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Organism or Machine?

Climate Change Frames and Frame-Building in Mainstream and Alternative
Media in Flanders

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Foreword and Acknowledgements

Where do the origins of this doctoral thesis lie?

In the scholarship granted to the applied linguistics department to encourage academic research, briefly after the embedding of the department into the super structure of the VUB?

In the minds of my supervisors, who wrote down a project proposal, being fully aware of the importance of environmental and climate communication at the beginning of the twenty-first century?

In my own concern for the environment, emboldened by my upbringing, media reports, my personal experiences? In the growing awareness that I – and most people around me – are losing, or have lost, a connection with nature and the larger world around us?

In any case, over the last four years, my doctoral thesis has grown into a very personal project, nourishing my own life views: I have fully realized the embeddedness of the climate problem in our society and minds, have become more aware of the close interconnection between humans and non-humans, and the complexity of the human-natural world in general, and have started to respect more the views of others and to prioritize other values in my own life. Accordingly, I have started to change some of my deeply ingrained habits: I have become a ‘flexanist’, have tried to reduce air miles, to re- and upcycle more or to look for other, more environment-friendly and local alternatives when eating, shopping, travelling, living. I hope this research has and will inspire others in comparable ways, to start changing their hearts and habits.

However, this doctoral thesis is more than a personal project. Many people have directly or indirectly inspired me, supported me and contributed to this end-result:

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My supervisor during my Bachelor and Master in the Languages and Linguistics at the University of Ghent, professor Jacques van Keymeulen, who was the first to plant the seed of a PhD in my mind.

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Summary in English

Climate change is, arguably, *the* global threat of the twenty-first century (IPCC, 2014a, 2014b). Therefore, humanity is called to action. All action starts with perception, cognition, emotion, communication. In short, it starts with framing (e.g. Bilandzic, Kalch & Soetgen, 2017). However, depending on the frame (e.g. ‘economic challenge frame’ versus ‘human rights frame’), other causes and problems are foregrounded, other ethical considerations come to the fore, other actions become likely, feasible or even indispensable (Entman, 1993, 2004). As surveys (e.g. Eurobarometer, 2014) have shown that people’s engagement and willingness to act are at a low ebb, researchers have called for more effective types of frames which are better able to encourage the public to think and act in ‘favourable ways’ (e.g. Lakoff, 2010). In this dissertation, however, I will criticize this dominant ‘anthropocentric’ type of framing for ‘depoliticizing’ the climate debate (e.g. Pepermans, 2015): They approach the audience as passive consumers, who must be ‘steered’ towards the so-called ‘rational consensus’. However, this view mainly supports and reproduces the interests of small groups of elites. Put differently, they fail to fundamentally criticize the development thinking of the capitalist-liberalist project (Brulle, 2010). Nevertheless, only few researchers recognize the hegemonic colour of their frames (e.g. Maesele, 2010). This may, at least partly, be due to the ways in which framing and frames are often conceptualized and operationalized. For instance, frames are often separated from their underlying argumentations and, thus, ideological interests. Also, the visual and verbal modes are usually separated, while the full – and often subtle, ideological – meanings of a frame can only be found in the interaction of both modes (e.g. Coleman, 2010). Furthermore, many researchers do not allow (their) hegemonic views to interact with alternative perspectives, which are more likely to appear in the context of, among others, (progressive) alternative media. I will use the ‘machine’ metaphor (Verhagen, 2008) – clustering features like decontextualization, hierarchy, unilateralism, quantity – to define both the anthropocentric character of the dominant (sub)frames as well as the dominant framing (theories,) methods and empirical applications. Accordingly, I will argue that both the climate and the academic (framing) debate need politicization in order to go beyond the (hegemonic) consensus view. Citizens from all kinds of backgrounds must be allowed to interact and actively participate in climate discussions. They may collectively help to instigate fundamental change, questioning the hegemonic perspectives and providing alternatives in the interest of the whole ecological system. I will connect this type of framing to a biocentric worldview, which has the ‘organism’ as a pivotal metaphor (e.g. Verhagen, 2008). The features that characterize the organism – debate, openness, interaction, inclusiveness, equality, complexity, contextualization – may also constitute a guiding line for the ways in which the framing (concept,) method and empirical application may be approached and operationalized.

Firstly, in an attempt to approach framing in a more ‘organic’ way, I will present a multi-level and multimodal framing analysis toolkit, drawing on earlier proposals and a wide range of insights from

backgrounds like critical discourse analysis, (eco)linguistics or photography and film studies. Each of the levels will deal with one of the functions or workings of frames, while the model will also shed more light on the various ways in which the visual and verbal modes may elaborate, enhance or extend each other. I will, in particular, try to contribute to the further development of multimodal reasoning devices and salience enhancing devices: Both issues are not – or only lightly – touched upon by most other (empirical) framing studies. As such – operationalizing the presented theoretical views on framing – this study may help to fill a (methodological) gap in the framing literature.

This methodological toolkit will be tested and applied on a corpus of 1.256 climate news articles published in three mainstream newspapers (*De Standaard* (broadsheet, centrist), *De Morgen* (broadsheet, leftist) and *Het Laatste Nieuws* (popular, liberal roots)) and two progressive alternative outlets (the online outlet *DeWereldMorgen* and the news website of the magazine *MO**) in Flanders. This empirical application will allow to propose and discuss an extensive set of five climate change frames, ten ideologically coloured subframes and two masterframes which, I believe, may help to illustrate and make tangible the hegemonic struggles in the context of frames (Carragee & Roefs, 2004). Besides, I will show how the Biocentric Subframes are more likely to engage a broader audience – employing strategies such as deconstruction-reconstruction, global awareness, collective responsibility, contextualized conflict or resonant values – without depoliticizing the debate. A brief quantitative discussion will highlight the prevalence of the various types of (sub)frames across the media outlets, particularly the mainstream and alternative outlets. Finally, two case studies will discuss the Environmental Justice and Cycles of Nature Frames in more detail, illustrating how exactly (sub)frames take shape in multimodal texts and how the framing analysis toolkit may help to excavate the underlying ideological struggles among anthropocentric and biocentric worldviews. The differential approaches to and operationalizations of justice – a key concept in the climate discussion – will be dealt with in greater depth.

Finally, I will transfer the ‘machine-organism’ dualism to the context of frame-building. Directly connecting journalist frames and the influences that affect the decision-making with the climate change frames in news texts, I will attempt to (partly) trace the Anthropocentric and Biocentric Subframes throughout the framing process. This is important, as insights into the origin of frames may help us to better grasp the (ideological / hegemonic) implications and potential meanings of frames. The multi-method approach will combine interviews with 26 ‘climate journalists’ with a framing analysis of 114 climate change articles produced by the reporters. Presenting mainstream newsrooms as ‘machines’ and alternative newsrooms as ‘organisms’, I will empirically illustrate and explicate the thesis that mainstream media are more likely to depoliticize the debate while (progressive) alternative media are more inclined to politicize it.

Based on these findings, the dissertation will conclude by providing six points of advice which may help all communicators – working in academia, journalism, non-profit, politics or society at large – to evolve towards a more organic and constructive type of communication: modesty, transparency, inclusiveness and interaction, contextualization, deconstruction-reconstruction, quality over quantity.

Nederlandstalige Samenvatting

Er bestaat weinig twijfel over: Klimaatverandering is wellicht *de* globale dreiging van de ééentwintigste eeuw (IPCC, 2014a, 2014b). De mensheid moet actie ondernemen. Actie begint echter bij perceptie, cognitie, emotie, communicatie. Kortom, het start bij framing (bijv., Bilandzic, Kalch & Soetgen, 2017). Afhankelijk van het frame (bijv. ‘Economische Uitdaging’ versus ‘Mensenrechten’) worden andere oorzaken en problemen belicht, komen andere ethische overwegingen op de voorgrond, worden bepaalde acties waarschijnlijker, haalbaarder of zelfs onontbeerlijk (Entman, 1993, 2004). Enquêtes bij het grote publiek (bijv., Eurobarometer, 2014) hebben aangetoond dat zowel de algemene betrokkenheid en verontrusting, maar ook de bereidheid om actie te ondernemen niet erg groot zijn. Onderzoekers hebben daarom opgeroepen op zoek te gaan naar frames die een groter potentieel hebben om het publiek te engageren en hen aan te moedigen om op ‘gunstigere manieren’ te denken en te handelen (bijv. Lakoff, 2010). In dit proefschrift zal ik echter deze dominante groep van ‘Antropocentrische Frames’ kritisch belichten, vanuit de overtuiging dat ze vooral bijdragen tot een ‘gedepoliteerd’ klimaatdebat (bijv. Pepermans, 2015): Ze benaderen het publiek als passieve consumenten, die in de richting van de zogenaamde ‘rationele consensus’ gestuurd dienen te worden. Die visie ondersteunt en bevestigt echter vooral de belangen van een kleine elitegroep. Met andere woorden, zulke frames slagen er niet in om het ontwikkelingsdenken van het kapitalistisch-liberaal project fundamenteel in vraag te stellen (Brulle, 2010). Toch erkennen maar weinig onderzoekers dat hun frames een ‘hegemonische kleur’ hebben (zie echter Maesele, 2010). Dit heeft – minstens voor een deel – te maken met de manier waarop framing en frames doorgaans gedefinieerd en geoperationaliseerd worden. Bijvoorbeeld, frames worden vaak gescheiden van hun onderliggende argumentaties en dus ideologische belangen. Ook het verbale en visuele luik worden meestal losgekoppeld, terwijl de volledige – en vaak subtiele, ideologische – betekenis van frames pas ten volle tot uiting komt in visueel-verbale interacties (bijv. Coleman, 2010). Veel onderzoekers laten bovendien (hun) hegemonische perspectieven niet in dialoog treden met alternatieve visies. Die komen vaker voor in de context van, onder meer, (progressieve) alternatieve media. Ik zal de metafoer van de ‘machine’ (Verhagen, 2008) gebruiken om zowel het antropocentrische karakter van de dominante (sub)frames als de dominante framing(theorieën,) -methodes en -toepassingen te omschrijven. Die metafoer staat immers voor eigenschappen als decontextualisering, hiërarchie, unilateralisme, individualisme of kwantiteit (eerder dan kwaliteit). Ik zal, bijgevolg, argumenteren dat zowel het klimaat als het academisch (framing)debat nood hebben aan ‘politisering’, om de (hegemonische) consensusvisie te kunnen overstijgen. Burgers

van allerlei achtergronden moeten met elkaar in discussie kunnen treden en actief kunnen participeren in het klimaatdebat. Zo kunnen ze collectief bijdragen tot fundamentele veranderingen, door het hegemonische perspectief in vraag te stellen en alternatieven aan te brengen in het belang van het hele ecologische systeem. Ik zal dit soort frames verbinden met een biocentrische wereldvisie, die het ‘organisme’ als centrale metafoor heeft (bijv. Verhagen, 2008). De eigenschappen die het organisme karakteriseren – debat, openheid, interactie, inclusiviteit, gelijkheid, complexiteit, contextualisering – kunnen ook een leidraad vormen voor de manier waarop framing, als methode, concept en toepassing, kan worden benaderd.

Met dit doel voor ogen zal ik, ten eerste, een meerlagige en multimodale framinganalysetoolkit introduceren, geïnspireerd door eerdere modellen en de inzichten uit een breed spectrum van disciplines en achtergronden, zoals kritische discoursanalyse, (eco)linguïstiek of fotografie- en filmstudies. Elk niveau van dit model focust op een van de functies van het frame. Bovendien zal de methode aantonen hoe het visuele en het verbale luik van frames elkaar op verschillende manieren kunnen aanvullen, uitbreiden, nuanceren of in een ander licht plaatsen. De toolkit zal, in het bijzonder, proberen bij te dragen aan de verdere ontwikkeling van multimodale ‘reasoning devices’ en ‘salience enhancing devices’: Beide worden niet – of slechts oppervlakkig – uitgewerkt in het merendeel van de bestaande (empirische) framing studies. Op deze manier wil deze studie – die ook de geïntroduceerde concepten en theoretische discussies zal koppelen aan / vertalen naar de methodologie – een hiaat in de bestaande framingliteratuur vullen.

De methodologische toolkit zal getest en toegepast worden op een corpus van 1.256 nieuwsartikelen rond klimaat die gepubliceerd werden in drie mainstream kranten (*De Standaard* (kwaliteitskrant die zich in het ideologische centrum positioneert), *De Morgen* (een eerder linkse kwaliteitskrant) en *Het Laatste Nieuws* (een populaire krant met liberale achtergrond)) en twee progressieve alternatieve media (het online mediaplatform *DeWereldMorgen* en de website van *MO* Magazine*) in Vlaanderen. Op basis van deze empirische toepassing zal ik een uitgebreide frameset introduceren en bespreken: vijf klimaatveranderingsframes, tien ideologisch gekleurde subframes en twee overkoepelende masterframes. Ik ben van mening dat deze kunnen helpen om de ‘hegemonische strijd’ in de context van frames verder bloot te leggen (Carragee & Roefs, 2004). Bovendien zal ik aantonen waarom de Biocentrische Subframes – die inspelen op strategieën zoals deconstructie-reconstructie, globaal bewustzijn, collectieve verantwoordelijkheid, gecontextualiseerd conflict of universele waarden – beter in staat zijn om een breder publiek te engageren, zonder het debat te depolitiseren. Een korte kwantitatieve discussie zal aantonen hoe vaak de verschillende soorten (sub)frames voorkomen in de diverse mediatypes, in het bijzonder de mainstream en alternatieve publicaties. Twee case studies zullen, tot slot, het Rechtvaardigheidsframe en het Cyclische Natuurframe in meer detail belichten. De discussie zal illustreren hoe (sub)frames exact vorm kunnen krijgen in multimodale teksten en hoe de

methodologische toolkit precies kan helpen om de onderliggende ideologische strijd tussen antropocentrische en biocentrische wereldvisies naar boven te brengen. Rechtvaardigheid, en de verschillende manieren waarop het begrip benaderd en gedefinieerd kan worden, zal centraal staan in deze discussies. Tenslotte is rechtvaardigheid *het* centrale begrip in de klimaatdiscussie.

Tot slot zal ik ook de ‘machine-organisme’-tegenstelling overbrengen naar de context van framebuilding. Door de mentale frames van de journalisten en de invloeden of beperkingen op de besluitvorming direct te verbinden met de klimaatframes in de nieuwsteksten, zal ik proberen om de Antropocentrische en Biocentrische Subframes te traceren doorheen het framingproces. Dat zal ik doen door analyses van interviews met 26 ‘klimaatjournalisten’ te combineren met de resultaten van een framinganalyse op basis van 114 klimaatartikels geproduceerd door deze journalisten. Dat kan belangrijke inzichten opleveren: uiteindelijk kunnen we de (ideologische / hegemonische) implicaties en potentiële betekenis van frames pas ten volle inschatten als we ook de oorsprong van frames kennen en begrijpen. Door mainstream redacties te benaderen als ‘machines’ en alternatieve redacties als ‘organismen’, zal ik de stelling dat mainstream media depolitiseren en alternatieve media politiseren verder onderbouwen en uitwerken.

Op basis van die bevindingen zal deze doctoraatsdissertatie afsluiten met zes punten van advies die elke communicator – zowel diegenen die actief zijn in de academische wereld als in de journalistiek, de non-profitsector, de politiek of de maatschappij in het algemeen – kunnen helpen om te evolueren in de richting van communicatie die, door haar organisch karakter, een meer constructieve rol kan spelen. Kernwoorden zijn: bescheidenheid, transparantie, inclusiviteit en interactie, contextualisering, deconstructie en reconstructie, en kwaliteit (eerder dan kwantiteit).

1 Introduction

1.1 Climate Change: Global Problem, Unequal Risks

Climate change can, arguably, be considered as *the global threat of the twenty-first century*. Over the last decades, the scientific consensus regarding the existence of the problem and the responsibility of humans has been growing. The synthesis report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change states (IPCC, 2014b) for example:

Human influence on the climate system is clear, and recent anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases are the highest in history. Recent climate changes have had widespread impacts on human and natural systems (p.40).

According to the report, economic and population growth are responsible for the increase of human-induced *greenhouse gas emissions* since the pre-industrial era. Human influence is said to be ‘extremely likely’ to be the dominant cause of various changes in the climatic system. Scientists have observed and described a number of climatic changes – as ‘unequivocal’ and ‘unprecedented’ – such as the warming of the atmosphere and the oceans, diminishing amounts of snow and ice, a changing global water cycle and global sea level rise. Since about 1950, for instance, changes in extreme weather and climate events – like heat waves, droughts, floods, cyclones or wildfires – have been observed. These climate consequences are expected to become more frequent and/or more extreme over the next decades. Anyhow, the changes have already affected natural and human systems on all continents and across the oceans and are expected to further increase their vulnerability. For instance, in many regions the quality and quantity of water resources and food (crop) production are under threat. Many species have already changed their geographic ranges, seasonal activities, migration patterns or interactions in response to climatic changes. Increased mortality rates (or even extinction), severe ill-health, security risks and economic losses have been linked to climate change consequences. Researchers expect, for instance, that we risk to lose unique ecosystems, biodiversity and ecosystem goods, functions and services over the next years. Climatic changes will also increasingly motivate human migration, interacting with (or exacerbating) existing economic, environmental, social, political or demographic drivers. This may cause pressures on and conflicts in receiving areas. Some of the future risks are likely to occur even at a 1°C global mean temperature increase above pre-industrial levels. Hazards increase with rising temperatures. The precise threshold for irreversible and abrupt changes remains uncertain, though. Yet, the risks of crossing these will go up as global temperatures rise (Black et al., 2011; Dupont & Van Eetvelde, 2013; IPCC, 2014a, 2014b; Mugambiwa & Tirivangasi, 2017; Pizer, 2017; Reuveny, 2007; Tabari, Taye, & Willems, 2015; Tavakoli et al., 2014; Urban, 2015).

However, some (human-natural) systems are expected to be affected earlier and/or more severely than others:

The character and severity of impacts from climate change and extreme events emerge from risk that depends not only on climate-related hazards but also on exposure (people and assets at risk) and vulnerability (susceptibility to harm) of human and natural systems (IPCC, 2014b, p.54).

Vulnerability depends on a number of interconnected – social, economic, cultural, political, institutional – variables. For example, *people* who are marginalized based on gender, age, class, ethnicity or (in)ability are especially vulnerable to climate change consequences. The same is true for population groups who suffer from poor nutrition, corrupt governments, AIDS, poverty. Climatic changes are most likely to exacerbate other stressors – destructing houses, decreasing crop yields, increasing food prices – for those who already struggle to survive. However, these groups usually also lack the means or capacity – that is, human, social, political, scientific, technological and/or economic resources – to adapt (e.g. to take protective measures). Vulnerable regions are, accordingly, those which have low adaptive capacity but which expect high climate change impacts (e.g. Bangladesh, the Philippines, small island states). For instance, water-scarce regions (especially in Africa) already have unsustainable water systems under stress of population growth and water contamination. Climate change will only exacerbate these. Regions with residual risks expect relatively low climatic consequences, but – lacking resilience and means to adapt – are likely to suffer considerably from these changes (e.g. Namibia). These two groups are often equated to the so-called ‘developing countries’ (UNDP, 2016). Countries like the US also anticipate significant impacts. However, being considered as ‘developed’ (UNDP, 2016), they do possess the adaptive capacity to cope with these. Finally, some (‘developed’) countries have both a high adaptive capacity and low expected climate impacts. Accordingly, they run low risks and are most likely to adapt effectively (e.g. Canada) (de Onís, 2012; IPCC, 2014a, 2014b; Kasperson & Kasperson, 2001; Mugambiwa & Tirivangasi, 2017; Sze & London, 2008; Toll et al., 2004). A similar distinction could be made among *natural ecosystems*, of which some happen to have more coping abilities (and may even prosper thanks to climatic changes) while others are more vulnerable and/or more prone to extinction. However, geographical locations also play a role (Erasmus et al., 2002). Within Europe, *Belgium* (and Flanders, in particular) is, just like the Netherlands, considered one of the most vulnerable regions in terms of flooding (Tavakoli et al., 2014). Accordingly, considerable risks are expected in terms of damage costs and human safety. Simultaneously, summers are becoming hotter, and thus drier, which may cause problems for water availability (Tabari, Taye, & Willems, 2015). Also, the Belgian (and Dutch) polders – as unique rural landscapes and cultural heritage – are expected to suffer from climatic changes (Dupont & Van Eetvelde, 2013; IPCC, 2014a). This study will be concerned with the climate change reporting in Northern Belgium (Flanders).

While some uncertainty remains as for the character and extent of the required human interventions, *mitigation and adaptation* (see below) are considered as complementary strategies, which can help to reduce and manage the risks. It has, for instance, been (quite) generally accepted that the substantial decrease of GHG emissions (i.e. mitigation) is a shared human responsibility that must, however, be

distributed based on fairness principles (i.e. common but differentiated responsibility). That is, those ('developed') countries who bear a larger historical responsibility for the emission of GHG are expected to make more efforts to reduce their emissions. Stringent climate policies, increased efficiency, technological or scientific interventions or developments (e.g. renewable energy, carbon capture and storage) or reforestation / afforestation are often envisaged when it comes to mitigation. Adaptation – or the anticipating, preventing and/or minimizing of the consequences of climate change – may happen through structural or physical interventions (e.g. engineered options like flood levees, or technological options like more efficient irrigation, new crop or animal varieties), spatial or land-use planning (e.g. providing adequate housing, infrastructure, services), poverty alleviation (e.g. improved access to local resources, insurance schemes) or social interventions (e.g. awareness-raising and knowledge-sharing, gender equity in education). Both strategies are considered as crucial in the light of a more sustainable human development (Arrow et al., 1995; Baer et al., 2000; Figueres et al., 2017; Grunwald, 2016; IPCC, 2014b; Kasperson & Kasperson, 2001; Kyoto Protocol, 1997; Larkin, 2017; Lohmann, 2008; Sze & London, 2008; Unmüßig, Sachs & Fatheuer, 2012). As I will argue below, however, human development as such is not fundamentally questioned (e.g. Dryzek, 1997; Grunwald, 2016; Hopwood, Mellor & O'Brien, 2005; Unmüßig, Sachs & Fatheuer, 2012; Shiva, 1988, 1993).

1.2 Public Awareness and Concern

Political *and* public concern, awareness and willingness to act are crucial preconditions for effective climate action. In Europe, in particular, *public awareness or consciousness* regarding climate change has been relatively high for several decades now. Lorenzoni and Pidgeon (2006) refer, for instance, to the results of the 1992 Gallup Health of the Planet (HOP) Survey. This showed that more than fifty percent of the respondents in thirteen countries (eight of which were European) out of 24 considered climate change as a serious problem. More than 65 percent of the respondents, in 23 out of 24 countries, stated that they considered climate change as a serious or somewhat serious problem (see Brechin, 2003). The special Eurobarometer on climate change, based on surveys commissioned by the European Union, indicates that the public concern regarding the climate has increased over the last couple of years. The most recently published report (Eurobarometer, 2014), for instance, shows that ninety percent of the Europeans feel that climate change is a serious global problem. Half of the Europeans consider climate change as one of the four most serious threats. Nevertheless, poverty, hunger and the lack of drinking water, and the economic crisis are still considered to have higher priority. In Belgium, however, only the economic situation is ranked higher than climate change. This is consonant with the findings of earlier studies, which also show that other environmental, personal or social issues usually come before climate concerns (see Whitmarsh, O'Neill & Lorenzoni, 2013). Based on a British survey, for instance, Poortinga and Pidgeon (2003) concluded that issues like health, family, safety and finances were prioritized over climate (see Gaber, 2000). Anyhow, compared to the United States (see for

instance the ‘Six Americas’ (Leiserowitz, 2006, 2007)), in particular, the public consensus in Europe regarding the existence and seriousness of climate change is relatively strong. Nevertheless, research also shows that there are still widespread misunderstandings regarding (human contributions to) climate change. For instance, Brechin (2003) points out that many respondents do not consider the burning of fossil fuels as a main cause of climatic changes. Also, climate change is often – incorrectly – associated with ozone depletion (e.g. Dunlap, 1998; Leiserowitz, 2006, 2007; Nicholson-Cole, 2005; Ungar, 2000).

It is broadly believed that feelings of (personal) responsibility and willingness to act increase as more information is made available to the public. That is, the *information-deficit model* approaches the audience as ‘empty vessels’ which need to be filled with information. This will inspire them to take the ‘best, rational action’ (Brown, 2009). In short, people need more (scientific) information. However, this unilateral model has extensively been criticized and denounced, with many researchers pointing out that it ignores the complexity of (the influences on) the communication process, including public understanding, learning or behaviour changes, and the heterogeneity of audiences and their contexts. In other words, environmental knowledge or awareness – but also concern – do not simply equate willingness to act or feelings of (self-)efficacy (e.g. Bucchi, 2008; Butler & Pidgeon, 2009; Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002; Malka, Krosnick & Langer, 2009; Whitmarsh, 2009; Whitmarsh, O’Neill & Lorenzoni, 2013; Wolf & Moser, 2011). Drawing on Wynne (1989, 1995), Bucchi (2008) summarizes:

(...) [T]he disjunction between expert and lay knowledge cannot be reduced to a mere information gap between experts and the general public as envisaged by the deficit model. Lay knowledge is not an impoverished or quantitatively inferior version of expert knowledge; it is qualitatively different. Factual information is only one ingredient of lay knowledge, in which it interweaves with other elements (value judgements, trust in the scientific institutions, the person’s perception of his or her ability to put scientific knowledge to practical use) to form a corpus no less sophisticated than specialist expertise (p.60).

I will discuss some of these influences below (see 1.2.1 Media Framing and Public Awareness; 3.3 Frame Interpretations). Testing the information-deficit model in the United States, Kellstedt, Zahran and Vedlitz (2008) demonstrate, for instance, that contrary to the assumptions of the model, the more information about climate change people have, the less responsible *and* concerned they feel. The authors do not provide an explanation for this relation. Yet, this may be related to one of their other findings: People who have a greater confidence in scientists or governmental experts to understand the problem and provide solutions, show less personal efficacy (see below). A greater insight into the scientific state of the art may, arguably, foster this confidence.¹ As discussed below, however, much depends on the character or content of the information.

¹ Malka, Krosnick and Langer (2009) found that knowledge only encourages concern among people who trust scientists, while it does not help to increase concern among sceptics. The authors did, however, not test the effects on feelings of self-efficacy.

Reviewing a large number of studies regarding public views on the climate, Lorenzoni and Pidgeon (2006) conclude that there is indeed a general *lack of a sense of urgency* among citizens world-wide: They feel that they cannot (or do not have to) do much about climate change; they have a *low sense of self-efficacy*. Rather, they lay responsibility with national and international politics and institutions, which are (supposed to be) able to instigate the required large-scale policies and actions (Kellstedt, Zahran and Vedlitz, 2008). The respondents in a 2002 survey assessed by Poortinga and Pidgeon (2003) argue for more public involvement in decision-making. Nevertheless, they dissociate this from their own engagement. Similarly, the results of the 2014 Eurobarometer show that most Europeans consider climate change action as the responsibility of national governments (who are, for instance, expected to set targets to increase renewable energy) (49 %), business and industry (41 %) or the EU (39 %), while only 25 percent feel that they also bear personal responsibility. Among the Belgian respondents, however, more people (37 %) consider themselves as responsible agents.

Most of the actions people say to (be willing to) take, are, however, small-scale, low-cost and relatively easy. Most often mentioned are actions like recycling and trying to reduce waste, using less disposable items (like plastic bags), consuming more local and seasonal produce, buying new (i.e. more energy-efficient) household appliances, using public transport or insulating houses. More than in other countries, Belgian citizens are, however, willing to choose for renewable energy, by switching to a more environment-friendly energy supplier or taking their own renewable energy installation. Probably, this can be largely explained by the (energy supplier) comparison tools and financial incentives provided by the government (e.g. Verbruggen, 2004). Overall, most of these actions are carried out by individual *consumers in the context of a consumption (market) society*. Accordingly, most of them are, at least partly, encouraged by financial considerations (see Brulle, 2010; Dryzek, 1997; Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002; Maniates, 2001; Stibbe, 2005, 2015; Stoll-Kleemann, O’Riordan & Jaeger, 2001; Unmüßig, Sachs & Fatheuer, 2012; Whitmarsh, 2009). While all of these actions may be considered as environmental, many of them (e.g. recycling) actually do very little to really reduce GHG emissions. According to Whitmarsh (2009), they can be attributed to a lack of knowledge about how emissions can be reduced effectively. The preoccupation with economics can also be seen in the strong support of Europeans for statements like ‘fighting climate change has economic benefits, for instance by creating jobs or improving energy efficiency’ or ‘reducing the import of fossil fuels from outside of the EU has economic benefits’ (70 %) (Eurobarometer, 2014). Surely, it is equally telling that the Europe-wide survey did only invite citizens to consider climate change from an economic angle (or frame) and not from other equally valuable – and interconnected – angles like human well-being or environmental stability and harmony (see 1.2.1 Media Framing and Public Engagement). Note, finally, that the Eurobarometer (2014) clearly demonstrates the influence of factors like nationality, age, education, socio-economic position or socio-professional category on the views, concern or actions of individuals (see e.g. Kellstedt, Zahran and Vedlitz, 2008; Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002; Nicholson-Cole, 2005). For instance,

those most likely to take personal action are more highly educated and between 40 and 54 years old. People in Sweden are most likely to consider climate change as the single most important problem while citizens in Estonia are least likely to do so.²

1.2.1 Media Framing and Public Engagement

Dilling and Moser (2007) discuss a number of *social, institutional, practical and psychological barriers* that prevent people from feeling a sense of urgency and taking personal action. Even those people who want to change are faced with such obstacles (e.g. Shanahan & McComas, 1999; Whitmarsh, 2009; Wolf, Brown & Conway, 2009; Wolf & Moser, 2011). Many of those barriers can be directly or indirectly linked to *media communication*. As Nelkin (1995) points out, the public understands science, including the climate issue “(...) less through direct experience or past education than through the filter of journalistic language and imagery” (p.2). Other authors, like Cox (2010), Butler and Pidgeon (2009), Corbett and Durfee (2004), Wilson (1995), Graber (1988), Petersen and Ferruci (2017), Spence and Pidgeon (2010), Scott (2014), Nicholson-Cole (2005) or Metag, Füchslin and Schäfer (2017), argue in similar ways: media constitute particularly important sources of information about the climate (and the environment in general), next to education, popular culture, personal experiences or personal communication with family and friends, which alert us, help to shape our perceptions and may, or may not, persuade and engage us. In the introductory chapter to the edited volume *Climate Change and the Media*, Cottle (2009) argues, accordingly:

How global crises are signalled and defined, staged and elaborated in the world’s media proves critical to wider processes of recognition and response, entering into their future course and conduct. In exercising their symbolic and communicative power, the world’s media variously inform processes of public understanding, but so too can they dissimulate the nature of the threats that confront us and marginalize those voices that seek to mobilize forces for change. (p.vii)

Nisbet, Cooper and Ellithorpe (2015) have demonstrated a positive effect of exposure to newspapers on the climate change knowledge of recipients. The exposure to television news, however, had little effect on the participants in their study. Similarly, Zhao (2009) found that exposure to newspapers and the internet, but not television news, positively influenced knowledge.

(Media) frames, in particular, have been shown to be highly influential, having the potency to affect – to a large extent – the ways in which we think or talk about, and act upon, the climate. That is, they are of crucial importance for the public and political debate and, thus, for our collective climate future. That is especially so for the visual (parts of) frames, which have been shown to be particularly pervasive (e.g. Abraham & Appiah, 2006; Brantner, Lobinger & Wetzstein, 2011; Hart, 2011; Lakoff, 2010; Myers et al., 2012; O’Neill, 2017; O’Neill et al., 2013; Powell et al., 2015; Spence & Pidgeon, 2010; Spence,

² The report does not provide an explanation as for the ‘why’ of these differences.

Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2012). In this study, I define a frame as an immanent (i.e. inherent, fundamental) structuring idea that gives coherence and meaning to multimodal texts³ and cognitive processes (i.e. in the minds of individuals, groups, the wider population, ‘humans’). Framing, then, is applying a particular frame in order to structure an area of life: It involves selecting, backgrounding, omitting, expanding and giving salience to certain aspects of a perceived reality, providing context and suggesting a particular problem definition, causal responsibility, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation (Entman 1991, 1993, 2004; Gamson, 1989, 1992; Gamson & Modigliani 1989; Gitlin, 1980; Stibbe, 2015; Van Gorp, 2006, 2007). As I will discuss in more detail below (2.2 Defining Frames and Framing), a frame can be understood by means of two equal and interacting metaphors: the ‘picture frame’ and the ‘building frame’ (e.g. Pan & Kosicki, 1993; Stibbe, 2015; Tuchman, 1978). The former foregrounds the frame’s selecting, including, omitting or (de)emphasizing of information. This can best be understood by imagining the multiple decisions which a painter or photographer makes (e.g. the inclusion or exclusion of certain participants, objects, scenes; the selection of a particular perspective; ‘the decisive moment’ (Cartier-Bresson, 2014)). The building metaphor highlights the more profound structuring and contextualizing functions of frames: Functioning as ‘skeletons’, they hold together, structure and connect elements in particular ways. As Stibbe (2015) points out, “(...) if a building was structured using a different frame it would be an entirely different building” (p.54). In other words, depending on the frame, the selected actors, objects or contexts may be connected, and allowed to interact, in completely different ways. For instance, two frames may both select ‘humans’ and ‘nature’ as important participants. In the structure of the former, however, humans bear the major responsibility for the destruction of the natural environment and ecosystems. Accordingly, solutions also lie with humans. The argumentation of the latter, on the other hand, may foreground processes inherent to nature as major instigators of the natural crises (like climate change) humans are currently witnessing. Hence, the solutions also lie within nature, and not so much with humans. Davis (1995) and Bilandzic, Kalch and Soetgen (2017) illustrate, for instance, that differing frames may influence people’s responses to environmental communication and their willingness to take part in climate actions. Thus, while academic fields like physics, geography or biology contribute in important ways to our understanding of the external ‘climate facts’, humanities and social sciences – particularly media and communication studies – are indispensable when it comes to a fuller understanding of the ways in which climate change takes shape (within)in (the interaction among) human societies, human communication and human minds.

Conflicting Values and Self-Interests. A first problem pointed out by Dilling and Moser (2007) is that climate action often goes counter to other values or self-interests of individuals, like *economic growth or job security* (see above) (e.g. Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002; Sandvik, 2008; Whitmarsh, 2009;

³ Multimodality attends to “the full range of communicational forms people use – image, gesture, gaze, posture, and so on – and the relationships between them” (Jewitt, 2009, p.14).

Whitmarsh, O'Neill & Lorenzoni, 2013). Norgaard (2006) points out, for instance, that “[c]itizens of wealthy nations who fail to respond to the issue of climate change benefit from their denial in short-run economic terms” (p.366). Similarly, Stoll-Kleemann, O’Riordan and Jaeger (2001) note that “[t]he most powerful zone for denial was the perceived unwillingness to abandon what appeared as personal comfort and lifestyle-selected consumption and behaviour in the name of climate change mitigation” (p.113). People do, for instance, defend choices which they associate with a particular social identity or status (e.g. Steg, Vlek & Slotegraaf, 2001). Also, people are unwilling to give up their *individual freedom as consumers*, struggling to recognize that personal sacrifices might be worth the social gain. For instance, they have few incentives to give up comfort by using the train rather than the car as they do not see how this may contribute to the greater good.

Solution Scepticism. Stoll-Kleemann, O’Riordan and Jaeger (2001) link this to ‘solution scepticism’ (Dilling & Moser, 2007): how could our small, personal actions really make any difference in the light of such a huge global threat like climate change (see below)? Accordingly, people are more inclined to lay responsibility with politics and institutions, as they are (expected to be) able to instigate the required large-scale changes (Barr, 2011; Eurobarometer, 2014; Hart, 2011; Kellstedt, Zahran and Vedlitz, 2008; Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006; Stoll-Kleemann, O’Riordan & Jaeger, 2001). Kollmuss and Agyeman (2002) refer to this as ‘delegation’ (see 1.2 Public Awareness and Concern). Also, people tend to put the blame on the inertia of others or humans in general, highlighting their own powerlessness: what is the point of them taking action if others stick to their routines? As Hart (2011) or Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole and Whitmarsh (2007) discuss, we need *peer support* as an incentive for us to take action. That is, we need to see that others are also acting or are willing to change (see Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Graber, 1988; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). In that light, it is quite problematic that climate change communication often highlights the responsibility of individuals – elites (or producers) but, secondarily, also consumers – to act. This prevents us from seeing the broader structures in society or the opportunities for collective action (e.g. Berglez, Höijer & Olausson, 2009; Darley, 2000; Harrabin, 2000; Howard-Williams, 2009; Maniates, 2001; Nicholson-Cole, 2005; Nossek & Kunelius, 2012; Olausson, 2009, 2010; O’Neill, 2013, 2017; Trumbo, 1996). According to Wolf and Moser (2011), framing is particularly critical in the identification of responsible agents (see Entman, 1991, 1993, 2004; Van Gorp, 2006, 2007). The authors point out, however, that climate change is often framed in scientific or technological terms, foregrounding experts – and thus, ‘others’ – as main actors (e.g. Brand & Brunnengräber, 2012; Fletcher, 2009; Gordon, Deines & Havice, 2010; Kenix, 2008a, 2008b; Nielsen & Kjaergaard, 2011; Shehata & Hopmann, 2012; Stephens, Rand & Melnick, 2009; Weathers & Kendall, 2015; Zehr, 2009).

Distance. This last remark touches upon a third problem identified by Dilling and Moser (2007): the temporal, spatial and/or psychological distancing of climatic problems. Climate change is, in essence, a largely invisible, slow and non-immediate process. The consequences of the GHG emitted today in the

West manifest themselves at a very slow pace (making them hard to perceive for humans) and will, probably, only become more tangible in a couple of years. Even then we will, however, struggle to grasp the immense complexity of the – interconnected – problems. The major impacts that are already visible, are mainly experienced by people living in ‘foreign countries’ (the Global South; non-dominant regions). In other words, various barriers prevent us from fully understanding the problems. As Kollmuss and Agyeman (2002) point out, “(...) our cognitive limitations to understanding environmental degradation seriously compromises our emotional engagement and our willingness to act” (p.254). Similarly, Stoll-Kleemann, O’Riordan and Jaeger (2001) contend that people are more inclined to consider their activities as unharmed (or, at least, deny their harmfulness) if they lack a directly experienced link between personal actions and their consequences for the climate (see Jang, 2013; Kellstedt, Zahran and Vedlitz, 2008). However, even when people feel emotional reactions when being faced with environmental degradation (primary psychological responses), secondary psychological responses are likely to prevent pro-environmental action: Although most individuals living in the ‘West’ recognize the threats, they *distance or deny the uncomfortable truth* (Höijer, 2004; Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006; Spence & Pidgeon, 2010; Spence, Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2012). For instance, they may dissociate the threats from their personal lives, considering them as (far-away) social problems (affecting other time-spaces, human groups, species), or filter incoming information so as to fit it into their existing mental structures. For example, westerners may hold on to the belief that they live in a safe world, separated from the world of the innocent suffering (see ‘just worlds belief’). This may push the imagined zones of poverty and danger out of the realm of the actual (Bankoff, 2001; von Engelhardt & Jansz, 2014). Also, people who are faced with the disproportionate responsibility of their own in-group may attribute climate change mainly to a purely external, uncontrollable (natural) force (Jang, 2013). As such, they try to protect themselves emotionally, psychologically and/or – as discussed above – economically (Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002; Norgaard, 2006; Sandvik, 2008). Accordingly, they feel less urgency to act (i.e. they dissociate themselves from the responsibility to act). Norgaard (2006) argues, more specifically, that denial makes us blind for what we need to see to really change anything. People who distance the problems have less internal motivation to engage in climate action (Jang, 2013; Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002). Spence, Poortinga and Pidgeon (2012), however, nuance these argumentations somewhat, concluding that some aspects of psychological distance – especially considerations of the very serious impacts of climate change on distant countries – may, at times, encourage people to take sustainable action. That is, the focus on distance may help “(...) people to make more confident predictions about the future, and to make clearer evaluations and behavioural choices” (p.959).

Previous research has demonstrated that (*media*) *communication often distances us* from climate change (consequences), potentially reinforcing feelings of psychological, temporal and/or spatial disconnection. For instance, the (stereotypical) metaphors or metonyms which we are most often provided with, are

smoke stacks, polar bears, melting glaciers, satellite views or globes, typhoons hitting helpless people living in far-away exotic places (e.g. Borah, 2009; DiFrancesco & Young, 2010; Doyle, 2007, 2009; Grittmann, 2014; Hughes, 2012; Léon & Erviti, 2015; Manzo, 2010a, 2010b; Nicholson-Cole, 2005; O’Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 2009; Smith & Joffe, 2009).⁴ O’Neill (2013) identifies, for instance, a ‘distancing’ visual frame and argues that the dominance of, among others, generic symbols, non-human nature, non-identifiable people or elite (responsible) actors disconnects the problem from our daily lives and experiences. According to O’Neill (2017) and O’Neill et al. (2013), imagery of smokestacks or industry impacts on the environment may make the problems more important to the audience. Yet, they do not feel as if they can or should contribute to solutions. What is more, depictions of elites – like politicians, business leaders or celebrities – make the problems less salient *and* make people feel that that they cannot (or do not have to) do anything about them (see Boykoff & Goodman, 2009; Kellstedt, Zahran and Vedlitz, 2008). Léon and Erviti (2015) notice that visualizations often foreground (international) political or technological causes and solutions, remote from the individual (domestic) sphere, in which the audience might feel committed to the climate problem and able to respond (see Grittmann, 2014). O’Neill (2013, 2017) and Nurmis (2017) find a lack of (local) solutions among the dominant visuals which accompany climate change articles. These might, however, galvanize a sense of self-efficacy among the audience. Chouliaraki (2006) and Joye (2009) discuss a number of media strategies which are used to represent (natural) disasters abroad. Spectacular (air) views, a focus on faceless groups (e.g. numbers, percentages) of passive victims or the lack of future (internal) solutions help to maximize the emotional and psychological distance to the ‘O/other’ (see Höijer, 2004; Scott, 2014). Rather than feeling responsible for causes or solutions, we just gaze down on sublime ‘tableaux vivants’ or observe and assess distant sceneries, disconnected from our own time-spaces (‘sublimation’) (see Grittmann, 2014; Hansen & Machin, 2008; Hughes, 2012).

Alarmism. Those problems can be related to alarmism, which has also been shown to be a quite ineffective way to engage the audience to take action (e.g. Crompton & Smith, 2015; Dilling & Moser, 2007; Foust & O’Shannon Murphy, 2009; Hulme, 2004; O’Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 2009). Yet, it is broadly used in the media. This is illustrated by the number of studies that identify an ‘apocalypse’, an ‘alarmist’ or a ‘Pandora’s Box’ frame in the context of climate change or environmental reporting (e.g. Doulton & Brown, 2009; Eide, 2012; Foust & O’Shannon Murphy, 2009; Hulme, 2009; Kenix, 2008a, 2008b; Nisbet, 2009; O’Neill, 2013; O’Neill et al., 2015; Painter, 2013; Van Gorp & van der Goot, 2009). Apocalyptic vocabulary, strong truth modality (‘will’ or ‘is’ versus ‘may’ or ‘could’), short time frames (‘Apocalypse now’) or no sense of time scale at all, feedback loops which do not allow for human intervention, analogical references (e.g. to the fate of the dinosaurs), or awe-inspiring air views, globes

⁴ Note, however, that Swim and Bloodhart (2015) nuance the distancing effects of polar bear images, pointing out that audience responses depend on contextual factors, the (emphatic or objective) perspective adopted by the audience and/or their personal backgrounds (e.g. environmentalists versus non-environmentalists).

or other depictions which face us with the large-scale, all-encompassing problems, may grab our attention and *emotionally engage us*, raising concern. However, these strategies are also likely to distance and paralyze us, stifling our sense of agency: what can we possibly do about these large-scale problems, which are outside of human power (e.g. Doyle, 2007, 2009; Foust & O’Shannon Murphy, 2009; Hughes, 2012; Manzo, 2010a; Nurmis, 2015; O’Neill, 2017; O’Neill et al., 2013; Remillard, 2011)? Slovic (2010) refers to *‘psychic numbing’* as a defence mechanism in the face of mass destruction or atrocity. Besides, alarmism may make climatic problems appear less realistic and more (science-fiction) film-like (see Stoll-Kleemann, O’Riordan & Jaeger, 2001; von Engelhardt & Jansz, 2014). O’Neill (2017) and O’Neill et al. (2013) demonstrate, for instance, that spectacular images of climate extremes – flood aerial views, melting ice-sheets, gloomy visuals of drought-cracked grounds or extreme, unbearable heat (burning sun, red and orange hues) – may heighten feelings of issue saliency or importance among the audience, but undermine feelings of self-efficacy or responsibility. Swim and Bloodhart (2015) confirm that distress is unlikely to produce social support.

Conflict and Uncertainty. Another problem with climate change communication, according to several authors, is the representation of the climate issue as a (political / scientific) battlefield, for instance by balancing sources like scientists and climate deniers (see Boykoff & Boykoff, 2004; Butler & Pidgeon, 2009; Darley, 2000; Fahy, 2017; Gee, 2000; Harrabin, 2000; Hiles & Hinnant, 2014; Nissani, 1999; Wilson, 2000). Indeed, various authors identify ‘conflict’ or ‘uncertainty’ frames (e.g. Antilla, 2005; Fletcher, 2009; Gordon, Deines & Havice, 2010; Nisbet, 2009; O’Neill, 2013; O’Neill et al., 2015; Painter, 2013; Schlichting, 2013; Weathers & Kendall, 2015; Wessler et al., 2016). Equating balance with bias, Boykoff and Boykoff (2004) and Boykoff (2007) point out that such debates give too much weight to contrarians, masking the general consensus (see IPCC, 2014a, 2014b). As Corbett and Durfee (2004) discuss, balanced reporting (i.e. a focus on controversy) heightens a *sense of uncertainty and distrust among the audience*, especially if no broader contextualization is provided (Hart, 2011; Iyengar, 1990). This may discourage public action, serving as excuse for apathy (Butler & Pidgeon, 2009; Dilling & Moser, 2007; Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002). Hendry (2010) adds that a ‘polarizing rhetoric’ serves oversimplification, creates a self-reinforcing and self-perpetuating conflict (i.e. a negative spiral) and may inhibit possibilities for collaborative solutions (see Harrabin, 2000; Ritchie & Thomas, 2015).

Dilling and Moser (2007) conclude, accordingly, that it is crucial to find different ways to communicate about the climate. Throughout the literature, we find a number of suggestions as for *how to communicate in more constructive and engaging ways*, and thus, to overcome the public denial, apathy and inertia. Underlying the various strategies – concerned with the stifling or disengaging effects of uncertainty, alarmism, distancing, lack of peer support or a sense of collective responsibility and conflicting interests – is, in particular, a recurrent plea for the inclusion of broader *contextualizations*.

Contextualized Conflict. Corbett and Durfee (2004) argue that the inclusion of political, social or economic contexts may mitigate the stifling effect on human engagement which depictions of uncertainty can have. That is, context may increase the audience's perceptions of *certainty*, as it may, for instance, help to portray the extent of consensus and dissent more accurately. Accordingly, Leiserowitz (2007) points out the need to openly discuss and explain remaining uncertainties, clarifying that their existence is no reason for distrust regarding the rationality of science, and thus for inertia (see Nicholson-Cole, 2005).

Deconstruction-Reconstruction. It is generally accepted that it is necessary to emotionally engage the audience and raise concern by confronting them with unsettling truths and looming perils. However, these highly salient depictions must always be combined with views which promote self-efficacy, for instance through messages of hope (e.g. Kellstedt, Zahran & Vedlitz, 2008; Leiserowitz, 2006, 2007; O'Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 2009; Painter, 2013; Spence & Pidgeon, 2010; Spence, Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2012; Swim & Bloodhart, 2015; von Engelhardt & Jansz, 2014). This is, among others, the underlying rationale of constructive journalism (e.g. Curry, Stroud & McGregor, 2016; McIntyre, 2015). According to McIntyre (2015), this "emerging form of journalism (...) involves applying positive psychology techniques to news work in an effort to create more productive, engaging stories while holding true to journalism's core functions" (p.9), such as a dedication to truth, accuracy, balance or criticism. It is also referred to as 'solutions journalism'. Empirical research by the authors (Curry, Stroud & McGregor, 2016; McIntyre, 2015) has, indeed, demonstrated that such types of journalism tend to evoke stronger feelings of self-efficacy and willingness to engage in certain pro-social behaviours. Also, readers felt more inspired and had more positive attitudes towards stories. Accordingly, O'Neill (2017) and O'Neill et al. (2013) argue for the combination of pictures like scientific graphs or flooded areas, which highlight the seriousness of the problems, with positive examples of energy futures or lifestyle changes (e.g. insulation), which show people how they can contribute to the climate cause (see also Manzo, 2010a, 2010b; Nurmis, 2015). Similarly, Von Engelhardt and Jansz (2014) argue that people need sufficient information on how exactly their actions may contribute to change in order to engage. Foust and O'Shannon Murphy (2009) propose a so-called 'Comic Apocalypse', which emphasizes human agency, introduces a manageable time-frame (e.g. 'in 100 years' time') and links the concerns to the views and values that are already relevant to the various stakeholders.

Domestication. Accordingly, many authors (implicitly) suggest that it is crucial to reconcile the large-scale (alarmist) perspective with the human perspective, bringing climate change home and connecting it to the time-spaces of the public (see Nurmis, 2015). The connection between the global and local can be made more implicitly through 'domestication' or visualizing climate causes, consequences and solutions in *people's own backyards or communities* (see Doyle, 2007, 2009; Nicholson-Cole, 2005). For instance, Sheppard (2012) introduces a number of 3D and 4D visualization techniques, which may

help to present the public with the impacts of climate change in their own communities. These techniques may also be used to make local sources of greenhouse gases *and* potential local responses visible (see O'Neill et al., 2013). Similarly, Barron et al. (2012) discuss the development of a 'visioning package', which allows local citizens and politicians in British Columbia (Canada) to envision the consequences of future scenarios of sea level rise and storms – and the effects of particular adaptation strategies – on their communities (see also Schweizer, Davis & Thompson, 2013). Similarly, Corner, Webster and Teriete (2015) demonstrate that climate change images that show local (serious) impacts are more likely to galvanize concern and engagement. Nevertheless, the authors recommend to link the local impacts to the global problems to avoid trivialization. Joye (2015) distinguishes among four more specific domestication strategies used by news producers to make distant suffering more engaging. 'What are the stakes' (i.e. linking the risks of the foreign event to the time-space of the audience) can be linked most directly to the described suggestions. The three other strategies include: (1) 'emotional domestication' (i.e. the selection of emotionally narrated stories, often by compatriots in the affected region), (2) 'aid-driven domestication' (i.e. we are linked to the foreign suffering through aid workers as intermediators), (3) 'familiarizing the unfamiliar' (i.e. employing narrative strategies to make events, like famine or earthquakes, more familiar to an audience which lacks experiences with these events).

Global awareness. In a similar vein, Lester and Cottle (2009) contend that the media primarily must contribute to people's sense of ecological citizenship, making them more directly aware of the embeddedness of their local contexts in the broader, global context and their connection to other people and the Earth. This may evoke feelings of global awareness, solidarity, responsibility, concern or empathy. Beck (2000) addresses this as the 'theory of world risk society'. According to the author, the media representation of global risks, like climate change, may contribute to a '*cosmopolitan consciousness*' among the audience, who suddenly become aware of their place in a larger threatened world: "Threats create society, and global threats create global society" (Beck, 2000, p.38). This may mobilize governments, corporations and citizens to collectively engage in global action and policies. Lester and Cottle (2009) suggest a number of specific strategies which may contribute to this awareness. Oddly enough, however, some of their suggestions include the very choices which are considered by other authors as distancing or destructing the audience's sense of self-efficacy (e.g. Chouliaraki, 2006; Doyle, 2007, 2009; Grittmann, 2014; Hughes, 2012; Nicholson-Cole, 2005; O'Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 2009; O'Neill, 2017; O'Neill et al., 2013) (see above). For instance, the authors argue that *globes or depictions of dramatic and spectacular large-scale impacts* may make the abstract idea of climate change more 'knowable' and relevant, bringing it closer. Although most authors do agree that such images may add salience and a sense of importance, the focus generally lies on the – adverse – potential of such 'overwhelming' imagery to stifle engagement and distance the audience. However, Lester and Cottle (2009) also suggest that linking depictions of our shared globe to the specificity of (various) local places under threat or connecting domestic scenes of '*ordinary humans*' (e.g. preparing food) to looming

natural threats may contribute to broader awareness. Showing climate impacts on ordinary humans – especially those living in the same time-space as the audience – may remind the audience that they may suffer themselves from such disasters one day. That is, these depictions may resonate with the public (see Hahn, Eide & Ali, 2012; Hughes, 2012; Manzo, 2010a, 2010b; O’Neill, 2017; Ritchie & Thomas, 2015; Smith & Joffe, 2009). Yet, the authors admit that depending on the representational choices, media may still suggest distance and ‘O/otherness’ rather than connection (see above) (e.g. Dalhgren & Chakrapani, 1982; Chouliaraki, 2006; Höijer, 2004; Joye, 2015; Scott, 2014). The *humanization* of suffering and action / activism, on the contrary, may be inspirational. People may, for instance, be depicted as (small groups of) active individuals, with identifiable faces and names, just like ourselves (see Chouliaraki, 2006; Corner, Webster & Teriete, 2015; Dreher & Voyer, 2015; Figenschou, 2011; Hart, 2011; Manzo, 2010a, 2010b; Weik von Mossner, 2011). Swim and Bloodhart (2015) illustrate, for instance, that empathy may encourage engagement and action. Lester and Cottle (2009) also claim that the reappearance of (intertextual) symbolic stock images may evoke the idea that the changes are omnipresent and repetitive, and thus due to a more fundamental, underlying (climate) problem. Besides, *cultural resonance* based on shared memories, recognizable objects or places and symbols of tradition may encourage a sense of impending collective loss. Accordingly, Hulme (2004) points out the potential power of relating (differential) danger to icons which matter to / in the daily lives of public and policymakers, such as global cities (e.g. New York hit by a hurricane), cultural heritage sites (e.g. Machu Picchu) or valued natural systems (e.g. the Great Barrier Reef). The latter often draw on long-standing traditions of pristine yet vulnerable nature, which needs human protection (see Brönnimann, 2002; Cottle, 2000; Cox, 2010; Doyle, 2007, 2009; Grittmann, 2014; Hahn, Eide & Ali, 2012; Hansen & Machin, 2008; Manzo, 2010a, Remillard, 2011).

Collective Responsibility. Drawing on the research of Iyengar (1990), Hart (2011) demonstrates that people need ‘*thematic*’ frames, which highlight the responsibility in the society at large for causes and solutions (i.e. contextualization), rather than ‘episodic’ frames, which lay the responsibility with individuals (i.e. decontextualization), for them to be engaged and to support policies (see Nicholson-Cole, 2005). After all, people need a confirmation that others are also addressing this huge problem, which can only be tackled through collective action (see Fiske and Taylor, 1991; Graber, 1988; Petty and Cacioppo, 1986). Besides, being able to connect their own actions to broader causes and solutions, people may feel personal guilt, which may encourage them to take action (Kellstedt, Zahran & Vedlitz, 2008; Swim & Bloodhart, 2015). Wolf and Moser (2011) argue, more specifically, that frames which highlight (moral-religious aspects of) human stewardship are more likely to address the broader audience as actors (for causes and/or consequences) (Brulle, 2010; Dryzek, 1997; Prelli & Winters, 2009). O’Neill (2017), drawing on Corner, Webster and Teriete (2015), argues that images of traffic congestions – which are easily connected to climate change (O’Neill et al., 2013) – should be shown at scale (vis-à-vis an individual family in their car) in order to engage. Highlighting society-wide problems,

such imagery is unlikely to demonize individuals or certain population groups. Corner, Webster and Teriete (2015) implicitly argue for broader contextualization, warning that individual-person action-based visuals of energy futures, particularly depictions of home insulation (which are shown by O'Neill et al. (2013) to be highly effective in motivating feelings of self-efficacy), need to be used with care.⁵ Also, the authors add, audiences are more likely to identify with 'real' people, like themselves, acting in authentic situations than with staged, and thus less 'realistic', scenes (see O'Neill et al., 2013).

Resonant Values and Interests. Acknowledging the crucial importance of emotional engagement, various authors have also argued that climate change must be linked to (i.e. framed in the context of) *people's existing belief systems or values* (e.g. financial interests, public health or security) to make the problem more resonant (e.g. Darnton & Kirk, 2011; Fletcher, 2009; Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002; Lakoff, 2010; Leiserowitz, 2006, 2007; Myers et al., 2012; Shen, 2004b; Shen & Edwards, 2005; Slocum, 2004; Somerville, 2006; Weathers & Kendall, 2015; Weathers, Maibach & Nisbet, 2017). As I have discussed above, these concerns are, indeed, often prioritized over climate threats as such (e.g. Eurobarometer, 2014; Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2003; Whitmarsh, 2009). Nisbet (2009, p.60) argues, accordingly, that "(...) research needs to pinpoint the mental associations and cognitive schemata that make a complex science topic accessible and personally meaningful for a targeted audience along with the particular frame devices that instantly translate these intended meanings". Myers et al. (2012) compared, for instance, the impact on the audience of the 'health', 'national security' and 'environmental' frames, concluding that the former is most likely to arouse feelings of hope and efficacy (see Kellstedt, Zahran & Vedlitz, 2008; Weathers, Maibach & Nisbet, 2017). Davis (1995) demonstrates that people are more likely to take action if they are provided with frames which highlight the negative consequences of their own inertia on themselves and their own generation (see Spence, Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2012). Similarly, Bilandzic, Kalch and Soetgen (2017) contend that gain-negative frames (avoiding negative consequences when engaging in climate protection) and loss frames (negative consequences of not engaging in climate protection) tend to increase people's sense of threat and, accordingly, their willingness to sacrifice. Gain-positive frames (positive consequences of engaging in climate protection) were shown to increase hope and – simultaneously – to decrease perceived threat and willingness to act. Zia and Todd (2010) believe that the reframing of climate change in terms of security threats, religious appeals or the economic crisis may help to affect behavioural change among individuals across ideological divides. Ungar (2007) notes that highlighting the links between security concerns and energy supplies can help to engage the audience.

⁵ Note, again, the inconsistency among the findings of several authors. Apparently, there is no clear-cut answer to the question 'how can we communicate in the most effective ways about the climate?'. Surely, that is no great surprise as, like I pointed out before, the communication process is highly complex, being subject to various, interacting influences.

The authors argue, however, that it is crucial to *tailor messages to individual (groups of) audiences*. Indeed, people's uptake and understanding of and response to messages are influenced by their existing belief systems, worldviews, (pro-environmental) knowledge (e.g. how nature works, how humans should interact with nature, what a fair and just society is or what 'the good life' means), motivation or personality traits, like age, gender or ethnicity (Corner, Webster & Teriete, 2015; Hulme, 2009; Kahan, Jenkins & Braman, 2011; Kim, 2011; Kolmus & Agyeman, 2002; Nicholson-Cole, 2005; White & Wall, 2008; Wolf & Moser, 2011; Zia & Todd, 2010). This can also be linked to 'positionality', which is defined by people's life experiences, ideologies, socio-economic positions, racial identities and/or gender (see Pulido & Peña, 1998; Taylor, 2000). As Pulido & Peña (1998) contend, people tend to think and talk about and act upon environmental issues in different ways depending on their positionality. Leiserowitz (2006, 2007) and Myers et al. (2012) distinguish, for instance, among 'Six Americas', or six audience segments (ranging from the 'alarmed' to the 'disengaged') based on people's attitudes, beliefs, values, concern, engagement, knowledge, policy preferences and behaviours. Similarly, Metag, Fuchslin and Schäfer (2017) describe five audience segments in Germany (ranging from 'alarmed' to 'doubtful'). Myers et al. (2012) demonstrate that the 'concerned' groups in the United States are most likely to find hope in the traditional 'environmental frame', while the 'national security frame' tends to arouse the highest levels of hope among the 'alarmed'. 'National security' may, however, also instigate an angry backlash among the 'doubtful' and 'dismissive', which may lead to unintended social responses (see Weathers, Maibach & Nisbet, 2017). Leiserowitz (2007) argues, accordingly, that it is more fruitful to address these conservative groups with frames that highlight economic opportunities (e.g. strengthening the market position of a country, making it less dependent on import) (e.g. Zehr, 2009) or religious arguments (e.g. the responsibility of humanity for stewardship and care; bringing the other closer to God) (e.g. Dryzek, 1997; Prelli & Winters, 2009), which resonate better with their belief systems.

According to Lakoff (2010), every person holds (or has access to) *various value systems*. Hence, it is the task of the communicator to activate the most constructive one (e.g. empathy, personal responsibility for ourselves and others, government regulation), while inhibiting destructive (conservative) views (e.g. nature for human use, market fundamentalism, no government regulations) through strategic framing. As such, the audience can be engaged for '*the right cause*'. Providing a toolkit for charities, Crompton and Smith (2015) give some suggestions as for how to enhance 'common cause communication'. In a comparable way to Lakoff (2010), they advise communicators to activate intrinsic values in people such as benevolence, affiliation, self-acceptance, universalism or community feeling, arguing that everyone holds these values to some extent. Stibbe (2015) defines intrinsic values as values "(...) aimed at altruistic goals which, *in themselves*, contribute to the common good. In other words, the goals are an ethical end in themselves" (p.203; italics in original). Based on the literature and their own reception research, they conclude that such values are more likely to activate people (e.g. giving a donation).

Whereas everyone – some people more than others – also holds extrinsic values (e.g. achievement, power), the authors argue that those should be avoided, or only used sparingly to address certain groups of people, like policy-makers (see also Darnton & Kirk, 2011; Ritchie & Thomas, 2015). Values can be considered as extrinsic if they are concerned with “(...) self-serving goals which, *in themselves*, make no contribution to the common good. In other words, the goals are not an ethical end in themselves” (Stibbe, 2015, p.202; italic in original).

Summarizing, throughout the literature we find *five groups of strategies* which are supposed to give rise to more constructive types of climate communication: (1) Conflict and uncertainty must be contextualized; (2) alarmism (‘deconstruction’) must be balanced with positive (‘constructive’) solutions; (3) domestication or global awareness must close the gap between the audience and climate causes, consequences and solutions; (4) a sense of collective responsibility must give rise to peer support, making people aware of their own responsibility and ability to act; (5) resonant values and interests must be integrated into – and made consonant with – constructive climate frames which are, preferably, tailored to various audience groups. ‘Contextualization’ is the common underlying denominator. As I pointed out throughout the discussion, however, there is *no consensus* as for the exact ways in which these strategies need to be employed or filled out. For instance, while some authors consider feelings of hope as constructive and, potentially, engaging (e.g. Kellstedt, Zahran & Vedlitz, 2008; Leiserowitz, 2006, 2007; Myers et al., 2012; O’Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 2009; Swim & Bloodhart, 2015), others, like Bilandzic, Kalch and Soetgen (2017), contend that hope may decrease perceived threat and willingness to act. Also, there is no agreement as for the potential impacts of globes or dramatic imagery (e.g. Chouliaraki, 2006; Doyle, 2007, 2009; Grittmann, 2014; Hughes, 2012; Lester & Cottle, 2009; Nicholson-Cole, 2005; O’Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 2009; O’Neill, 2017; O’Neill et al., 2013). Much has, no doubt, to do with the complex and largely unpredictable character of the communication process (e.g. Bucchi, 2008; Butler & Pidgeon, 2009; Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002; Malka, Krosnick & Langer, 2009; Whitmarsh, 2009; Whitmarsh, O’Neill & Lorenzoni, 2013; Wolf & Moser, 2011), not least the influence of the contexts and backgrounds (‘positionality’) of various audiences (e.g. Leiserowitz, 2006, 2007; Metag, Füchslin & Schäfer, 2017; Myers et al., 2012). I will return to this in the concluding sections (Chapter 7).

1.3 Depoliticizing versus Politicizing Frames

The insights provided by the existing audience perception and reception studies are valuable. They teach us a lot about the ways in which communication in general, and frames in particular, may interact with, and affect, the cognitions and emotions of people. Accordingly, the strategies that are suggested with an eye on *‘better, more constructive types of communication’* may provide valuable handles for any communicator looking for alternatives. Despite this, I do question the underlying assumptions of most of those studies. They accept (i.e. they do not question and even reconfirm) that elite communicators –

like journalists, scientists, politicians, NGO spokespeople – must find the most effective frames to engage the audience and encourage them to think and act in ‘favourable ways’, “(...) in some cases to directly challenge fundamental misconceptions, in others to resonate with strongly held values” (Leiserowitz, 2006, p.64). That is, they adopt a rather *hierarchical and exclusive perspective*. I am inclined to align with the criticism voiced by authors like Brulle (2010), Pepermans (2015), Pepermans and Maesele (2014), Swyngedouw (2010) or Mouffe (2005) who argue that this type of communication may mainly contribute to the depoliticization of the debate (see also Carvalho & Peterson, 2012; De Lucia, 2009; Fraser, 2000, 2005; Gamson & Ryan, 2005; Gramsci, 1980; Habermas & Burger, 1989; Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Shanahan & McComas, 1999; Shiva, 1988, 1993).

