the conference could not hear them chant, nor could they read the messages their banners carried. Because most policymakers present at the WTO Ministerial Conference were not exposed to these protest activities, it is doubtful whether these efforts had any influence on them. Yet, our own fieldwork at three global diplomatic conferences shows that, while attending the conference, half of the 232 interviewed lobbyists dedicated 50 percent or more of their advocacy efforts to outside strategies (see below). In line with these observations, various scholars have documented that global policymaking processes are increasingly surrounded by protests, media campaigns and contentious political activities (Barakso 2010; Bob 2005; Dür & Mateo 2014; Hadden 2015; Muñoz-Cabré 2011).

At first sight the extensive use of outside lobbying by transnational lobbyists seems puzzling. The international level lacks a coherent public that can be mobilized, as the relevant publics are situated within countries, and there is no such thing as a global public opinion to influence and involve in lobbying activities. Hence, one would expect interest groups to invest mostly in inside lobbying and refrain from outside lobbying. Outside lobbying is also puzzling because international policymaking is largely a state-affair with governments bargaining in settings that remain remote from domestic audiences (Zahrnt 2008). Moreover, policy change is difficult to realize as some key features of international negotiations — the many veto players and the required unanimity — mean that policymaking runs the risk of ending up in deadlock or in lowest common denominator outcomes (Narlikar 2010; Underdal et al. 2012).

The costs associated with outside lobbying at the international level seem to profoundly outweigh the potential policy benefits. This makes one wonder: why would transnational lobbyists choose outside lobbying over inside lobbying? Considering that lobbying at the global level – for instance, attending diplomatic conferences – is a rather expensive endeavor, it is plausible to presume that transnational lobbyists are generally rather resourceful. Developing a robust set of political activities will, thus, usually not be an issue for most transnational advocates. Therefore, we aim to explain which strategies transnational lobbyists *prioritize* rather than how intensively a particular lobbying strategy is used (see Dür

& Mateo 2013). Our main question is: how do interest groups at global diplomatic conferences balance inside and outside lobbying?

Questions about lobbying strategies lay at the heart of interest representation and have been the focus of several studies (Beyers 2004; Binderkrantz 2005; Dür & Mateo 2013; Holyoke 2003; Kollman 1998). As Schattschneider (1960: 17) put it: ‘There has been a long standing struggle between the conflicting tendencies toward the privatization and socialization of conflict.’ Inside strategies are usually defined as lobbying activities that are directly aimed at policymakers and mostly these political activities are not visible to a broader audience. Outside lobbying, such as those mentioned above, address policymakers indirectly. Instead of seeking direct access, advocates mobilize and seek to raise the awareness of a broader audience by communicating their political message through various sorts of public media. While inside lobbying privatizes conflict and restricts its scope, outside lobbying aims at socializing conflict by involving a relevant audience of stakeholders (Schattschneider, 1960; Kollman, 1998).

The scholarship seeking to *explain* the use of inside and outside lobbying has focused predominantly on two explanatory factors: group type and resources (Binderkrantz 2005; Beyers 2004; Chalmers 2013; Della Porta & Diani 1999: 168-9; Gais & Walker Jr 1991: 105; Kollman 1998: 107-8). Usually, group type refers to whether an organized interest represents diffuse citizen interests or a specific economic interests. Resources pertain to financial means, policy expertise or staff resources. It is often argued that outside lobbying is a strategy for the weak, namely those who lack the expertise and resources that allow them to gain direct access to policymakers (Della Porta & Diani 1999: 168-9; Gais & Walker Jr 1991: 105; Kollman 1998: 107-8). Sometimes, group type is seen as a proxy for resources, presuming that citizen groups have fewer resources and will therefore rely more on outside lobbying. In contrast, we argue that simply looking at group type or organizational resources is problematic when explaining varying lobbying strategies. Namely, how organized interests balance inside and outside lobbying will be moderated by the resource scarcity and/or the competition for resources they are confronted with. To illustrate the latter, if NGOs face less competition for resources, the need to communicate with their constituency decreases and as a result they are less inclined to use outside strategies. In short, this implies that the effect of group type on lobbying strategies needs to be analyzed as conditioned by organizational resources and the competition organizations face.

Our empirical analysis relies on interview data obtained from 232 interest group representatives that participated at three global diplomatic events. Before presenting the

details of the research design and the operationalization of the dependent and explanatory variables, we first develop our theoretical expectations. The multivariate analysis then demonstrates that, indeed, it is not group type as such that is the crucial explanatory factor in explaining how organized interests develop their lobbying strategies; rather, it is the conditional effect of resources and resource competition that affects the relative extent to which lobbyists rely on outside and inside lobbying.

Balancing inside and outside lobbying

To explain how transnational lobbyists balance inside and outside lobbying, we rely on the political science literature that deals with lobbying strategies and adjust this to the context of international policymaking. Much current literature on strategies links the balance that groups seek between inside and outside lobbying to influence seeking objectives. From this perspective, lobbyists would weigh the costs of inside versus outside lobbying against the potential benefits in terms of generating influence. In this line of thought, various scholars have suggested that outside lobbying is a measure of last resort or a weapon of the weak, and that this explains why citizen groups more often rely on such strategies while business interests rely more on inside lobbying (Della Porta & Diani 1999: 168-9; Gais & Walker Jr 1991: 105; Kollman 1998: 107-8). The presumption is then that inside strategies are superior in terms of generating policy influence.

