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# ***COMPETING ORIGIN COUNTRY PERSPECTIVES ON EMIGRANTS' DESCENDANTS: MOROCCAN DIASPORA INSTITUTIONS' POLICY VIEWS AND PRACTICES REGARDING THE 'NEXT GENERATION ABROAD'***

*This paper contributes to the literature on diaspora policies by offering a deeper understanding of origin-state perspectives on emigrants' descendants. The main question addressed is how diaspora policies targeting this group are rationalized by the state of origin, that is, how policy practices, expectations and modes of thought related to this "next generation" of the emigrant population are interlinked conceptually. An in-depth inquiry of two major Moroccan diaspora institutions reveals the different governing rationalities underlying the cultural diaspora policies in place. The rationalities disagree on the fundamental question of whose interests the diaspora policies should serve primarily: the homeland's or the diaspora's. As such, the analysis not only draws attention to the way in which the emergence of post-migrant generations alters the governmentality of the diaspora but also points at implications of intra-state institutional plurality.*

## ***INTRODUCTION***

One of the most remarkable tendencies in the field of migration policies since the turn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century is the growing number of emigration countries establishing diaspora engagement policies. By 2014, at least 47 emigration countries worldwide had more than one institution dedicated entirely to their respective diasporas (Gamlen 2014). Today, in fact, most countries confronted with significant emigration have installed diaspora institutions, defined as formal state offices dedicated to emigrants and their descendants and located within the executive and legislative branches of national governments (Collyer 2013, Dufoix et al. 2010, Délano 2014, Gamlen 2014, Agunias 2009). While some state initiatives to engage diasporas trace back to the 19<sup>th</sup> century (Smith 2003), their recent spread and rise in significance are remarkable.

In the growing literature on diaspora policies, a neglected aspect is the fact that origin states' efforts are usually not limited to their emigrants but also extend to the "next generations", i.e., to emigrants' *descendants*. Commonly labeled by immigration scholars as "second generation (im)migrants", this group is more appropriately conceptualized as the "post-migrant" generation: while their ancestors' migration experience continues to impact their lives in various ways, the post-migrant generation never emigrated from the country of origin but was born and raised in its respective receiving country (Wagner 2008, The Author 2015). This has direct implications for this group's relationship to the ancestors' birth country: post-migrant generations usually maintain transnational ties, ranging from a sense of attachment to strong transnational engagement, but these ties differ substantially from migrants' transnational ties (Levitt and Waters 2002, Lee 2008, Wessendorf 2013). Because the descendants of migrants do not engage in transnational practices with the same intensity, frequency, and scope as their parents (Portes & Rumbaut 2001), post-migrant generations' "homeland" attachments are commonly perceived to be weaker and more precarious than their parents'. In sum, there is no simple unilateral "transmission" of transnational attitudes and behaviors across generations (Huynh & Yiu 2015).

As a response to these shifting transnational ties across generations, diverse emigration countries have implemented targeted cultural policies for post-migrant generations. Examples of these policies include the creation of an educational system in the receiving countries to transmit the national language(s), culture and/or religion; the organization of guided cultural-educational exposure tours in the homeland; and support for activities propagating the homeland culture in the receiving countries (Garcia-Sanchez 2010, Louie 2003). Generally, these strategies focus on youth, ranging from primary school children to young adults. Apart from their direct importance for target groups, these policies are also particularly significant because they highlight how diaspora policies engage in not only diaspora mobilization but also diaspora building (Kelner 2010, Gamlen 2006). As such, they reflect the origin state's long-term diaspora policy vision (The Author 2015).

However, the framework in which these cultural diaspora policies are developed is unclear. How, for example, are they understood and legitimized from an origin-state

perspective? How do origin states rationalize spending a considerable budget on programs that have no obvious material returns and that benefit a segment of their expatriate communities with rather insecure ties to the homeland? This article offers a deeper understanding of the meaning of these policies by analyzing the government rationalities of Morocco's diaspora institutions. Drawing on Foucault's (2007) governmentality perspective on power, rationality here entails a mode of reasoning followed by government (i.e. any systematized, regulated mode of power, such as the state) which defines the ultimate goal of governmental action and the ways to achieve this goal (Lemke 2000, Dean, 1999). Since it is our central aim to understand origin-state modes of thought on emigrants' descendants and the way these modes of thought are linked to concrete diaspora policy practices, we believe the governmentality perspective offers a highly suitable framework for our research purpose.

In our endeavor to understand the origin-state perspective on the post-migrant segment of the diaspora, the Moroccan state is not conceptualized as a monolithic entity producing univocal policy. As in many other emigration countries (Agunias 2009), the complexity of Morocco's institutional landscape is striking (Belgendouz 2006). With regard to the design and implementation of policy programs for post-migrant Moroccans in particular, two major institutions are in charge: the *Hassan II Foundation for Moroccans Living Abroad* (FHII) and the *Ministry in charge of the Moroccans Living Abroad* (MCMRE)<sup>[1]</sup>. Based on the different backgrounds of both diaspora institutions, we expect their government rationalities to differ as well. Therefore, the article examines the two institutions separately in its main section and offers a comparison afterwards.

The analysis contributes to the understanding of diaspora policies in two ways. First, we reveal how origin-country policy actors perceive and (attempt to) govern the post-migrant segment of the diaspora, while also demonstrating how the diffusion of power across diaspora institutions leads to multiple governing rationalities. Second, and more broadly, our analytic focus on *origin-country* perspectives on migration offers a refreshing counterbalance in an academic field still heavily dominated by *receiving country* perspectives that focus on immigration-related concerns, not on emigration (Dufoix et al. 2010, Collyer 2013, Berriane,

de Haas & Natter 2015). In sum, our article attends to the need to highlight underexposed, multiple perspectives on emigration.

## ***RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY***

This article presents a case study of Moroccan cultural diaspora policies for post-migrant Moroccan youth, with the aim of enhancing the understanding of this type of policy. As such, our case study should be understood as “an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units” (Gerring 2004, 342). Morocco is well suited as a case, due to the confluence of two characteristics. First, we note the existence of well-developed policy actions explicitly or implicitly targeting post-migrant generations. Some policy programs, such as the FHII’s summer camps for Moroccan children, have been running for more than two decades. This suggests that the differentiated approach to post-migrant generations is neither embryonic nor fortuitous but structurally integrated into Moroccan policies. The presence of tangible and well-established “technologies” of government allows us to reflect on how policy thought legitimates existing policy practices and, vice versa, how policy practices are grounded in ideas. Second, in contrast to the majority of origin states that initiated their diaspora policies from the late 1990s on (Agunias 2009, Gamlen 2014), Morocco occupies a pioneering role, especially in the Global South. The Moroccan state approach to emigration and development has been described as the creative and innovative result of a long and on-going engagement with its diaspora (Iskander 2010) and functions as a source of inspiration for other emigration countries. Because policy imitation is widespread among origin states (Smith 2003) and because pioneer states play a central role in diaspora policy diffusion through bilateral and multilateral dialogue (Délano 2014), we expect the Moroccan state’s government rationality with regard to post-migrant youth to catch on elsewhere too. This is most likely to happen in countries with sociocultural linkages to and similar (migration) experiences as Morocco (ibid.), such as other post-colonial states in Africa and the Middle East.