Depoliticization. According to the authors, the ‘top-down frames’ envisioned by Lakoff (2010), Leiserowitz (2006, 2007), Myers et al. (2012), Zia and Todd (2010) or Nisbet (2000) help to ‘manipulate passive consumers’ (Brulle, 2010) into supporting short-term pragmatic actions (‘best practices’) that fit within the hegemonic system. Put differently, they mainly reproduce views that support the imperatives of the current (globalized) economic and political systems which – being largely marketized – mainly focus on economic development and gain (e.g. Beck, 2000; Wasko, 2016). In this system, only those with economic or cultural capital (Bourdieu, 2005) – politicians, scientists, corporate voices – come to decide what should be considered as ‘the best environmental practices’. These are, among others, the dominant sources in mainstream media (e.g. Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Gans, 1979, 2004; Gitlin, 1980; Hänggli & Kriesi, 2012; Molotch & Lester, 1974; Shoemaker & Reese, 2014; Trumbo, 1996; Tuchman, 1978). As Dryzek (1997) or Hopwood, Mellor and O’Brien (2005) illustrate, there are various ways to deal with the current ecological challenges. One approach is not necessarily superior to others. Yet, some may be more constructive or workable in some contexts than in others. After all, knowledge always has a contingent character and depends on place, time and culture (see Beck, 2000; Endres, 2012; De Lucia, 2009; Lohmann, 2008; Sen, 1999, 2009; Shiva, 1988, 1993).⁶ Nevertheless, the political, socio-economic and cultural elites tend to *exclude a priori those ‘irrational’ insights or solutions* from the ‘democratic debate’ which are not conform to the *accepted, ‘neutral’ consensus* (i.e. which go beyond the ‘inevitable’ thinking of capitalism and liberal democracy) (see Bucchi, 2008). They rationalize, naturalize and universalize the latter while delegitimizing their proponents. These are not necessarily deliberative choices, but it would – obviously – be irrational for the ruling classes to support views which damage them (Stibbe, 2005). Besides, being ‘caught’ in a particular culture, they are largely blind for alternatives (i.e. unable to look beyond the boundaries of their thinking). All the same, these strategies help to reproduce and reconfirm a hierarchy of views and voices in society while eliminating most genuine debate. As Mouffe (2005) summarizes, they contribute to ‘antagonism’. Beck (2000)

⁶ This is reminiscent of the concept of ‘positionality’. As pointed out above, people are likely to think and talk about and act on the environment in different ways depending on their life experiences, ideologies, views, socio-economic positions, racial identity or gender (Pulido & Peña, 1998; Taylor, 2000).

refers, in a similar vein, to the ‘immunization of independent spheres against one another’. In other words, they *depoliticize* the debate, precluding a democratic discussion of the hegemonic model and possible alternatives (Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Pepermans, 2015; Pepermans & Maesele, 2014; Swyngedouw, 2010).

For instance, Stibbe (2005) discusses how the creation of the ‘homo economicus’ has generalized and *naturalized economic, self-interest thinking* as the (only) ‘rational thinking’. People are in most cases only encouraged to consider a limited set of values like short-term interest and pleasure or economic wealth maximization (see Beck, 2000; Unmüßig, Sachs & Fatheuer, 2012). De Lucia (2009) argues that *environmental justice in its narrow meaning* of ‘the right to develop’ (for all groups in society towards a western ideal) and (material / financial) redistribution, has been universalized as a neutral concept while it actually supports the capitalist vision and the interests of the ruling classes (see Beck, 2000). Shiva (1988) points out that the dominant science-economic development thinking is thought to be class, culture and gender neutral while it is actually a project of *modern, western (i.e. male, white) patriarchy* that threatens survival itself (of nature and bottom-up groups in the first place) (see also Endres, 2012; Entman & Rojecki, 1993; Gitlin, 1980). According to Swyngedouw (2010) and Kenis and Mathijs (2014), the *consensual focus on the struggle against an external villain*, GHG, constrains climate change to a scientific problem. While (political) decision-making based on scientific rationality and expertise does not allow for dissent or alternative ‘irrational’ (i.e. non-scientific) perspectives, the externalizing of the problem, outside of human society, also forecloses a discussion of alternative ideological views or societal organizations. Accordingly, Larson (2011, p.115) states that

(...) we often frame environmental problems as ones related to nature. Hence, science becomes savior and solution as if the problem really lies in what is ‘out there’ in the objective world that we can approach through natural science, rather than ‘in here’, in ourselves, in our social world, and in how we relate to the world.

However, the ‘narrow’ (pragmatic) solutions may exacerbate, or at least reproduce, the existing fundamental problems (e.g. Grunwald, 2016; Unmüßig, Sachs & Fatheuer, 2012). Also, the focus on *‘(inclusive / collective) we’ versus a collective enemy* – particularly in alarmist contexts – masks the fundamental inequalities and injustices in society (Manzo, 2010a, 2010b), including the fact that some (human and natural) groups will be affected earlier and more severely, both by climate change consequences as well as by the so-called ‘solutions’. For example, ‘western’ technological solutions like hydraulic dams or wind farm sites may have detrimental socio-economic consequences for local communities in the South (e.g. destroying livelihoods) or unpredictable effects on ecosystems (e.g. cutting of migration paths of animals) (e.g. Alexander, 2007; Bankoff, 2001; Fraser, 2000, 2005; Lohmann, 2008; Roosvall & Tegelberg, 2012, 2013, 2015). In short, climate change (action) becomes a largely managerial, technocratic and scientific (elite) issue (see Cottle, 2009; Fuchs & Graff, 2010; Ritchie & Thomas, 2015).

In the process, citizens are turned into *clients, individual consumers or passive objects of manipulation and spin*. Drawing on polls (numbers, percentages), elites may measure the values and personal interests of the ‘consumers’ (see e.g. Eurobarometer, 2014) and attempt to appeal to them, in order to sell their ideas and persuade individuals to voluntarily change their consumption behaviour or to accept certain policy proposals. Carvalho and Peterson (2012) call this ‘social marketing’. Clearly, framing becomes, as such, an important weapon in struggles for dominance, with the media acting as one of the important arenas (e.g. Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Gamson & Stuart, 1992; Gitlin, 1980; Hänggli, 2012; Hänggli & Kriesi, 2012; Maesele, 2010; Johannessen, 2015; Trumbo, 1996). Trying to *fit their frames into existing (socialized) worldviews*, however, the ruling groups are – again – limited when it comes to the range of views they may take into consideration: As they want to reassure the audience that they will not have to give up on their economic interests, comfort, status or freedom, they usually end up with argumentations which fail to recognize the incompatibility of pro-environmental action and the hegemonic capitalist market system (e.g. Grunwald, 2016; Moser & Dilling, 2007; Norgaard, 2006; Sandvik, 2008; Stoll-Kleemann, O’Riordan & Jaeger, 2001; Whitmarsh, O’Neill & Lorenzoni, 2013) (see above). Maniates (2001) argues, accordingly, that the dominant responses to the environmental crisis – preoccupied with individualism and consumerism – stem from the core views of liberalism, the commodifying tendencies of capitalism but also the increasing threats of environmental change for human prosperity and the heritage of mainstream environmentalism (see Alexander, 2007; Cox, 2010; Dryzek, 1997; Hopwood, Mellor & O’Brien, 2005; Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Meister, 1997; Stern, 2007; Stibbe, 2005, 2015; Taylor, 2000; Unmüßig, Sachs & Fatheuer, 2012). Cottle (2009) theorizes that the commercial character of mainstream media – in terms of their industrialized means of production or their endorsement of an unsustainable culture of consumption (e.g. Gans, 1979; Hamilton, 2004; McChesney, 2008; Shoemaker & Reese, 2014) – may contribute to “(...) the comforting but simplistic hopes placed in technology” (p.x), allowing the media to side-line more fundamental questions as regards to the social problems of globalizing modernity (and thus collective responsibilities).

In other words, being co-opted by the hegemony (Gitlin, 1980), environmentalism is merely “a *bandage* on the perceived wounds of industrialism” (Shanahan & McComas, 1999, p.15; italics added), and thus the *anthropocentric ideology*. The latter – which is central to Judeo-Christian traditions – highlights values like development and growth (in terms of money, consumption, luxury, knowledge...), competition, hierarchy (human-nature *and* human-human), human (technological) ingenuity and control, utilitarianism, individualism and egocentrism. Also, human and nature are clearly separated: humans are outside of nature. Metaphors like ‘the natural machine’ and ‘survival of the fittest’ are pivotal in this thinking (e.g. Adamson, 2014; Alexander, 2007; Larson, 2011; Prelli & Winters, 2009; Remillard, 2011; Shanahan & McComas, 1999; Shiva, 1988, 1993; Stibbe, 2005, 2015; Unmüßig, Sachs & Fatheuer, 2012; Verhagen, 2008). The various discourses which can be distinguished within the

contours of the anthropocentric worldview – ‘Promethean’, ‘Problem-solving (leave it to the market / leave it to the people / administrative rationalism)’, ‘Survivalist’, ‘Sustainable Development’ and ‘Ecological Modernization’ (Dryzek, 1997) – can be clustered into two overarching perspectives. Indeed, discussing the co-optation by the dominant groups of the formerly critical and emancipatory concept and term ‘sustainable development’, Hopwood, Mellor and O’Brien (2005) distinguish between ‘Status Quo’, on the one hand, and ‘Reform’ on the other. ‘*Status Quo*’ does not, or barely, question unlimited (economic) growth and development, but rather considers them as part of the solution. Market and business, rather than government, will come up with solutions, such as widespread private ownership or managerial techniques (e.g. cost-benefit). ‘*Reform*’, however does contend that there must be limitations on growth and development in order to keep them within the boundaries of the natural system. This has to protect the interests and survival of current and future human generations. The existing societal structures do not need to be rejected, though. Rather, reforms will need to update the system, fixing the problems, imbalances or internal ‘bugs’. That is, sustainable growth is the main goal; efficiency and productivity need to be increased through technological or scientific innovations or market incentives. The government has the responsibility to intervene (see Arrow et al., 1995; Baer et al., 2000; Grunwald, 2016; Larkin, 2017; Shanahan & McComas, 1999; Unmüßig, Sachs & Fatheuer, 2012).⁷

Depoliticizing ‘Frames’. Due to the rather generic character of most *frames in the literature* (see Table 4) and the lack of detailed descriptions (see 2.2.1.6 Non-Frames; 4.3 Environmental Frames in the Literature), it is hard to draw far-reaching conclusions as for the character of the argumentations and worldviews underlying the dominant frames (e.g. Entman, 1993, 2004; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Van Gorp, 2006, 2007).⁸ Nevertheless, I do find more general patterns among the mainstream media

⁷ As demonstrated by Pepermans (2015), for instance, critical discourse analysis allows for detailed and context-specific assessments which show how the same (e.g. anthropocentric) voices and views (scope) can be presented in depoliticization or politicizing ways (form). Accordingly, the author points out, anthropocentric views and voices are not, by definition, represented in a depoliticizing manner, although this is frequently so (Maesele & Raeijmaekers, 2017). I do not question this. Depending on the specific context of an article or outlet, (slightly) different patterns may indeed occur. Yet, contrary to discourse analysis, framing analysis is concerned with the most salient and recurrent underlying patterns (in particular time-spaces). Accordingly, it accepts that certain (clusters of) devices are likely to evoke the (most salient) frames (or argumentations) available in a certain time-space. Diverging patterns are likely to be neglected or reinterpreted by the audience to fit into these available structures (see 2.2 Defining Frames and Framing). In the current western(ized) society, we may well expect that the most pervasive and systematic depoliticizing structures (i.e. frames) can be found in the context of anthropocentrism, which currently constitutes the dominant and largely unquestioned worldview. This is confirmed by Pepermans (2015). While I do accept that politicizing anthropocentric (sub)frames may exist, they do not belong to the group of broadly shared ‘culturally available frames’ (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). Of course, evolutions in society could make those types of frames (widely) available at one point.

⁸ Similarly, this makes it largely impossible to draw broader conclusions as regards to the implementation of ‘more constructive communication strategies’ in the mainstream media reporting. There are, however, some indications that certain strategies are used. For instance, the ‘economic’ or ‘health and safety’ frames may, presumably, resonate with the values of (some) audiences. These frames, and certainly ‘technological fix’ or ‘progress’ frames, also suggest that fear and threat are (sometimes) balanced with more positive alternatives. Most frames do, however, not indicate to what extent ‘uncertainty’ or ‘conflict’ are contextualized or whether / how reporting tries to encourage a sense of ‘ecological citizenship’ among the public (Lester & Cottle, 2009).

frames, which largely seem to confirm my discussion above: certain actors or actions are legitimized as ‘rational’ or ‘moral’ while others are delegitimized (or even completely deleted) as ‘irrational or immoral’. I provide some examples here. The full discussion can be found in Chapter 3.1.1.1.5 (Previous Framing Research: Mainstream Media). The consistent recurrence of ‘*economic frames*’ across previous studies concerned with climate change framing is the most apparent indication of the hegemonic preoccupation with consumerism, a competitive free market, economic growth and prosperity. Frames such as ‘fairness and effectiveness through market mechanisms’ (Schmidt & Schäfer, 2015), ‘sustainable energy’ (Wessler et al., 2016) or ‘industrial leadership’ (Schlichting, 2013), in particular, demonstrate the failure of the dominant communicators to acknowledge the incommensurable character of exclusively capitalist, managerial or technological thinking and fundamental ecological change. The same could be said about the ‘*technological fix*’ or ‘*progress*’ frames (e.g. Brand & Brunnengräber, 2012; Dahinden, 2005; Nielsen & Kjaergaard, 2011; Nisbet & Lewenstein, 2002; Wessler et al., 2016). Further, several frames – like ‘valid science’ (Antilla, 2005), ‘scientific research’ (Nielsen & Kjaergaard, 2011) or ‘settled science’ (O’Neill et al., 2015) – seem to illustrate the preoccupation in mainstream communication (and academics) with the *rational, scientific (consensus) view* (i.e. climate change exclusively as scientific fact / object of scientific inquiry). Also, we find multiple frames – like ‘political’ or ‘public accountability’ – which reflect the generally accepted responsibility of *elite managers*, like politicians or scientists, to take action for the greater good, based on the proper use of science (e.g. Gordon, Deines & Havice, 2010; Kenix, 2008a, 2008b; Nielsen & Kjaergaard, 2011; Nisbet, 2009; Olausson, 2009; Rebich-Hespanha et al., 2013; Schlichting, 2013; Wessler et al., 2016). ‘*Uncertainty*’ and ‘*conflict*’ frames also tend to draw our attention to the political and scientific character of the issue, delegitimizing ‘irrational’ and/or non-elite voices (e.g. Antilla, 2005; Nisbet, 2009; O’Neill, 2013; O’Neill et al., 2015; Wessler et al., 2016). Some ‘health and safety’ and ‘security’ frames have also been identified in previous framing studies. Bringing the problem home, they foreground *the vulnerability of ‘collective us’* (Borah, 2009; Fletcher, 2009; Nisbet, 2009; Nisbet & Lewenstein, 2002; Nisbet & Scheufele, 2009; O’Neill et al. 2015; Stephens, Rand & Melnick, 2009). ‘Moral’ or ‘ethics’ frames try to appeal to the *existing (‘most constructive’) moral values of the audience*, like (western) religious considerations or (hegemonic views on) justice (see Prelli & Winters, 2009; Sen, 1999, 2009; Shiva, 1988, 1993; Whitmarsh, O’Neill & Lorenzoni, 2013). ‘*Apocalypse*’, ‘*alarmist*’ or ‘*Pandora’s Box*’ frames take the idea that ‘human (environment) is under threat’ to an extreme (e.g. Doulton & Brown, 2009; Foust & O’Shannon Murphy, 2009; Kenix, 2008a, 2008b; Nisbet, 2009; O’Neill, 2013; O’Neill et al., 2015; Painter, 2013).

Politicization. Summarizing the fundamental problems with this kind of framing, Gamson and Ryan (2005, p.15) argue:

The central lessons to be learned from Lakoff’s omission is that building an effective framing strategy is not merely about more effective marketing expressed through catchy

symbols that tap an emotional hot button and trigger the desired response. The problem isn't that it doesn't work – in the short run; it may – but that its singular focus on finesse in individual framing undermines the goal of increasing citizens' sense that they can collectively change things.

That is, reinforcing '*social atomization*' (Brulle, 2010), the top-down framing strategies address and encourage a passive civil society, preventing real democratic debate or the – collective and conscious – criticizing of structural (political-economic) problems or inequalities. Accordingly, people are deprived from the ability to imagine and (try to) enact perspectives which go beyond the capitalist (neo)liberal thinking (i.e. fundamental, large-scale evolutions) (Fraser, 2000, 2005; Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Mouffe, 2005; Pepermans, 2015; Pepermans & Maesele, 2014; Sen, 1999, 2009; Shiva, 1988, 1993; Swyngedouw, 2010). Shanahan and McComas (1999) point out, more specifically, that the western anthropocentric thinking, focusing on individual (elite) human agents and scientific, technocratic or bureaucratic solutions, disconnects us from relevant scenes for action. Alternative outlooks, however, are more likely to connect us with (human / natural) equals, as members of a broader society, culture and natural world. As Habermas (Habermas & Burger, 1989) states, civil society is key to fundamental change, but requires an independent, *open public sphere* which allows citizens the freedom to collectively identify problems, discuss alternatives and think about fundamental change. Being equal participants in the debate, citizens are likely to come up with long-term alternatives in their own interest and of human and nature in general. Or, as Brulle (2010) phrases it: “[p]articipating in deliberative collective decision-making processes involves a process of moral development away from a narrow individualism and toward a more encompassing notion of morality” (p.84). *Participatory parity* – as a goal and a means – is a fundamental precondition for true change (see Fraser, 2000, 2005; Maniates, 2001; Sen, 1999, 2009; Shiva, 1988, 1993).

Yet, as discussed above, the marketization of society – and the mainstream media system, accordingly – has contributed to the crumbling of this public sphere since the 18th century, at least in (western) capitalist regions (Gans, 1979, 2004; Habermas & Burger, 1989; Hamilton, 2004; Lewis, 2007; Lewis & Boyce, 2009; McChesney, 2008; Nee, 2014). However, socio-environmental movements and *progressive alternative media* – often collaborating closely – (try to) give rise to such alternative public spheres (see 3.1.2 Alternative Media).⁹ That is, they are more open to dissent and conflict, attempting to facilitate the development, distribution and promotion of counter-hegemonic views. While mainstream media usually have a top-down positionality, (progressive) alternative media tend to have a *bottom-up positionality* (Pulido & Peña, 1998; Taylor, 2000), in terms of their position in the broader

⁹ 'Alternative media' encompasses a spectrum of differing outlets, both more progressive as well non-progressive ones (e.g. extreme rightist). The goals and strategies of the various types of alternative platforms tend to diverge. The progressive outlets, which closely cooperate with progressive-leftist movements, tend to have a more open, collective and democratic character than their more conservative counter-parts. Also, they are inclined to openly criticize the current hegemonic consensus view, arguing for fundamental change (e.g. anti-capitalism). Non-progressive outlets, then, tend to take a reactionary stand, promoting or encouraging, for instance, climate scepticism or racism (see 3.1.2 Alternative Media).

(political, economic, cultural) context, their content, and their production process. For instance, they often encourage bottom-up groups and citizens to participate as sources and/or citizen journalists, allowing them to have a(n authoritative) voice in the debate. Put differently, values like democracy, equality and mutual dependence are – as means and goals – more central in these outlets (e.g. Atton, 2002, 2003; Baysha, 2014; Downing, 2001, 2003; Gunster, 2012; Fuchs, 2010; Harcup, 2003, 2014; Lewis, 2007; Sen, 1999, 2009).¹⁰

Gamson and Ryan (2005) conclude that true environmental (re)framing must go beyond the superficial level of the debate (i.e. style or content). Indeed, it must “(...) attend to base building and challenge the contours of the non-level playing field in which the contest is carried on” (p.14). Thus, only if environmental frames help to promote a different worldview – beyond anthropocentric views – true change can be established. *Biocentrism* makes for such an alternative worldview. Biocentrism foregrounds ideas of harmony, diversity, mutual interconnectedness and dependence, equality of all living beings, as well as respect, caring for and sharing with others and sufficiency (including good, equitable living). Humans are part of nature, not separate from it; nature is considered as an important touchstone for human. Hence, humans are urged to show more moderation. Summarizing, metaphors like ‘Mother Nature’ or ‘natural web’ (or ‘organism’) are pivotal in this thinking. Biocentrism is characteristic for more traditional cultural or natural religions, such as Shintoism or Navajo religion (Adamson, 2014; Dryzek, 1997; Harrabin, 2000; Hopwood, Mellor & O’Brien, 2005; Larson, 2011; Naess, 1973; Shanahan & McComas, 1999; Shepard, 2015; Shiva, 1988, 1993; Stibbe, 2015; Unmüßig, Sachs & Fatheuer, 2012; Verhagen, 2008). Dryzek (1997) situates these values in two discourses, ‘Green Romanticism’ and ‘Green Rationalism’. Based on Hopwood, Mellor and O’Brien (2005), I argue that those belong to the overarching ‘Transformation’ discourse. That is, they argue that the very economic and political structures of the current capitalist society, including the ways in which people interact with each other and nature, are at the roots of the current problems. Unlimited growth is perverse. Hence, a fundamental transformation of society is required, drawing on the main values of biocentrism. In short, they criticize and deconstruct the current hegemonic views and construct alternatives (Grunwald, 2016; Shanahan & McComas, 1999). Unmüßig, Sachs and Fatheuer (2012, p.34) highlight the comprehensive character of the required transformation:

If we are looking for new models for society that accept human rights, equity, cultural diversity and democratic participation as fundamental principles while at the same time aiming to stay within ecological limits, we are tasked with nothing less than reinvention of the modern age.

¹⁰ In 3.1.2 (Alternative Media) I will, however, nuance the ‘deconstructive-reconstructive’ character of the progressive alternative media somewhat. These media do not necessarily or in all cases give rise to open and democratic – and thus inclusive and responsive – debates (beyond the hegemonic consensus) (e.g. Baysha; Groshek & Han, 2011). See also my nuancing note below, based on Kenis and Mathijs (2014).

Indeed, Fraser (2000, 2005) summarizes that true justice requires both (economic / material) redistribution, cultural status recognition as well as political representation. After all, climate change (i.e. the disproportionate human emission of GHG) is depicted as just one consequence of a broader capitalist system, which has also produced a number of other, interconnected social, economic, political and cultural injustices (de Onís, 2012; Grunwald, 2016). Concluding, the introduction of biocentric alternatives may help to politicize the debate and allow for true discussions or ‘agonistic struggles’ (Mouffe, 2005) among conflicting yet legitimate positions, rather than dichotomies of legitimate and delegitimate views (based on a priori consensus views). That is a precondition for a well-functioning democracy (Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Pepermans, 2015; Pepermans & Maesele, 2014; Swyngedouw, 2010).¹¹

Politicizing ‘Frames’. The limited research that has been concerned with climate change coverage in alternative media provides some empirical evidence of *alternative types of frames*. These seem to reflect – at least some traces of – the biocentric perspective. That is, some attempts to politicize the debate have been found. Brand and Brunnengräber (2012), for instance, identify a ‘*transformation*’ frame and an ‘*anti-adaptation*’ frame. The former argues that capitalism is responsible for the climate crisis. Hence, the current societal system needs to be comprehensively revised and transformed. The latter contends that adaptational measures merely serve to prolong the climate crisis. Contrary to their expectations, however, the authors only found traces of the frames in the alternative media, at least in the context of the climate debate. Even so, it is important that these alternative views are (more or less) legitimated. Other authors have identified frames which show one or multiple characteristics of ‘*collective action framing*’ (Benford & Snow, 2000; Čapek, 1993; Hopke, 2012; Taylor, 2000). Hopke (2012), for instance, has detected a number of such frames in a study on the Salvadoran media representation of conflicts over metallic mining and water pollution. The grassroots ‘environmental justice’, ‘community rights’, ‘Pacific Rim as a threat’ and ‘government negligent’ frames were only found in the alternative media. The frames foreground community rights (‘us’), denouncing deconstructive and unjust actions of mining companies and/or the government (‘them’) and emphasizing the agency of the communities to collectively defend their rights and to act for change. The mainstream media, on the contrary, predominantly framed the issue in terms of economic progress (e.g. ‘benefits and progress’, ‘corporate rights’) or ‘national sovereignty’, and thus almost exclusively from the legitimated perspective of economic and government actors. Discussing the media framing of the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Summit in a number of Canadian media outlets, Gunster (2011) argues that the mainstream media

¹¹ See footnote 7. In the current western(ized) society in which anthropocentrism constitutes the dominant and largely unquestioned worldview, we may expect that the most pervasive and systematic politicizing structures (i.e. frames) can be found in the context of biocentrism, as minor, counter-hegemonic view. For example, it is the policy of alternative media – one of the major mouthpieces of alternative voices – to deconstruct the dominant system and present alternatives (e.g. Atton, 2002; Harcup, 2014). This is, for instance, confirmed by Pepermans (2015).

highlight a rather pessimistic view of failed politics. Although the alternative media are equally pessimistic about institutionalized politics, they do present a number of other, *more positive futures* (i.e. *alternatives*). They argue, for instance, that we can turn the climate threat into a collective challenge which we can cope with if we adopt a different kind of climate politics: ‘It is time to fight together’ (see Gunster, 2012). Clearly, then, these studies also suggest that the alternative frames draw on *different sets of (biocentric) values*, such as equality, collectivity or democracy (see also Calmeyn, 2013; Cherian, 2003; Doğu, 2015).

These findings are consonant with the proposal of Brulle (2010), who theorizes about more constructive types of framing. Drawing on, among others, O’Neill and Nicholson-Cole (2009), he contends that balancing fear with information about alternatives can be strongly motivating, galvanizing concern and engagement (see Hendry, 2010). That is, he reinterprets the ‘Comic Apocalypse’ (or melodrama) as described by Foust and O’Shannon Murphy (2009) as a potent strategy to *deconstruct the hegemonic reality and (re)construct counter-hegemonic alternatives*: “By critiquing ideological worldviews, melodrama can combat discourses of co-optation, reveal ideological mechanisms of control, and expand the range of options considered” (Brulle, 2010, p.93). As implied by the author, this strategy must always be part of a broader set of deconstruction-reconstruction strategies, allowing openness towards various ideological perspectives. As described above, that is not the case for the ‘Comic Apocalypse’ as understood and applied in the context of the mainstream media. In this context, the strategy mainly helps to confirm human actions within the limited scope of the (hegemonic) anthropocentric consensus view (e.g. techno-economic solutions) promoted by elite interest groups. McIntyre (2015) argues, for example, that constructive journalism must be aimed at manipulating individuals’ feelings, encouraging them to take more pro-social behaviour like talking about solutions (on social media) or supporting charities by donating or volunteering. (*Progressive*) *alternative media* are, as argued, more likely to provide supportive contexts for alternatives. Being both oppositional *and* constructive, it is the policy of these media to try and lay bare the problems in the current hegemonic (media) system while providing valid alternatives.¹² As such, drawing on critical analyses and broader contextualization, they attempt to provide “information about and interpretations of the world which we might not otherwise see and information about the world that we simply will not find anywhere else” (Atton, 2002, pp.11-12). For doing so, they allow – among others – a broader group of (non-hegemonic) sources, (citizen)journalists and opinion-makers to contribute to the debate (e.g. Atton, 2002, 2003; Baysha, 2014; Downing, 2001, 2003; Drok & Hermans, 2016; Fuchs, 2010; Harcup, 2003, 2014; Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2007; Lewis, 2007; Mendelson & Creech, 2016).

Contextualization is – I have pointed out above – the common denominator underlying the ‘engaging strategies’ suggested in the literature. I therefore expect that these strategies may also play a role in the

¹² See footnote 10.

alternative, politicizing types of (sub)frames reproduced by the alternative media. However, it is not unlikely that their operationalization is somewhat different, being informed by a more bottom-up, counter-hegemonic context, which foregrounds alternative, more biocentric values (see also the counter-hegemonic operationalization of the ‘Comic Apocalypse’). The examples above provide some indications which suggest that this indeed may be the case. As illustrated, contextualization may help to highlight the collective character of the envisioned actions, giving rise to a sense of *peer support* (Hart, 2011; Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole & Whitmarsh, 2007). More generally, it may locate problems, causes and solutions within *more fundamental societal and/or environmental structures* and patterns (e.g. Hart, 2011; Iyengar, 1989; O’Neill, 2017). Similarly, the integration of various equal voices, perspectives and experiences may help to give rise to the idea of an *intricate ‘natural web’* (Shepard, 2015; Verhagen, 2008), which interconnects the experiences, actions or decisions of various groups in various time-spaces; if climate change or other threats affect, for instance, one part of the web, this will fan out to all other parts (e.g. Chouliaraki, 2006; Lester & Cottle, 2009; Manzo, 2010a, 2010b). *Contextualized conflict and debate* (see Corbett & Durfee, 2004) – drawing on broad dialogues rather than (predefined) balance or dichotomies (e.g. Carpentier, 2008; Gans, 1989; Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2007) – may help to highlight that none of the suggested solutions is final (McIntyre, 2015) and deviant views are welcomed to the debate (rather than excluded from the outset in favour of ‘superior’ or ‘rational’ views). This may, supposedly, also allow a *wider range of human values* to interact and inform each other. However, I mainly expect to find more ‘intrinsic’ types of values, which have been shown to galvanize more engagement and willingness to act (e.g. Crompton & Smith, 2015; Grouzet et al., 2005; Schwartz, 1994; Whitmarsh, O’Neill & Lorenzoni, 2013).

Based on the limited and rather *loose sets of findings in the existing literature* on alternative climate change framing, however, it is difficult to decide how exactly these strategies are integrated in, or help to shape, various broader argumentations or more comprehensive and comparable frameworks. What is, for instance, the relation between these strategies and underlying (non-hegemonic) ideological worldviews in the context of various frames? How do they (mutually) influence or reinforce each other? Also, it remains unclear to what extent the strategies are fully implemented or operationalized in different (temporal, spatial, cultural...) contexts. Not all authors identify the various strategies, but that may also be due to a lack of methodological systematicity (see 1.4 Towards a More Comprehensive Understanding of Climate Change Framing). Yet, a study by Kenis and Mathijs (2014) on the representation of environmental justice during the Copenhagen climate summit of 2009, demonstrates that these strategies were not fully developed or operational(ized) in that context (see also Brand & Brunnengräber, 2012). Kenis and Mathijs (2014) criticize, for instance, the lack of alternative, positive futures or the overly strong focus on us (‘the heroes’, particularly the members of the grassroots movements) and them (‘the villains’, the others, particularly the elites), preventing the full development

of the idea of ‘collective action’. This ‘us-them’ contrast is also a recurrent pattern identified in several of the studies discussed above.

1.4 Towards a More Comprehensive Understanding of Climate Change Framing

As illustrated above, the existing literature on climate change framing seems to provide confirmation of the existence of two differential groups of frames: depoliticizing frames, which help to reproduce and reinforce anthropocentric thinking, and politicizing frames, which help to introduce biocentric values into the debate. However, the discussion also illustrates the strong *fragmentation of the framing field*, with various authors identifying their own sets of frames, which are often defined along (slightly) different lines (see Table 4). This inhibits comparison among studies and topics and largely prevents the further development of the framing concept and methodology (Hertog & McLeod, 2001). I found, in particular, a lack of consistency among the mainstream frame sets, on the one hand, and the alternative frame sets, on the other. Also, the apparent overlap among frames – for instance, ‘morality’ and ‘human health and safety’ – is confusing. This is further exacerbated by the fact that many authors fail to clearly outline the underlying argumentative structures of their frames. This could, however, elucidate the character of the identified causes, problems, solutions or moral evaluations and, secondarily, underlying worldviews. After all, frames always help to naturalize ideological perspectives (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Reese, 2007; Tankard, 2001; Van Gorp, 2006, 2007). Yet, many researchers seem to be largely unaware of the underlying ideological implications of their frames or, at least, they do not explicitly recognize or address these. Especially those who are only concerned with frames which reflect the anthropocentric consensus view rarely acknowledge the influence of the latter (see, however, Brand & Brunnengräber, 2012; Maesele, 2010). As such, they may (unconsciously) confirm the so-called ‘neutral’ and ‘unavoidable’ status of certain views, *neglecting underlying hegemonic struggles* among strongly diverging ideological viewpoints. As Carragee and Roefs (2004) point out, “[f]raming research that ignores the ways in which frames construct meanings and the interests served by those meanings deprives the concept of its theoretical and substantive significance” (p.219). In other words, contrary to multiple studies based on critical discourse analysis (e.g. Carvalho, 2005, 2007; Carvalho & Peterson, 2012; Pepermans, 2015; Pepermans & Maesele, 2014), most framing studies have not integrated the insights from hegemony research, the (de)politicization literature or related research traditions (see however, Maesele (2010)). If doing so, however, framing can be a highly useful concept: As I will discuss in Chapter 2, frames may help to provide empirical and tangible bases to arguments regarding ruling worldviews and underlying ideological struggles, allowing both for detail as well as for generalization and comparison among problems or argumentations, issues, studies or phases in the communication process.

To overcome these problems and shortcomings, the approach on framing in this research will slightly diverge from the approaches adopted in most empirical (climate change) framing studies. Following the

views of Gamson and Modigliani (1989) or Van Gorp (2006, 2007), I argue that one frame never equals an ideology, or vice versa. That is, a single frame can be used by various ideological groups, conveying their particular interests, while different frames may also reflect the same ideology. Accordingly, I argue that some of the broadly distributed – and thus, potentially resonant – ‘environmental’ frames (see Table 4) may well be able to reproduce either anthropocentric or rather biocentric ideological perspectives. Based on the discussion above, however, I expect that currently many frames are predominantly used to promote anthropocentric views, at least in mainstream contexts. Put differently, while the presence of various frames (e.g. ‘economic’ and ‘human health and safety’ frames) may make climate change appear as a highly debated issue, the debate is largely taking place on the frame level and not on the level of more fundamental underlying worldviews. I find implicit confirmation for this argumentation in the aforementioned statement of Shanahan and McComas (1999, p.15) that hegemonic environmentalism is merely “(...) a bandage on the perceived wounds of industrialism”, highlighting that opinion or attitudinal shifts mainly have taken place within the contours of the dominant western paradigm (see Shiva, 1988). Gamson and Ryan (2005, p.14) were quoted before, arguing in a similar vein that “(...) framing strategies must not just address the content of the message or the style of debate but attend to base building and challenge the contours of the non-level playing field in which the contest is carried on”. Throughout this study, I will, accordingly, distinguish between (anthropocentric and biocentric) *masterframes* (broad, structured collectives of language, images and ideas about how the world is and should be), *frames* (which help to structure particular problems or topics of concern, like economics, public well-being or justice) and *subframes* (ideologically coloured realizations of the frames which are given shape by the masterframe one abides by) (Baden, 2010; Benford & Snow, 2000; Brulle, 2010; Coy, Woehrle & Maney, 2008; Shanahan and McComas, 1999). As such, this study attempts to further *integrate and operationalize framing and hegemony research*. I will, more specifically, strongly draw on the views of the (de)politicization literature (Carragee and Roefs 2004; Fairclough, 1995, 2000; Gans, 2004; Gitlin, 1980; Gramsci, 1980; Maesele, 2010; Mouffe, 2005; Pepermans, 2015; Pepermans & Maesele, 2014; Swyngedouw, 2010; van Dijk, 1988, 1998, 2001).

Accordingly, I formulate the following central research question: *How do hegemonic anthropocentric and counter-hegemonic biocentric perspectives give shape to various visual-verbal climate change frames (i.e. subframes) in mainstream and (progressive) alternative media?* I will attempt to provide answers to this question by tracing the two worldviews throughout the framing process. After all, only by approaching *framing as a process*, news production can be linked to – and may allow for a fuller understanding of – broader socio-political, economic, cultural, and thus, ideological contexts. More specifically, I will look at frame-building – the practices, influences, hegemonic struggles at the origin of frames – and the resulting frames in multimodal media texts. Accordingly, these are the two overarching sub-questions of this study:

- (1) How can the anthropocentric and biocentric views be traced and captured in the visual-verbal frame-building practices of mainstream and (progressive) alternative media?
- (2) Which multimodal climate change frames can be found in mainstream and (progressive) alternative reporting?
 - a. How do anthropocentric and biocentric worldviews define the underlying masterframes and subframes?

As time limitations did not permit me to conduct reception research, I will further (try to) interpret my findings, theorizing on their potential implications, by connecting them to previous frame-effects studies (Carragee & Roefs, 2004; De Vreese, 2005; Entman, Matthes & Pellicano, 2009; Gans, 1979; Gitlin, 1980; B. Scheufele, 2006; D. A. Scheufele, 1999; Tuchman, 1979; Van Gorp, 2006, 2007; Vliegthart & Zoonen, 2011).

I will carry out this research as an *advocate scientist*, analysing empirical ‘facts’ as a scientist but taking a critical and engaged position as a citizen whose responsibility it is to enlighten her fellow citizens regarding alternative views which might contribute to social and environmental change (Adamson, Evans & Stein, 2015; Alexander, 2007; Larson, 2011). Obviously, my interpretations and argumentations are largely defined by my positionality as a white, female scholar in the humanities, living in a Western European country and holding certain worldviews and values. The latter are both informed by my life experiences as well as interactions with peers, fellow researchers, socio-environmental movements, the media (Pulido & Peña, 1998; Taylor, 2000). Similarly, Stibbe (2015) argues that every researcher has a particular ethical framework to evaluate whether the object – for instance, a discourse, a frame – (s)he is analysing ‘works’ or is constructive. He introduces the term ‘ecosophy’ to refer to the values, assumptions or priorities which researchers judge stories against in the context of environmental communication (i.e. ecolinguistics) (see Larson, 2011). Drawing on the three spectra Stibbe (2015) suggests, I would define my own *ecosophy* as ecocentric, progressive and optimistic. More specifically, my *ecosophy* is largely shaped by social ecology, ecofeminism, post-colonial ecocriticism, deep ecology and, to some extent, the Transition Movement (see Adamson, 2014; Alexander, 2007; Deloughrey, 2014; Dryzek, 1997; Hopkins, 2008; Hopwood, Mellor & O’Brien, 2005; Huggan & Tiffin, 2014; Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Naess, 1973; Nixon, 2015; Roos & Hunt, 2010; Sen, 1999, 2009; Shiva, 1988, 1993; Stibbe, 2015; Verhagen, 2008): I believe that all living beings (including all humans) are equal. While being closely interconnected and mutually dependent, we all have value in our own right as well. This equality should be recognized, respected and – if needed – restored (ecocentrism). I am convinced that (economic, social, cultural and political) resources need to be equally (re)distributed. This will require fundamental development, away from the current global capitalist-liberalist system, the survival of which largely depends on inequality, injustice and unlimited development (progressive). I strongly believe in the inherent power and ability of humans – in close

interaction with others within and outside human society – to awaken to the ‘organic’ (intrinsic) values which they have lost out of sight, and to restore them, building a ‘good’ and equitable life for all living beings on Earth (optimism). In short, my ecosophy has a largely biocentric colour. As I argued above, the values of biocentrism can be connected to the argumentations underlying the idea of politicization. Accordingly, I also align with authors who defend the need to politicize the (climate) debate (e.g. Brulle, 2010; De Lucia, 2009; Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Mouffe, 2005; Pepermans, 2015; Pepermans & Maesele, 2014; Swyngedouw, 2010).

As Hertog and McLeod (2001) point out, it is crucial for researchers to clarify their own views on framing, as there exist multiple conceptualizations and operationalizations across the literature (see Borah, 2011; Brantner, Geise & Lobinger, 2012; Entman, 1993). A clear definition may prevent one’s work from being grouped with distinctly different types of framing studies (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007)¹³ or, perhaps, may help to further the ideal of a coherent framing paradigm (Entman, 1993). *Chapter two* will attend to this *concept-building*, clarifying what I consider as the main characteristics of framing. It will, in particular, devote special attention to the multimodal character of the concept and method (e.g. Coleman, 2010; Geise & Baden, 2015; Herbers & Volpers, 2013; Lobinger & Geise, 2013; Meier, 2013; Wessler et al., 2016) and the relations of frames to ideology. Both have received relatively little attention in the framing literature. The chapter will conclude by introducing a multi-level, multimodal framing analysis toolkit, drawing on earlier proposals and a wide range of insights from other backgrounds like critical discourse analysis, semiotics, (eco)linguistics or film and photography studies. As such – operationalizing my theoretical views on framing – this study may help to fill a (methodological) gap in the framing literature.

Chapter three will further elaborate on the ‘*framing process*’. I will introduce some of the influences (see Shoemaker & Reese, 2014) which may affect frame-building within (and beyond) various types of newsrooms, including the (hegemonic) struggles of various frame sponsors. The main focus will lie on the mainstream-alternative divide and, accordingly, the effects of commercialization on the public sphere (Habermas & Burger, 1989). Further, the chapter will also introduce popular and broadsheet media and media with varying ideological backgrounds, as the corpus in the empirical section encompasses media outlets with these various backgrounds. Finally, I will also briefly address frame interpretations by the audience.

Chapter four will encompass a first empirical application of the insights discussed in the previous chapters. It will draw on the inductive-deductive qualitative framing analysis (see Van Gorp, 2006) of a corpus of 1.256 climate news articles published in three mainstream newspapers (*De Standaard* (broadsheet, centrist), *De Morgen* (broadsheet, leftist) and *Het Laatste Nieuws* (popular, liberal roots))

¹³ That does not mean, however, that different views on ‘framing’ cannot interact and, thus, inform each other.

and two progressive alternative outlets (the online outlet *DeWereldMorgen* and the news website of the magazine *MO**) in Flanders. The main research questions of this chapter will be the following ones:

- (1) Which set of multimodal climate change frames can be found drawing on a corpus of mainstream *and* alternative media articles?
- (2) How do these frames account for ideological diversity (i.e. hegemonic struggles)? That is, which sets of underlying ideologically coloured ‘subframes’ can be detected?
 - a. Which insights does this provide with regard to the contribution of framing to depoliticization and politicization (research)?
- (3) How can we summarize and make tangible the main multimodal characteristics of the detected frames by means of frame matrices?

I will, more specifically, propose an extensive *set of five climate change frames, ten ideologically coloured subframes and two masterframes* which, I believe, may help to illustrate and make tangible the hegemonic struggles in the context of frames (Carragee & Roefs, 2004). I will clarify and discuss each frame based on one exemplary news article and summarize the main characteristics in frame matrices (Maesele, 2010; Schlichting, 2013; Van Gorp, 2006, 2007; Van Gorp & van der Goot, 2012). The latter allow for comparison – among frames, studies, issues, phases of the communication process – connecting detail and examples with generalizations and abstract patterns. As such, I hope to complement the existing framing studies, trying to answer to the call of Borah (2011) for research that connects and contributes to a broader, cumulative understanding of framing. The chapter will also contain a brief quantitative discussion, highlighting the prevalence of the various types of (sub)frames across the media outlets, particularly the mainstream and alternative outlets.

In *Chapter five* I will turn to two case studies, discussing the Environmental Justice and Cycles of Nature Frames in more detail. Both discussions will illustrate how exactly (sub)frames take shape in multimodal texts and how the framing analysis toolkit may help to excavate the underlying ideological struggles among anthropocentric and biocentric worldviews. Firstly, I will zoom in on *Environmental Justice and its two underlying subframes*, Unequal Vulnerability and Unequal Attribution. As Kasperson and Kasperson (2001) posit, environmental injustice – the unequal attribution of the benefits and burdens of climate change among various groups – is key to understanding climate change and addressing it more effectively. After all, “(...) the roots of the problem are found in the differential power and global inequalities in relationship with the environment” (Sze & London, 2008, p.1342). As discussed, power inequalities, hierarchy and injustice are the main topics of struggle and debate in processes of depoliticization and politicization. Hence, the Environmental Justice Frame makes for a particularly illustrative and important example of how differential positionalities (Pulido & Peña, 1998; Taylor, 2000) may affect the realization of a frame (i.e. subframes). The ‘(reversed) ideological square’ (van Dijk, 1998, p.33) will help to crystallize the ideological struggles. The second part of Chapter five will

integrate the Cycles of Nature frame into the discussion, bringing the issue of natural justice to the forefront. After all, human-human justice and human-nature justice are strongly intertwined and cannot be approached, or aspired, separately (e.g. Adamson, 2014; Adamson, Evans & Stein, 2015; Roos & Hunt, 2010). The *in-depth comparison of Environmental Justice and Cycles of Nature* and their subframes (Unequal Vulnerability and Scala Naturae; Unequal Attribution and Natural Web) may further support and make tangible the claim that similar ideological struggles can be identified – and thus, mutually reinforced – across various frames (Carragee & Roefs, 2014). I will, in particular, problematize the underdeveloped struggles for natural justice across all subframes. That is, nature is not visually or verbally depicted as equal to humans. However, as long as we do not change the ways in which we talk about or represent nature, we cannot profoundly change our relation with nature, including our fellow human beings (Cox, 2010; Larson, 2011; Milstein, 2009; Norton, 2014; Shanahan and McComas, 1999; Roos & Hunt, 2010; Shepard, 2015; Verhagen, 2008).

Chapter six, finally, will connect the identified news frames to the *frame-building practices* in the various newsrooms. This will allow for a fuller understanding of their potential implications or (intended) meanings. My analysis – considering journalists as central nucleus in the frame-building process (Boesman et al., 2017; Engesser & Brüggemann, 2016) – is one of the first to directly link the cognitive frames of journalists with their news frames in climate change articles (see also Vossen, Van Gorp & Schulpen, 2017). As such, it will attempt to (partly) trace the Anthropocentric and Biocentric Subframes throughout the framing process, contributing to the insights regarding framing-building in the context of mainstream and (progressive) alternative newsrooms. For this concluding section, I have interviewed 26 climate journalists, news chiefs, photo editors and opinion-makers who work for the five selected outlets. I combined the findings of my thematic content analysis (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003; Ritchie & Spencer, 1994) with the results of a deductive framing analysis of 114 climate change articles produced by the reporters during the interview period (November-December 2016). Drawing on the metaphors of the ‘machine’ and the ‘organism’ (Dryzek, 1997; Larson, 2011; Navaz & Ferrer, 2012; Shepard, 2015; Stibbe, 2015; Verhagen, 2008), I will clarify and compare the workings of the mainstream and alternative newsrooms, and directly connect them to the resulting news and journalist (sub)frames. This will help to empirically illustrate and explicate the thesis that mainstream media are more likely to depoliticize the debate while (progressive) alternative media are more inclined to politicize it. Summarizing, this chapter will attempt to provide answers to the following research questions:

- (1) What are the journalist frames (and shared newsroom frames) of climate change reporters working in three mainstream and two progressive alternative media outlets in Flanders?
- (2) In which ways do the identified journalist (and newsroom) frames help to predict the news frames in these outlets, and vice versa?

- (3) Which influences affect frame-building in the context of five Flemish media outlets? Which factors help to explain the presence (or dominance) of certain climate change journalist and news frames? How do influences and frames interact?
- (4) Which are the main differences in the production process of mainstream and alternative media which may help to explain their differential framings?

2 Multimodal Framing: Conceptualization and Methodology

“[T]he social world is (...) a kaleidoscope of potential realities, any of which can be readily evoked” (Edelman, 1993, p.232)

2.1 The Emergence of a Paradigm

Defining them as “principles of organisation” (Goffman, 1986, p.10), it was sociologist Goffman (1974), drawing on views of anthropologist Bateson (1972), who laid the foundations of frames, and framing. In the following decades, however, ‘framing’ was adopted by numerous other disciplines, such as cognitive psychology (e.g. Bartlett, 1961; Kahneman & Tversky, 1984), economics (e.g. Kahneman & Tversky, 1984), (cognitive) linguistics (e.g. Fillmore & Baker, 2009; Lakoff, 2010; Tannen, 1993), artificial intelligence research (e.g. Minsky, 1975), social-movements research (e.g. Benford & Snow, 2000), policy research (e.g. Schön & Rein, 1994), political communication (e.g. Gitlin, 1980) or public-relations research (e.g. Hallahan, 1999). Tuchman (1978) and Gamson (e.g. Gamson, 1989, 1992; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989) are considered to be the founders of framing in the context of communication and media studies, in which it has grown into a very popular, often employed concept and method (Weaver, 2007).

A serious drawback of this multidisciplinary concept, however, is the fact that it constitutes an “imprecise catchall” (Entman, 2004, p.5). Indeed, “[t]he term ‘frame’ (...) is used in a wide variety of ways by academics in different disciplines” but also “by those in the same discipline and even by the same author” (Stibbe, 2015, p.47). Multiple authors (e.g. Baden, 2010; Borah, 2011; Carragee & Roefs, 2014; D’Angelo, 2002; De Vreese, 2005; Entman, 1991, 1993; Hertog & McLeod, 2001; Matthes & Kohring, 2008; Reese, 2001a, 2007; Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007; Tankard, 2001; Vliegenthart & van Zoonen, 2011) address this lack of consistency and imprecision, in terms of conceptualization and methodology. They denounce the fact that ‘framing’ is often merely used as a metaphor or as a synonym for related, but separate, concepts such as schemata, scripts, story topics or issue positions. What is more, as a result of its heterogeneity ‘framing’ fails to evolve as a theory. Clearly, this is due to the fact that findings, concepts and methodologies do not add up. For instance, as most researchers design their own set of frames (for each topic under research), it is hard to compare framing analyses. Besides, many of the (theoretical) approaches disagree on key points (Hertog & McLeod, 2001). Therefore, most of these critical reviews urge for the evolution towards clarity, a more coherent paradigm, an integrated approach.

D’Angelo (2002), however, contends that a single paradigm is not desirable nor possible. On the contrary, the diversity within the framing paradigm leads to more comprehensive views of the framing process. Accordingly, Hertog and McLeod (2011), calling the variety of views “both a blessing and a

course” (p.139), argue that it allows for more creativity. Although Reese (2007) calls for more clarity and coherence, he values framing as a ‘bridging model’, that keeps alerting us to alternative views, perspectives and theories (from different disciplines) and prevents us from growing too rigid or uncritical when theorizing and operationalizing. Cross-fertilizations might, indeed, feed into more open views (across different fields). As Hallahan (1999) demonstrates, for instance, insights from psychology might also inform the study of media frames.

Leaving aside the previous nuances, however, framing – indebted and related to a number of other frameworks, such as Critical Discourse Analysis (e.g. Fairclough, 1995, 2000; Machin, 2013; Machin & Mayr, 2012; Richardson, 2007; van Dijk, 1988, 1998, 2001; van Leeuwen, 2008) – definitely constitutes a highly valuable theory and methodology addressing the social construction of realities. Framing is, among others, a more useful alternative to the (modernist) objectivity-bias debate on media coverage (Cirino, 1973; Hackett, 1984). Drawing on epistemological realism, the latter maintains the (fallacious) idea that media organizations, and journalists, can function as purely objective intermediaries between the unmediated, objective reality and media accounts. Observations are evaluated as true or false (i.e. biased) based on their correspondence with reality. Clearly, this goes counter to the (post-modernist) constructivist approach, which argues that different observations exist and can be compared but that there is not a world independent from observation. We can never know ‘the truth’. There is no neutral vantage point. Hence, constructivism highlights the importance of the observer whose observations are influenced by various ‘contingent distinctions’, which can be revealed and analysed. That is, human representation and knowledge are socially situated and are always the result of subjective interpretations and/or the construction work by various interacting communicators and audiences (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Danelzik, 2016). This idea is also addressed by Pulido & Peña (1998) (see also Taylor, 2000) when coining the term ‘positionality’: depending on their social positions, backgrounds, values, life experiences or worldviews, people are likely to think and talk about, and thus represent, the world in different ways. The constructivist paradigm constitutes an important theoretical foundation of framing (e.g. Danelzik, 2016; Gamson et al., 1992; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Tuchman, 1972, 1978; Van Gorp, 2007).

Framing analyses make manifest the underlying comprehensive frameworks which structure people’s representations of reality in various time-spaces. Accordingly, they may also expose the media’s reflection and reproduction of certain worldviews, of power moves and of stabilizing hegemonic ideologies (Carragee & Roefs, 2004), allowing for systematic examination and informed discussion (Danelzik, 2016; Hackett, 1984; Tankard, 2001). That is, combining detail with a more comprehensive and abstract character, these frame(work)s allow for comparison (among discussions or issues) and generalization. Indeed, the argumentation of Shanahan and McComas (1999) with regard to narratives also holds true for frames, to which they are closely related (see 2.2.1.4 Frames and Narratives). Frames

provide a relevant level of analysis, which is neither overly theorized nor too microanalytic. Accordingly, they can also quite easily be traced in the consecutive phases of the communication process. By emphasizing framing as a process, framing theory links news to broader social and cultural contexts. For instance, frames both interact with, and result from, the practices and influences in the news-building process and interpretations and cognitive frames (and schemata) of various audiences (De Vreese, 2005; Druckman, 2001b; Entman, Matthes & Pellicano, 2009; Scheufele, B., 2006; Scheufele, D. A., 1999; Tuchman, 1979; Van Gorp, 2006, 2007; Vliegenthart & van Zoonen, 2011). Perlmutter (1998) concludes, therefore, that “[f]raming’s main contribution as a research paradigm is that it is equally applicable to the production, transmission, and reception of messages” (p.7). As such, it guards against the “(...) unduly compartmentalizing [of] components of communication (...)” (Reese, 2001a, p.8).

Related communication concepts as agenda-setting (McCombs & Shaw, 1972; McLeod, Becker & Byrnes, 1974) and priming (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987) highlight the effects of media on *what* people think about or the attention they attach to an issue. Framing, however, is concerned with the ways in which (*how*) people think about issues (Weaver, 2007, 2016). While agenda-setting and priming are said to make certain issues or topics more prominent (salient) and thus accessible, framing gives more weight to particular structures or concepts, making them more applicable for the understanding of topics or issues (e.g. Nelson, Oxley & Clawson, 1997; Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007; Slothuus, 2008). Nevertheless, framing has been approached as an extension of ‘second-level agenda-setting’ (e.g. McCombs & Ghanem, 2001), which is concerned with the foregrounding, backgrounding or omission of particular attributes or characteristics of an object or issue on the media agenda (rather than of objects or issues as such, which happens on the first level). I agree with Weaver (2016) that there are indeed some similarities among framing and second-level agenda-setting (e.g. both are concerned with how issues are covered and which aspects are most salient). I argue, however, that equating frames to second-level agenda-setting is far too reductive. As I will discuss more extensively below (see 2.2.1.6 Non-Frames; 4.3 Environmental Frames in the Literature), framing approaches inspired by agenda-setting tend to ignore the structuring function and ideological level of frames (see Entman, 1993, 2004; Gamson et al., 1992; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989) and – being issue-specific – prevent comparison among topics (Carragee & Roefs, 2004). As Van Gorp (2007) points out, lacking the constructivist background, agenda-setting and priming focus on the causal – rather than the interactive – effects of media communication and fail to incorporate the elements and interactions related to the idea of communication as a process (production contexts, audience interpretations) (see Carragee & Roefs, 2004).

2.2 Defining Frames and Framing

According to Hallahan (1999), more than a thousand citations can be found in the literature defining frames and framing. Indeed, as I have pointed out already, the field is highly heterogeneous, even if one confines oneself to reviewing studies within the same discipline, or strongly related disciplines (Borah, 2011; Entman, 2004; Stibbe, 2015). With an eye on my research on media communication, I will only provide a limited number of definitions here. These are the definitions from the scholarly fields which I consider most instructive for the construction and, particularly, fine-tuning of my own conceptualization. I draw, in particular, on studies in the fields of (political) communication, media research and (eco)linguistics: Tuchman (1978) – describing news as a window onto the world – argues, for instance, that “(...) frames turn non-recognizable happenings or amorphous talk into a discernible event. Without the frame, they would be mere happenings of mere talk, incomprehensible sounds” (p.192). Clearly, the ‘window metaphor’ ought to be understood from a constructivist perspective (Hackett, 1984). Indeed, as Tuchman (1978, p.1) argues:

The view through a window depends upon whether the window is large or small, has many panes or few, whether the glass is opaque or clear, whether the window faces a street or a backyard. The unfolding scene also depends upon where one stands, far or near, craning one’s neck on the side, or gazing straight ahead, eyes parallel to the wall in which the window is encased.

Gitlin (1980) defines media frames in his seminal work as “(...) persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation, of selection, emphasis and exclusion, by which symbol-handlers routinely organize discourse, whether verbal or visual” (p.7). Gamson (1989, 1992) and Gamson and Modigliani (1989) describe a frame in more concise terms as the “central organizing idea”, “(...) making sense of relevant events and suggesting what is at issue” (Gamson, 1989, p.157). Entman (1993), however, provides a more extensive and frequently cited definition:

Framing essentially involves selection and salience. To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described (p.52).

More recent accounts are clearly indebted to this literature, although they add their own emphases: “Frames are organizing principles that are socially shared and persistent over time, that work symbolically to meaningfully structure the social world”, according to Reese (2001a, p.11), who emphasizes that ‘frame’ is both a noun as well as a verb (i.e. framing). Tankard (2001) talks about a “central organizing idea or news content that supplies a context and suggests what the issue is through the use of selection, emphasis, exclusion, and elaboration”. Concluding, I add Stibbe (2015) as a recent, but illuminating, (eco)linguistic source. Projecting the workings of metaphors onto framing – mapping from a (concrete) source domain (e.g. greenhouse (effect)) to a more abstract target domain (e.g. climate

change) – his definition depicts a frame as “(...) a story about an area of life that is brought to mind by particular trigger words”. Framing, then, is “(...) the use of a story from one area of life (a frame) to structure how another area of life is conceptualised” (p.47) (see e.g. Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007). This argumentation is reminiscent of blending theory in cognitive linguistics. Blending theory is concerned with the hybrid mental spaces which people build in order to deal with everyday challenges. These contain elements from various input domains; a source and target domain are brought together to produce new meaning (see Fauconnier & Turner, 2002). Despite the fact that I consider this outlook on framing as enlightening, I will argue for a more abstract and generic interpretation of frames, substituting the definition of a frame as a ‘story from one area of life’ with the interpretation of the frame as (drawing on) a ‘generally shared narrative’ or ‘mythological archetype’, which may be employed to structure various areas of life (2.2.1.4 Frames and Narratives) (Hertog & McLeod, 2001; Reese, 2007; Van Gorp, 2007).

Hertog and McLeod (2001) urge researchers to clarify their views on the framing concept. This may prevent their work from being grouped with distinctly different types of framing studies (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007) or, perhaps, may help to further the ideal of a more coherent framing paradigm (Entman, 1993) – as far as that is feasible and/or desirable. Van Gorp (2006), reviewing the literature on framing in an attempt to identify common grounds, responded to this call. His highly extensive and detailed discussion of concepts and methodologies, preceding his research on the framing of asylum seekers in the Flemish media, constituted an important example to me. Although I did not refrain from conducting my own review of the framing literature, including more recent sources and applications, Van Gorp often led the way in my theorizations. My definition, therefore, draws on the definition provided by Van Gorp (2006) and is further informed by my own views derived from the literature:

A frame is an immanent structuring idea which gives coherence and meaning to multimodal texts and cognitive processes. Framing, then, is applying a particular frame to structure an area of life: It involves selecting, backgrounding, omitting, expanding and giving salience to certain aspects of a perceived reality, providing context and suggesting a particular problem definition, causal responsibility, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation.

Quite some authors employ a metaphor in an attempt to illuminate and clarify the frame concept. ‘Frame’ has two possible meanings in English: a picture frame or a building frame. Both can be found in the literature (e.g. Pan & Kosicki, 1993; Stibbe, 2015; Tuchman, 1978). According to Gamson et al. (1992), most authors focus on the second meaning, although the first often slips in as well. Nevertheless, I contend that both metaphors touch upon crucial aspects of my definition and therefore should be considered as equal. The former addresses a frame’s selecting, including, omitting or (de)emphasizing of information. Put differently, “[t]he essence of framing is sizing – magnifying or shrinking elements of the depicted reality to make them more or less salient” (Entman, 1991, p.9). Consider, for instance, the work of a painter or a photographer, who cannot but depict only a small or slightly larger fragment

of the immense, complex world, restricted by the boundaries of the ‘frame’. For doing so, he or she uses a particular perspective, or he or she may play with depth of field, focus, light, colour... He or she eternalizes one event, action or scene for eternity, which may already have profoundly changed a few moments later (see ‘the decisive moment’ of Cartier-Bresson (2014)). In a similar way, the author of a verbal text can, deliberately or rather unconsciously, only include the cheering supporters when describing the inauguration speech of a new political leader, or (s)he may rather highlight the violent manifestations of a small group of dissidents. Drawing on Goffman (1986) and Bateson (1972), Kress (2009) summarizes:

When painters or film directors want to get a sense of what should be represented, they form a rectangle with thumb and fingers of both hands and look at the world through that makeshift frame. What is in the frame now appears as separated from what is outside the frame; what is inside the frame now forms a unity, in some way. In a semiotic perspective the word ‘frame’ names the semiotic resource which separates an entity from other entities; it provides unity and coherence to what is framed, the elements inside the frame, the elements outside the frame. The frame is essential to make meaning. Without it I do not know what to put together with what and where the boundaries to interpretation are. Frames and means of framing are essential to all meaning making, in all modes (p.66).

The ‘building metaphor’, on the other hand, highlights the more profound structuring and contextualizing functions of frames: Frames also function as ‘skeletons’, holding together, structuring and connecting elements, in a larger whole. As Stibbe (2015) remarks, “(...) if a building was structured using a different frame it would be an entirely different building” (p.54). In other words, depending on the frame, the selected actors, objects or contexts may be connected, and allowed to interact, in entirely different ways. For instance, while one frame may put the responsibility for mental suffering with the depressed and may foreground the agency of the latter in the recovery process, another may emphasize the interplay of depression as an ‘external monster’ and the help which one’s friends or family can provide. The depressed is then only a passive victim.

I will now elaborate on the most crucial elements and levels which constitute my definition of framing, clarifying my own viewpoints indebted to the literature. It may be clear from the above that framing is key to all human communication. Given the purposes of my research, however, I will approach the concept mainly within the context of media communication.

2.2.1 Key features

2.2.1.1 *Persistent*

As my definition clarifies, I accept, like Hertog and McLeod (2001) or Reese (2001a, 2007), that frames are persistent (abstract) structures. Edelman (1993) states that “(...) the social world is (...) a kaleidoscope of potential realities, any of which can be readily evoked” (p.232). This group of “potential

realities”, I contend, could also be defined as a quite stable group containing a limited number of frames (‘cultural frames’) which can be activated at any point in time, in any cultural context, in any possible instance. That is, persistence can both be understood in a diachronic as well as a synchronic sense. Accordingly, one frame never equals one issue or topic or vice versa (Dahinden, 2005; Hertog & McLeod, 2001; Reese, 2001a; Scheufele & Tewskbury, 2007; Van Gorp, 2006, 2007). Put differently, (abstract) ‘cultural frames’ can organize an unlimited number of stories or topics, while one topic can be framed in many different ways. This goes counter to the ‘issue-specific frames’, inspired by (second-level agenda-setting) (see e.g. Carragee & Roefs, 2004; Gamson et al., 1992), which some authors employ (e.g. De Vreese, Peter & Semetko, 2001). As I will discuss below (see 2.2.1.5 Ideology), frames always have an ideological backbone. Whereas certain frames are more likely to promote particular ideological interests (e.g. a focus on sceptic views is associated with right-wing communicators by Carvalho (2005, 2007), Ereaut and Segnit (2006) or Dirikx and Gelders (2010)), a frame never equals one ideological view, or vice versa (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Gamson & Stuart, 1992; Hackett, 1984; Hallahan, 1999; Van Gorp, 2006, 2007). Obviously, the latter also follows from the persistent and abstract nature of frames.

(Only) particular frames, however, are manifest (or dominant) at a certain point in time, in a certain place or context, while others are not. Gamson and Modigliani (1989) refer to ‘culturally available frames’ (see Stibbe, 2015). This is due to a number of contextual influences, which I will discuss in more detail below (see, among others, 3.1 Frame-Building), like cultural resonance, media practices or (hegemonic) interests. For instance, both Entman (1991) and Fahmy (2010) demonstrate that acts of war or terrorism are framed differently – focused on the technical or rather the human and moral character – depending on the national (as well as social, cultural, economic or political) contexts of media outlets. Thus, only the “tip of a very big iceberg” (Reese, 2001a, p.17) is shown in any particular context, while the rest remains invisible. Needless to say, this visible ‘tip’ is subject to continuous change. Indeed, framing practice is a dynamic process of ups and downs. Or, to further the iceberg metaphor, it is a process of ‘melting and freezing’. The number of people, groups or (cultural) organizations, such as the media, which consider a certain frame useful and relevant to apply, is continuously changing (and thus, might just as well equal zero) both from a synchronic as well as from a diachronic point of view. Clearly, this is due to shifts in values, interests or worldviews, which are, for a part, the outcome of struggles for dominance by various interest groups (e.g. Bennett, Lawrence & Livingston, 2006; Carragee & Roefs, 2004; Gamson, 1992; Gitlin, 1980; Hänggli, 2012; Hopke, 2012; Johannessen, 2015; Maesele, 2010; Trumbo, 1996).

This process encompasses reframing, for instance through ‘frame transformation’ (discarding a frame entirely and replacing it with another), ‘frame bridging’ (the linking of two structurally separate frames) or ‘frame extension’ (the broadening of a frame) (Benford & Snow, 2000; Gamson et al., 1992; Taylor,

2000). ‘Frame transformation’ might be achieved through ‘frame chaining’ (Stibbe, 2015), the step-by-step substituting of frames with a series of other frames, each of which diverges more from the initial frame.¹⁴ These evolutions in the application of frames, however, usually take place without the underlying stable group of frames undergoing any transformation (Gamson, 1989; Gitlin, 1980; Hallahan, 1999; Hertog & McLeod, 2001; Reese, 2001a; Van Gorp, 2006, 2007). Indeed, reframing is merely a shift in the application of one (‘cultural’) frame to another. Nevertheless, change is possible with regard to this persistent group of frames, notably when it comes to the demarcations among frames. This is, however, a particularly slow and gradual process (Reese, 2007; Van Gorp, 2006, 2007), following on from a (series of) large-scale cultural or societal shifts. Clearly, an individual cannot incite, let alone control, such frame movements (Hertog & McLeod, 2001; Reese, 2007; Van Gorp, 2007). Drawing on Kepplinger and Habermeier (1995), Van Gorp (2006) argues, for instance, that we need a shock – an event like 9/11 or hurricane Katrina – to become able again to perceive the boundaries of frames, and to cross them (see Chilton, 1987; Zelizer, 2004).

2.2.1.2 Selecting and Structuring

‘Reality’ is far too chaotic, big and complex for humans to deal with. Or, as Gitlin (1980) puts it, “[m]any things exist. At each moment the world is rife with events. Even within a given event there is an infinity of noticeable details” (p.6). Accordingly, happenings are ungraspable, even meaningless, in their raw appearance. Selection and construction, therefore, are necessary – and even natural, cognitive – strategies for humans to deal with reality. What is more, structuring, selecting or categorizing is a precondition for abstract or symbolic thinking (e.g. Alexander & Stibbe, 2014; Bateson, 1972; Durham, 2001; Fillmore & Baker, 2009; Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Halliday, 2000; Jakobson & Hall, 1956; 2002; Goffman, 1986; Graber, 1988; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Langacker, 1993; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).