Nonetheless, there is no clear agreement in the literature on the inferiority (or superiority) of outside lobbying. Mahoney, for instance, found a negative relationship between outside strategies and lobbying success (2007; see also Eising 2007). Chalmers, on the other hand, concluded that inside and outside lobbying are equally effective in gaining access (2013). Many have also argued that the effectiveness of lobbying tactics (and thus the preferences for particular tactics) is contextually dependent. Scholars such as Kollman (1998) and Smith (2000) argued that the success of outside lobbying depends on factors such as issue salience and the support organized interests enjoy among the broader public (see also Dür & Mateo 2014). Finally, some analysts have observed that much outside lobbying is conducted by powerful and resourceful actors as a skillful use of media tactics is demanding in terms of resources (Binderkrantz 2012; Danielian & Page 1994; Thrall 2006).

From an influence seeking perspective, it is also often argued that some group types are better able to exchange particular types of information and that varying abilities are reflected in their lobbying strategies. Again, from this perspective it is expected that business groups will focus on inside lobbying, while citizen groups will rely on outside lobbying. For

instance, Dür and Mateo (2013) suggest that business interests (when compared to NGOs) rely more intensively on inside strategies because they possess technical information, which is more easily transmitted via inside lobbying. NGOs, on the other hand, are presumed to possess more political information (and less technical information), which make them more reliant on outside strategies. However, although some research shows that NGOs, compared to business interests, rely more on outside strategies (Binderkrantz 2005/2008; Dür & Mateo 2013), the claim that NGOs and business interests possess and supply distinct types of information enjoys little empirical support. Actually, some analysts have demonstrated that, when faced with comparable policy challenges and institutional opportunities, NGOs and business interests provide quite similar types of information to policymakers (De Bruycker 2015; Nownes & Newmark 2016; Yackee & Yackee 2006). The difference between NGOs and business interests in terms of their reliance on inside and outside strategies might, thus, require another explanation.

Instead of viewing lobbying predominantly as a way to influence policymakers, lobbying can also be viewed as a way to raise funds and to interact with members, donors, or patrons (Salisbury 1969; Holyoke 2011). Hereby interest organizations aim to expand or sustain their resources in order to maintain themselves or expand their future activities (Streeck & Schmitter 1999; Lowery 2007; Dür & Mateo 2013). This view implies that organized interests not only consider policy gains when developing a lobbying strategy, but also seek to deploy strategies that adhere to organizational maintenance needs.

Both inside and outside lobbying can be understood from an organizational maintenance perspective. For instance, with inside lobbying organizations may gain regular access to policymakers and build long-lasting relationships. Such stable ties signal to the supportive constituency — e.g. members, donors, and beneficiaries — that resources are used effectively and that they are significant players in the political arena (Fraussen 2013). Yet, inside lobbying does not generate much public exposure and such tactics are – compared to outside lobbying – less visible to the supportive constituency. By investing solely in inside lobbying, an organized interest runs the risk that constituencies do not notice that the group was actively engaged in a specific cause. In contrast, outside lobbying allows signaling to the supportive constituency that group representatives were effectively lobbying on a specific matter. Therefore, outside lobbying can be a viable option in light of organizational maintenance objectives. Importantly, from this perspective citizen groups are also expected to rely predominantly on outside lobbying; most scholars presume that NGOs or citizen groups face (compared to business groups) more obstacles to attract resources and therefore need to

reach out to their supporters more actively (Gais & Walker 1991: 106; Binderkrantz 2008: 179; Dür & Mateo 2013: 664).

In short, both the influence seeking and organizational maintenance perspectives suggest that diffuse interests will rely more on outside lobbying while business interests mainly focus on inside lobbying. The argument we develop in this article is that this conclusion is too quick. In reality, there is much more variation with respect to lobbying strategies, not only between different types of interest groups (such as business versus non-business), but also within specific group types (for instance among business groups). We will deal with this variation by arguing that the effect of group type on lobbying strategies is *conditional* on the resources that groups have at their disposal (see Dür & Mateo 2013), and on the competition they face in securing resources. Business groups which face stiff competition, for example, might invest a great deal of their resources in outside lobbying as a means to broaden or to consolidate their constituency. In contrast, citizen groups that face limited resource competition are probably more inclined to refrain from using outside strategies and will — relatively speaking — tend to make more use of inside strategies. To put it differently, explanations for the use of outside or inside lobbying need to incorporate the resource-dependencies interest groups face (Barakso 2010; Binderkrantz 2005; Dür & Mateo 2013; Schmitter & Streeck 1999). Therefore, instead of testing the impact of group type and resources as unconditional effects, we develop an approach that considers these variables as conditional on the specific context in which a lobbyist operates.

The conditional impact of group type and resources

For the purposes of this article we distinguish between four organizational forms: encompassing business associations, specialized business groups, NGOs, and research organizations. Other things being equal, what can we expect with regard to how these different types balance inside and outside strategies?

First, we distinguish between specialized business groups and encompassing business associations. Specialized business interests have a narrowly delineated constituency confined to one particular product, area, or field (Bouwen 2002). Generally, they employ a considerable set of professionals that deal with specialist issues and their lobbying activities are usually confined to a particular niche. Compared to encompassing business associations, contacting their constituency is easier and can be done via direct communication channels such as emails and direct briefings. Encompassing business interests, such as sector-wide or cross-sectoral associations, are usually involved in developing coordinated policy positions

and represent a wide range of business interests. Typically they monitor multiple parts of a policy process and present broadly supported policy positions to policymakers. Their encompassing organizational form implies that they face, compared to more specialized business groups, more severe collective action problems. For example, they depend on and interact with a constituency that is more dispersed over different sectors and fields. This makes outside lobbying more appropriate, as such strategies enable them to signal to their broad array of supporters that they are actively defending their concerns. Hence, we expect that encompassing business interests rely more on outside lobbying than specialized business interests.