To get an overview of Moroccan state policies relevant to our research question, we started with secondary data collection. From 2012 to 2016, we collected publicly available

documentation such as press statements, policy briefs and royal statements (*Discours Royaux*) regarding state-diaspora relations. We found this information through the diaspora institutions' websites, Moroccan state media as well as by contacting and visiting the diaspora institutions' headquarters in Rabat. However, as the rationalities of diaspora policies for young post-migrant Moroccans are only superficially articulated in secondary data, we considered elite interviews to be a suitable method for “tap[ping] into political constructs that may otherwise be difficult to examine” (Beamer 2002, 87). Therefore, the primary data sources used in this article are 15 semi-structured, in-depth interviews with people working for the two major Moroccan diaspora policy institutions introduced above, the MCMRE and the FHII in 2013 and 2014. Interviewees included managing directors, policy advisors, civil servants and commissioned policy executers such as program coordinators. Interviews explored various aspects of the Moroccan diaspora policies concerning post-migrant Moroccan youth,<sup>[2]</sup> such as their goals, implementation, organization, evolution and challenges. The majority of interviews were recorded and transcribed; non-recorded interviews are paraphrased.<sup>[3]</sup>

## ***ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK***

### ***The governmentality perspective***

This article offers insight into cultural diaspora policies targeting post-migrant youth by identifying and analyzing underlying government rationalities. Our analysis builds on the idea of governmentality, an approach to the study of power introduced by Foucault (2007) and further developed and applied by others (Dean 1999, Lemke 2000, Bröckling et al. 2011). According to this approach, the focus of government is not sovereignty over territory but the regulation of human conduct (Dean 1999). The act of governing entails a range of practices that try to shape, sculpt, mobilize, and work through the choices, desires, aspirations, needs, wants and lifestyles of individuals and groups. [Governmentality] is a perspective, then, that seeks to connect questions of government, politics and administration to the space of bodies, lives, selves, and persons. (Dean 1999, 20)

Governing a population should not be understood as simply forcing people to do what the governor wants; rather, “it is always a versatile equilibrium, with complementarity and conflicts between techniques which assure coercion and processes through which the self is constructed

or modified by himself” (Foucault 1993, 204). Indeed, a central notion in the governmentality perspective is that governing draws on not only technologies of domination or discipline (external regulation practices), but also “technologies of the self” (self-regulation practices). As such, self-government is considered an indissoluble element of government.

Pivotal to the analysis of governmentality is the disclosure of government rationalities, that is, ways of reasoning or thinking that render reality conceivable and thus manageable (Bröckling et al. 2011). Importantly, political rationality is not considered pure or neutral knowledge that simply represents the governed reality but is instead seen as an element of government itself, which helps to create a discursive field in which exercising power is “rational” (Lemke 2000). As such, programs of (self-)government are descriptive and prescriptive at the same time: they describe and problematize a presumed reality in which they subsequently intervene with the aim of transforming it (Bröckling et al. 2011). As a consequence, when investigating government rationalities, one isn’t assessing things in terms of an absolute against which they could be evaluated as constituting more or less perfect forms of rationality, but rather examining how forms of rationality inscribe themselves in practices or systems of practices, and what role they play within them (Foucault 1991, 79).

An important implication of this view is the plurality of rationalities. What is considered rational depends on which assumptions about starting points, means, and goals can claim plausibility; which criteria of legitimacy and acceptability are established; and which authorities and inventories of knowledge are evoked to define statements as true and practices as rational (Bröckling et al. 2011). Therefore, government rationalities include not only rational elements (based on human sciences) but also a-rational elements (such as imagery or mythology) (Dean 1999).

In the governmentality perspective, rationalities and technologies of government, modes of thinking, and forms of intervention are mutually constitutive (Bröckling et al. 2011). This attentiveness to the interplay between policy rationalities and practices distinguishes the governmentality approach from alternative approaches to the study of thinking and speaking about governing. For example, political discourse analysis (Van Dijk 1997) and narrative policy analysis (van Eeten 2007) build their analysis mainly on language (such as use of vocabularies,

internal coherence, and presence of narrative structure) and its employment in the political arena, while governmentality perspectives incorporate tangible “technologies of power” in their analysis. As Dean (1999) stresses, the analytics of government is concerned with “thought as it is embedded within programs for the directions and reforms of conduct,” rather than with the theoretical or abstract dimensions of thought (27). Consequently, to analyze government rationalities is to analyze thought made practical and technical (ibid.).

### *Governing the diaspora*

While Foucault’s thinking on government was not limited to the sphere of the state – indeed, the state is considered but one actor involved in government – many scholars, including Foucault himself, have deployed the governmentality approach in their study of the functioning of state power (e.g. Foucault 2007, Dean 1999). With regard to the government of migration, states continue to take a central position in the 21<sup>st</sup> century (Fassin 2013, Iskander 2010, Collyer 2013). This is not only the case in receiving or transit regions, but also in countries of origin, where state institutions are increasingly re-claiming and re-defining “their” expatriate populations (Brand 2010, Ho 2011, Gamlen 2014, Portes & Fernandez-Kelly 2015).

In terms of governance, the defining feature of an expatriate population – that is, its position *outside* the origin-state’s territory – brings along a fundamental theoretical problem for the state of origin: how should state institutions with an internationally recognized territorial competency deal with citizens who permanently reside in the territory of another nation-state (Collyer 2013)? For expatriates who are long-term residents or even citizens in a foreign territory, the origin state’s capacity to employ its conventional array of managing (e.g. population census), disciplinary (e.g. national education) or coercive (e.g. monopoly of violence) governing technologies is severely curtailed. While states of origin do have certain tools at their disposal to govern expatriate citizens<sup>[4]</sup>, in general, they “lack reliable coercive powers beyond their legal jurisdictions, and therefore, the effectiveness of extra-territorial policies depends on the ability to make migrants self-identify as loyal, self-disciplining subjects” (Gamlen 2014, 193). The direct implication here is that other governing strategies, aiming at self-government, move to the forefront. In fact, the core purpose of diaspora policies



is the production of a communal mentality among expatriate citizens that renders them governable (Gamlen 2006).

Precisely because of this reliance on forms of self-government in contemporary diaspora policies, the governmentality perspective, which puts self-government center stage, is gaining ground in studies of state-diaspora relations (Kunz 2008, Gamlen 2014). Several scholars using this perspective have linked the emergence of diaspora policies to modifications in state power in recent decades (Ragazzi 2014). For example, Kunz's (2008) case study on Mexico illustrates how ways of governing Mexican emigrants comply with neoliberal rationality. Gamlen's (2014) comparative work takes the notion of governmentality a step further by arguing that not only emigrants, but increasingly, origin states themselves are being governed too: just as origin states mobilize emigrants without coercion into a web of rights and obligations, states are activated into an international community whose members share responsibility for migration management without the need for top-down coordination. In the broader field of diaspora policies, scholars who do not adopt the governmentality framework explicitly often touch upon related issues as well (e.g. Brand 2010, Nyíri 2001). A recurring theme in this work is the particular language used by governing bodies (such as states, but also media). This terminology is seen as both an indicator for and a constitutive factor in evolving state-diaspora relations. For example, Brand (2010) argues that the introduction in the 1990s of the notion of kinship in Moroccan state discourses on expatriate Moroccans – who evolved from being mere “workers abroad” to “our sons and daughters abroad” – were an attempt to redefine and strengthen the diaspora's ties to Morocco. On a more conceptual level, the tendency among policy makers to frame a loose collection of expatriate citizens and their descendants as a “diaspora” – a notion assuming a group identity, an unwanted migration and a natural, eternal bond to a distant territory – can also be regarded as an act of governing, because it is a political claim rather than a mere description (Ragazzi 2012).

