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[ct]Modernism, Mind and Manuscripts[/ct]

[au]Dirk Van Hulle[/au]¹

Why have so many modernist writers kept their manuscripts? In her capacity as director of the manuscript department of the Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Florence Callu (1993) opened a chapter on twentieth-century manuscripts by noting that this is the beginning of a “golden age”: “Commence alore l’âge d’or du manuscrit contemporain. Tout auteur – du plus modeste au plus grand – préserve la moindre note, le moindre ‘tapuscrit’, le moindre placard corrigé comme une relique” (65). Callu’s use of the religious metaphor of relics is appropriate in this context if, as Peter Childs suggests, the “diagnosis of the individual” in literary modernism “came to substitute for religion” (60). If manuscripts are relics of the workings of the mind, it is understandable that many literary modernists preserved them, and this act of preservation can be linked to the content of their works. Manuscripts thus become part of a modernist project, described by Finn Fordham (2010) as “reformulating the self” or “the reconstruction of ideas of selfhood and identity,” which is turned “Inside-Out” in his chapter on “Modernism and the Self”: “Manuscripts – broadly understood – have been underestimated as a potential scene from which such reformulations can be both provoked and described” (35). The program of “reformulating the self” is presented as part of the so-called “shift from outside to inside” (Meisel 2006, 79) that is often associated with literary modernism.

Recent developments in post-cognitivist philosophy, however, question the inside/outside dichotomy with regard to descriptions of the mind. These developments are directly relevant to the study of modernism’s preoccupation with the workings of the mind and representations of consciousness. In narrative theory, concepts from the cognitive sciences and from cognitive philosophy are usefully employed to develop a vocabulary for the analysis of stories, focusing mainly on the *reception* of literary texts. Genetic criticism has the expertise to investigate the relevance of recent developments in cognitive philosophy for the *production* of literary texts. In “Re-Minding Modernism,” David Herman (2011) suggests that modernist writers could be regarded as “*Umwelt* researchers in von Uexküll’s sense – explorers of the lived, phenomenal worlds that emerge from, or are enacted through, the interplay between intelligent agents and their cultural as well as material circumstances” (266). The notion of “*Umwelt*” employed in this context is based on the Estonian biologist Jakob von Uexküll’s coinage, applied to such organisms as the tick. An *Umwelt*, in this biological context, is the organism’s model of the world. It consists of all the meaningful aspects of the world for any particular organism, for example, water, food, shelter, potential threats, or points of reference for navigation. Each organism has a unique history, so each organism also has a different *Umwelt*:

[#]

[ext]Mit der Zahl der Leistungen eines Tieres wächst auch die Anzahl der Gegenstände, die seine Umwelt bevölkern. Sie erhöht sich im Lauf des individuellen Lebens eines jeden Tieres, das Erfahrungen zu sammeln vermag. Denn jede neue Erfahrung bedingt die Neueinstellung gegenüber neuen Eindrücken.

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[As the number of an animal's performances increases, so does the number of objects that populate its *Umwelt*. It increases in the course of the individual life of each animal that is capable of gathering experiences. For every new experience brings about the new attitude to new impressions.] (von Uexküll 1956, 69)[/ext]

[#]

Especially the last sentence in this passage stresses the organism's constant interaction with its surroundings. An organism creates and reshapes its own *Umwelt* every time it interacts with the world. Because of this interaction, mind and world are inseparable. Instead of viewing the world as one entity that contained all living species, stemmatically relatable in a tree of life, von Uexküll came up with the suggestion of a variety of worlds-as-perceived. Von Uexküll's attempt to describe the tick's *Umwelt* is so defamiliarizing that Giorgio Agamben (2002) has called it a pinnacle of modern antihumanism, to be read next to *Ubu Roi* and *Monsieur Teste* (69).

In order to present a world as a world-as-perceived, writers need to be keen observers of the way intelligent agents experience the world. If modernist writers can be regarded as "*Umwelt* researchers," they necessarily start from their own *Umwelt* and their research in its turn becomes part of their *Umwelt*. While performing their research, they also construe their own *Umwelt*, typically by means of manuscripts, which can be regarded as part of what in cognitive philosophy is often referred to as the "extended mind" (Logan 2007; Menary 2010). The present essay investigates the role of manuscripts in these "construals."