Second, typical for NGOs is the absence of a direct overlap between those who benefit from their advocacy efforts and those who actively support them. Often the beneficiaries — for example future generations or animals — are not able to speak on their own behalf (Halpin 2006). In comparison, most business groups represent well-defined and rather easy to reach constituencies. While an organization representing, for example, car manufacturers or the fruit juice industry has an identifiable corpus of supporters who can be reached directly, the constituencies of NGOs are generally composed of a diffuse set of supporters. For instance, development NGOs can represent and/or depend on individual donors, the recipients of development aid, or the government authorities that sponsor them. Outside lobbying is then a relevant tool as this allows them to reach a diffuse set of supportive stakeholders. Other things being equal, NGOs are more likely to rely on outside lobbying than on inside lobbying.

Third, transnational arenas attract many research organizations that aim to develop and disseminate policy expertise and technical knowledge. A research organizations' main goal is to have a neutral public image, and spread knowledge and elucidate ongoing societal and political events. Although research organizations do not claim to speak on behalf of some constituency, many of them have a political affiliation and function as government or corporate sponsored think-tanks; this means that they are keen to supply information in support of their sponsors. Research organizations will, therefore, actively seek out the public debate as a way to showcase their image as knowledge providers. Yet, given the institutional sponsorship they usually enjoy, they do not necessarily need the public arena in order to communicate with their diffuse constituency, as is the case for NGOs.

These reflections suggest the following hypothesis:

H1: NGOs rely more on outside lobbying compared to inside lobbying, followed by research organizations and encompassing business groups, while specialized business groups rely on outside strategies the least.

Yet, we expect that the effect of group type on lobbying strategies is conditional on the resources groups have at their disposal and the competition or uncertainty they face in acquiring resources. Importantly, we expect that business interests, NGOs, and research organizations react differently to variations in their resource environment. One could argue that uncertainty is less of an issue for resource rich organizations, and that wealthy groups can use their slack resources and spend more on both outside and inside lobbying. Yet, it seems implausible that prosperous organizations will just invest their resources indiscriminately. We expect that organized interests will spend additional resources on lobbying strategies that fit best with their group type. If an organization has a considerable expertise or familiarity with some strategy, we expect it will be predisposed to increase the use of this particular strategy when resources increase. Here we anticipate significant differences between NGOs and business interests. As NGOs typically depend on a supportive constituency that can be reached through outside channels, we expect them to increasingly focus on outside lobbying when their material resources expand. In contrast, business organizations are, when their resources increase, in relative terms more inclined to use inside strategies as they have a strategic expertise that fits better with inside channels and business interests will not gain much (in terms of organizational resources and in comparison to NGOs) from using outside strategies (Dür & Mateo 2013). Therefore we hypothesize the following conditional effect:

H2: More resources results in relatively less outside lobbying by business interests, but in relatively more outside lobbying by NGOs.

Connected to this is the competition an organization faces when generating and maintaining its resources. This form of competition should not be confused with the political competition in which lobbyists are involved as it does not directly concern concrete policymaking processes. For example, though the *International Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers* faces substantial political competition, it is the only global peak association defending car manufacturers. Such organizations possess a ‘representational monopoly’ and face less competition for members, donors, and sponsors, than organizations that do not have such a monopoly. It is harder to collect resources and convince potential supporters to donate, if one lacks a monopoly and faces competition from like-minded organizations that defend similar causes (such as most environmental NGOs, like *Greenpeace* or *The Rainforest Alliance*).

Competition for resources is not just an exogenous phenomenon, but should be understood as moderated by the organizational form of an interest group. The well-delineated membership corpus of business interests enables them to accurately target and market their services among their potential supporters. NGOs, on the other hand, need to address a broader audience in their hunt for membership and supporter contributions, which makes outside lobbying a more suitable approach for coping with resource competition. Public visibility, namely, increases awareness about the organization's views and may contribute to a positive image among prospective donors. Especially when NGOs face considerable resource competition, they will be more inclined to use outside strategies. For instance, for environmental NGOs, it is important that their constituency sees that representatives attend global climate conferences and are actively defending their issues of concern. We expect a similar pattern for research organizations, although in their case it is not competition for individual supporters, but rather corporate or government sponsorship that matters. In short, we expect increased competition to have little effect on the extent to which business actors adopt outside strategies, yet that it will have a positive effect on the use of outside strategies by NGOs and research organizations.

H3: More competition for resources results in relatively more outside lobbying for NGOs and research organizations, but it does not result in relatively more outside lobbying for business interests.

Table 1. The hypothesised effects on the use of outside and inside lobbying strategies

Variables	B-Specialized	B-Encompassing	NGO	Research
H1 Group type	-- Very Low	- Low	++ Very high	+ High
H2 Resources	-	-	+	No effect hypothesized
H3 Competition	No effect hypothesized	No effect hypothesized	+	+
Control variables				
Saliency	+	+	+	+
Alignment	-	-	-	-

Next to these three hypotheses, our models control for factors related to the specific policy context within which lobbyists operate (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Mahoney 2007). First, one could argue that a lobbyist adapts her strategy in response to the degree of public attention an issue is subject to, i.e. the issue's public saliency. The higher the public saliency, the more attention policymakers will pay to an issue and the more they are pressured by

organized interests and public opinion. Public salience should be expected to stimulate outside lobbying relative to inside lobbying. The higher the public salience, the more an organizational constituency expects the lobbyist to play a role in the public debate. Remaining inactive on salient issues means that supporters may start asking questions on the passive attitude of their representatives (Holyoke 2003). Interest groups are therefore prone to rely on public salience as a heuristic cue in order to estimate the salience of an issue to their constituency. Even organized interests that would normally eschew public exposure will be pressured to go public as they might need to respond to claims made by their opponents and/or to reply to the demands made by journalists.