Particularly relevant to our research purpose is Kunz's (2008) suggestion to consider three co-constitutive dimensions of government rationalities: “ways of thinking and speaking”, “ways of acting” and “ways of being”. The first dimension, Kunz argues, entails the production of particular knowledge and truth about the domain and population to be governed. Broadly

speaking, these are the conceptual expressions of a particular way of governing. The second dimension refers to institutional expressions and technologies of a particular way of governing, that is, concrete policy actions. The third regards the formation of subjectivities within this particular mode of governing – the articulation of a “model” subject that the governed are expected to internalize and emulate (ibid. 9-10).

While we build on this literature, our approach also departs from it in two respects. First, in contrast to what seems to be the default position in the diaspora policy literature (see Gamlen 2006, Ragazzi 2014), we do not presume the origin state to be a unitary actor with one single government rationality. Rather, we adopt a neo-pluralist understanding of the state, which disaggregates “the origin state” into a multilevel organization of distinct units in which a range of political actors compete (Fitzgerald 2006). This approach corresponds with our understanding of the governmentality perspective, as it postulates a plurality of rationalities. It is also consistent with the particular Moroccan institutional context, where the rivalry between various institutions impels us to consider the possibility of different, co-existing rationalities. Second, scholarly reflection on diaspora policies tends to hold on to the image of the diaspora as a monolithic entity and, thus, to ignore the question whether different segments of the diaspora are governed differently (Tsourapas 2015, Ho 2011).

We argue that the government of emigrants’ descendants raises additional issues on top of the general challenges mentioned above. These issues flow from the characteristics of emigrants’ descendants’ transnational identifications and practices (Levitt and Waters 2002) as well as their formal relation to the state of origin (citizenship status). By definition, post-migrant generations lack lived experience in the country of origin. Compared to their migrant parents, they are less proficient in the ancestral language, have a lower sense of obligation towards family members “back home,” and have alternative future prospects regarding return to the homeland. More often than migrants, migrants’ descendants hold foreign citizenship in addition to (or even without) origin-state nationality, implying different rights and loyalties. Foreign citizenship also makes it more difficult for origin states to claim descendants of migrants as full members of “the nation,” because competing, assimilationist rationalities on immigrant incorporation in receiving countries oppose this idea (Brubaker 2004). Equally

important, as full citizens in the receiving country, migrant descendants rely to a lesser extent on legal protection or social assistance offered by origin states to their expatriate citizens (Agunias 2009). All these differences have deep implications for this group's governmentality. Simply put, traditional diaspora governing technologies, such as consular networks, are insufficient to reach out to post-migrant youth, while origin states' ways of framing their emigrants, such as through the ideal type of the "entrepreneurial migrant" supporting his family back home (Kunz 2008), become inappropriate because they do not relate to post-migrant experiences. Therefore, the general observation that "state institutions must work harder to maintain a claim to represent a nation 'living in different places'" (Collyer 2013, 2) appears even more accurate when it comes to the descendants of emigrants.

### ***MOROCCAN DIASPORA POLICIES***

Moroccan emigration began in the 1960s as low-skilled male labor migration encouraged by the Moroccan state and various West-European countries (France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany). When due to the 1970s crisis the need for imported labor forces slumped, labor migration was followed by family migration (Bouras 2012, de Haas 2013). From the late 1980s, Morocco's position as an emigration country was further consolidated by emigrations to Italy and Spain. Significant numbers have moved to other Arab countries, North America and Israel (Berriane, de Haas & Natter 2015). However, Europe has been and continues to be the primary destination for Moroccan emigrants<sup>[51]</sup>.

Morocco's long-standing diaspora policies developed in response to the historic mass-scale labor migration to Western Europe. The overarching framework for Moroccan diaspora policies has been provided by the monarchy. Late King Hassan II's stand (r. 1961–1999) had been highly ambiguous: while conscious of expatriate citizens' economic contribution, he also feared them as a political threat (Iskander 2010, Brand 2006). Under his reign, emigrants were intimidated and persecuted by state agents during their holiday return to Morocco, while state-led *Amicales* (friendship societies) ensured control in the immigration countries. In contrast to his father, King Mohammed VI (r. 1999–) has consistently praised expatriate Moroccans, approaching them as a resource for the country's

development (ibid.). However, this shift in discourses and governing techniques should not obscure that the foundations of the two diaspora institutions in Morocco with the longest record in the field, the *Hassan II Foundation for Moroccans Living Abroad* (FHII) and the *Ministry in charge of the Moroccans Living Abroad* (MCMRE), were both laid by Hassan II in 1990. Their installation marked a new state approach aimed at halting emigrants' increasing alienation from their country of origin. This sense of alienation was triggered by a number of transformations in Moroccan communities abroad: the abandonment of the hope for return, the emergence of post-migrant generations, the dissociation in terms of language, culture, identity and religion, massive naturalizations, and political participation in the country of residence (Ouali 2004). In this context, old ways of governing the Moroccan diaspora – that is, the management of emigrants' financial resources, on the one hand, and the repressive control of their social and political activities through the *Amicales*, on the other – became obsolete and ineffective (Iskander 2010).

In an attempt to revive emigrants' connection to the kingdom and to make the transforming expatriate population manageable, a more holistic governing strategy was introduced. To avoid losing its grip on expatriate communities completely, the new vision took into account cultural, religious, social, and political dimensions of their homeland connections. The Ministry (MCMRE) was ordered (a) to promote social, economic, and cultural actions for expatriate Moroccans, (b) to monitor Moroccan migration, (c) to develop reintegration programs for returnees, and (d) to invest in diplomacy regarding living conditions and emigration of migrants (Fellat 1995). The Foundation (FHII), on the other hand, was tasked (a) to provide cultural, religious and language education for the children of emigrants (b) to organize holiday camps in Morocco for them, (c) to provide financial, medical, and judicial aid to those in need, (d) to organize cultural, artistic, and sports events in receiving countries, and (e) to manage the annual return visit to Morocco (ibid.). While mandated by the state and partly government-funded,<sup>[6]</sup> the FHII was not conceived as a political institution but as a quasi-governmental social aid agency, a status that allowed it to circumvent political sensibilities and operate in a more flexible manner. As such, it was seen to compliment, rather than to compete with, the MCMRE (Brand 2006).

Many of the transformations that led to the creation of the two new institutions related directly to the growing size and importance of the post-migrant cohort in the Moroccan diaspora at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Due to limited return migration among the initial labor migrants and their families, post-migrant Moroccans constituted by then a large share of Moroccan communities in the original destination countries – France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany (de Haas 2013). Additionally, the socio-economic profile of the expatriate Moroccan population started to diversify, due, among others, to the upward mobility that part of the post-migrant generations experienced compared to their low-educated migrant parents (Crul & Heering 2008).