[h1]The So-Called "Inward Turn"[/h1]

One of the most conspicuous effects of modernist fiction is its attempt to find new ways of allowing readers to "enter" the minds of its characters. To a large extent, Modernist writers themselves are responsible for creating this commonplace view of the mind as an interior space. Virginia Woolf's rhetoric in essays such as "Mrs. Brown and Mr. Bennett" or "Modern Fiction" not only aimed at creating a rift between her own generation and the previous one, but Woolf (1972) also insisted on the image of "entering" her characters' minds, under the famous motto: "Look within" (106). Although criticism has punctured this rhetoric, the image of "looking within" is persistent. For instance, in his introduction to James Joyce's book project *Stephen Hero*, Theodore Spencer describes Joyce's endeavor as an attempt "to place his centre of action as much as possible *inside* the consciousness of his hero" (Joyce 1969, 17; emphasis added). According to Woolf, "Mr. James Joyce" was the "most notable" exponent of the new generation of authors whose work distinguished itself from the previous generation's. To investigate how this effect of "entering" a mind is achieved, Joyce's writings may serve as a suitable case study.

With reference to criticism of Romanticism, Jerome McGann (1983) pointed out to what extent critics were influenced by the self-images of the Romantics and their writings were "dominated by a Romantic Ideology, by an uncritical absorption in Romanticism's self-representations" (1). To some extent a similar observation applies to twentieth-century criticism of Modernism. The so-called "inward turn," which has become "something of a critical commonplace" (Herman 2011, 249), is based on a Cartesian model of the mind as an interior space. A good example of the critical response to that "inward turn" is the notion of "skullscape" that is frequently used in Beckett studies. For instance, Samuel Beckett's stage setting of *Fin de partie / Endgame* has been interpreted as the inside of a skull. The stage directions do start with a description of a "*Bare interior. Grey light. Left and right back, high up, two small windows, curtains drawn*" (Beckett 2009a, 5). From this "internalist" perspective, the play can be connected to Beckett's early novel *Murphy*, notably the famous chapter 6 about Murphy's mind. But Beckett's extreme examples of the "inward turn" entail a serious criticism of the Cartesian dualism between mind and body. Murphy aspires to pure Cartesianism: "For it was not until his body was appeased that he could come alive in his

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mind, as description in section six. And life in his mind gave him pleasure, such pleasure that pleasure was not the word" (Beckett 2009b, 4). Yet, after the realization that this extreme focus on the "inside" of the mind leads to solipsism, both the body and the mind of Murphy (in the form of his ashes) are eventually scattered among an "external" world that consists of such demented particulars as "the sand, the beer, the butts, the glass, the matches, the spits, the vomit" (171).

The Cartesian mind-body split in terms of an "inside" and an "outside" is not only mocked in *Murphy*, but also criticized by several cognitive philosophers. Daniel C. Dennett refers to Descartes' model as the "Cartesian theatre," suggesting the image of a small theater in the brain, where a tiny homunculus observes and interprets all the incoming sensory data (as if they were projected onto a screen) and where he makes decisions or sends out commands to the limbs – not unlike the way the "homunculus" Hamm commands Clov inside the bare interior of *Endgame*. This homunculus would need a consciousness, which would in its turn necessitate another, even smaller homunculus inside that consciousness, etcetera, ad infinitum.

Instead of this scenario, Dennett suggests another metaphor, which he called the multiple-drafts model. In other words, the research object of genetic criticism serves as a model for the workings of the mind. In Dennett's multiple-drafts model, various sensory inputs from a certain event and various interpretations of these inputs happen at various times. The result is a succession of interpretations, which are comparable to multiple drafts of a narrative. Conscious experience thus appears as a process unfolding in time. The innovating aspect of this model is that it does not posit a clear boundary to separate a conscious experience from all other mental processing.