Next to salience, another factor we control for is the lobbyists' policy position with respect to an issue. When an interest group strongly opposes a government's position on a particular issue, lobbyists are incentivized to signal to their constituency that they are actively working on it. Quiet politics or soft lobbying is usually not an option for those who oppose their government. In contrast, for those who support their government, outside lobbying may be counterproductive as more public attention may lead to conflict expansion and mobilize potential opponents (Schattschneider 1960; Gamson & Wolfsfeld 1993). Organized interests that support their government may even avoid or prevent public scrutiny of a given issue, since it involves the risk that the government may reconsider its position due to growing public pressures (Baumgartner et al. 2009). Therefore, in order to understand outside lobbying it is important to control how a lobbyist is positioned vis-à-vis her national government.

Research design

To test our hypotheses, we analyze the strategies reported by 232 transnational advocates in the fields of trade and climate change. The data were collected at three global diplomatic conferences in 2011 and 2012: the 2012 session of the Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization in Geneva (MC hereafter), and the 2011 and 2012 sessions of the Conference of the Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP hereafter) in Durban (South-Africa) and Doha (Qatar). These venues were chosen because they are the highest decision-making fora in two key international policy-fields, trade and climate change. Moreover, policies made in these areas affect a wide range of stakeholders, and because they attract many different types of interest groups, we were able to interview representatives of both business as well as non-business interests. Finally, both venues represent typical instances of international policymaking (Zahrnt 2008; Narlikar 2010; Underdal et al. 2012); decision-making depends on unanimous support, it takes often many

years before any decisions are made, and, if agreements are reached, they embody package deals in which a diverse set of interests is integrated.

At these three diplomatic meetings, a small team of 3 to 4 research assistants randomly asked lobbyists and government delegates to participate in an interview of 15 to 30 minutes (see Online Appendix for more details on the fieldwork). During the interviews respondents were asked to mention one specific issue they were working on and to report on their lobbying strategies in relation to this issue (Baumgartner et al. 2009). In total we interviewed 348 lobbyists, but in this paper we analyze the responses of only 232 interviewees.¹ Their involvement spanned 74 different issues. If the interviewee was not able to provide us with reliable information on organizational structure (for instance whether the organization is an NGO or not, and in some cases, on the available resources), we relied on the organization's website or employed other publicly available sources to update our data.

Interviewing lobbyists at global diplomatic conferences provides some important methodological advantages compared to other types of data collection. First, it gave us the chance to talk face-to-face to a large set of lobbyists from a wide range of countries (59 in total) in a relatively short time span (3 to 10 days). Second, as we interviewed on the spot, namely at the very moment when lobbying took place, response bias due to memory effects was minimized. Third, the interviewed lobbyists were active on similar issues in two different policy fields. Our design thus keeps much policy-specific idiosyncrasy under control, which increases the robustness and reliability of our findings.² Fourth, the fact that we presented ourselves as neutral observers and that we guaranteed anonymity, implies that the interviewees had little incentive to strategically under- or overestimate the usage of some strategies (see Online Appendix for details on the interview protocol).

¹ Our respondents stem from Africa (n=36), Asia (n=59), Europe (n=70), Northern America (n=45), Oceania (n=7), South America (n=15) (see Online Appendix). In ten cases we interviewed more than one representative for the same organization, but these respondents were always working on different issues. Interviews with global organizations (n=71), i.e. organizations that are not tied one specific country, but represent constituencies in a large array of countries are not used for this paper. For these organizations we lack data on several explanatory variables, such as how much their national government supports their policy position. Another reason for why not all interview material could be used for this paper is that the dependent or independent variables could not be measured; for instance, several attendees (n=55) indicated that they did not lobby in favor or against a specific issue; rather, they attended the conference for monitoring or networking purposes.


² For instance, if we would interview lobbyists in their home country on issue-specific strategies at a particular moment in time within this country, it would be much harder to disentangle country-specific effects from issue-specific effects.

Our dependent variable is the relative use of inside and outside strategies, which is measured with one interview question on an issue that the respondent professed to be primarily interested in:

On this issue, could you indicate which percentage of your advocacy efforts were dedicated to in- and outside strategies?

For instance, a lobbyist could indicate that she focused 75 percent of her efforts on outside strategies and 25 percent on inside strategies. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the dependent variable, or, more precisely, the amount of outside compared to inside lobbying. To ease the presentation of the results, we categorized the evidence in five sets, namely those who dedicated less than 25 percent of their efforts on outside lobbying (and the rest on inside lobbying), between 25 and 49 percent, between 51 and 74 percent, more than 75 percent on outside lobbying, and, finally, those for whom inside and outside lobbying were evenly balanced. It is noteworthy that almost half of our respondents stated to devote 50 percent or more of their lobbying efforts on outside lobbying and only.