Responding to the emergence of this new category of Moroccans citizens abroad<sup>[7]</sup>, a range of targeted policy initiatives have been developed gradually by the two Moroccan diaspora institutions. While they are situated in both the countries of residence and in country of origin and target various age groups, we group these initiatives together as “cultural diaspora policies” since the transmission and maintenance of various dimensions of homeland culture is pivotal in all of them. Among others, the FHII launched language and cultural education (*l'Enseignement de la Langue Arabe et de la Culture Marocaine* (ELACM)) and summer camps for children (first *Colonies de Vacances*, later *Séjours Culturels*) in the 1990s, while more recently, the MCMRE initiated summer universities (*Universités d'été au profit des Jeunes Marocains Résidant à l'étranger*, from 2009 on), large conferences (*Forum des Jeunes Marocains Résidant à l'étranger*, in 2011 and 2016), cultural stays for adolescents and young adults (*Séjours Culturels*), and cultural centers (*Centres Culturels marocains à l'étranger 'Dar el Maghrib'*). Similar cultural diaspora policies aiming at post-migrant or diasporic youth can be found in other countries as well, including Israel (Kelner 2010), India (Agunias 2009), and China (Louie 2003).

Notwithstanding their overlapping authorities, the relationship between the FHII and the MCMRE has been unclear, and coordination of their activities, missing from the outset. In their first seven years, the two institutions functioned as one in practice, since the Minister was also president of the FHII. For the MCMRE, bureaucratic infighting with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a general lack of state capacity led to its gradual demolition and eventual absorption

by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1997 (Brand 2006). In the absence of an independent Ministry, the FHII became the only national institution dedicated fully to Moroccans abroad. However, under Mohammed VI, the emigration portfolio reemerged in the Moroccan government in 2002, leading to the re-establishment of a separate Ministry (2007) as an important political tool for the implementation of his vision. Since then, the MCMRE has only strengthened its position, for instance by adding immigration affairs to its portfolio in 2013<sup>181</sup>. Also, while previously, the cultural and educational domain was seen as the FHII's prerogative, young expatriate Moroccans have increasingly been targeted by the MCMRE too. On top of this, another diaspora institution was created in 2007: The Council of the Moroccan Community Living Abroad (CCME). Notwithstanding its consultative, non-executive role, the creation of the CCME has only reinvigorated the older criticism that there are simply too many institutions with overlapping competencies in the field of Moroccan diaspora policies (Belguendouz 2006).

Given this context, the existence of inter-institutional rivalry does not come as a surprise. However, as we argue in the next section, this rivalry transcends competition over resources. It extends into substantial domains, such as the questions of how and why to target post-migrant Moroccans policy-wise.

### ***GOVERNMENT RATIONALITIES: HOW AND WHY TO GOVERN POST-MIGRANT MOROCCANS?***

This part of the article identifies and illustrates the government rationalities regarding post-migrant Moroccans of the Ministry in charge of the Moroccans Living Abroad (MCMRE) and the Hassan II Foundation for the Moroccans Living Abroad (FHII). What, it asks, are in these rationalities “ways of thinking and speaking”, “ways of acting” and “ways of being” (Kunz, 2008) for post-migrant Moroccans, and how do these dimensions connect?

In a nutshell, our analysis reveals how the two institutions' government rationalities differ regarding the question of whose interest cultural diaspora policies should primarily serve: the homeland's or the diaspora's. For the MCMRE, Morocco's strategic interests are pivotal, whereas for the FHII, the needs of expatriate communities are prioritized. We classify the former set of interests as *homeland-centered rationality* and the latter as *diaspora-centered*

*rationality*. The homeland-centered rationality draws on the idea that the expatriate population constitutes a resource for the country of origin. Accordingly, diaspora policies are conceptualized as an instrument to develop this resource. In contrast, the diaspora-centered rationality starts from the idea that the expatriate population, due to its migratory situation, has a range of special needs. Accordingly, diaspora policies are conceptualized as a way to cater to the expatriate community's particular needs, especially with regards to their transnational relationship with the country of origin and their wellbeing in the country of residence.

### *The homeland-centered rationality*

Moroccans living abroad have contributed for decades, from the sixties until today, to the development of their region [of origin]... They have contributed considerably to Morocco's development in terms of infrastructure, in terms of social services, in terms of the battle against poverty, etc. And we would like this to continue, with the coming generations. (Policy advisor F)

The understanding that emigrants make a significant contribution to Moroccan economic and human development lies at the heart of the MCMRE's homeland-centered rationality. In the interview with the policy advisor quoted above, we can see how the idea that emigrants are an important resource for the origin-country, is reiterated as a well-established principle for the country. Yet what is particular here is how this idea is transmitted seamlessly to the foreign-born descendants of Moroccan emigrants. Moreover, addressing this segment of the diaspora is considered essential for Morocco's development strategy:

Morocco has approximately 4.5 million expatriate Moroccans. The majority of them are born abroad... Well, Morocco has strategic interests in the preservation of the relationship with its subjects abroad. First, because they are Moroccans, they embody the culture, the Moroccan cultural diversity; [second,] the future generations carry the hope, regardless of being inside [Morocco] or abroad. Especially by the contribution of the Moroccan competencies abroad: scientific, cultural, athletic, manifold competencies... So, it's an added value for Morocco; it's an essential element in its development strategy. (Policy advisor F)

Underlying this sentiment is the notion that this group's ties to Morocco are not self-evident. If they were, there would be no need for policies to preserve them. Conceptually, a demarcation line is drawn between expatriate Moroccans born in Morocco (the "first generation" who emigrated as adults or adolescents) and those born and raised abroad. For the former, a strong attachment to Morocco is considered self-evident – they were born in Morocco,

usually have close family ties there, and have ‘contributed for decades’. For the latter, their relationship with Morocco is thought to be much looser – their links to Morocco must be cultivated. Also, post-migrant Moroccans are considered to be more integrated in the receiving countries. Therefore, the Moroccan state must make a deliberate effort to preserve their *marocanité* (Moroccan-ness). A second difference between the two groups concerns the (assumed) higher socio-economic and educational status of post-migrant generations, compared to their parents. These generational differences also translate into diverging expectations regarding their contribution to development:

The generation of the parents... send remittances, they contribute through community associations by building schools, building roads, building micro-infrastructure for local development, especially in very poor regions. We want the children of these migrants to continue doing this. Not necessarily in their region of origin, [but] by contributing to development by bringing their skills by doing investments, by transferring technology, etc. (Policy advisor F)

Therefore, while the continuation of transnational ties across generations is pursued, it is not expected or desired that post-migrant generations copy their parents’ transnational practices; other ways of being a “good” expatriate Moroccan are promoted. The adage is that Morocco does not want these post-migrant Moroccans’ money – as “there are always banks that can provide you the capital” (Policy advisor F). Instead, it wants their innovative ideas, technologic know-how and *compétences* (skills). Apparently, the demographic transition in the Moroccan diaspora (from migrant to post-migrant) converges with a broadening of the policy focus from the diaspora’s financial capital to human and financial capital.