Obviously, selecting and structuring also happens in more institutionalized (cultural) contexts, such as media production. Every day, countless potential media events take place. While the media can only cover a limited number of those (i.e. the tip of an iceberg or pyramid), reporters also need to make the selected news stories graspable and comprehensible: Selecting or emphasizing certain issues, sources or perspectives while omitting or downplaying others; foregrounding particular quotes at the expense of others; constructing narratives based on a selection of particular actors, causes, consequences and solutions. Providing one or several pictures and deciding how to incorporate them into the news article. Each of these practices is key to the ways in which the media work, how they construct media stories drawing on routines, trying to deal with certain restraints such as time and space limitations (e.g. Cirino,

¹⁴ Boesman et al. (2017) have, for instance, demonstrated that ‘frame bridging’ (or blending) resulted from the confrontation and combination of the ‘terrorist frame’ and ‘victim frame’ in the coverage of Belgian Syria fighters. This gave rise to a more comprehensive ‘pact with the devil frame’. The original frames did not entirely disappear but were contained in this more comprehensive frame.

1973; Galtung & Ruge, 1965, 1973; Gans, 1979; Gitlin, 1980; Molotch & Lester, 1974; Shoemaker & Reese, 2014; Tuchman, 1978) (see 3.1 Frame-Building). Clearly, these processes of selecting, omitting, expanding, highlighting or downplaying of information, go hand in hand with the structuring, and thus generating, of information (Fillmore & Baker, 2009; Gamson, 1989; Gitlin, 1980; Hertog & McLeod, 2001; Pan & Kosicki, 1993; Reese, 2001a, 2007; Tankard, 2001). Or, as Brantner, Geise and Lobinger (2012) put it: “In this course of selecting and highlighting, certain attributions, evaluations, or decisions for the issue or item described are suggested” (p.5). As argued, frames always introduce a particular problem definition, causal responsibility, moral evaluation and treatment recommendation (Entman, 1993, 2004). In other words, ‘frame’ must always be understood in its double meaning of ‘picture frame’ *and* ‘building frame’. The former function entails the latter, while the latter is not feasible without the former.

In conclusion, framing is an inextricable part of media production (e.g. Buehner, 2012; Dahinden, 2005; Gitlin, 1980; Goffman, 1986; Pan & Kosicki, 1993; Tuchman, 1978; Van Gorp, 2006, 2007). As Brüggemann (2014) claims, media workers cannot but produce frames, while attempting to make the complex reality graspable for their audiences. Obviously, the media practices, habits and various influences always interact with, facilitate, reinforce or, rather, background the mental frames of communicators and audiences, and accordingly certain cultural frames (e.g. Boesman et al., 2017; Brüggemann, 2014; Engesser & Brüggemann, 2016; Vossen, Van Gorp & Schulpen, 2017). In any case, media are modern-day storytellers, which provide (cultural) constructions which help us to make sense of reality (Fisher, 1985; Goodnow, 2005; Lule, 2001, 2002; McComas & Shanahan, 1999; Shanahan & McComas, 1999).

2.2.1.3 Latent-Manifest

Frames are not to be found ‘in’ texts, but they are structures ‘around’ or ‘above’ texts. That is, they are latent (Van Gorp, 2006, 2007), but help to structure manifest messages; texts always comprise manifest facts as well as latent frames, or ‘information between the lines’. Due to its underlying frames, each text tells much more than the explicit message may suggest. Frames are, nevertheless, made manifest to a certain extent through “signature elements” (Gamson, 1989, p.159; Gamson, 1992; Gamson & Stuart, 1992), and more specifically through the reader’s interaction with these devices in the reading process (Reese, 2001a). These “signature elements” can be recognized as the ‘diverging facts’ which stand out next to the shared facts in various stories which deal with the same event or issue, but are structured by different frames.

Drawing on Gamson (e.g. Gamson, 1992; Gamson & Stuart, 1992) and Pan and Kosicki (1993, pp.1, 3), who described the frame as the “central organizing idea” in “interpretive packages”, Van Gorp (2007, pp.64-65) introduces the “frame package” as the “identity kit” that allows for the reconstruction of

frames in multimodal texts. This package comprises, firstly, a number of manifest framing devices (see Gamson & Modigliani, 1989), such as metaphors, catchphrases, visuals or exemplars (e.g. Entman, 1991, 1993, 2004; Pan & Kosicki, 1993; Tankard, 2001), which “(...) make a frame communicable through the news media” (Pan & Kosicki, 1993, p.59).

However, “(...) content is only the tip of a very big iceberg” (Reese, 2001a, p.17). Indeed, underlying these symbolic manifestations, there is always an implicit organizing idea – the core of the frame – that provides a coherent structure and suggests the context in which to make sense of the manifest facts. That is, it limits the meaning which is likely to be given to the factual information. This theme is usually made manifest in the naming of frames (e.g. ‘Human Rights’ or ‘Cycles of Nature’), which suggest the focus of the frame message. I contend, therefore, that we must be very careful when labelling frames.¹⁵ After all, as Tankard (2001, p. 98) cautions, naming is framing (Van de Voorde & Temmerman, 2014). The central organizing idea is often (based on) a (universally shared) cultural narrative (Hertog & McLeod, 2001; Van Gorp, 2006, 2007). I will discuss this in more detail below (2.2.1.4 Frames and Narratives).

Though offering coherence, the central organizing idea cannot structure the ‘target domain’ (see Stibbe, 2015). Therefore, (a coherent group of) reasoning devices support the theme, suggesting a problem definition, causal responsibility, moral evaluation and treatment recommendation (Entman, 1993, 2004). “A single sentence may perform more than one of these four framing functions, although many sentences in a text may perform none of them. And a frame in any particular text may not necessarily include all four functions” (Entman, 1993, p.52). Indeed, these devices can be explicit, but they might also remain implicit. The reader is, however, likely to add implicit devices, drawing on his or her cognitive frames and schemata, which provide a broader context (see 3.3 Frame Interpretations).

Further on, I will discuss the manifest and latent layers and the devices which constitute the “frame package” (Van Gorp, 2007, p.64-65) in more detail (see 2.3.3 Multimodal Framing Analysis: A Method).

2.2.1.4 Frames and Narratives

As suggested above, frames and narratives are closely related. McComas and Shanahan (1999) argue, for instance, that “humans use narratives to weave together fragmented observations to construct meanings and realities” (p.36). That is, just like frames, narratives bring together and structure certain actors (i.e. roles), objects, concepts, acts, contextual information or values. As such, they help to make

¹⁵ Therefore, I let the names that I allocated to my (sub)frames (see Chapter 4) arise from my data, more specifically from the wordings and ideas which seemed to be core to each of the (sub)frames I identified. Besides, I put these proposals to the test, based on broader readings and background (lived) knowledge concerning the narratives, themes, archetypes, myths or metaphors which constitute the ‘master stories’ in human culture(s) (Hertog & McLeod, 2001; Van Gorp, 2006).

reality understandable for the audience (see Fisher, 1985; Lule, 2001, 2002; Goodnow, 2005; McComas & Shanahan, 1999; Shanahan & McComas, 1999). Nevertheless, frames and narratives work on different levels. Wozniak, Lück and Wessler (2015) argue, for instance, that similar frames are used across articles, outlets or cultures, but that they are imbedded in other (culturally defined / resonant) narratives. In short, one frame never equals one narrative, or vice versa (see 2.2.1.1 Persistent). The authors argue, more specifically, that narratives may function as rhetorical *structures* that help to communicate frames (i.e. argumentative structures) more effectively, for instance by engaging the audience through emotionalization, dramatic conflict or personalization. Jones (2014) has, for example, empirically demonstrated the power of climate narratives (vis-à-vis climate facts) to engage people, for instance by positively influencing affect for the heroes (see Hendry, 2010).

Nevertheless, narratives are also at the heart of frames, not as the manifest structures (in particular news articles) in which frames are embedded but as the underlying, latent organizing ideas. As I pointed out before (see 2.2 Defining Frames and Framing), Stibbe (2015) highlights the resemblances between the workings of frames and metaphors. He theorizes that a certain source frame, or story (e.g. violence), from a particular area of life tends to be mapped on a target domain (e.g. climate change) from another area of life. As such, the ‘source story’ structures, and guides our understanding, of the issue under focus. That is, the context provided by the (more familiar) source narratives allows readers to evaluate information, to comprehend meaning and to take action (Hallahan, 1999; Hertog & McLeod, 2001; Reese, 2007). Accordingly, Hertog and McLeod (2001) or Van Gorp (2006, 2007) contend that narratives, like myths and metaphors, often help to organize disparate ideas and information in frames (i.e. they act as central organizing ideas). Yet, I do not entirely agree. After all, myths, mythical figures and narratives are bound to certain societies, cultures and time-spaces: they help to make sense of those, confirming, naturalizing and justifying the dominant values, ideologies and ideals (Barthes, 1972). ‘Devil’s bargain’ (a frame identified by Gamson and Modigliani (1989)) or ‘Goliath versus David’ (Dahinden, 2006, in Van Gorp, 2007) are, for instance, characteristic for the Christian tradition. However, such western (Biblical) myths reflect a different worldview than the myths of traditional peoples in Africa or South America (see Shiva, 1988, 1993; Verhagen, 2008). ‘Mother Earth’ (Van Gorp & van der Goot, 2009) is, then, more characteristic for the latter. Lule (2002) contends, accordingly, that one culture’s enemy may be another’s hero, and vice versa. As argued above, cultural frames are stable and consistent across time-spaces. Clearly, this is incommensurable with frames which are structured based on culture- (and time-) specific narratives or values (see 2.2.1.1 Persistent). However, universally shared narratives, formats or motives, which are not bound to particular time-spaces, may play a pivotal role in the context of ‘cultural frames’ (Van Gorp, 2006, 2007). Examples are ‘human rights’ or ‘(environmental) justice’ (see Chapter 4). Lule (2001, 2002) also identifies a number of universal archetypes, like the hero, victim, enemy or ‘foreboding future’, which are used across nations to structure news stories (see Propp et al., 1998). I believe that these may also act as important structuring

devices in the context of various frames (rather than central organizing ideas as such).¹⁶ Thus, expanding the frame definition of Stibbe (2015), I argue that universally shared (‘source’) stories may help us to structure and make sense of ‘target domains’. As I will discuss later on (see 3.3 Frame Interpretations) (sub)frames are more or less likely to be accepted and internalized by the audience depending on the cultural resonance of these structuring narratives. Similarly, Fisher (1985) argues that people judge stories as rational or true based on their narrative fidelity (i.e. the external consistency with what we know or believe to be true in the real world) (see Entman, 1993, 2004; Gamson, 1989; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Hall, 1997; Hendry, 2010; Shanahan & McComas, 1999; Van Gorp, 2006, 2007).

2.2.1.5 Ideology

Media never mirror, but rather construct, reality (e.g. Danelzik, 2016; Van Gorp, 2007). And while the social world is “a kaleidoscope of potential realities” (Edelman, 1993, p.232), frames constitute the lenses through which people see the world. These lenses help to reflect and reinforce ideological colours. I define ideology drawing on Carvalho (2007):

I understand ideology as a system of values, norms and political preferences, linked to a program of action vis-à-vis a given social and political order. People relate to each other and to the world on the basis of value judgments, ideas about how things should be, and preferred forms of governance of the world. In other words, ideologies are axiological, normative, and political. Besides government and society, the referents of ideologies may include, for example, the economy and the relations between humans and the environment (p.225).

(see, among others, Fairclough, 1995, 2000; Fowler, 1996; Gramsci, 1980; van Dijk, 1988, 1998; 2001; Verschueren, 2011). Framing and ideology are, indeed, concepts that are strongly related. Ideologies are, however, much broader and all-encompassing meaning systems in which frames dwell (Durham, 2001). As a result, a certain ideology never equals one frame, or vice versa. On the contrary, a particular ideological group might frame an issue in several, different ways, while a single frame might be used by different ideological groups, representing, thus, various ideological points of view (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Hackett, 1984; Hallahan, 1999; Van Gorp, 2006). Frames and ideologies are, furthermore, mutually constitutive: While frames have an ideological basis, they also reproduce and naturalize this ideology, at the expense of other ideologies (e.g. Hänggli, 2012; Hänggli & Kriesi, 2012; Hopke, 2012; Maesele, 2010; Richardson, 2007; Van Gorp, 2006). Incorporating the frameworks of authors like Benford and Snow (2000), Baden (2010), Brulle (2010), Coy, Woehrle and Maney (2008), Shanahan and McComas (1999) or Taylor (2000) into this widely accepted view, I distinguish between three interacting and mutually dependent framing levels:

¹⁶ Note that I approach ‘justice’, ‘human rights’, ‘heroes’ or ‘victims’ here in their most generic and abstract (structuring) sense, separate (decontextualized) from the (various) meanings which they may be endowed with in specific time-spaces (e.g. Lule, 2001, 2002; Sen, 1999, 2009).

- Masterframes are structured collectives of arguments, ideas, language and images about how the world is and should be. Each masterframe reflects (rather directly) a particular ideology (e.g. anthropocentrism or biocentrism) within its structure (i.e. reasoning devices, framing devices, central organizing idea). Being created by power-holders and challengers (see hegemonic struggles, e.g. Gramsci (1980)), each masterframe “(...) helps to weave the fabric of a society” (Coy, Woehrle & Maney, 2008, 2.6). Masterframes may evolve through the interaction and tensions with other masterframes – for instance, through processes of co-opting – or through the adaptations by various groups (e.g. environmental movements, human rights movements), who use masterframes to structure their various concerns in particular social, political, economic or cultural contexts (see below).
- ‘Generic substance’ frames¹⁷ help to structure particular problems or topics of concern (e.g. economics, public well-being, justice) (Baden, 2010). Being part and parcel of human culture (Van Gorp, 2006, 2007), they constitute a rather stable group, which may reappear across various debates and issues (e.g. climate change, asylum debate, financial crisis). Yet, the frames which manifest themselves in a given society at a given moment in time (‘culturally available frames’) may differ (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Stibbe, 2015) (see 2.2.1.1 Persistent).
- The subframes – as patches in the ‘fabric of society’ – are shaped and constrained by the available masterframes. That is, although various interest groups may use the same frames, the realization of their – ideologically – coloured subframes, depends on the masterframe they abide by. Put differently, the masterframes only become ‘visible’ in the context of a particular frame. As such, subframes may contribute to the development of the masterframes, through their usage in particular contexts and/or the interaction with other subframes (see above). Clearly, then, subframes are less stable than frames, as they evolve along with the masterframes (and may spur this development).

As argued before, I do not agree with Van Gorp and van der Goot (2009) who consider, among others, ‘Frankenstein’ or ‘Mother Earth’ as frames, or those authors who equate the Greek origin myth ‘Pandora’s box’ with a(n alarmist) frame (e.g. Nisbet, 2009; Nisbet & Lewenstein, 2002; Nisbet & Scheufele, 2009; Maesele, 2010). Contrary to universal archetypes (Lule, 2001, 2002), these myths are bound to particular societies, cultures and time-spaces (Barthes, 1972). Therefore, I contend, myths are more likely to provide the underlying structure of subframes, while collectives of myths (e.g. anthropocentric versus biocentric myths) can be situated on the level of masterframes. As said, universal archetypes (or narratives, motives, formats) function on the frame-level.

¹⁷ ‘Generic’ refers to the fact that frames are, in essence, theme- or issue-independent. That is, they can appear across various issues. ‘Substance’ highlights the idea that they are more than (empty) formal structures (or labels). Rather, they constitute packages which contain particular meanings, arguments, structural elements (Baden, 2010; Gamson, 1992; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Trabert, 2013; Van Gorp, 2006).

2.2.1.6 Non-Frames

A large number of ‘frames’ is in circulation in the literature (see e.g. Borah, 2011; Dahinden, 2005). Many of those, however, are only remotely related to my concept of framing, only function as ‘metaphors’ or work on other levels of abstraction. As Carragee and Roefs (2004) point out, many of these approaches to framing are indebted to second-level agenda-setting, but do not self-identify as such. That is, they are not indebted to constructivism (Van Gorp, 2007). As a result, they lack one or multiple of the features which I consider as the most valuable contributions of framing, even though they may also provide some interesting insights into media constructions and/or interpretations. Most problematic is, however, that many of the authors do refer to Entman (1991, 1993, 2004), Gamson and Modigliani (1989) and/or Van Gorp (2006, 2007) when conceptualizing framing. Yet, they do not apply these insights when turning to the empirical analyses. As Reese (2007) argues, ‘frame’ is often used as a ‘catch-all phrase’: “Authors often give an obligatory nod to the literature before proceeding to do whatever they were going to do in the first place” (p.151). Therefore, in order to avoid any misinterpretations (Hertog & McLeod, 2001; Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007), I will draw clear boundaries between what I consider to be frames and applications of ‘framing’ which do not meet the terms of my definition, indebted to the literature.

As De Vreese (2005), De Vreese and Lecheler (2016) or Hertog and McLeod (2001) note, many authors tend to design an individual set of frames – issue-specific frames (see also De Vreese, Peter & Semetko, 2001; Gamson et al., 1992) – for each topic under research. Obviously, this goes counter to the idea of a stable group of ‘cultural frames’ (see 2.2.1.1 Persistent). This proliferation of frame sets is largely due to the fact that many authors fail to look beyond the surface features of their frames, reducing frames to themes or story subjects, such as the ‘political frame’ (Borah, 2009) or the ‘environmental frame’ (e.g. Boykoff, 2008), attributes (e.g. the risk and opportunity frames of Kahneman and Tversky (1984) or Stephens, Rand & Melnick (2009)) or issue positions (e.g. the ‘pro-frame’ and ‘contra-frame’ of Bechtel et al., 2015 or the ‘pro-war’ and ‘anti-war’ frames of Fahmy (2010)). Such detailed issue-specific frames usually do not structure stories on a deeper level, in terms of a problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation. Structuring is, however, key to framing. Nor do such approaches to framing allow for comparison or generalization across issue fields (e.g. discussions concerning climate change, on the one hand, and air pollution or migration, on the other hand). In other words, they do not add up to something bigger, the further development of framing as a research tool, or the structuring of broader discussions in society. Additionally, Carragee and Roefs (2004) argue that they undermine the value of framing when it comes to its excavating of underlying ideological (hegemonic) struggles (in the various phases of the communication process) (see also Maesele, 2010):

By identifying frames as little more than story topics, attributes, or issue positions, some contemporary approaches to framing neglect the ideological nature and consequences of the framing process as well as the power relationships that influence that process.

Framing research that ignores the ways in which frames construct meanings and the interests served by those meanings deprives the concept of its theoretical and substantive significance (p.219).

According to Van Gorp (2007) and Reese (2007), each issue-specific frame can – and has to – be linked to a more ‘abstract masterframe’¹⁸ or ‘cultural frame’, which does allow for comparison and generalization. After all, a frame is never inextricably linked to one particular issue (Hertog & McLeod, 2001; Nisbet, 2009; Reese, 2001a). Similarly, De Vreese and Lecheler (2016) posit that there is no need for studies which prevent comparison: “To move the field forward studies are needed that distil framing patterns and identify frames comparatively, be it across issues, media, culture and/or time” (p.409). The authors refer in that context to so-called ‘generic frames’.

Nevertheless, I also find some problems with studies which describe such ‘generic news frames’ (see De Vreese, Peter & Semetko, 2001), such as ‘thematic’ and ‘episodic’ frames (Iyengar, 1990) ‘sensationalism’ (Kenix, 2008a, 2008b) or ‘conflict frames’ (e.g. Nisbet, 2009; Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000; Weathers & Kendall, 2015). I agree with Hertog and McLeod (2001), Entman (2004) and Van Gorp (2006, 2007) that these constitute merely journalistic formats or scripts, journalistic routines to deal with and structure information in efficient ways. The ‘conflict frame’ – to single out just one example – stems, for instance, from the journalistic habit to balance sources and/or from the news values ‘drama’ or ‘conflict’ (e.g. Boykoff & Boykoff, 2004, 2007; Galtung & Ruge, 1965, 1973; Gans, 1979; Hackett, 1984; Harcup & O’Neill, 2001, 2017; Hiles & Hinnant, 2014; Shoemaker & Reese, 2014; Tuchman, 1972, 1978). These formats also largely fail to introduce an underlying organizing idea (i.e. generally shared narrative), nor do they structure stories on a deeper level (i.e. they lack reasoning devices). Besides, they do not have the ideological backbone, which is key to frames. Although journalistic routines play an important part in the construction and highlighting of (particular) (sub)frames (e.g. Boesman et al., 2017) (see 3.1 Frame-Building; Chapter 6), they cannot account as such for the wide variety of worldviews claims-makers wish to promote.

As pointed out before, my conceptualization and application of ‘framing’ envisions frames that combine the strengths of the generic *and* the issue-specific approach: ‘Generic substance’ frames should both allow for generalization, comparison and abstraction as well as for a profound level of detail and specificity (De Vreese, 2005; De Vreese & Lecheler, 2016).

2.3 Visual and Multimodal Framing

We live in a visual age, a multimodal era. Online news and entertainment websites provide us with a plethora of photographs, cartoons, graphics, still and moving images, accompanying, collaborating with

¹⁸ Note that ‘masterframe’ is interpreted here in different ways than the ‘masterframe’ as I described it above. Masterframe must be understood here in the sense of the ‘cultural frame’ or ‘generic substance frame’ (see 2.2.1.5 Ideology).

or clarifying written or spoken texts. TV programmes and commercials, billboards, magazines and newspapers, comics, mangas, graphic novels..., each plays around with visual-verbal interactions, colours, layouts, typographies, visual words or speaking images.

Since the nineteenth century, image-dominant media have begun to replace word-dominant media (see also Mitchell's (1994) 'pictorial turn'). Rationalism – preoccupied with a belief in the reasonable – gave rise to the ideal of photographic, or visual, truth. From 'What I can see a photograph of, must be true' to 'Pics or it didn't happen'. Science, but also society in general, started to attach strong validity to the content of photographs (Newton, 2000). Indeed, their resemblance to (iconicity) and special bond with reality as physical imprints (indexicality), their mechanical nature, their holistic character or their level of detail and concreteness make them highly convincing testimonies (e.g. Barthes, 1977; Graber, 1996, 1988; Messaris & Abraham, 2001; Mitchell, 1992; Rose, 2001).

Eye-tracking research has shown that readers tend to enter a newspaper page through the dominant image. That is, visual elements are more likely to catch our attention (Smith, 2005; Smith & Price, 2005). Visuals turn large amounts of details into graspable frameworks, conveying the essence of a message. As such, they may clarify the textual message (e.g. Geise & Baden, 2015; Graber, 1996). Further, images have been shown to enhance persuasion (Joffe, 2008; Seo, Dillard & Shen, 2013) and to aid memory (Domke, Perlmutter & Spratt, 2002; Paivio & Csapo, 1973; Zelizer, 2004), learning (Paivio & Yarmey, 1966) and attention and information acquisition (Knobloch et al., 2003; Zillmann, Knobloch, Yu, 2001). They may evoke stronger involvement and emotional responses (Brantner, Lobinger, Wetzstein, 2011; Joffe, 2008). (Close-up) depictions of humans, in particular, have been shown to draw attention, emotionally engage and enhance memorability (Coleman, 2010; Graber, 1988, 1996; Hart, 2011; Höjjer, 2004; Jewitt & Oyama, 2001; Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; Manzo, 2010b; Messaris, 1997; Small & Loewenstein, 2003). Further, visuals are able to bias our perceptions towards the (one-sided) views they provide (Zillmann, Gibson, Sargent, 1999) and have the particularly powerful ability to activate pre-existing cognitions and feelings in a way that fosters a carry over to other issues (Domke, Perlmutter & Spratt, 2002). This can be summarized as 'the picture superiority effect' (Paivio & Csapo, 1973).

The special bond of humans with the visual is largely related to the ways in which we are biologically, and mentally, determined to process information: Textual messages as well as abstract symbols or numbers are processed through the high-effort 'central route' (conscious, deliberate, rational, logical and analytical thinking). Visual messages, but also metaphors or narratives, are primarily processed through the more intuitive 'peripheral route' (automatic, affective, holistic thinking). The latter develops earlier in life – and has developed earlier in the history of mankind – and is, as such, more easily accessible. Put differently, humans are more adapted to processing (audio)visual information since they have been engaged with it much longer. Accordingly, images, along with metaphors and narratives, are highly salient, vivid and compelling communication tools. However, peripheral processes interact with

the cognitive system: Images or emotions can affect cognitive dispositions, processes, decisions or action preferences (e.g. Myers et al., 2012). That is, images can both activate cognitive as well as affective processes (Domke, Perlmutter & Spratt, 2002; Geise & Baden, 2015; Graber, 1996; Leiserowitz, 2006; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Williams, 2005).

Hence, even in an era in which the audience has become well-aware – on a cognitive level, at least – of the subjectivity and the potential for manipulation of the photographic (production) process, the belief in visual truth largely survives (e.g. Barthes, 1977; Mitchell, 1992). That is, in particular, the case when it comes to documentary and press photography, of which a higher level of objectivity is expected (Kaml, 2005; Mendelson, 2005; Tirohl, 2000; Wright, 2011).¹⁹ Newton (2000, p.98) points out:

Visual reportage legitimates ways of looking at other people and ways of looking at ourselves. It enters the public consciousness under the guise of authority of the press: This is true. This is what happened. This is what the situation looked like. This is what people looked like. The context has been one of *assumed truth* (italic in original).

Unsurprisingly, then, visuals constitute important news values (see Bednarek & Caple, 2012; Hall, 1973; Harcup & O'Neill, 2001, 2017; Perlmutter, 1998; Smith & Joffe, 2009). What is more, several authors (e.g. Coleman, 2010; Messaris & Abraham, 2001) have pointed out that the visual is particularly apt to framing, producing remarkably pervasive 'windows onto the world' (Perlmutter, 1998; Rose, 2001).

For example, during political elections, each party tries to control and manipulate the visual representations of their own candidate(s) and those of the rivalry parties, recognizing their exceptional power 'as weapons in the electoral battle'. That is, they seek for visuals that help to legitimate the excellent leadership qualities or the superior ethical behaviour of their candidate(s), representing them as the personification of values which the electorate is expected to attach importance to. Simultaneously, they attempt to exclusively represent (visual) frames that emphasize the lack of such merits in the rival

¹⁹ Note that the definition / interpretation of 'objectivity' has evolved throughout the ages (see Daston & Galison, 2007). Up till today, various epistemological traditions are in circulation. 'Truth-to-nature' pursues imagery that reflects underlying, 'essential truth', the universal, ideal, generalizable types (e.g. of natural phenomena). Since the mid-nineteenth century, 'mechanical objectivity' is the dominant view. It strives for 'blind sight', eliminating the subjective self. That is, visuals must allow the – undistorted – objective world to speak for itself. The focus lies on what is seen, not on interpretation. Photography is – due to its mechanical, sharp and unbiased nature, its level of detail, its ability to show us what we cannot know otherwise (e.g. birds in flight) – an emblem of 'mechanical objectivity'. Since the early twentieth century, 'trained judgement' has emerged. Considering the mechanical as inadequate and acknowledging the influence of (unconscious) motivations or biases, it foregrounds the need for interpreted images. Makers and audiences of images must interact, assessing them, synthesizing or classifying them, smoothing or refining them. Accordingly, interventions are allowed for the purpose of understanding and clarity, in the search for 'the real'. For instance, one may emphasize particular characteristics or a certain viewpoint – de-emphasizing other aspects – in order to make visible what would be largely invisible in a 'naturalistic' depiction. Similarly, evolutions in 'slow journalism', which call for an interpretive type of imagery (adding symbolism, distinct narrative layers, the voice of individual photographers) (e.g. Drok & Hermans, 2016; Mendelson & Creech, 2016), also criticize the automatic character of 'mechanical objectivity', which still largely survives in the context of mainstream media. In most recent times, images are also more often constructions rather than re-presentations. 3D simulations, for instance, are partly art and are, among others, used to envision how things can be done or made.

candidate(s). For instance, during the 2016 United States presidential elections, Republicans represented Donald Trump as Uncle Sam, stating “I Want to Make America Great Again”. Uncle Sam is a famous symbol in American culture, as a metaphor of the United States in general and patriotism in particular, which was, among others, used by the American government during the First World War for propaganda purposes (“I Want You for U.S. Army”). Opponents of Donald Trump, however, depicted the presidential candidate using (culturally resonant) symbolism reminiscent of Adolf Hitler and the Nazi ideology he stands for (e.g. the swastika, brown colours, the moustache and hair style). One cartoon contains, for instance, a speech bubble saying “Register Muslims”. Obviously, such powerful depictions shed an entirely different light on the same person (and political strand), foregrounding particular values or associations – without overly stating them – and backgrounding or obliterating others. As such, both depictions may (help to) give rise to oppositional (mutually exclusive) argumentations, or frames, supporting oppositional interests, worldviews or beliefs.

As the majority of the reception studies above demonstrate, however, the visual and the verbal often work in integrated ways (see Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Williams, 2005), with the visual affecting, for example, the information acquisition of (Knobloch et al., 2003) or the (emotional) involvement with (Brantner, Lobinger, Wetzstein, 2011) the (whole visual-)verbal message. Indeed, pictures hardly ever appear without accompanying text, especially in contexts such as media communication or advertising. Coleman (2010) argues, accordingly, that the verbal and the visual modes tend to work in tandem. They often interact in complex ways – each with their own properties, allowances and limitations – mutually influencing one another. As such, they produce meaning beyond the capacity of one modality (Geise & Baden, 2015; Jewitt, 2009; Machin & Mayr, 2012; Martinec & Salway, 2005; Unsworth & Cléirigh, 2009). Clearly then, most contemporary communication cannot be adequately understood unless both the verbal and the visual are taken into account: “In other words if we wish to understand the discourse presented in the media that might shape public perceptions (...) we must also understand how these discourses are realized visually” (Hansen & Machin, 2008, p.777).

It is, therefore, remarkable that a highly popular and influential concept and method as (media) framing remains, up till now, largely preoccupied with the verbal mode (see Herbers & Volpers, 2013; Lobinger & Geise, 2013; Meier, 2013). According to O’Neill (2013) and Dan and Ihlen (2011), this is due to the difficult, time-consuming nature of visual data collection and analysis. The findings of Matthes (2009) are significant: In his meta-analysis of media framing studies published between 1990 and 2005, he demonstrates that only four out of 131 content analyses focus on visual frames as the main object of research. However, since 2005 – following the argumentations of Messaris and Abraham (2001) on the power of visual / multimodal frames – the number of framing studies which do recognize the indispensable role of the visual, have been expanding (Brantner, Geise & Lobinger, 2012). Yet, mainly focusing on the monomodal visual (e.g. Dan, 2017; Fahmy, 2004, 2010; Gamson & Stuart, 1992;

Grittmann, 2014; O'Neill, 2013; Parry, 2010; Schwalbe, 2013; Schwalbe, Silcock & Keith, 2008)²⁰ even more recent studies largely ignore the call of Coleman (2010) for multimodal framing. Only a small number of researchers have yet attempted to integrate the visual and the verbal as equal modes (e.g. Dan & Ihlen, 2011; Entman, 1991; Jungblut & Zakareviciute, 2018; Rosas-Moreno, 2010; Wessler et al., 2016). Obviously, each of these endeavours is important. Nevertheless, some major problems remain: A clear definition of visual, or multimodal, framing is still lacking. Besides, most studies – conceptually drawing on the general framing literature (Entman, 1993, 2004; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Van Gorp, 2006, 2007) – fail to translate these definitions into a coherent, comprehensive method or consistent empirical application. Hence, both the concept as well as the method require further development and elaboration. As Geise and Baden (2015) contend, it is crucial to further develop multimodal framing, integrating it into the general (verbal) framing concept, in order to deal with the increasingly multimodal context of our media (see Lobinger & Geise, 2013).

2.3.1 Framing and the Special Attributes of the Visual

The two common metaphors for framing introduced above (2.2 Defining Frames and Framing) – particularly the picture frame metaphor – already highlight the intrinsic connection between framing and the visual. Accordingly, several authors make references to the visual as one of the framing devices when defining or conceptualizing framing (e.g. Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Van Gorp, 2006). Gitlin (1980, p.7) emphasizes that frames can either be “verbal or visual”. Indeed, as Perlmutter (1998) argues, “(...) news photographs are remarkably selective windows on the world” (...), constituting particularly pervasive “(...) frame[s] of understanding” (p.126). This argumentation falls apart into two elements, the first having to do with production, the second being largely related to the interaction of the audience with the visual (i.e. reception) (see also 3 Framing as a Process).

Selection and organization – *the* two functions of the frame – are, pre-eminently, key to the process of photo(journalistic) production. Indeed, Buehner (2012) points out a number of gatekeeping practices or considerations which are, in particular, characteristic for visuals: Which perspective is taken when covering an event? Which scene or subject is foregrounded, backgrounded or omitted? Does the photo get cropped or digitally manipulated in one way or another? Which, and how many, pictures are selected for publication? Which pictures are juxtaposed and in which order? Which textual elements (e.g. title, caption, main text) are they presented with? (e.g. Brantner, Geise & Lobinger, 2012; Coleman, 2010; Graber, 1996; Guéry, 1995; Hall, 1973; Huxford, 2001; Mendelson, 2005; Messaris, 1997; Messaris & Abraham, 2001; Perlmutter, 1998; Rodriguez & Dimitrova, 2011).²¹ Various interacting processes and participants – photographer, photo editor, (text) journalist, layouter, editor-in-chief, management,

²⁰ See also: Aday, Cluverius and Livingston (2005), Batziou (2011), Borah (2009), Bruce (2014), Cheregi (2015), Dahmen (2009), Huang and Fahmy (2013), Neumann and Fahmy (2012), Rebich-Hespanha et al. (2013).

²¹ See also: Dan and Ihlen (2011), Fahmy (2010), Parry (2010).

audience... – may affect these choices and considerations (e.g. de Smaele, Geenen & De Cock, 2017; Grayson, 2013; Mendelson, 2005; Nurmis, 2017; Seelig, 2005). The ‘hierarchy-of-influences model’ (Bissell, 2000; Mendelson, 2005; Reese, 2001b; Scoggin McEntee, 2016; Shoemaker & Reese, 2014; Voakes, 1998) allows to structure some of these factors in a more systematic way.

Individual Level. Bissell (2000), De Smaele, Geenen and De Cock (2017) and Seelig (2005) emphasize the rather subjective (individual) character of photo editing, with photo editors as ‘visual elites’. Being visually educated and/or experienced, they often make the final decisions (see Mendelson, 2005; Wozniak, Wessler & Lück, 2017). Yet, factors such as personal opinions or political preferences, gender or age may affect this decision-making (see positionality (Pulido & Peña, 1998; Taylor, 2000)). Nurmis (2017) and Bissell (2000) point out, for instance, that news-workers only provide pictures with articles which they find sufficiently important or interesting (see also Grayson, 2013). Clearly, this can enhance the salience of these articles or particular argumentations. However, the character of visual gatekeepers has been changing in recent years. Depending on the outlet (e.g. popular rather than broadsheet; alternative rather than mainstream), (word) reporters, lacking much visual literacy, are increasingly expected to select the images with the written news articles. This is mainly due to technical evolutions but also commercial pressures (e.g. limited budgets, deadlines) (Grayson, 2013; Kaml, 2005; McChesney, 2008; Nurmis, 2017; Scoggin McEntee, 2016; Silcock & Schwalbe, 2010; Tirohl, 2000). Obviously, photographers – the very first gatekeepers in the chain – are also influenced by their personal backgrounds, beliefs, visual literacy or demographic backgrounds when selecting a particular scene, angle or photographic technique (Mendelson, 2005; Thomson & Greenwood, 2017).

Routines Level. Apart from personal biases or opinions, photo editors are also affected by journalistic routines, practices and professional philosophies (Mendelson, 2005; Scoggin McEntee, 2016). News values may, for instance, be of particular importance (e.g. Galtung & Ruge, 1965, 1973; Gans, 1979; Hall, 1973; Harcup & O’Neill, 2001, 2017; Huxford, 2001; Joye, 2010; Tuchman, 1978). Bednarek and Caple (2012) translate news values to the visual mode, pointing out, among others, that personalization may be expressed through (extreme) close ups or facial expressions. According to Fahmy, Kelly and Kim (2007) “[t]he more that news photographs manifest emotional and intimate human elements, the higher they are located in this hierarchy” of news values (p.549) (see Bissell, 2000; de Smaele, Geenen & De Cock, 2017; Höijer, 2004; Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; Messaris, 1997; Nurmis, 2017; Seelig, 2005; Small & Loewenstein, 2003). Kaml (2005) argues that a lot of context is often routinely deleted in (photo)journalism, with an eye on clarity and unambiguity. This also allows to transfer an image more easily from one (con)text to another to illustrate, or support, various claims, arguments or realities (e.g. Barthes, 1977; Fahmy, Kelly & Kim, 2007; Grittmann, 2014; Hall, 1973; Herbers & Volpers, 2013; Lobinger & Geise, 2013; Meier, 2013). Seelig (2005), De Smaele, Geenen and De Cock (2017) and Nurmis (2017) contend that photographs are selected based on considerations in terms of content (i.e. a

relation to the content of the news story), aesthetics (i.e. high quality photos) and news values. However, pragmatic considerations (e.g. layout, time or financial constraints) may always overrule any of the other factors (see Bissell, 2000; Mendelson, 2005). Mendelson (2005) adds that photo editors generally prefer candid photographs over posed photos, with an eye on objectivity (de Smaele, Geenen & De Cock, 2017). Also, certain shared expectations – e.g. what a dictator looks like – often make news photography highly conventional (see Hall, 1973). Similarly, Tuchman (1978) points out that photojournalists (and photo editors) often stick to the same visual conventions – social distance, eye-level, head-on perspective – which are supposed to convey an air of truth and trustworthiness. That is, they help to legitimate (elite) ‘talking heads’.

Organizational Level (Including Small Groups). On the organizational level, photo editing is affected by the newsroom culture (Bissell, 2000). Within this context, various gatekeepers – each with their own biases – interact and may have some influence on the process. Bissell (2000) summarizes: “[i]n some cases, a single gatekeeper’s decision-making opened or shut the door on a photograph, but it was via the gatekeeping chain that so many minor decisions altered the content” (p.91). According to Seelig (2005), photo editors tend to discuss their photo selection with news editors or layouters and, in exceptional cases, with editors in chief (de Smaele, Geenen & De Cock, 2017). However, such discussions are mostly a matter of courtesy. Text journalists, however, are rarely involved in the process (see Boesman, d’Haenens & Van Gorp, 2015; de Smaele, Geenen & De Cock, 2017; Mendelson, 2005; Wozniak, Wessler & Lück, 2017).

Extra-media (Including Competition). Scoggin McEntee (2016) contends that audience concern plays a pivotal role in the news photo editing process and even ought to be approached as a separate (primary) category in the hierarchy-of-influences model. Ethical considerations, audience sensitivities and ‘good taste’ indeed often guide decision-making. Borah (2009) and Hanusch (2013) point out, for instance, that newsmakers may well refrain from publishing graphic images if they know this may scare away the public (see also Bissell, 2000; Borah & Bulla, 2006; de Smaele, Geenen & De Cock, 2017; Fahmy, 2010; Nurmis, 2017; Perlmutter, 2005; Seelig, 2005; Rose, 2001; Wright, 2011).

The interaction of a photojournalist and his/her subject affects the eventual representation. For instance, the presence of a (photo)journalist – with a particular appearance (e.g. tattoos, a beard), demographic background, knowledge, ideological views – his/her equipment (more or less professional, more or less visible), the location of a shoot (e.g. private or public) or the time spent by photographer and subject may have an influence on the behaviour of subjects. The same is true for the communication of the photographer with his/her subject during a photoshoot, through verbal interaction, eye-contact, nods, gestures, smiles or body language. For instance, subjects may be more comfortable and more willing to open themselves up in the presence of a photojournalist who shares similar demographic characteristics, who looks like a professional, who makes eye contact and takes the time to get to know his/her subject.

Anyhow, subjects are likely to become more aware of their identities in the presence of a (photo)journalist. They may, for instance, start to act as representatives of broader – professional, demographic, cultural, ethnic... – groups. Also, they may pose, alter their actions or behave based on expectations as regards to a photojournalist's intents, earlier experiences, self-image, examples from the media, cultural conventions. Goffman (1986) used the phrase 'presentation of self' to refer to the ((self)conscious) ways in which actors try to present themselves in terms of identity, reputation, social order. Elites usually have more control over the ways in which they are visually depicted in the media, for instance by deciding on locations or poses. They might, for example, refuse to be photographed in stereotypical poses. Non-elites, however, may feel stronger pressures to accept the (stereotypical) images or choices initiated by the photographer, although they may also try to challenge those. Some groups – especially those (socio-economic groups) who are struggling to survive – may simply lack the means or time to focus on self-representation or appearance (see Mendelson, 2005; Newton, 2000; Thomson & Greenwood, 2017).

That is important as such visual choices may contribute to legitimation or rather delegitimation, helping to confirm or debunk certain (stereotypical) associations (see Goodnow, 2005; Hall, 1973; Perlmutter, 1998; Rose, 2001; Tuchman, 1978). Lester and Cottle (2009) posit, for instance, that news media are likely to legitimate elite sources, like politicians or scientists, by depicting them in settings which suggest their credibility, engagement and power to act (e.g. doing fieldwork, addressing a crowd). Social or environmental groups, on the contrary, are more often delegitimized by being distanced from the core of the political action (e.g. passively standing in generic, green spaces). It is no surprise, then, that NGOs try to draw (more constructive) news coverage by providing the media with appealing 'focusing' or 'image events', like PR-stunts (see Delicath & Deluca, 2003; Sachsman, Simon & Valenti, 2010; Wozniak, Wessler & Lück, 2017). Wright (2011) confirms that news nowadays mostly relies on evocative key photographs rather than series of images that spell the story out (see Bissell, 2000; Nurmis, 2017). These key photographs are supposed to summarize complex realities and, simultaneously, intrigue the audience and draw them in (see Perlmutter, 1998; Rose, 2001; Seelig, 2005). That is, they have metaphoric and metonymic functions. However, the prevalence of such key photographs may also vary depending on media type (e.g. popular or broadsheet media), outlet, gatekeeper or other contextual factors (see Tirohl, 2000). According to Hanusch (2013), for instance, popular media publish more graphic images of death and disaster. However, newspapers in Western Europe or Northern America – such as those in Belgium – are more reluctant to do so.

These visual choices are, no doubt, also (partly) due to the previously addressed limitations in terms of space, time or money (see Kaml, 2005; McChesney, 2008; Mendelson, 2005; Nurmis, 2017). The availability of images is, for instance, an influential factor. According to León and Erviti (2015) and Nurmis (2017), 'aesthetic', newsworthy, resonant visuals are scarce in the context of climate change.

Especially those media which almost exclusively depend on wire materials often struggle with such limitations. The absence of suitable visuals may even prevent a topic from becoming a (large) news story, while the availability of a powerful picture may be a reason to put an article on the front page that would otherwise not have been considered as particularly newsworthy (see Bissell, 2000). Some authors have also discussed the increasing influence of user-generated content (i.e. photographs provided by amateur (citizen) journalists) facilitated by online media contexts (e.g. Grayson, 2013; Scoggin McEntee, 2016; Silcock & Schwalbe, 2010; Tirohl, 2000). Fahmy (2005) nuances, however, the impact of non-professional images, emphasizing that this material often fails to meet the standards of the professional newsmakers and, accordingly, lacks credibility (see de Nilsson & Wadbring, 2015; Nurmis, 2017; Silcock & Schwalbe, 2010).

Ideological Level. Ideology may both refer to the broader (hegemonic and counter-hegemonic) interests, values, ideologies and power struggles in society (i.e. in particular time-spaces) as well as to the ideological leanings of various media outlets. Particular worldviews may give rise to certain icons or stereotypes (e.g. Lester, 1995; Lippmann, 2006; Machin & Mayr, 2012; Rose, 2001; Sibley & Osborne, 2016; van Dijk, 1988, 1998; van Leeuwen, 2001; Van Straten, 2002), such as (luxury) cars evoking ideas of (human / male) power, virility or control over nature (e.g. Meister, 1997; Messaris, 1997) or the suffering child in the South, standing for the vulnerability, helplessness and underdevelopment of a whole region (e.g. Ali, James & Vultee, 2013; Chouliaraki, 2006; Manzo, 2010b; Perlmutter, 1998). Both are pervasive western (anthropocentric) metaphors / metonyms, which are not unlikely to be – unconsciously – reproduced in the media (e.g. Abraham & Appiah, 2006; Coleman, 2010; Lester, 1995). Clearly, then, other icons or stereotypes can be found in other (cultural) time-spaces.

Summarizing, each of these conscious or unconscious choices and influences affects the reality constructed by media accounts, suggesting what to focus on or how to interpret an event. For instance, a close shot of the human hardship caused by a natural disaster might give rise to a very different frame than a distant air shot showing physical destruction (Borah, 2009; Borah & Bulla, 2006).

Indeed, depictions are never innocent, nor are they “(...) transparent windows on to the world. They interpret the world; they display it in very particular ways” (Rose, 2001, p.6). In spite of this, (journalistic) photographs make strong truth claims, purporting to capture the essence of an issue or event, to sum it all up (Hall, 1973; Messaris, 1997; Perlmutter, 1998). The audience tends to accept those claims (see Graber, 1996; Kaml, 2005; Mendelson, 2005; Mitchell, 1992; Tirohl, 2000). Clearly, the special attributes that underpin the long-standing myth of ‘visual truth’ largely account for this (see Newton, 2000) (see 2.3 Visual and Multimodal Framing). Plantinga (2005) refers in that context to the ‘asserted veridical representation’, a representation that is “(...) in the case of images, sounds, or combinations thereof, a reliable guide to relevant elements of the pro-filmic scene or scenes” (p.111). The communicator does not only intend the audience to believe the represented reality but also to accept

the (photographic) medium as a reliable means, which allows the audience to form true beliefs (i.e. ‘to know’ this reality). The interaction between visual frames and audience schemata plays a vital role here: The fact that visuals, particularly photographs, are more easily accepted as real and trustworthy is not a characteristic of the image as such, but is dependent on the interaction of the audience with the visual (e.g. Buehner, 2012; Mendelson, 2005; Rose, 2001). Messaris and Abraham (2001) highlight three characteristics which strongly contribute to the naturalizing of a particular perspective, view or ideology, camouflaging its constructed nature and making it appear as *the* reality. That is crucial, as ideology is most pervasive if conveyed implicitly (see also Geise & Baden, 2015; Hall, 1973; Joffe, 2008; Kaml, 2005; Machin & Mayr, 2012; Messaris, 1997; Mitchell, 1992; Moriarty & Sayre, 2005; Smith & Price, 2005):

- *Analogical quality or iconicity*: Contrary to arbitrary, conventional words, images constitute a largely analogical system. Whereas words usually do not show the slightest similarity/comparability to the reality they stand for (with the exception of onomatopoeias), pictures look like what they represent, are based on similarities or ‘likeness’ and, thus, appear to be closer to reality. Accordingly, viewers are more inclined to overlook their artificial, constructed character and accept them as natural. Photographs, in particular, are likely to be believed.
- *Indexicality*: Like a fingerprint or a footprint, photographs have a special bond with reality. They are physical imprints, traces. They have a connection to the object or event they refer to. Due to their mechanical and automatic origin, we are more inclined to accept them as authentic proof.
- *Lack of explicit propositional syntax*: The verbal language has an explicit (sequential) syntax, encompassing particular rules and clear devices to express relations such as causality or contrast. The ‘visual language’, on the contrary, is based on a spatial-associative logic. It only encompasses implicit devices, which are imprecise and unsystematic. As such, a single device may imply a range of different meanings (e.g. Jewitt, 2009; Kress, 2009; Machin, 2009; Unsworth & Cléirigh, 2009). Put differently, more than verbal texts, visuals are highly polysemic, or open to a wide range of interpretations. That is, they hold many different meaning potentials, possible meanings which get only activated through the interaction with actors, like audience members (e.g. Barthes, 1977; Domke, Perlmutter & Spratt, 2002; Gamson et al., 1992; Grancea, 2014; Kaml, 2005; Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; Mendelson, 2005; Rose, 2001). However, socialization in a particular culture (and, accordingly, particular mental frames / schemata), contextual factors and/or (subtle) cues or conventions in images may guide the audience’s interpretations towards a preferred meaning without the latter necessarily realizing it. Cues or conventions like size, contrast or position may, for instance, imply importance, relations, sequences. A high camera angle may encourage the audience to approach a depicted person as powerless. Colours are often associated with particular meanings or values (e.g.

Barthes, 1972; Graber, 1996; Grancea, 2014; Hall, 1997; Huxford, 2001; Jewitt & Oyama, 2001; Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; Mendelson, 2005; Messaris & Abraham, 2001; Perlmutter, 1998; Rose, 2001; Zelizer, 2004). These associations largely rely on real-life (social) experiences, interactions and associations. Clearly, then, they may also differ depending on cultural contexts (e.g. Koga-Browes, 2013; Pauwels, 2005). Communicators may (deliberatively) employ certain (contextual) cues, conventions, icons or symbols to guide the interpretations of the public. Nevertheless, having ‘chosen’ to see something in a certain way, people are more inclined to believe it (see Newton, 2000). “Consequently, viewers may be less conscious of having been presented with a full articulated set of claims than they would be if those claims were made verbally” (Messaris & Abraham, 2001, p.219). As such, visual claims often go much further than would be readily accepted if they were spelled out explicitly in words (i.e. the verbal mode). Van Leeuwen (2001, p.97) summarizes accordingly:

Photographs are particularly good vehicles for such meanings, because they naturalize them. They can be thought of as just ‘finding’ these meanings on the street, as it were, rather than ‘constructing’ them. And they can also be thought of as not quite ‘spelling out’ their message, not saying it ‘in so many words’, so that that message can be construed as ‘read into it’ by the viewer, rather than as communicated by a powerful institution.

Messaris and Abraham (2001, p.220) conclude therefore that visuals provide a “shield of deniability”. Stereotypes, in particular, constitute a highly pervasive group of (culturally-specific) visuals. Such oversimplified categorizations, reflected in the way in which a group of people is represented, are often used by dominant groups to reproduce certain (pejorative) values. As such, they try to naturalize and justify their own dominance and, accordingly, inter-group inequalities. That is, focusing on simplistic overgeneralizations, stereotypes prevent us from addressing, let alone understanding, broader contexts, underlying problems, alternative perspectives (see Hartman & Husband, 1973; Lester, 1995; Lippmann, 2006; Machin & Mayr, 2012; Messaris, 1997; Perlmutter, 1998; Rose, 2001; Sibley & Osborne, 2016; van Dijk, 1988, 1998; Wright, 2011). Messaris and Abraham (2001) demonstrate, for instance, the working of ‘stereotypical juxtaposing’: By illustrating textual stories on unemployment or violence with visuals depicting Blacks, certain stereotypes are reproduced and reinforced, albeit not being spelled out. Stereotypes are highly conventional and naturalized. As such, they are hardly ever questioned, neither by the media, nor by the audience. Accordingly, they make for particularly powerful framing devices (Abraham & Appiah, 2006; Coleman, 2010; Lester, 1995) (see 2.3.3 Multimodal Framing Analysis: A Method).

Geise and Baden (2015) and Buehner (2012) do, however, slightly nuance the power of the ‘visual frame’. They point out that it is harder to control interpretations when presenting the audience with visual information, exactly because these are far more dependent on the mental frames or schemata of the audience (e.g. Domke, Perlmutter & Spratt, 2002; Mendelson, 2005), including the (cultural)

knowledge of recipients or their willingness / ability to interpret visuals (in particular ways). That is, pictures may suggest certain (preferred) meanings, but they always remain open to multiple interpretations. There is no tight relation between signifier and signified. For instance, recipients may not be able to recognize an object, person or event (i.e. denotative level) that is uncommon or absent in their time-space, may lack certain (culturally-dependent) associations or connotations or may denounce them even if they are familiar with them (e.g. Barthes, 1977; Buehner, 2012; Grancea, 2014; Messaris, 1997; Pauwels, 2005; van Leeuwen, 2011; Van Straten, 2002). Accordingly, Rose (2001) points out: “Not all audiences will be able or willing to respond to the way of seeing invited by a particular images (sic) and its particular practices of display” (see 3.3 Frame Interpretations).

Clearly, the visual hardly ever operates individually and nor does the verbal. Indeed, human communication – and thus, framing – is essentially multimodal. Multimodality attends to “the full range of communicational forms people use – image, gesture, gaze, posture, and so on – and the relationships between them” (Jewitt, 2009, p.14). Coleman (2010) argues, more specifically, that the visual and verbal tend to work in tandem and are, accordingly, processed simultaneously by the audience. They often interact in complex ways – each with their own properties, allowances and limitations – mutually influencing and complementing each another. As such, they produce meaning that would be unattainable in a single mode. Put differently, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts (Herbers & Volpers, 2013; Jewitt, 2009; Kress, 2009; Lobinger & Geise, 2013; Machin, 2007, 2009, 2013; Meier, 2013). Graber (1989, p.145) argues:

[P]urely verbal analyses not only miss the information contained in the pictures and nonverbal sounds, they even fail to interpret the verbal content appropriately because that content is modified by its combination with picture messages.

Clearly, the same is true for monomodal visual analyses (see Hansen & Machin, 2008; Mendelson, 2005). A caption may, for instance, transform a visual into a certain reality, a narrative with a beginning, middle and end (Dan & Ihlen, 2011; Geise & Baden, 2015; Goodnow, 2005; Grittmann, 2014). Mellese and Müller (2012, p.208) refer to the “bridging function” of the caption in multimodal documents: the caption connects the visual and verbal modes, providing as such the contextualization of the visual message. Fahmy, Kelly and Kim (2007) contend that identical images spread by photo agencies may convey different meanings, depending on the news outlets (i.e. among others, the textual context) in which they end up.²² An image accompanying a story may contribute to or expand some of its meanings. Colour may, for instance, suggest certain associations and meanings language would not be able to convey. Stereotypical prejudices about certain groups – e.g. Blacks being lazy and unemployed; Jews

²² Similarly, Krauss (1982) points out that the context in which a photograph is seen, creates a particular ‘discursive space’. This prompts particular ideas in the viewer, simultaneously excluding others. For example, the same photograph may be approached differently when shown in a newspaper or in a museum. Of course, the context is formed by more than text alone. Yet, the text (e.g. the article texts in newspapers or the textual explanations provided with art works in museums) may play an important role.

being greedy and manipulative – would be impossible or inappropriate to be expressed in the verbal part of the text, but are more easily accepted when being visualized (Abraham & Appiah, 2006; Joffe, 2008; Machin, 2013; Machin & Mayr, 2012; Martinec & Salway, 2005; Unsworth & Cléirigh, 2009). The verbal is more suited for the representation of sequential or causal relationships, categorizations, generalizations or abstractions, while the visual may add spatial information, like degree, quantity, colour, shape, relative size or spatial relations of (dis)connection (Geise & Baden, 2015; Jewitt, 2009; Machin, 2009; Machin & Mayr, 2012; Pauwels, 2005; Unsworth & Cléirigh, 2009). Accordingly, Kress (2009, p.56) contends: “(...) while the relations of elements of an image can usually be ‘read’ in an order shaped by the interest of the ‘viewer’, the reading of writing is governed by *linearity* and *directionality* – left to right or right to left – by the ordering of syntax” (italic in original). As discussed above, lacking an explicit propositional syntax, visuals leave recipients more room to ‘choose’ how they structure and interpret the information, or at least, they make us believe they do so. Summarizing, then, the visual often adds salience – for instance, foregrounding certain ideas from the text, backgrounding others (e.g. through sizing or colour) – while the verbal provides structure. The whole of the multimodal message benefits, then, from the strengths of both modes (Geise & Baden, 2015; Lobinger & Geise, 2013; Machin & Mayr, 2012; Meier, 2013). Focussing on audience reception, Geise and Baden (2015) conclude that visual, verbal and multimodal information eventually all feed into the same kind of mental process, in which a coherent message is shaped. Accordingly, they contend that framing must be approached as a bridging model (see Reese, 2007) between modes.²³

2.3.2 Conceptualizing Multimodal Framing

Table 1 provides a (non-exhaustive) overview of the existing research on visual framing and the preliminary work on multimodal framing, within the field of media and communication studies. As pointed out by Brantner, Geise and Lobinger (2012), the majority of these studies focus on a limited number of issues: war and conflict, ‘the other’ (e.g. immigrants) and natural disasters or climate change. Clearly, lessons can be drawn from these first attempts to incorporate the visual into framing research. Yet, the examples also demonstrate some important shortcomings, which begs for further development.

The current visual (and multimodal) framing research shows a lack of conceptual and methodological consistency, as well as a general reluctance towards theory building or the development of a methodological framework (Buehner, 2012; Brantner, Geise & Lobinger, 2012; Coleman, 2010; Herbers & Volpers, 2013; Lobinger & Geise, 2013; Matthes, 2009; Müller, 2013; Rodriguez & Dimitrova, 2011). Accordingly, Entman’s (1993) description of framing as a ‘fractured paradigm’ still seems to hold true.

²³ See also Langacker (1993) who contends that linguistic structures are an integrated part of human cognition. As such, they can only be understood and characterized in the context of a broader account of cognitive functioning. Obviously, ‘visual structures’ are also part of the latter (accordingly, the statement of Langacker also holds true for ‘visual structures’).

When it comes to conceptualization, however, Brantner, Geise and Lobinger (2012) highlight that a majority of the studies draw on a limited number of general framing sources. This is also illustrated by Table 1: Most studies refer to Entman (1991, 1993, 2004), Gamson and Modigliani (1989), Gitlin (1980) and/or Pan and Kosicki (1993). Although these references are often quite brief, with most authors failing to clarify or elaborate on their own views, I consider the current conceptualizations not as highly problematic. After all, I agree with Dan and Ihlen (2011) who conclude that the framing definition can be applied to text *and* visuals, since frames are all-rounded messages consisting of text and visuals alike (see Geise & Baden, 2015; Herbers & Volpers, 2013; Lobinger & Geise, 2013; Meier, 2013). In a similar vein, Kress (2009) contends: “Frames and means of framing are essential to all meaning making, in all modes” (p.66). Accordingly, ‘visual framing definitions’ – as provided by Brantner, Geise and Lobinger (2012) or Coleman (2010), for instance – though useful for highlighting the particular pervasiveness and contributions of the visual (2.3.1 Framing and the Special Attributes of the Visual), make less sense in an essentially multimodal context (see Jungblut & Zakareviciute, 2018).

More problematic, then, is the translation of the framing concept into an operational visual / multimodal method and empirical applications. I have quoted Reese (2007) before who argues that “[a]uthors often give an obligatory nod to the literature before proceeding to do whatever they were going to do in the first place” (p.151). In other words, key attributes of framing – selection and organization, the frame package (central organizing idea, framing and reasoning devices), the ideological level (see 2.2.1 Key Features) – described by the quoted authors are partly or largely missing in most visual or multimodal framing studies. While these are more general problems in the framing research at large (see 2.2.1.6 Non-Frames; Chapter 4), they are particularly manifest in the developing field of visual / multimodal framing (Lobinger & Geise, 2013).

Surely, some interesting efforts have been made as for the development of a methodological toolkit, with various studies providing useful handles. With regard to framing devices, for example, several authors point to the identification of (denotative) themes, participants and objects, while also taking into account stylistic variables such as distance or point of view (see Rodriguez & Dimitrova, 2011). Apparently, there is quite some consistency here. Only some researchers do operationalize (visual / multimodal) salience, though: Entman (1991) distinguishes, for instance, a number of visual-verbal salience indicators such as frame size, repetition or placement (i.e. attention and prominence). Fahmy (2010) refers to the emphasis device (e.g. frequency or size) and the graphic device (e.g. the close-up of a dead body) (i.e. attention and valence) (see Kioussis, 2004). Finally, some first attempts have been made to integrate the visual and verbal modes, with several authors (e.g. Aday, Cluverius & Livingston, 2005; Dahmen, 2009; Grittmann, 2014; Huang & Fahmy, 2013; Ojala, Pantti & Kangas, 2017; Parry, 2010; Rebich-Hespanha et al., 2013) considering the headings, captions or participant statements as secondary variables in their ‘visual framing analyses’. The interactions among the visual and verbal are,

however, usually approached (or at least, analysed) as unilateral, with researchers solely attending to the ways in which verbal elements may steer interpretations of the visual. Of particular interest is the 1991 study of Entman on the KAL and Iran Air Incidents. In this study, the author demonstrates more thoroughly the interactions and coherence among visual and verbal devices, linking, for instance, word choices (abstractness, generalization, naming) to the visual level of detail, proximity or point of view. Rosas-Moreno (2010), Dan and Ihlen (2011) and Wessler et al. (2016) also make an effort to integrate more thoroughly the visual and verbal parts of the frame (see Herbers & Volpers, 2013; Lobinger & Geise, 2013; Meier, 2013). Jungblut and Zakareviciute (2018) present a quite thorough multimodal framing analysis of the Israel-Gaza conflict, but approach verbal and visual frames as separate – yet interacting – entities.

That said, there is still much to be done for methods and applications to fully exploit the potential of framing and multimodal communication. Firstly, almost none of the framing studies in Table 1 identify an argumentative structure, thus constraining frames to one of their key functions, *selection*. The second function, *structuring*, is largely ignored (see, however, Ojala, Pantti & Kangas (2017)). Yet, the latter, in particular, allows framing to provide added value in comparison to related concepts and methodologies like agenda-setting, priming (see 2.1 The Emergence of a Paradigm), critical discourse analysis or semiotics. Those do not (systematically) address the structuring functions of (visual-verbal) texts and lack comprehensive tools to make those graspable and comparable. However, as most studies are (almost) exclusively concerned with the monomodal visual mode, the omission of reasoning devices is understandable. According to Grittmann (2014), visuals have their own independent meaning(s) (potentials), based on their iconography or aesthetics, but they are only framed when being integrated into a specific discourse. Put differently, their argumentative meaning almost exclusively draws from the verbal context (i.e. the caption). Also, the author argues that it is only possible to identify one reasoning device in each visual. They are ‘single frame elements’ (see Dan & Ihlen, 2011). Other visual / multimodal framing studies which also equate reasoning devices to frame types (e.g. Cheregi, 2015; Parry, 2010) or consider reasoning devices as purely verbal variables (e.g. Wessler et al., 2016), indirectly underscore this argumentation.

I partly agree with the view of Grittmann (2014). Yet, drawing on authors like Herbers and Volpers (2013), Meier (2013) or Lobinger and Geise (2013), I propose a more elaborated and extended version of this view. Visuals in the framing process are especially powerful when it comes to the *selection* of meanings and ideas, rendering those particularly *salient* (e.g. Entman, 1991; Geise & Baden, 2015; Lobinger & Geises, 2013; Meier, 2013). However, drawing on the three-dimensional model of Geise and Rössler (2012)²⁴, Herbers and Volpers (2013) claim that both *selection* as well as *structuring* may

²⁴ The three-dimensional model of Geise and Rössler (2012) distinguishes among three visual meaning layers: The ‘surface structure’ (‘Oberflächenstruktur’) encompasses manifest, ‘self-contained’ variables, such as sizes, colours

be going on in the ‘Tiefenstruktur’ (‘deep structure’) of individual images. This latent, symbolic meaning level is based on the (syntagmatic / paradigmatic) interactions of (manifest and quasi-manifest) individual elements (i.e. framing devices) (Rose, 2001). For instance, actors with particular symbolic attributes can be connected through vectors, which may highlight their roles or responsibilities. Nevertheless, I contend that an isolated visual can never equal one frame (Lobinger & Geise, 2013). On the contrary, due to its polysemic character (e.g. Barthes, 1977; Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; Machin & Mayr, 2012; Messaris, 1997; Perlmutter, 1998), a single picture (i.e. a number of framing devices, combined in a visual) may be part of various frames (e.g. Geise & Baden, 2015; Liebler & Bendix, 1996; Mellese & Müller, 2012). Geise and Baden (2015) argue:

The greater richness and higher ambiguity in visuals compared to texts results in a surplus of information available for integration, and introduces higher variability in the information constructed. Consequently, the identification of a central organizing idea integrating the available information is less homogeneous, and less predictable for visual frames (p.60).

In short, a visual may support various argumentations, or frames. For example, a depiction of a robot assisting the inhabitants of a retirement home may in one frame reinforce the argumentation that technological development is the answer (solution) to several problems (western) humans are currently faced with (e.g. an ageing population, financial, staff and time constraints in care services for the elderly). In another frame, however, this same depiction may highlight the threat (problem) of dehumanization and alienation in the care for the elderly, due to technological developments (cause). Concluding, various potential argumentative functions coexist within one visual: meaning floats; there is not one fixed meaning (Mendelson, 2005). Only when the image is incorporated in a broader context, however, one of those potential meanings is – temporarily – crystallized. Or, as Rose (2001) puts it: “An image may have its own effects, but these are always mediated by the many and various uses to which it is put” (p.14).

Indeed, selected visual elements only receive an argumentative function within the context (i.e. the *structure*) of a broader frame. This may happen within and across modes. Clearly, the verbal text is crucial in this regard (Herbers & Volpers, 2013; Lobinger & Geise, 2013; Meier, 2013).²⁵ The caption and title (see Barthes, 1977; Bucher & Schumacher, 2006; Dan & Ihlen, 2011; Geise & Baden, 2015; Hall, 1973; Goodnow, 2005; Grittmann, 2014; Guéry, 1995; Jungblut & Zakareviciute, 2018; Mellese & Müller, 2012; Ojala, Pantti & Kangas, 2017; Parry, 2010; Unsworth & Cléirigh, 2009), in particular,

(‘representational level’), names, functions (‘object level’) and spatial relations (‘compositional level’). The ‘internal structure’ (‘Binnenstruktur’) is concerned with the ‘quasi-manifest’, ‘expressive’ variables like symbols, icons, stereotypes, visual motives or ‘tendencies’. The latent ‘deep structure’ (‘Tiefenstruktur’) focuses on the implicit meanings which are conveyed by the whole image (i.e. the aggregate of meaning layers and devices) and which help to underpin a particular cultural, national, religious or philosophical worldview. Clearly, this is reminiscent of the three meaning levels – denotation, connotation and myth – distinguished in the semiotic tradition, and more specifically by Barthes (1972, 1977).