Figure 1. Varying levels of inside versus outside lobbying at COPs and MCs (N=232)



Note: horizontal axis represents five categories (actors dedicating less than 25 percent of their efforts on outside lobbying, between 25 and 49 percent, between 51 and 74 percent, more than 75 percent on outside lobbying, and those for whom inside and outside lobbying were evenly balanced) and vertical axis shows the percentage of respondents in each category

As argued, we expect that different interest group types rely on different lobbying strategies; for testing Hypothesis 1 we distinguish between specialized business groups, encompassing business associations, NGOs, and research organizations. Specialized business groups defend the interests of product-level economic sectors, while encompassing business

groups focus on a broader set of products or multiple sectors. To differentiate between these two types we coded all organizations according to the International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC). More precisely, organizations representing issue areas that correspond with ISIC level 3 or 4, for instance the ‘sugar’ industry, were coded as specialized business organizations. Organizations coded at the ISIC 1 or 2 level, such as ‘agriculture’, were categorized as encompassing business associations. The latter category also includes cross-sectoral business associations. NGOs were coded by considering the areas (e.g., human rights) they are active in and the specific goals they pursue (e.g., poverty reduction). Finally, research organizations were classified as those which are primarily sponsored by governments or corporations, and who portray themselves predominantly as creators or disseminators of expert knowledge. In total we interviewed 35 specialized business organizations, 23 encompassing business organizations, 127 NGOs, and 47 research organizations.

For Hypothesis 2 on the role of resource endowment, we used the amount of staff the lobbyist’s organization employs for advocacy and public affairs purposes as a proxy for resource endowment. Due to its skewed nature, we log-transformed this variable. To test Hypothesis 3, we asked respondents to indicate how much (in percentages) members, government subsidies, and commercial services to clients contribute to the overall organizational budget. In addition, we asked whether they faced strong (1), medium (2), or weak competition (3) in retrieving each of these types of resources. For instance, respondents could indicate that their organization obtained 50 percent of the budget from membership fees facing strong competition (1), 40 percent from government subsidies facing medium competition (2), and 10 percent from commercial services facing weak competition (3). For the purpose of this paper, we established a weighted competition-index through the following formula: $\sum(\text{proportion membership fees} \times \text{competition}) + (\text{proportion subsidies} \times \text{competition}) + (\text{proportion sales} \times \text{competition})$. This resulted in an index ranging from 1 (lowest level of competition) to 3 (highest level of competition). For Hypothesis 4, we measured the salience of the issue actors were lobbying on by asking to indicate whether the issue had gained strong (1), medium (2), or weak (3) attention in the media of their home country.³ Finally, for Hypothesis 5, we asked interviewees to indicate on a scale of 1

³ Note that our measures are primarily based on self-reported information about lobbying strategies and the perceived salience of policy issues. Admittedly, actual salience — for instance as measured in terms of media coverage — does not necessarily correspond with how actors subjectively appreciate the salience of a particular issue. Yet, a subjective measure is justified because lobbyists do not just respond to some objective reality (they

(completely agree) to 5 (completely disagree) the extent to which they agreed with how their government handled the issue they were lobbying on. To test the conditional effects (Hypotheses 2 and 3), we added two interaction terms, one between group type and resources and another between group type and competition.

Our models contain three control variables. First, the size of a country (log of the population size, World Bank Statistics 2012) is included. We anticipate that outside lobbying is a more prominent strategy in large countries, as the potential constituency is larger and more spread out, which would increase the relevance of media strategies in reaching out to it. Second, we control for the level of democracy with the Polity IV index in the year prior to the MC or COP.⁴ This indicator ranges from -10 to 10, where high positive scores refer to a more democratic, as opposed to authoritarian, regime. We expect outside lobbying to be more prevalent in democratic countries given the importance of public arenas for the mobilization of voters. Finally, as we did interviews at three global diplomatic conferences, one MC session and two sessions of the COP, we control for possible differences between them.

might not be well aware of), but their activities are mediated by their subjective appreciation of the context in which they operate.

⁴ See <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm>.


Table 2. Overview of dependent, independent, and control variables

Variable	Description	Source	Mean	Stand. Dev.	Min	Max
Strategy index	Percentage outside lobbying of total lobby activity/100	Survey data	0.39	0.28	0	1
Group Type	Business specialized; Business associations; NGOs; Research organizations.	Survey data and website coding	2.80	.93	1	4
Resources	Overall staff size of the organization dedicates to advocacy - logged.	Survey data	2.30	1.43	0	6.90
Competition	Competition for funds (originating from government, members or commercial activities) the organization faces (1-3).	Survey data	1.15	0.82	0	2.25
Saliency	Saliency of an issue (high-medium-low).	Survey data	2.32	0.78	1	3
Alignment	Level of agreement with government (1-5).	Survey data	3.04	1.20	1	5
Population	Number of citizens in country – logged.	World Bank	4.15	1.60	0.56	7.20
Democracy	Level of democracy: -10 to 10.	POLITY IV	6.85	5.14	-10	10
MC_COP	MC or COP conference.	Location of survey	0.85	0.35	0	1

Data analysis

For our multivariate analysis we used as the dependent variable the relative use of inside and outside strategies by lobbyists. Before turning to the multivariate analysis, it is useful to take another look at some descriptives. The boxplot in Figure 2 shows that, as expected, the four group types show considerably different levels of outside lobbying. Yet, there are also substantial differences within each category, for instance, a large number of business associations pursue outside lobbying and many NGOs are involved in inside lobbying.⁵ These descriptive observations suggest that group type as such might not provide a sufficient explanation for strategy development.

Figure 2. Boxplot comparing varying levels of outside lobbying across four different group types (N=232)



To handle the dependent variable properly, we took account of the bounded nature of the response variable by using a fractional logit model with the proportion in the (0,1) interval as a dependent variable (Papke & Wooldridge 1996). One additional complication was that we had repeated measures for several (but not all) countries and/or policy issues because we interviewed multiple lobbyists from one country or in relation to the same issue. This implies that we cannot assume independent residuals and need to anticipate some clustering in the data. Issue clustering is less common. We identified 48 issues with one respondent and 10 issues with more than 5 respondents (out of 74 issues). Nevertheless, in order to avoid too

⁵ The boxplot shows one outlier, namely a specialized business group whose representative claimed to spend 80 percent of its efforts on outside lobbying. It concerned an association in the field of media and public relations. In order to check for robustness, we run all models without this outlier and these analyses showed that the outlier has no effect at all on the results.

optimistic estimates, we used clustered standard errors (clustered on the level of 59 countries) with a correction term based on the observed raw residuals.