Another subdiscipline within cognitive sciences that criticizes a Cartesian model is "enactivism," which does not regard cognition as the representation of a pre-given world by a pre-given mind, but as the enactment of a world and a mind on the basis of performances. From this point of view, the modernists attempted, not to "look within," but to study the resulting *Umwelten*, focusing on what David Herman calls "the nexus between intelligent agents and the environments they seek to navigate" (2011, 264). Herman's analysis of the confession scene in *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* is a convincing example of Joyce's complex representation of Stephen Dedalus's mental construals, marked by the interweaving of two systems of understanding:

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[ext]A soft whispering noise floated in vaporous cloudlets out of the [confession] box. It was the woman: soft whispering cloudlets, soft whispering vapor, whispering and vanishing. He beat his breast with his fist humbly, secretly under cover of the wooden armrest. He would be at one with others and with God. He would love his neighbor. (Joyce 2000, 154)[/ext]

[#]

Thanks to Stephen's past interactions with similar environments (churches, chapels), he is familiar with the so-called "protocols" for inhabiting this ecosystem. But while he perceives this environment with his *religious* system of understanding (kneeling, waiting, preparing for confession), his *poetic* system of understanding interferes (the repetitious melopoeia of the "soft whispering" cloudlets and vapor) and the tension between these two systems "suggests the extent to which Stephen oscillates between them, switching back and forth between two ways of orienting himself within his environment via two competing sets of action possibilities" (2011, 259).

The vocabulary developed to describe the interaction between mind and environment in terms of "protocols" corresponds with Daniel Ferrer's important definition of modern

manuscripts as “des protocoles pour la fabrication d’un texte”: “C’est la diversité et la complexité des *instructions* composant ces protocoles qui font du brouillon un espace ouvert, échappant à l’implacable exigence de répétition à laquelle est soumis l’espace textuel” (Ferrer 2011, 182; emphasis added). The definition of modern manuscripts, not as texts but as protocols for making a text, regards them as “instructions,” in function of an afterlife.

But these documents do not only function solely in view of an afterlife; they also have a life of their own, marked by a logic that functions along the lines of what cognitive philosophy calls *enaction*. Activity is central in the enactive approach to the so-called “extended mind,” an approach that focuses on “how the manipulation of environmental vehicles constitutes cognitive processes” (Menary 2010, 21). This is relevant for the study of writing processes, for such an “environmental vehicle” can be a notebook or a draft – which opens perspectives for genetic criticism.

[h1]The Manuscript as “Environmental Vehicle”[/h1]

In the enactivist paradigm of cognitive science, writing is “not a simple derivative transcription of spoken language” but “an integral part of cognitive operations that would be simply impossible on the sole basis of spoken language” (Stewart 2011, 23). While narratology makes these cognitive philosophical concepts operational for narrative analysis, genetic criticism can probe them to analyze the dynamics of the process of writing – which is always a process of *thinking and* writing. In “Writing as Thinking,” Richard Menary (2007) employs his notion of “cognitive integration” to show that the creation and manipulation of “written vehicles” is part of our cognitive processing and to argue that “writing transforms our cognitive abilities” (621).

The eighteenth-century scientist and satirist Georg Christoph Lichtenberg already noted in his notebooks or “Sudelbücher”: “jeder der je geschrieben hat, wird gefunden haben, dass schreiben immer etwas erweckt, was man vorher nicht deutlich erkannte, ob es gleich in uns lag” [“anyone who has ever written will have experienced that writing always awakens something that one had not previously recognized clearly, even though it was lying simply within us”] (Lichtenberg 1968, I.653, notebook J.19). The observation that the act of writing often facilitates the process of thinking is a well-known phenomenon in genetic criticism. In this process of “writing as thinking,” the notion of *invention* plays a central role.

In *Logiques du brouillon: Modèles pour une critique génétique* (2011) Daniel Ferrer defines the discipline of genetic criticism as the science of written invention – “la science de l’invention écrite” (184). The etymology of “invention” (Lat. “in-venire”) is to “come in.” For Joyceans, this etymology is reminiscent of a famous anecdote about Samuel Beckett’s contribution to the composition process of *Finnegans Wake* – which was at that point still called “Work in Progress.” According to the biographer Richard Ellmann, Joyce was dictating to Beckett. When Joyce asked him to read what he had written, Beckett read it out loud and arrived at a passage that said: “come in.” Joyce interrupted Beckett and asked him where this “come in” came from. ““Yes, you said that,” said Beckett,” according to the biographer. “Joyce thought for a moment, then said, ‘Let it stand.’ He was quite willing to accept coincidence as his collaborator” (Ellmann 1983, 649). Whether this anecdote is true or not, it keeps being recounted. While Joyce’s biographer introduced it, Beckett’s official biographer, James Knowlson, questioned it, arguing that “it has proved hard for scholars to find the unintended words in the finished text” (1996, 99). Of course, if we really wanted to verify this anecdote, it would not suffice to examine the finished text; we would need to check hundreds of manuscript pages. But that is not the point here. The point is the tenacity of the anecdote, possibly because it confirms a common view on Joycean “invention” as a form of “coming in.”