²⁵ See my discussion of the linguistic ‘macrostructure’ in 2.3.3 Multimodal Framing Analysis: A Method.

help to frame the visual, disambiguating and guiding interpretations. However, all textual elements, including the introduction, main text or pull quotes, are part of the multimodal interplay (Barthes, 1977; Coleman, 2010; Geise & Baden, 2015; Machin & Mayr, 2012; Martinec & Salway, 2005; Mendelson, 2005; Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; Plantinga, 1997; Unsworth & Cléirigh, 2009). As Geise and Baden (2015) argue, texts contain only a limited number of salient elements. As such, they allow more easily for the deduction of a certain organizing idea. Plantinga (1997) argues accordingly: “Only verbal or other symbolic discourse, perhaps in tandem with images, can explicitly make complex arguments and persuasive cases” (p.123). Swim and Bloodhart (2015) illustrate, for instance, how different captions and broader verbal contexts may frame the same picture of a polar bear in different ways, evoking other emotional responses among the audience. Yet, I argue that *structure* may – to a certain extent – also be provided by the interaction of various visuals, often within the context of the article space (Geise & Baden, 2015; Herbers & Volpers, 2013; Kaplan, 2005; Ojala, Pantti & Kangas, 2017). For instance, a sequence of depictions may imply a causal relationship (e.g. the depiction of a hurricane (cause) and its destructive consequences (problem)) (Huxford, 2001; Machin & Mayr, 2012; Mendelson, 2005; Messaris, 1997). Nevertheless, Messaris (1997) points out that even simple visual juxtapositions often need a verbal explanation for the audience to discern their meaning (Jungblut & Zakareviciute, 2018).

Clearly, these syntagmatic interactions cannot be decoupled from broader media, production or reception contexts, which strongly affect the interpretations of visual information. These include, among others, the frames (or visual / verbal / multimodal elements) in the same outlet or on the same page, mental frames or schemata accessible to communicators and recipients or (generally shared) conventions, symbols or icons in a particular time-space (e.g. Entman, Matthes & Pellicano, 2009; Fairclough, 1995, 2000; Geise & Baden, 2015; Graber, 1988; Hall, 1973, 1997; Herbers & Volpers, 2013; Huxford, 2001; Jungblut & Zakareviciute, 2018; Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; Machin & Mayr, 2012; Meier, 2013; Messaris, 1997; Rose, 2001; van Dijk, 1988, 1998).²⁶ These may guide our understanding of the ‘individual’ framing devices, which can be situated on the (manifest) ‘Oberflächenstruktur’ (‘surface structure’) and (quasi-manifest) ‘Binnenstruktur’ (‘internal structure’) of Geise & Rössler (2012) (see Rodriguez & Dimitrova, 2011). For instance, depictions of threatened pristine landscapes can only evoke certain responses because they play around with colour symbolism (e.g. dark versus light) or western conventions about ‘how nature should look like’ (e.g. Cottle, 2000; Grittmann, 2014; Remillard, 2011). Hansen and Machin (2013) argue that climate and environmental imagery, in particular, does not offer itself with ready-made meanings. Rather, audiences – in particular time-spaces – learn to recognize particular visuals as symbols or icons associated with particular meanings, issues, problems. I also referred above (see 2.3.1 Framing and the Special Attributes of the Visual) to the preferred meanings, which are (unconsciously) suggested by communicators, and quite

²⁶ See also: Buehner (2012), Domke, Perlmutter and Spratt (2002), Grancea (2014), Jewitt (2009), Kaplan (2005), Mendelson (2005), Unsworth and Cléirigh (2009), Wright (2011), Scheufele, D. A. (1999), Van Gorp (2006).

easily accepted by the audience (e.g. Hall, 1997; Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; Rose, 2001). On this level of interpretation, the broader context mainly facilitates understanding, meaning (*selection*) and *salience* enhancement. For the visual (framing devices) to become a (constitutive) part of a particular argumentative *structure*, however, the context must also help to give rise to, or suggest, a particular frame (i.e. ‘Tiefenstruktur’ or ‘deep structure’ (Geise & Rössler, 2012)). For instance, the colour symbolism and western conventions regarding nature may prompt the moral evaluation described by Grittmann (2014), if the audience has mental access to the frame that highlights natural wealth and human (neglecting his) responsibility to conserve this (i.e. Scala Naturae). As this type of visual (i.e. visual framing devices) often appears in the context of this particular (well-known, western) frame, it is not unlikely that the image evokes these associations in the (western) audience (see 3.3 Frame Interpretations). The juxtaposition with another article that employs the same frame may, obviously, reinforce this effect. The same is true for the interaction with the framing devices in the caption, title or main text or other (con)textual factors (see also Ojala, Pantti & Kangas, 2017).

This is in keeping with the idea that frames only take (full) shape across various realizations and, accordingly, that the (manifest) realization of a frame in a single (multimodal) text is usually partial. That is, one or more reasoning devices often remain implicit (e.g. Entman, 1993). Yet, according to Van Gorp (2006), one frame element can, in principle, evoke the broader frame structure in which it is embedded. I believe that this is definitely true for visuals. As discussed before, images are in particular able to evoke pre-existing cognitions and feelings (Domke, Perlmutter & Spratt, 2002). Of course, much depends on the mental frames or schemata and knowledge available to the participants and the character of the picture (e.g. Buehner, 2012; Geise & Baden, 2015). For instance, I expect that well-known, powerful framing devices as stereotypes or symbols, like the suffering child in the South (Ali, James & Vultee, 2013; Chouliaraki, 2006; Perlmutter, 1998), are likely to evoke the (justice) frame they are often part of (see Chapter 4). I theorize, accordingly, that it is not unlikely that such a powerful visual symbol may readily evoke the frame in which the other (verbal) framing devices can be interpreted, especially if it is made salient through placement, size or colour contrasts. That is, I argue that some types of visuals – interacting with broader contextual factors and/or other visuals, in sequences – may be able to provide an argumentative context for the verbal devices.

Authors	References to leading framing scholars?	Reasoning devices?	Framing devices?	Salience enhancing devices?	Integration of verbal elements?
Bruce (2014), Neumann & Fahmy (2012), Schwalbe (2013)	Yes	/	Denotative meaning level (frame categories like themes, topics, participants, objects, attributes)	/	/
Rebich-Hespanha et al. (2013)	Yes	/	Denotative meaning level	/	Caption and headline
Fahmy (2010)	Yes	/	/	Prominence and valence (graphic or affective quality)	/
Batziou (2011), Borah (2009), Schwalbe, Silcock & Keith (2008)	Yes	/	Denotative and stylistic (e.g. distance, point of view, imaginary contact) meaning levels	Attention, prominence and/or valence	/
O'Neill (2013)	Yes	/	Denotative, stylistic, connotative (e.g. symbols) and ideological meaning levels	/	/
Cheregi (2015)	Yes	Reasoning devices as frame types	Denotative meaning level	/	/
Fahmy (2004), Pantti (2013)	Yes	/	Denotative and/or stylistic meaning levels	/	Caption
Aday, Cluverius & Livingston (2005), Dahmen (2009), Huang & Fahmy (2013)	Yes	/	Denotative and/or stylistic meaning levels	Attention and/or prominence	Caption, headline and/or body text
Gamson & Stuart (1992)	Yes	No, but coding of central organizing idea	Denotative and connotative meaning levels	/	Verbal text in cartoons is taken into account
Grittmann (2014), Parry (2010)	Yes	Focus on single reasoning devices (i.e. 1 frame / 1 visual = 1 reasoning device)	Denotative, stylistic and/or connotative meaning levels	Attention, prominence and/or valence	Caption and headline
Ojala, Pantti & Kangas (2017)	Yes	Yes (mostly based on descriptions of heroes, victims, villains etc.)	Denotative (including processes) and connotative meaning levels; interaction among images	Limited / visual representation as salient	Caption and headline
Rosas-Moreno (2010)	Yes	/	Comparative narrative analysis	/	Largely integrated multimodal analysis
Dan & Ihlen (2011), Wessler et al. (2016)	Yes	Not or limited (only visual problem definition / only in verbal text)	Denotative meaning level	/	Largely integrated multimodal analysis
Jungblut & Zakareviciute (2018)	Yes	Limited (only visual problem definition and moral evaluation)	Denotative, stylistic, connotative meaning levels	Limited (tangible) operationalization	Parallel/interconnected visual and verbal frames
Entman (1991)	Yes	/	Various verbal-visual devices (related to agency, identification, categorization, generalization) on the denotative, stylistic, connotative (and ideological) meaning levels	Visual-verbal salience: attention and prominence	Strongly integrated multimodal analysis

Table 1: (Non-exhaustive) overview of existing visual and multimodal framing studies and their major characteristics. The grey areas highlight those studies which (attempt to) integrate the verbal and visual in more thorough / comprehensive ways.

That is most likely to happen if the text has a rather abstract character and largely fails to specify a clear, salient structure (see Geise & Baden, 2015). Alternatively, visual-verbal interactions may also be mutually constitutive, with the visual and verbal reinforcing each other. This may, for instance, be the case if the two modes contain powerful (culturally resonant) framing devices, which are likely to evoke the same frame.²⁷

Summarizing, then, all visual and verbal elements contribute in various ways to the framing of multimodal texts, with the broader contextual / intertextual cues also playing a pivotal role. Only taking all these multimodal elements into account may, in most cases, allow for quite comprehensive and nuanced interpretations of the *selection* and *structuring* functions of frames. While visuals tend to appear in multimodal contexts, especially in media or commercial communication, we may, once in a while, come across monomodal visuals. As highlighted before, one image never equals a frame (Lobinger & Geise, 2013). Yet, it may be clear from the discussion above that a framing analysis in a monomodal context is still feasible, yet more challenging (e.g. Fahmy, 2010; Unsworth & Cléirigh, 2009). Clearly, such an endeavour depends to a much larger extent on the contextual information available to the viewer (e.g. Buehner, 2012) as well as the character of the visual (e.g. Grittmann, 2014). Accordingly, I expect that monomodal analyses are much more likely to reflect the polysemic character of visuals (i.e. various recipients / researchers in various contexts are likely to take away various argumentations). Besides, as illustrated in Table 1, they may encourage the identification of (a set of) salient selected ideas or meanings rather than an underlying argumentative structure. Conversely, the lack of visual contextualization sustaining the verbal part of the frame poses less challenges, despite the fact that the visual mode in many cases adds important information, salience or clarification (e.g. Graber, 1996). As demonstrated by Messaris and Abraham (2001), for instance, subtle meanings can emerge exactly from the interaction between the modes (see ‘stereotypical juxtaposing’). Indeed, the whole is often greater than the sum of its parts.

Another problem is that almost all studies are mainly concerned with the surface levels of communication (i.e. the ‘denotative’ and ‘stylistic’ levels as described by Rodriguez and Dimitrova (2011)), often by means of a content analysis. As such, they largely or entirely overlook connotations or ideological implications (see Entman, 1991; Geise & Rössler, 2012; Gamson & Stuart, 1992;

²⁷ Entman (1991) illustrates how the visual and verbal modes can mutually reinforce each other. He describes, for instance, how the verbal devices which help to humanize the victims of the KAL incident victims are reinforced by powerful visual choices. Both may (in interaction) help to evoke a ‘moral’ frame. The media offered, among others, detailed descriptions of what was going on in the airplane moments before / during the crash, encouraging identification with the terrified passengers. The latter were humanized through words like ‘civilians’ or ‘loved ones’. Accordingly, pictures gave a face to the (named) victims. As pointed out before, an intimate human face is one of the most powerful depictions which is likely to draw attention, emotionally engage and enhance memorability (e.g. Graber, 1988, 1996; Höjjer, 2004; Jewitt & Oyama, 2001; Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; Small & Loewenstein, 2003). The explosion was visually represented in quite ‘graphic’ ways with, for instance, red colours referring to fire and blood.

Grittmann, 2014; Herbers & Volpers, 2013; Meier, 2013; O'Neill, 2013; Rodriguez & Dimitrova, 2011), intertextual references, rhetorical devices or narrative elements (see Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Herbers & Volpers, 2013; Rosas-Moreno, 2010; Van Gorp, 2006; Wozniak, Lück & Wessler, 2015) and most importantly, perhaps, the interaction of the visual and verbal modes (e.g. Martinec & Salway, 2005; Unsworth & Cléirigh, 2009) (see 2.3.3 Multimodal Framing Analysis: A Method). In short, they do not account for the wealth of visual, verbal and multimodal affordances or meaning potentials identified and demonstrated in fields like critical discourse analysis, semiotics, rhetorics, photography and film studies, linguistics, narrative analysis or journalism studies.

Both major problems I identified – the restriction of framing to selection and salience enhancement and the rather limited scope of the framing analysis toolkit (i.e. framing devices) – also affect the character of the ‘frames’ identified (see 2.2.1 Key Features). Rather than reflecting clear argumentations, informing us about underlying ideological interests (e.g. Carragee & Roefs, 2004) or allowing for nuance or detail, they mostly constitute themes or topics – e.g. ‘political’ (Borah, 2009), ‘science’ (Dahmen, 2009) – attributes – e.g. ‘anti-war’ versus ‘pro-war’ (Fahmy, 2010) – or journalistic formats or routines – e.g. ‘contested’ (O'Neill, 2013), ‘human interest’ (Schwalbe, Silcock & Keith, 2008). The former two categories are in most cases issue-specific, conflicting with the idea of ‘universal cultural frames’ (Van Gorp, 2006, 2007). The latter are generic, but lack substance. Others – e.g. ‘polluters and causes’ (Grittmann, 2014) – focus only on one part of the argumentative structure (Entman, 1993, 2004). Clearly, these various categories work on different levels. Since most authors also identify their own set of frames, comparison among studies and issues becomes almost impossible. As such, the further development of the (visual / multimodal) framing concept and methodology is further hampered (Hertog & McLeod, 2001).

Based on these findings, I draw some conclusions. Firstly, I agree with Geise and Baden (2015) that “(...) there is nothing in common framing definitions that necessitates a restriction to only words as framing devices” (p.48). Accordingly, I abide by the definition I have previously presented, with the understanding that every reference to ‘text’ implies both verbal, visual as well as multimodal texts. That is, (media) framing is in essence a multimodal concept and method and needs to be approached as such (see Dan & Ihlen, 2011). This implies, secondly, that the framing analysis toolkit (i.e. frame package) needs to be expanded to include – and allow for the analysis of – the visual mode. Based on authors like Geise and Baden (2015) or previous multimodal endeavours in critical discourse analysis or semiotics (e.g. Machin & Mayr, 2012) I expect to find multiple parallels – overarching complementary workings – across the modes, which are likely to be reflected in the framing (and reasoning) devices, as well as the salience enhancing devices. Clearly, also broader contextual cues and intertextuality require a place in the model. Thirdly, only by integrating the visual and verbal we will be truly able to account for the full range of manifest and implicit reasoning devices in multimodal texts. This might, again, allow to

delve deeper into the underlying ideological interests or hegemonic struggles. That said, I acknowledge that the framing analysis of a monomodal verbal or visual text is feasible. As discussed, however, the latter – in particular – is likely to pose a greater challenge and yield less developed frames.

2.3.3 Multimodal Framing Analysis: A Method

I introduce an extensive, multi-level and multimodal framing analysis toolkit (Table 2), in a first attempt to respond to, and operationalize, the conclusions drawn in previous chapters (see 2.2.1 Key Features; 2.3.2 Conceptualizing Multimodal Framing). This draws on previous research on visual, verbal and multimodal framing (in particular, Entman, 1991, 1993, 2004; Fahmy, 2010; Grittmann, 2014; Jungblut & Zakareviciute, 2018; O’Neill, 2013; Pan & Kosicki, 1993; Rodriguez & Dimitrova, 2011; Van Gorp, 2006, 2007), as well as a broad range of sources from others fields like critical discourse analysis, semiotics, rhetorics, photography and film studies, (eco)linguistics, narrative analysis or journalism studies (in particular Chouliaraki, 2006; Durand, 1987; Hall, 1997; Halliday, 2000; Machin & Mayr, 2012; Martinec & Salway, 2005; Monaco, 2000; Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; Richardson, 2007; van Dijk, 1988, 1998; van Leeuwen, 2008; Verschueren, 2011). As such, I follow Machin’s (2009) advice “(...) to be aware of existing work on visual communication, discover where it has stumbled and where it has built, using the ideas we find as a resource to make a more robust multimodality” (p.190). Admittedly, (multimodal) discourse analysis and semiotics, in particular, have been very influential. The theories / methods are concerned with the relations among (non-)verbal communication and (ideological) meaning, power and/or control and allow to add detail and nuance to (qualitative) analyses. As such, they coincide with, and may sustain, the loci of framing. As I will describe in the following chapters (see Chapters 4, 5 and 6), I have applied, and tested, the model on my own corpus of multimodal climate change texts.

The particular design, or layout, of this table is not coincidental. Various authors have proposed *multi-level framing analysis toolkits* before. After all, communication is complex, with meaning being constructed on various (interacting) levels (e.g. Barthes, 1972, 1977; Barthes & Duisit, 1975; Geise & Rössler, 2012; Halliday, 2000; Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; van Dijk, 1977, 1988, 1998). Pan and Kosicki (1993), for example, distinguished between a syntactical (macrosyntax, placement in the structure of a news article, like heading, lead or caption), script (narrative structure, binary roles, contrast, conflict, drama, narrative point of view), thematic (hypothesis and hypothesis testing features, e.g. quotes, examples) and rhetorical level (metaphors, exemplars, catchphrases, depictions, visual images (see Gamson & Modigliani, 1989), metonyms, descriptions, numbers, word choice). Besides, they emphasized the crucial role of lexical choices. Van Gorp (2006) updated this model by adding a level of intertextuality (references to the same or similar issues, temporal relations). Also, he argued that the syntactical level did not comprise framing devices as such but that it was concerned with salience. While the authors refer to the visual mode, it is restricted to one framing device on the rhetorical level.

Accordingly, the structure and levels of the toolkits are largely inspired by a *verbal logic* (i.e. sequential / temporal ordering, naming function) (see Geise & Baden, 2015; Kress, 2009; Unsworth & Cléirigh, 2009).

More recently, Rodriguez and Dimitrova (2011) proposed a multi-level system for visual framing analysis, indebted to a range of visual fields like art history, critical discourse analysis, semiotics or gestalt theory of visual perception but also previous empirical work on visual framing. The toolkit distinguishes between the levels ‘visuals as denotative systems’, ‘visuals as stylistic-semiotic systems’, ‘visuals as connotative systems’ and ‘visuals as ideological representations’. Obviously, the model strongly reflects the logic and ‘*special characteristics*’ of the visual, like the spatial-associative logic, the function of depicting and organizing, the powerful ability of visuals to convey and naturalize ideas, associations or ideologies (Geise & Baden, 2015; Messaris & Abraham, 2001; Kress, 2009; Unsworth & Cléirigh, 2009). The levels are, in particular, reminiscent of those described by Barthes (1972, 1977) (see also Geise & Rössler, 2012). The ideological level may, arguably, be related to the ‘Tiefenstruktur’ (Geise & Rössler, 2012) on which, I argued, we may situate the frame. As discussed earlier (2.3.2 Conceptualizing Multimodal Framing), most empirical research mainly draws on the first two levels. While the multi-level model of Rodriguez and Dimitrova (2011) can provide useful handles, it seems still too limited. For instance, it lacks a thorough discussion of visual salience enhancing devices (e.g. visual hierarchy, function of emphasizing) (Geise & Baden, 2015; Unsworth & Cléirigh, 2009). Many (empirical) framing studies do provide valuable contributions (e.g. Fahmy, 2010), though. Also, the model does not explain where the structuring elements can be situated: reasoning devices are no part of it. That is, the focus lies on selection rather than structuring. Further, the differences among the levels are not always clear-cut. It is, for example, not argued why it is useful to distinguish between a denotative and connotative level in the light of a framing analysis (see also Buehner, 2012). I conclude, therefore, that while this toolkit – and a majority of the empirical studies, accordingly – does provide an interesting contribution to the visual field in general, it *lacks too much of a foundation in the general framing research* (i.e. it ignores the specificities of the framing concept) to truly encourage the development of a more comprehensive, systematic and clear (visual / multimodal) framing analysis method (Geise & Baden, 2015).

Nevertheless, I admit that both groups of multi-level toolkits – including the (empirical) studies which they are indebted to or to which they constitute a background – do, to a certain extent, provide useful handles to conduct ‘monomodal’ framing analyses. Yet, as argued, both are (1) too strongly tied to the logic of one mode and/or (2) fail to operationalize, or further build upon, the conceptual and methodological findings of the framing field at large.

In order to address these two major problems, I have, firstly, *deconstructed the previously identified levels*, separating all individual (groups of) potential verbal and visual framing devices. Also, I added

some devices that did not appear in the multi-level toolkits but that were proposed by other verbal or visual framing studies, for instance the salience enhancing devices described by Fahmy (2010) or the active / passive voice of verbs introduced by Entman (1991). All these devices were weighed up against the meaningful variables identified in other fields, like critical discourse analysis, semiotics, rhetorics, photography and film studies, linguistics, narrative analysis or journalism studies. These fields allowed me to add some additional devices, to further develop existing ones or to discard others. Obviously, my framing definition and conceptualization also guided each of my decisions. Of particular importance is, for instance, the categorization of participants inspired by Van Leeuwen (2008), the transitivity theory of Halliday (2000) or the insights from, among others, film and photography studies (e.g. Monaco, 2000) regarding the usage of lighting, focus, depth of field or setting as meaningful variables. As I argued before, frames and narratives strongly overlap – with the latter facilitating the (salient) realization of the former – even though they work on different levels of abstraction. The levels of narrative work described by Barthes and Duisit (1975) helped me to integrate the various narrative features into the model, organize them and link them to other (levels of) devices (see the script level of Pan & Kosicki (1993) and Van Gorp (2006)).

Secondly, I looked for *parallels, symmetry, similar elements (or, rather, functions) in the verbal and visual systems*. This allowed me to group visual and verbal devices together – cutting across the modality specific levels – and provide each level with an overarching category name and description. Again, other fields – especially those concerned with multimodal interactions like critical discourse analysis and semiotics (e.g. Machin & Mayr, 2012, 2013) – partly guided my decisions. For instance, Machin and Mayr (2012, 2013) inspired me to distinguish a separate level of modality. I adopted the ‘level of narration’ from Barthes and Duisit (1975) to group the narrative ‘meta- (or macro-)functions’ (i.e. the ‘how’ of the narration) in both modes (see, among other, van Dijk, 1988, 1998; Plantinga, 1997). In the process, it became clear to me that identified groups (i.e. levels) of devices could be divided into framing devices (white areas in Table 2), on the one hand, and *salience enhancing devices* (grey areas in Table 2), on the other. While previous work on framing – especially Entman (1991, 1993, 2004) or Fahmy (2004, 2010) – had already drawn the basic lines regarding salience, the broader literature again helped me to complement these insights. It allowed me to identify salience enhancing devices on each level, highlighting parallels across the modes that were previously overlooked (e.g. direct address in the visual and verbal or the dramatic or emotional character of visuals and verbal text(s) sections)). Also, the literature helped me to realize that some devices (e.g. metaphors, distance, angle) can not only function as framing devices but also as salience enhancing devices. This further development of salience may be crucial, as “[t]he essence of framing is sizing – magnifying or shrinking elements of the depicted reality to make them more or less salient” (Entman, 1991, p.9). The presence of salience enhancing devices in both modes and on various levels allows for the analysis of interactive (multimodal, multi-level) salience

enhancing effects, including the relative salience of visual and verbal framing and reasoning devices (e.g. Meier, 2013).

Overall, the various levels are rooted in my *major assumptions regarding (the functions of) frames*: Frames provide a particular problem definition, causal responsibility, treatment recommendation and moral evaluation. Each of these arguments, it can be argued, answers one or more of the basic questions, ‘who’, ‘what’, ‘how’, ‘why’, ‘when’, ‘where’ (see Jungblut & Zakareviciute, 2018). Depending on the frame (i.e. argumentation), however, these (answers) interact in different ways. For example, the same ‘who’ (selection) may be victim in one frame but hero in another (structuring). Each level of multimodal framing devices, I argue, can help to make one or several of these ‘answers’ manifest, while argumentative structures mainly result from the interaction of devices within or, especially, across multimodal levels (see the ‘Tiefenstruktur’ of Geise and Rössler (2012)). As argued, the argumentation is further facilitated (and crystallized) by broader contextual factors, like the mental frames or schemata of participants (see 2.3.2 Conceptualizing Multimodal Framing). I argue, nevertheless, that some levels are more catered to selection and salience (e.g. modality) while others primarily, but not exclusively, facilitate the structuring function of frames (e.g. processes).

In order to fully understand and develop the answers to the six basic questions, we need, firstly, to analyse which participants (‘who’, ‘what’) and (inter)actions (‘what’) have been selected, how they have been placed in particular circumstances (‘when’, ‘where’, ‘why’), and which perspectives, evaluations or associations (mainly ‘how’) (positionality, modality, rhetorical figures, narration, intertextuality) have been suggested.

The level of participants and attributes and *the level of processes* respond most directly to the basic framing devices identified in many studies: word choice, the foregrounding of participants (and their attributes), objects, activities (e.g. Entman, 1991; Jungblut & Zakareviciute, 2018; O’Neill, 2013; Pan & Kosicki, 1993; Van Gorp, 2006). Rather than approaching those devices as (constituting) one level, I have decided to separate them into two levels (see Van de Voorde & Temmerman, 2014), drawing on other (multi-level) models from narrative analysis, linguistics, critical discourse analysis or semiotics (e.g. Barthes & Duisit, 1975; Halliday, 2000; Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; van Leeuwen, 1996, 2008). Barthes and Duisit (1975) distinguish, for instance, among a (bottom) level of ‘functions’ (see Propp et al., 1998) and a (middle) level of ‘actions’ in their three-level model of narrative work. *Positionality* provides a deepening dimension, combining a number of variables, like distance and point of view, which are (convincingly) employed in various visual(-verbal) framing studies (e.g. Aday, Cluverius & Livingston, 2005; Entman, 1991; Fahmy, 2004, 2010; Jungblut & Zakareviciute, 2018; Meier, 2013; Schwalbe, Silcock & Keith, 2008). These variables are also described more broadly as particularly pervasive devices, which draw on real life, social interactions and conventions (see Hall, 1997; Kress & Van Leeuwen, 2006; Machin & Mayr, 2012). The verbal devices on this level (e.g. personal pronouns)

were inspired by discussions in linguistics and (multimodal) discourse analysis (e.g. Halliday, 2000; Langacker, 1993; Machin & Mayr, 2012; van Dijk, 1998; Verschueren, 2011). I added *circumstances* (see ‘circumstances’ in Halliday (2000) or Kress and van Leeuwen (2006)) as a separate level as my preliminary empirical research demonstrated the pivotal role of (temporal, spatial and/or causal) (de)contextualization to framing (see Jungblut & Zakareviciute, 2018). This is also described by Iyengar (1990) (see thematic and episodic news frames) and, more broadly, by Chouliaraki (2006). Besides, ‘circumstances’ is also concerned with causality, which is key to the underlying argumentation of frames. As I will discuss below, positionality and circumstances often interact, and may reinforce one another. *The level of modality*²⁸ may contribute to the framing process as it renders – visually and verbally – a particular reality more certain, trusted, likely, true (see e.g. Halliday, 2000; Jungblut & Zakareviciute, 2018; Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; Machin & Mayr, 2012).

The rhetorical level – closely connected to framing through the particularly powerful ability of foregrounding and backgrounding (deeper levels of) meaning that many rhetorical devices share (e.g. Catalano & Waugh, 2013; Durand, 1987; Kennedy & Kennedy, 1993; Machin & Mayr, 2012; Richardson, 2007; Verschueren, 2011; Woods, Fernández & Coen, 2010) – expands the homonymous level of Pan and Kosicki (1993) and Van Gorp (2006) and the connotative level of Rodriguez and Dimitrova (2011). Metaphors, stereotypes and icons, in particular, are often seen as pivotal to framing (e.g. Abraham & Appiah, 2006; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Herbers & Volpers, 2013; Jungblut & Zakareviciute, 2018; Perlmutter, 1998; Stibbe, 2015).

Similarly to Pan and Kosicki (1993) and Van Gorp (2006), I discern a *narrative level* (see the script level). As several authors contend, frames are closely related to narratives and myths (e.g. Wozniak, Lück & Wessler, 2015; Van Gorp, 2006) (see 2.2.1.4 Frames and Narratives). Contrary to Pan and Kosicki (1993) and Van Gorp (2006), however, I situate narrative elements or styles on various multimodal levels. As I already pointed out, for instance, some of the ‘functions’ and ‘actions’ described by Barthes and Duisit (1975) can be situated on – or linked to – some of the devices on the level of participants and attributes and the level of (inter)actions (e.g. the narrative roles on the level of participants and attributes (see Propp et al., 1998)). References to myths or other culturally shared narratives can be situated on the intertextual level. The ‘level of narration’, then, is largely inspired by the homonymous (top) level of Barthes and Duisit (1975). As the authors point out, narration must mainly be understood in terms of ‘discourse’ here. Hence, inspired by – among others – Plantinga (1997), I argue that this level accounts for the formal / meta-level of narration, being concerned with the

²⁸ Note that ‘mode’ and ‘modality’ here – situated on the ‘interpersonal’ (Halliday, 2000; Royce, 1999) or ‘interactional’ level (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006) of visual and verbal communication – should be clearly distinguished from ‘mode’ or ‘modality’ in ‘multimodality’, as more comprehensive (‘meta’) terms. As argued, multimodality attends to “the full range of communicational forms people use – image, gesture, gaze, posture, and so on – and the relationships between them” (Jewitt, 2009, p.14). In this context, ‘mode’ refers to one of these communicational forms (e.g. the visual or the verbal mode).

relation among (the situation of) narrator / narration and (the situation of) audience. As Barthes and Duisit (1975, pp.265-266) put it:

The narrational level opens out into the world where the narrative is consumed. Yet, at the same time, acting as a keystone to the preceding levels, this level closes the narrative, constitutes it once and for all, like the speech act of language which anticipates and even carries its own metalanguage.

The most important devices that can be related to the act of narrating as such, influencing the ways in which the audience(, the narrator) and the narration ‘meet’ (i.e. how the audience is encouraged or allowed to approach, discover or experience the narrated content) are voice / narrative point of view, quotes, overall style of representation, duration and order. The narrators within (sources) and outside (communicators such as journalists) the texts who structure the narrative in particular ways and whose views and contributions are legitimized or delegitimized, are of particular importance to framing. After all, we are inclined to accept the frames of narrators we trust and refuse those of the ones we deem untrustworthy (e.g. Druckman, 2001a; Malka, Krosnick & Langer, 2009). The distinct ‘narration level’, then, is narrower than the ‘script level’ of Pan and Kosicki (1993) and Van Gorp (2006) (e.g. it does not take into account elements like binary roles, contrast or conflict), but – simultaneously – also incorporates some of the elements the authors situate on the (salience enhancing) syntactical level and the thematic level.

Finally, I added the level introduced by Van Gorp (2006), *intertextuality*.²⁹ This partly accounts for – and helps us to deal with – the fact that frames always take shape over the scope of various (multimodal) texts, and thus, the need to take broader contextual factors (like the frames available to communicators and audiences) into account (see 2.3.2 Conceptualizing Multimodal Framing) (see also Ojala, Pantti & Kangas, 2017).

I decided to identify *two parallel columns* – one verbal, one visual – of devices on each level as this allows to attend to modality-specific contributions, functions, allowances or frame effects (e.g. the particular pervasiveness of visual stereotypes). Simultaneously, this visualization highlights the fact that the two modes are integrated and complement one another. That is, the model also implies, and allows to attend to, multimodal interactions (Geise & Baden, 2015; Jungblut & Zakareviciute, 2018; Lobinger & Geise, 2013; Machin & Mayr, 2012). As I will discuss below (see 2.3.3.9 Multimodal (Multi-Level) Interactions), the (multimodal) interactions of individual (groups of) framing devices on each individual

²⁹ While ‘circumstances’ and ‘intertextuality’ are both directly concerned with ‘context’, they work on different levels. As discussed, ‘circumstances’ is concerned with the (‘direct’ / frame-internal) temporal, spatial and causal contextual elements, which are or are not represented in frames. They help to structure more directly the reasoning devices of the frame, including the associations we may draw regarding participants, positionality or narrators. Intertextuality, on the other hand, deals with (broader / ‘meta’) contextual interactions that go beyond the context of frames, texts, images. That is, this level is mainly concerned with the ways in which (more or less) direct cues may help to transfer (more comprehensive) frames or argumentative structures from one context to another.

level, or across levels (e.g. visual positionality and verbal context, or vice versa), mainly help us to make sense of relations such as ‘repetition’, ‘antonymy’ or ‘amplification’ (Martin, 1992; Royce, 1999) (see the ‘surface’ and ‘internal’ structures of Geise and Rössler (2012)). That is, it may provide a more thorough understanding of the full range of *selected* (potential) meanings and ideas and, particularly, the ways in which they interact, reinforce, expand or counterbalance each other. Usually, however, we need to attend to all, or at least multiple, multimodal *and* multi-level interactions to grasp the broader argumentative *structure* in which the variables get a particular argumentative function or role (see the symbolic ‘deep structure’ or ‘Tiefenstruktur’ of Geise and Rössler (2012)). Again, this is further facilitated by broader contextual factors (see 2.3.2 Conceptualizing Multimodal Framing). Obviously, these theoretical levels of analysis cannot be separated in the practice of interpreting and sense-making. Generally speaking, the audience is more likely to process multimodal texts as holistic messages, focusing on the – for them – most salient parts, rather than to analyse deeply or consciously each (multimodal) level separately (Bal, 1991; Machin, 2009; Machin & Mayr, 2012; Mendelson, 2005). However, some (individual or small groups of) framing devices are sufficiently powerful – culturally resonant, deeply entrenched in (shared) mental frames or schemata – to evoke a frame (i.e. argumentation) (Gamson, 1989; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Hertog & McLeod, 2001; Perlmutter, 1998; Van Gorp, 2006). That is, multi-level / multimodal interactions are not required in all cases for the interpretation of frames.

As I have pointed out before, *reasoning devices* may be explicit (i.e. manifest) in texts. As may be clear by now, this is exclusively true for the verbal mode. The verbal language has an explicit (sequential) syntax, which allows to express relations such as causality. The spatial-associative logic of the ‘visual language’, however, does not allow for such explicit argumentations (e.g. Geise & Baden, 2015; Jewitt, 2009; Jungblut & Zakareviciute, 2018; Kress, 2009; Machin, 2009; Unsworth & Cléirigh, 2009). As said, a frame always exceeds the limits of a text (see, in particular, 2.3.3.8 Intertextuality). Yet, some of the argumentations – evoked by the interaction of the lower-level framing devices – may be captured (i.e. crystallized) in the so-called ‘*macrostructure*’ or ‘*macrosyntax*’ (van Dijk, 1977, 1988) of verbal texts (see also Halliday, 2000; Langacker, 1993). Pan and Kosicki (1993) considered this as one of the levels (i.e. the syntactical level) in their multi-levelled model of framing devices, while Van Gorp (2006) pointed out that this level only contains salience enhancing devices (e.g. the inverted pyramid structure, balance or impartiality (i.e. objectivity)) rather than framing devices as such. However, just like Van Dijk (1977) I want to foreground here the semantics of the macrostructure, rather than the more formal (i.e. ‘structural’) organization (see 2.3.3.7 Narration): As the author explains, the global meanings of texts only emerge on the macro-level. In other words, it is not sufficient to exclusively look at isolated words, phrases, sentences or sequences of sentences (i.e. lower levels of information). Clearly, this is reminiscent of my statement that frames may only start to emerge if individual devices are allowed to interact (in a broader context). Again, the verbal text can never (fully) lay hold of or reflect the

‘Tiefenstruktur’ (Geise & Rössler, 2012) on which, I argued, we may situate the frame. Yet, due to its sequential character, the verbal mode may at least provide some more explicit handles as for the (potential) underlying argumentative structure. Premises and conclusions – mapped on ordered sequences of propositions – operate on the macro-level. The relations among sentences in discourses may or may not be explicated by conjunctions, adverbs or other cues (causal statements, contingent relations) that add cohesion, like ‘accordingly’, ‘because’, ‘therefore’, ‘consequently’, ‘the main problem is (...)’, ‘due to’, ‘if ... then’, and the like. Also, implicit ordering may suggest (causal / temporal) relations in the sequential structure of the text. Van Dijk (1977) also adds that people tend to fill out implicit information or relations based on their mental schemata or scripts (e.g. What exactly does a children’s party encompass? How does a police interrogation work? What steps are to be taken when one commutes to work?), which the author calls ‘frames’ (see Fillmore & Baker, 2009). Clearly, cognitive frames as understood in the current research (see 3.1 Frame-Building) may also help to guide the audience to decode the information, in terms of problem definitions, causal responsibilities, treatment recommendations or moral evaluations. For instance, a reader may add problem definitions which are not (explicitly) present in the text. Pan and Kosicki (1993) also refer to the ‘thematic structure’ (i.e. hypothesis testing level), considering it as a level of framing devices (see Van Gorp, 2006). They argue that researchers should look for hypotheses (often, but not necessarily, in the headline or introduction) and hypotheses testing features in texts. However, being exclusively based on the linguistic (sequential) logic, this level is, in my opinion, not useful or valid in the context of a multimodal framing analysis (toolkit). It fails, for instance, to capture the (implicit) arguments conveyed by interacting visual and/or verbal devices. While awareness of the macrostructure of written (or spoken) discourse is certainly helpful, I contend that it is more useful to take a more general approach towards the argumentative structure, as the more profound or comprehensive ‘*macro-level*’ where groups of (individual) framing devices (microstructures) interactively make meaning. This meaning-making may or may not come to (i.e. be signalled at) the surface.

I will first discuss the toolkit, highlighting the major multimodal framing devices on each of the eight levels – (in)animate participants and attributes, (inter)actions, positionality, circumstances, modality, rhetorical figures, narration and intertextuality – and providing some clarifications and examples. Also, I will draw attention to the salience enhancing devices, which were inserted on each level. Afterwards, I will refer to some potential tools to capture multimodal interactions and cohesion. Secondly, I will apply the model on a case study news article, illustrating its usefulness and feasibility.

Multimodal Framing Analysis Toolkit

Framing Devices &

Saliency Enhancing Devices

Verbal

Visual

CENTRAL ORGANIZING IDEA

- Problem definition**
- Causal responsibility**
- Treatment recommendation**
- Moral evaluation**

-Naming and predicational strategies
-Ordering of lexical terms, e.g. enumeration, separation (generalization, contrast, analogy...)

(In)animate participants and attributes
-Presence or absence
-Categorization, connotation
-Individualization / humanization – collectivization / generalization (including stereotypes)
-Identification – functionalization
-Narrative roles (villain, hero, victim...)

-Visual choices (e.g. facial expression, gesture, pose, clothing, hairstyle, age, gender, race, props, size)
-(Dis)connection of participants / images (e.g. through frame lines), (lack of) symmetry / similarity, repetition (generalization, contrast, analogy...)

-Overlexicalization versus deletion

-Relative size (proximity / proportion), focus, deletion
-Depictions of human beings, emotions

-Choice for particular verbs
-Active / passive verb constructions, adjuncts, auxiliary verbs, conjugations
-Nominalizations

Processes
-Transitivity: material, behavioural, verbal, mental (narrative), relational, existential (conceptual) processes
-Active / passive voice – abstraction / nominalization
-Subject / object, giver / recipient, adjutant / opposer
-Tense

-Vectors (e.g. gazes, arm lines), spatial arrangement, co-occurrence, schematic representations...
-(Lack of) gaze (offer or demand)
-Ordering, relative size, colour, frameless pictures, quality (of composition)...
-Shutter speed

-Foregrounding / backgrounding / deleting of agents / patients / other specificities (see theme-rheme)

-Direct gaze (demand)
-Vectors as leading lines, producing a hierarchy of elements
-Composition (within picture frame): centre / margin, foreground / middle ground / background – absence
-Movement

-Personal pronouns or other (deictic) choices which imply viewpoint

Positionality
-(Moral) alignment between participants inside / outside the frame

-Point of view (horizontally / vertically)
-Distance (intimate, personal, social, public)
-(Lack of) gaze (offer or demand)
-(Soft) focus, lighting

-Type of address, e.g. direct address ('you') versus indirect third person
-First person perspective

-Eye level and / or intimate or personal distance + contact (i.e. presence of a gaze)
-First person perspective

-Focus on time, causality, sequences...
-Adverbs, prepositional constructions...
-Event / context-centred versus person / subject-centred text

Circumstances (time, space, causality...)
-Contextualization versus decontextualization
-Character (e.g. generic or specific)
-Background interacts with / legitimizes certain participants / events / acts (foreground)
-(Absence of) contextualization: linked to positionality

-Focus on space, spatial relations and characteristics...
-Distance / angle / focus / depth of field (emphasis on context or subject / scene)
-Sublimation (decontextualization)

-Event / context-centred versus person / subject-centred text (e.g. title, caption...)
-'Ordinary' people ('like us') in an 'ordinary' setting

-Distance / angle / focus / degree of articulation of depth, detail, background (emphasis on context / scene or subject)
-'Ordinary' people ('like us') in an 'ordinary' setting
-Sublimation

-Grammatical mood (imperative, indicative, subjunctive), modal auxiliaries, adjectives, adverbs or particles
-Negation

Modality
-(Degrees of) necessity, possibility, certainty, likelihood

-Articulation of detail, background, depth, colour saturation, modulation, tone, quality, light and shadow

-Strong modality versus weak modality		-Strong modality versus weak modality -Focus, depth of field, illumination, brightness, quality, texture, colour – especially high contrasts -Subjunctive voice ('what if')
-Metaphors, metonyms, hyperboles, euphemisms, semantic reversals, litotes, ellipses, presupposition, personifications, exemplifications, numbers, inversions... -Rhetorical questions, stock phrases, one-liners, alliterations...	Rhetorical figures -Add deeper layers of meaning -Foreground certain elements, rendering others invisible -Make (parts of) the frame more convincing	-Metaphors, metonyms, hyperboles, euphemisms, semantic reversals, litotes, ellipses presuppositions, personifications, exemplifications, numbers, inversion... -Colour or shape symbolism
-Repetition, ellipsis, metaphor, metonym (including layout, e.g. size, colour, e.g. bold face), hyperbole, litotes, euphemism		-Repetition, ellipsis, metaphor, metonym (including layout, e.g. size, colour, e.g. bold face), hyperbole, litotes, euphemism, inversion
-(De)legitimized narrators and their quotes	Narration -Relation among (the narrative situation of) narrators and (the situation of) audiences -As a rhetorical device the narrative structure helps to communicate the frame more effectively	-(De)legitimized narrators and their 'quotes' / viewpoints
-Selected narrators / quotes as most legitimate, neutral, trustworthy ('objective') -(De)legitimation of narrators: depiction of narrators (naming and predicational strategies) -(De)legitimation of quotes: modality, hedging, choice for particular quoting verbs, objective or subjective point of view (see evidentiality) -First person perspective -Overall emotional / dramatic... narrative style, the unexpected -Placement in the structure of the news story (e.g. heading, beginning, ending) -Duration (reduction, expansion)		-Selected narrators / quotes as most legitimate, neutral, trustworthy ('objective') -(De)legitimation of narrators: depiction of narrators (choice for particular attributes, poses, gestures, facial expressions, setting, distance) -(De)legitimation of quotes: objective, subjective point of view -First person perspective -Overall aesthetic, affective or graphic quality of a picture, arousing content, the unexpected
-Verbal icons, symbols, metonyms, allusions, (mythological) themes and motifs, intertextual references... -Frame lines, (structural) similarity	Intertextuality (direct / broader context) -Key events, icons and symbols, myths... -Similar (multimodal) texts (e.g. same theme) -Interaction on a page (layout), in an outlet, on inter-source level	-Visual icons, symbols, metonyms, allusions, (mythological) themes and motifs, intertextual references... -Frame lines, similarity (i.e. inter-visual synonymy)
-Cultural resonance -Repetition, placement (e.g. top versus bottom, centre versus margin), size, incongruities in layout, frame lines, vectors (leading lines)... on page / outlet / inter-source level		-Cultural resonance -Repetition, placement (e.g. top versus bottom, centre versus margin), size, presence / absence and number of pictures, incongruities in layout, frame lines, vectors (leading lines)... on page / outlet / inter-source level




Table 2: Multi-level, multimodal framing analysis toolkit, incorporating framing, reasoning and salience enhancing devices.

2.3.3.1 (In)animate Participants and Attributes

What participants – humans, animals, plants, objects... – are present or absent and how exactly are they depicted? Those are the main questions on this level. More specifically, what verbal naming and predicational strategies (i.e. the selection of qualities and values) (Alexander, 2011; Reisigl & Wodak, 2001) are employed? What about the visual choices, like facial expressions, non-verbal behaviour, physical conditions, emotions, gestures, poses, body movements, role, gender, race, hairstyles, clothing or props (Conboy, 2007; Graber, 1988, 1996; Hall, 1997; Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; Machin & Mayr, 2012; Messaris, 1997; Monaco, 2000; Richardson, 2007; Rodriguez & Dimitrova, 2011; Rose, 2001; van Dijk, 1988, 1998; van Leeuwen, 1996, 2001, 2008; Verschueren, 2011)?³⁰

Each may convey particular *evaluations, values, connotations, and hence ideological messages* (depending on the (cultural) context). Indeed, the way participants are presented may

(...) highlight certain aspects of their identity which we wish to draw attention to, or background others we may want to conceal. Each choice (whether deliberate or not) can have the effect of connoting ideas, values and attitudes that are not necessarily overtly stated. (Machin & Mayr, 2013, p.361)

Put differently, a different word or visual choice – which, being part of a network of meaning, always implicitly or explicitly invokes (paradigmatic) alternatives – can give rise to an entirely different world of reference, a different context, and thus, a different frame (see Halliday, 2000; Langacker, 1993). It is usually those in power who are able to promote certain representations, which are aimed to serve their interests (Cox, 2010; Edelman, 1993; Fairclough, 1995, 2000; Fowler, 1996; Machin & Mayr, 2012; Milstein, 2009; Pan & Kosicki, 1993; van Dijk, 1988, 1998; Van Gorp, 2006; Verschueren, 2011). For instance, ‘Muslim man’ carries certain (negative) evaluations which strongly differ from the associations (e.g. humanization, positive image) which ‘a father of four’ may evoke.³¹ Similarly, describing the same group of people as ‘floods of migrants’ or rather as ‘families, women with babies in their arms, small children holding hands’ may have different consequences. Non-verbal behaviour, body movements or facial expressions are interpreted as cues of certain character traits, such as trustworthiness, moods or mental states (e.g. Bell, 2001; Coleman, 2010; Graber, 1996, 1988). For instance, a smiling person is likely to be approached in a more positive way. Mandell and Shaw (1973) demonstrate that active people are rated more positively (e.g. more potent) than people who are presented in a passive state (e.g. a

³⁰ See also: Aday, Cluverius and Livingston (2005), Coleman (2010), Dan and Ihlen (2011), Fahmy (2004), Fillmore and Baker (2009), Grittmann (2014), Huang and Fahmy (2013), Neuman and Fahmy (2012), O’Neill (2013, 2017), Parry (2010), Van Gorp (2006), Wessler et al. (2016).

³¹ Note, however, that we should beware of over-analyzing, that is, automatically drawing direct links between form and meaning. Counter-screening, taking the direct and broader (e.g. cultural) context into account, is always needed (Verschueren, 2011). That is especially important when looking at the highly polysemic – analogical / iconic – visual mode. For instance, every variable may be connotative in some contexts but denotative in others (Barthes, 1977; Buehner, 2012; Grancea, 2014; Machin, 2009; Monaco, 2000; Mendelson, 2005).

president who is going out to help people after a natural disaster versus a president who is passively sitting behind his desk). Chouliaraki (2006) contends that the former are humanized while the latter are dehumanized. An expensive car may suggest certain (cultural) associations, like wealth, while a personal library may imply intelligence (see e.g. Messaris, 1997).

Van Leeuwen (1996, 2008) provides an inventory for the classification of people, which is, I contend, also applicable to non-human participants. Visual-verbal choices may individualize and personalize participants or can collectivize or depict actors as generic categories or types. The latter is closely connected to stereotypes (e.g. Lester, 2005; Lippmann, 2006; Sibley & Osborne, 2016; Wright, 2011), oversimplified or overgeneralized representations or characterizations of groups (of people) which naturalize particular ideas about class, gender, race. As pointed out before, visuals can more easily reinforce or reproduce stereotypes (e.g. all immigrants are unemployed) which would not be (easily) accepted in the verbal parts of texts (e.g. Abraham & Appiah, 2006; Jewitt & Oyama, 2001; Messaris & Abraham, 2001). *Individualization* is verbally facilitated by concrete count nouns, detailed predications or names, while abstract wordings, numbers, uncountable or mass nouns give rise to *generalizations* (see Langacker, 1993). Compare, for instance, references like ‘Davy, a 31-year-old singer from Belgium’ or ‘her favourite black and white horse, Spark’, with ‘humans’, ‘half of the population’, ‘thousands of animals’. Van Leeuwen (2001) discusses how an emphasis on the cultural attributes (e.g. long clothes, headscarves, stereotypical hairstyles) or physiognomic attributes (physical traits like skin colour) of immigrant women can serve to represent them as homogenized types, as opposed to individuals, identified by names in the photo captions (see Machin & Mayr, 2012). Conceptual patterns work in comparable ways: Disconnection (i.e. individualization, contrast) can be implied by visual elements which separate, such as frame lines, empty spaces, distance, contrasts in colours, forms, poses. Connection (i.e. generalization, belonging together, constituting one group or single unit) is implied by visual cues like the absence of frame lines or empty spaces, the juxtaposition or overlap of frames or frame lines, proximity, similarities or rhymes of colours, forms or poses (e.g. Huxford, 2001; Jewitt & Oyama, 2001; Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; Machin & Mayr, 2012; Messaris, 1997; van Leeuwen, 2001, 2011). Similarly, verbal enumerations or the juxtaposition of various elements can suggest equality, analogy, and thus, generalization. Separation, however, may imply contrast, difference and, possibly, individualization (Verschueren, 2011). Clearly, then, syntagmatic relations or interactions can be a part of the meaning making process on this level.

While individualizations may encourage humanization and identification, generalizations erase the subject and distance the reader (e.g. Graber, 1988, 1996; Hart, 2011; Heuberger, 2007; Höijer, 2004; Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; Manzo, 2010b; Messaris, 1997; Slovic, 2010; Small & Loewenstein, 2003; Stibbe, 2015). Yet, generalizations may also heighten credibility (Fowler, 1996; van Dijk, 1988): (the situation of) a participant is not exceptional or idiosyncratic, but there are others like him / her / it. There

is a pattern. Anyhow, both an exaggerated emphasis on the individual as well as the exclusive usage of (stereotypical) generalized representations (e.g. ‘the developed North’ versus ‘the underdeveloped South’) may mask underlying contextual factors or broader socio-economic, political or cultural patterns (e.g. Iyengar, 1990; Lester, 2005; Lippmann, 2006; Verschueren, 2011). Accordingly, the balance of generalized representations (e.g. percentages) (van Dijk, 1988) and individualized cases (e.g. the story of an individual, with a name and a face) is often considered as most convincing by the audience (Chouliaraki, 2006; Perlmutter, 1998; von Engelhardt & Jansz, 2014).

A second dualism is that between *identification* and *functionalization*. Identifications emphasize ‘what one is or has’, in terms of physical characteristics, classifications (e.g. gender, race, age, class) or (personal, kinship or work) relations (e.g. a barefooted man with grey hair, ‘a grandfather’, ‘a poor man’) while functionalizations highlight ‘what one does’ (e.g. ‘a farmer’, ‘a politician’, ‘a leader’). While the former suggests an (‘eternal’) essence, the latter leaves room for change, progress, evolution, interaction (Chouliaraki, 2006; Entman, 1991; van Leeuwen, 1996, 2008). Machin and Mayr (2013) argue that functionalizations may help to legitimize people but, simultaneously, may reduce a participant to a particular role. For instance, a focus on one’s role of president may background (i.e. make us blind for) the fact that a person is also a citizen, a husband or wife, a father or mother, a son or daughter, a sportsman or -woman.

Finally, we can also analyse how the actors interact based on their (binary) *narrative roles*, particularly the villain, victim or (false) hero (Barthes & Duisit, 1975; Propp et al., 1998; Wozniak, Lück & Wessler, 2015). Clearly, each of these roles is central to the argumentative structure (i.e. reasoning devices) of frames: While the villain is the main actor when it comes to ‘causal responsibility’, the victim is crucial for the problem definition. The hero, then, carries the main responsibility for solutions (see also Fillmore & Baker, 2009).

Several *salience enhancing devices* can be identified on this level. Verbal overlexicalization – the excess of quasi synonymous words – may signal that persuasion is taking place. Visual or verbal deletion, on the other hand, does no longer require us to think about certain issues or problems (Entman, 1991; Machin & Mayr, 2012; Stibbe, 2015; Verschueren, 2011). Stibbe (2015) argues, for instance, that nature is often deleted in hegemonic western discourse. Visually, size or focus can draw our attention: the relative size of a depicted participant and whether or not (s)he is put into focus may connote the importance of this participant in the story (Huxford, 2001). Also, the presence of human beings and emotions can enhance salience. That is, as humans we are drawn to (the faces of) other humans (Coleman, 2010; Graber, 1988, 1996; Hart, 2011; Höijer, 2004; Jewitt & Oyama, 2001; Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; Manzo, 2010b; Messaris, 1997; Small & Loewenstein, 2003).

2.3.3.2 Processes

Of particular importance is ‘*transitivity*’, a property of verbs that highlights the doings of and relations between participants. There are three (syntagmatic) components of ‘transitivity processes’: the process itself, the participants and the circumstances (Halliday, 2000).³² Halliday (2000) distinguishes between six types of processes in his systemic-functional grammar. Put differently, communicators have always various (paradigmatic) alternatives to choose from (see also Fowler, 1996; Machin & Mayr, 2012; Richardson, 2007; van Dijk, 1988, 1998; van Leeuwen, 2008):

- *Material processes*: Acts with material consequences, involving an actor, goal, recipient and/or beneficiary. That is, these are processes of doing by an animate or inanimate actor. For instance: ‘He has built his own house’; ‘The process started yesterday’; ‘She gave him a present’.
- *Verbal processes*: Acts related to talking (i.e. conveying meaning in a broad sense), encompassing a sayer and a verbiage (the verbalization), receiver (to whom the verbiage is addressed) or target (the direct participant on whom the sayer acts verbally). For instance: ‘They told us they would decide tomorrow’; ‘She insulted him’.
- *Mental processes*: Acts of sensing, feeling, perceiving – in short, inner processes – which encompass a senser and a phenomenon. For instance: ‘I saw what happened’; ‘They like painting’; ‘He knew they were coming’.
- *Behavioural processes*: Acts without material consequences, which are a mixture of material and mental processes or psychological and physical behaviour. There is often only one participant, the behavior. This is a conscious sensor, involved in processes that express a sense of doing. For instance: ‘She dreams about a better life’; ‘He stares out of the window’; ‘They listen to the speech of the president’; ‘We sing’; ‘She is crying’.
- *Relational processes*: Processes of being or having, ascribing particular characteristics to someone or something. More specifically, they indicate that there is some kind of relation between an identified and an identifier, attribute or circumstance. Yet, the participants do not affect each other. For instance: ‘She is the leader’; ‘The deadline is tomorrow’; ‘They have the keys’; ‘You are tall’.
- *Existential processes*: Processes that signify states of being or existing, unrelated to others. ‘There’ usually takes the subject position. Further, the clauses often contain the verb ‘to be’ or another verb of existence, as well as an existent (a phenomenon or event). For instance: ‘There was a war in 1998’; ‘There is a problem’; ‘It is raining’.

³² Note that there is a difference between the more general usage of ‘transitivity’ (i.e. indicating verbs which have or need an object, versus ‘intransitive verbs’) and the approach of Halliday (2000), who distinguishes between six more specific types of processes in his systemic-functional grammar.

The descriptions above are primarily related to the *verbal mode*, but can be *approximated in the visual mode*. In that context, Kress and van Leeuwen (2006) consider the four first processes as ‘narrative’ and the latter two as rather ‘conceptual’. Obviously, visual grammar uses different tools, which may give rise to the various narrative and conceptual processes (Huxford, 2001; Jewitt & Oyama, 2001; Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; Machin & Mayr, 2012, 2013; Messaris, 1997; Monaco, 2000; Rose, 2001; van Leeuwen, 2011).

When it comes to *narrative processes*, a *transactive action* (see transitive verbs, which have or need an object) is in most cases constituted if a vector – a line or an arm – connects an actor with a goal, beneficiary or phenomenon. More specifically, the vector starts from or is formed by the actor and is directed to another participant, guiding our attention from the most salient participant to the next. For example, an image depicting a person handing over a gift to another person (see material processes). Note that the vector, as such, may help to signal a hierarchy of prominence. This is further sustained by other cues like relative size, place in the composition (foreground, middle ground, background, centre or margin), colour saturation or focus (see also the salience enhancing devices on the other levels). However, transactional actions can also be bidirectional, with each participant alternately playing the role of actor and the role of goal (e.g. now talking, then listening). I argue that this reciprocity may reinforce the idea of equality and mutual dependence rather than hierarchy. *Transactional reactions* – indicated by a gaze or eyeline as vector – may give rise to mental processes (particularly, ‘perceiving’ / looking). The thoughts or feelings of a senser can be made more concrete if the latter is connected through a ‘thought bubble’ (or other conventional device) as vector to a (verbal or non-verbal) ‘phenomenon’ (i.e. thoughts, feelings). A similar strategy may be used for verbal processes where a speech bubble may connect a sayer and an utterance. Such visual strategies are not common in the context of media communication, though. In case there is only one person (or object), the image is non-transactional (see intransitive; i.e. verbs which do not have / need objects). There is a vector that emanates from the actor but that does not point to another participant. A *non-transactional action* (a material process with only one participant) can also be called an event (see below). *Non-transactional reactions* (i.e. the vector is a gaze or eye line) may help to give rise to behavioural or mental processes. The gaze of a participant may, for instance, encourage the spectator to imagine what the latter is thinking or looking at (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006). For example, if a participant is looking down, we may be inclined to see this as an indication of him / her being worried (e.g. about an issue that is depicted in the visual or discussed in the verbal text). If one is looking up, we may be more likely to approach him / her as a visionary, who is ‘looking at ideals’ (Machin & Mayr, 2012). Note that ‘up’ and ‘down’ function here as metaphors for ‘positivity’ and ‘negativity’ (see 2.3.3.3 Positionality and 2.3.3.6 Rhetorical Figures). Kress and van Leeuwen (2006) also identify ‘*conversion processes*’ – in which a participant (i.e. ‘the relay’) acts as a goal in one (inter)action and as an actor in another – as quite unique to the visual mode. Such processes can mostly be found in diagrams or diagrammatic representations. Those

are often used to represent natural processes (e.g. a hydrological cycle), but may also be applied to human (inter)action. According to the authors, the latter are then represented as though they were natural processes. In schematic representations of the communication process (and, accordingly, the framing process), for instance, a communicator (sender) is both an actor (or, more correctly, a sayer) as well as a goal (i.e. a receiver). Cues, such as facial expressions, gestures or captions, may help the viewer to further fill in the nature of relationships or (inter)actions. For instance, the description in the caption of two depicted world leaders turned to each other as ‘discussing’ or ‘talking about’ international treaties signals a verbal process. Facial expressions can convey various behavioural processes, like crying or laughing. Note that there are often *primary (major) and secondary (minor) processes* (i.e. (inter)actions) taking place, and, accordingly, major (more salient) and minor (less salient) participants. Their prominence (and thus, *salience*) may also be signalled in the composition or by other cues (see above) (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; Royce, 1999).

Actions can also take place across various images, accompanying an article. Their ordering, then, can suggest causality. For instance, one photo may depict a hurricane (cause), while the next may represent the destruction and human suffering (consequences). In this case, we can read the interaction as a transactive action (i.e. a material process) (Huxford, 2001, Machin & Mayr, 2012; Mendelson, 2005; Messaris, 1997).

Conceptual processes, then, encompass classificational, analytical and symbolic types of processes. *Classificational processes* relate participants (i.e. a superordinate and subordinate) to each other in a ‘kind of’ relationship. This may happen implicitly (e.g. only in the accompanying text or based on similarities perceived by the recipient) or more explicitly (e.g. by presenting various pictures in a tree organization, connected through lines). An example is a tree diagram representing the animal species which (are considered to) belong to the class of ‘mammals’. *Analytical processes* relate participants (carrier and possessive attributes) in terms of a part-whole structure. The possessive attributes may be (verbally) described or labelled inside or outside the picture space (e.g. in the caption) (see Barthes, 1961, 1964; Martinec & Salway, 2005). According to Kress and van Leeuwen (2006), analytical images are often, but not necessarily, schematic (i.e. low modality, e.g. lack of detail or backgrounds) (see 2.3.3.5 Modality) to draw the attention to the analytical purpose of the representation. Examples are (world) maps, depictions of animals or plants in schoolbooks, timelines, pie charts and graphs. However, non-schematic representations can also give rise to analytical processes. For instance, a group of children can be presented as carriers of (prototypical) possessive attributes such as skin colours, hairstyles or types of clothing, which signal their ethnicities. *Symbolic processes* are concerned with what a participant (the carrier) means or is. The carrier is often related to a symbolic attribute (i.e. the meaning or identity). The latter is usually made salient (e.g. through placement, lighting, focus, colour contrast) or is pointed at by means of a gesture that cannot be interpreted as signalling another action. Also, it

may look out of place or it is conventionally associated with symbolic meaning (see icons and symbols) (2.3.3.6 Rhetorical Figures). Animate (e.g. human) participants often pose for the viewer, without being involved in other (inter)actions. That is, they are just sitting or standing, showing themselves to the audience. If only a carrier is present, we are usually dealing with symbolic suggestive processes, which represent meaning and identity as ‘coming from within’. These are often signalled by lowered modality (e.g. the blurring of details). The generalized essence of the participant is the focus, not his / her specificities in a particular time-space. For instance, a globe may be foregrounded as a symbol of connectivity, ‘all of us together’. As Kress & van Leeuwen (2006) point out, the visual conceptual processes are most akin (but certainly not identical to) the verbal relational processes. The symbolic suggestive process approximates most closely the verbal existential process. As the authors emphasize, however, the visual and verbal allowances greatly differ. Similarly, the visual narrative processes cannot be fully equated with the verbal processes (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; Royce, 1999). While I do agree, I will use the verbal (‘Hallidayan’) concepts as short-hands to refer to the verbal, visual *and* multimodal processes in order to keep my discussions and analyses comprehensible (see Royce, 1999).

Particular transitivity categories may foster *particular connotations or associations*, some of which may be ideological. In other words, the (paradigmatic) choice for a particular process always has significance and plays an important role in meaning making. *Mental processes* may provide insights into the mental world of the involved participants, who act as focalizers or reflectors (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006). As such, they may constitute “(...) device[s] through which the audience are encouraged to have empathy with these persons, serving to humanize them and to make us align with them” (Machin & Mayr, 2013, p. 369). Obviously, multiple factors – such as the backgrounds, experiences or mental frames or schemata of recipients or the character and representation of the depicted participants (see 2.3.3.1 (In)animate Participants and Attributes; 2.3.3.3 Positionality) – may, in practice, affect the interaction of the audience with the ‘other’ (e.g. Chouliaraki, 2006; Höijer, 2004). As discussed above, the direction of the gaze of a participant in a visual may also convey certain associations. For instance, participants looking directly outside of the picture frame (not up or down) may be seen as able to deal with issues straight away (Machin & Mayr, 2012). *Relational (and existential) processes* allow, more than other processes, to present ‘opinions’ as ‘objective facts’. For example, ‘he is a fool’ (rather than: ‘I think that he is a fool’). Similarly, tree diagrams or other (schematic) representations which give rise to visual conceptual processes, naturalize certain relations (e.g. hierarchical classifications of species). Surely, these relations do not (necessarily) reflect reality but only an interpretation or judgement of a certain (group of) communicators. As Kress and van Leeuwen (2006, p.79) point out “[t]he ordering in the image itself produces the relations”.

Furthermore, some types of processes tend to *activate* participants while others rather *passivate* them. Material processes (with a goal or outcome), in particular, convey a sense of activity, the ability to make

things happen in the world or to control people, things, animals, nature. They are more likely to – but not necessarily – evoke positive connotations (see Mandell & Shaw, 1973). Obviously, much depends on the meaning (potential) of the selected verb (and the broader context). Mental, behavioural, relational or material processes without goal or outcome are more likely to suggest passivity, that is, the inability to really change anything. The same is true for existential processes. Mental, behavioural and relational processes, for instance, usually have no or only limited (direct) consequences in the world. Behavioural and existential processes only involve one (conscious) being or participant. Adjuncts (optional modifying words or phrases) can further add to such passivizations. Compare, for instance, the sentence ‘The locals were involved in the emergency aid organized by western NGOs’ with ‘The locals organized the emergency aid’. Decentring participants from their activities, such adjuncts emphasize that they are not really in charge. Also, general, abstract verbs – e.g. to work, to manage – may conceal what participants are really doing and why they are doing this. That is, how exactly they (refrain from) affect(ing) reality. This may sustain, or give rise, to various roles and responsibilities, helping to answer questions like: Who carries (or can / should carry) most responsibility for causes and consequences, or who are only (passive) victims or helpers (see 2.3.3.1 (In)animate Participants and Attributes) (Halliday, 2000; Machin & Mayr, 2012; Richardson, 2007; van Leeuwen, 1996, 2008). Barthes and Duisit (1975) emphasize, in a comparable way, that “(...) the infinite world of characters also comes under the control of a paradigmatic structure (subject / object, giver / recipient, adjudant / opposer), projected on the syntagmatic axis of the narrative” (p.258). The authors add that the actions ought not to be understood as minor (i.e. specific) acts but as the acts which constitute (or contribute to) the larger structures (i.e. ‘larger articulations of praxis’) of the narrative. Similarly, fundamental, structuring (and recurring / salient) acts are also the main object of concern in framing analyses.