Because the weakening homeland attachment of post-migrant Moroccans is thought to limit their willingness to contribute to Morocco’s development, it is only “rational” for the Moroccan state to invest in the cultural ties of young post-migrant Moroccans. For this reason, cultural diaspora policies are tightly interwoven with the economic and development agendas of broader diaspora policies. This connection clearly emerged in interviews, where the different policy objectives were often mentioned in one breath and connected conceptually:

In recent years, the Ministry has been concerned about showing [young expatriate Moroccans] that regardless of the country you are in, you should not forget that you are Moroccan; you have rights and obligations towards your country... It’s for this reason we are interested in identity: because if one feels that (s)he is Moroccan; (s)he will defend the interests of Morocco. (S)he will love our country, (s)he will



make sacrifices for our country, (s)he will help to improve the situation of our country. (Program coordinator G)

Here, the connection between ways of thinking and acting becomes clear: by ensuring the preservation of young post-migrant Moroccans' transnational ties to Morocco, cultural diaspora policies enable the fulfillment of this group's potential as resource for development.

In strengthening transnational ties, Moroccan diaspora policies are not developed in a vacuum: an extensive field of established transnational practices exists. For example, it is acknowledged that most post-migrant Moroccans have repeatedly visited Morocco during their childhood through extended family visits. This summer "pilgrimage" is commonly regarded as an established tradition inherited by younger generations. Yet interviewees in this study problematize the widespread practice of homeland visits. Although visiting Morocco is applauded, concrete visiting practices of post-migrant Moroccans are seen to be limited because they are too narrowly focused on family visits in the village of origin and leave no space for broader, more touristic explorations of Morocco:

The majority of young Moroccans coming with their families to Morocco do not come in order to get to know Morocco. They come to a specific place, which is their parents' place of origin, a location either with the tribe or in a small town. As a result, they pass their holidays – or at least, the majority of their holidays – in a very limited space, filled with family visits. In fact, it is not a holiday, because they are not taking a vacation: they came to arrange things with their parents, to visit family members, maybe to distribute some stuff. But they did not come to get to know their culture of origin. Hence, the concern arises for the Ministry, the intention to make programs that incite these people, these young Moroccans, to get to know their [culture of origin]. (Civil servant A)

Interviewees claim that due to the stressful conditions characterizing private homeland visits (such as lack of personal freedom, stress related to distribution of goods and money, and harsh living conditions in rural, under-developed towns), these homeland visits leave a rather negative imprint on post-migrant Moroccans' relationship with Morocco. This concern indicates a normative way of thinking of the transnational behavior of expatriate Moroccans: interviewees judge this group's private tourist practices as ineffective or even counterproductive in terms of connecting with the home country. However, 'limited' homeland trips are not the only culprits here. According to interviewees, other factors further contribute to post-migrant generations' presumed negative perception and limited knowledge of Morocco.

Their perception and knowledge of Morocco are thought to be caused too by their parents' outmoded view of the country, which is based mainly on these parents' (rural) lives in Morocco under the brutal reign of late Hassan II. After emigrating, their parents would continue to base their view on Morocco on these experiences, uninformed about Morocco's economic and political evolutions. In addition, media in the countries of residence are reproached to disperse biased and limited information on Morocco. In sum, for various reasons post-migrant Moroccans are thought to have a skewed view on their ancestors' country of birth.

Diaspora policies are tasked with counterbalancing these negative perceptions, yet interviewees realize that these cannot be changed easily. Because policy programs like cultural visits and summer universities are too brief to leave deep imprints on participants' views, policy actions often aim instead to trigger a "change of mind." A term frequently used by respondents is "sensitization" (in French: *sensibilisation*), a policy strategy to raise awareness about the "real" and "modern" Moroccan society and to incite post-migrant Moroccans to imagine themselves as part of it. The hope is that this sensitization will pay off in desirable homeland-oriented behavior in the future; therefore, it is conceptualized as a strategic long-term investment. As Managing Director J explains,

When one builds a country, he won't construct it in 2, 3, 4 years. He will construct it in 20, 30, 40, 50 years. Morocco currently needs her Moroccans, regardless of where they are, because even for us, when (s)he has the nationality [of the country of residence], (s)he is Moroccan. Today, (s)he is a student... When (s)he will be 30 years old, (s)he might be either an employee or a manager, so it's today we need to teach them... It's not an investment like "We're going to look for a European company and we'll tell them: come and invest in Morocco". [On the contrary] We make an investment in persons, but in the long term.

The metaphor of "fishing" was also used to describe this approach: to catch a fish, you need to cast a fishing rod first. However, it is not just Morocco that is "fishing". It is well understood that highly educated post-migrant Moroccans are a sought-after group in the international labor market:

We need to benefit from the fact it's a Moroccan, we need to benefit from his experience of being a Moroccan abroad, his studies and so on. Every country would be seeking for someone like him, so why not return to the origins, Morocco? . . . Better [to choose] for their country [of origin, rather] than invest in other countries. (Program coordinator I)

Due to this global competition for talent, particularly of highly educated post-migrant Moroccans, the promotion of “enterprise Morocco” is a vital ingredient of Morocco’s cultural programs. Illustrative is this reflection on a conference, during which around 500 highly educated young Moroccans living around the world gathered in the city of Ifrane in 2010: That’s it: it was practically like one of those meetings certain commercial companies organize. When they want to attract future employees, they organize hotel stays or trips somewhere and this allows them to get to know other future employees better and to get to know the culture of the company which [candidate employees] will integrate in. For Morocco, this was the occasion to promote the enterprise “Morocco”, to make known first of all, the modernity of Morocco... (Policy advisor F)

This approach shows how policy makers’ ways of thinking about post-migrant Moroccans translate into corresponding ways of acting towards this group: more than only a homeland, Morocco is presented as a competitive, attractive enterprise.

Consistent with the policy aim of strengthening of post-migrant generations’ cultural ties, much attention is paid in the concrete policy programs to sharing knowledge about Moroccan culture, religion and language. For example, cultural stay programs are designed to enable post-migrant Moroccans to get in touch with the “real” Islam (here referring to orthodox Moroccan Islam) as an indissoluble part of Moroccan culture that is embedded in a broader multi-ethnic “culture of tolerance”:

Moroccan culture is a rich, diversified culture. It’s an Arabic, African, Berber culture... Moroccan culture is a culture of tolerance... In Morocco you find [various] places of worship: the mosque, Jewish and Christian places of worship... We want to inform the students about the real Islamic religion, the Islam of tolerance and not the radical Islam. (Program coordinator H)

Another tangible element of having Moroccan roots is being familiar with Moroccan languages. Interviewees considered proficiency in Standard Arabic and in the Moroccan dialect, Darija, to be crucial parts of expatriates’ cultural ties to Morocco. Post-migrant Moroccans unable to express themselves in these languages are pitied and encouraged to learn it, for instance, by practicing whenever in Morocco or attending language classes.

The framing of the above elements – culture, religion, and language – reveals ways of thinking that problematize post-migrant Moroccans’ current view on Islam, their current (Arabic) language knowledge, etc. This articulation also refers to subjectivity creation, in

defining the norm for transnational practices and identifications with regard to Morocco. The “model” post-migrant Moroccan adheres to Moroccan Islam and values, is well-informed about Moroccan history and politics, and speaks Moroccan Arabic fluently. Since cultural diaspora policies are conceived as interwoven with broader economic policies, not surprisingly, the subjectivity creation extends into the economic sphere as well. In this rationality, therefore, the model post-migrant Moroccan reconnects to Morocco not only in terms of homeland-oriented identifications but also through homeland-oriented practices that contribute to development.