This “coming in” presents us with a metaphor – or a “model” in the sense of the “modèles pour une critique génétique” in Daniel Ferrer’s *Logiques du brouillon* – in which

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not so much the author is the in-ventor, but something else, coming in from somewhere else. If this "somewhere else" is to be conceived as an "outside," it is important that, whatever it is that "comes in," it enters the *manuscripts* rather than the mind of the author. If the "come in" model of "invention" suggests an out/in metaphor, it is the outside and inside of "exogenesis" and "endogenesis," not the in/out of the mind/body dualism à la Descartes.

Raymonde Debray Genette coined the terms exogenesis and endogenesis in her article "Génétique et poétique: le cas Flaubert" (1979). Whereas exogenesis relates to the gathering of external information and materials, endogenesis focuses on the actual writing of drafts, including the processing, assimilation, appropriation, or absorption of this external information in the author's own work. As Pierre-Marc de Biasi (1996) indicates, the border zone between these two domains is necessarily vague since "the exogenetic procedure contains within itself the principle of its own effacement by writing" (46).

In spite of the recent recognition within the cognitive sciences of the role of writing in cognitive processes, there is still some skepticism among theorists of genetic criticism, who feel it is necessary to distinguish their discipline from the cognitive sciences before trying to find a common ground, as explored in articles (Lumbroso 2005; Lebrave 2010), lectures (Bernini, Oxford, October 31, 2011) and genetic colloquia (Aachen 2010; Antwerp 2011, "Figures of Thought: Between Thinking and Writing"). The word "versus" in the title ("Kognitive Forschung versus *critique génétique*") of Louis Hay's contribution to the latter, for instance, indicates the apparent need for a clear delineation, before an interdisciplinary exchange of views can take place. The reticence is understandable if cognitive sciences are understood in the cognitivist sense of an internalist conception of mind. The task of the genetic critic, according to Louis Hay, is to act as a ferryman between the universe of the writer and that of the reader – "Il lui faut être le passeur entre l'univers des écrivains et celui des lecteurs, faire que le livre, dans leur main, ne reste pas un objet, mais vive encore de toutes les vies qu'il a traversées" (Hay 2002, 30). The concrete, material objects (manuscripts) are the starting point of genetic criticism. "Face à des traces ostensibles (...) elle peut passer du régime de la spéculation à celui de l'observation et dire *comment les choses se sont faites*" (19).

On the other hand, Daniel Ferrer (2011) insists that the research object of genetic criticism is *not* material; what it studies is "l'objet immatériel qu'est le processus d'écriture" (185). Regarding this process of writing, Louis Hay and Almuth Grésillon have suggested a dichotomy between *écriture à programme* and *écriture à processus* (Grésillon 1994). The "intelligent agents" enacting these forms of *écriture* all belong to what the editorial theorist Siegfried Scheibe called "Papierarbeiter" or "paper workers," because only paper workers leave palpable traces (Van Hulle 2008, 47). Scheibe's other category is called "Kopfarbeiter" or "mind workers" in the sense of writers who conceptualize their literary work in their "heads" before putting pen to paper – according to the traditional, cognitivist opinion that the head is where the mind resides. But if this traditional dichotomy does not hold, according to post-cognitivist theories, and the mind should be regarded as "extended," the so-called "paper workers" are actually the kind of authors whose manuscripts show the mind at work.

Evidently, genetic criticism is not the science that "enters the author's mind" and investigates what goes on "inside"; that is not its field of expertise. But if the mind is by definition "extended" and the manuscripts are considered as part of the writer's *Umwelt*, the workings of the writer's mind can be "triangulated" or "trilaterated." In this respect, modernist manuscripts could serve as a GPS of modernist studies, a useful tool for what Herman (2011) dubbed "Remapping Modernism / Modernist Remappings: New Geographies of Mind" (254) and the study of the way in which intelligent agents navigate their

environments. Through the use of “reflectors” Henry James already tried to embed the characters’ construals of events into the discourse of narration. If modernists can be said to have “sought to develop an even finer-grained representation of the form and flow of mental activities as they unfolded in time” (247), the techniques they devised are not limited to interior monologue and stream of consciousness, punctuated by “moments of being,” “*mémoires involontaires*,” or “epiphanies.”