Obviously, passivizations and activation is – in an even more explicit way, perhaps – also conveyed by the *active* (e.g. ‘We have hurt them’) or *passive voice* (e.g. ‘They have been hurt’) of verbs. Those help to highlight who (or what) is able to act upon the world and who (or what) only undergoes actions or events. Verbally, the passive voice is signalled by an auxiliary verb, usually ‘to be’ (Entman, 1991; Conboy, 2007; Halliday, 2000; van Dijk, 1988, 1998; Verschueren, 2011). Visually, the differences between active and passive voice are less clear-cut. However, some visual codes can be identified, which mainly draw on everyday experiences (Chouliaraki, 2006; Fahmy, 2004; Jewitt & Oyama, 2001; Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; Machin & Mayr, 2012; Messaris, 1997; Rose, 2001): A ‘special type of vector’ connects the world within the frame with the outside world. When the participant in the picture frame and the viewer look at each other, this may constitute a relationship (i.e. contact). According to Kress and van Leeuwen (2006), a visual *demand* is formulated if the person in the picture looks at the viewer, recognizing the latter as actor and asking for a reaction. Cues, such as facial expressions, contexts or gestures, may clarify the content of this demand. For instance, a family standing in front of their flooded house can desperately look at the spectator for help (e.g. emergency aid). An immigrant may look at us

with a confident smile, asking to be respected as a fellow human being. The famous ‘I want you’ poster shows Uncle Sam looking his audience in the eye and pointing his finger at them, calling for their attention and engagement (i.e. joining the US army). In short, the depicted person is allocated the role of an agent, and thus humanized. In case of a visual *offer*, however, no contact is made. The viewer is offered a depiction, a scene or event, for observation and scrutiny. This may create a sense of distance. This is, in particular, so for visual ‘events’, pictures which show non-transactional actions (i.e. material processes with only one participant) or conceptual (i.e. relational or existential) processes. For instance, a picture may just invite us to look at a polar bear in the distance, standing on a floating ice shelf. In this case, the participant in the picture is often objectified and considered as passive and available. The only action is undertaken by the ‘active’ spectator (agent). However, if the depicted participants are shown in transactional (inter)actions within the picture space – interacting with their environment or other participants (e.g. building a house, teaching children, harvesting crops, protecting their cubs) – the viewer may be more inclined to approach them as self-conscious agents. That is, they are able to offer other insights, knowledge or experiences (see Chouliaraki, 2006). A device like ‘point of view’ may further specify or underpin the ‘voice’, and thus the relationship between the participants (see 2.3.3.3 Positionality). Also, shutter speed may help to highlight (in)action. A long shutter speed may ‘literally’ visualize or capture the action (or change), for instance of an athlete crossing the finish line. A short shutter speed freezes the action (the change).³³

Visual demand is generally considered as an attention-getter, and thus *salience enhancing device*. Suggesting some kind of relationship or engagement between the viewer and the viewed, it may humanize the depicted participant(s). The viewer may feel as if (s)he has entered the world within the picture frame, especially if emotions are shown (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; Machin & Mayr, 2012; Messaris, 1997). As discussed earlier, we generally get more emotionally or mentally engaged when we are presented with other identifiable and specific human(s) (faces), particularly if we get the feeling that they address us and/or that we have something (a reality) in common (e.g. Graber, 1988, 1996; Hart, 2011; Höijer, 2004; Jewitt & Oyama, 2001; Manzo, 2010b; Messaris, 1997; Small & Loewenstein, 2003; von Engelhardt & Jansz, 2014).

The active voice is more likely to put the *focus on the agent*, who drives the process (as subject), whereas the passive voice rather focalizes the patient, who undergoes the process (as subject). Accordingly, passivization may distract attention away from the agent, or *conceal agency* entirely through active agent deletion. That is, it may disguise responsibility. Compare, for instance, a sentence like ‘Belgians emit too much GHG’ (active voice) with ‘Too much GHG is emitted by Belgians’ (passive voice, no agent deletion) or ‘Too much GHG is emitted’ (passive voice, agent deletion). Verbal *nominalizations*

³³ Langacker (1993) argues, in a more general vein, that movement may make an entity stand out as a ‘figure’ from the surrounding ‘ground’, giving it particular prominence (i.e. salience).

(substituting a verb for a noun), like ‘the emission of GHG’, work in comparable ways. That is, turning processes or acts with an active (responsible) agent into inevitable facts, natural states or abstract objects, they may cause abstraction and loss of information (e.g. voice, modality, participants, circumstances). For instance, a sentence like ‘The economic crisis has created social dramas across Europe’ conceals that the economic crisis is not an independent agent but a process or phenomenon which results from the decisions of economic and political agents. Accordingly, the responsibility – and ability – of these actors to provide solutions is also downplayed. In a comparable way, a ‘*visual event*’ (e.g. a ‘one-participant material process’ or non-transactional action) may, for instance, only show water pollution, but conceal (i.e. delete) the responsible agent (e.g. a company) who caused it. I conclude, then, that the verbal / visual foregrounding, backgrounding or deleting may amplify, or rather weaken, the *salience of particular participants or other specificities* (Alexander, 2011; Conboy, 2007; Fairclough, 1995; Fowler, 1996; Halliday, 2000; Heuberger, 2007; Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; Machin & Mayr, 2012; Monaco, 2000; van Dijk, 1988, 1998; Richardson, 2007; Stibbe, 2015; Verschueren, 2011).

Finally, the *tense of verbs* places the events or issues in a certain time frame: past, present or future (e.g. Halliday, 2000). Chouliaraki (2006) argues, for instance, that the past tense may suggest a completed process, which can no longer be acted upon. Possibilities for change or evolution are excluded. Hence, we are separated from participants, events or issues and are not encouraged to engage (see Scott, 2014). In a similar way, Doyle (2007, 2009) notices that ‘then-now’ photos, which suggest the evolution over time, may situate the dramatic consequences of climate change – e.g. the melting of a glacier – in the past, and thus separate from us. She argues: “(...) photographs of retreating glaciers depict an already affected environment, illustrating the current reality of climate change through the image, and at the same time signifying the failure of preventative action required to halt its acceleration” (Doyle, 2009, p.280). The future tense can, likewise, distance us from the process (action) (Moser & Dilling, 2007). Present is often used to state general truths (Verschueren, 2011) (see 2.3.3.5 Modality). While conjugations (i.e. the variation of the form of a verb, e.g. work (present simple tense) versus worked (past simple tense)) and auxiliary verbs (e.g. has worked) signal the tense in the verbal mode, the visual mode has – according to Huxford (2001) – a broad range of visual cues which may situate a participant or scene in past, present or future. For example, the relative size or shape of a picture frame, as well as the colour of the visual, may signal temporal transitions. When a smaller and larger picture frame appear together, for instance, the former tends to represent an earlier moment in time (past tense) than the latter. Round or oval shapes and/or black and whites or sepia (past tense) and right angles and/or (bright) colours (present tense) work in comparable ways. A picture lifted out of its frame and put into a new context is likely to convey a sense of continuation or timelessness (‘continuous tense’ / (present) simple tense) while a poorly composed shot may evoke the feeling of immediacy, inviting the spectator to enter events which are taking place ‘at this current moment’ (present tense). According to Hall (1973, p.188), however, news photographs only have one tense: historical instantaneousness. This makes all history

explicable in terms of now, today, the immediate. Visualized causes, problems and solutions are all situated – and may be understood – in the small time frame of the now. Surely, this seems to leave little room for contextualization or (long-term) development (see 2.3.3.4 Circumstances). Nevertheless, the interaction with the verbal cues (in the caption or body text) can (further) fill in the tense of a process, and thus, provide temporal contextualization. Indeed, as argued before, their sequential / temporal ordering makes verbal texts more fit to express temporal or causal relations than visuals, which draw on a spatial-associative logic (Geise & Baden, 2015; Kress, 2009; Unsworth & Cléirigh, 2009).

2.3.3.3 Positionality

Visual-verbal cues may also evoke a certain (moral) alignment among the participants inside / outside the picture frame. As such, they may invite us to approach an issue from a *particular positionality or viewpoint*. As Pulido & Peña (1998) argue, reality may look quite different depending on one's positionality (see Taylor, 2000): Particular ideas, roles, values may be foregrounded while others may be largely concealed. Again, communicators have various visual-verbal (paradigmatic) options at their disposal, which are often (syntagmatically) combined. As I will discuss, each choice may help to give rise to different realities (and thus, different types of frames). Halliday (2000) calls this the 'mood' system (see also Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; Royce, 1999).

Verbally, *personal pronouns* may connect or delineate, encouraging identification or distancing. In the process, they align us against or alongside certain views, beliefs, ideas (Fairclough, 2000; Fowler, 1996; Graber, 1988; Iyengar, 1990; Machin & Mayr, 2012; Verschueren, 2011). For instance, 'exclusive we' – solely including the speaker and his in-group – versus (exclusive) 'they' clearly gives rise to two closed and rather oppositional groups. 'We' might, however, also be used in a broader sense, emphasizing, for instance, equality or imposing one (hegemonic) stance on all participants and readers ('inclusive we') or 'human' in general ('generic or global we') (Alexander, 2011; Fowler, 1996; Machin & Mayr, 2012). For instance, 'We all believe in the power of the free market' generalizes a capitalist (western) ideal, suggesting that all members of society support this ideology. The *ideological square* (van Dijk, 1998) illuminates, accordingly, how (exclusive) 'we' is usually described in positive terms (in-group), while 'they' is put in a more negative light (out-group). Also, if villains in the in-group are identified, they are usually singled out as individuals (e.g. 'he', negative naming or attributes like 'beast', 'unprofessional'), who are not representative for the group and thus distant from 'us'. The opposite is true for the out-group: Negative characteristics are generalized (aggregated 'they' – see generalization and stereotypes above (2.3.3.1 (In)animate Participants and Attributes)), while positive characteristics are presented as exceptional traits of individuals. Note, however, that 'they' or 'we' are slippery pronouns, which allow for vagueness. Besides, as implied in the framework of Van Dijk (1998), they may get another interpretation depending on (the positionality of) the writer / speaker, audience or the (textual, temporal, spatial) context in which they appear (Fairclough, 2000). That is, they are deictic

(e.g. Langacker, 1993). The pronouns ‘she’ and ‘he’ humanize while ‘it’ (or plural ‘they’) may deprive a participant of his / her gender, ‘humanity’ or individuality, or at least equality to (certain) other groups. Furthermore, possessive pronouns carry with them the idea that we – for instance, humans – own something or someone – for instance, nature (Heuberger, 2007; Stibbe, 2015). Other deictic choices, for instance the dichotomy ‘down there’ / ‘up here’, may also delineate participants with different ‘positionalities’ (e.g. Langacker, 1993) (see 2.3.3.4 Circumstances). The imperative (e.g. ‘Act now!’) may imply authority and inequality, that is, power of the communicator over the audience (Fairclough, 2000; Fowler, 1996; Graber, 1988; Iyengar, 1990; Machin & Mayr, 2012; Verschueren, 2011).

While the choice of pronouns or other (deictic) forms in the verbal mode suggests certain alignments, point of view (horizontally and vertically) and distance serve a comparable goal in the *visual mode* (see e.g. Aday, Cluverious & Livingston, 2005; Batziou, 2011; Borah, 2009; Borah & Bulla, 2006; Fahmy, 2004; O’Neill, 2013; Parry, 2010; Schwalbe, Silcock & Keith, 2008). They allow, however, for much more subtle gradations and nuances (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006). Both are visual conventions which tend to give rise to interactive meaning relations which may connect the world inside the picture frame in certain ways to the viewer (or actors within the picture frame with one another). That is, they may allow or prevent us to identify with another and, accordingly, do or do not pull us into complicity with this participant. As such, images assume, and are likely to give rise, to a certain viewer. They make us stand where they want us to stand. They show us what they want to show us. Note that the participants in the visual may be human or non-human (e.g. an animal, object, nature, building). These visual codes are based on real-life experiences. Hence, they are largely culturally-specific (Hall, 1973, 1997; Jewitt & Oyama, 2001; Koga-Browes, 2013; Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; Machin & Mayr, 2012; Messaris, 1997; Rose, 2001).

With regard to the *vertical point of view*, three main alternatives can be distinguished (Chouliaraki, 2006; Guéry, 1995; Jewitt & Oyama, 2001; Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; Machin & Mayr, 2012; Messaris, 1997; Monaco, 2000; Rose, 2001; Tuchman, 1978):

- *Frontality*: As spectators we are encouraged to engage and identify with the depicted subject who becomes a part of our world.
- *Profile*: Profile suggests detachment, and is likely to ‘other’, distance or objectify the depicted participant (they). However, much depends on the interaction with other devices. Machin and Mayr (2012) argue, for instance, that a profile view may also convey togetherness (i.e. the sharing of a position, standing side by side) in combination with closeness.
- *Back view*: According to Kress and van Leeuwen (2006), this may both – simultaneously – invoke feelings of distance as well as attachment: As the authors argue, a back view prevents all contact, while ‘turning one’s back on someone’ also implies a relationship of trust. Also, Machin and Mayr (2012) contend:

Where we see people from behind, this can often serve to offer us their point of view, their perspective on the world. So if in an image we were to see the back of a person and then beyond them another person pointing a gun at them, we would take the perspective of the first person who faces the threat (p.99)

Messaris (1997) and Rose (2001) argue in similar ways, referring to the ‘subjective camera’.

The *horizontal point of view* can be filled out in the following ways (Chouliaraki, 2006; Hughes, 2012; Jewitt & Oyama, 2001; Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; Machin & Mayr, 2012; Messaris, 1997; Monaco, 2000; Rose, 2001; Tuchman, 1978):

- *Low angle*: Places the viewer in a subordinated position towards the depicted participant. Thus, this angle may imply power over the viewer. Messaris (1997) points out, however, that this relation of inequality is more likely to be accepted if the other indeed has recognized authority and tends to be rejected if the other is considered as an equal. In some cases, low angle may also evoke positive impressions, especially if combined with side (i.e. profile) views.
- *Eye level*: Places the viewer and the participant in the picture frame in a relationship of equality. An equal relationship between the viewer and the viewed may evoke the idea that the latter is equal to the former with regard to humanness. This might encourage identification and engagement.
- *High angle*: This implies the power of the viewer, while the depicted participant is subordinated. According to Tuchman (1978), this angle is likely to turn ‘others’ into objects (i.e. dehumanize, distance them), which we are less inclined to engage or identify with. This angle is often used in combination with images that invite the speaker to respond to weakness (see visual demand above), for instance, a picture of an (emaciated) child or cute animal (Chouliaraki, 2006; Messaris, 1997). In a similar vein, Hughes (2012) – addressing the visualization of climate consequences – contends that air views highlight, among others, the vulnerability of the planet, showing the immense impact of climate change. Simultaneously, a high angle may suggest human power and ability to manipulate the world, and thus, to address climate change (see 2.3.3.4 Circumstances).

Monaco (2000) adds that lighting can reinforce the effect of the angle. For instance, overhead lighting can dominate a subject. The author also points out that similar rules apply to the interaction of elements within the picture space (or in an article or on a page). For instance, elements pushed to the bottom are usually seen as less powerful.

The norms of our everyday social relations also determine the *distance* we keep. These implicit conventions, which are part of our mental schemata, may, for instance, suggest that others are intimates or rather distant (collectivized) strangers, which we do not feel connected with (Hall, 1973, 1997; Jewitt & Oyama, 2001; Kaml, 2005; Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; Machin, 2007; Machin & Mayr, 2012;

Monaco, 2000; Tuchman, 1978; van Leeuwen, 2001). Drawing on Monaco (2000), I argue that the effects of distance can be reinforced by photographic techniques like soft focus, which may smooth out details and create distance. In a more general sense, a person, animal or object that is shown in focus is likely to appear closer than a participant that is shown out of focus.

- *Intimate distance*: We only see a close-up of one's face or head. Expressions, emotions and details of the face can be easily discerned; a focus is put on the individual traits of the depicted participant. Clearly, this distance implies intimacy, a close relationship. The closer we see others, the more we approach them "(...) as though they belong or should belong to 'our group' (...)". As such, "(...) the viewer is (...) addressed as a certain kind of person" (Jewitt & Oyama, 2001, p.146) (see also Coleman, 2010; Graber, 1988, 1996; Hart, 2011; Höijer, 2004; Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; Manzo, 2010b; Messaris, 1997; Small & Loewenstein, 2003). However, a very tight close-up can also have an opposite effect. Leaving out all details (see 2.3.3.4 Circumstances), it may dehumanize the other and thus create distance, or it may make a depiction claustrophobic and disorienting (Messaris, 1997; Monaco, 2000; Rose, 2001). Chouliaraki (2006) discusses, for instance, how a close-up which only shows some body parts (e.g. arms, legs rather than faces) of young victims puts the focus on differences rather than similarities.
- *Personal distance*: Participants at a personal distance are seen as subjects of personal interest and involvement.
 - Close personal or friendly distance: We take in the head and the shoulders of the depicted participants.
 - Far personal distance ('one of us'): The participant is depicted from the waist up.
- *Social distance*: At a social distance, our relationship to the other is rather professional, impersonal or 'neutral'. The figures are becoming generic types rather than individuals (see public distance).
 - Close or familiar social distance: We see the figure approximately to knee level (less formal).
 - Far or general social distance: The whole figure is depicted (more formal).
- *Public (impersonal) distance*: The figure fills half or more of the image height. We can see the torso of a group of participants (four or five, or more). Clearly, the greater the distance that separates us from the other, the more details (e.g. facial expressions) are lost, and the less we feel connected with them. The other is depersonalized, 'othered', isolated. There is no contact, no involvement.

Finally, as discussed above, (the lack of) contact (i.e. *visual demand*) between the viewer and the viewed can encourage or rather discourage a relationship, engagement among the former and the latter.

Accordingly, it may increase or decrease distance. If contact is made, the viewer is invited to enter the world of the other and thus, to look at the world from a different positionality (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006).

Again, we can identify a number of *saliency enhancing devices* on this level. Verbally, a direct address ('you') is more likely to draw the audience in than the indirect third person ('they', 'he'). The former may imply equality or even suggest a private conversation, while the latter may rather create distance. This largely ties in with the argument of Druckman (2001a), who demonstrates that we are more inclined to accept the frames of narrators we consider as trustworthy experts or people like ourselves (see Malka, Krosnick & Langer, 2009). Advertisements, for example, often address audiences directly to enhance their rhetorical effects. Compare, for instance, a sentence like 'If you change your lifestyle now, you will enjoy the financial and health benefits later on' with 'If one changes his lifestyle now, he will enjoy the financial and health benefits later on' (e.g. Fairclough, 1995; Fowler, 1996; Machin & Mayr, 2012; Verschueren, 2011). Visually, direct address, equality and/or identification may be evoked by intimate or personal distance, a gaze as well as an eye level perspective (e.g. Hall, 1997; Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; Schaap & Pleijter, 2012). As pointed out before, humans are especially attracted to the (intimate) faces of other humans. They are most likely to emotionally engage us and enhance memorability (see Coleman, 2010; Graber, 1988, 1996; Hart, 2011; Höijer, 2004; Jewitt & Oyama, 2001; Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; Manzo, 2010b; Messaris, 1997; Small & Loewenstein, 2003; von Engelhardt & Jansz, 2014). The same is true for first person perspectives (i.e. 'looking through the eyes' of a participant or narrator) or a subjective camera (e.g. we see the hands or feet of the photographer): They give us the experience of seeing the world through someone else's point of view. Surely, this facilitates strong identifications and a heightened saliency of the (visually) represented views. That is, we are more inclined to accept / adopt particular frames as our own (Messaris, 1997; Rose, 2001). Drawing on Roman Jakobson, Peters (1997) refers in this context to the 'phatic function' (building a relationship with the receiver; drawing attention) and 'conative function' (motivating the receiver to accept and internalize certain arguments by appealing to certain needs or values; persuading) of communication.

2.3.3.4 *Circumstances*

Due to their differing characteristics, the verbal and the visual modes are likely to provide us with *different types of 'circumstantial' information*. Written and spoken language are defined by time and the sequence of elements in time and, as such, allow more easily to convey temporal or causal information. That is, the sequential organization of texts – for instance, one event being presented before another – is more likely to (implicitly) suggest temporal or causal relations. These may be further explicated through adverbs or prepositional constructions. Space and relations of simultaneously present elements in space largely define the affordances of the visual. Accordingly, images are particularly apt for the expression of spatial information, including spatial relations and interactions (e.g. through the

arrangement of entities, size, lines, shapes, colours). Obviously, that does not exclude that visuals may also convey temporal information (see Huxford, 2001) or, in particular, that verbal texts provide spatial information (Geise & Baden, 2015; Kress, 2009; Unsworth & Cléirigh, 2009).

Circumstances (time, space, causality...) are closely interlinked with the levels of positionality and participants (see also Halliday, 2000). For instance, depending on the distance / angle of a shot or the degree of articulation of detail, background or depth, more or less circumstantial information (i.e. context) will be provided (see also 2.3.3.5 Modality). Accordingly, the emphasis (i.e. salience) is put on a detail, a subject or a small slice of an event (*decontextualization*) – for instance, the close bonding of two world leaders – or rather on the broader context – the meeting which they are part of with lots of similar interactions going on (*contextualization*) (Hall, 1973; Hansen & Machin, 2008; Kaml, 2005; Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; Machin & Mayr, 2012; Monaco, 2000; Perlmutter, 1998). In a similar way, a title or caption can either be subject-centred or rather event/context-centred. Also, a text in general may focus on (individual) participants or specificities (see also personalization as a news value (e.g. Galtung & Ruge, 1965; 1973)) or rather on broader socio-economic, historical, cultural or political contexts. According to Iyengar (1990), the former (i.e. *decontextualization*) may encourage the audience to allocate responsibility – for instance, for poverty – to individuals, immediate contexts or even accident. That is, it prevents them from seeing structural problems or broader processes (see Hart, 2011; van Dijk, 1988, 1998). In this context, Machin and Mayr (2012, p.204) provide a conclusion that is highly relevant in the light of framing research:

What happens is that in images with reduced articulation of details or settings the consequent removal of time and space discourages the viewer from placing such events in actual socio-economic-political contexts and rather indexes typical news frames or discourses about war, health and education, crime, etc.

Chouliaraki (2006) and Dalhgren and Chakrapani (1982) argue in similar ways, addressing representations of the Global South (see also Scott, 2014; von Engelhardt & Jansz, 2014; Wright, 2011). They add, more specifically, that the presence of contextual or ‘circumstantial’ information may encourage a connection between (the time-space of) the audience and (the time-space of) the depicted participant. This may encourage engagement, identification and, possibly, a sense of responsibility for the suffering of the other (see Lester & Cottle, 2009). Lack of context is more likely to produce disconnection and disengagement. The same is true for overly generic (e.g. a generic term like ‘the South’ to refer to highly diverse spaces and contexts, or the use of a very rudimentary map) or too specific contextual information (e.g. referring to and / or showing a small and – to the audience – unknown town in South America without clearly situating it within the broader context (map) of the country, continent, world). Such choices may dehumanize the depicted participants, making them distant, generic types, living in narrow, uncomplex and homogenous time-spaces, as opposed to contextualized individuals (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006) (see 2.3.3.3 Positionality). Compare, for example, an African woman

with her child taken out of her contextual frame with a European mother standing against the backdrop of a – for the viewer – recognizable capital city. Such ‘ordinary’ people (like us) in ‘ordinary’ settings are more likely to draw our attention (and thus, heighten *saliency*) (e.g. O’Neill, 2017).

Decontextualization can, visually, also be caused by ‘*sublimation*’ (see Cottle, 2000, Grittmann, 2014). For instance, a spectacular air view shows the large-scale consequences of a natural disaster, such as the destruction after the passing of a hurricane or completely flooded areas (see also globes or satellite views). According to Chouliaraki (2006), this may invite us to gaze at this impressive, ‘aesthetic’ tableaux vivant from a distance, contemplating the immense consequences of this natural disaster, rather than to feel related, or responsible for, causes or consequences. According to Messaris (1997), the timelessness and eternal qualities of the scene put us (largely) outside of it. Or, as Hughes (2012) puts it, it provides us with a “(...) point of view that favours large scale dramatic impacts carrying with them the implication that individual human perspectives in the here and now are irrelevant in the face of such catastrophe” (p.90). Adamson (2014) adds that the focus on spectacular events keeps us from considering, and understanding, the underlying, large-scale causes of injustice (which cannot be disconnected from our own lives). In short, while such sublime views may grab attention (i.e. heighten *saliency*), they fail to move or really engage (e.g. Nurmis, 2015; O’Neill, 2017; O’Neill et al., 2013; O’Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 2009).

In a similar vein, Hansen and Machin (2008) and Shanahan and McComas (1999) contend that contemporary media tend to (verbally and visually) *decontextualize natural time-spaces*, deconstructing as such our connection with the environment (see also Hall, 1973). In the process, a hegemonic (i.e. anthropocentric) capitalist logic is imposed upon the (natural) world. Hansen and Machin (2008) describe, for instance, what Larson (2011) calls ‘pigeonholing’: A highly complex issue as climate change is turned into a handful of decontextualized, individualized events, issues or victims (e.g. a polar bear on an ice shelf), largely disconnected from (our) time and space. Shanahan and McComas (1999) argue that we are mostly provided with exclusively human contexts (with individuals like us), separated from the broader, holistic world (encompassing nature, groups of people who are not like us). If the environment is part of stories, it only features in the background as a sublime scene or bountiful resource. As such, it helps to naturalize or legitimize certain human acts (e.g. the exploitation of ‘our environmental resources’) in the foreground. The authors point out (Shanahan & McComas, 1999, p.58):

(...) with the scene taking a background position, the logic of the entire act is less likely to be questioned, because it is the ‘act’ itself that is usually justified in our thinking, not the scene. Scenes exist: they are given; they do not need to be justified.

Clearly, other types of acts (and thus, underlying ideologies) – such as approaching nature and others as equals who deserve our respect – are delegitimized in such contexts (see e.g. Larson, 2011; Remillard, 2011; Stibbe, 2015; Verhagen, 2008).

Background may, finally, also (*de*)legitimize participants in the foreground. For instance, in the context of environment and climate reporting elite participants like politicians or scientists are likely to be represented in front of (i.e. addressing) a crowd, in the field (doing field work, showing support for victims after a disaster), at their desk, in a laboratory. That is, they often appear in time-spaces which legitimate them as able and credible agents. Non-hegemonic participants like NGO spokespeople, however, have been shown to feature more often in circumstances which do little in terms of legitimization. For instance, during interviews they may be shown in generic green spaces which they do not interact with. That is, they are separated from the (relevant) time-spaces in which causes, problems and solutions can be situated (Lester & Cottle, 2009; Liebler & Bendix, 1996).

2.3.3.5 Modality

Verbally, grammatical mood (imperative, indicative, subjunctive), modal auxiliaries, adjectives, adverbs or particles can help to express epistemic, deontic or dynamic modality (Conboy, 2007; Fairclough, 1995; Fowler, 1996; Halliday, 2000; Machin & Mayr, 2012; Richardson, 2007; Verschueren, 2011). *Epistemic modality or truth modality* ('certainly', 'will', 'could', 'might', 'it seems') expresses the certainty that something will happen. For instance: 'It is certain that more migrants will come to Europe' versus 'We do not know whether more migrants will come to Europe' (in the last example, the negation helps to lower the factuality). The former expresses strong, the latter weak (truth) modality. Thus, depending on the (paradigmatic) choices made, another reality can be evoked, which may call for different responses, solutions, approaches. In the example, the strong modality may – especially in combination with other variables – suggest a more dramatic and pressing (i.e. a more certain) fate. This might call for different (e.g. more pragmatic), more urgent solutions. The (virtual) absence of a major threat, on the other hand, may feed complacency and inertia (see e.g. Fuchs & Graf, 2010; Kenis & Mathijs, 2014). *Deontic modality* is concerned with the extent to which a speaker is convinced that something needs to be done. It deals with the ways in which one compels, instructs, influences. For instance, 'We have to protect our welfare state against the consequences of immigration' versus 'Perhaps, we may protect our welfare state against the consequences of immigration'. As such, it may, in particular, function as a signpost for treatment recommendations. In such contexts, in particular, strong modality can close off the room for other possible solutions beyond the views (ideology) of the speaker (i.e. 'there is only one possible, valuable solution') and, accordingly, for those who are able to provide or carry out these solutions. In short, it suggests hierarchy, inequality, expertise. Weak modality, on the other hand, is more likely to open up the debate, allowing for other input, views, actions, of other contributors (i.e. 'various solutions can be valuable and may interact'). It is more likely to suggest equality and interaction. Simultaneously, however, it might also make an argument weak and less convincing. Obviously – as in all situations – the actual meanings conveyed by particular choices depend on the broader context and interaction with other variables. *Dynamic modality*, finally, does not express

the opinion of a speaker, nor does the latter try to influence a situation. Rather, this type of modality is concerned with the intrinsic potential, willingness or abilities of things or persons. That is, it deals with the likelihood of events or one's ability to act. For instance: 'Polar bears can save themselves' versus 'Polar bears cannot save themselves'. Again, different choices may give rise to different realities, calling for different problem definitions, causal responsibilities, treatment recommendations and/or moral evaluations. For instance, the helplessness of the polar bears may engage us to intervene, for instance, by setting up sanctuaries (see e.g. Larson, 2011; Remillard, 2011). However, verbal modality also allows for ambiguity. Modals help to inform us, but may, at the same time, conceal power or details about the actual task. For instance, 'We must take globalization as an opportunity' may reflect epistemic modality ('the evidence compels us') or deontic modality ('I tell you so') (Machin & Mayr, 2012, p.191). That is, in particular, useful in the context of framing: It may conceal (or help to detect, in the context of an in-depth analysis) the power struggles which are underlying each frame (e.g. Carragee & Roefs, 2004).

Visual grammar also has a number of devices – continuums or scales – which may (in interaction) give rise to various types of modality: the degree of detail, background, or depth articulation, the articulation of light and shadow, colour saturation, tone or modulation and the quality and perspective of an image. However, these variables play a different role depending on the type of modality. Also, the exact meaning conveyed depends on the context as well as the manner in which these modality scales are being combined. Visual modality is, for instance, in particular culturally dependent. What is considered as real or credible depends on how a group defines reality (e.g. Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; Liu, 2013). *Naturalistic (or empirical truth) modality* is based on the congruence between what we see in an image and what can normally be seen in reality, in a particular situation and from a certain angle (based on cultural, historical standards). Realistic details are key here. This kind of realism – 'photo realism' – remains the dominant standard in western cultures based on which we judge the reality of representations (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; Newton, 2000). For example, fully modulated colours, with a rich palette of tones, are more readily associated with naturalism (reality) than flat colours, lacking nuance (e.g. in a comic book). The same is true, for instance, for maximally deep perspective versus the absence of perspective (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006). Also, poorly composed pictures or grainy visuals of bad quality may increase a sense of reality, depending on the context. Hyperrealism, on the other hand, may be interpreted as less truthful (Chouliaraki, 2006; Huxford, 2001; Kaml, 2005; Monaco, 2000). In this context, Huxford (2001) also argues that clear violations of 'reality' may carry symbolic meaning (see Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; Messaris, 1997), such as the prophetic representation of a possible future or the reflection of fears and tensions in society. He exemplifies this referring to 'acid-filled eggs', discussed in a news article accompanied by a depiction of these eggs. While the latter are clearly a visual 'construction' (which sets them apart from the indexical nature of photographs), their context – the objective context of the newspaper – nevertheless implies that the visual does represent something that really exists. *Scientific or essential truth*, on the other hand, is based on the generic, abstract or regular

nature of the represented, or the lack of unnecessary details. For example, the absence of depth articulation or backgrounds signals truthfulness in this context. Scientific or essential truth is characteristic for scientific graphs or schematic diagrams, which show, for instance, relations between phenomena. Finally, *sensory truth* draws on the sensory experiences of objects (colours, shapes, textures, ‘the feel’) (Buehner, 2012; Hansen & Machin, 2008; Jewitt & Oyama, 2001; Kaml, 2005; Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; Machin & Mayr, 2012; Monaco, 2000; Royce, 1999). Based on my empirical analyses, I argue, for example, that red and orange (i.e. warm) colours are not only conventional symbols (i.e. metonyms / metaphors) for climate change, but that they also reflect the experiences most people have with ‘heat’, ‘a warm climate’ or, more generally, ‘danger’ (see Doyle, 2007, 2009; Mahony & Hulme, 2014; Manzo, 2010b; O’Neill, 2013, 2017).

Clearly, then, similar to – and often in interaction with – verbal modality, visual (strong or weak) modality may help to give rise to *different realities*, and thus different problem definitions, causal responsibilities, treatment recommendations and/or moral evaluations. For instance, a scientific graph may reduce, or simplify, climate change to the essential truth of disproportionate human-induced GHG emissions, showing the relations among the increase of GHG and rising temperatures. This is likely to give rise to a strong scientific modality. This purely scientific reality may also draw our attention to causes, problems and solutions which can be defined in these clear, scientific terms (see Nocke, 2014). For instance, as GHG emissions are the problem, the solution is the reduction of GHG (see e.g. Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Swyngedouw, 2010). Low scientific modality, then, might help to buttress more sceptic argumentations (and thus, frames), degrading climate change to a myth or natural variance that does not require human action (see Schneider, Nocke & Feulner, 2014). As (strong) sensory modality draws on recognizable human experiences, I argue, it may (convincingly but implicitly) help to connect climate change to human life worlds. As said, red or orange hues in the context of climate change communication may be used to reflect, but also influence, human feelings or associations (for instance, heat or danger) (see Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; O’Neill, 2013, 2017). This may make climate change a more conceivable, and thus realistic, part of (or threat to) human reality (see Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Graber, 1988; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). I argue that this may facilitate, or at least reinforce, frames which in particular foreground human fate when it comes to problems, causes, solutions and/or moral evaluations.

As implicitly suggested in the discussion above, modality is, in particular, highly valuable as a *salience enhancing device*. Signalling degrees of possibility, certainty, likelihood or necessity, it helps to reveal (or conceal) and conceive information, without being too obvious. That is crucial in the light of framing. After all, the major goal of frames is to naturalize, or legitimize, certain realities, while delegitimizing or deflating others, preferably without the audience noticing. More specifically, modality may help to foreground some realities as unquestionable, particular solutions as inevitable or certain predictions as

the most likely ones. Simultaneously, other argumentations, views or ideas are delegitimized as unimportant, unnecessary or impossible. Clearly, the former are more likely to be noticed (as salient, relevant arguments) by the audience than the latter (see Fairclough, 1995; Fowler, 1996; Richardson, 2007; Verschueren, 2011). Machin and Mayr (2012) argue that modality also tells us something about the trustworthiness of a communicator. For instance, strong modality – or the deliberate balance of strong and weak modality – may suggest confidence, commitment, authority. As argued before, we are more inclined to accept frames if we associate them with people we trust (Druckman, 2001a; Malka, Krosnick & Langer, 2009). In a more general sense, then, the visual devices – depth of field, illumination, brightness, quality, texture, colour – found on this level can often help to highlight particular participants, events, values or ideas while backgrounding others. For instance, the contrast between a highly saturated topic and its desaturated context can draw the attention to the former. Chiaroscuro or ‘clair obscure’ can have a similar effect, playing with contrasts between bright and dark colours, or illuminated and underexposed areas (see e.g. Monaco, 2000).

Zelizer (2004) maintains that images often freeze events in mid-action: She discusses the telling example of the ‘about-to-die’ photograph in the context of 9/11. According to the researcher, the uncertain character of these visuals or, at least, the interpretation of the spectator (partly guided by textual cues like overgeneralized captions) are likely to give rise to a *subjunctive voice*, ‘what if’ (truth modality). This modality is expected to encourage spectators to try and complete the story, coming up with alternative possibilities to the ‘actual’ ending they are in many cases already familiar with (due to the information in the text or other visual or verbal texts they have been presented with). This is likely to render harsh ‘realities’ less shocking, while representing complex realities in a graspable way. As I argued above, contingency, uncertainty or openness tend to engage the audience more strongly. Coming up with their own interpretations – even if these are guided by other cues – makes them more receptive for these interpretations (see 2.3.1 Framing and the Special Attributes of the Visual). Accordingly, I argue that the ‘what if’ modality can add to the salience of certain arguments or frames (see Goodnow, 2005; Messaris & Abraham, 2001). The same could, arguably, be said about lowered deontic modality: as argued above, this may leave more room for the audience to contribute to the debate and to come up with their own alternative solutions.

2.3.3.6 *Rhetorical Figures*

Defining framing devices, many authors fall back on the short enumeration provided by Gamson and Modigliani (1989, p.3): “metaphors, exemplars, catchphrases, depictions, visual images” (see Gamson, 1989, 1992). This illustrates the generally accepted value of these framing devices, which can all – except for the generalizing term ‘visual images’, of course – be situated on the rhetorical level (see also Entman, 1991; Fahmy, 2004, 2010; Gamson & Stuart, 1992; Grittmann, 2014; O’Neill, 2013; Rodriguez & Dimitrova, 2011; Van Gorp, 2012; Van Gorp & van der Goot, 2009). Rhetorical figures are crucial

to framing because of two main reasons: Firstly, they may add *deeper layers of meaning* (denotation and connotation) (Barthes, 1977) without necessarily spelling them out (see Verschueren (2011): ‘implicature-typed meaning’). Secondly, they may *foreground* certain elements or ideas, rendering others invisible. As such, they can make (parts of) the frame highly convincing, and thus *salient* (e.g. Durand, 1987; Larson, 2011; Machin & Mayr, 2012; Stibbe, 2015). In a more general sense, Van Dijk (1988) argues that rhetorical figures are likely to raise the attention of the reader. As Moriarty and Sayre (2005) argue:

One might speculate that because the symbolic meanings of these message elements are more unrestricted and less predictable, they are more interesting and mentally engaging. These symbolic elements are also more complex and demand more involvement by the viewers to interpret the meanings (p.253).

While the authors are primarily concerned with the visual, their argumentation can also be applied to verbal symbolism and rhetorical figures (see also Kaplan, 2005; Messaris, 1997). As argued before, the stronger the audience is engaged, the more they are inclined to accept messages as ‘truths’ (see e.g. Geise & Baden, 2015; Messaris & Abraham, 2001; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). However, figures of speech may – due to their vivid, concrete character – also be processed more automatically and intuitively (that is, through the second, peripheral, low-effort route) (Leiserowitz, 2006; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). As such, rhetorical figures may strongly encourage the storage and retrieval of frames or frame elements. Put differently, rhetoric renders a frame more convincing in terms of – what the Greek philosopher Aristotle called – *ethos* (personal characteristics such as competence or empathy), *pathos* (‘emotions’) and *logos* (‘reason’) (see Richardson, 2007; Modrak, 1987): “The truthful value of the frames of news discourse is enhanced as is the likelihood of these frames being accepted” (Pan & Kosicki, 1993, p.62). Note that rhetorics are, in particular, culturally dependent, especially in the visual mode. That is, an audience can only decipher the meaning of a figure of speech if they share certain icons, symbols, rules or conventions with the communicator. If the audience does not share those, it is likely that they remain unresponsive to rhetorical figures or interpret them in other ways. For instance, symbols representing the western ideal of individualism can be repelled by those not sharing this culture. A cross, cow or a star carry religious meanings (connotation) in some cultures but not in others (denotation) (Barthes, 1977; Buehner, 2012; Grancea, 2014; Messaris, 1997; Rose, 2001; van Leeuwen, 2001; Van Straten, 2002).

Metaphors and metonyms are, arguably, the most powerful devices in this regard. As authors like Jakobson and Hall (1956) or Lakoff and Johnson (1980) argue, they are *fundamental principles in the organization of human thinking* (i.e. how the human brain is structured) and discourse. That is, we often rely on metaphors or metonyms to understand our world. Accordingly, the metaphors and metonyms we use to describe reality, strongly influence the ways in which we think and talk about and possibly interact with this reality: the ways in which we approach other people or living beings, the institutions we build,

the policies we apply, the people we allow to govern... However, we are generally unaware of them (see also Benczes, Barcelona & Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez, 2011; Fauconnier & Turner, 2002). As such, they are crucial in the naturalization and (re)negotiation of worldviews or ideologies (Fairclough, 1995). This makes them highly similar to, and pivotal in the working of, frames. Stibbe (2015) even considers metaphors as frames ('metaphoric frames'), a view that is (implicitly) confirmed by Larson (2011) or Ritchie and Thomas (2015).

Both *metaphors*, *metonyms* as well as frames could, in very general terms, be defined as stories "(...) that describe (...) something as if it was something else" (Stibbe, 2015, p.63).³⁴ In other words, the unknown is rendered known by presenting it in terms of information from another (source) domain which is unrelated (metaphor) or related / associated (metonym) to the target domain. This is based on similarity (metaphor) or contiguity (e.g. part-whole, effect-cause, action-agent) (metonym). In the context of metaphors, in particular, the source domain is usually more tangible, concrete or familiar, while the target domain is more abstract or distant. As Catalano and Waugh (2013, pp.33-34) summarize it, a metaphor represents an 'is a' type, while the metonym is a 'stands for' type of relation (Benczes, Barcelona & Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez, 2011; Durand, 1987; Fauconnier & Turner, 2002; Kennedy & Kennedy, 1993; Kaplan, 2005; Lakoff, 1993; Woods, Fernández & Coen, 2010).

Metaphors and metonyms can both appear in the *verbal* as well as in the *visual mode* and work in largely similar ways. In the case of visual metonyms one participant, object, concept (e.g. a pointing finger) usually stands in for (i.e. substitutes) another, related participant, object, concept or idea (e.g. guilt) (Catalano & Waugh, 2013; Durand, 1987; Perlmutter, 1998). That is not very different from the ways in which verbal metonyms work. Verbal and visual metaphors may also substitute one entity for another. However, visual metaphors can also take various other shapes: They are, among others, signalled by the juxtaposition or morphing of elements (e.g. 'globe head', a person with a head representing planet Earth in Cold War cartoons (Gamson & Stuart, 1992)), or the violation of conventions (e.g. the rules for framing a shot) or audience expectations (e.g. presence of elements in inappropriate settings, like a polar bear in a shopping street) (Durand, 1987; Gamson & Stuart, 1992; Grancea, 2014; Hahn, Eide & Ali, 2012; Kaplan, 2005; Kennedy & Kennedy, 1993; Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; Messaris, 1997; Meister, 1997; Rose, 2001; Wrigth, 2011). Kaplan (2005) argues:

To classify a picture as metaphorical there should be enough similarities between the two elements with respect to physical form or abstract qualities as to permit a tentative analogy, yet enough differences between them to cue the viewer that the artist did not intend the depiction or representation to be taken as literally true (p.174).

³⁴ In the case of frames the 'equation' between the target and the source domain is quite literal. For instance, climate change is, literally, an economic challenge. In the case of metaphors or metonyms, this 'equation' is not literally true. For instance, climate change is not, literally, a 'rollercoaster' (metaphor) (see Stibbe, 2015).

Thus, just like verbal metaphors, visual metaphors draw on the interplay of similarities and incongruities. Contrary to verbal metaphors, however, visual metaphors are often bidirectional. That is, it is not often clear what should be considered as goal or target. Messaris (1997) discusses, for instance, the example of a tiger and a car in an advertisement. While the commercial context suggests we are expected to project certain characteristics of the tiger onto the car, nothing prevents us from (also) understanding the tiger by means of (characteristics of) the car. As argued before, visuals are particularly powerful as metonyms, suggesting that ‘they say it all’: “The use of one image to illustrate a news story implies, without need of a caption, that the picture represents the greater event. This ‘summing up’ quality is a special value of the news picture” (Perlmutter, 1998, p.17).

Some examples may further illustrate the workings (and meaning potentials) of visual and verbal metaphors and metonyms. For instance, the metaphor ‘Natural Machine’ visualizes, and foregrounds, a particular view, projecting on nature the well-organized structure of a machine controlled by the human mechanic. Simultaneously, it backgrounds other perspectives (e.g. ‘Mother Nature’) (Larson, 2011; Shepard, 2015; Verhagen, 2008). Fuchs and Graff (2010) argue that representing financial crises based on weather metaphors, evokes the idea that they cannot be controlled nor predicted. Accordingly, they are more likely to encourage pragmatic responses rather than the questioning of structural problems or underlying responsibilities (i.e. the capitalist free market thinking) (see also Ritchie & Thomas, 2015). Similar workings could be ascribed to the ‘war metaphor’, which is often used in the context of climate change (e.g. Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Ritchie & Thomas, 2015). According to Cohen (2011), this metaphor is likely to resonate with the audience in an age of conflict. Besides, it may remind us of the hardship and measures during the world wars. The author argues that ‘war’ may be used to (mentally) prepare the public for stringent policy decisions (i.e. austerity regimes, rationing, the idea of fair shares for all). That is, the audience may only be prepared to give up on consumerism in the light of extreme misery, concretized by the metaphor. Woods, Fernández and Coen (2010), then, point out that religious metaphors – climate change as a ‘religion’, environmentalists as ‘fanatics’, the morality of climatologists as ‘doom-laden’ – may be used to denigrate and delegitimize climate change as irrational and unscientific. *Colours and shapes* are often associated with particular values or meanings, largely based on experiences in real life (see Messaris, 1997; Monaco, 2000). Kress and van Leeuwen (2006) developed, for instance, an inventory which summarizes the meaning potentials of colours. With regard to hue, for instance, red may stand for danger (Catalano & Waugh, 2013; Doyle, 2007, 2009), warmth, energy or salience while blue is more likely to be associated with passivity (Huxford, 2001), distance, calmness, or backgrounding (see also David, 1990). As argued before, colours (and colour contrasts) may also function as *salience enhancing devices*. Similarly, thick letters (i.e. bold face) may signify seriousness and importance (i.e. salience) (e.g. van Leeuwen, 2011). Instead of referring to particular politicians or governments one may, for instance, talk about ‘the West’. This metonym conceals, as such, the actions and responsibilities of individuals. The ‘child (in the South)’ is a generally shared

(visual) metaphor in the West, associated with ideas of vulnerability, innocence or passivity. As a metonym, it stands for the vulnerability of a whole human group ('the South'). Other characteristics of this group – such as resilience, cooperation, a more profound understanding of nature – are glossed over (see Ali, James & Vultee, 2013; Chouliaraki, 2006; Manzo, 2010a, 2010b; Perlmutter, 1998). Summarizing, by singling out one aspect which is often emotive and/or simplistic, a complex issue is turned apprehensible. Hence, while appearing to clarify reality, metaphors and metonyms actually conceal large parts of reality and shape understanding, implicitly sending ideological messages. That is, depending on ideological interests and worldviews, less favourable elements are hidden or rather exposed (see e.g. Fairclough, 1995; Machin & Mayr, 2012; van Dijk, 1988, 1998; van Leeuwen, 2001).

Stock metaphors, in particular (e.g. 'greenhouse effect', 'society is a market'), are very pervasive. Being part of our everyday thinking and discourse, they have become invisible and difficult to question. Yet, they still influence to a large extent how we define our world. Some domains have become dominated with particular types of (such generally accepted) metaphors. The discourses about environment in general (e.g. Alexander, 2011; Heuberger, 2007; Verhagen, 2008; Stibbe, 2015), and western science in particular (e.g. Larson, 2011), are, for instance, characterized by metaphors which reflect values such as hierarchy, competition, efficiency, human control, utilitarianism or unlimited growth. Examples encompass 'nature is a machine', 'invasive species' or 'the top / bottom of the food chain'.

Other visual-verbal rhetorical figures which may act as influential framing devices are *hyperboles*, *euphemisms* and *semantic reversals*. A hyperbole or overstatement is a strong exaggeration which may create emphasis, effect and sometimes strong emotions (i.e. *salience*). That is, a hyperbole may 'enlarge' or 'inflate' a certain issue, problem, argumentation. As such, it may, however, also distance us from certain realities or participants, for instance by 'othering' particular groups. (Metaphorical) terms like 'avalanche' or 'flood' may, for example, help to emphasize that (large groups of) migrants constitute a threat for our safety, while numbers might have represented this group in more 'neutral' terms. Visually, an element can be 'literally' enlarged (see caricatures). That is, especially, a frequently used strategy in drawings or cartoons (e.g. Gamson & Stuart, 1992; Hahn, Eide & Ali, 2012). For instance, a cartoon may represent the 'underdeveloped' South showing an outline of the African continent but enlarging a begging hand. The two other devices are employed in an attempt to mitigate or conceal certain 'realities'. Heuberger (2007) argues, for example, that euphemisms may make the use of nature easier or prevent responsible action: 'Greenhouse effect' (which is also a metaphor) downplays, for instance, the significance of our changing climate. Violence or warfare is often described in vague or generalized (often institutionalized) terms (e.g. 'an efficient and clean military operation', 'collateral damage'), especially when the violence of the in-group is addressed (e.g. Entman, 1991; van Dijk, 1988, 1998). Symbolic representations (e.g. skull and crossbones) may visually soften or abstract content (e.g. death). Litotes, however, uses understatement exactly to emphasize a point, using the negative of his contrary

(e.g. ‘He is not a bad leader’). Yet, according to Durand (1987), a visual litotes may be expressed through the reduction or even absence of an element. Euphemism is akin to the semantic reversal, a misleading term or representation which suggests inaccurate facts or circumstances (e.g. a ‘plant protection device’ is used to poison unwanted plants) (Durand, 1987; Heuberger, 2007; Lanham, 1991; Richardson, 2007; Stibbe, 2015; van Dijk, 1988; Van Gorp, 2006; Verschueren, 2011) (see 2.3.3.1 (In)animate Participants and Attributes; 2.3.3.3 Positionality).

Contrast and comparison may also play a role in multimodal frames (see also 2.3.3.1 (In)animate Participants and Attributes). Contrasts (see also dichotomy, decoupling) emphasize differences while comparisons highlight similarities. That is, the former background similarities or connections while the latter render differences largely invisible. This can be done in more explicit (see for instance the simile (like / as)) or rather implicit ways (e.g. juxtaposing or rather separating of participants, events, issues; focus on (formal) similarities or differences) (e.g. Jewitt & Oyama, 2001; Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; van Leeuwen, 2001, 2011). In an article on the media representations of the financial crisis, for instance, Fuchs and Graf (2010) demonstrate, among others, that the financial system is often decoupled from the ‘real’ economy (see decontextualization). The dichotomy human-nature is largely accepted and reproduced in western cultures and comes along with contrasting values, representations and, thus, responsibilities or roles (e.g. natural victims versus human agents) (e.g. Remillard, 2011). By visually juxtaposing victims of floods in the West and the South, presented in similar poses and comparable (flooded) landscapes, it is suggested that people are not so different (i.e. they suffer equal or similar hardships) (Manzo, 2010b). Van Dijk (1998) discusses the usage of similar metaphors in a news article to describe ‘Gadhafi and ‘Saddam Hussein’ in order to emphasize the similarities among the two ‘tyrants’ or ‘demons’ (i.e. villains of the US). The juxtaposition of economy or technological development (e.g. a wind turbine) and natural preservation may imply that they are not contradictory. On the contrary, they are in harmony and may reinforce each other (e.g. Grittmann, 2014; Meister, 1997; Zehr, 2009). In this context, comparatives (e.g. older) and superlatives (e.g. strongest), in particular, may add *salience*. For instance, contrasting images of the poles today and ten years ago may face us with the disproportionate melting of the ice caps (e.g. Brönnimann, 2002; Doyle, 2007, 2009). This may heighten a sense of urgency (Durand, 1987; Heuberger, 2007; Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; Lanham, 1991; Messaris, 1997; Richardson, 2007; Stibbe, 2015; van Dijk, 1988, 1998; Verschueren, 2011).

A number of other verbal-visual rhetorical devices can also function as potent framing and/or salience enhancing devices: *Ellipsis* (leaving out of certain elements) can make certain realities – literally – invisible. However, it may also implicitly encourage the audience to fill out the gap in a particular way. This may render a(n ideological) message or perspective even more pervasive (see Geise & Baden, 2015; Fuchs & Graf, 2010; Messaris, 1997). *Inversion*, or the reversing of normal order, can also inflate or deflate certain elements or ideas. In the visual mode, for instance, the sizes of elements or their places

in a composition may be changed. Verbally, certain elements can be marked through a reversed word order. *Personifications* (or anthropomorphisms) attribute human characteristics to an animal or inanimate object (e.g. the representation of the Earth as a conscious being or a mother). This may put them in a different light. It can, for instance, bring them closer to us and facilitate identification (see 2.3.3.1 (In)animate Participants and Attributes; 2.3.3.3 Positionality). Also, it may allow them to play different roles, for instance as active agents able to provide solutions rather than as passive objects (see Heuberger, 2007; Stibbe, 2015). *Exemplars* (see also personalization) or *numbers* (including scientific graphs, percentages) can make particular (parts of) frames more tangible, engaging and/or convincing (and thus, salient). In the verbal mode, *stock phrases*, *one-liners*, *rhetorical questions* and *slogans* can often be found in the title or the first paragraphs of an article and offer a (salient) memorable and concise – but usually quite subjective – definition of the matter (Van Gorp, 2006). *Alliterations* (e.g. economic environmentalism) may draw the attention of the audience. Also, they signal a strong relationship between two issues or ideas. *Presuppositions* let authors imply meanings without overly stating them or suggest that something is factual (i.e. not the subject of discussion) while it is actually highly subjective and ideological. For instance, a sentence like ‘The real problem is that many migrants do not want to work’ allows the communicator to foreground only one problem (i.e. the problem that fits in his or her perspective, that supports his or her worldview), suggesting that all other problems are irrelevant (Durand, 1987; Fowler, 1996; Fuchs & Graff, 2010; Lanham, 1991; Machin & Mayr, 2012; Richardson, 2007; van Dijk, 1988, 1998; Van Gorp, 2006; Verschueren, 2011). *Repetition and size*, finally, are arguably among the *most pervasive salience enhancing devices*. After all, Entman (1991) argues that “[t]he essence of framing is sizing – magnifying or shrinking elements of the depicted reality to make them more or less salient” (p.9) (e.g. Coleman, 2010; Entman, 1993, 2004; Fahmy, 2010; Gamson, 1989; Kioussis, 2004; Jewitt & Oyama, 2001; Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; Machin & Mayr, 2012; Mendelson, 2005; Schaap & Pleijter, 2012; Tankard, 2001; Touri & Koteyko, 2015; van Dijk, 1988, 1998; Van Gorp, 2006).³⁵

2.3.3.7 Narration

Various labels have been used to refer to the macro-level of (verbal) texts: I have already mentioned the semantic ‘macrostructure’ or ‘macrosyntax’ of Van Dijk (1977) above while discussing the potential (explicit) manifestation of reasoning devices in the verbal mode (see also Halliday, 2000). As said, Van Dijk’s ‘macrostructure’ inspired Pan and Kosicki (1993) to introduce a (hypothesis-testing) ‘thematic structure’ for framing analysis, which was later adopted by Van Gorp (2006). I pointed out, however, that Pan and Kosicki (1993) also drew on Van Dijk (1977) for their ‘syntactical dimension’, which they called a ‘truly structural level’ that does not require semantic analysis for interpretation. That is, as

³⁵ See also: Aday, Cluverius and Livingston (2005), Alexander (2011), Borah (2009), Borah and Bulla (2006) Brantner, Geise and Lobinger (2012), Dahmen (2009), Huang and Fahmy (2013), Schwalbe, Silcock and Keith (2008).

pointed out by Van Gorp (2006), this level is merely concerned with salience (i.e. the ways in which the ordering of discourse may signify power). Another level introduced by the authors is the ‘script level’, which – as they argued – is also largely structural in nature. That is, it deals with the organization of (news) stories based on ‘story grammars’ (e.g. the ‘5 w’s and 1 h’). Pan and Kosicki (1993) also referred to characters, actions and human emotions (the two former have already been addressed on the levels of (In)animate Participants and Attributes (2.3.3.1) and Processes (2.3.3.2)).

While I also recognize the crucial importance of macrostructural elements as salience enhancing devices to any framing analysis, I consider the approach of Pan and Kosicki (1993) and Van Gorp (2006) far too narrow in the light of a multimodal framing analysis as it is entirely based on linguistic theory (Halliday, 2000; van Dijk, 1977).³⁶ Besides, the logic of their framing model is too much determined by the news narrative (e.g. the inverted pyramid) while frames structure all kinds of (textual and/or cognitive) narratives (e.g. political speeches, films, the cognitive frames of the audience). Nevertheless, as I have pointed out before (see 2.2.1.4 Frames and Narratives), I agree that frames and narratives are closely intertwined, even though they work on different levels of abstraction (see e.g. Stibbe, 2015; Van Gorp, 2006; Wozniak, Lück & Wessler, 2015). Yet, arguing for a broader perspective on the narrative – not exclusively verbal; not exclusively related to news but to narratives in general³⁷ – I adopt ‘the level of narration’ (or ‘discourse’) of Barthes and Duisit (1975) as a broader (i.e. modality-independent), more useful level to approach the *more structural workings of narratives*. The (lower, more substantive) levels of ‘functions’ and ‘actions’ of these authors have already been largely covered before (see 2.3.3.1 (In)animate Participants and Attributes; 2.3.3.2 Processes). As Barthes and Duisit (1975) argue, the level of narration is mostly concerned with the *relations among (the narrative situation of) the narrator and (the situation of) the listener or reader*, without which a narrative simply cannot exist. Accordingly, theorizing based on Barthes and Duisit (1975), Plantinga (1997), Van Dijk (1977, 1988, 1998) as well as Goodnow (2005) or Wozniak, Lück and Wessler (2015), I contend that this level contains variables such as point of view, narrative style, order and duration. Introducing ‘narration’, then, mainly allows to approach (visual) narratives as ‘rhetorical structures’ which help to communicate frames more effectively (Hendry, 2010; Wozniak, Lück & Wessler, 2015). Apart from quoting, which both has implications for salience as well as content, all devices on this level can first and foremost be considered as salience enhancing devices. Jones (2014) has, for instance, empirically demonstrated the power of climate narratives (vis-à-vis climate facts) to engage people (i.e. to enhance salience), for instance positively influencing affect for the heroes.

³⁶ As pointed out, the semantic macrostructure is useful to detect explicit reasoning devices in the verbal discourse, but is not applicable to (implicit) visual-verbal argumentations.

³⁷ In the end, all (acts of) human communication could be considered as narrative acts (e.g. McComas & Shanahan, 1999; Shanahan & McComas, 1999)

Firstly, I attend to the *narrators* (i.e. the communicators, such as journalists, and their sources) (see Carragee & Roefs, 2004; Entman & Rojecki, 1993; Fowler, 1996; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Gans, 1979, 2004; Pan & Kosicki, 1993; Peters, 1977; Plantinga, 1997; Tankard, 2001; Tuchman, 1978; van Dijk, 1988; Van Gorp, 2006).³⁸ Who is allowed to speak and who is not? Which quotes are selected and which are not? How are they presented (see voice and polyphony in Roulet (2011))? Clearly, various groups may foreground various (sub)frames, depending on their interests or worldviews (see 3.1 Frame-Building). Verbal quotes (i.e. quoted statements or views) are often rich in framing devices (e.g. catchphrases) or implicit / explicit (verbal) ordering devices (e.g. ‘the main problem is (...)’) signalling *certain argumentations*. As such, they may function as pivotal devices on the semantic macrostructural level (van Dijk, 1977, 1988) (see 2.3.3 Multimodal Framing Analysis: A Method). Surely, that is no surprise. It is in the interest of frame-sponsors to promote their views as clearly and eloquently as possible (e.g. Cox & Schwarze, 2015; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Greenberg, Knight & Westersund, 2011; Molotch & Lester, 1974). Obviously, images are also (increasingly) used with that purpose (e.g. Delicath & Deluca, 2003; Doyle, 2007, 2009; Liu, 2013; Mendelson, 2005; Wozniak, Wessler & Lück, 2017). Accordingly, visuals may – in interaction with the (con)text – ‘quote’ certain interest groups by exclusively showing the reality ‘as they see it’. Captions or article texts, then, may or may not explicitly relate certain sources to certain views. For instance, in the ‘visual framing contest about climate change’ photo editors may choose to adopt the photo material provided by politicians, who mainly wish to showcase their own actions or the consequences of climate change, or rather those of NGOs, who use photographs to spotlight their own brand or to highlight the urgency of climate action (see Wozniak, Wessler & Lück, 2017). Clearly, the selection of certain narrators also – directly and indirectly – reinforces the lower-level argumentations as for who is able to contribute as an active, authoritative participant (i.e. a sayers), for instance proposing (and enacting) solutions.

The act of quoting as such (i.e. as a strategy), however, can rather be considered as a *salience enhancing device*. Quoting is considered as a crucial strategy which may sustain objectivity and neutrality, particularly – but not exclusively (see e.g. academic literature) – in news discourse (e.g. Tuchman, 1972) (see 3.1.1 Mainstream Media). The selection and foregrounding of certain interest groups and their quotes at the expense of others (implicitly) suggests that some narrators and their views of the world are *more legitimate or more ‘trustworthy’* than others. Framing can only take place on condition that the communicators are deemed credible by the public because they are considered as experts or because ‘they are just like us’ (Druckman, 2001a; Malka, Krosnick & Langer, 2009; O’Neill, 2017). Accordingly, the argumentations of legitimized narrators are more likely to be noticed and accepted by the audience while the views of delegitimated speakers are marginalized. Apart from simple *selection or exclusion*, some other, *more specific (de)legitimization strategies* can be used. Some of these

³⁸ See also the ‘verbal processes’ (Halliday, 2000), which encompass – among others – a sayers and a verbiage (2.3.3.2 Processes).

strategies are concerned with *the representation of the narrators*. For instance, describing a source as ‘a well-known physicist from Oxford University’ is more likely to give weight to his/her views than a reference to ‘a Belgian farmer’ (see hedging, e.g. Machin & Mayr (2012)). Machin and Mayr (2012) argue that news media often select stock images representing the sources quoted in the articles. This allows for a certain extent of manipulation, that is, the selection of particular poses or facial expressions, which may imply particular personality traits or characteristics (e.g. Bell, 2001). According to Tuchman (1978), social distance, eye-level and a head-on perspective help to legitimate sources, conveying an air of truth and trustworthiness (see 2.3.3.3 Positionality). Besides, the contexts (circumstances) in which sources are represented or the actions (i.e. processes) they are shown or said to be involved in may also help to legitimate or rather delegitimize them (see 2.3.3.4 Circumstances). For example, protesters violently clashing with the police are likely to be approached as less trustworthy (and more distant) sources than peaceful activists providing well-argued claims (e.g. through focusing events, like PR stunts) (see Atton, 2003; Gitlin, 1980; Hall, 1973; Harcup, 2003; Lester & Cottle, 2009; van Dijk, 1988, 1998; Wozniak, Wessler & Lück, 2017).

Another set of (de)legitimization strategies deals with the *representation of quotes*. Verbally, we may, among others, look at the ways in which the views of sources are expressed through reported speech or direct quotations. What do the quoting verbs reveal about the credibility or trustworthiness of the speaker? ‘Explain’, ‘say’ or ‘announce’, for instance, imply factuality and neutrality. Officials are often presented as neutral and, thus, legitimate. Verbs like ‘insist’, ‘claim’ or ‘plaid’ suggest more irrationality and, thus, less credibility. Compare, for example, ‘The minister explained that government would expand the social insurance system’ or ‘The activists claimed that the minister had used government money for personal purposes’. As Caldas-Coulthard (1994) concludes, authors can use particular quoting verbs to express – in an implicit but pervasive way – particular social, cultural or ideological meanings (Caldas-Coulthard, 1994; Fowler, 1996; Machin & Mayr, 2012; Richardson, 2007; Roulet, 2011; Verschueren, 2011). In a similar vein, Entman and Rojecki (1993) demonstrate that the views of non-elite sources – in this case the anti-nuclear movement – are more often associated with fear, worry or anxiety. That is, they are usually represented as being driven by negative emotional reactions. I also add ‘evidentiality’, or the ways in which a communicator qualifies a statement – including the (content of) quotes – by referring to the source of the information, such as sensory perception, hearsay, inference or speculation (e.g. Aikenvald, 2004). Compare, for instance, ‘He said that he had seen that she was sick’ (perception), ‘He said that he was told that she was sick’ (hearsay) and ‘He said that he guessed that she was sick’ (speculation). Modality may add – in comparable (but distinctive) ways – to the strength or weakness, and thus credibility or trustworthiness, of quotes (see 2.3.3.5 Modality). Of course, this always happens in interaction with other devices, particularly the representation of the narrators. For instance, the inferences of a professor are more likely to be approached as trustworthy than those of the man in the street. Visually, point of view can suggest certain degrees of involvement or objectivity.

Long shots and deep focus may, for instance, give rise to an objective point of view while close-ups and shallow focus suggest a subjective – and potentially less trustworthy – point of view. The over-the-shoulder shot may invite the audience to take a narrator’s viewpoint (Barthes & Duisit, 1975; Messaris, 1997; Monaco, 2000; Rose, 2001). Similarly, Langacker (1993) points out that certain verbal choices – for instance, whether or not the personal pronoun ‘I’ is used – may suggest whether or not the ‘self’ of the narrator is part of a scene or acts as a vantage point for observation.