These are the two main messages we try to pass on to them... That Morocco is experiencing change... and it's true that their place is abroad, but their place can be also here [in Morocco]... [The message is] that their place is here [in Morocco] or rather, that Morocco counts upon them for its development. That's it; these are the largest messages we try to [convey]. Whether they will attract 100%, I don't think so. But I'm sure they will attract at least 50%. (Managing director J)

Frequently used phrases like “Morocco counts upon its citizens, regardless of where they live” and “a Moroccan can help Morocco, either from abroad or from Morocco” illustrate the moral obligation to contribute to Moroccan interests. The model post-migrant Moroccan is not an abstract notion; it is given flesh and bones by highlighting “exemplary” post-migrant Moroccans, such as students doing voluntary work or young entrepreneurs launching a start-up company. One program coordinator evoked memories of a visit to an investment project in a highly specialized niche sector, run by Europe-based Moroccans, during an exposure program for young expatriate Moroccans in 2012:

We went to a factory built by Moroccan [e]migrants that produces spare parts for Boeing in Tangier... So, what did they [the program participants] discover? They discovered that the people running this factory were in Europe. [These people] completed their studies in Europe, came to Morocco, and looked for investment capital here in Morocco. Subsequently, they started a project in Morocco with something very profitable, that is, the production of parts for Boeing – which is not an easy thing... If [program participants] hadn't witnessed this productive project, they wouldn't have known this [type of business] existed [in Morocco]. That's the goal. (Program coordinator G)

Illustrative of the moral obligation to contribute to Moroccan interest, is that post-migrant Moroccans are considered “ambassadors for Morocco” and encouraged to improve their capacities as such. Familiarity with contemporary Moroccan society is essential here, as it is argued that one cannot defend Morocco's interests effectively if one does not know Morocco.

Solid knowledge of the country, combined with a sense of national pride, constitutes the “ammunition” needed to defend Morocco’s interest and promote a positive image of it.

We are concerned with informing them about political changes, changes in the field of human rights, changes that Morocco experiences in that area. For us, as long as someone is Moroccan, (s)he needs to have the means to defend Morocco’s cause... Personally, it embarrasses me a little when I meet a young Moroccan of immigrant background, and (s)he does not know Morocco has a new constitution, [and] is going through political transformation. (Program coordinator H)

Building on the idea of ambassadorship, there is also a concern with the “integration” of post-migrant Moroccans into their receiving society, represented by high performance in education and exemplary conduct. Those who do not live up to these standards, such as low-performing or delinquent youngsters, are judged as spoiling the reputation of “decent” expatriate Moroccans and of Morocco. As such, the “ways of being” propagated for post-migrant Moroccans are not limited to their transnational ties to Morocco but extend well into their lives in the receiving countries.

### *The diaspora-centered rationality*

From the moment you give them the microphone, when they arrive, the first thing they ask for is the education of Arabic, for the children, and for themselves. Thus, it is a priority. It is a vital demand for Moroccans. The official departments, that is, the Foundation and the government, are not doing anything but following these tendencies, this demand. (Managing director N)

In contrast to the MCMRE’s homeland-centered rationality, the FHII’s government rationality is centered on expatriate citizens’ needs and interests. The FHII conceives its role as supportive, as a provider of “services” to the diaspora, on demand. Its core premise is that strong demand for the maintenance of cultural, linguistic, and religious transnational ties with the homeland exists in the Moroccan expatriate community. Initially, this demand was related to the idea of permanent return to Morocco, which was central to the early labor migrants’ migration project:

If you are [living] abroad, and you have children, and you think of one day returning to the country of origin, you will make at least some effort to ensure they learn the language of the country of origin. (Managing director K)

But the expected massive return to Morocco never materialized (de Haas 2013)<sup>[9]</sup>, implying that Moroccan cultural diaspora policies lost their *raison d'être*. Notwithstanding, these policies were not abandoned, instead, their rationality was redefined throughout the years.

So what is the government rationality of cultural diaspora policies, if not to smooth return migration? The arguments provided by interviewees are multi-faceted. First, return to Morocco does happen, though in temporary form through summer visits. During holidays, interviews stated, it is important that emigrants' descendants "are able to speak the language, and that they are not illiterate." (Managing director K). As such, policies respond to needs arising from the transnational practice of regular homeland visits. Contrary to the homeland-centered rationality, however, homeland visits are not problematized per se. Policies here are not aiming to change practices to the homeland's benefit but rather to improve the quality of the experience for those involved. Second, beyond their practical utility during homeland visits, language proficiency and cultural familiarity are more broadly understood as means to stay in touch with the country of origin on a more permanent basis. Put differently, "this education really enables the Moroccan community to maintain the umbilical cord with the country of origin" (Managing director L). As such, diaspora policies respond to initial migrant parents' craving to pass on their national, cultural and religious affiliations to their children.

Third, contrary to popular belief that children and youngsters of Moroccan origin are forced to learn Arabic by their parents, in the FHII it is argued that post-migrant generations consider learning Arabic as valuable. Thus, the language demand, initially coming from migrant parents, has "spilled over" to the next generations.

This may appear paradoxical, but the demand today is coming much more from youngsters... [Their parents] have transmitted to their children the necessity of knowing [Arabic] because it opens employment horizons, particularly in the Gulf countries. This has led to the current demand of having some Arabic language proficiency... There is a material interest that is obvious and that is legitimate. (Managing director N)

If, according to homeland-centered rationality, Arabic language training was key to the country of origin's interests, according to diaspora-centered rationality, its benefits for post-migrant Moroccans themselves are prioritized.

According to the demand-based logic of the diaspora-centered rationality, policies are only required if asked for by members of the diaspora and if these policies address their needs directly. This is because members of the diaspora are considered to know best what they need. Consequently, diaspora policies should not make any special effort to reach out to expatriate community members who show no interest in involvement.

We should not produce actions and activities for people who don't need them. For example, regarding Arabic language [education], and the practice of sending theater groups or music groups, if there are no requests, we send them there, where there is a demand. Where the demand is absent, we consider that there is no need for these activities and therefore, we are reassured. (Managing director N)

This demand-driven, non-interventionist approach explains not only the focus of FHII's interventions (ways of acting) but also what it is *not* doing. This logic legitimizes, for instance, the FHII's relatively limited offer of education in Tamazight, the Berber language spoken in Morocco (recognized as an official language by Morocco since 2011). While a significant share of expatriate Moroccans originates from Berber-speaking areas and considers Tamazight rather than Moroccan Arabic to be their mother tongue, according to FHII employees, there is little demand for Berber language education.

So far, the entire demand presented to us is formulated as a demand for Arabic... [It is] the demand, the pressing demand... All Moroccans, [when] asked, "what are your needs?", they recount "[learning] Arabic", "being Moroccan" and "being connected with the culture and the religion", that's it. (Managing director N)

In this rationality, heterogeneity among post-migrant Moroccans is the point of departure for policy action, since "there is no single 'young Moroccan living abroad'" but instead, "millions of young Moroccans living abroad" (Managing director K). In contrast to the homeland-centered rationality, in the diaspora-centered government rationality, no single issue is put forward as *the* policy problem regarding post-migrant Moroccans. Accordingly, rather than looking for a uniform "miracle receipt," tailor-made actions are preferred. Also, policy actions do not prioritize "the future elite", as is the case in the MCMRE. All these elements indicate the more demand-driven nature of the FHII's rationality.