[h1]Non-Epiphanies[/h1]

To some extent, Joyce already parodied his own method of the epiphany as soon as he had developed it. Gabriel Conroy’s famous epiphany toward the end of “The Dead,” marked by the two stylistic X figures of the double antimetabole “softly falling” / “falling softly” and “faintly falling” / “falling faintly,” is parodied in the endings of the chapters of *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*, most conspicuously at the end of chapter 4: “soft and slight / slight and soft” (Joyce 2000, 186). Joyce’s gradual distancing from the notion of “epiphany” in the sense of a “sudden spiritual manifestation, whether in the vulgarity of speech or of gesture or in a memorable *phase of the mind* itself” – as Stephen defines it in *Stephen Hero* (Joyce 1969, 216; emphasis added) – does not necessarily mean that moments of crystallization or sudden comprehension cannot occur, but it suggests the realization that, if such privileged moments occur at all, they do so thanks to intense construal processes and they often have a supportive rather than a climactic function in these processes, as Scott Berkun (2010) has pointed out: “The myth of epiphany tempts us to believe that the magic moment is the grand catalyst; however, all evidence points to its more supportive role” (8). When Stephen speaks of a “memorable phase in the mind itself,” the notion of a “phase” suggests a series of mental activities unfolding in time.

If one were to apply this epiphanoid paradigm to Joyce’s own work, a most “memorable phase” would be his shift of focus from a preoccupation with epiphanies to a more empathetic form of “*Umwelt* research.” This is a paradox because the shift was not a “sudden spiritual manifestation,” but a gradual process. As the number of an animal’s performances increases, according to von Uexküll, so does the number of objects that populate its *Umwelt* (69; cf. supra) and every new experience brings about a new attitude to new impressions. In the world of James Joyce, at least one new attitude is incarnated by Leopold Bloom. In the very first chapter in which he is introduced in *Ulysses*, he bends down to his cat and wonders what a cat’s *Umwelt* looks like: “They call them stupid. They understand what we say better than we understand them. She understands all she wants to. Vindictive too. Cruel. Her nature. Curious mice never squeal. Seem to like it. Wonder what I look like to her. Height of a tower? No, she can jump me” (Joyce 1993, 45). Bloom effortlessly switches from the first “They” to the second “They,” from an anthropocentric perspective (“They call them stupid”) to a feline point of view (“They understand what we say ...”). This is precisely the kind of mental experiment Jakob von Uexküll performs in order to “see the world through the eye of a fly,” or, in more general terms, “eine Anschauung der *Umwelt* eines Tieres zu gewinnen” [to gain an impression of an animal’s *Umwelt*] (39). The title of von Uexküll’s work would, for that matter, make an excellent candidate in a Monty Pythonesque “Summarize *Ulysses* Contest”: Streifzüge durch die Umwelten von Tieren und Menschen [A Stroll through the Worlds of Animals and Men].

From a genetic point of view it is interesting that this scene of Bloom and the cat on the opening page of chapter 4 of *Ulysses* was developed in several phases. Only at a late stage in the process of composition – in the bottom margin of the first page proofs – did Joyce add the crucial lines reflecting Bloom’s mental research into the cat’s *Umwelt*. And this addition in its turn consists of two writing phases, for within the autograph addition, Joyce added yet another perspective, the point of view of mice. “Vindictive too. ^{Cruel. Her nature. Curious mice never} squeal. Seem to like it. Wonder what I look like to her. Height of a tower? No, she can jump me”

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(*JJA* 22, 173). Bloom's empathetic ability to put himself in other positions is the accumulated result of multiple drafts or phases in Joyce's *Umwelt* research.