In a more general sense, then, the overall *narrative style* may also draw the attention to certain frames or particular arguments: The emotional or dramatic character of texts, and accordingly, the aesthetic, affective or graphic qualities of pictures, as well as arousing or unexpected content, may add salience (i.e. valence) (see Batziou, 2011; Borah, 2009; Borah & Bulla, 2006; Brantner, Geise & Lobinger, 2012; Entman, 1991; Fahmy, 2010; Grittmann, 2014; Hanusch, 2013; Jungblut & Zakareviciute, 2018; Kioussis, 2004; Parry, 2010; Peters, 1977; Schaap & Pleijter, 2012; van Dijk, 1988, 1998). This narrative style largely arises from – but also exceeds – the interacting salience enhancing devices which I have discussed above. For example, the emotional character and suspense of the (well-crafted and detailed) story of a young migrant girl who dies trying to cross the Mediterranean, may attract our attention, more than a dry report that starts out with an overview of abstract numbers and percentages and discusses those in a more formal and ‘neutral’ language. Obviously, a first person perspective – inviting us to look through the eyes of the narrator – may heighten this effect (Messaris, 1997; Monaco, 2000; Rose, 2001) (see above and 2.3.3.3 Positionality). A graphic image of a dead body (e.g. focus on the close-up of a decontextualized human face; the scene is characterized by rich colours) is likely to engage the audience (e.g. Borah, 2009; Borah & Bulla, 2006; Fahmy, 2010; Grittmann, 2014; Hanusch, 2013; Schaap & Pleijter, 2012). A visual of an unharmed, beautiful girl in the midst of a destructed landscape after a natural disaster may draw our attention as she looks out of place (Ayass, 2016). That is, she adds emotion, unexpectedness and, possibly, aesthetics to a visual. DiFrancesco and Young (2010) argue that an emotive, aesthetic scene of a polar bear and her cub are more likely to convey pervasive messages with regard to climate change. After all, the audience is invited to feel rather than to think and these feelings are less likely to be questioned. Yet, they may give rise to particular rational responses. Grittmann (2014) argues in a similar way:

Images of the landscape are abundant, spectacular ways to characterize nature’s power. They are vivid due to the structure and unlimited size of frame and the long shot. They emphasize nature’s beauty by careful choice of light and colour. And who would not want to protect this overwhelming pristine wilderness and beauty. (p.141)

Note, as argued before, that this kind of ‘sublimation’, or aestheticization, may also serve decontextualization (see 2.3.3.4 Circumstances) (see also Brantner, Lobinger & Wetzstein, 2011; Chouliaraki, 2006; Graber, 1988; Hansen & Machin, 2008; Huxford, 2001; Joffe, 2008; Leiserowitz, 2006, 2007; Myers et al., 2012; Whitmarsh, O’Neill & Lorenzoni, 2013).

Finally, the *placement* of an argumentation in the structure of the story – particularly the beginning (e.g. heading, subhead, lead, first paragraphs), ending (conclusions) or picture (caption) – may give it more salience. Plantinga (1997) argues, for instance:

Once spectators make hypotheses (...) they are stubborn in their tendency to retain them through the duration of the text, and to resist alternative frames. (...) The epilogue of a text, then, assists the viewer in [his/her] backward-looking process by filling in gaps, summing up, and suggesting a frame by which the previous data can be interpreted. (p.90)

Also, a pull quote may ‘literally’ foreground a (part of a) particular frame. The same is true for ‘*duration*’ (i.e. size): an elaboration on an idea or view is more likely to make it salient than a reference in passing (Brantner, Geise & Lobinger, 2012; Coleman, 2010; Kiouisis, 2004; Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; Plantinga, 1997; Tankard, 2001; van Dijk, 1988, 1998)³⁹.

2.3.3.8 Intertextuality

As I have pointed out before, the meanings of verbal and visual devices are largely defined by the contexts (e.g. time, space, culture) in which they are produced and interpreted, including the cognitive frames of the communicators (e.g. Barthes, 1977; Buehner, 2012; Entman, Matthes & Pellicano, 2009; Fairclough, 1995, 2000; Graber, 1996; Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; Messaris, 1997). In other words, context (implicitly) plays a role on all levels of this framing analysis toolkit – as it defines the communication process in general. This separate level of intertextuality, however, deals more explicitly with the traces or cues in and beyond (multimodal) texts which attest to – and may encourage – the interaction and transfer of (more comprehensive) frames, argumentative structures or arguments between contexts (see the ideological level of Barthes (1972, 1977) or the ‘Tiefenstruktur’ of Geise and Rössler (2012)). After all, frames only take (full) shape across various realizations (i.e. various multimodal / monomodal texts). “Intertextuality refers to the way that the meaning of any one discursive image or text depend not only on that one text or image but also on the meanings carried by other images and texts” (Rose, 2001, p.136). In short, the intertextual structure places frames (and news stories) explicitly in a *broader issue debate*, which adds to the meaning-building (see Fowler, 1996; Giles & Shaw, 2009; Mendelson, 2005; Richardson, 2007; Van Gorp, 2006; Verschueren, 2011; Zelizer, 2004).

Visual and verbal references to other (media) texts (e.g. related through the same / similar subjects or temporal links), *icons, symbols, myths, metonyms, allusions or “key events”* (e.g. 9/11), which are part of the collective memory, may evoke certain associations and emotions within the audience (Van Gorp, 2006). As such, they can contextualize, complement or sustain a (sub)frame. Visuals, as powerful and memorable icons crystallizing and concretizing complex issues (see e.g. Perlmutter, 1998), in particular,

³⁹ See also Dan and Ihlen (2011), Entman (1991), Fahmy (2010), Pan and Kosicki (1993), Schwalbe, Silcock and Keith (2008).

may constitute potent devices connecting events, issues or arguments. Zelizer (2004, p.161) posits, more specifically, that such “[c]ollectively held images act as signposts [...], providing a frame in which people can collectively appropriate images. That frame directs us to preferred meaning by the fastest if not the most all-encompassing route”. According to the author, the modality of a picture – for instance, the above discussed ‘subjunctive voice’, which encourages the spectator to interpret the visual (e.g. answering questions such as ‘What does this remind me of?’) – facilitates the connection between visuals across time and space (e.g. linking images of wars, natural disasters or terrorist attacks). While new pictures largely borrow their meanings from the collectively shaped frame, they also add new meanings to this tradition. For instance, the starving child is a highly familiar icon – and a metonym for the suffering of the ‘developing world’ – which we recognize from stories as diverse as the early twentieth century colonialization, the Vietnam war as well as recent natural disasters like the 2004 Tsunami (Ali, James & Vultee, 2013; Chouliaraki, 2006; Perlmutter, 1998). In a similar way, a reference to the November 2015 Paris attacks or the Brexit are likely to activate particular mental frames or schemata among the audience (in particular time-spaces), which they may use to interpret new issues or events (see Boesman et al., 2017; Gamson et al., 1992; Graber, 1988; Scheufele, 1999, 2006).⁴⁰ Accordingly, Goodnow (2005) argues that visuals are very powerful narratives that may affirm or reconfirm existing narratives or myths (e.g. the universal flood myth (see Gavin, Leonard-Milsom & Montgomery, 2011; Salvador & Norton, 2011)). However, they can also help to challenge them if they provide evidence that shows that alternatives are possible. For instance, a picture that shows evidence of the massacres by the US army abroad may encourage the audience to question the myth that the US (army) acts upon values like justice or the sacredness of human life (see Kaml, 2005).

Clearly, then, ‘*cultural resonance*’ can also be considered as a salience enhancing device: The more frames resonate with larger cultural themes, the more likely they are to be perceived, to be understood, to be (fully / largely) incorporated and to incite affective reactions or identification, at least for those (living in particular time-spaces) familiar with these themes (e.g. Barthes, 1972; Buehner, 2012; Grancea, 2014; Koga-Browes, 2013; Mendelson, 2005; Messaris, 1997; Pauwels, 2005; Perlmutter, 1998, 2005; Rose, 2001). Besides, they are more readily accepted or even remain largely unnoticed due to the fact that people perceive their devices as familiar, or even natural (Entman, 1993, 2004; Fisher, 1985; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Machin & Mayr, 2012; Wozniak, Lück & Wessler, 2015). The suffering child is a good example of this. Perlmutter (1998) argues that *icons* (i.e. iconographic images), in particular, are highly influential, as they often tap into recognizable biblical, classical, historical or cross-cultural themes, such as ‘the father and the son’ or the Last Supper (see Van Straten, 2002). For instance, Ayass (2016) considers the image of ‘Tsunami girl’, a picture of a young woman wrapped in

⁴⁰ Boesman et al. (2017) argue, accordingly, that journalists often adopt the frames which they have used to comprehend and represent earlier (key) events when first dealing with new and unfamiliar issues. Key events can even develop into new frames if the existing frames do not allow to deal with a fundamentally changed reality (see Van Gorp, 2006).

a blanket which was circulated during the tsunami and earthquake in Japan in 2011, as a key image: It may not only evoke the Christian iconography of the Madonna (without child), but it also reflects a universal motif of a parent in search of her child.

Layout choices, such as (lacking) frame lines, (structural) similarities or (the lack of) inter-visual synonymy, may also suggest *(dis)connection or (in)coherence*, on the level of the page or outlet. For instance, a smaller story about the financial deflation in Belgium can be inserted into the layout (i.e. the space on the newspaper page) of a longer story dealing with the economic consequences of climatic changes felt by citizens around the globe, implying certain similarities in terms of content (e.g. theme, topic, frame) (e.g. Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; Meier, 2013; van Leeuwen, 2011). Furthermore, *repetition, placement, size, frame lines, incongruities in the layout, vectors, the number of pictures* may heighten *salience* on page, outlet or inter-source level. For example, the placement of a story on the front page is more likely to provide prominence than its placement on one of the pages inside a newspaper or magazine. According to Nurmis (2017), the placement of an article within a news outlet is – apart from a range of other factors, such as personal decisions or preferences of layouters or chiefs – dependent on the salience and aesthetic values of the accompanying visual. The presence or absence of visuals accompanying verbal texts is usually the result of deliberate choices, which help to highlight the relevant importance of articles as evaluated by the decision-makers (Bissell, 2000; Nurmis, 2017). A larger or different font or coloured frame around a picture may also draw our attention. According to authors like Kress and van Leeuwen (2006) or Monaco (2000), elements which are placed at the left and/or at the top of a page are usually given more weight, at least in a western context. The presence of large images or the repetition of a frame throughout (one edition of) a newspaper or across outlets may also heighten salience (Brantner, Geise & Lobinger, 2004; Entman, 1991; Entman & Rojecki, 1993; Fahmy, 2010; Kioussis, 2004; Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; Meier, 2013; Perlmutter, 1998; Royce, 1999; Schaap & Pleijter, 2012; van Dijk, 1988, 1998; van Leeuwen, 2011). Several authors note, for instance, that the same (type of) visuals tend to be used over and over again (Coleman, 2010; Graber, 1996; Mellese & Müller, 2012; Tuchman, 1978; Zelizer, 2004), for instance with regard to climate change (e.g. Léon & Erviti, 2015; Manzo, 2010a, 2010b; O’Neill, 2013, 2017). Accordingly, it is not unlikely that the same or similar frames are also repeated time and again, and hence, become highly salient.

2.3.3.9 Multimodal (Multi-Level) Interactions

Obviously, the visual and verbal modes do not work separately, or in parallel. As Barthes (1977) pointed out already, they always co-operate, creating *more or less coherent wholes* (see 2.3.1 Framing and the Special Attributes of the Visual) (see Geise & Baden, 2015). His ‘anchorage’ and ‘relay’ clearly tie in with the multimodal framing process. Anchorage refers to the selective, repressive function of language encouraging the reader to receive certain meanings from the image while avoiding others. In the case of relay, image and text stand in a complementary relation (e.g. a cartoon), both adding information that

cannot be found in the other mode. More recent frameworks, like Royce's (1999) or Martinec and Salway's (2005), who draw on authors like Barthes (1977), Halliday (1978, 1985, 1994, in Royce (1999) and Martinec & Salway (2005)), Martin (1992) or Kress and van Leeuwen (2006), allow to further elaborate and operationalize the visual-verbal interactions (see also Unsworth & Cléirigh, 2009).

'Individual' (groups of) framing devices interact, both across as well as within modes. As argued before, I contend that these interactions can mainly be situated on the 'Oberflächenstruktur' ('surface structure'; denotative) and (quasi-manifest; connotative) 'Binnenstruktur' ('internal structure') of Geise and Rössler (2012) (see Barthes, 1977). Elaborating on Royce (1999) and Martin (1992) (see componential cohesion), I claim that all multimodal and multi-level interactions can be analysed in terms of (paradigmatic) repetition (or reinforcement), antonymy (or dissonance), synonymy, 'metonymy' or 'amplification' (which can all be considered as congruent relations).⁴¹ *Repetition (or reinforcement)* indicates that visual and verbal devices represent a (near) 'identical' meaning or idea. For instance, 'farmer' may be repeated in the text and visual (on a denotative level). Note, however, that visual and verbal meanings can never be fully identical due to the different properties, allowances and limitations of the two modes (e.g. Unsworth & Cléirigh, 2009). *Antonymy (or dissonance)* deals with oppositional meanings in the two modes. The passivity (e.g. passive voice, mental or relational processes) of a participant in the verbal text can, for instance, be counter-balanced by his/her activity (e.g. vectors indicating transactive (re)actions, no visual demand) in the visual. *Synonymy (congruence on equal level of abstraction)* is the representation of similar ideas in the visual and verbal. For example, the visual may legitimate a source using social distance, eye-level and head-on perspective (see Tuchman, 1978) while the verbal may refer to the 'eliteness' of the source (e.g. a spokesperson of the United Nations) and use neutral quoting verbs like 'said' or 'announced'. While these first three relations are concerned with meanings on the same (or a similar) level of abstraction or concreteness, *metonymy (congruence on unequal level of abstraction)* is not. As defined before (see 2.3.3.6 Rhetorical Figures), metonymy deals with contiguity relations (e.g. part-whole, abstract-concrete) (e.g. Catalano & Waugh, 2013). In this case, one element is represented in the visual, the other in the verbal part of multimodal texts. For example, the verbal text may deal with the poor state of bike lanes in Belgium in general, while the visual may provide an image of a very specific bike lane (in a particular street, in a particular Belgian city). In the case of *amplification* the information in the visual is extended or enhanced by the verbal or vice versa. For instance, the visual may provide an iconographical reference to the universal Flood myth (e.g. Salvador & Norton, 2011), which is completely absent in the verbal text and which may alter the interpretations of the latter. The verbal text may situate a political meeting in time that is visualized in the image. Obviously, visual and verbal variables can also be related in terms of *relative salience*, for

⁴¹ The latter two are my own terms. They are based on theoretical reasoning, drawing on the literature. I use 'metonymy' as a more comprehensive term instead of hyponymy and meronymy in Royce (1999) and Martin (1992). 'Amplification' summarizes, I argue, the cohesive relations described as concatenations by Royce (1999) and as nuclear relations of enhancement and extension by Martin (1992).

instance based on their repetition, relative size, placement (e.g. top versus bottom) or colour contrasts within the article. Obviously, the repetition of similar or identical variables across modes may also heighten their salience (see e.g. Entman, 1991, 2004; Huxford, 2001; Jewitt & Oyama, 2001; Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; Machin & Mayr, 2012; Van Gorp, 2006). As suggested above, these interactions on the level of individual (groups of) selected devices (or components) can also be applied on the relations among variables within the same mode.

However, a framing analysis is always aimed at laying bare the meaning making processes of *selection and structuring* (i.e. paradigmatic and syntagmatic interactions (see Halliday, 2000; Langacker, 1993)) on a deeper, more comprehensive and fundamental (ideological) level (see the ‘Tiefenstruktur’ of Geise and Rössler (2012)). Besides, the audience is more likely to process multimodal texts as holistic messages, focusing on the – for them – most salient parts, rather than to analyse deeply or consciously each (multimodal) level separately (Bal, 1991; Machin, 2009; Machin & Mayr, 2012; Mendelson, 2005). As I will discuss in Chapter 6, this largely mirrors the production process of multimodal texts in media organizations. Accordingly, it is particularly useful – and more feasible in practice – to primarily attend to the relations on the level of the whole visual-verbal interactions. Obviously, the lower-level ‘individual’ interactions help to give rise to these comprehensive relationships and do facilitate analyses. The model of ‘logico-semantic relations’ proposed by Martinec and Salway (2005) (drawing on Barthes, 1977; Halliday, 1978, 1985, 1994, in Royce (1999) and Martinec & Salway (2005)) constitutes a useful guideline. I borrow the terms elaboration, extension and enhancement, which are all types of expansion. *Elaboration* can mean exposition (text and visual are equal in terms of abstraction or concreteness) or exemplification (either the image or the text is more abstract or concrete). *Extension* involves the adding of information, an exception or an alternative by either image or text. *Enhancement* is the adding of contextual information regarding time, place, cause, result... (see 2.3.3.4 Circumstances). Translating this to the framing concept, I argue that in case of exposition or exemplification the same, or very similar, argumentations (or reasoning devices) can be found in both modes. These may be equally abstract / concrete or more detailed in one of the modes. Extension and, in particular, enhancement, however, are more likely to involve the elaboration of the discussion (i.e. the adding of reasoning devices) in either the verbal or the visual mode. For instance, the verbal text may add a causal responsibility which cannot be found in the visual. The *composite of salience enhancing devices* on various levels may give an indication of the relative salience of the visual, verbal or multimodal message.⁴²

⁴² Martinec and Salway (2005) also mention ‘*projection*’. That is, the verbal is part of the image and does not constitute a text in its own right. *Locution* refers then to the quoting of exact wordings, *idea* to the quoting of mental processes or thoughts. For instance, in analytical images (e.g. in textbooks) the text often labels the meanings in the visual. In comic strips, the text is incorporated into the visual in speech or thought bubbles (see 2.3.3.2 Processes). This is only of secondary relevance in (the analysis of) multimodal framing.

Clearly, this model assumes coherent multimodal frame messages (Geise & Baden, 2015). Therefore, I want to accentuate that we must apply it with the understanding that the visual and verbal modes always mutually affect each other, while both are dependent on contextual factors. That is, the meaning potential of the visual is always limited by textual cues, the interpretation of the verbal is guided by the visual, and the multimodal message is strongly affected by broader contextual factors (Barthes, 1977; Coleman, 2010; Geise & Baden, 2015; Machin & Mayr, 2012; Martinec & Salway, 2005; Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; Unsworth & Cléirigh, 2009). Accordingly, it is important to be aware of and identify the most important variables – visual, verbal and/or contextual – which pre-eminently help to give rise to a coherent multimodal frame on the deeper, comprehensive level. For instance, taking salience into account, we must try to decide whether the verbal is most likely to provide the argumentative structure in which the devices are rendered meaningful (and the incongruent meanings or ideas are discarded), or whether a highly salient and culturally resonant visual icon, metonym or other framing device is, perhaps, more likely to give rise to a frame in which we may embed the verbal devices. However, this may also be a mutually constitutive process, with both modes (or sets of multimodal devices) reinforcing each other. In any case, the guiding role of either the verbal or the visual does not prevent the ‘secondary’ mode from affecting the meaning (potential) of the more salient mode, at least on the surface or internal level. In the process, we must, of course, always take into account the dominant cultural frames, mental frames or schemata of communicators and recipients (including researchers), culturally shared views or conventions, frames on the same page or in the same outlet.

For example, a large, rather grainy photograph shows an air view of a ‘faceless’ crowd of immigrants trying to cross a fence. The caption situates the scene ‘yesterday’ on ‘the Greek-Macedonian border’. This is placed in the centre of an article, ‘Should Europe close its borders?’, which discusses numbers and percentages (migrants, countries of origin etc.), based on a recent international study by various famous universities. References are made, among others, to ‘large floods of migrants’ and to generalized ‘them’. Some causes – civil wars, climate change, famine – are discussed in the text. They are presented as quite independent agents. Further, solutions – repressive, dissuasive measures (but also local development aid) or, rather, commitments to welcome migrants – which the governments of the various European countries (i.e. elite agents, active voice) are obliged to take, are provided. Clearly, the verbal text extends and enhances the visual argumentation, providing causal responsibilities and a range of treatment recommendations. The visual, on the other hand, exemplifies the problem (large, anonymous groups of migrants but situated in a particular time-space) and one of the solutions (closing of a particular border). As such, selecting certain elements, the image may help to highlight a particular frame. That is, in interaction with the text – see the textual legitimization, title, flood metaphor, strong modality – it heightens the salience of certain arguments through its size, central placement in the layout, graininess, objective point of view, intertextual references to similar, familiar scenes. Also, its contextualization in (our) recognizable time-space may heighten a sense of urgency. Bringing together a number of (visual-

verbal) culturally resonant devices – ‘us versus them’, the flood metaphor, the helpless other, the developed world as the hero (e.g. Chouliaraki, 2006; van Dijk, 1998) – this is likely to evoke, and reinforce, the generally shared (Anthropocentric Subframe of the) justice frame (see Chapter 4) (e.g. Hopke, 2012; Vihersalo, 2008).

2.3.4 Application of the Framing Analysis Toolkit

In order to illustrate the efficacy and feasibility of a multimodal framing analysis, I will now briefly apply the multimodal framing analysis toolkit on a case study news article about climate change. I will discuss some of the most salient devices in the example. I selected the article “Australia must put a price on carbon, say institutional investors”, which was published on the website of the British newspaper *The Guardian* on 7 March 2017. The image, which only comprises orange-red and black shades, shows an evening landscape with the silhouettes of powerlines at the horizon and a natural scene, with plants and a bird, in the foreground. The caption reads: “The Investor Group on Climate Change has urged the government to take concreted steps to unlock new investment” (see Appendix 1: Case Study Article). The article makes use of the Scala Naturae (Anthropocentric) Subframe (see Chapter 4).

Both verbal text and visual highlight that climate change is the main (external) force that causes the current problems. The text does so, among others, by presenting climate change as the agent in material processes: “Climate change is worsening the impacts from heatwaves and hot weather and is putting a strain on critical infrastructures (...)”. The focus lies on (scientific) numbers indicating the rise (and, particularly, the extremes) of GHG emissions and temperatures. The visual exemplifies this, drawing on the more abstract ideas of heat conveyed by the red-orange hues. This may, potentially, decontextualize the cause beyond the concrete time-space in which people act. The familiar (i.e. intertextual) colour symbolism may function as a powerful cue that may evoke the broader context (and thus, argumentation) of the Anthropocentric Scala Naturae Subframe, which often employs such symbolism. The verbal text further enhances this information, highlighting the failure of the Australian government to act properly.

The problems, then, are verbally situated in Australia, especially in certain regions (see pigeonholing). While they are discussed in more general terms – suggesting consequences for human and nature – we find repeated (i.e. salient) references to power outages (and thus, the consequences for humans as victims – see passivity, terms like ‘vulnerability’): “This summer alone has shown the vulnerability of the electricity grid to heatwaves, with power outages during peak times in South Australia during a severe February heatwave, while New South Wales narrowly avoided widespread outages several days later”. Put differently, the impact on humans is implicitly foregrounded. The visual, however, backgrounds the Australian context (i.e. decontextualization), exclusively focussing on more specific events or subjects (exemplification). The vulnerable power infrastructure *and* nature are foregrounded – in black shades – as victims of climatic changes: the powerlines in the background and the stork, pool and meadow in the

foreground stand as metonyms for, respectively, threatened (generic) human (development) and threatened nature as a whole. I consider the visual scene as an example of a relational process (i.e. a symbolic (conceptual) process), with the carriers holding a symbolic meaning. The symbolic potential of the visual is, among others, emphasized through the lowered (truth) modality (e.g. lack of details in the underexposed foreground, an overly saturated background). The image draws, more specifically, on the culturally resonant symbol of the (decontextualized) threatened pristine landscape which humans are responsible for (see e.g. Cottle, 2000; Grittmann, 2014; Remillard, 2011). In this particular realization of this recurrent theme, the contrast between light and darkness, (red-orange) colours and black shades may help to reinforce the sense of threat. As such, the photograph extends the verbal argumentation. This resonant representation – often used in the context of *Scala Naturae* – might evoke strong responses, and thus enhance the salience of the visual(-verbal) information. Apart from its cultural resonance, the image contains a number of other devices which may heighten its salience, like its dramatic character, its colour and light contrasts and its sensory truth. Sensory truth, which reflects the sensory experience of objects or events through details, shapes or colours (see the association red-orange and heat), may enhance emotive resonance.

Solutions are mainly (immanently) discussed in the verbal part of the article, for instance, in the salient title: “Australia must put a price on carbon, say institutional investors”. The repeated strong modality (in title and text) does not leave room for any other possible views on solutions. These solutions are, more specifically, completely situated within the hegemonic (free) market thinking (carbon trading, new investments, market mechanisms) and techno-optimism (green, renewable energy). While standing for the threatened human infrastructure, the powerlines in the background may – simultaneously – also symbolize part of the technological solution (elaboration). The main, legitimized sources, like the Investor Group of Climate Change or the Clean Energy Finance Corporation, can also be situated in this context. An individualized, top-down actor – Australian government – is singled out as main responsible agent, rather than, for instance, industry or human (elites) across the globe.

2.3.5 Pending issues

We live in a media and entertainment world that is increasingly becoming more multimodal. Therefore, we need tools to grasp and analyse this world. In other words, concepts and methods like framing ought to become multimodal. As I have shown, efforts have indeed been made to embrace the visual. These endeavours provide valuable starting points. Yet, they still present some major problems, failing to incorporate the two modes as equal and interactive or providing frames which largely ignore underlying argumentations and, as such, ideological or power interests. I have argued that most of those problems stem from narrow or underdeveloped methods and, accordingly, applications. Therefore, I have introduced a multimodal, multi-level framing analysis toolkit, drawing on earlier research within the framing field and beyond. I believe that this may provide handles for further research, stimulating the

increase of – much needed – multimodal framing conceptualizations, methods and empirical applications. Obviously, the provided model will also need further input and development, by being applied on different cases and issues or in other academic fields, beyond communication and media studies.

The structure of the multimodal model is largely rooted in (multimodal) critical discourse analysis and semiotics, as well as framing. These are fields which are still largely dominated by the linguistic mode / thinking. Surely, this has some benefits. As Machin (2009) argues, for instance, linguistic theory may help to make us aware of issues like the syntagmatic and paradigmatic (see Halliday, 2000; Langacker, 1993) relations of signs (see Jones, 2016; Monaco, 2000). Indeed, throughout the toolkit, particularly within the levels in the central grey area and in the symmetrical ('mirrored') columns, alternative (i.e. paradigmatic) verbal *and* visual choices are identified, or at least suggested, encouraging us to consider what has (not) been *selected*. Besides, the horizontal and vertical rows and columns are supposed to visualize the potential of syntagmatic relations and *structures* within and across levels and modes. The arrow underneath the model, in particular, may help to clarify the multimodal relations, largely drawing on linguistic concepts like logico-semantic relations and componential cohesion. As said, selection and organization are key to framing. Therefore, I consider both axes as crucial contributions to any framing model (see Monaco, 2000).

Yet, the paradigmatic axe, in particular, may also pose some problems: Mirroring the verbal, the visual part of the model may encourage us to impose an overly tight syntax on the – polysemic, analogical / iconic – images, approaching them as abstract (symbolical) signs.⁴³ Indeed, one must not forget that the 'visual syntax' is fundamentally different from the verbal syntax, with the former interacting to a much larger extent with (con)texts and mental audience frames and schemata. Accordingly, we must be wary of handling (typical) form-function relationships mechanically, and particularly of over-analysing:⁴⁴ Contrary to what the framework might suggest, for instance, every variable may be connotative in some contexts but denotative in others (Barthes, 1977; Buehner, 2012; Grancea, 2014; Machin, 2009; Monaco, 2000; Mendelson, 2005). For example, the use of an air view may intend to distance us from the victims of a natural disaster and/or suggest an unequal relationship, but it may also simply result from practical or technical constraints briefly after such events (e.g. Borah, 2009; Borah & Bulla, 2006; Grayson, 2013).

⁴³ Some visual codes can be distinguished, though. Yet, rather than being based on structural relationships, they mainly draw on (our experiences of) reality or the (ideological) meanings allocated to them in particular cultural time-spaces (Machin, 2009) (e.g. social distance (Hall, 1997), point of view or colour symbolism (e.g. Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006)).

⁴⁴ This is applicable to any analysis. For instance, counter-screening, taking the direct and broader (e.g. cultural) context into account, is always needed (e.g. Verschueren, 2011). Yet, it is of particular importance when looking at the highly polysemic visual mode.

Trying to overcome these pitfalls, I have taken a broad range of insights into account. As such, however, I ended up with a rather complex framework. Although it may allow for detailed descriptions of the (interacting) modes (Jewitt, 2009), it is difficult and time consuming to apply and communicate. Accordingly, my qualitative analysis is, up till now, rather limited, which hampers the broader testing of the toolkit (see Chapters 4, 5 and 6). Furthermore, it is a challenge to discuss more than one or two (sub)frames at length (i.e. all multimodal layers and interactions) in qualitative research papers (see Jones, 2016). Therefore, I suggest, it is perhaps more effective to approach the toolkit in its current form as an extensive overview of potential framing devices and interactions. Each researcher can mold and adapt it depending on the research design, topic or field of research, selecting a number of key devices and narrowing it down where needed. One may argue, then, that the framework must and can be ‘framed’ in various ways, by various researchers, depending on their contexts and purposes. After all, there is not one way to carry out a framing analysis, nor can one researcher come up with *the* ultimate toolkit, which is applicable in all contexts. Yet, I believe that methods, and empirical applications accordingly, must be sufficiently transparent, coherent and in-depth. In that regard, the proposed toolkit may constitute a useful guideline. It may be a first step towards such ways of working, which may also allow for comparison and further theory and/or method building. I hope, more specifically, that the flexibility and openness of the method will stir (fruitful) interactions among various perspectives and contributions, as these may further help to develop the framework, answer some unanswered questions, expand the model.

Indeed, the toolkit is still underdeveloped in some areas. For instance, being tailored to printed or online media (or texts in general), the toolkit may still be too limited in some respects. Audio-visual communication, for instance, is likely to pose new challenges, which will need to be carefully addressed (see Grimm, 2014). While I have incorporated some considerations from audio-visual researchers (e.g. Jones, 2016), I have not yet operationalized or tested the toolkit in this context. Besides, the model – due to its, inevitably, two-dimensional character – currently seems unable to truly account for (i.e. visualize / operationalize) (all) interactions across layers and modes. While they do manifest themselves during the application of the method, they are merely suggested in the design of the table. Also, the toolkit has mainly emerged from / in the context of western linguistics and visual traditions. It is not unlikely that colleagues from different backgrounds may deconstruct some levels or devices as culturally-specific, which the model now (implicitly) presents as universal.

Finally, the model does not provide definite answers as for the handling of visual-verbal contrasts (see Geise & Baden, 2015). Contrasts are often pivotal in (news) texts. Accordingly, I have included antonymy (or dissonance) on the level of ‘componential cohesion’ (see the ‘Oberflächenstruktur’ and ‘Binnenstruktur’ of Geise & Rössler (2012)). Berger (2004, p.22) contends: “discerning meaning without finding polar oppositions is like listening to the sound of one hand clapping”. That is, contrasts

may give rise to secondary meanings, going beyond the individual modes (Machin & Mayr, 2012). Lobinger and Geise (2013) argue that it is not sufficient for researchers to determine whether, and how, one subframe surpasses another. Rather, one should look for multimodal integrations on a higher level (see Geise & Baden, 2015). I expect, indeed, that the visual and verbal layers are more likely to convey one comprehensive multimodal frame rather than two monomodal frames. After all, the two modes – each with their own properties, allowances and limitations – often interact in complex ways, mutually influencing each other (Coleman, 2010; Geise & Baden, 2015). Therefore, I have argued that we should focus on the comprehensive ‘logico-semantic relations’ (Martinec & Salway, 2005), or the ‘Tiefenstruktur’ (Geise & Rössler, 2012). According to Jones (2016), for example, it is often helpful to look in the verbal or visual for what is missing (i.e. certain implications which may be related to contextual factors). For instance, the visual symbol of the suffering, passive child (Ali, James & Vultee, 2013; Chouliaraki, 2006; Perlmutter, 1998) may be integrated in the argumentation of a verbal text that seems, at first glance, dissonant (antonymous): On a lower level of analysis, the generic, helpless child can oppose the verbal representations of resilience and agency of local grassroots groups in the global South (e.g. passive versus active voice, ‘them’ versus ‘us’ (positionality)). This can help to balance and nuance the representation of the locals, who are neither exclusively victims, nor exclusively agents. In the broader context of the comprehensive multimodal (sub)frame, then, the depiction may help to give shape to the causal responsibility by facing a western viewer with his stereotypical – and thus lacking – framing of the South, which is argued (in the text) to be the cause of much of the suffering and deprivation in this region. This nuanced idea of victimization may also buttress the problem definition (see Verschueren, 2011; Machin & Mayr, 2012).

However, one problem remains. As I have argued before and illustrated above, the cohesive multimodal message often emerges from the guiding text, which gives rise to a frame in which all multimodal devices can be embedded. However, I also expect that the visual, at times, may prompt the argumentative structure in which the verbal devices can be integrated. As I have pointed out, (relative) salience, including the cultural resonance of particular devices or conventions (see preferred meaning), may help the audience to decide which devices are most pervasive (g., Hall, 1997; Huxford, 2001; Jewitt & Oyama, 2001; Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; Messaris, 1997; Messaris & Abraham, 2001). One may wonder, however, how we ought to deal with different types of icons or symbols in the visual and the verbal mode which appear to be comparable in terms of salience (e.g. cultural resonance), at least in certain time-spaces? For example, the heading and lead of the verbal text may foreground the pervasive western conventions of sublime nature (Cottle, 2000; Grittmann, 2014; Remillard, 2011) while the visual may highlight the icon of the suffering child in the South. As said, I expect that both are likely to evoke different subframes (i.e. the anthropocentric version of Cycles of Nature or rather Environmental Justice). Which subframe is, then, most likely to guide the framing of the multimodal whole? The visual has been shown to be particularly pervasive, especially when depicting humans (e.g. Abraham &

Appiah, 2006; Brantner, Lobinger & Wetzstein, 2011; Domke, Perlmutter & Spratt, 2002; Graber, 1988, 1996; Newton, 2000; Powell et al., 2015). Drawing on previous reception studies, for instance, Geise and Baden (2015) posit that viewers tend to perceive the visual information first and understand the subsequent verbal information against that background. Also, Moriarty and Sayre (2005) contend that visual elements with a symbolic meaning usually have a greater impact, as they tend to be more complex and, thus, require more involvement and mental engagement of the receiver (see Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Nevertheless, multiple (contextual) factors may be at play in any given situation, such as the relative salience of the visual and verbal as experienced by the recipients, the mental schemata or frames of the audience or other intervening factors like engagement, knowledge or mood (Fillmore & Baker, 2009; Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Graber, 1988; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) (see 3.3 Frame Interpretations).

Therefore, in order to get beyond (well-argued) guesswork, I argue that audience reception research will need to complement the text-focused studies, which the proposed model primarily caters for. These may provide crucial insights regarding the frames which audiences actually take away from multimodal texts (e.g. Buehner, 2012; Domke, Perlmutter & Spratt, 2002; Mendelson, 2005). Yet, it is equally important to understand the production context (see Chapter 6) (Jones, 2016). While – as suggested – the application of the model must always take into account some contextual factors, like the profile or ownership of the media outlet or broader hegemonic influences, a fuller understanding of multimodal framing (e.g. potential and preferred meanings, ideological interests) can only fully emanate from studies focusing primarily on the production side (e.g. Boesman et al., 2017; Brüggeman, 2014; Brüggemann & Engesser, 2014, 2016; Nurmis, 2017; Vossen, Van Gorp & Schulpen, 2017).

3 Framing as a Process

With origins in both sociology as well as cognitive psychology, framing is a bridging model (see Reese, 2007; Van Gorp, 2007) between culture and cognition (Goffmann, 1986; Gamson et al., 1992) and the individual and collective levels of society (Entman, Matthes & Pellicano, 2009). This is also highlighted by Gitlin (1980) who defines (media) frames as “(...) persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation, of selection, emphasis and exclusion (...)” (p.7). Frames can indeed be found in a number of different areas, which can be summarized in the scheme below (Figure 1) with regard to the media communication process (Dahinden, 2005; De Vreese, 2005; Druckman, 2001b; Entman, Matthes & Pellicano, 2009; Scheufele, B., 2006; Scheufele, D.A., 1999; Van Gorp, 2006; Vliegthart & van Zoonen, 2011).⁴⁵ Interest groups or frame-sponsors, journalists (both individual journalists as well as groups of journalists organized in beats or newsrooms) and audiences have cognitive frames, which help them to process information: interest group frames, journalist, beat or newsroom frames and audience frames. According to Reese (2007), for instance, the ‘dynamic quality’ of frames, “(...) their ability to project knowledge ahead as they guide the structure of incoming experience” (p.150) is crucial to framing. Frames become manifest when they are used to structure (multimodal) texts like news reports (i.e. news frames). As indicated by the arrows in the scheme, the various frames interact and influence each other (in feedback processes). As such, they also give shape to the overarching stock of (universal) cultural frames people – simultaneously – choose from and are restrained by. Cultural frames constitute a rather small and quite stable group of shared cognitive frames in human culture, in the minds of publics and elites, in texts of literature, film, news, education (Entman, Matthes & Pellicano, 2009; Hertog & McLeod, 2001; Reese, 2007). Yet, the frames which become manifest and (thus) mentally available to people may strongly differ depending on particular time-spaces, including various cultures, nations, historical time periods or types of outlets (e.g. popular versus broadsheet, mainstream versus popular) (Van Gorp, 2006, 2007). Gamson and Modigliani (1989) speak about ‘culturally available frames’ (see Stibbe, 2015).

Frame-building and frame-setting are often used in this context (Buehner, 2012; De Vreese, 2005; Hart, 2011; Scheufele, B., 2006; Scheufele, D.A., 1999; Vliegthart & van Zoonen, 2011). Frame-building, by a communicator or ‘sender’, addresses all media-internal and media-external forces that help to shape – or build – the eventual frame, and hence the media product. Although the term ‘building’ might suggest a fully conscious process, I do not understand it as such: Some influences may stem from (rather) conscious decisions, such as frame-sponsoring (i.e. strategic framing). However, many of them – interacting with and mitigating these conscious forces – are usually rather accidental or unconscious (i.e. non-strategic framing) (Boesman & Van Gorp, 2016; Brüggemann, 2014; Coleman, 2010; Druckman, 2001a; Entman, 1993; Entman, Matthes & Pellicano, 2009; Gamson, 1989; Hänggli, 2012;

⁴⁵ See also the encoding / decoding model of Stuart Hall (1980).

Hänggli & Kriesi, 2012; Reese, 2007). ‘Frame-setting’ refers to the influence frames may exert on the audience (i.e. the receiver), affecting their thinking, values, emotions and, potentially, their behaviour. As indicated in the scheme (see the feedback loops), journalists are also a part of the audience. That is, they are likely to be influenced by the (dominant) news frames. While the word ‘setting’ may evoke the idea of a one-way process – originating with the media (product) and aimed at a passive audience – I do understand this as an interactive process, involving an active audience (e.g. Borah, 2011; Buehner, 2012; Druckman, 2001a, 2001b; Hart, 2011). Therefore, I prefer and will use the term ‘frame interpretations’ (see e.g. Scheufele, B., 2006).

Cognitive frames, including journalist frames, result from cultural frames and interactions with (the frames of) other communicators, but they are also influenced by personal attitudes, experiences and views (Engesser & Brüggemann, 2016). Bertram Scheufele (2006) argues, accordingly, that mental frames are based on a consistent cluster of mental schemata (e.g. a victim-schema, a culprit-schema, a cause-schema). Each individual builds these schemata drawing on socialization in a certain culture, education, media input but also cognitions, values, feelings, life experiences or reasoning (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Graber, 1988; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). “News frames, in contrast, are the product of professional collaboration and represent a mixture of different social and cultural frames, actor [i.e. interest-group] frames, editorial frames and journalist frames” (Engesser & Brüggemann, 2016, p.828). Clearly then, even if the input of journalist frames and news frames may be similar, both types of frames can never be identical: the former have a more individual, the latter a more social or collective character. Functioning in similar contexts, drawing on comparable experiences or being socialized in comparable ways, journalists in the same beats or newsrooms may, however, adopt beat or newsroom frames, which have a more collective (i.e. shared) character. As pointed out above, cultural frames are also (generally) shared frames (see De Vreese, 2005; Entman, Matthes & Pellicano, 2009; Fillmore & Baker, 2009; Gamson, 1989; Scheufele, D.A., 1999; Vliegenthart & van Zoonen, 2011).

Concluding, to appreciate the full potential and possible implications of framing, we must never forget that framing is a process. I will now discuss the three stages of the framing process (i.e. frame-building, the multimodal text, frame interpretations) in detail, highlighting interactions and feedback loops as well as broader contexts. I will focus, in particular, on frame-building as this will be the central topic of Chapter 6. Besides, it provides important underlying insights, which allow for a fuller understanding of Chapters 4 and 5. The ‘text’ has already been discussed extensively in Chapter 2. Hence, I will only include some general remarks as regards to its role and status in the broader framing process. Frame interpretations will be discussed briefly as they will not be directly addressed in this study. Yet, some of the findings may help to contextualize the findings which I will present in the empirical chapters. As may be clear from the above, I will primarily concentrate on media framing. Nevertheless, my discussion

will touch upon more general patterns and processes which are common to framing in general, that is, in all kinds of settings and contexts.

3.1 Frame-Building




Figure 1: The figure visualizes the framing process, with various (mutually) interacting phases, actors and influences, including cultural, mental and textual frames. The phase of frame-building and the interactions which are directly related to it, are highlighted in green.

Media constitute a “very important arena in the struggle for legitimacy” (Trumbo, 1996, p.270), in which various interest groups or ‘frame-sponsors’ are involved. The latter, promoting their interpretation of an issue (i.e. their values, views, interests), strive to define the hegemonic views in society. In other words, they want their understanding to dominate all other understandings (Goffman, 1986, p.105). As such, their frames – promoting their interests – are likely to be accepted by the audience as common sense, as natural. Hegemony could, therefore, be defined as the process by which certain groups secure their ruling power (the established political order) by constructing consent. Or, as Gitlin (1980) vividly summarizes, hegemony unites persuasion from above with consent from below. Hegemonic positions are, however, temporal, unstable, continually shifting; they are being challenged and resisted by counter-groups, and renewed, recreated and defended by hegemonic groups (Carragee & Roefs, 2004; Fairclough, 1995, 2000; Gamson, 1992; Gamson et al., 1992; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Gans, 2004; Gitlin, 1980; Gramsci, 1980; Hall, 1973; Hallahan, 1999; Tankard, 2001). Accordingly, Mouffe (2005), Swyngedouw (2010), Pepermans (2015), Pepermans and Maesele (2014) or Kenis and Mathijs (2014) argue that

hegemonic powers mainly strive to depoliticize the debate, reproducing argumentations which fit well within the hegemonic thinking (i.e. 'thinking within the hegemonic box'). As such, they prevent true change. Non-hegemonic forces, however, try to politicize the debate. That is, they try to open up the debate to other input, views, argumentations, which may facilitate a fundamental (ideological) transformation (i.e. 'thinking outside of the hegemonic box') (see also Brulle, 2010). Entman (1993, p.55) and Carragee and Roefs (2004, p.222) conclude that frames are "imprints of power". Those who are most powerful in particular time-spaces have the best chance to affect the frame-building process, and thus to reproduce the frames which serve their interests (Molotch & Lester, 1974). Or, in a more general sense, the dominant media frames very much depend on the (top-down or rather bottom-up) positionality (Pulido & Peña, 1998; Taylor, 2000) of those who can – thoroughly – affect the frame-building process.

Reese (2001b) and Shoemaker and Reese (2014) summarize the various influences which may affect frame-building in their 'hierarchy-of-influences model' (see Bissell (1998) and Scoggin McEntee (2016) for an application on the visual and Brüggemann (2014) for the integration of the model into the framing concept). The model encompasses an individual level, routines level, organizational level, extra-media level and ideological level. Based on Voakes (1998), I also add 'small groups' and 'competition'.

As discussed above (3 Framing as a Process), journalists have cognitive journalist frames. Since they are also audiences of news content (of their colleagues), these cognitive frames are likely to interact with the (dominant) media frames which they are confronted with. Further, they are influenced by training and socialization in the media organization and the broader culture but also real-life experiences, values or reasoning (Entman, Matthes & Pellicano, 2009; Gamson, 1989; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Gitlin, 1980; Graber, 1988; Scheufele, B., 2006). Factors such as expertise (Brüggemann & Engesser, 2014), gender (Rodgers & Thorson, 2003) or ideology (Carvalho, 2007; Engesser & Brüggemann, 2016) have, for instance, been shown to affect the reporting of news-workers. For example, a young generalist journalist, lacking experience, background and influence, might get affected more easily by external pressures. A senior expert writer, on the contrary, is more likely to remain faithful to his/her own (critical, well-developed) perspective or values, and to set the tone for others (Brüggemann & Engesser, 2014; Carvalho, 2007; Gans, 1979; Graber, 1988; Reese, 2001b; Shoemaker & Reese, 2014; Tuchman, 1978). Similarly, it has been shown that decisions of individual photographers or photo editors are influenced by artistic instinct, emotions, past experiences, beliefs, skills, training, attitudes, prejudices, personal or demographic backgrounds, opinions or ideological beliefs (e.g. Bissell, 2000; Coleman, 2010; de Smaele, Geenen & De Cock, 2017; Grayson, 2013; Hanusch, 2013; Mendelson, 2005; Nurmis, 2017; Scoggin McEntee, 2016; Seelig, 2005). Summarizing, the mental frames of reporters are likely to affect the news frames they introduce in their media production. Or, as Reese (2007, p.150) puts it, (routinely employed mental) frames help them to structure the incoming information. There is no

agreement in the literature as for the extent to which journalists' frame judgements happen consciously (Reese, 2007; Scheufele, D.A., 1999) or rather unconsciously (Boesman & Van Gorp, 2016; Gitlin, 1980). However, I am inclined to agree with Entman (1993) and Van Gorp (2007) who contend that such decisions may both happen in conscious or unconscious ways, depending on the situation.

Even though the journalist can be considered as the nucleus in the frame-building process, the other – hierarchically organized – influences also affect his or her decision-making (Boesman et al., 2017; Brüggemann, 2014; Brüggemann & Engesser, 2016; Vossen, Van Gorp & Schulpen, 2017). On the routines level, for instance, we find norms, habits or procedures like news values, practices which are supposed to guarantee objectivity or other (visual, verbal or visual-verbal) selection criteria which may affect the eventual news product, and thus news framing. The organizational level is concerned with the interactions among various players (and their – conflicting – interests) in the newsroom (journalists, editors and photo editors, photographers, chiefs of various departments, editors in chief) and within the broader media company (management, media owners) (e.g. Breed, 1955). The level of small groups highlights, more specifically, the influence of peers and informal social interactions. For instance, journalists often interact within the context of small beats – specialist fields, like the political or science beat – which may constitute interpretive communities (see Berkowitz & TerKeurst, 1999; Zelizer, 1993) within or beyond the boundaries of their newsrooms (Gans, 1979; McCluskey, 2008). Dunwoody (1998) discusses, for instance, the 'science writing inner club'. She argues that science journalists from various outlets cooperate or share knowledge, especially during conferences or other events where they (informally) meet. Gans (1979) also describes the tendency of reporters – particularly generalist journalists – to 'move in packs' (see Crouse, 1973). The extra-media level refers to the interaction with broader (socio-political, economic, cultural) contexts and, in particular, actors outside of the media organization like (commercial or non-commercial) partners or sponsors, governments, institutions, NGOs, experts, citizens, broader society. Many of those try to influence the media production (i.e. frame-building) as frame-sponsors or interest groups. Audiences, the interaction with audiences and audience considerations are highly influential too. Media organizations try, for instance, to tailor their verbal and visual media texts to the interests, expectations, sensitivities or ethical considerations of their target audiences as well as (their assessments of) previous audience reactions to certain representations (e.g. Bissell, 2000; Borah, 2009; Borah & Bulla, 2006; Buehner, 2012; de Smaele, Geenen & De Cock, 2017; Fahmy, 2010; Hanusch, 2013; Nurmis, 2017; Perlmutter, 2005; Scoggin McEntee, 2016; Seelig, 2005; Rose, 2001; Wright, 2011). I also add 'competition' here, that is the reaction to (or anticipation of) the work of competing media. Other media are, for instance, considered as influential examples to be followed (see 'pack journalism' (Crouse, 1973) or intermedia agenda-setting (e.g. Lopez-Escobar et al., 1998)) or rather to be surpassed, for instance with an exclusive story or 'scoop'. All these levels add up to the last, ideological level. I contend that ideology both refers to the broader (hegemonic and counter-hegemonic) interests, values, ideologies and power struggles in society (i.e. in particular time-

spaces) (Evans, 2016), as well as to the ideological leanings of various media outlets (see also Darley, 2000; Deuze, 2005b; Galtung & Ruge, 1965, 1973; Harcup & O'Neill, 2001, 2017; Harrabin, 2000; Gans, 1979, 2004; Gitlin, 1980; Seelig, 2005; Tuchman, 1972, 1978).

In Chapter 6 I will discuss in more detail how the various levels of the hierarchy-of-influences model may affect the frame-building process. Here I will attend, in a more general sense, to the three major axes – (1) mainstream / alternative, (2) broadsheet / popular and (3) leftist / centrist / rightist ideological backgrounds – on which the outlets in my corpus can be situated. I argue that the various backgrounds, values and characteristics of the outlet types may largely define their varying positionalities (Pulido & Peña, 1998; Taylor, 2000) and, accordingly, the (sub)frames they are likely to (re)produce. I start out by discussing the commercial character that defines most mainstream media outlets today.

3.1.1 Mainstream Media

Habermas (see Habermas & Burger, 1989) maintained that the media have the responsibility to contribute to a public sphere in which informed public debate can take place. Accordingly, the media are obliged to provide the audience with information, discussions and evidence which allow them to draw informed conclusions. As such, they can participate as free, self-governing citizens in the democratic (political) society. In short, the media have a public responsibility. Private ownership and profit motives have, however, increasingly made to crumble this public sphere since the 18th century, at least in (western) capitalist regions (Gans, 1979, 2004; Habermas & Burger, 1989; Hamilton, 2004; Lewis, 2007; Lewis & Boyce, 2009; McChesney, 2008; Nee, 2014). This taps in with the field theory of Bourdieu (2005), as applied on journalism: In every field the actors and processes reflect a certain logic or *nomos*. Deuze (2005b) identifies, for instance, a professional journalistic ideology, encompassing values such as immediacy, public services, objectivity or autonomy (see also Gans, 1979; Shoemaker & Reese, 2014). Top-down (heteronomous) pressures, like commercialization, privatization or technological requirements, however, have recently limited the autonomy of journalists, and thus the power of *nomos*, in certain areas of the field. That is, the more outlets are commercialized, the more economic capital is valued over cultural capital. Profit and growth, competition in narrow news markets, advertising revenues and circulation are important variables (Marchetti, 2005). Accordingly, the audience becomes a commodity – ears and eyes to be sold to advertisers – and (passive) consumers, which should be given what they want. News is a product, which needs to be produced as quickly and efficiently – i.e. requiring as few paid employees and resources – as possible. That is, quantity is more important than quality and “(...) profits are increasingly being won at the cost of journalistic integrity, autonomy and quality” (Lewis, Williams & Franklin, 2008, p.42). The more intellectual outlets, on the other hand, are characterized by a larger extent of autonomy and, thus, *nomos*. Cultural capital, like journalistic reputation and in-depth or investigative reporting, is valued over economic capital. The audience is approached as (active) citizens rather than as consumers. In short, quality is more important

than quantity (Davies, 2008; De Keyser, 2012; Franklin, Lewis & Williams, 2010; Gans, 1979; Hamilton, 2004; Hanitzsch, 2007, 2011; Harrabin, 2000; Lewis, Williams & Franklin, 2008; McChesney, 2008; Reese, 2001b; Shoemaker & Reese, 2014).

3.1.1.1 Professionalization

In the end, all mainstream media are part of the commercial and highly competitive media market. That is, mainstream media-making (and thus, frame-building) nowadays happens within the context of commercial, rationalized, privatized media concerns, largely ruled by the economic logic preoccupied with audience preferences, the cutting of expenses, the value of certain segments of the audience to advertisers or the competition with other media outlets. Any reporter working within any commercial news organization sees his/her work, autonomy and professionalism constrained by the pressure to produce an increasing amount of output (tailored to the audience), while being restrained by limitations of time, means (including personnel) and space. Technological evolutions and innovations have further intensified these pressures, for instance by speeding up the news cycle or heightening competition. Many of the professional routines and habits in newsrooms can be understood in that light: As, among others, McChesney (2008) points out, the commercialization of the (western) media since the eighteenth-nineteenth century went hand in hand with the process of media professionalization. Accordingly, many of the professional norms – which are often, incorrectly, generalized as naturalistic and static standards, characteristic for ‘*the global journalist*’ (Deuze, 2005b; Hallin & Mancini, 2004; Hanitzsch, 2007, 2011; Liu, 2013) – developed in the commercial(ized/izing) context of the (western) newsroom. However, today (i.e. since the second half of the twentieth century) more than ever, they help reporters to deal with the increasing top-down pressures and expectations. As Zelizer (1993) and Berkowitz and TerKeurst (1999) argue, journalists function (and interact) in (inter)national ‘interpretive communities’, sharing broadly held understandings, conventions and practices even if those compromise their autonomy or ‘nomos’ (Darley, 2000; Davies, 2008; De Keyser, 2012; Franklin, Lewis & Williams, 2010; Gans, 1979, 2004; Gitlin, 1980; Hamilton, 2004; Hanitzsch, 2007, 2011; Lewis, Williams & Franklin, 2008; McChesney, 2008; Shoemaker & Reese, 2014; Tuchman, 1972, 1978; Zelizer, 2007).

3.1.1.1.1 Objectivity

Objectivity, in particular, has become a universalized and hegemonized nodal point of ‘good journalism’ (Carpentier & Trioen, 2010; Deuze, 2005b; Schudson & Anderson, 2009). Schudson (2001, p.150) provides a definition of objectivity that is, nowadays, generally accepted:

The objectivity norm guides journalists to separate facts from values and to report only the facts. Objective reporting is supposed to be cool, rather than emotional, in tone. Objective reporting takes pains to represent fairly each leading side in a political controversy. According to the objectivity norm, the journalist’s job consists of reporting

something called ‘news’ without commenting on it, slanting it, or shaping its formulation in any way.

That is, the ‘subjective self’ is taken out of the journalistic production process; facts are separated from values, opinions, emotions. This view on objectivity is often linked to the journalist as ‘detached watchdog’, which is the dominant professional role in western countries (see Hanitzsch, 2007, 2011). Accordingly, Carpentier and Trioen (2010) argue that ‘*objectivity-as-a-value*’ is an important constituent for the professional journalistic identity, generating meaning and coherence, particularly in the context of western liberal democracies. Kovach and Rosenstiel (2007) contend that objectivity has become an important part of the marketing of modern media. Objectivity claims must, more specifically, help to legitimate the news media, ensuring that no personal or ideological values or interests are involved. Put differently, objectivity is a defence mechanism, a “*strategic ritual* protecting newspapermen from the risks of their trade” (Tuchman, 1972, p.660; italics added): public mistrust, criticism or even libel suits (versus the appeal to as broad an audience as possible) but also the continuous deadlines (which leave no time for extensive assessments) or rebukes from their superiors (i.e. their standing in the news organization). That is, it helps to protect them from a decrease in efficiency, circulation and, thus, profit (see Boesman & Van Gorp, 2016). As Harbers (2016) summarizes, the commercial “(...) production logic was conducive to the rise of the objectivity regime and was simultaneously reinforced by it” (p.497), facilitating – among others – hierarchically reinforced editorial uniformity (Schudson, 2001).

In spite of holding on to ‘objectivity-as-a-value’, journalists are generally aware of the fact that this modernist ideal is untenable, or unfeasible, in practice. Yet, protecting their authority and role of ‘truth-speakers’ (Tuchman, 1978), they use a number of strategies to convince the audience of the objective character of their reporting – even, or especially, in a time in which the general (modernist) belief in ‘truthful grand narratives’, provided by institutions like the media, the church or government, is quickly disappearing (Broersma, 2010; Carpentier & Trioen, 2010; Harbers, 2016). *Objectivity claims* are supported in a number of ways (‘objectivity-as-a-practice’ (Carpentier & Trioen, 2010)): Facts, which can be separated from values, are considered to be ‘out there’ and should be described as accurately and precisely as possible. However, if facts cannot be observed, experienced or measured by the reporters or their colleagues, factuality is suggested by quoting news sources, as a form of supporting evidence. The reporter and his/her views are, supposedly, no part of the story. That is, (s)he just ‘lets the facts speak for themselves’. This allows, however, for critical views to be inserted without the reporter risking to be accused of bias or personal opinion. Also, balance – telling both sides of the story as a strategic ritual which must allow the consumer to decide what is the truth – is a typical strategy. Statements are also accepted as factual or common sense if they correspond to the ‘facts’ provided by other – preferably elite – news outlets or by the outlets’ expert reporters: their experiences or ‘craftmanship’ validate their judgements and claims. Finally, some facts – concerning the environment (e.g. climate change) or

justice, for instance – are considered to be proven and, thus, taken for granted, while statistics and numbers are also considered to be more trustworthy than language (see Fowler, 1996; van Dijk, 1988). Subjective views and personal opinions are restricted to specifically dedicated pages or contributions, like the opinion pages, and are clearly labelled as such (Darley, 2000; Gans, 1979; Hanitzsch, 2007; Hiles and Hinnant, 2014; Lewis & Reese, 2009; Shoemaker & Reese, 2014; Tuchman, 1972, 1978).

In more recent years, in particular, the sense of objectivity and neutrality has also increasingly been supported by the photographs or images that accompany news pieces. That is, *photographic truth* may be transferred to the content of stories. While the audience still has a fairly strong confidence in the truth or credibility of (news) photographs, this is slowly crumbling away. Awareness regarding the subjectivity and potential for manipulation of the photographic (production) process is growing. Photojournalists (and photo editors) are, for instance, no longer approached as camera operators or ‘technicians’ but as creative and subjective picture makers. Also, the transition of photography from a chemical – and thus more technical – process, requiring craftsmanship, to a self-managed digital process, accessible to anyone, has nourished scepticism towards the objectivity of media representations (e.g. Schwartz, 2003). Accordingly, newspapers – especially the more serious ones – deliberately try to maintain the belief in photographic truth, in order to uphold their status as objective and reliable sources. For instance, they scare away from manipulating pictures or focus on denotation (i.e. naturalistic pictures providing ‘direct visual evidence’ of people, places, events). When making use of suggestive, evocative pictures (which – according to Wright (2011) – increasingly happens), objectivity claims are legitimized by ‘objective’ captions or the naturalistic character (i.e. the denotative level) of the pictures. For example, light or point of view may evoke certain meanings or associations, but are kept naturalistic (i.e. unmanipulated) (Barthes, 1977; Bissell, 2000; Grayson, 2013; Hall, 1973; Kaml, 2005; Liu, 2013; Mendelson, 2005; Messaris & Abraham, 2001; Mitchell, 1992; Newton, 2000; Nilsson & Wadbring, 2015; Nurmis, 2017; Seelig, 2005; Tirohl, 2000; Wright, 2011). De Smaele, Geenen and De Cock (2017) conclude that ‘truthfulness’ is both concerned with content (‘what is pictured’) as well as technical aspects (‘how it is pictured’). For instance, the Flemish photo editors in their study preferred natural and spontaneous photographs. Digital manipulation is not acceptable if it leads to the misreporting of facts. That is, photo editors try to hold up the long-standing ideal of ‘*mechanical objectivity*’, claiming that the objective world is allowed to speak for itself through the image, without intervention or interpretation. As discussed in 2.3 (Visual and Multimodal Framing), the editors can, of course, not but intervene in practice (e.g. selecting, organizing, fore- or backgrounding), drawing on their experiences and visual literacy (e.g. de Smaele, Geenen & De Cock, 2017; Nurmis, 2017; Seelig, 2005). As such, one can argue, their practices actually lean closer towards more interpretive approaches to truth and objectivity, especially ‘trained judgement’ (see Daston & Galison, 2007). As argued above, the fact that newsmakers are aware of this opposition clearly does not mean they are open about it (Broersma, 2010; Carpentier & Trioen, 2010).

In any case, *professional photojournalism* is in *crisis*. On the one hand, there are more ‘direct’ commercial top-down pressures (e.g. lack of visually educated staff, lack of budget, the need to master equipment and technology, the increased focus on breaking news and tight 24-hour news cycles) (e.g. McChesney, 2008; Zelizer, 2007). On the other hand – and partly facilitated (or necessitated) by those pressures as well as technological developments – is the competition with citizen photojournalists who – having access to places or events which may be beyond the reach of professionals – provide increasing amounts of materials, which often diverge from the professional notions of ‘good (i.e. aesthetic and technical quality, information value), truthful and ethical photojournalism’ (e.g. Grayson, 2013; Nilsson & Wadbring, 2015; Scoggin McEntee, 2016; Silcock & Schwalbe, 2010; Tirohl, 2000). One may argue that the practice of ‘eye-witnessing’ – a journalistic key word according to Zelizer (2007) – is increasingly being taken over by non-professionals, with the ‘having-been-there’ claims of their photographs supporting discursive authority (i.e. visual truth claims) (Pantti & Andén-Papadopoulos, 2011). More generally, it has been shown that the audience is more inclined to accept the ‘direct’ visual reports of (subjective) amateurs – poorly composed (close-up) pictures or grainy visuals of bad quality – than the ‘less authentic’ – more distant, hyper-realistic, edited / manipulated – photographs of ‘detached’ professionals (Chouliaraki, 2006; Huxford, 2001; Kaml, 2005; Monaco, 2000). While professional newsmakers could adapt to this evolution by adopting the role of ‘visual gatekeepers’ of user-generated content (e.g. Scoggin McEntee, 2016; Silcock & Schwalbe, 2010), Fahmy (2005), Nilsson and Wadbring (2015) and Nurmis (2017) demonstrate that the influence of non-professional materials remains limited, especially in broadsheet media. That is, mainstream photo editors largely stick to the traditional norms of ‘good, truthful photojournalism’ to convince, persuade and attract the audience; the control over the gatekeeping process remains largely within the newsrooms, with photo editors who are increasingly expected to become ‘jacks of all trades’ (see Deuze, 2005a). Nilsson and Wadbring (2015) add, however, that the limited influence of user-generated content may also, partly, be due to a lack of interest among the audience. Summarizing, in order to maintain their own role as credible agents or ‘truth-speakers’, reporters continually attempt to uphold the (professional) “web of facticity” (Tuchman, 1978, p.86) they have constructed.

Kovach and Rosenstiel (2007) criticize these widespread contemporary practices as hollow devices which need to convince the audience of the objectivity and trustworthiness of journalism while obscuring actual verification methods or even deceiving the public. The authors distinguish among two levels of ‘truth’: *Correspondence* means getting the facts straight, for instance, the number of people who died in an accident or the words spoken by the Prime Minister during a speech. *Coherence* means ‘making sense of the facts’, providing broader contexts and fair and reliable interpretations of possible meanings. The goal is the ‘best obtainable version of the truth’. Coherence is often a process, which takes place over various articles, op-eds, contributions, and thus in conversation with various groups, including the audience: “This practical truth is a protean thing that, like learning, grows like a stalactite

in a cave, drop by drop, over time” (p.44). Similarly, Carpentier (2008), drawing on Westerståhl (1983), distinguishes among two levels of objectivity: factuality (i.e. relevance and truthfulness) and impartiality (balance and neutrality). These objectivity levels do not entirely coincide with the levels of ‘truth’ of Kovach and Rosenstiel (2007). Nevertheless, I argue, a focus on relevant and truthful facts can most directly be associated with ‘correspondence’ while ‘coherence’, in particular, requires the introduction of a wide range of voices, and thus interpretations (see impartiality). Yet, balance (and quoting) can also be employed on the level of ‘correspondence’. According to Carpentier (2008), however, impartiality is increasingly contested as it is used in too absolutist and detached ways, distancing journalists and audiences from ‘the world’ (i.e. events) and one another (Harbers, 2016). That is especially problematic if universal values (e.g. justice) are at stake. Carpentier (2008) argues, accordingly, for ‘pluralist objectivity’, which allows for engagement without limiting the discussion to only one perspective or solution (see Deuze, 2005b; Fahy, 2017; Gans, 1979; Gess, 2012; Harbers, 2016; Hiles & Hinant, 2014; Le Masurier, 2015). Kovach and Rosenstiel (2007) add that the hegemonic approach to balance and neutrality is, in particular, misleading, as news-making is always subjective (Boykoff & Boykoff, 2004; Harbers, 2016). For instance, the approach privileges certain sources at the expense of others without being open about it. As I will discuss below, these are usually elites and/or sources which reflect views consonant with those of the journalists (see Brüggemann & Engesser, 2014; Tuchman, 1972). Accordingly, Tuchman (1978) argues that using sources as forms of evidence, journalists “intermesh fact and source” (p.90). Objectivity has been automatized, atop of subjectivity. Put differently, *objectivity* has become a *goal in its own right* (i.e. to appear neutral), while it ought to be – and was envisioned as such in the early twentieth century (see Lippmann, 2006) – a (coherent) method and means to deal with unavoidable subjectivity (i.e. to prevent biases from undermining accuracy). As the authors contend, journalists can never be objective – due to, among others, their backgrounds, interests or preoccupations with certain routines (see e.g. Molotch & Lester, 1974) – but their methods can be. Accordingly, they argue that journalists should be more open, transparent and sceptical regarding methods, sources, motives, expertise, interpretations or assumptions. Hence, balance (i.e. the inclusion of various viewpoints / pluralist objectivity) ought to be approached as method for gathering information rather than simply for presentation (see Cushion, 2012a, 2012b; Carpentier & Trioen, 2010; Deuze, 2005b; Fahy, 2017; Hiles & Hinnant, 2014). Clearly, this argumentation can also be applied to visual ‘truth’ or ‘objectivity’. Proponents of slow (visual) journalism (e.g. Drok & Hermans, 2016; Mendelson & Creech, 2016) contend, for instance, that visuals ought to be (openly) used to provide deeper interpretations, symbolism and contextualization, while allowing for various perspectives and voices to partake in the debate (i.e. images may reflect the view of the producer rather than a standardized, institutionalized way of seeing).

Discussing the Dutch journalistic platform *De Correspondent* as an example of ‘slow journalism’ (see Gess, 2012, Le Masurier, 2015), Harbers (2016) demonstrates how these ideals can be operationalized.