Table 3. Explaining inside and outside lobbying (fractional logit regression)

	Model I		Model II	
Intercept	-0.574***	(0.509)	0.916*	(0.511)
Independent				
Group type				
<i>Business specialized (ref.)</i>	ref.		ref.	
<i>Business association</i>	-0.986***	(0.361)	1.407	(0.919)
<i>NGO</i>	0.666**	(0.290)	-0.036	(0.955)
<i>Research</i>	0.225	(0.269)	-0.510	(0.480)
Resources	-0.098	(0.060)	-0.259	(0.270)
Competition	-0.256**	(0.101)	-0.433	(0.366)
Saliency				
<i>High (ref.)</i>	ref.		ref.	
<i>Medium</i>	-0.112	(0.206)	-0.045	(0.202)
<i>Low</i>	0.122	(0.194)	-0.078	(0.179)
Alignment	0.126**	(0.060)	0.107*	(0.057)
Interactions-effects				
Group type*resources				
<i>Business specialized (ref.)</i>			ref.	
<i>Business association*resources</i>			-0.354	(0.278)
<i>NGO*resources</i>			0.225*	(0.351)
<i>Research*resources</i>			0.268	(0.266)
Group type*competition				
<i>Business specialized (ref.)</i>			ref.	
<i>Business association*competition</i>			0.266	(0.493)
<i>NGO*competition</i>			0.865***	(0.354)
<i>Research*competition</i>			0.764**	(0.382)
Control				
Population-logged	0.138***	(0.038)	0.142	(.038)
Democracy	-0.004	(0.014)	-0.009	(0.014)
MC_COP	-0.449*	(0.254)	-0.395	(0.272)
Diagnostics				
Log Likelihood	-108.242		-105.767	
Df	11		17	
AIC	1.036		1.066	
BIC	-1123.29		-1095.55	
N	232		232	

Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: *p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .01.

For Hypothesis 1, we used specialized business organizations as the reference category because we expected this type of organizations to rely the least on outside lobbying. Table 2 present the results. Controlled for resources, competition, and context variables, we find

substantial differences between different group types in the order we anticipated (predicted outside lobbying of specialized business, $\hat{y}=.15$ < encompassing business, $\hat{y}=.32$ < research organization, $\hat{y}=.38$ < NGOs, $\hat{y}=.48$; see also Figure 2). This result is highly consistent with research on other political systems (Binderkrantz 2005; Dür & Mateo 2013; Kollman 1998).

Yet, although this outcome confirms Hypothesis 1, the two interaction effects (Hypotheses 2 and 3) we envisaged, imply that an eventual effect of group type needs to be evaluated as conditional on resources and the level of competition organizations face. In Model I, without interaction terms, we observe no main effect of resources, but a negative effect of competition which confirms that higher levels of competition entail an increased level of outside compared to inside lobbying. Yet, this result is difficult to interpret given the hypothesized interaction effect with organization type (Brambor et al. 2006). The limited impact of resources on the relative use of inside and outside lobbying is not entirely surprising as we expected that the impact of resources will mainly occur through a moderation with group type. More precisely, having resources would affect the relative use of inside lobbying positively for business actors, while it would have a positive effect for outside lobbying among NGOs. Similarly, we expected that more competition would increase the propensity for outside lobbying among NGOs and research organizations, but not for business associations. Model II tests for these interaction effects and mostly confirms these expectations (interaction effect diagnostics: Wald $\chi^2=9.25$; $p=.026$ for the interaction ‘resources \times group type’ and Wald $\chi^2=11.08$; $p=.011$ for the interaction ‘competition \times group type’). For both interaction effects, we plotted the predicted means in Figures 3 and 4, which illustrate how the effect of resources and competition is moderated by group type.

To start, at a very low level of resources, specialized business groups engage more in inside lobbying than *all* other organization types (Hypothesis 2). It is noteworthy that at lower levels of resources, we find significant differences between specialized and encompassing business interests, the latter using outside lobbying more (at very low levels of resources) or almost as intensively (at moderate levels of resources) as NGOs. So, encompassing business associations with limited resources rely quite strongly on outside lobbying, even a bit more than the less resource-endowed NGOs. It is only with high levels of resources — with the number of staff higher than 50 (i.e., Ln is higher than 4) — that encompassing business interests start to differ substantially from NGOs and research organizations. Nonetheless, the overall difference between business associations and specialized business organizations is statistically not significant, and it is especially when resources increase that we observe growing differences between business groups, NGOs, and research organizations. Both types

of business groups increase the relative extent of inside lobbying when they gain more resources and the difference between specialized and encompassing business interests becomes smaller. In fact, the most resourceful business organizations have a predicted value of almost zero, which indicates that they only resort to inside lobbying. In contrast, NGOs and research organizations show no change in their use of outside lobbying relative to inside lobbying as the level of resources changes; irrespective of their resources, they use a similar relative amount of inside and outside lobbying (the predicted values remain slightly above .40 for NGOs, and slightly under .40 for research organizations). In short, these result partially support Hypothesis 2, namely that resources have a differential impact depending on group type. Yet, in contrast to Dür and Mateo (2013), we did not find support for the expectation that NGOs adjust their strategic considerations based on their resource endowment.