Joyce's development as an *Umwelt* researcher could be described in terms of a shift of emphasis from a narrow focus on "memorable phases" to the complex process of the numerous other phases that make up the mind. These phases are the equivalent of what Daniel Dennett described in terms of "multiple drafts." It is of course just a metaphor, but it is a metaphor not only we live by (as Lakoff and Johnson would put it), but especially a metaphor many literary modernists lived by, often only gradually realizing the many complex implications of this metaphor. If the use of "reflectors" was a way of embedding the characters' construals of events into the discourse of narration, Joyce's vagueness of the notion of character in *Finnegans Wake* can be interpreted as a method of embedding in the discourse of narration the *process* of "enaction" (rather than the *products* in the form of "construals"). "*Umwelt* researchers" such as James Joyce seem to have done important spadework for post-cognitivist researchers to be able to demythologize the myth of epiphany and understand the workings of the mind in a more enactive sense. Scott Berkun compares the notion of epiphany to working on a jigsaw puzzle. The last piece that is put into place is only significant because of all the others that have been put into place before; what matters, according to Berkun, is not so much "the magic moment" but "the work before and after" (8). Against this background, Joyce's procedure in his "Work in Progress" demythologizes the epiphany, and to a large extent his manuscripts enable us to reconstruct some of that work.

[h1]Case study[/h1]

A suitable case to examine the topical issue regarding the interplay of modernism, mind, and manuscripts is a note that eventually turned out to be important in the development of *Finnegans Wake*. When shortly after finishing *Ulysses* James Joyce took notes from a newspaper in a notebook, he did not yet have a clear idea of what his next work was going to be. To a journalist he claimed that he was going to write a "history of the world," but if and how this was going to take shape was far from established. When he read the *Daily Sketch* of December 14, 1922, he came across a petition regarding a murder trial (a source text discovered by Vincent Deane). A man called Frederick Bywaters had murdered the husband of his beloved Edith Thompson. In spite of an appeal and petitions for reprieve, the murderer was eventually hanged on January 9, 1923, and so was Edith Thompson, as she was considered an accessory to the murder. From the petition for reprieve that appeared in the *Daily Sketch*, Joyce excerpted several opinions, notably the following one:

[#]

[ext]Three soldiers were walking in Fleetstreet: one gave an opinion in which all concurred. It was the woman who was to blame. Bywaters played a bad part in the crime, but he was coerced. He proved himself a man afterwards. (*Daily Sketch*, 14 December 1922; qtd. in Deane, Ferrer, and Lernout 2001, 10)[/ext]

[#]

When Joyce excerpted this passage (almost literally) in his notebook (VI.B.10, p. 71), it was simply a note among numerous others. Not until October 1923, almost one year later, did Joyce realize that it might be interesting for his new work. He started writing sections of this "Work in Progress" in a copybook that opens with the word "Guiltless" (preserved in the British Library, BL MS 27271b). This first word already indicates how Joyce was conceptualizing his new work at that moment: if his next book was going to be a history of the world it would be a history as perceived and construed by people. The protagonist of his "Work in Progress" might or might not have been involved in some vague crime, but it was crucial that the text would never plainly state the truth about what actually happened. The

whole book can be regarded as a tangle of interrelated construals. Once a character claims that the protagonist is “Guiltless,” that very construal can be interpreted as a sign that at least something fishy must be going on. From the lack of sufficient information each character construes his or her own narrative. And these construals are constantly readjusted as soon as new elements in the character’s surroundings are picked up or overheard.

As soon as Joyce saw the potential of the note on the three soldiers and assimilated it in his text, it became an intertextual note. The first draft version reads:

[#]

[ext]Three soldiers of the Coldstream Guards were walking in Montgomery street. One gave an opinion in which all concurred. It was the women, they said; he showed himself a man afterwards. (BL MS 47471b, page 3recto)[/ext]

[#]

As the work “progressed” and the plot thickened, so did the phrasing of the passage:

[#]

[ext]Three tommix, soldiers, free, cockaleak and capparee, of the Coldstream. Guards were walking, in (*pardonnez-leur, je vous en prie, eh?*) Montgomery Street. One voiced an opinion in which on either wide (*pardonnez!*), nodding, all the Finner Camps concurred (*je vous en prie, eh?*). It was the first woman, they said, souped him, that fatal welluesday, Lili Coninghams, by suggesting him they go in a field. Wroth mod eldfar, ruth redd stiland, wrath wrackt wroth, confessed private Pat Marchison *retro*. (Terse!) (Joyce 1939, 58)[/ext]

[#]

The intertext is still recognizable, but no matter how important the source text once was, the “thickening” elements are just as important, since they indicate the degree of interaction between exogenesis and endogenesis. The note plays an important role as a point of interplay between the two domains.