In *De Correspondent* reporting is not just providing a final product. Rather, the process of reporting is foregrounded, allowing journalists to be open about their problems, frustrations, experiences or emotions, and the ways in which they have conducted research, constructed stories or reached conclusions. The audience is invited to actively engage in this ‘work in progress’. Stories in *De Correspondent* capitalize, in particular, on the ‘mediating subjectivity’ of the reporters. That is, the journalists explicitly or implicitly make clear that they present *their* representation of reality by, among others, adopting a first-person perspective, addressing the reader, or sharing personal experiences and detailed descriptions of their observations or conversations with sources. As Harpers (2016) concludes, the reporters turn away from the idea of one ‘given’ (top-down) truth, but do not lapse into complete relativism either. Rather, they are concerned with aggregative truth(-seeking), with overt moral grounding:

Based on thorough reporting and in-depth background research, they ultimately choose sides in a certain matter or determine what the best point of view is. The authority of the accounts is thus inextricably bound to the individual behind it (p.500).

Besides, the journalists do not question the idea of ‘factuality’ as such. That is, they argue that sound empirical research or interviews with specialists (i.e. ‘getting the facts right’) must cement and contextualize their analyses, arguments or experiences. Clearly, this is reminiscent of the ‘levels of truth’ distinguished by Kovach and Rosenstiel (2007). These authors conclude, in a similar vein, that *correspondence and coherence* should always go hand in hand. After all, facts without broader contextualization may give rise to distortion (e.g. stereotypes). They argue, however, that commercial pressures nowadays necessitate reporters to largely confine themselves to facts (i.e. correspondence) and that fact checking is increasingly replaced by the reproducing of input provided by external sources.

3.1.1.1.2 Hierarchy of Access

This criticism can be found in the work of many scholars. Journalists often fall back on the same types of (external) *routine sources*: their network of familiar (elite) sources, press agencies, press releases and press conferences, other media or journalists, social media, general documentation, data bases and archives... (Darley, 2000; De Keyser, 2012; De Keyser, Raeymaeckers & Paulussen, 2011; Franklin, Lewis & Williams, 2010; Gans, 1979, 2004; Gitlin, 1980; Molotch & Lester, 1974; Lewis, Williams & Franklin, 2008; Shoemaker & Reese, 2014; Van Leuven, Deprez & Raeymaeckers, 2015; Van Leuven, Joye & Flamey, 2015; Tuchman, 1978). Davies (2008) introduced in this context the rather negative term ‘churnalism’, denouncing the fact that in the news factory journalists are reduced to passive processors who do not have the time to go out and speak with sources, to do their own research or to check facts. Rather, they simply have to trust in the accuracy and factuality of external material. Press releases or press agency input, in particular, provides them with – often – well-structured material that respects the rules of news-making. This saves time, resources, and thus, money. Gandy (1982) addresses

these interactions as *'information subsidies'* (see Franklin, Lewis & Williams, 2010; Lewis, Williams and Franklin, 2008; Molotch & Lester, 1974). Clearly, journalists need trustworthy sources, who can deliver content, who provide their articles with a sense of objectivity and factuality (i.e. the rhetorical *'argumentum auctoritatis'*) (Tuchman, 1972) and who are easily and routinely accessible. However, sources also need journalists or, more specifically, access to (i.e. the possibility to influence) the news production process. After all, media constitute important *'arenas'* with various interest groups struggling for attention and thus (potential) prestige and influence for their worldviews, ideologies, frames (see the hegemonic struggle (e.g. Fairclough, 1995, 2000; Gramsci, 1980)). Gans (1979, 2004) described the mutually dependent and beneficial relationship among journalists and sources as a dance: "Public officials and the news media use each other in a sufficient number of ways that a cause-effects model cannot easily be applied to the symbiotic relationship that is at times also a set of feedback loops" (Gans, 2004, p.82). However, the author also referred to the relationship as *'a tug of war'* (Gans, 1979, p.117), with the sources trying to manage the news in order to present themselves – and their case – in the best possible ways and the journalists trying to manage the sources in order to get the information they want. Similarly, Wolfsfeld (1991, in Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993) refers to the journalist-source relationship as a *'competitive symbiosis'*. Patterns may develop in which the repeated media access of certain sources reinforces and confirms the authoritative status of the latter but also of the media which use those authoritative sources. The tendency of media (reporters) to look at each other – so-called *'pack journalism'* (Crouse, 1973) – may further facilitate the authoritative status of particular groups of sources across outlets (see Carlson, 2009).

However, some sources are more likely to get habitual access to the media than others, as they possess the required economic or cultural capital (see Bourdieu, 2005): financial means, expertise, communication personnel, a network, strategic alliances, the prestige to produce *'information subsidies'*. Also, sources who are psychologically and geographically closer to the journalists are more likely to be consulted (Berglez, Höijer & Olausson, 2009; De Keyser, 2012; De Keyser, Raeymaeckers & Paulussen, 2011; Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993; Gans, 1979; Nossek & Kunelius, 2012; Roosvall & Tegelberg, 2013, 2015; Tuchman, 1978). Accordingly, the *primary definers* – i.e. the most influential sources, who have the strongest ties with the media – are often (national) elite or official actors, like politicians, governments (of elite countries), civil servants or corporate businesses. They possess, for instance, the means and the (PR) staff to set up events, such as press conferences, or to distribute press releases or advertising. Those are likely to attract media attention. Their communication is generally well-adapted to what journalists want or expect, providing, for instance, catchphrases or other salient framing devices, (eloquently) foregrounding and summarizing the frames they wish to see covered. Mendelson (2005) points out that these groups also have more control over the ways in which they are visually depicted in press photographs (see Newton, 2000; Thomson & Greenwood, 2017). As discussed above (2.3.3.7 Narration), visual representation is important as it may help to legitimize or delegitimize certain frame-

sponsors and their views. Molotch and Lester (1974) conclude that the needs of the habitual ‘promoters’ usually overlap with those of the ‘news assemblers’. Less established sources, such as NGOs, trade unions, bottom-up groups or ordinary citizens, are often *secondary definers*, if they are not completely absent. As Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993) point out, the (power) relation between media and movements is unequal, with the movements needing the media much more than the media needing the movements. According to the authors, the latter mainly strive for mobilization, validation and scope enlargement through the media. Movements must struggle to get occasional access at most, relying, for instance, on disruptive (visual) actions (e.g. a demonstration or strike), which challenge the normal functioning of the (hegemonic) social world, to draw the attention of media-makers (Entman & Rojecki, 1993; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993; Gitlin, 1980; Molotch & Lester, 1974; Shoemaker & Reese, 2014; Trumbo, 1996; Tuchman, 1978).⁴⁶ This unequal access to the media is often referred to as ‘*hierarchy of access*’ (e.g. Gans, 1979, 2004). This routine helps to naturalize and reproduce who has power and how is powerless, who can be trusted and who cannot, who is an expert and who is a deviant, who is allowed to speak and who is not. Many (multimodal) texts also show the imprints of these battles fought (e.g. Carragee & Roefs, 2004; Gamson, 1989; Gamson, 1992; Gamson et al., 1992). Accordingly, although each text applies one dominant frame, most texts show traces of multiple frames (Entman, 1991). This is also addressed by the concept of ‘polyphony’ (Roulet, 2011), the idea that discourses comprise two or more ‘voices’.

Critical voices, such as Herman and Chomsky (1988) or Cirino (1973), conclude that this dependency relationship primarily allows the economic and political elites to define the debate and to reproduce a narrow, hegemonic (i.e. anthropocentric) outlook upon the world while other voices are largely or entirely excluded. That is, journalists (unintentionally) naturalize *dominant power structures and inequalities* (see also Bennett, Lawrence & Livingston, 2006; Gans, 1979, 2004; Gitlin, 1980; Davies, 2008; Maesele, 2010; McChesney, 2008; Nissani, 1999). Accordingly, van Dijk (1988, p.120) argues:

(...) [J]ournalists internalize the social picture that results from the social and professional constraints on newswriting. And this model or schema in turn favours the selection and production of news stories about the same elites. It has proved to be very difficult to break this vicious cycle.

Clearly, this view presents the external frame-sponsors as conscious and active, as opposed to rather passive, unconscious, or at least easily manipulated, media (workers), serving as intermediators. This perspective has, however, been denounced for being too reductive, unilateral or static. Other authors highlight, for instance, that media access remains a *constant struggle* situated in complex and evolving media and socio-political contexts. As Carlson (2009, p.535) puts it, “[p]rimary definition is an actively

⁴⁶ See also Carragee and Roefs (2004), Darley (2000), De Keyser, Raeymaeckers and Paulussen (2011), Delicath and Deluca (2003), Entman (1993), Hänggli (2012), Hänggli and Kriesi (2012), León and Erviti (2015), Liu (2013), Van Leuven, Deprez and Raeymaeckers (2015), Wozniak, Wessler and Lück (2017).

pursued goal for various organizations, but *automatically* attained by none” (italics in original). Besides, the final news product is always the result of multiple influences, not the least the (conscious) decisions and evaluations of journalists (see also gatekeeping (e.g. Bissell, 2000; Bruns, 2003; de Smaele, Geenen & De Cock, 2017; Fahmy, 2005; McQuail, 2010; Nurmis, 2017; Scoggin McEntee, 2016; Seelig, 2005; Shoemaker & Reese, 2014; Silcock & Schwalbe, 2010; White, 1950)). Tankard (2001) and Entman (1991), among others, agree that frames are the – deliberate – choice of journalists, “(...) mindful of the ‘spin’ various labels give” (Reese, 2007, p.152), in order to elicit favourable reactions. Durham (2001) concludes that “(...) being able to designate ‘salience’ reflects the social power of journalism, which lies precisely in the inclusion of certain voices in normative social discourse and the exclusion of others” (p.125). Sponsors’ frames are, thus, negotiated, and journalists might reject, neglect, criticize or counter them (see Brüggeman, 2014; Gitlin, 1980; Scheufele, B., 2006; Scheufele, D.A., 1999; Tankard, 2001; Taylor & Stanyer, 2017; Van Gorp, 2006; Vossen, Van Gorp & Schulpen, 2017). De Keyser, Raeymaeckers and Paulussen (2011) argue, for instance, that journalists may be wary towards possibly economically tainted information (see De Keyser, 2012). Drawing on Eason (1988), Carlson (2009) refers to the concept of *‘disobedient dependence’* in this context: While strongly depending on certain sources as providers of content and legitimacy (i.e. objectivity), journalists occasionally diverge from their views in order to confirm their critical independence and unattachment. Drawing on a literature review, the author also concludes that the dependence on routine sources seems to weaken, particularly when journalists have to deal with natural disasters or other unusual events. This is consonant with the argumentation of Van Gorp (2006) who – drawing on Kepplinger and Habermeier (1995) – argues that we need a shock to be able to see the boundaries of our dominant frames and to cross them (see 3.3 Frame Interpretations).

De Keyser, Raeymaeckers and Paulussen (2011), Van Leuven, Deprez and Raeymaeckers (2015) and Van Leuven, Joye, Flamey (2015) illustrate, furthermore, that Flemish journalists have consulted a *broader group of sources*, like NGOs, ordinary people or trade unions, in more recent years. Technological developments – widespread internet access, social media, and the like – may have facilitated these evolutions (see Ahva, 2017; Bruns, 2003; Scoggin McEntee, 2016; Silcock & Schwalbe, 2010). Also, the authors argue, an increasing number of journalists are all-rounders (‘jacks of all trades’), who attach more importance to a broader group of sources, as opposed to specialized beat reporters (Deuze, 2005a; Gans, 1979; Gibson et al., 2016; McCluskey, 2008). Besides, NGOs (like Greenpeace) have established themselves in more recent years as more trustworthy sources, by professionalizing their communication, conducting their own research in specific domains (e.g. environment, development in the South), providing the media with ready-made information packages, playing into news values or cultivating relationships with journalists. Wozniak, Wessler and Lück (2017) and Delicath and Deluca (2003) discuss, for instance, ‘focusing’ or ‘image events’, like PR-stunts, as ‘argumentative fragments’ which NGOs set up to provide the media with interesting visual material (see Molotch & Lester, 1974).

As such, they have succeeded in drawing more media attention and building up more sustainable relations with the media (Anderson, 1991; Cox & Schwarze, 2015; Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993; Miller & Riechert, 2000; Mormont & Dasnoy, 1995; Ryan & Freeman Brown, 2015; Van Leuven, Deprez & Raeymaeckers, 2015; Van Leuven, Joye & Flamey, 2015). Their increasing influence may be important as they are more likely to introduce other values, worldviews or frames. That is, they often have different (bottom-up) positionalities (Pulido & Peña, 1998; Taylor, 2000). As such, NGOs and counter-hegemonic voices may move issues from the uncontested to the contested realm (Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993).

However, the fact that the media more often consult social movements is not necessarily visible in the quotes or references in the news articles.⁴⁷ It seems that they mainly function as *agenda-setters*, which draw the attention of the media to interesting events or newsworthy reports (see Harrabin, 2000; Nilsson & Wadbring, 2015). If they appear in the coverage, it is often in the context of a story initiated by other sources (Van Leuven, Joye & Flamey, 2015; Van Leuven, Joye & Flamey, 2015; Wozniak, Wessler and Lück, 2017). In other words, they do not get to initiate their own frames, but are mainly allowed to respond to – and possibly reinforce – those of others (Gitlin, 1980). Some authors argue in a more general vein that social and environmental movements are inclined to adapt their views and argumentations to the hegemonic thinking in order to be heard by the mainstream media (e.g. Farbotko, 2005; Gitlin, 1980; Takahashi & Meisner, 2012). Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993) summarize, for instance: “The media speak *mainstreamese*, and movements are pushed to adopt this language to be heard since journalists are prone to misunderstanding or never hear the alternate language and its underlying ideas” (p.119; italics added). However, if movements adapt their language, codes and ideas too strongly to what is easily welcomed, their oppositional role may get lost or largely backgrounded. Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993) refer, for instance, to environmental movements which seek broad support (and media coverage) through targeting (‘safe’, symbolic problems like) consumer behaviour instead of more fundamental structural problems, and the corporate and political actors who reproduce them.

However, as suggested above (see Carlson, 2009), new, unfamiliar or unexpected events, like natural or human disasters, may give non-hegemonic sources the opportunity to exert stronger influence on the news-making process. While the PR machine of hegemonic sources is still lagging behind and newsmakers are in need of input, NGOs, bottom-up groups or citizens may (be allowed to) – temporarily – jump into the hole. However, the roles of citizens often remain limited to that of ‘*accidental journalists*’, being in the wrong place at the right time (Cottle, 2000; Gans, 1979; Molotch & Lester, 1974; Shoemaker & Reese, 2014; Tuchman, 1978). Nilsson and Wadbring (2015) conclude, in a similar way, that most of the amateur photographs in broadsheets have a ‘breaking news character’ (e.g.

⁴⁷ The same is true for other types of sources, in particular press agency material.

accidents, crime, severe weather): their value mostly resides in their ‘eye-witness’ character (Pantti & Andén-Papadopoulos, 2011; Zelizer, 2007).

De Keyser, Raeymaeckers and Paulussen (2011) also demonstrate that Flemish journalists increasingly depend on *citizens as sources*, who may even be more important than NGOs or business elites. Technological developments, like online blogging, make it easier for journalists to get in touch with citizens (see Ahva, 2017; Bruns, 2003; Harbers, 2016; Scoggin McEntee, 2016; Silcock & Schwalbe, 2010). The research by Fahmy (2005) on the visual sourcing in the context of 9/11 coverage does, however, not (yet) confirm such evolutions, nor does the visual (climate) frame-building study of Nurmis (2017). The same is true for the visual gatekeeping study that Nilsson and Wadbring (2015) conducted in Sweden. According to the authors, international press agencies and professional photojournalists remain the dominant sources (see León & Erviti, 2015), at the expense of citizen(journalist)s and other groups of sources. This may be problematic as press agency material, according to Hansen and Machin (2008) or Aiello and Woodhouse (2016), often generalizes and decontextualizes issues, reflecting and confirming hegemonic capitalist values.

3.1.1.1.3 News Values

News values or criteria of newsworthiness influence both the gatekeeping process (e.g. Bissell, 2000; Bruns, 2003; Fahmy, 2005; McQuail, 2010; Nurmis, 2017; Scoggin McEntee, 2016; Seelig, 2005; Shoemaker & Reese, 2014; Silcock & Schwalbe, 2010; White, 1950) (i.e. the selection of news items) as well as the formulation (or transformation) of news items. That is, they “(...) help the journalist to process large amounts of information in an efficient and routine manner, supporting them in the selection of elements and their organization in a coherent framework” (Van Gorp, 2006, p.74; my translation). Drawing on these socialized and often rather unconscious values, journalists can quickly and efficiently decide which events or issues have the best chance to appeal to (a large share of) the audience as well as to their superiors, who can accept or reject their proposals. As they are separated from the audience (i.e. the communication is largely one-way), they cannot directly ask their audience.⁴⁸ Therefore, news values provide clear and tested leads. In short, news values help reporters to predict *whether news items will be ‘sellable’*. According to Gans (1979), reporters weigh up the newsworthiness of an event based on their own reference frames (see positionality (Pulido & Peña, 1998; Taylor, 2000)) and/or on what they know or expect their (middle class) friends or family to like. Also, news values may be used by frame-sponsors in order to increase their chances to get coverage (Fowler, 1996; Galtung & Ruge, 1965, 1973; Gans, 1979; Hall, 1973; Harcup & O’Neill, 2001, 2017; van Dijk, 1988, 1998; Joye, 2010;

⁴⁸ Obviously, however, recent technological developments – for instance, communication via online news platforms or social media (e.g. likes, shares or comments on Facebook or Twitter) – do present (some groups of) journalists with more direct feedback as regards the audience appeal of their selection and organizational choices (Harcup & O’Neill, 2001, 2017).

Shoemaker & Reese, 2014; Tuchman, 1978). So, in the end, news values are not so much concerned with what audiences need or want to know as with economic, organizational, ideological, cultural or sociological considerations. Accordingly, they are no objective criteria:

In other words, who is selecting news, for whom, in what medium and by what means (and available resources), may well be as important as whatever news values may or may not be inherent in any potential story (Harcup & O'Neill, 2017, p.1483).

In short, (the realizations of) news values are affected by a 'hierarchy-of-influences' (see Shoemaker & Reese, 2014).

Various authors have identified *sets of news values* (e.g. Bednarek & Caple, 2012; Gans, 1979; Joye, 2010; Lang & Lang, 1953). Drawing on the analysis of foreign news reporting in four Norwegian newspapers, Galtung and Ruge (1965, 1973) provided, however, a landmark study, which has been cited in countless other studies. Harcup and O'Neill (2011, 2017) recently produced an update, identifying the following criteria as crucial news values: power elites (including large corporations), celebrity, entertainment (human interest, animals, humour, sports, entertaining photos, witty headlines...), drama (darker stories of 'human interest' involving unfolding drama, e.g. accidents, battles, rescues), surprise (the unexpected, 'unusualness', diverging from the routine), bad news (stories with particularly negative overtones, like death, defeat, loss), conflict (controversies, arguments, fights, strikes, warfare...), good news (stories with particularly positive overtones, like recoveries, cures, celebrations), magnitude (i.e. significance in terms of number of people involved or potential impact; extreme behaviours or occurrences), relevance (for the target audience), exclusivity (i.e. 'scoops'), follow-up (stories about topics which are already in the news) and newspaper agenda (commercial, ideological, a particular campaign). Studying audience behaviour and interactions on social media, Harcup and O'Neill add in their 2017 study also the value 'shareability' (stories which are expected to encourage sharing and comments on social media; often funny stories or stories which may make people angry). Drawing on other authors (Berglez, 2011; Boykoff & Boykoff, 2007; Galtung & Ruge, 1965, 1973; Gans, 1979; Gerbner & Marvanyi, 1977; Hall, 1973; Joye, 2010; Nossek & Kunelius, 2012; Shoemaker & Reese, 2014; Swain, 2003), I add novelty (new, fresh, original or timely; events which take place within the 24-hour news cycle as news pegs), consonance (with socially-shared norms, values, attitudes, the ideological consensus), proximity (both geographically, culturally, psychologically as well as historically), composition (competition with other potential news items) and unambiguity (clarity). Obviously, a number of these values can be combined in one article. Combinations of news values may help to increase newsworthiness. Bednarek and Caple (2012) have applied news values to the *visual mode*. The authors identify, more specifically, both the visual and verbal devices which (are) commonly (used to) reflect certain values. Negativity can, for instance, be expressed verbally by negative vocabulary or references to emotions, visually by evaluative or negative elements or by references to emotions (e.g. images showing people who experience negative emotions). In their latest study, Harcup

and O'Neill (2017) also add 'audio-visual' as an important selection criterium as such (see Caple, 2013 (in Nurmis, 2017); Cushion, 2012a; León & Erviti, 2015; Nurmis, 2017; Smith & Joffe, 2009; Tuchman, 1978). Photo editors argue that, ideally, visuals must not only convey a particular content, but must also have aesthetic values (i.e. appealing to the audience) and reflect particular news values. They have to draw the audience in and move them emotionally (e.g. Bissell, 2000; Fahmy, 2005; Fahmy, Kelly and Kim, 2007; Grayson, 2013; Hanusch, 2013; León & Erviti, 2015; Mendelson, 2005; Nurmis, 2017; Scoggin McEntee, 2016; Seelig, 2005; Smith & Joffe, 2009). News values are subject of change and renegotiation. Accordingly, they cannot be found uniformly across all news outlets, either (Cushion, 2012b; Eliasoph, 1988; Harcup & O'Neill, 2001, 2017). Various authors have pointed out that news values are largely incompatible with climate stories, as climate change is unobtrusive (i.e. invisible) and distant, does not fit the 24-hour news cycle, has lost 'novelty', is highly complex, is not in keeping with pre-existing (mental) models (e.g. Boykoff & Boykoff, 2007; Darley, 2000; Gee, 2000; Harrabin, 2000; Smith & Joffe, 2009).

3.1.1.1.4 Newsroom Organization

Finally, many authors argue that newsrooms nowadays are organized as *factories*, which are efficiently and hierarchically structured, assembly lines in which everyone has their own task or responsibility (see e.g. Davies, 2008; Lewis, Williams & Franklin, 2008; Gans, 1979; Richardson, 2007; Shoemaker & Reese, 2014). Put differently, there is a chain of multiple *gatekeepers*. Each gatekeeper, drawing on his/her own backgrounds, values and routines (see positionality (Pulido & Peña, 1998; Taylor, 2000), evaluates, selects and/or alters stories and/or visuals (e.g. Bissell, 2000; Bruns, 2003; de Smaele, Geenen & De Cock, 2017; Fahmy, 2005; McQuail, 2010; Nurmis, 2017; Scoggin McEntee, 2016; Seelig, 2005; Silcock & Schwalbe, 2010; White, 1950). However, the *freedom and power* to make decisions is not equally distributed among the various gatekeepers. Management and, especially, editors in chief or chiefs of sub-departments (like the chief photo editor) have the last word and make sure that the newsworkers keep their ranks. This often happens in rather subtle and implicit ways, for instance through rewards, salary increases, promotions, or the lack thereof. Also, the killing or adapting of stories during the editing process can make journalists aware of what their superiors expect. Further, reporters are likely to internalize the implicit policies or guidelines through experiences or observation of the kinds of stories or views which are often discussed by their colleagues or published by the outlet. That is, journalists are – indirectly – encouraged to adapt their views and practices (i.e. apply self-censorship) if they want to survive in the media organization. In short, they are socialized. However, more direct interventions may take place as soon as the viewpoints of journalists diverge too strongly from those of their superiors and/or if economic interests are at stake. Advertisers are, for instance, important commercial partners and management, in particular, rather keeps them satisfied (e.g. Gilens & Hertzman, 2000). Senior writers or experts usually also enjoy more autonomy than their colleagues,

especially junior journalists (Breed, 1955; Brüggemann & De Keyser, 2012; de Smaele, Geenen & De Cock, 2017; Engesser, 2014; Gans, 1979; Gitlin, 1980; Sachsman, Simon & Valenti, 2010; Shoemaker & Reese, 2014).

Many news organizations are strongly '*compartmentalized*'. They often work with several beat reporters, next to a small or larger group of generalist reporters. Each beat journalist covers a particular topic or issue, like politics, science or lifestyle. *Beat journalists* are usually experts in their field thanks to past experiences and tend to have strong ties with a network of regular sources. As such, they can act as translators, who can make complex issues – like economics or climate change – understandable for a lay public. The beat system seems to have several benefits: For instance, it helps reporters to save time (and thus, money and means) as they can routinely check in with their network (Brüggemann & Engesser, 2014, 2016; De Keyser, Raeymaeckers & Paulussen, 2011; Gans, 1979; McCluskey, 2008; Sachsman, Simon & Valenti, 2010). Statements of expert (beat) reporters can more easily be sold as objective or factual (Tuchman, 1972). Nevertheless, the editorial partitions often function as quite impenetrable boundaries, making interaction and cooperation across sections and specialized reporters less likely (Berglez, 2011; de Semir, 2000; Harrabin, 2000). Yet, the more news organizations are commercialized, the more likely they are to mainly work with *generalist reporters*. These are expected to be flexible 'jacks of all trades' who can go quickly from one story to another. They often feel more pressure to produce quickly and efficiently (i.e. deadline stress). Accordingly, they are more inclined to accept what they are told by sources or other journalists or to focus on the exceptional and dramatic rather than the bigger picture. Consequently, their reports are likely to be more superficial or one-sided. In other words, these journalists often lack profound knowledge of the (complex) issues which they are expected to cover, due to the – according to Wilson (2000) – lethal combination of a lack of time and training. Contrary to the beat reporters, they usually enjoy far less autonomy and are often expected to just accept the articles they are assigned (Boesman, d'Haenens & Van Gorp, 2015; Deuze, 2005a; Gans, 1979; Gibson et al., 2016; Sachsman, Simon & Valenti, 2010). The division of labour is also highly visible when it comes to *photo selection*. Newton (2000) and Bissell (2000) argue, for instance, that photo editors are one of the major gatekeepers in newspapers, the others including reporters, word editors, designers, marketing directors and publishers. Seelig (2005) concludes, more specifically, that photo editors can be considered as visual elites who often make decisions that are strongly inspired by rather subjective criteria, like personal opinions or perceptions regarding audience expectations (see Bissell, 2000; de Smaele, Geenen & De Cock, 2017; Mendelson, 2005; Nurmis, 2017). Discussions with superiors are mostly a matter of courtesy, with the latter usually simply approving the decisions of the photo editor. Journalists have no or little say (Boesman, d'Haenens & Van Gorp, 2015; de Smaele, Geenen & De Cock, 2017; Mendelson, 2005; Seelig, 2005; Wozniak, Wessler & Lück, 2017). However, more recent evolutions like technological developments as well as increasing commercial pressures (e.g. lack of budget and personnel) may, according to some researchers (e.g. Bruns, 2003; Grayson, 2013;

Kaml, 2005; McChesney, 2008; Nurmis, 2017; Scoggin McEntee, 2016; Silcock & Schwalbe, 2010; Tirohl, 2000), make (news and) photo production more of a collective endeavour, including journalists with little or no visual literacy and/or citizen(journalist)s. As discussed above, however, Fahmy (2005) demonstrates that the influence of the latter remains limited (see Nilsson & Wadbring, 2015; Nurmis, 2017). That is, they are not (yet) recognized as equal gatekeepers by the mainstream media.

3.1.1.1.5 Previous Framing Research: Mainstream Media

Previous framing research has been mainly concerned with the ‘frames’ in mainstream (written) media (see Table 4). The lack of detailed descriptions (see 2.2.1.6 Non-Frames; 4.3 Environmental Frames in the Literature) prevents me from drawing far-reaching conclusions with regard to the underlying argumentations and worldviews (e.g. Entman, 1993, 2004; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Van Gorp, 2006, 2007). Nevertheless, I do find some general patterns underlying these ‘frames’ which seem to confirm my expectation that the focus in the mainstream media mainly lies on top-down, (hegemonic) *anthropocentric views*, which are tailored to the existing (elite) interests in a largely commercialized capitalist-liberalist human society. As pointed out in the introductory chapter (1.3 Depoliticizing versus Politicizing), some (elite) actors and actions are legitimized as rational while others are deligitimized or largely backgrounded.

For instance, the consistent recurrence of ‘*economic frames*’ illustrates the hegemonic preoccupation with consumerism, a competitive free market, economic growth and prosperity.⁴⁹ Frames such as ‘fairness and effectiveness through market mechanisms’ (Schmidt & Schäfer, 2015), ‘sustainable energy’ (Wessler et al., 2016) or ‘industrial leadership’ (Schlichting, 2013) are, in particular, illustrative. Similarly, ‘*technological fix*’ or ‘*progress*’ frames (e.g. Brand & Brunnengräber, 2012; Dahinden, 2005; Eide, 2012; Nielsen & Kjaergaard, 2011; Nisbet & Lewenstein, 2002; Schlichting, 2013; Van Gorp & van der Goot, 2009; Wessler et al., 2016) illustrate the failure to acknowledge the incommensurable character of exclusively capitalist, managerial or technological thinking and fundamental ecological change. The ‘valid science’ frame (versus ‘uncertainty’ or ‘controversy’) of Antilla (2005) may, arguably, illustrate the preoccupation in mainstream communication (and academics) with the *rational, scientific (consensus) view* (i.e. climate change exclusively as scientific fact / object of scientific inquiry). The same is true for, among others, the ‘scientific research’ frame in Nielsen and Kjaergaard (2011), ‘new evidence or research presented’ and ‘scientific background’ in Kenix (2008a, 2008b) or ‘settled science’ or ‘role of science’ in O’Neill et al. (2015) (see also Dahinden, 2005; Gordon, Deines & Havice, 2010; Olausson, 2009; Weathers and Kendall, 2015). Also, across the various frame sets, we

⁴⁹ Other authors who identify economic frames (or discourses) are, among others: Dahinden (2005), Fletcher (2009), Gordon, Deines and Havice (2010), Kenix (2008a, 2008b), Nielsen and Kjaergaard (2011), Nisbet (2009), Nisbet and Lewenstein (2002), Nisbet and Scheufele (2009, 2013), Nissani (1999), O’Neill et al. (2015), Rebich-Hespanha et al. (2013), Semetko and Valkenburg (2000), Shehata and Hopmann (2012), Stephens, Rand and Melnick (2009), Weathers and Kendall (2015), Wessler et al. (2016), Zehr (2009).

find multiple frames – like ‘political’ or ‘public accountability’ – which reflect the generally accepted responsibility of *elite managers*, like politicians or scientists, to take action for the greater good, based on the proper use of science (e.g. Borah, 2009; Eide, 2012; Gordon, Deines & Havice, 2010; Kenix, 2008a, 2008b; Nielsen & Kjaergaard, 2011; Nisbet, 2009; Nisbet & Lewenstein, 2002; Nisbet & Scheufele, 2009; Olausson, 2009; Rebich-Hespanha et al., 2013; Schlichting, 2013; Wessler et al., 2016). ‘Uncertainty’ and ‘conflict’ frames also tend to draw our attention to the political and scientific character of the issue, delegitimizing ‘irrational’ and/or non-elite voices (e.g. Antilla, 2005; Nisbet, 2009; O’Neill, 2013; O’Neill et al., 2015; Wessler et al., 2016).⁵⁰

Schlichting (2013) – providing a more detailed discussion of the underlying argumentations of his frames – points out that his ‘*industrial leadership*’ frame foregrounds industry as primary and consumers as secondary responsible agents, with technological innovations as solution. The ‘socio-economic consequences’ frame identified by the same author emphasizes *socio-economic decline*, caused by the Kyoto Protocol, as the main problem and has a ‘crippled economy’ and ‘restricted lifestyles’ as characteristic depictions. Clearly, this frame reflects a ‘Status-Quo’ view rather than ‘Reform’. The frames which Brand and Brunnengräber (2012) identify as dominant in the (mainstream) media – ‘manageability’, ‘technological fix / behaviour’, ‘adaptation’ and ‘compatibility’ – also demonstrate the belief in *human ingenuity* to cope with climatic changes. Depending on the frame, market-based mechanisms, technological fixes (e.g. nuclear energy), behaviour changes of individual consumers (e.g. switching light bulbs), adaptational measures or the compatibility of the current socio-economic organization and climate change policies are foregrounded. Wessler et al. (2016) identify GHG and the burning of fossil fuels as causes and technological innovations (especially renewable energy) or human management of nature as solutions across their four frames, ‘global warming victims’, ‘civil society demands’, ‘political negotiations’ and ‘sustainable energy’. The focus on *external causes* is also apparent in the framing study of Vihersalo (2008) on climate justice (see also Nerlich, 2012). The author identifies, more specifically, the frame ‘climate change as a problem of greenhouse gas emissions’. Several authors also found that the focus in climate change coverage is usually on the actions of individuals. Apart from the dominant elites (‘managers’ / ‘producers’), consumers are – in some cases – also foregrounded as responsible actors (e.g. Berglez, Höjjer & Olausson, 2009; Cohen, 2011; Cottle, 2000; Eide, 2012; Hart, 2011; Howard-Williams, 2009; Iyengar, 1990; Nicholson-Cole, 2005; Nossek & Kunelius, 2012; Olausson, 2009; O’Neill, 2013; Trumbo, 1996). This individualization usually goes hand in hand with the promotion of capitalist values. Boykoff and Goodman (2009) argue, for instance, that the focus of the media on celebrity actors, politicians, sports figures, business people, musicians or intellectuals as individualized climate heroes – recycling, changing light bulbs or donating money – may

⁵⁰ See also: Dahinden (2005), Fletcher (2009), Gordon, Deines and Havice (2010), Kenix (2008a, 2008b), Nisbet and Lewenstein (2002), Nisbet and Scheufele (2009), Painter (2013), Rebich-Hespanha et al. (2013), Schlichting (2013), Semetko and Valkenburg (2000), Weathers and Kendall (2015)

help to reconfirm and reproduce the values of *individualistic green consumerism* within the context of a largely uncontested (neo)liberal capitalist society (see Berglez, Höijer & Olausson, 2009; Davis, 1995; Hansen & Machin, 2008; Maniates, 2001; Slocum, 2004).

Some ‘health and safety’ and ‘security’ frames have also been identified in previous framing studies. Bringing the problem home, they foreground the *vulnerability of ‘collective us’*, with the latter exclusively referring to human victims (Borah, 2009; Fletcher, 2009; Nisbet, 2009; Nisbet & Lewenstein, 2002; Nisbet & Scheufele, 2009; O’Neill et al. 2015; Stephens, Rand & Melnick, 2009). These frames also confirm the prevalence of certain hegemonic views, actions and actors. The ‘security frame’ described by Fletcher (2009), for instance, encourages *pragmatic policies and political actions* (see Fuchs & Graff, 2010; Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Ritchie & Thomas, 2015), such as GHG mitigation bills or green economy measures, rather than the consideration of more fundamental alternatives to the anthropocentric thinking (see also Methman & Rothe, 2012). Some authors also include ‘moral’ or ‘ethics’ frames in their frame sets. These frames try to appeal to the *existing (‘most constructive’) moral values of the audience*, like (western) religious considerations or (hegemonic views on) justice (see Prelli & Winters, 2009; Sen, 1999, 2009; Shiva, 1988, 1993; Whitmarsh, O’Neill & Lorenzoni, 2013). While these may be concerned with human responsibilities towards nature, human well-being is usually (implicitly) included. Hence, the distinction between ‘morality’ and ‘health and safety’ / ‘security’ is not clear-cut (e.g. Dahinden, 2005; Kenix, 2008a, 2008b; Nielsen & Kjaergaard, 2011; Nisbet, 2009; Nisbet & Lewenstein, 2002; Nisbet & Scheufele, 2009; O’Neill et al., 2015; Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000; Van Gorp & van der Goot, 2009; Weathers & Kendall, 2015). ‘Apocalypse’, ‘alarmist’ or ‘Pandora’s Box’ frames take the idea that ‘human (environment) is under threat’ to an extreme (e.g. Doulton & Brown, 2009; Foust & O’Shannon Murphy, 2009; Hulme, 2009; Kenix, 2008a, 2008b; Nisbet, 2009; O’Neill, 2013; O’Neill et al., 2015; Painter, 2013; Van Gorp & van der Goot, 2009).

3.1.1.2 Popularization and Ideology

In the context of commercialization, the term popularization or tabloidization is often used (Bird, 2009; Gans, 2009; Hautekeete, Peersman & Debackere, 2002; Uribe & Gunter, 2004; Weibull & Nilsson, 2010). Sparks (1988, p.7), for instance, summarizes this evolution as follows:

Tabloidization is, first of all, a process in which the amount and prominence of material concerned with public, economic and political affairs is reduced within the media. It is, secondly, a process by which the conventions of reporting and debate make immediate individual experience the prime source of evidence and value.

Like Gans (2009), I prefer the term ‘*popularization*’ over ‘tabloidization’, as the latter diverts the attention away from the actual problems of journalism and is overly pejorative (see Bird, 2009). The author contends that the elite classes have always attempted to universalize their culture (and cultural products) and values, legitimize their superiority and impose them upon others, denouncing everything

else as inferior or harmful: “Since moderate and low-income people are the main consumers of tabloid news, tabloidization is a particularly handy verbal weapon used by more educated people to disparage the culture of less educated ones” (Gans, 2009, p.17). I agree that various cultures may be different, but that they are – in essence – equal (see the discussion on (de)politicization in Chapter 1). Everyone has the right to choose those cultural products which best fit their standards, unless those have been proved to be harmful to them or others. As Gans (2009) argues, popularization – a broader term that is not limited to media – is not exclusively pejorative or deconstructive, but can also be interpreted in constructive ways. That is, at least, the case if the process is not exclusively approached from a top-down perspective (see below).

Sparks (1988) contends that popular media – or their predecessors like street literature or ballads of the seventeenth or eighteenth century – *have always been around*, in one form or another. Also, popular and broadsheet types of media have always been influencing each other. However, major changes in the second half of the twentieth century – particularly, the ‘ontzuiling’ (Dutch for ‘depillarization’) of society (i.e. the evolution away from societies which were divided into ‘segments’ or ‘pillars’ according to ideologies or religions) in many western countries, which went hand in hand with an increasing commercialization – have accelerated the process. Both the ‘intellectual’ broadsheet media as well as the ‘commercial’ popular media themselves are said to have adopted an increasing number of popular characteristics, like soft news, visuals or personalization (Bird, 2009; Gans, 2009; Hauttekeete, Peersman & Debackere, 2002; Uribe & Gunter, 2004; Weibull & Nilsson, 2010).

Based on the metrics ‘*range, form and style*’ proposed by Uribe & Gunter (2004), who draw on McLachlan and Golding (2000), I summarize some characteristics which can typically be found in media at / moving towards the more popular end of the spectrum: Popular media show a preference for ‘soft news’, such as sports, crime, entertainment, show business, royal family, human interest or sensation over ‘hard news’, like politics, economics, foreign stories or culture. That is, they are mainly concerned with ‘everyday life’ and the private sphere (i.e. range). Their formats are rather simplistic and comprise a lot of large visuals, compared to the amount of text. Besides, the textual parts of articles often get a narrative structure. Also, exciting headlines, teasing leads or dramatic pictures (especially on the front page) have to draw readers in (i.e. form). Finally, they often employ a rather subjective, sensational and conversationalist discourse, drawing on commentary, opinion and experiences, and try to bring the news home, personalizing their coverage (i.e. style). That is, popular news is usually characterized by some or all of the following attributes: soft news, sensationalism, narrativization, conversationalization, personalization, visualization. Broadsheets tend to put a stronger emphasis on ‘hard news’, with topics such as politics, foreign stories, economics and culture. In short, they are more preoccupied with the public (political-economic) sphere (range). They are relatively sober and rational, downplay flamboyant material and keep away from hyperbolic or personalized language (form). Furthermore, they delve

deeper into issues and put effort in investigative journalism, usually drawing on more than one perspective or source, thus providing more background, context and explanation (style). The latter is, no doubt, related to the fact that these outlets more often have specialist (beat) reporters. Popular journalists are, on the other hand, usually expected to be generalist reporters, '*jacks of all trades*' who must be more flexible and can be assigned all kinds of articles. As argued before, this can give rise to more biased or superficial reporting. In the context of climate reporting, for instance, Boykoff and Mansfield (2008) claim that popular media in the United Kingdom persist, till a later date and to a larger extent than the (UK and United States) broadsheet press, in covering climate science in a balanced way. As such, they present climate sceptics as equal voices in the debate and downplay the general consensus, which actually exists among climate scientists (IPCC, 2014a, 2014b). In a similar vein, Brüggemann and Engesser (2014) demonstrate that specialist reporters are more likely to deny sceptics access to the debate than generalist reporters (see Bird, 2009; Costera Meijer, 2001; De Bens & Raeymaeckers, 2010; Deuze, 2005a; Gibson et al., 2016; Hanitzsch, 2007; Hauttekeete, Peersman & Debackere, 2002; Orgeret & d'Essen, 2012).

Obviously, however, news media can always be situated on a *continuum*. Reinemann et al. (2012) argue, for instance, that 'hard' and 'soft news' must be approached as multi-dimensional *and* gradual concepts. That is, topic (e.g. politics, economics, culture, sports, human interest), style (e.g. text-oriented and factual or rather visual-oriented and personalized) and focus (e.g. thematic versus episodic framing) ought to be considered as separate dimensions, with the topic dimension as the foundation on which style and focus are grounded. For instance, a news item concerned with politically relevant topics is always 'harder' than news items dealing with non-politically relevant topics, regardless of the character of style and focus. Besides, the authors (Reinemann et al., 2012, p.231) add:

(...) assigning certain topics to the hard and soft category in advance may be misleading because seemingly soft topics may be framed as socially relevant or hard news might be presented as light-hearted, entertaining and with a focus on their 'soft' aspects.

As an alternative, they propose to distinguish between degrees of politically or socially relevant topics (e.g. the presence or absence of societal actors or authorities, plans or programmes, decision-making). Underlying the style dimension, then, is a continuum between impersonal and unemotional and personal, emotional reporting. The focus dimension can be measured in terms of more or less societal relevance and thematic versus episodic framing. As the authors point out, the focus dimension may be of particular interest in the context of framing research (see Iyengar, 1990). Similarly, Harcup and O'Neill (2017) point out that some news values – like entertainment and celebrity – are more typical for popular outlets while others – like elites – are more significant in broadsheets. However, none of the news values is exclusive to one type of outlet. Sparks (2000, in Hanusch, 2013) nuances the dichotomy by adding ('in-between') outlet categories. He distinguishes among 'serious press' and 'semi-serious press' and 'serious-popular press' and 'news stand tabloid press'. The 'serious press' leans most closely towards

the ideal described by Habermas and Burger (1989) above, while ‘semi-serious press’ has increasing amounts of soft news or visuals. ‘News-stand tabloid press’ diverges most strongly from this ideal, while ‘serious-popular press’ still has some news values similar to the ‘serious press’. Also, the evolution of popularization may strongly differ depending on national media contexts. Esser (1999) demonstrates, for instance, that the German press is less popularized than the written media in the United States or Britain.

I argue that the *situation in Flanders* is comparable to that in Germany. As shown by De Bens and Raeymaeckers (2010) and Moernaut (2012), the Flemish newspapers are moving in a popularizing direction, increasingly opting for less socially relevant topics, attractive layouts, more and larger pictures, a higher number of pages and more supplements. Also, most broadsheet newspapers have switched to tabloid (size) format. Yet, I argue that they can best be described as ‘semi-serious press’ (Sparks, 2000). After all, they hold on to a certain level of their traditional journalistic values (‘nomos’) or even have been shifting back towards a more traditional broadsheet profile, after they had been strongly popularizing during the nineties (Weibull & Nilsson, 2010, pp.54-55). Schönbach (1997, in De Bens & Raeymaeckers, 2010) calls this the ‘contrast strategy’: in order to show off their surplus value in comparison to competitors, media outlets might want to focus on their own strong points, such as larger amounts of literature, interpretation and background information concerning broader evolutions. Similarly, Kovach and Rosenstiel (2007) argue that broadsheets often use ‘coherence’ as a response to popularization: rather than providing the facts which are also available elsewhere (‘correspondence’), they provide interpretations and contextualization of these facts. The popular outlet in this study, *Het Laatste Nieuws*, can be situated at the centre of the popular-broadsheet continuum (i.e. ‘serious-popular press’), as it still has attention for socially relevant topics. Besides, its readership is much broader than the audience of ‘news-stand tabloids’ (Sparks, 2000)), which are predominantly read by working classes. *Het Laatste Nieuws* reaches large groups of readers from all social classes and all backgrounds in society (cim, 2016; De Bens & Raeymaeckers, 2010).

Just like in Germany, the media-political system in Belgium can best be described as *Democratic Corporatist* (i.e. the North / Central European model), as opposed to the Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist Model and the North Atlantic or Liberal Model (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). That is, both countries – i.e. their societies, political systems and institutions – are built upon principles of the welfare state and pluralistic democracy. Their media systems are characterized by a large degree of independence and autonomy, and thus, press freedom. They used to have a strong *partisan or politically opinionated press*, openly supporting particular political groups or stances and functioning as conduits for their ideas. The newspaper *De Morgen*, for instance, has been owned or sponsored by the socialist party till 1986. *De Standaard* has been known as a rather conservative Catholic newspaper. *Het Laatste Nieuws* historically has liberal roots. In recent years, however, they have been evolving towards *more*

neutral, commercial outlets as a result of the major – society-wide – changes of commercialization and privatization, which I referred to above. As said, these processes went hand in hand with the so-called ‘ontzuiling’ (Dutch for ‘depillarization’) of society. That is, clear partisan subdivisions (e.g. schools, associations, newspapers) have been replaced by an economic, free-market society based on individualism and free choice. The capitalist logic preoccupied with profit-making and growth does not allow media to take pronounced ideological stances that target narrow groups. Rather, objectivity, neutrality or factuality must attract broad groups of consumers. Also, readers no longer expect newspapers to be too strongly partisan. It is considered to be unprofessional, and thus, less trustworthy (Gilens & Hertzman, 2000; Hamilton, 2004; McChesney, 2008; Pritchard, Terry & Brewer, 2008). Cushion (2012b) argues, for instance, that impartiality guidelines and the focus on objectivity as a selling point largely prevent (ideological) diversity, with various outlets drawing, among others, on a selection of ‘objective’ news values. The latter are, however, also likely to reproduce particular (hegemonic) views on society (see e.g. Hall, 1973). In any case, De Bens and Raeymaeckers (2010) contend that each Belgian newspaper still shows some affiliations with one of the major political ideologies. Accordingly, De Keyser (2012, p.5) found that Flemish newspaper journalists, in particular, still experience some pressure from the political field, concluding that this “(...) suggests that the ties with the political field have not yet completely been cut” (my translation). For example, *De Morgen* is still considered as rather left-wing, while *De Standaard* is seen as centrist. Boesman and Van Gorp (2016) describe the more recent strategy of *De Morgen* to produce ‘salmon stories’. That is, the newspaper claims that it tries to swim ‘against the current’, questioning both the ‘ideological (hegemonic) frames’ in society as well as its own ‘ideological frames’ from the past. This leads to more diverse, yet definitely not value-free (as the newspaper claims) reporting. Anyhow, the current ideological stances of Flemish newspapers can, more accurately, be described as background values or sympathies. Usually, they are only reflected in particular accents or the slightly stronger attention for particular problems. However, during critical discourse moments (Chilton, 1987) – e.g. political debates during (climate) summits – media outlets might be more inclined to take more outspoken ideological standpoints (Berglez, Höijer & Olausson, 2009; Blom & Lamberts, 2007; De Bens & Raeymaeckers, 2010; Dirikx & Gelders, 2010; Durnez, 1985, 1993; Fransen, 1990; Maesele et al., 2014; Pepermans, 2015). As Carvalho (2005, p.6) points out, critical discourse moments “(...) are topical events which potentially challenge existing discursive positions and construct or, in contrast, may contribute to their further sedimentation”.

According to De Bens and Raeymaeckers (2010), the increasing *concentration* of the news market (i.e. a smaller number of (media) companies own a wide variety of media outlets) (McChesney, 2008; VRM, 2016) may further contribute to the decrease of diversity and pluralism: the same or similar views are often voiced in the different outlets of one company (see Gilens & Hertzman, 2000). One could also argue that the current *economic interests and affiliations* of media outlets may problematize the independence and freedom of journalists in comparable ways as their partisan affiliations in the past.

That is, it hampers their acting as watchdogs vis-à-vis business and industry (Boesman & Van Gorp, 2016; Cushion, 2012b; Davies, 2008; Gans, 1979, 2004; De Bens & Raeymaeckers, 2010; Gilens & Hertzman, 2000; Hamilton, 2004; McChesney, 2008; Pritchard, Terry & Brewer, 2008; Shoemaker & Reese, 2014). Verschueren (2011), however, nuances this idea of the end of ideology in favour of capitalism and liberalism. He argues: “(...) because of the everyday nature of the ideology it bears upon (...), [ideology] is omnipresent, ubiquitous, immune to extinction as long as humans, as we know them, exist” (p.198).

Broadsheets are predominantly read by audiences from *higher social classes*. Accordingly, they are more likely to influence politicians or other decision-makers in society. Also, they are more often watched closely and/or imitated by other outlets (see Crouse, 1973; Lopez-Escobar et al., 1998). This may also magnify their (top-down) influence. Popular media, on the other hand, control a huge share of the market. *Het Laatste Nieuws*, for instance, is ranked as the most read daily in Flanders (CIM.be, 2016). On top of that, popular newspapers are more often shared in public spaces (e.g. in the train). Put differently, popular media influence the lives and thinking of large parts of the population, feeding, as such, everyday (bottom-up) conversations. Anyhow, popular media outlets appeal primarily to *lower classes in society* (Boykoff, 2008; Boykoff & Mansfield, 2008; Gans, 2009).

Accordingly, popular media are often evaluated in rather negative terms and denounced for their ‘sensational, trivial or simplified coverage or their bent for the lowest common denominator of public taste’. In short, they are seen as ‘*dumbing down*’ journalism (see e.g. Bird, 2009). According to the critics, popular reporting habits constitute a threat to democracy, feeding lower classes a strongly distorted, superficial representation of the world and lulling them asleep, while keeping them ignorant of what is really going on in the world (e.g. larger social, political, cultural contexts). Sparks (1998) argues, for instance: “Tabloidization, it seems to me, is precisely that kind of journalism in which the personal is not only the starting point but also the substance and end point. That is an obstacle to Enlightenment” (p.6). It is, thus, argued that popular media prevent the audience from drawing informed conclusions for themselves and to truly participate as citizens in society (see Habermas & Burger, 1989). That is, for instance, problematic when it comes to climate change, which is likely to affect first and most severely the less privileged classes. As discussed above, however, Gans (2009) denounces the top-down view on ‘tabloidization’, which considers the more serious broadsheet media as the only cultural products which can provide people with the rational, ‘enlightening’ information they need to know. What is more, the author highlights that popularization can actually be highly constructive as it can create *alternative public spheres* (see Habermas & Burger, 1989) for those who are not reached by the broadsheet outlets, which they can understand and participate in. While the substance of the news should not vary by taste or class, the presentation of the news – simplifications, less detail, more explanation, informality, humour (e.g. cartoons), other news frames or formats – can be adapted so as to enhance

people's engagement and understanding: "If keeping to a single set of the 'highest' presentation standards means losing a significant part of the audience, then the public's need to know cannot be properly satisfied" (Gans, 2009, p.21). Costera Meijer (2001) and Bird (2009) argue in similar ways, adding that stories about the private sphere, personal relationships or emotionality are equally important to fully understand democracy, social life, good citizenship and morality, while they are more likely to engage large groups of people. However, the issues need to be covered as seriously as articles dealing with politics or economy. As Cushion (2012b) puts it, "(...) journalism should be able to remain popular without being populist" (p.44). According to Boykoff & Mansfield (2008, p.7), this is critical in the context of climate change reporting since "(...) [t]hese segments of citizenry are crucial components of social movements and potential public pressure for improved climate policy action worldwide" (see Boykoff, 2008; De Bens & Raeymaeckers, 2010; Deuze, 2005a; Orgeret & d'Essen, 2012).

3.1.1.2.1 Previous Framing Research: Broadsheets versus Popular Media, Ideological Leanings

Drawing on previous research, I expect that popular media are likely to cover issues like climate change differently from broadsheet media (e.g. Darley, 2000). Also, the ideological background of outlets may affect their coverage. On the one hand, many authors show that this 'hard news' or 'economically, socially and politically relevant' topic appears less often in the popular media. Comparing the coverage of climate summits in broadsheet and popular newspapers, Orgeret & d'Essen (2012) point out, for instance, that the latter are not really interested in the issue. According to Maesele et al. (2014), that is mainly due to the fact that climate summits are primarily presented in terms of international politics, which is of secondary interest to the more commercial outlets. Boykoff (2008) also admits that *climate change is not really a popular topic*, lacking – among others – visibility and events. However, his own research shows an increase of coverage during the last couple of years. According to the author, the interest of popular media is stirred thanks to an increase of political rhetoric (with a potential for drama) and clear evidence on the issue (and hence, the presence or creation of clear 'events'). Additionally, most newspapers have expanded over the last years, in terms of number of pages or supplements. As such, they have created more space for the coverage of topics diverging from their traditional focus, such as climate change. That is, the expansion has somewhat lessened the competition (see news value 'composition') among topics.

On the other hand, various authors have shown that media types – broadsheet or popular media – and ideological affiliations or backgrounds are often related to *different types of frames or discourses*. As I have discussed before (2.2.1.6 Non-Frames) and will explicate in more detail below (see Chapter 4), the ways in which these authors apply 'framing' diverges from the ways in which I conceptualize and operationalize 'framing' in this study. Nevertheless, I formulate some general hypotheses or expectations based on these findings.

Boykoff (2008) argues that *popular media* in the UK use more climate change frames like ‘weather events’, ‘biodiversity’ or ‘alarmism’. Yet, also ‘political-economic’ frames are prevalent. ‘Science’ and ‘justice and risk’, however, are less often used. In the *broadsheet media*, then, ‘political-economic responsibility’ and ‘economic consequences’ are dominant. According to Boykoff (2008), the newspapers respond to the life worlds and interests of their various target audiences. Science, for instance, is expected to be of no interest to working classes, and so is ‘justice and risk’. The author argues, however, that the latter (i.e. differentiated responsibilities and vulnerabilities), in particular, is actually highly relevant to the lower classes as they run a larger risk to be affected earlier and more severely by climate change consequences. Accordingly, the thematic frames largely reflect the differential ‘ranges’ (or ‘topics’), ‘styles’ (or ‘forms’) and ‘focuses’ discussed above (Reinemann et al., 2012; Uribe & Gunter, 2004): Popular media are more concerned with everyday life and less with socially or politically relevant topics (frames: ‘weather events’, ‘biodiversity’). Besides, they often employ a more sensational or emotional style or form (‘alarmism’). Broadsheets, on the contrary, are more likely to provide broader contexts and explanations, focusing on societal, politically relevant (hard) news, like politics or economics (‘political-economic responsibility’, ‘economic consequences’). Similarly, Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) – discussing the framing of European politics in their often quoted study – contend that popular media produce most ‘human interest’ frames while broadsheets use more ‘conflict’ and ‘attribution of responsibility’ frames. However, these frames are also rather superficial ‘labels’. More specifically, they reflect journalistic formats and routines, in this case news values like entertainment (human interest) or bad news (conflict) (Galtung & Ruge, 1965, 1973; Harcup & O’Neill, 2001, 2017). Hence, it is not surprising that the authors more often find the ‘human interest’ frame in the popular media, as it directly reflects the preference of these media for this news value (i.e. personalization, narrativization, emotion, public sphere). ‘Attribution of responsibility’ or ‘conflict’ are more likely to be found in the context of ‘harder’ topics like politics, economics or science (involving societal (politically / socially relevant) actors, programmes, debates, decision-making, accountability). As pointed out above, broadsheet media tend to provide broader contexts, including the representation of more than one perspective or source (i.e. balance) (Reinemann et al., 2012; Uribe & Gunter, 2004). Other authors, however, do not confirm the claim of Boykoff (2008) that popular media are more alarmist. According to Ereaut and Segnit (2006), popular media are more likely to focus on pragmatic, optimistic ‘repertoires’ like ‘small actions’ (see individual relevance, everyday life, personalization). Vicsek (2013), looking at the coverage of genetically modified crops and food in a number of Hungarian newspapers, also finds more positive coverage in the popular media (i.e. the ‘PRO-GM (advancement and benefits)’ frame).

More consistency can be found among the studies that look at *the influence of ideological stances* on climate change reporting. Carvalho (2007), Dirickx and Gelders (2010) and Ereaut and Segnit (2006) argue that conservative outlets are generally more sceptical and tend to highlight the uncertainty of

climate science. According to Ereaut and Segnit (2006), for instance, right-wing media reflect alarmist views but only to deconstruct them drawing on sceptic repertoires such as ‘settlerdom’, ‘rhetorical sceptic’, ‘free-market protection’, ‘expert climate-change denial’ or ‘warming is good’. In short, finding their (the news firm’s) ideological, political and/or economic interests threatened, they support a status-quo, arguing that action is unnecessary. Left-wing media were found to promote confidence in climate science, highlighting the risks and calling for urgent action. Accordingly, they often criticize government’s inertia. Ereaut and Segnit (2006) and Dirickx and Gelders (2010) contend that these outlets often balance alarmism with pragmatic, optimistic views like ‘small actions’ or ‘human agency’. Carvalho (2005) adds that left-wing media are more inclined to cover the climate from the viewpoint of people in the South – who are more likely to be affected earlier and more severely by climate change consequences – and to discuss their rights and the responsibilities of the West (i.e. environmental justice). Contrary to their colleagues who are concerned with media in the UK, Dirickx and Gelders (2010) compared media in France and the Netherlands. The authors point out that differences among the outlets are more distinct in the French context than in the Netherlands, which – just like Flanders – has a liberal media system (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). Nevertheless, Pepermans (2015) and Maesele et al. (2014) did find some distinct differences among the discourses in two Flemish broadsheets – *De Morgen* (leftist background) and *De Standaard* (centrist, with catholic roots) – which will also be discussed in this study. Those confirm more or less the patterns outlined above. Reporting on international climate summits and the reports of the IPCC, *De Morgen* tended to call for urgent action, balancing pessimism (about climate politics) with hope and optimism about national and transnational political progress. The need for a binding (international) climate agreement and more ambitious (national) emission targets, in particular, was foregrounded, with the UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) as unquestioned framework for climate policy. These actions were partly rationalized based on economic argumentations. *De Standaard*, however, was – particularly in more recent years (i.e. 2010-2012) – overall more alarmist and pessimistic, especially about (international) climate politics (notably the regulation of greenhouse gases). The newspaper often introduced an economic perspective into the discussion, emphasizing market-driven technological innovation (i.e. techno-optimism) as solution rather than government intervention. *De Morgen* was more likely to take sides with developing countries or emerging economies, like China or India, while *De Standaard* would adopt the discourse of the US. Neither of the outlets did, however, deny the responsibility of humans for climate change, and thus the trustworthiness of climate science. *De Morgen*, in particular, was shown to actively delegitimize scientific uncertainty and climate sceptics.

Discussing the visual frames of climate change produced by a number of popular and broadsheet newspapers with various ideological stances in the UK, US and Australia, however, O’Neill (2013) did not report any clear differences among the various media. Nevertheless, this may be due to the ways in which the author operationalized frames, that is, in terms of generic themes or media routines (i.e.

‘contested’ visual frame and the ‘distancing’ visual frame). The same is, probably, true for Borah and Bulla (2006), who looked at the visual framing of the Indian Ocean Tsunami (2004) and Hurricane Katrina (2005) in a number of US and Indian newspapers with different ideological backgrounds. National context more than ideology seemed to affect the framing. Yet, the authors identified a number of small differences which may demonstrate the effect of ideological views. For example, the Indian pro-establishment ‘TOI’ newspaper provided far more emotional frames (focusing on grief, human suffering and emotion) than ‘The Hindu’, which is more traditional and moderate. Vicsek (2013) also concluded that ideological stance had little influence on the preference for the (attribute) ‘ANTI-GM (threat)’ frame and the ‘PRO-GM (advancement and benefits)’ frame in Hungarian news outlets.

3.1.2 Alternative Media

The opposition between mainstream and alternative media is not clear-cut. After all, “(...) everything, at some point, is alternative to something else” (Downing, Ford, & Stein, 2001, p.ix). Besides, it is increasingly blurred as a result of recent evolutions such as digitalization. As pointed out before, this study will focus on two *progressive alternative outlets*, *DeWereldMorgen* and *MO**. Accordingly, my definition applies, in particular, to this part of the alternative spectrum. For clarity’s sake it does take the counter-hegemonic features of alternative media as a starting point (see Atton, 2002, 2003, 2008; Bailey, Cammaerts & Carpentier, 2007; Downing, 2001, 2003; Fuchs, 2010; Gunster, 2012; Hamilton, 2000; Harcup, 2003, 2014; Navaz & Ferrer, 2012): Alternative media tend to be less, if not at all, institutionalized or driven by commercial interests than mainstream media. This *context* allows them to be radical and engaged in terms of their *content* and *production process*. While they challenge and deconstruct journalistic, social, political, economic and/or cultural practices and construct alternatives, they tend to enact this change in non-hierarchical and (partly) de-professionalized organizations. Their aim is, as such, to constitute an alternative public sphere, which may empower citizens and encourage them to speak up and act for change. In short, democracy, equality and mutual respect are – at least in theory – both their means and their goals. Table 3 provides an elaboration on this definition, clarifying the crudely defined oppositional positionalities.

However, just like ‘mainstream media’ ‘alternative media’ encompasses a *spectrum of differing outlets*. Non-progressive reactionary movements like extreme rightist, radical Catholic or fundamentalist Muslim movements also use alternative (online) media. Their goals and strategies do, however, differ from those of the progressive outlets. In the context of climate change, for instance, conservative think tanks may promote climate scepticism (e.g. Jacques, Dunlap & Freeman, 2008). Downing (2001) points out that these media tend to have a repressive rather than a democratic character. Atton (2006) argues, for instance, that the website of the British National Party – while voicing the experiences and values of its members – has a highly closed and hierarchical character, preventing people from participating in the debate. Other authors demonstrate, however, that rightist movements also make use of (online)

participatory production methods (see Sandoval & Fuchs, 2010). Yet, Atton (2008) warns against validating “participation as good in itself” (p.217). That is, the use of participatory production processes does not necessarily entail democratic emancipation. Looking at a case study in northern Belgium, Cammaerts (2007) concludes that (online) extreme rightist media constitute ‘anti-public spaces’, which challenge democratic values through hate speech and us-them (i.e. the other, the enemy) discourses (see van Dijk, 1998). As Mouffe (2005) puts it, they feed antagonism (i.e. depoliticization) rather than agonistic struggles (i.e. (re)politicization) between conflicting ideas in a democratic space (see Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Pepermans, 2015; Pepermans & Maesele, 2014; Swyngedouw, 2010). As I will point out below, however, the values and ideals of the progressive alternative media do not always nor necessarily feed into inclusive and responsive debates, either (Groshek & Han, 2011). Before nuancing the open and democratic character of these progressive media, however, I will first elaborate further on the definition introduced above.

	Mainstream media	Alternative media
	Top-down positionality	Bottom-up positionality
Context	Commercial, institutionalized: (elite) corporate / political pressures and values. Yet, they depict themselves as largely ‘ autonomous ’	Anti-commercial, de-institutionalized: cooperation with (grassroots) movements , dependent on foundation grants and sponsoring = clear ideological colour
Content	Routines and news values (serving top-down (commercial) pressures). Among others: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hierarchy of access: prevalence of elite sources • Focus on news values: events, conflict, proximity, unambiguity, consonance, personalization... • Objectivity: ‘facts’, neutrality 	Partly – but not fully – abandoning, redefining or renegotiating mainstream routines and values. Among others: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ‘Reversed’ hierarchy of access: prevalence of (alternative) NGOs, grassroots movements, citizens, or those speaking on their behalf • Focus on broader contexts and backgrounds, critical analysis, beyond the hegemonic story (e.g. positive stories in favour of minorities) • ‘Multiperspectivalism’, position-taking (+ ‘facts’)
Production process	Hierarchy : small (elite) group of professional journalists clearly separated from the audience (as passive consumers / commodity), quite rigid newsroom organization	Egalitarianism : blurring of boundaries between journalists and audience (citizen journalists, active producers, ‘in-betweeners’), journalists taking up several roles

Table 3: The oppositional positionality of mainstream and alternative media in terms of context, content and production process.

According to Atton (2002, p.25), the lack of profit-making goals and hierarchical, corporate structures grants alternative media more freedom compared to mainstream outlets: there is, for instance, less commercial or political pressure to publish certain contents, to maximize audiences, to attract advertisers, to produce news as efficiently as possible... (see Habermas & Burger, 1989; Hamilton, 2004; Harbers, 2016; McChesney, 2008). That does not mean, however, that alternative media can be considered completely independent, let alone objective (as mainstream media posit to be). On the

contrary, (most) progressive alternative outlets have strong ties with various social movements or NGOs and function – to a certain extent – as their mouthpieces. Besides, they often draw on government subsidies, donations or grants, which may come with certain expectations (e.g. in terms of the content they produce). Accordingly, alternative outlets tend to define themselves as highly *ideologized, subjective and engaged*. They may, for example, clearly situate themselves on the side of labourers and labour movements, minorities or environmental movements (Atton, 2002; Downing, 2003; Gunster, 2012; Harcup, 2014; Wiesslitz & Ashuri, 2011). Summarizing, NGOs or (grassroots) movements and alternative media are mutually constitutive, providing each other with means to survive, opinion pieces, source materials, or opportunities to reach broader (engaged) audiences. The alternative journalists mostly act as activist journalists (Atton, 2002; Carpentier, 2008; Downing, 2003) or moral journalists (Wiesslitz & Ashuri, 2011). Unsurprisingly, alternative journalists and/or newsrooms are also often involved in non-journalistic side-projects like debates, educational workshops, films or neighbourhood projects (see ‘participation around journalism’ (Ahva, 2017)).

Alternative media content can be described as both *oppositional (deconstructive) and (re)constructive*. While these outlets produce critical content that uncovers, challenges and deconstructs fundamental hegemonic values and ideologies (including mainstream media representations), they also tend to construct alternative social orders, focussing on the positive (bottom-up) alternatives that exist (Ahva, 2017; Atton, 2002, 2003; Brulle, 2010; Fuchs, 2010; Groshek & Han, 2011; Gunster, 2012; Hamilton, 2000; Harcup, 2014; Wiesslitz & Ashuri, 2011). As such, they provide “information about and interpretations of the world which we might not otherwise see and information about the world that we simply will not find anywhere else” (Atton, 2002, pp.11-12). Put differently, the content they produce is often characterized by in-depth critical analysis and broad contextualization (i.e. ‘the news – broader structures or tendencies – behind the news’) (see Drok & Hermans, 2016; Gess, 2012; Le Masurier, 2015; Mendelson & Creech, 2016). Harcup (2014) speaks about ‘oppositional reporting’. This seems to largely fit the ‘coherence’ strategy as described by Kovach and Rosenstiel (2007).