Figure 3. Interaction effect resources and organization type and the expected share of outside lobbying in the overall lobbying strategies





Figure 4. Interaction effect competition, organization type and the expected share of outside lobbying in the overall lobbying strategies



Second, we expected that the level of resource competition organizations face would affect mostly NGOs and research organizations, but business interests much less (Hypothesis 3). Our results confirm this and show that different types of interest groups react differently when confronted with resource competition. At the lowest level of resource competition (right side of X-axis, Figure 4), we do not find a significant difference in the relative extent of outside lobbying between the four organization types. Yet, the relative use of outside lobbying increases substantially for NGOs and research organizations when they face stronger competition. NGOs that encounter much competition have a predicted value of almost .70, whereas NGOs that face less competition have a predicted value of .35. We observe a similar trend for research organizations. The predicted use of outside strategies increases from .30 in limited competitive environments to .50 in a highly competitive context. For business groups we see exactly the opposite, namely the predicted relative use of inside strategies increases in more competitive environments.

There are some relevant results to report with respect to the control variables. To begin with, regarding salience we expected a positive effect on the propensity to use outside strategies. The analysis, however, does not confirm this, and shows that salience does not

affect how an individual transnational advocate uses outside strategies *relative* to inside strategies. However, we should be careful with this result and not infer from this that salience has no impact on lobbying strategies. First, as our interviews focused on issues where organized interests indicated some interest, it is plausible that our observations are somewhat clustered around more salient issues. Second, elsewhere we have demonstrated that the overall attention for an issue area, measured as the amount of media coverage, has a positive impact on *the number* of organizations that lobby in relation to transnational policy issues (Hanegraaff et al. 2015). Third, we analyzed the relative use of inside and outside strategies, which should not be conflated with an absolute measure of *all* lobbying efforts. It might be that if salience increases, all lobbying expenditures — both for inside and outside strategies — are intensified, but that the overall distribution of inside versus outside lobbying remains unaffected.

Finally, we controlled whether or not the alignment of the lobbyists with the national government affected their strategies. We expected lobbyists who opposed their government to be more likely to use outside strategies, whereas a closer alignment should be associated with a relatively more extensive use of inside lobbying. The results strongly support this expectation. All tested models show a positive, substantial, and statistically significant effect of alignment on the extent to which lobbyists rely on outside lobbying. An organization that sees itself one point further away from the government (on a 5 point scale) spends, other things being equal, roughly 13 percent more on outside strategies. Therefore, the alignment or de-alignment of lobbyists with the government on a specific issue is an important predictor for the relative usage of outside and inside strategies.

Conclusion

With this article we aimed to explain variation in the relative use of inside and outside strategies by transnational advocates. Our starting point was that lobbying strategies are shaped by both influence seeking and maintenance related purposes. Whilst it might be less effective in attaining policy influence, outside lobbying can still serve as a fruitful strategy to address resources needs. This means that the costs associated with outside lobbying should not only be weighed against its potential political benefits, but also against the potential advantages in terms of organizational maintenance and resource needs. More specifically, our analysis of the lobbying strategies of 232 lobbyists at high-profile diplomatic events demonstrates that the effect of group type on the choice of lobbying strategies is conditional on the resources organized interests have at their disposal and the competition they face in

securing resources. For instance, we observed a clear connection between outside lobbying and the level of competition NGOs and research organizations face. This means that lobbying strategies are not just or only a matter of group type or the policy issue at stake, but that they are significantly affected by the resource scarcities organizations are confronted with.

These results have important implications for the literature on lobbying, political influence and transnational advocacy. We see at least three important contributions.

First, lobbying strategies have received quite some scholarly attention, but most studies are still situated at the national level — mostly within democracies, but seldom comparing countries — or at the level of the European Union (Binderkrantz 2005; Dür & Mateo 2013; Holyoke 2003; Kollman 1998; Weiler & Brändli 2015). However, in contrast to democratic politics, outside lobbying by transnational advocates is quite puzzling given the difficulty to influence global policies and the costs involved in such activities. Migrating theoretical perspectives on outside lobbying from the comparative politics literature to the growing literature on transnational advocacy (see for instance Bob 2001, 2005; Cooley and Ron 2002; Ron et al. 2005; Tallberg et al. 2013) allowed us to refine our knowledge on transnational advocacy. More specifically, while some studies on transnational advocacy have demonstrated that issue-priorities of transnational advocates affect the acquisition of resources (see for instance Bob 2001, 2005; Cooley & Ron 2002; Ron et al. 2005; Tallberg et al. 2013), our analysis adds to this that resource dependencies also severely affect the type of *lobbying strategies* transnational advocates deploy.

Second, we demonstrate that the connection between group type and lobbying strategies is not as simple as has oftentimes been claimed (Binderkrantz 2004; Beyers 2004; Chalmers 2013; Della Porta & Diani 1999: 168-9; Gais & Walker Jr 1991: 105; Kollman 1998: 107-8). Future analysts should avoid over-simplistic claims about group type which presume that some groups are by nature predestined to rely on a particular lobbying strategy. For instance, our analyses demonstrate that – depending on resource endowment and the competition for resources – the differences between business interests and NGOs in how they balance between inside and outside lobbying are less pronounced than often presumed. Moreover, we show that there is significant variation among NGOs when it comes to how they balance inside and outside strategies. Combined, this indicates that differences between group types found by former research are likely not related to intrinsic differences between these group types, but rather reflect specific contextual conditions and the resource dependencies these organizations are confronted with.