Among Joyce’s notes, and among notes by other modernists as well, there are at least two different kinds of jottings: intertextual notes and conceptual notes. Conceptual notes are intuitively considered more important in literary studies than intertextual ones. In 1995, David Hayman denoted “source hunting” as “philological spadework,” making a clear distinction between those “who limit themselves to the philological tasks” and “we others” (8). Hayman may have been right in urging “source hunters” to use “the implications of such findings (...) to disclose something about the text and its procedures,” but at the same time an emphasis on the critical interpretation of notes should not lead to a neglect of the philological spadework (8). Confronted with handwritten notes, it is tempting to regard them as conceptual notes rather than “merely” intertextual ones. First of all, philological “spadework” or “source hunting” requires diligent research that can be extremely time-consuming; moreover, intertextual notes may turn out to be simply excerpts from an uninteresting newspaper article that eventually did not make it into the published text. If, on the other hand, one prefers to treat them as conceptual notes, one regards them as potentially important steps in the conception of the literary work. In 1999, David Hayman suggested the term “epiphanoiding” for a particular, Joycean form of conceptualizing his work. As an example, he quoted a series of notes from the same notebook VI.B.10 (pp. 77 and 78):

[#]

[verse] It’s [a] comedy or smthg. Lord, I’m tired yawning (...)

child to father – Aren’t we a pair of young rascals

Joyce (DB) / tugs at heartstrings

~~Jackie Coogan believes in caveman attitude to W~~ (qtd. in Hayman 1999, 37)[/verse]

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Hayman regarded this as an “epiphanoid” and interpreted it as follows: “The first item probably records [Joyce’s wife] Nora’s reaction to a book, but its glory derives from its wit

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and from the absurdity of her colloquial phrasing, her being 'tired yawning'" (37). In the transcription by the editors of the *Finnegans Wake Notebooks at Buffalo*, however, the first line does not read "It's [a] comedy or smthg" but "It's windy or smthg" (Deane et al. 2001, 94), which makes Hayman's interpretation less plausible. Regarding the other entries quoted above, Hayman admitted that they may have been taken from "a newspaper" (as Vincent Deane suggested to him), but nonetheless he proposed that "Joyce is treating it as a personal epiphanoid"; even with regard to the last item relating to Jackie Coogan, the child star from the silent movie *The Kid*, Hayman wrote that he was "tempted" to treat it as an epiphanoid "because its implications are personal and wry in a way characteristic of Joyce's wit" (38–39).

As Vincent Deane has shown, these items do not just derive from "a newspaper" but from the same newspaper as the Bywaters notes, the *Daily Sketch* of December 21, 1922, the day that was set for the (unsuccessful) appeal in the Bywaters case. "Joycey" for instance is based on the *faits divers* page, mentioning that "Many of my friends are going to the Côte d'Azur by sea [...] Vi Lorraine (Mrs Edward Joicey) is making this journey next week" (qtd. in Deane et al. 2001, 95). The note was taken from a section in the newspaper called "Echoes of the Town and Round About." It is telling that these trivialities are presented as "Echoes" – not the direct sound, but an indirect, roundabout reverberation. From the same page Joyce took the note about Coogan's belief in "the cave-man attitude to women" (qtd. in Deane et al. 2001, 95). In the endogenetic writing process (more specifically in his first draft), Joyce used this line in the same paragraph as the three soldiers. And he opened the previous paragraph with a line based on yet another note from VI.B.10 (p. 39): "these data, did we possess them, are too complex." In the first draft, this became: "The data, did we possess them, are too few to warrant certitude" and in the first typescript Joyce crossed out the word "data," replacing it by "unfacts" (British Library MS 47472-150; *JJA* 45, 189).

The data James Joyce himself worked with were sentences he snatched from his surroundings, such as one of the three soldiers' opinion in which all concurred: "It was the woman. He proved himself a man afterwards" (qtd. in Deane et al. 2001, 86) In the first draft, Joyce subtly changed the "woman" into plural "women" and "proved" into "showed": "he showed himself a man afterwards." One of the vague accusations made against the protagonist of *Finnegans Wake* is his so-called crime in Phoenix Park, Dublin. Judging from hearsay, this may have consisted in exposing himself to two girls or women. Taken out of its original context and placed in the new context of gossip and scandalmongering, the line with the changed verb ("he showed himself a man afterwards") suddenly became very ambiguous. But if exposing himself was the actual crime, the information was too explicit to run the gossip factory and in the typescript Joyce turned the "data" into an "unfact" by crossing out the line "~~He showed himself a man afterwards.~~" (BL MS 47472-150; *JJA* 45, 189). The whole book, Joyce's "history of the world," thus turns around a void – "In the buginning is the woid" (Joyce 1939, 378.29).