Overall, a predefined strategic-political agenda regarding transnational attachments or practices of young Moroccans abroad seems consistently absent for the FHII. For instance, no policy position is taken on return migration or emigration, and investments in Morocco are not

promoted as such. Rather, the FHII regards it its duty as informing potential investors, warning them about pitfalls and assisting upon request – all with the aim of reducing the risk of failure. This does not mean that the government rationality is non-normative, only that its norms are not grounded in a homeland-centered logic. A central normative position in this rationality is that knowing one's roots has general benefits for personal well-being and identity development:

For example, the language courses, they are important for your own identity. Someone who knows his own identity has a strong personality. If you don't know your own identity, you feel insecure. (Civil servant E)

In particular, hybrid identities incorporating the national identity of both receiving and origin country are considered as favorable. As managing director K explains, migrants' descendants, because of their dual national belongings, "are the ideal interface for partnerships" between Morocco and the countries of residence. He prefers such an approach to an exclusive understanding of belonging, either as part of the "external pillar" of Moroccan society or as part of the country of residence.

Imagine a Moroccan who was born in [a certain country of residence], has studied there, knows [that country] inside out and is an exemplary citizen of that country – at the same time, he can be a good Moroccan citizen. It's better to sit on two "chairs" at the same time, than to fall in between. (Managing director K)

Embracing both national affiliations is put forward as the most fruitful approach to the identity of post-migrant generations. On the contrary, if people choose one nationality – meaning they "give up" their other nationality and assimilate completely – "this is a catastrophe". The FHII therefore considers it part of its mission to promote a dual (national) identity. It argues that countries of residence should adopt a more relaxed attitude towards dual national allegiance and the transnational practices it brings about: "Why would you impede, for example, French Moroccans to come on holiday to Morocco?" (Managing director K). However, while no moral obligation with regard to Moroccan national interests is articulated and "ambassadorship" is not assumed, the appraisal of a dual national identity in this rationality implies the superiority of post-migrant Moroccans who cultivate their affiliation to Morocco, compared to those who show little interest in their Moroccan roots. As an example, emigrant youngsters' alienation of their Moroccan origins is considered one of the root causes of their social deprivation.



Therefore, although this rationality is in various respects less directive than the homeland-centered rationality, here too a moral guideline for the post-migrant Moroccans' way of being is presented.

The ways of thinking and speaking about the Moroccan emigrant population directly affect the policy approach. The conceptualization of this group as heterogeneous, with ever-shifting needs, results in a rather flexible policy approach. Should the demand for particular programs (such as language education programs) disappear or change in the future, a shift in the offer of diaspora policy programs would be the rational result:

I don't have the numbers but if in a few years, the Foundation wouldn't receive requests for language courses any longer... it would be wasted money [to continue this education], in my opinion. (Civil servant E)

As a result, in this government rationality it is uncertain what the future will bring. Some current programs may become entirely redundant, while new policy actions may need to be developed. This illustrates how 'ways of thinking and speaking' about the policy's target group are dynamically linked to the policy's 'ways of acting'.

### *Comparing and contextualizing government rationalities*

The previous sections unraveled the government rationalities of the two main Moroccan diaspora institutions. Both rationalities link a particular notion of post-migrant Moroccans and their relation to Morocco (ways of thinking) to certain policies, that is, cultural diaspora policies (ways of acting), and moral guidelines for the governed (ways of being). How, though, do these two distinctive rationalities relate to each other with regard to these three aspects?

Concerning the ways of thinking about the post-migrant Moroccans, the homeland-centered rationality underlines the instrumental value of their homeland-oriented ties. A strong transnational cultural affiliation is applauded, as it is considered to be related to profitable transnational practices, such as remittances, diaspora philanthropy, and diaspora investments. As such, cultural diaspora policies dedicated to migrants' descendants are rationalized through a variant of the widely used "tapping explanation" that focuses on states' pursuit of material resources through engaging diasporas (Gamlen 2014). In contrast, the diaspora-centered rationality rejects this instrumental approach of homeland-oriented ties

and defines their value more in social and psychological terms: these ties are valuable because they are central to the self-esteem and wellbeing of migrants' descendants.

These different conceptualizations of transnational ties correspond to diverging perspectives on cultural diaspora policies, i.e., different ways of acting. In the homeland-centered rationality, cultural diaspora policies are naturally intertwined with other elements of the broader diaspora policy agenda, such as policies stimulating the dedication of the diaspora's human capital to homeland development. This rationality exudes a proactive, interventionist idea of diaspora policies: post-migrant Moroccans' existing relationships with the homeland are to be reshaped and modified through policies to ultimately mold them into their desired form. In contrast, the diaspora-centered rationality approaches cultural diaspora policies independently from broader strategic-political agendas. There are few pre-set goals, and those that exist are defined by the target group. As such, diaspora policies are attributed a more reactive, assisting role. The policy aim is not to change post-migrant Moroccans' transnational ties to Morocco but to offer support where needed. These diverging modes of thinking are also reflected in concrete practices. The FHII focuses more on sustainable informal cooperation with Moroccan and non-Moroccan civil society actors from the country of residence, resulting in tailored cooperation. The MCMRE's actions, by contrast, feature more top-down, standardized initiatives, with pre-set goals explicitly connected to the government's broader development agenda.

What constitutes the "model" post-migrant Moroccan differs too. While in their "ways of being" both rationalities put forward a well-developed dual national identity as desirable, in the homeland-centered rationality this position is related to the assumed strategic utility of dual identities for Moroccan interests; whereas in the diaspora-centered rationality the positive side-effects for the (post-) migrant dual citizens matter most. Another difference can be found in the articulation of an economic dimension. In the MCMRE, expectations about socio-economic contribution to the homeland are explicit. Actions selectively aim at those post-migrant Moroccans who are considered most likely to accomplish this contribution. The MCMRE's purposeful aiming at "tomorrow's elite" reveals the selective nature of extraterritorial state practices: the visible targets are those in privileged class positions, while

others, such as low-class labor migrants, are neglected (Ho 2011, Mani & Varadarajan 2005). This focus is evident in programs such as the Summer Universities, in which only expatriate Moroccans enrolled in higher education are eligible to participate. Contrarily, in the FHII's rationality, which takes diaspora needs as its starting point, this selective focus seems absent. Programs aim as much at the highly skilled as at vulnerable categories of expatriates, such as elderly, prisoners and youngsters in a precarious condition.

The co-existence of two different government rationalities within a single national context begs the question, what factors contribute to this plurality? While the governmentality perspective is more concerned with the nature of rationalities than with their sources (Gamlén 2014), reflection on the question is useful to contextualize our findings.