Finally, the finding that resource competition is a significant predictor for the use of outside lobbying demonstrates that interest groups take organizational maintenance goals into consideration when designing a strategy. While some have pointed at this before us (Gais & Walker 1991: 106; Binderkrantz, 2008: 179; Dür & Mateo, 2013: 664), our analysis provides the first large-N statistical test which demonstrates the severity of this effect. Accordingly, we need to reconsider how we evaluate lobbying efficacy, especially outside lobbying (Dür & Mateo 2014). Analysts might be tempted to evaluate the relevance of lobbying strategies on the basis of some influence seeking purpose, but this might be a flawed benchmark if organizational maintenance and resource dependencies are ignored. Even if an organized interest loses some important political battles in the short run, their lobbying efforts might generate useful benefits in terms of resources that may support future political activities. Based on our results we would recommend future scholarship to focus on both the influence seeking motives *and* resource dependencies when explaining how interest groups balance inside and outside lobbying strategies.

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Appendix 1. List of countries from where the respondents stem from

Country of origin respondents	Frequency	Percent
Azerbaijan	1	0.43
Argentina	4	1.72
Australia	7	3.02
Bangladesh	2	0.86
Belgium	4	1.72
Bolivia	3	1.29
Brazil	4	1.72
Cambodia	1	0.43
Cameroon	1	0.43
Canada	8	3.45
Sri Lanka	4	1.72
Chad	1	0.43
China	9	3.88
Colombia	2	0.86
Republic of the Congo	2	0.86
Denmark	5	2.16
Ethiopia	1	0.43
Finland	2	0.86
France	7	3.02
Germany	12	5.17
Guinea	1	0.43
Honduras	1	0.43
India	11	4.74
Ireland	1	0.43
Israël	1	0.43
Japan	10	4.31
Kazakhstan	1	0.43
Jordan	1	0.43
Kenya	3	1.29
Republic of Korea	1	0.43
Malawi	1	0.43
Malaysia	3	1.29
Mali	3	1.29
Mauritania	1	0.43
Mexico	2	0.86
Namibia	2	0.86
Nepal	1	0.43
Netherlands	10	4.31
Nigeria	5	2.16
Norway	8	3.45
Peru	1	0.43
Philippines	3	1.29
Qatar	1	0.43
Senegal	2	0.86

South Africa	2	0.86
Spain	1	0.43
Sudan	1	0.43
Sweden	1	0.43
Switzerland	3	1.29
Thailand	2	0.86
Tunisia	1	0.43
Uganda	2	0.86
Egypt	2	0.86
United Kingdom	16	6.90
Tanzania	2	0.86
United States	35	15.09
Burkina Faso	1	0.43
Zambia	2	0.86
Chinese Taipei	7	3.02
Total	232	100.00

Appendix 2. Description fieldwork

During the conferences a small team of researchers asked participants randomly to participate in an interview. The respondents were chosen by the researcher in charge ('pointer') to make sure interviewers would not (unknowingly) have a bias in their selection of respondents (e.g. convenience sampling). Moreover, the researcher in charge made sure all physical areas at the conference location were targeted in order to increase the chance of getting a random and representative sample of the participants at the conferences. The fact that our sample includes both key players (such as Greenpeace, Oxfam, BusinessEurope, International Chamber of Commerce, Shell, et cetera) as well as small groups from developing countries makes us confident the sample is a good representation of the broader population.

Moreover, given that we asked lobbyist directly to participate in an interview generally led to very high response rate. Overall, we estimate that more than half of the people we invited agree to the interview. Unfortunately, the research technique makes it impossible to track precisely non-response rates because sometimes delegates were invited (unintentionally) two times by two different interviewers or delegates refused the first invitation but then agreed when invited again.

Table 2. Interviewed lobbyists and the population distribution

	Interviews (N=232)	WTO-MC (N=231)	UNFCCC-COPs (N=1451)
Specialized business	15%	20%	11%
Encompassing business	10%	16%	16%
NGOs	55%	45%	45%
Research organizations	20%	17%	28%

One question is whether our selection of lobbyists is representative of the lobby community that attends these global diplomatic conferences. For instance, it would be problematic to interview mostly business interests, if there would be mostly NGOs or research organization. Fortunately, based on the list of attendees, we can check to what extent our set of interviews reflect the distribution in the population. We compare the distributions, we observe that,

although there might be some over-representation of NGOs, our procedure led to a sample that nicely reflects the distribution in the population.

The interview guide included 31 closed questions (most answers were structured as a Likert scale), and 2 open questions. During the interviews respondents were asked to mention one specific issue they were working on and to report on their lobbying strategies in relation to this issue. For two reasons most respondents did not face difficulties in answering our questions. First, as said, respondents were asked about their activities in the few days leading up to the interviews, which implies that the potential for memory bias was limited. Second, we made sure the respondents understood what we were aiming for with our questions by extensively explaining the meaning of the question as well as providing several examples.

The questions we used for this paper are listed below:

Dependent variable

Inside and outside lobbying:

On this issue, could you indicate which percentage of your advocacy efforts were dedicated to in- and outside strategies?(add up to 100 percent)

Independent variables

Resources:

How much staff does your organization employ which deal with advocacy and/or public affairs?(number of staff)

Competition:

Could you indicate the percentage the following sources contribute to the overall budget? (add up to 100 percent)

- (1) Subscriptions from members/donations*
- (2) Payments for services or sales*
- (3) Government subsidies*

And, in finding these resources do you face a) strong, b) moderate, or) limited competition?

Salience:

Would you say that this issue, compared to other issues in the country you work, has gained a) much, b) around average, or c) limited media attention in the months up to this conference?

Alignment:

On a scale of 1-5, to what extent do you agree with how your government handles this issue? 1 means completely agree with your government stand on the issue, 5 means completely disagree with how they handle this issue.