[h1](De)composition, Bricolage, and Worldmaking[/h1]

To the extent that *Finnegans Wake* can be read as a huge speculation about the protagonist's crime in the park, the idea of taking away the piece of the puzzle that allows one to suddenly see the whole picture ("~~he showed himself a man~~") is an excellent way of drawing attention to what Berkun called "the work before and after." This cancellation is an interesting example of the role of decomposition in the composition process. In *Logiques du brouillon*, Daniel Ferrer describes the subject of genetic criticism as a "dialectique de l'invention écrite" (185), that is, invention consists of a dialectics between composition and decomposition. Ferrer suggests that this notion of invention opens up the possibility of a larger relevance of genetic studies as

genetic criticism could make an important contribution to the study of invention in our everyday lives, and even of the invention *of* our everyday lives (181). Especially Ferrer's exploration of possible worlds toward the end of his book is an important step in that direction. Notably the notion of bricolage could serve as a catalyst in order to find possible points of common interest between post-cognitivist philosophy and genetic criticism, especially against the background of modernism's preoccupation with consciousness. Modern manuscripts could be regarded as part of an *Umwelt* and reflect various "Ways of Worldmaking." And as Nelson Goodman already noted in 1978, "worldmaking (...) always starts from worlds already on hand; the making is a remaking": "The many stuffs (...) that worlds are made of are made along with worlds" (6).

A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man is thus a remaking of *Stephen Hero*, and *Finnegans Wake* is made of such "stuff" as *faits divers* from newspapers like the *Daily Sketch*. The source may be trivial, but precisely the triviality seems important: Joyce's notes from the *Daily Sketch* illustrate his research into the "nexus between intelligent agents and the environments they seek to navigate" (Herman 2011, 264). The cluster of notes is neither an "epiphanoid" nor a "conceptual note," and yet it is important because it is an excellent illustration of the workings of the extended mind. If modernists can be regarded as "*Umwelt* researchers" (266), and if genetic criticism has the potential to make a contribution to the study of invention in our everyday lives, and even of the invention *of* our everyday lives (Ferrer 2011, 181; cf. supra), it might be possible to find common points of interest between the narratologist's and the genetic critic's views precisely in the area of post-cognitivist research: the extended mind as it functions, both in (i) the researcher's *Umwelt* (the writing as process) and in (ii) the *Umwelt* research (the writing as product).

(i) The researcher's *Umwelt*: although it is impossible to "enter" the mind of James Joyce in the cognitivist sense, it is possible to make a triangulation between the newspaper article, the note, and the first "construal" (the first-draft version). More notebook research on the period between December 14, 1922 and October 1923 might result in a more precise account of the way the first draft was construed. This triangulation could lead to a more precise mapping of what in a German-speaking context is more readily referred to as "conceptualization" than in a Francophone context or in an Anglophone context, which may prefer the notion of "crystallization." The more important question for modernism studies, however, is what this yields for modernist writings as "*Umwelt* research."

(ii) The *Umwelt* research: if the modernists' aim was not so much to "look within" – as Woolf formulated it – but to explore and map *Umwelten*, the anti-Cartesian multiple-drafts model suggested by Dennett may be an interesting model to find correspondences between the researcher's *Umwelt* (the process of "writing as thinking") and the *Umwelt* research (in the published text or the writing as product). The post-Cartesian, enactivist framework sheds new light on Modernist narratives and the way they create the effect of a fictional world as it is perceived and experienced. Even though Virginia Woolf presented the endeavor to represent consciousness in terms of an inward/outward opposition, many modernists were remarkably sensitive to the process-like nature of the mind and its inseparability from its surroundings. The nexus between the mind and its environment is a constant process of interaction that helps constitute the mind in the first place. This process is sometimes more evident in modernists' manuscripts than in their published texts, and given the literary modernist preoccupation with the mind, it is therefore no wonder that so many of them did preserve their manuscripts.

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