We may assume that the nature of both institutions and their positions within the Moroccan state apparatus deeply impact government rationalities. As outlined in a previous section, the FHII operates as a semi-independent institution, while the MCMRE, as a governmental department, is strongly interlinked with national politics. While bound by decree, the FHII is not accountable to the Moroccan government or public and is mainly funded by emigrant money, though indirectly. This may help to explain why the FHII's rationality does not refer to Moroccan national interests and focuses instead on the beneficiaries'. On the contrary, for the MCMRE, as a national political body, the government rationality needs to fit into the broader policy framework of serving the "national interests" in economic and political terms. As the Monarchy sets the course for government policies, it is not surprising to find the MCMRE's rationality resonating with King Mohammed VI's discourses. Indeed, the MCMRE's re-establishment by Mohammed VI in 2007 can be regarded as a strategic maneuver to invigorate his strategic course. In comparison, the FHII is a relic of King Hassan II's strategic approach to diaspora. However, it too has adapted its rationality to shifting circumstances, by moving away from paternalist rationality to a more cooperative diaspora-centered approach.<sup>[10]</sup>

In addition, differences in institutional continuity are relevant to understanding diverging rationalities. The MCMRE has taken many forms since its inception and was even abandoned completely for some years. In addition, in our fieldwork we observed there to be

a high turnover of staff members, especially in the higher echelons, which is related to party politics. In contrast, FHII personnel we interviewed had worked there for almost two decades. Consequently, the FHII is characterized by a stronger continuity in terms of expertise and networking with Moroccan expatriate communities. This has nurtured a more historically grounded government rationality, whereas in the MCMRE, the rationality centers on a future-oriented political project.

## *CONCLUSION*

In a global context where diaspora policies have become a regular feature of political life (Gamlen 2014), how do origin states approach the descendants of their emigrants? More particularly, how do diaspora institutions think about this group and act towards it? These are important questions, as the current policy approach to post-migrant youth may have strong implications for state-diaspora relations in the long term. Our empirical investigation of Moroccan diaspora policies reveals that there is no single answer to these questions. Different conceptualizations of post-migrant Moroccans and their “problems” co-exist, as do diverging ways to respond to these problems policy-wise.

The homeland-centered rationality, dominant in the Ministry for Moroccans Living Abroad, reveals how the conceptualization of emigrants as a resource is extended across emigrant generations to include foreign-born descendants of emigrants. Particularly remarkable in this rationality is the overt instrumentalization of homeland-oriented cultural attachments of post-migrant generations for the benefit of the origin state. The diaspora-centered rationality, articulated by the Hassan II Foundation for Moroccans Living Abroad, is notable as for revealing an alternative origin-state understanding of diaspora policies. The tone of this rationality, averse to political interests and supporting the self-determination of post-migrant generations regarding their homeland ties, bears little resemblance to the nationalist leitmotif of the competing homeland-centered rationality.

Our findings undermine the homogeneity of origin states’ diaspora policies and thus endorse a neo-pluralist understanding of the origin state (Fitzgerald 2006). The mere existence of two distinctive diaspora policy rationalities within a single origin state illustrates

how competing policy rationalities can co-exist. More broadly, it points to the plurality of government rationalities (Bröckling et al. 2011). As the article shows, diaspora institutions may articulate and act according to very different understandings of the same emigration reality.

In fact, the different rationalities represent competing views on who needs to take care of whom – the homeland of the diaspora or the diaspora of the homeland? In the diaspora-centered rationality, policies are grounded in the state’s historical responsibility towards emigrants and their children, while the homeland-centered rationality stresses that emigrants and their descendants continue to carry responsibility towards their country of origin. These diverging vantage points bring to the fore a fundamental question: should diaspora policies serve the homeland or the diaspora? While the tensions between homeland and diaspora interests have been illustrated before (Ho 2011, Mani & Varadarajan 2005), our analysis shows these tensions are also present at the state level, through diaspora institutions affiliating more with one of both positions.

On a more general level, this study demonstrates how demographic and other evolutions in the diaspora impact upon origin countries’ outlook on the diaspora. The Moroccan state’s interest in the “next generations” of Moroccans abroad, and the development of targeted policies for this group, illustrate the state’s attempt to manage shifting migration realities. For migration scholars, these observations underpin the need to reject static, monolithic understandings of diaspora. The adoption of more dynamic, empirically grounded perspectives on diasporic communities, taking into account generational and other changes, is necessary to enable more fine-grained understandings of state-diaspora relations, in Morocco and elsewhere.

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<sup>[11]</sup> A third important institution is the *Council of the Moroccan Community living Abroad* (CCME). However, conceived more as a consultative body, the CCME has only a few activities that involve post-migrant Moroccans in a direct or systematic manner. Whereas the MCMRE and FHII both have strong executive roles, reflected in extensive, regularly organized programs for young Moroccans living abroad, the CCME's task is primarily contemplative. Because our analytic focus is on how modes of thought are interlinked with concrete programs we do not include this institution in our analysis.

<sup>[12]</sup> "Post-migrant generations/youth/Moroccans" are labels we created for this study. Interviewees employed various terms, such as "young Moroccans living abroad", the "next", "emerging" or "second" generation(s), or, alternatively, the "third and fourth generations" (the first generation being emigrants who left Morocco as adults and the second those who left as minors).

<sup>[13]</sup> Interviews were conducted in French (12), English (2), and Dutch (1). As a result, most quotes in the analysis are translations. For confidentiality reasons, interviewees have been anonymized.

<sup>[14]</sup> The fact that many expatriates reside temporarily in the origin country on a frequent basis, offers the origin state the opportunity to use some of its 'classic' government technologies such as state violence. For instance, up to the 1980s, intimidation and persecution of Moroccan emigrants during their summer holiday return was a common practice (Bouras 2012).

<sup>[15]</sup> It should be noted that due to the recent increase of transit migration and immigrant settlement in Morocco, the country is no longer a sending country only, but also a receiving and transit country, especially for Sub-Saharan African migrants (Berriane, de Haas & Natter 2015).

<sup>[16]</sup> The major source of income constitutes a direct contribution of the Moroccan financial institutions governing migrant remittances, based on a fixed interest rate on emigrant savings (Belguendouz 2006).

<sup>[17]</sup> Every child born to Moroccan parents acquires Moroccan citizenship automatically, no matter the place of birth. As Castles and Davidson (2000) note "*jus sanguinis* has been seen historically as being appropriate for an emigration country... that wishes to retain the allegiance of people who have settled elsewhere" (2000, 85). In practice, for most Moroccan migrant descendants it is part of a dual citizenship.

<sup>[18]</sup> It should be noted that at the time of publication of this article, the position of the MCMRE has shifted again. In the *El Othmani* government (installed in 2017 after parliamentary elections) the MCMRE lost its status as independent ministry. Instead, the emigration portfolio was added to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the first months after the government installation, prior activities of the MCMRE such as the 'Summer Universities' have been continued. It is however unclear how the institutional shift will affect the government's diaspora policies in the long term.

<sup>[19]</sup> The return rate among Moroccans is among the lowest of all immigrant groups in Europe (de Haas 2013). Moreover, only a small portion of returnees has children (Cassarino 2008), implying that the reintegration of children upon permanent return is not a principal issue.

<sup>[10]</sup> The participative working modus was emphasized and illustrated extensively by interviewees at the FHII. Probably, they wanted to counter the (older) image of the FHII as a remnant of Hassan II's paternalist, non-participative approach to governing the diaspora (Iskander 2010, 173-176).