That is largely due to the fact that alternative journalists do not adhere to the traditional journalistic ideology, and thus traditional routines, norms and habits. Rather, they *redefine, and constantly renegotiate, these generally accepted (hegemonic) journalistic values and norms* (Deuze, 2005b; Eliasoph, 1988; Harbers, 2016) and consciously and openly use them as means to provide a different kind of reporting. For instance, their choices are not so much guided by news values, like conflict or timeliness (see Galtung & Ruge, 1965, 1973; Harcup & O’Neill, 2001, 2017), as by the views or perspectives which they find most important or relevant. The verbal and visual choices of alternative media often go beyond the hegemonic field, including culturally resonant stereotypes. For instance, they are likely to avoid terms like ‘terrorists’ or ‘gangs’ for factions or groups which challenge the views and interests of the ruling classes. Hegemonic perceptions of objectivity are denounced. For example, instead

of presenting images as ‘windows on the world’, showing ‘what is’, proponents of slow journalism (e.g. Drok & Hermans, 2016; Mendelson & Creech, 2016) argue for depictions that provide interpretation, add (narrative) layers to the verbal text or that are laden with symbolism. Aesthetic decisions may, for example, make us think about what is shown and why it is shown. Also, Mendelson and Creech (2016) contend that standardized (institutionalized) ways of seeing must be replaced with the individual voice of the photographer. Similarly, the (verbal) ideal of objectivity through balance is replaced by more ‘multiperspectival’ views (Carpentier, 2008; Gans, 1979; Harbers, 2016). Accordingly, alternative reporters denounce the traditional ‘hierarchy of access’ routine (Atton, 2002; Deuze, 2005b; Eliasoph, 1988; Gans, 1979, 2004; Gunster, 2012; Hanitzsch, 2007; Harcup, 2003, 2014; Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2007; Le Masurier, 2015; Wiesslitz & Ashuri, 2011).

As outlined above, mainstream outlets indeed tend to grant routine access to elite or official frame-sponsors, reproducing similar – hegemonic – frames which act “to foreclose discussion before it could go beyond the boundaries of the dominant ideological field” (Harcup, 2003, p.263). Furthermore, even if they represent the perspectives of non-elite sources, they often frame their case in a hegemonic way (Baylor, 1996; Farbotko, 2005; Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993; Gitlin, 1980; Hopke, 2012; Molotch & Lester, 1974; Takahashi & Meisner, 2012). That is, they stifle open, democratic debates (Groshek & Han, 2012). Progressive alternative media, however, give habitual access to (often marginalized frames of) *alternative ‘primary definers’* (Harcup, 2003), such as environmental or social movements, ordinary or indigenous people or resource-poor social groups (Atton, 2002, 2003; Deuze, 2005b; Fuchs, 2010; Harcup, 2003, 2014). That is, the ‘voiceless’ are given a voice and are presented as active agents rather than passive victims. The sustainable relationships they are able to build up and the authoritative voice they are granted, empowers these ‘neglected groups’ to try and counter-balance hegemonic reporting (Anderson, 1991; Carpentier, 2008; Groshek & Han, 2012; Gunster, 2012; Harcup, 2014; Hopke, 2012). Discussing an alternative media project in Manchester (‘Mule’), however, Harcup (2014) nuances the idea of ‘reversed hierarchy of access’. He demonstrates that a wide variety of sources are allowed to speak: official and mainstream sources feature alongside alternative, bottom-up or NGO sources (see Eliasoph, 1988). The online character of many alternative media definitely facilitates the introduction of a wide variety of sources (for instance through hyperlinking). This gives the audience the opportunity to uncover, check and evaluate evidence for themselves (Bruns, 2003; Harbers, 2016; Harcup, 2014; Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2007).

Finally, and maybe most importantly, progressive alternative media also enact the social change that they pursue in their production process. Mass media are ‘mass’ in terms of reach, but they are very narrow in terms of production. In other words, they are characterized by hierarchy and professionalism (Hamilton, 2000, p.358). Alternative media, on the contrary, often work with ‘native journalists’ or ‘*citizen journalists*’: “members of a community” (i.e. audience members) become “the media”,

“recorders of their own reality” (Atton, 2002, p.112). They can draw attention to problems which they find important and want to personally influence, comment on or contribute articles, take part in editorial decision-making (e.g. regarding selection and/or presentation of stories) and/or become editors themselves. In short, they are more than mere receivers (see ‘participation through / in journalism’ (Ahva, 2017; Carpentier, 2015)). These contributors often fulfil several – traditionally separated – roles (journalist, editor, photo editor, printer...). Ahva (2017) coins the term ‘in-betweeners’, pointing out, among other things, that these broad groups of contributors are not necessarily amateurs (e.g. they sometimes receive small financial compensations and/or consider themselves as journalists). Besides, as the author argues, the term foregrounds the continuum of varying participant roles (and practices or motivations) between the roles of ‘journalist’ and ‘audience’. Anyhow, egalitarianism and cooperation are key values (Ahva, 2017; Atton, 2002, 2003, 2008; Brulle, 2010; Carpentier, 2008; Deuze, 2005b; Downing, 2002, 2003; Harcup, 2003, 2014). Gatekeeping is truly a collective endeavour (Bruns, 2003; Scoggin McEntee, 2016; Silcock & Schwalbe, 2010). Nowadays, (online) alternative media have a variety of technological means at their disposal – audience comments underneath articles, forums, blogs, open source publishing – which facilitate, in particular, the interaction with and active role of the public (Ahva, 2017; Atton, 2002; Bruns, 2003; Harbers, 2016; Harcup, 2003, 2014; Platon & Deuze, 2003; Silcock & Schwalbe, 2010; Takahashi et al., 2014; Waltz, 2005). Beck (2000, p.105) points out the potential of electronic media to mobilize people arguing as follows:

Electronic communication makes possible what has previously been excluded: namely, active, simultaneous and reciprocal contact between individuals across all frontiers constituted by countries, religions and continents.

As such, each progressive alternative media may constitute an *alternative public sphere* (Atton, 2002, 2003; Harcup, 2003, 2014). These are incorporated in a global network of alternative public spheres (i.e. a global alternative public sphere), as opposed to a network of corporate (mainstream) spheres or forces (Baysha, 2014). This alternative sphere, which has participatory parity as means *and* goal (Brulle, 2010; Fraser, 2000, 2005; Habermas & Burger, 1989), empowers ordinary people (‘counter-publics’) and gives them a voice in a public debate that is not predefined by (elite) hegemonic ideologies (Harcup, 2003; Lewis, 2007). That is, it facilitates the critical exchange of a broad range of ideas and argumentations. As such, providing readers (including, possibly, mainstream journalists) with and urging them to take different, more critical views, they try to inspire change towards a more democratic, just, equal world. They create the necessary space that makes suppressed alternatives imaginable, opening up the possibility for critical judgement of the dominant frames in society *and* mainstream media (Baysha, 2014; Fuchs, 2010, p.181; Harcup, 2003, 2014; Wiesslitz & Ashuri, 2011). In short, they provide “information for action” (Atton, 2002, p.85), in the public, political, cultural, social, civic and media spheres. Drawing on Carpentier (2015), Ahva (2017) summarizes this as ‘participation through journalism’.

Some authors (Baysha, 2014; Groshek & Han, 2011) highlight, however, that progressive alternative media may, in the end, also *exclude, background or censor certain realities or voices*, exaggerating others. That is, while they have good intentions and strive for democracy, they may actually produce the opposite. As such, they may misinform or disorient the audience or make them blind for particular frames. Yet, this is exactly what they accuse the mainstream media of. That is, of course, not so surprising. After all, every type of news is a construction and this construction very much depends on the methods, purposes, goals (e.g. giving the voiceless a voice), assumptions or backgrounds (see positionality (Pulido & Peña, 1998; Taylor, 2000)) of those communicators which happen to be able to affect the news production (e.g. Molotch & Lester, 1974; Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2007). Several authors question the potential of the online (alternative) space to open up the room for debate, pointing out that most of the discussions take place among like-minded people who see their ideological views and values reconfirmed (see Cammaerts, 2007).

Groshek and Han (2011) demonstrate, for instance, that the alternative public sphere is just as *one-sided* as its mainstream counterpart. While giving a voice to, and legitimating, bottom-up groups, the alternative media marginalize hegemonic views. This prevents responsiveness, a dialogue between equal issue positions. However, the authors argue, every media outlet has the responsibility to make all views, or frames, available to the audience. This is reminiscent of the ideal of ‘multiperspectival’ journalism promoted by Gans (1979, pp.113-116), and described by, among others, Carpentier (2008), Deuze (2005b) or Kovach and Rosenstiel (2007). Discussing the representation of the Occupy Wall Street movement by the Russian alternative radio ‘Echo’, however, Baysha (2014) argues in rather different ways. Demonstrating that the outlet fails to provide the broader context of global, structural, neo-liberal problems denounced by the protesters, she concludes – drawing on Bailey, Cammaerts and Carpentier (2007) – that alternative media may, depending on the context, criticize and deconstruct the hegemonic order or rather reproduce the dominant thinking, cooperating with the market and state for strategic and tactical purposes. Bailey, Cammaerts and Carpentier (2007) introduce the term ‘*transhegemonic media*’. In the case of ‘Echo’, the Russian authoritarian context may, presumably, feed into a strong focus on (i.e. lack of criticism of) the European model of liberal democracy as ideal (Baysha, 2014). I argue, however, that other contexts, in particular the pressure to produce a viable ‘product’ (i.e. reach (and appeal to) a sufficient number of ‘consumers’ or ‘costumers’, make money, demonstrate a certain level of professionalization) in a liberal, competitive market system, with limited means and personnel (e.g. Atton, 2002; Hamilton, 2000; Nee, 2014; Waltz, 2005), may also feed into the ((un)conscious) adoption of hegemonic perspectives. For instance, the financial support (by non-commercial sponsors) can come along with certain expectations, with regard to circulation or professionalization. This may affect the organization of the outlets (e.g. a stronger reliance on professional, elite journalists and sources (see Hamilton, 2000; Platon & Deuze, 2003)) and, possibly, the content they produce. Indeed, in a more general sense it has been argued (see e.g. Carpentier, 2008; Gans, 1979, 2004; Gess, 2012; Habermas &

Burger, 1989; Hamilton, 2004; Le Masurier, 2015; Lewis, 2007; Lewis & Boyce, 2009; McChesney, 2008; Nee, 2014) that the increasing commercial character of outlets goes hand in hand with the weakening of democratic responsibilities or public services. Anyhow, Baysha (2014) argues that ‘transhegemonic media’ are problematic as their total openness towards all kinds of views and compromises prevents them from truly criticizing the inequalities and injustices reproduced in the hegemonic sphere.

3.1.2.1 Previous Framing Research: Alternative Media

The existing framing research concerned with alternative media is rather limited. Besides, the ways in which most authors apply ‘framing’ diverges from the ways in which I conceptualize and operationalize ‘framing’ in this study (see 2.2.1.6 Non-frames; Chapter 4). Nevertheless, comparing the findings of a few (case) studies concerned with the framing of environmental topics, war and conflict, I draw some conclusions which may be instructive in the light of my own research. While the opposition between mainstream and alternative media is not clear-cut, it seems indeed that the counter-hegemonic, bottom-up positionality of (progressive) alternative media may indeed give rise to *alternative ‘(sub)frames’*.

Some authors find diverging frames in mainstream media – e.g. ‘national security’, ‘police operation’ (Cherian, 2003), ‘corporate rights’ or ‘national sovereignty’ (Hopke, 2012) – and alternative media (e.g. ‘civil rights’, ‘media cover up’, ‘political motive’ (Cherian, 2003), ‘community rights’ or ‘government negligent’ (Hopke, 2012)). Others notice that the same frames can be found across mainstream and alternative media – e.g. ‘political’ (Gunster, 2011), ‘struggle for rights’ (Doğu, 2015) or ‘environmental justice’ (Hopke, 2012) – but that they are realized in quite different ways depending on the top-down or bottom-up character of the outlet. As I will discuss in Chapter 4, I would rather approach both these hegemonic and counter-hegemonic frames as well as the differential realizations of frames as ideologically coloured subframes. That said, a closer look at these various ‘frames’ allows to discern some *underlying patterns*: Contrary to the frames in the mainstream media, many of the frames in the alternative media have at least some characteristics of ‘*collective action*’ (Benford & Snow, 2000; Čapek, 1993; Hopke, 2012; Taylor, 2000). Firstly, most frames denounce deconstructive (hegemonic) action and injustice, demonstrating moral outrage. For instance, the ‘political motive’ frame of Cherian (2003) argues that the fight against terror was only used as a political excuse, among others to persecute political dissidents. The ‘community rights’ frame of Hopke (2012) foregrounds mining companies as aggressors, which severely threaten the human rights of the local communities. Secondly, they emphasize the need for collective (bottom-up) action, balancing the negative (deconstructive) with positive (constructive) alternatives. Gunster (2011) argues that the realization of the ‘political’ frame in the mainstream media strongly focuses on a rather pessimistic view of failed politics, preoccupied with (national) self-interest. While the alternative media are equally pessimistic about institutionalized politics, they also present a number of other, more positive, futures. Their hopeful coverage highlights,

more specifically, that we can turn the climate threat into a collective challenge which we can cope with if we adopt a different kind of climate politics: ‘It is time to fight together’ (see also Gunster, 2012). Doğu, (2015) contends that the alternative version of ‘struggle for rights’ is far more critical and contains clear calls for action. Thirdly, some – but not all – alternative frames demonstrate a strong ‘us versus them’ opposition, focusing in particular on the agency and efficacy of the bottom-up groups. This is not the case for the frame described by Gunster (2011, 2012), but it is a defining character of, among others, the ‘environmental justice’ or ‘government negligent’ grassroots frames described by Hopke (2012). Note, besides, that many of the frames also reflect *different sets of human values* (see Crompton & Smith, 2015; Grouzet et al., 2005; Schwartz, 1994) from those in the mainstream media. For instance, equality, justice, collectivity, democracy are foregrounded as alternatives for the hegemonic economic and corporate interests, growth, hierarchy, elite control or social order. Highlighting the strong ties among alternative outlets, (grassroots) movements and native journalists, Hopke (2012) concludes: “(...) by reframing dominant narratives of economic progress toward community rights and environmental justice, alternative media can act in synergy with environmental movements to discursively break a cycle of environmental inequity (...)” (p.2) (see also Calmeyn, 2013).

While being concerned with discourses rather than with (sub)frames, Pepermans (2015) confirms these differential patterns in mainstream and alternative media. In a longitudinal, comparative critical discourse analysis of the coverage of United Nations climate summits and reports by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the author demonstrates that Flemish mainstream (broadsheet) newspapers tend to reproduce the hegemonic perspectives, naturalizing one course of action (out of moral, scientific, technocratic or market-oriented considerations) and failing to open up the debate for alternatives (i.e. they depoliticize the debate). The Flemish alternative outlet *DeWereldMorgen*, however, is more likely to challenge – from a rather pessimistic perspective – the ruling political-economic model of (neo)liberal globalization or the unequal distribution of global wealth as underlying structural causes of climate change. Also, the outlet is more inclined to depict the issue from the perspective of (often neglected) bottom-up voices (in the South), highlighting their (threatened) interests and values. Climate (or environmental) justice is a particularly important topic in the outlet. Denouncing the fact that the hegemonic (anthropocentric) views strongly keep defining the direction of current climate debates and policies, they provide alternative courses of action. Collective, bottom-up action (including ordinary citizens but also NGOs and grassroots movements in the South), in particular, are seen as key to more fundamental solutions. Clearly, then, the contrast between ‘us’ (bottom-up) and ‘them’ (top-down global corporate and political elites) – and the alternative worldviews (and futures) they stand for – is pivotal. Highlighting the potential of the alternative outlet to *politicize* the climate debate, Pepermans (2015, p.141) concludes:

In sum, in coverage in *DeWereldMorgen*, the climate change debate is represented as a societal debate between grassroots movements, NGOs and (left-wing) governments of

developing countries on the one hand and powerful economic interests and governments of industrialized countries on the other. (*italics added*)

Brand and Brunnengraber (2012) do, however, not detect fundamental differences among the climate discourses produced by mainstream and alternative media in Germany and the US. For instance, the latter lack a (contextualized) fundamental criticism of the capitalist system. The authors conclude, therefore, that the alternative media only show traces of counter-hegemonic thinking but do not contribute to a real alternative movement. That is at least so for the reporting on climate change. Other issues are covered in more oppositional terms (see Baysha, 2014). In a similar vein, Kenix (2008a, 2008b) does not find any clear differences among the climate change frames in mainstream and alternative media. She only notes that the latter tend to report in slightly less dramatic ways. I argue, however, that her failure to identify differences may, at least partly, be due to the ways in which she operationalizes frames. Distinguishing among (generic) frames as ‘conflict’, ‘sensationalism’ or ‘morality’, her analysis remains vague and rather superficial (see 2.2.1.6 Non-frames; Chapter 4).

3.2 Text




Figure 2: The figure visualizes the framing process, with various (mutually) interacting phases, actors, influences, including cultural, mental and textual frames. The phase of the ‘text’ and the interactions which are directly related to it are highlighted in green.

The textual frame (i.e. the manifestation of frames in (multimodal) texts) could, arguably, be considered as the central node in the framing process. It is the most tangible phase of the process. As discussed above (2.2.1.3 Latent-Manifest), frames take shape through (latent / manifest) reasoning devices and

(manifest) framing devices – as “signature elements” (Gamson, 1989, p.159) – which can be detected in texts (see Entman, 1993, 2004; Gamson, 1992; Gamson et al., 1992; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Van Gorp, 2006, 2007). In Chapter 2 (2.3.3 Multimodal Framing Analysis: A Method), I have already extensively discussed a multimodal, multi-level toolkit which may – especially (but not exclusively) – be useful in the context of textual framing analyses. In the following chapters, I will demonstrate exactly how this toolkit can be used to lay bare textual (news) frames (see Chapters 4 and 5). Being, on the one hand, the output of the frame-building process and, on the other hand, the input for frame interpretations, the textual frame constitutes the most direct and explicit link between communicators and recipients. It is also the subject of (re)negotiation (i.e. interactions with mental frames) on both sides. For instance, I have already quoted Engesser and Brüggemann (2016) above, who point out that “[n]ews frames (...) are the product of professional collaboration and represent a mixture of different social and cultural frames, actor frames, editorial frames and journalist frames” (p.828). As I will discuss below (3.3 Frame Interpretations), recipients often do not simply accept and incorporate textual frames, but may negotiate, ignore or decline them, drawing on their cognitive frames (e.g. Gamson et al., 1992; Graber, 1988). Accordingly, textual frames often provide the manifest starting points – or at least important backgrounds – for studies concerned with frame-building (e.g. Boesman et al., 2017; Scheufele, B., 2006) and frame interpretations (e.g. Weathers, Maibach & Nisbet, 2017; Powell et al., 2015). However, the textual frame also makes for a highly interesting and (rather) straightforward (i.e. most easily detectable) topic of research in its own right.⁵¹ Accordingly, it is no surprise that the lion’s share of the existing framing studies are concerned with this level of the process. Chapter 4 contains an overview of previously detected textual frames in the context of climate change and related environmental issues, such as the ‘health’ frame (O’Neill et al., 2015), the ‘scientific progress’ frame (Maesele, 2010), the ‘sustainable energy’ frame (Wessler et al., 2016) or the ‘injustice’ frame (Asplund, Hjerpe & Wibeck, 2013). As said, in Chapters 4 and 5 of this study I will also introduce and discuss my own set of climate change news (i.e. textual) frames.

⁵¹ However, one must always take into account that the textual frame is always part of a process that (partly) defines its broader meanings and potential.

3.3 Frame Interpretations




Figure 3: The figure visualizes the framing process, with various (mutually) interacting phases, actors, influences, including cultural, mental and textual frames. The phase of frame interpretations and the interactions which are directly related to it are highlighted in green.

3.3.1 The Persuasiveness of Frames

Media in general (e.g. Graber, 1988; Nicholson-Cole, 2005; Petersen & Ferruci, 2017; Wilson, 1995) and media frames, in particular, constitute very powerful means to exert power, (potentially) affecting cognitive, emotional and behavioural responses. They can affect the public and political debate and may render (the support for) certain policy options more or less likely (Entman, 1991, 2004). Numerous studies demonstrate framing effects on the audience, often focusing on opinions, attitudes, behaviours or emotions: In their often quoted ‘Asian disease’ study, Kahneman and Tversky (1984) show how diverging (positive or negative) frames – a risk-averse (certain outcome – e.g. ‘200 people will be saved’) versus risk-seeking (uncertain outcome – e.g. ‘there is a 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved and a 2/3 probability that no people will be saved’) treatment – influence the support for health policies. That is, respondents tended to choose the risk-averse option. Iyengar (1990) – and Hart (2011), replicating the research of the former in the context of climate change communication – exemplify the impact of episodic and thematic frames on the attribution of responsibility (to the individual or rather to government / society as a whole). Similarly, Corbett and Durfee (2004) demonstrate that the inclusion of context in media discussions about climate change tends to increase a sense of certainty among the

audience. The highlighting of controversy, however, is likely to decrease perceptions of certainty. Researching climate change framing, Myers et al. (2012) and Weathers, Maibach and Nisbet (2017) illustrate how the human health frame is far more likely to arouse feelings of hope than more traditional frames, such as the alarmist frame. Davis (1995) argues that environmental frames which highlight the negative consequences of people's inertia on themselves or their generation are more likely to evoke response and willingness to participate in environmentally-responsible behaviour. Approaching 'climate change' and 'global warming' as two differential frames – drawing on different argumentations and associations – Anderson et al. (2014) point out that 'global warming' is more likely to stir negative, alarmist (affective) responses than 'climate change'. The threats or consequences related to 'global warming' (i.e. affective imagery) are also perceived to be more distant than those associated with 'climate change'. The authors did, however, not find any differences as for the beliefs, risk perceptions or perceived solvability invoked by the two frames. According to Shen (2004b), the framing of stem cell research in terms of ethics (i.e. an environmental frame) or rather in terms of benefits (i.e. an economic frame) influences the interpretations and attitudes of the audience. Nelson, Oxley and Clawson (1997) show that people are more tolerant towards the Ku Klux Klan if their actions are framed as an exercise of free speech rights rather than as a disruption of social order. Johnson (2012) contends that equality framing diminishes opposition towards same-sex marriage and civil union, as opposed to morality framing (including concerns regarding family and traditions). Price, Tewksbury and Powers (1997), finally, found that 'human interest', 'conflict' and 'personal consequences' frames had differential effects on the thoughts generated by participants (i.e. cognitive process) as well as on their decision-making with regard to public policy.

As already discussed (see 2.3.1 Framing and the Special Attributes of the Visual), the visual mode – in particular – has the potential to reinforce framing effects, due to the special characteristics of visual communication. The pervasiveness of visual frames largely resides in their subtle and implicit nature. As Rodriguez and Dimitrova (2011) point out, for instance: “[v]iewers mostly make sense of images with the help of contextual or other cues and might be less conscious of being presented with pre-selected information that omits certain visual cues” (p.52). Indeed, lacking an explicit propositional syntax, visuals do not spell out their messages and build, as such, a ‘shield of deniability’ (Messaris & Abraham, 2001). Hence, while visual frames do guide audiences’ information processing, the latter are not necessarily aware of this manipulation. Moreover, the audience is much more inclined to accept visual information as the truth, due to its analogical qualities and/or indexicality (e.g. Coleman, 2010; Geise & Baden, 2015; Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; Machin & Mayr, 2012; Messaris, 1997; Messaris & Abraham, 2001, van Leeuwen, 2001; Rose, 2001). Attending to the media coverage of the war in Gaza, for example, Brantner, Lobinger and Wetzstein (2011) argue that the visual ‘human interest’ frame, among others, evokes stronger emotional evaluations of articles than the text-alone condition and the visual ‘political’ frame. Also, respondents judged the communicative quality of articles to be higher

when being presented with visuals beside the article texts. Abraham and Appiah (2006) argue that juxtaposing articles discussing social problems like criminality or social support with visuals of various ethnic groups, may have differential consequences. For instance, implicit racial images of black people may activate stereotypes and encourage the audience to associate the discussed problems with this group of people (see Messaris & Abraham, 2001). Powell et al. (2015) looked at the coverage of a little-known conflict in Africa and argue that visuals may have stronger effects on opinions and behavioural intentions than texts when they are presented alone. Monomodal texts, however only produce effects if they contain a high degree of issue-specific knowledge. When texts and images are presented together as multimodal texts, however, the visual frame mostly affects behavioural intentions while the verbal frame primarily influences opinions. The visual framing effects, in particular, can be explained by the emotions, like fear or anger, evoked by the images (see Borah (2011) for an overview of frame-building studies). Gamson et al. (1992) argue, however, that the images currently provided by the media, preoccupied with efficiency and immediacy, are far too fragmented and ephemeral to really buttress, or help to give rise to, coherent organizing frames over time (see e.g. León & Erviti, 2015). As I was not able to find any empirical research supporting this claim, I am not inclined to agree. On the other hand, however, it must be admitted that most perception studies are concerned with short-term rather than long-term effects (see, however, Druckman, 2004).

Summarizing, a media frame invites the audience to interpret the information it helps to structure in a particular way. Accordingly, it may also direct and restrict the interpretation and attention of the audience when they encounter information concerning the same or a comparable issue at a later moment in time (Druckman, 2001a, 2001b; Entman, 1991; Entman, Matthes & Pellicano, 2009; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Graber, 1988; Scheufele, B., 2006; Scheufele, D.A., 1999). In other words, “(...) some of the limits and parameters within which decoding will operate” are constructed (Pan & Kosicki, 1993, pp.57-58). The more salient (a part of) a frame is, the better the chance that it gets ‘noticed’, discerned, processed and stored. Druckman (2001b) distinguishes two broad groups of frame-effects studies: Studies concerned with equivalency framing effects, such as the research of Kahneman and Tversky (1984), generally focus on the effects of the positive or negative portrayal of the same information (see valence or attribute framing). Emphasis (or issue) framing studies examine specific evaluations or behaviours rather than risk perceptions (e.g. Nelson, Oxley & Clawson, 1997). Clearly, the latter fits best in my interpretation of frames (as ‘generic substance frames’ with underlying argumentative structures). Nelson and Oxley (1999) and Nelson, Oxley and Clawson (1997) argue, accordingly, that ‘framing effects’ enhance the weight attached to certain beliefs or considerations (i.e. certain realities). According to the authors, belief importance is what makes framing a unique concept, compared to other forms of communication-based attitude change like persuasion or priming. The former is said to revise the content of one’s beliefs, for instance turning a positive attitude towards fossil fuels into a negative attitude. Priming (i.e. mentioning by a communicator) brings cognitions –

temporarily – to the top of one’s head, rendering them more readily accessible (see Druckman, 2001a, 2001b). In a more recent contribution, however, Slothuus (2008) argues that Nelson and his colleagues (1997) have disregarded the fact that frames can also add new beliefs and not solely alter the weight of what is already at someone’s disposal. That is, there are actually some resemblances to persuasion. Slothuus (2008) proposes, accordingly, a dual-process model which encompasses belief importance and belief content change as mediators of framing effects. Lecheler, Bos and Vliegenthart (2015) also add emotional response as important mediator. The authors show that frames which trigger certain emotional responses, particularly enthusiasm and anger, tend to be more powerful. That is, they have stronger effects on opinions. As pointed out above, various types of frames may cause different types of emotional responses (e.g. Myers et al., 2012; Weathers, Maibach & Nisbet, 2017).

3.3.2 The Active ‘Reader’

As the arrows in the scheme (Figure 3) imply, however, frame interpretation is far from a one-way process, with certain frames being transferred from the media to an audience, the latter passively accepting and incorporating them. Contrariwise, there are some serious limitations to frame effects. Indeed, as social constructivism suggests, meanings take shape in processes of social interaction (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Danelzik, 2016). Audiences may accept a (preferred) frame but just as well debate or decline it (Butler & Pidgeon, 2009; Davis, 1995; Domke, Perlmutter & Spratt, 2002; Druckman, 2001a, 2001b; Entman, Matthes & Pellicano, 2009; Gamson et al., 1992; Scheufele, B., 2006; Scheufele, D.A., 1999). Therefore, Gamson et al. (1992) argue for the usage of the label ‘reader’ rather than ‘audience’, as the former illuminates more clearly the active role of the receiver who brings all kinds of elements with him to the text (hence my preference for the term ‘frame interpretations’). Newton (2000) emphasizes that seeing is not always believing. That is, we are able to challenge what we see. This idea of activity and agency is also contained in the term ‘decoding’ (and ‘encoding’).

Various individual and contextual moderators may affect the audience’s interaction with media frames. Chong and Druckman (2007a) point out, for instance, that less knowledgeable individuals are more likely to be affected by (repeated) frames, focusing on peripheral cues, like the credibility of sources or the number of arguments provided (see contextual moderators). More knowledgeable recipients, however, are more inclined to systematically compare the relative strength of competitive frames, focusing on the substantive merits of frames (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Graber, 1988; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Accordingly, Schuck and De Vreese (2006) found that frames had less effect on the more (political) knowledgeable. While arguing in comparable terms (drawing on similar sources), Rhee (1997), De Vreese (2004) and Druckman and Nelson (2003) conclude, however, that deeper and more sophisticated information processing by more knowledgeable individuals is more likely to facilitate the uptake and incorporation of frames: “(...) knowledgeable people were better able to take the thoughts and ideas in the news materials and to integrate them into their interpretations” (Rhee, 1997). As the

authors point out, their access to issue-specific information and, accordingly, developed and well-organized mental structures, helps recipients to efficiently and effectively select, abstract, store, retrieve and interpret information. According to Rhee (1997), people use their existing mental schemata regardless of their content. That is, the availability of (relevant) knowledge structures as such suffices. Other individual factors which have been identified include age, gender (Bleich, 2007; Clayton, Coehn & Grover, 2013; Höijer, 2004), mood (Chang, 2007), partisanship (Bleich, 2007; Kim, 2011), core values (Clayton, Coehn & Grover, 2013; Shen & Edwards, 2005; Whitmarsh, O'Neill & Lorenzoni, 2013), environmental identity (Clayton, Coehn & Grover, 2013) or engagement for or belief in climate change (see 'the six America's of climate change') (Anderson et al., 2014; Leiserowitz, 2006, 2007; Myers et al., 2012; Weathers, Maibach & Nisbet, 2017). This ties in with the idea of 'positionality' (Pulido & Peña, 1998; Taylor, 2000). Contextual moderators encompass, in particular, interpersonal communication and source characteristics. According to Druckman (2001a), framing can only take place on condition that the communicators are deemed credible or trustworthy by the public (see Chong & Druckman, 2007a; Malka, Krosnick & Langer, 2009). What is more, the author even argues that framing effects only happen on the terms of the audience, that is, if the latter want the elites to frame, if they turn to them for guidance (see Perlmutter, 1998; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Clearly, this discussion implicitly refers to 'ethos', personal characteristics such as competence, good intention and empathy – communicated through verbal and non-verbal means – which make a speaker appear credible. This was identified by the Greek philosopher Aristototele as one of the three modes of persuasion in rhetoric, next to logos ('reason') and pathos ('emotions') (Modrak, 1987). Grayson (2013), Huxford (2001) or Mendelson (2005) point out, in a more general vein, that we are more inclined to accept (visual) arguments if they appear in elite, trustworthy contexts, such as the context of a newspaper. Druckman (2004) adds that the effects of frames may be moderated if debates are going on and various frames and counter-frames are present. Druckman and Nelson (2003) argue that interpersonal conversations may limit the elite framing effects (through the media).

Clearly, then, various influences directly or indirectly help to give shape to the mental frames and schemata of the audience and/or intervene in the interaction among audience frames (and schemata) and news frames (Buehner, 2012; Domke, Perlmutter & Spratt, 2002; Entman, 1993, 2004; Entman, Matthes & Pellicano, 2009; Graber, 1988; Scheufele, D.A., 1999; Van Gorp, 2006). As discussed, Bertram Scheufele (2006) contends that mental frames are based on consistent clusters of mental schemata (e.g. a victim-schema, a culprit-schema, a cause-schema). Graber (1988) defines schemata – which may be visualized as mental networks of connected concepts (Domke, Perlmutter & Spratt, 2002) – as expectations about how the world works, structures that "(...) may learn which dimensions of a given situation are worth noting and which can be safely ignored" (p.185). Fiske and Taylor (1991) refer to "(...) cognitive structures that represent knowledge about a concept or type of stimulus, including its attributes and the relations among attributes" (p.131). Schemata draw on socialization in a certain

culture, media input but also cognitions, values, feelings, life experiences or reasoning (Domke, Perlmutter & Spratt, 2002; Fillmore & Baker, 2009; Graber, 1988; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Obviously, this mixture of particular ingredients, as well as the amounts ‘added’, differs from one individual to another. Cultural frames and external input (such as news frames) interact with the clustered schemata to form mental frames.⁵²

Mental frames and schemata may explain to a large extent how people process incoming information, whether they accept (and incorporate) or negotiate the salient frame conveyed by a text, ignore it, or rather decline it and construct an alternative frame, drawing on the incongruent information available in the text. Schemata, and frames accordingly, have a strong, persistent nature. Graber (1988) argues, accordingly (see Shen, 2004a, 2004b):

(...) the dimensions that they exclude are apt to be ignored in subsequent information processing, even when media make them available. Hence the odds favour schema maintenance over schema growth or creation of new schemata (p.186).

Rather, when being confronted with a reality that disconfirms our schemata, we compile exception categories. Conversely, what we already know (i.e. what is congruent with our schemata), is what we are most likely to perceive and readily accept. Therefore, Gans (2004, p.71) maintains that “(...) the news media are thought to reinforce, strengthen, and even to legitimate, existing attitudes and behaviours rather than to change them”. Nevertheless, intermediary individual and contextual moderators, such as time, motivation or knowledge (see above), very much affect whether or not individuals will try to integrate inconsistent information into existing mental structures. The categories which are stimulated most often by incoming media impulses or other external input are particularly influential. That is, they are more quickly and easily available (Chong & Druckman, 2007a, 2007b; Domke, Perlmutter & Spratt, 2002; Entman, Matthes & Pellicano, 2009; Fillmore & Baker, 2009; Fiske and Taylor, 1991; Gamson et al., 1992; Graber, 1988; Kim, 2011; Langacker, 1993; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Scheufele, D.A., 1999).

Due to the highly polysemic character of images, audiences’ mental frames are even more vital when it comes to the frame interpretations of the visual mode (e.g. Domke, Perlmutter & Spratt, 2002; Geise & Baden, 2015; Kaml, 2005; Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; Mendelson, 2005; Messaris, 1997; Moriarty & Sayre, 2005; Perlmutter, 1998; Rose, 2001). As Buehner (2012, p.4) points out:

To a greater degree in visual messaging than in textual messaging, these meaning-making concepts from the audience-level of framing filter the effects from the media. This filtering occurs because visuals are reliant on the viewer’s ability to make intuitive sense of messages on the basis of contextual or other cues.

⁵² Langacker (1993) argues, in a more general vein, that we tend to interpret novel experiences through previous experiences (and expectations), which often constitute coherent structures.

As argued, visual meanings remain more often implicit and depend much stronger on the ways in which the audience reads the visual language, and their ability to interpret certain codes in the first place. Accordingly, mental frames and schemata have, in particular, a major influence on the visual information that we most readily perceive and select and the ways in which we interpret this information. As Fahmy (2004), Perlmutter (1998, 2005) or Ali, James and Vultee (2013) illustrate, for instance, one's cultural background is crucial in prompting a certain meaning deduction over another (see Barthes, 1972; Chouliaraki, 2006; Grancea, 2014; Hall, 1977; Koga-Browes, 2013; Mendelson, 2005; Messaris, 1997; Pauwels, 2005; Rose, 2001). For instance, while the burqa is interpreted in 'western' cultures as a symbol of subordination, this is not the case in countries where women tend to wear this garment (Fahmy, 2004). Clearly, such varying deductions can give rise to deviating frame interpretations. Domke, Perlmutter and Spratt (2002) discuss the substantial strength of mentally stored visual information, arguing that images are particularly strongly and deeply embedded within the mental network. Hence, they may have a more profound impact than verbal information: The researchers had expected that the participants in their study would identify with the protesters depicted in the photographs. After all, viewers are often said to be emotionally attracted to depictions, especially close-ups of other human beings (Coleman, 2010; Graber, 1988, 1996; Hart, 2011; Höijer, 2004; Jewitt & Oyama, 2001; Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; Manzo, 2010b; Messaris, 1997; Small & Loewenstein, 2003). However, the respondents did not identify. Guided by their mental information – especially the negative associations with protesters which are often activated by media or other cues (see e.g. Entman & Rojecki, 1993; Gitlin, 1980) – the participants drew a quite oppositional message from the image. In the process, these views were even carried over to broader, associated issues. Similarly, Moriarty and Sayre (2005) found that several viewers added certain elements (e.g. American symbolism) to a commercial in order to make the provided information fit into their mental schemata.

The discussion above highlights the importance of 'cultural resonance' in the framing process. I have argued before (see 2.2.1.4 Frames and Narratives) that frames – being part and parcel of culture (see 'cultural frames') (Van Gorp, 2006, 2007) – are often organized around a stereotype, symbol, archetype, motif or, in the case of subframes, a myth, folktale, worldview or value. The more those resonate with broadly shared themes in (human) culture(s), the stronger they probably are embedded in people's mental schemata. Accordingly, culturally resonant frames are more likely to be perceived, to be understood, to be (fully / largely) incorporated and to incite affective reactions or identification. Besides, they are more readily accepted or even remain largely unnoticed due to the fact that people perceive their devices as familiar or even natural. In short, cultural resonance adds to the prominence of frames (Barthes, 1972; Edelman, 1993; Entman, 1993, 2004; Gamson, 1989; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Hall, 1997; Hertog & McLeod, 2001; Perlmutter, 1998; Shanahan & McComas, 1999; Van Gorp, 2006, 2007; Wozniak, Lück & Wessler, 2015). For example, Whitmarsh, O'Neill and Lorenzoni (2013) argue

for building on broadly shared values or motives – such as health and safety – for designing more effective strategies for climate change communication (see ‘narrative fidelity’ (Fisher, 1985)).

The mechanisms underlying cultural resonance are related to the human tendency to accept most readily the information we are already familiar with and, in particular, what is most often repeated (e.g. Chong & Druckman, 2007a, 2007b). The more a ‘truth’ is replicated, the more important (e.g. Nelson & Oxley, 1999) and accessible (e.g. Domke, Perlmutter & Spratt, 2002) its mental categories become, the more it gets strengthened in people’s minds as an obvious and natural reality (Lakoff, 2010; Langacker, 1993). This is, for instance, how commercials work (Messaris, 1997). Once our thinking is led by a certain frame, however, we become largely unable to look beyond it, let alone to refute or challenge it. Drawing on Kepplinger and Habermeier (1995), Van Gorp (2006) argues that we need a shock – an event like 9/11 or hurricane Katrina – to become able again to perceive the boundaries of our dominant frames and to cross them (see Chilton, 1987). Indeed, memorable events are most able to impact people’s opinions (see Gans, 2004; Perlmutter, 1998; Scheufele, B., 2006; Zelizer, 2004). However, we are only prepared to adapt our (mental) frames if we are convinced that there is sufficient social support for such a change (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Graber, 1988; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).

Stereotypes, in particular, are culturally resonant. We are largely unaware of these preconceived categorizations due to their pervasiveness in culture: These ‘pictures in our heads’ (Lippmann, 2006) are provided, and continually repeated, by the media, in education or by other cultural institutions. As such, upon encountering visuals with a preferred, intended, or at least potential stereotypical message, we tend to readily and unconsciously infer this message. That is, being easily processed, stereotypes are unlikely to activate much (conscious) mental activity (i.e. they lower the cognitive load). Our easy acceptance of stereotypes as ‘established facts’ also has much to do with their (often) visual character. As argued, the messages, values or associations in visuals usually remain implicit. As such, images can convey stereotyped views which would be considered as unacceptable in words. Also, the emotional character of visuals makes them particularly powerful (Coleman, 2010; Gamson, 1989; Hartman & Husband, 1973; Jewitt & Oyama, 2001; Lester, 1995; Machin & Mayr, 2012; Messaris, 1997; Messaris & Abraham, 2001; Sibley & Osborne, 2016).⁵³ Graber (1988) confirms that schemata hold a good deal of stereotypical thinking. That is often, but not necessarily (Hartman & Husband, 1973), so when it comes to issues about which we lack personal experiences or first-hand knowledge (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). For example, depictions of far-away places and people are likely to affect mental schemata and frames as the latter are often underdeveloped with regard to these topics. Obviously, the (media’s) promoting of stereotypical messages might, particularly in these cases, have far-reaching consequences (Chouliaraki, 2006; Graber, 1988, 1996; Huiberts & von Engelhardt, 2014;

⁵³ See also: Bell (2001), Edelman (1993), Entman (1993, 2004), Gamson and Modigliani (1989), Gitlin (1980), Hertog & McLeod (2001), Perlmutter (1998), Rose (2001).

Perlmutter, 1998, 2005; Scott, 2014). More generally speaking, then, if experiences or personal knowledge concerning a particular issue – such as climate change – are unavailable to audience members, (repeated) media frames may have a stronger effect on the construction of mental schemata and frames. Further reasoning on and adapting of this external input is possible but depends on one's mental capabilities or access to alternative sources (Chong & Druckman, 2007a; De Vreese, 2004; Druckman, 2004; Druckman & Nelson, 2003; Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Graber, 1988; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Rhee, 1997; Scheufele, D.A., 1999; Schuck & De Vreese, 2006; Vliegenthart & van Zoonen, 2011).

Finally, the interaction between textual frames and mental frames and schemata is a vital prerequisite for the audience to make sense of news. As already discussed, frames only take shape across various (multimodal) texts. Accordingly, their realization in any single text is always partial. Nevertheless, they usually activate mental frames or schemata, which can provide broader information, fill in unstated reasoning devices, incite certain feelings, ideas or related values. In short, they introduce the broader context in which the reader may interpret the information. That is especially crucial when it comes to the visual side of multimodal frames as the latter, in particular, depends on audience interpretations (Buehner, 2012; Fillmore & Baker, 2009; Hallahan, 1999; Herbers & Volpers, 2013; Hertog & McLeod, 2001; Lobinger & Geise, 2013; Meier, 2013; Reese, 2007; van Dijk, 1977, 1988, 1998). According to Van Gorp (2006, 2007), key events are powerful activators of such worlds of interpretation. That is no coincidence. Key events constitute well-embedded categories within the mental networks of connected concepts (i.e. schemata): As a result of frequent stimulation – whether or not in association with other concepts – the linkages connecting them to other categories in the network become particularly strong (Domke, Perlmutter & Spratt, 2002). Hence, they are more likely to invoke related concepts or associations as soon as they get activated (see Kepplinger & Habermeier, 1995; Zelizer, 2004).

3.4 Framing as a Process: From Theory to Practice

Concluding, framing is a highly interactive process which encompasses frame-building (encoding), the textual frame and frame interpretations (decoding). As my discussion hopefully has illustrated, it is crucial to take into account these three – mutually constitutive – phases in any framing analysis in order to fully grasp the potential meanings, influences or impacts of frames. Ideally, a researcher develops his / her own insights by examining both frame-building, textual frames as well as frame interpretations. Alternatively, he or she may draw on insights provided by colleagues when lifting out one or two of those. The latter is, practically, most feasible. I will attempt to translate these theoretical views and insights to an empirical application in the next chapters. Chapters 4 and 5 will be concerned with the multimodal textual frames in climate change communication, based on the conceptual and methodological insights introduced in Chapter 2. Yet, I will draw on the discussed findings in the areas of frame-building and frame interpretations when it comes to interpretations and conclusions. Chapter

6 will approach the identified frames from the perspective of frame-building, rendering the theoretical expectations and assumptions in chapters 4 and 5 more concrete (and context-specific). The conclusions, then, will address all stages of the framing process, complementing the empirical findings and conclusions regarding frame-building and textual frames with more comprehensive theoretical remarks regarding frame interpretations.

4 Framing Climate Change: A Multi-level Model⁵⁴

4.1 Introduction

Small islands engulfed by rising seas, bad harvests and famine caused by water shortages, species going extinct due to changing weather conditions... Climate change is *the* threat of the twenty-first century for humans and nature (IPCC, 2014a, 2014b). However, depending on the ways in which the media depict the issue in words and images, other problems or concerns are brought to mind, or the audience is invited to engage or rather to take some distance. To most laypeople, media are indeed an important source of information, especially about abstract and intangible issues like climate change. As such, newspapers, magazines or TV broadcasts have the potency to strongly influence the boundaries of the public and political debate, and may, as such, affect whether and which action is undertaken (e.g. Graber, 1988; Lakoff, 2010; Myers et al., 2012; Nelkin, 1995; Nicholson-Cole, 2005; Petersen & Ferruci, 2017; Wilson, 1995) (see 3.3 Frame Interpretations).

Accordingly, it is no surprise that over the last couple of years an extensive number of media and communication scholars have conducted research into the media representation of climate change. Framing analysis, in particular, has proved to be a highly popular method, especially for looking at verbal (e.g. Boykoff, 2008; Brand & Brunnengräber, 2012; Fletcher, 2009; Nisbet, 2009; O'Neill et al., 2015; Shehata & Hopmann, 2012; Stephens, Rand & Melnick, 2009; Schlichting, 2013; Schmidt & Schäfer, 2015; Tillinghast & McCan, 2013; Weathers & Kendall, 2015)⁵⁵ but also at visual or multimodal (Borah, 2009; Grittmann, 2014; O'Neill, 2013; Rebich-Hespanha et al., 2013; Wozniak et al., 2016) representations of the climate and related issues. However, despite the potency of the framing concept and method as defined by authors like Entman (1991, 1993, 2004), Gamson (1989, 1992), Gamson and Modigliani (1989) or Van Gorp (2006, 2007) (see Chapter 2), the current empirical research is often overly restrictive or mainly outlines surface patterns.⁵⁶ While this is a more general finding, it is particularly well illustrated by the research on climate change framing (e.g. De Vreese, 2005; Hertog & McLeod, 2001; Reese, 2007; Tankard, 2001).

Firstly, most studies do not look beyond the mainstream media. However, only by taking a broader range of sources into account, one might be able to draw a more elaborate picture of the frames which are currently made available by the media, and the underlying ideologies they help to promote. As Brand

⁵⁴ A more concise version of this chapter has been published as a book chapter in a volume on climate change communication: Moernaut, R., Mast, J., & Pauwels, L. (2018). Framing Climate Change: A Multi-level Model. In W. L. Filho, E. Manolas, A. M. Azul, U. M. Azeiteiro & H. McGhie (eds.), *Handbook of Climate Change Communication: Vol. 1. Climate Change and Environmental* (pp. 215-271). Cham: Springer.

⁵⁵ See also Table 4 (Climate change and environmental (e.g. GM food) frames in the literature) below.

⁵⁶ As I will discuss throughout this chapter, however, many of the existing contributions do have a merit in that they may provide a starting point for other, more detailed or thorough studies, as this PhD thesis tries to provide.

and Brunnengräber (2012) illustrate, for instance, alternative media (e.g. Atton, 2002, 2003; Baysha, 2014; Downing, 2001, 2003; Groshek & Han, 2012; Harcup, 2003, 2014) are more likely to – but not necessarily do – promote non-hegemonic frames, which are absent or far less prevalent in the mainstream media. These question the dominant capitalist-liberalist development thinking. Similarly, Gunster (2011) demonstrates that alternative media are more likely to frame climate politics in terms of positive, collective alternatives. Hopke (2012) discusses, among others, the grassroots ‘environmental justice’ frame in the context of alternative Salvadoran media. This is largely absent in the mainstream press (see also Calmeyn, 2013; Pepermans, 2015; Maesele, 2010). Moreover, by exposing ourselves to different ways of seeing the world, we have a better chance to identify the dominant assumptions (i.e. the dominant frames) we live with – and which determine our framing (analyses) – and to take a more critical distance (Hertog & McLeod, 2001, p.150). Indeed, Entman (1991, p.6) argues that:

Unless narratives are compared, frames are difficult to detect fully and reliably, because many of the framing devices can appear as ‘natural’, unremarkable choices of words or images. Comparison reveals that such choices are not inevitable or unproblematic but rather are central to the way the news frame helps establish the literally ‘common sense’ (i.e. widespread) interpretation of events.

As discussed, the need for people to open up their minds to various alternative views is also the central argument of scholars like De Lucia (2009), Kenis and Mathijs (2014), Mouffe (2005), Pepermans (2015), Pepermans and Maesele (2014) or Swyngedouw (2010) who point out the need for politicization (vis-à-vis depoliticization, or the preoccupation with hegemonic views) (see also Alexander, 2011; Larson, 2011; Fairclough, 1995, 2000; Shanahan & McComas, 1999; Shiva, 1988, 1993; Stibbe, 2015; van Dijk, 1988, 1998).

Secondly, many scholars use ‘frames’ merely as empty – or at least too broad – labels, topics or themes. These help to capture and organize large amounts of media communication, but “neglect the ideological nature and consequences of the framing process as well as the power relationships that influence that process” (Carragee & Roefs, 2004, p.219). Besides, most frame approaches do not account for the underlying argumentative structure of frames (Entman, 1991, 1993, 2004; Van Gorp, 2006, 2007). Accordingly, many researchers fail to explicate exactly how they have detected the frames they propose, or how they come up with certain names. Thus, there is a need for more clarity, and for more reliable and replicable coding measures (e.g. Matthes & Kohring, 2008; Reese, 2007; Tankard, 2001). Frame matrices may be useful tools for summarizing the underlying patterns of frames, while also allowing for easy comparison and testing (see Van Gorp, 2006; Maesele, 2010; Van Gorp & van der Goot, 2009).

Finally, although the number of studies on (monomodal) visual framing is growing, most framing studies keep focusing on the verbal mode. That is peculiar, since the communicative power of visuals is broadly acknowledged, in a general sense and with regard to framing (e.g. Geise & Baden, 2015; Herbers & Volpers, 2013; Joffe, 2008; Lobinger & Geise, 2013; Messaris & Abraham, 2001; Perlmutter, 1998).

Besides, as the visual and the verbal modes always work in tandem, a monomodal approach is likely to limit our understanding (Coleman, 2010; Geise & Baden, 2015; Jewitt, 2009; Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; Machin & Mayr, 2012; Martinec & Salway, 2005; Unsworth & Cléirigh, 2009).

Hence, taking the existing climate change and environmental framing research as a useful and valuable basis, I have tried to take the latter to a next level, incorporating it into my own findings and insights. I have explored new directions, which have been theoretically addressed but which remain empirically under-researched. As such, this study attempts to open up paths for others to build on. That is, I aim to answer to the call of Borah (2011) for research that connects and contributes to a broader, cumulative understanding of framing. For doing so, I will conduct a qualitative framing analysis on three major mainstream newspapers – with differing characteristics and backgrounds – and the two main (online) alternative outlets in Flanders. Most media studies focus on the Anglo-Saxon world, thus overlooking the climate change framing in other regions. Exceptions are, among others, provided by Olausson (2009), Shehata and Hopmann (2012) or Asplund, Hjerpe and Wibeck (2013), who mainly focus on Scandinavian countries. Schmidt and Schäfer (2015) take German, Indian and American media into account, while Billett (2010) highlights the perspective taken in the Indian mass media (and thus, a representative of the Global South). Gordon, Deines and Havice (2010) look at the frames in a Mexico City newspaper. However, apart from critical discourse analyses conducted by Pepermans, Maesele and their colleagues (e.g. Maesele et al., 2014; Pepermans, 2015; Pepermans & Maesele, 2014), no media research yet exists that attends to the reporting of climate change in Flanders. Nevertheless, (northern) Belgium makes an interesting case: It is one of the most vulnerable regions in Europe in terms of flooding (IPCC, 2014a, 2014b). Besides, it is quite similar to other Western European countries, like Germany or the Netherlands, in terms of its (mainstream) media, economic, political and cultural systems (see the ‘Democratic Corporatist Model’ of Hallin and Mancini (2004)). That is, it could be considered as quite representative for important parts of (mainland) Western Europe. Contrary to countries like the United States or United Kingdom, human-induced climate change is more largely accepted (e.g. Eurobarometer, 2014; Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006; Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2003) and represented in the media as a fact (Boykoff, 2007; Boykoff & Boykoff, 2004; Dirikx & Gelders, 2009, 2010; Maesele et al., 2014; Pepermans, 2015).

This conceptual study will, more specifically, attempt to answer the following research questions:

- (1) Which set of multimodal frames can be found drawing on a corpus of mainstream *and* alternative media articles?
- (2) How do these frames account for ideological diversity (i.e. hegemonic struggles)? That is, which sets of underlying ideologically coloured ‘subframes’ can be detected?
 - a. Which insights does this provide with regard to the contribution of framing to depoliticization and politicization (research)?

- (3) How can we summarize and make tangible the main multimodal characteristics of the detected frames by means of frame matrices?

Summarizing, rather than to discuss quantitative data, I aim to provide an overview of the breadth and depth of the frames, and framing / reasoning devices which I discern in my corpus. The qualitative discussions will, however, be complemented with a brief quantitative section which may help to understand the detected frames in a broader context. That is, it will allow to identify underlying patterns and differences as for the prevalence of the frames in the various types of media outlets (mainly mainstream-alternative but also popular-tabloid and conservative-progressive).

4.2 Framing

I have defined framing in Chapter 2.2 (Defining Frames and Framing). Drawing on authors like Entman (1991, 1993, 2004), Gamson (1989, 1992), Gamson and Modigliani (1989), Stibbe (2015), Tankard (2001) or Van Gorp (2006, 2007), I argued that a frame is an immanent structuring idea which gives coherence and meaning to a text. Framing, then, is applying a particular frame to structure an area of life: It involves selecting, omitting, expanding and giving salience to certain aspects of a perceived reality in a text, providing context and suggesting a particular problem definition, causal responsibility, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation to the audience. As (media) frames are, in essence, multimodal, this general framing definition is equally applicable to the verbal as well as to the visual mode and, in particular, to multimodal interactions or composites.

‘Frame packages’ (Gamson, 1989, 1992; Pan & Kosicki, 1993; Van Gorp, 2006, 2007) always comprise a – latent – central organizing idea and are made immanent by (manifest / latent) reasoning devices (problem definition, causal responsibility, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation) (Entman, 1991, 1993, 2004) and verbal / visual framing devices. Framing and ideology are tightly interwoven (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Van Gorp, 2006). This study tries to account for this by introducing a distinction between masterframes, frames and ideologically coloured subframes.

The positionality (see Pulido & Peña, 1998; Taylor, 2000) of media outlets (and claims-makers) largely defines which subframes (and thus, masterframes) they are most likely to apply. For instance, drawing on the literature, I pointed out in Chapter 3 that alternative media are likely to use more non-hegemonic subframes than their mainstream counterparts, and vice versa (e.g. Brand & Brunnengräber, 2012; Gunster, 2011, 2012; Hopke, 2012; Pepermans, 2015; Pepermans & Maesele, 2014). Popular and broadsheet media also tend to promote different types of frames (e.g. Boykoff, 2008; Ereaud & Segnit, 2006). The same is true for more conservative and rather progressive types of outlets (e.g. Carvalho, 2005, 2007; Dirickx & Gelders, 2010; Ereaud & Segnit, 2006; Maesele et al., 2014; Pepermans, 2015).

4.3 Environmental Frames in the Literature

The existing empirical research on the (media) framing of climate change and related issues, like science (in general), GM food or (climate) justice, is extensive. That is illustrated by Table 4, which provides a – non-exhaustive – overview of frames found in the literature. I included, in particular, those studies which provide large sets of frames, or constitute an original contribution to the literature and/or an important source for other research.

Trying to classify this large number of frames, I ended up with seven broad categories: ‘Uncertainty/Conflict’, ‘Economics and Technology’, ‘Alarmism/Disaster’, ‘Responsibility (Human-induced Climate Change)’, ‘Morality and Ethics’, ‘Health and Safety’ and ‘Transformation’. Those give a good overview of general tendencies in the current debate about climate and environment(al) (politics). My own findings will build further on these insights. Yet, I also find some problems with the existing frames.

As Table 4 illustrates, the current field of climate change frames is quite messy, with many researchers identifying their own – often non-exhaustive and/or not mutually exclusive (Tankard, 2001) – (issue-specific) set of frames along slightly different lines. This allows researchers to find whatever they want to find in the first place, but it also prevents comparison among studies and issues. As such, it largely inhibits the further development of the framing concept and methodology (Borah, 2011; Hertog & McLeod, 2001). For instance, how to make a clear distinction between the frames in the categories ‘Morality and Ethics’, ‘Health and Safety’ or ‘Alarmism/Disaster’?

I argue that the problems are, for the greater part, due to the fact that many of the ‘frames’ work on different levels, largely accounting for what Entman (1993) calls “a fractured paradigm” (see Borah, 2011) (see 2.2.1.6 Non-Frames): Themes, topics or subjects – e.g. ‘ecological / meteorological’, ‘scientific’, ‘culture and society’ (Boykoff, 2008), ‘political’ (Gordon, Deines & Havice, 2010), ‘lives saved / lost’ (Borah, 2009) – or attributes – e.g. ‘the risk’ and ‘benefit’ / ‘opportunity’ frames of Stephens, Rand & Melnick (2009) or Painter (2013) – are often, but not necessarily, ‘issue-specific’. That is, they are limited to one issue. This goes counter to the idea of ‘cultural frames’ (Van Gorp, 2006, 2007). Journalistic formats or routines – e.g. ‘conflict’ (Weathers & Kendall, 2015), ‘sensationalism’ (Kenix, 2008a, 2008b) or ‘human interest’ (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000) – mostly (but not necessarily) constitute ‘generic frames’. Those may appear across a large number of issues and topics (Van Gorp, 2006, 2007). Others seem to focus on only one part (i.e. one reasoning device) of the argumentative structure (Entman, 1991, 1993, 2004; Van Gorp, 2006, 2007), for instance ‘responsibility’ (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000), ‘problem definition’ (Grittmann, 2014) or ‘morality (and ethics)’ (e.g. O’Neill et al., 2015; Nielsen & Kjaergaard, 2011; Weathers & Kendall, 2015). As such, many identified ‘frames’ (i.e. names) lack substance. They do not represent a ‘central organizing idea’ (i.e. an underlying

narrative), despite the fact that most authors strongly draw on the definitions of Entman (1993, 2004), Gamson (1989, 1992), Gamson and Modigliani (1989) and/or Van Gorp (2006, 2007) when conceptualizing framing. As Reese (2007) argues, ‘frame’ is indeed often used as a ‘catch-all phrase’: “Authors often give an obligatory nod to the literature before proceeding to do whatever they were going to do in the first place” (p.151).

Accordingly, most frames which are currently in circulation lack clear argumentative structures. A majority only provides little detail or generic, rather stereotypical statements concerning the structure of the frames. Put differently, they fail to explicate clear sets of reasoning and (visual / verbal) framing devices, which (ought to) sustain the ‘central organizing idea’ (Reese, 2007; Tankard, 2001). If present, the described sets of (framing) devices are often limited in scope and largely monomodal (mostly verbal), failing to take the contribution of visual or multimodal devices into account. Van Gorp and van der Goot (2009), Maesele (2010) or Slichting (2013), however, do summarize the underlying frame patterns by means of frame matrices. I consider these as useful tools, which allow for more clarity and validity, at least when being combined with an extensive set of reliable and replicable coding measures (Tankard, 2001). Summarizing, the majority of the existing frame(s) (sets) have one or multiple limitations that prevent them from thoroughly informing us about the (full) breadth and depth of frames, their communicative effects, ideological interests and, notably, the potential underlying hegemonic struggles (Carragee & Roefs, 2004; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Van Gorp, 2006, 2007).

Nevertheless, I argued in Chapters 1 (1.3 Depoliticizing versus Politicizing Frames) and 3 (3.1.1.1.5 Previous Framing Research: Mainstream Media) that most of the current climate or environmental frames help to illustrate the dominance of anthropocentric (depoliticizing) views in the media (and society) (see Dryzek, 1997; Grunwald, 2016; Hopwood, Mellor & O’Brien, 2005; Shanahan & McComas, 1999; Unmüßig, Sachs & Fatheuer, 2012; Verhagen, 2008). I pointed out, for example, that ‘economics and technology’ frames – such as ‘fairness and effectiveness through market mechanisms’ (Schmidt & Schäfer, 2015), ‘sustainable energy’ (Wessler et al, 2016) or ‘industrial leadership’ (Schlichting, 2013) – reflect a belief in technological-economic development as the main problem-solver. Other frames like ‘political’ (Gordon, Deines & Havice, 2010), ‘politics and policy-making’ (Nielsen & Kjaergaard, 2011) or ‘international relations’ (Kenix, 2008a, 2008b) (in)directly situate the responsibility (for causes and solutions) among the dominant (political) elites, rather than in society at large (i.e. among various social groups). Clearly, then, in its dominant application, ‘frame’ often functions on the level of ideology. In most cases, no distinction is made between the two concepts. I contend, however, that one frame never equals one ideology, but may reproduce a variety of ideologies (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Van Gorp, 2006, 2007) (see 2.2.1.5 Ideology). Hence, rather than ‘frames’ I would approach these knowledge constructions – which are definitely not universal – as subframes. These conceptual inconsistencies or disagreements are not problematic as such. As shown,

these approaches definitely have their value. For a start, they highlight – and summarize – the main concerns or solutions around which the hegemonic debate revolves. However, I do consider it as problematic that only a minority of the studies really acknowledge and thoroughly discuss the ideological nature (or origins) of their ‘frames’ (see however, Brand & Brunnengräber, 2012; Maesele, 2010). Overlooking “(...) the ideological nature and consequences of the framing process as well as the power relationships that influence that process” (Carragee & Roefs, 2004, p.219), they may (unconsciously) *confirm the so-called ‘natural’ or ‘universal’ status of these dominant views* (see Coy, Woehrlé & Maney, 2008). This may contribute, I argue, to the depoliticization of the (academic) debate (De Lucia, 2009; Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Mouffe, 2005; Pepermans, 2015; Pepermans & Maesele, 2014; Swyngedouw, 2010). That is especially so if audiences, drawing on well-known conceptualizations of framing, which are often (implicitly) referred to in empirical work (e.g. Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Van Gorp, 2006, 2007), approach frames as ‘universal’ constructions. Similarly, it is problematic if researchers adopt sets of hegemonic (ideologically coloured) ‘frames’ from colleagues (working in other time-spaces) in deductive framing analyses, considering – and confirming – those to be universal (and exhaustive). This may prevent them from seeing other (ideological) patterns (e.g. Asplund, Hjerpe & Wibeck, 2013; Calmeyn, 2013; Christensen & Wormbs, 2017; McCan, 2010; Tillinghast & McCan, 2010). As argued before, most framing studies exclusively focus on mainstream media (within western contexts). Accordingly, most researchers – apparently – do not (thoroughly) expose themselves, let alone their audiences, to different ways of seeing. Yet, doing so could help them to grasp and question more deeply the assumptions which determine the dominant (climate) frames and their framing analyses (see Entman, 1991; Hertog & McLeod, 2001, p.150). However, this is not necessarily so, especially if researchers employ a framing approach which does not (sufficiently) recognize the ideological colour of frames. Kenix (2008a, 2008b), for instance, identifies (generic) ‘frames’ such as ‘conflict’, ‘economics’, ‘sensationalism’, ‘domestic politics’ or ‘morality’, and reports that there are hardly any differences among mainstream and alternative media. Hence, deliberately discerning between the levels of masterframes, frames and subframes, I will attempt to avoid this pitfall. I will show, more specifically, that the *power of framing* lies exactly *in the subtle naturalization of particular ideologies*, which may – depending on the context or the frame-sponsors – open our eyes for some worldviews and, simultaneously, close them for others.

Summarizing, taking these considerations into account, I will attempt to contribute to a more extensive set of multimodal climate change frames, drawing on a clear, systematic method of analysis, which allows for reliability and validity (Tankard, 2001).

	<i>Uncertainty / conflict</i>	<i>Economics / technology</i>	<i>Alarmism / disaster</i>	<i>Human-induced climate change / responsible actors</i>	<i>Morality and ethics</i>	<i>Health and safety</i>	<i>Transformation</i>
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<i>Shehata & Hopmann (2012)</i>	Scientific uncertainty	Economic consequences		Climate change			
<i>Nisbet (2009)</i>	Scientific / technical uncertainty	Economic development	Pandora's box / Frankenstein's monster / Runaway science	Public accountability and governance (Middle way / alternative path)	Morality / ethics	Public health	
<i>Nisbet & Scheufele (2009)</i>		Economic prospect			Social progress		
<i>Nisbet & Lewenstein (2002)</i>		Conflict / strategy			Progress	Injustice	
<i>Asplund, Hjerpe & Wibeck (2013)</i>		Economic burden					
<i>Christensen & Wormbs (2017)</i>							
<i>Kenix (2008a, 2008b)</i>	Conflict	Economics	Sensationalism	New evidence or research Scientific background Domestic politics International relations Current weather Consequences	Morality Consequences	Consequences	
<i>Weathers & Kendall (2015)</i>	Conflict Uncertainty	Consequence		New evidence Action	Ethics	Consequence	
<i>Schlichting (2013)</i>	Scientific uncertainty	Socioeconomic consequences Industrial leadership		Industrial leadership			
<i>Fletcher (2009)</i>	Scientific scepticism	Economic opportunity				Security threat	
<i>O'Neill et al. (2015)</i>		Economic	Disaster	Settled science (Role of science)	Morality and ethics	Security Health	
	Political or ideological struggle Uncertain science						
		Opportunity					
<i>Gordon, Deines & Havice (2010)</i>	Scientific controversy / conflict U.S. conflict North / South conflict	Economic Alternative energy / technology		Political U.S. conflict North / South conflict Ecology / science Solutions			
				Consequences		Consequences	

<i>Painter (2013)</i>	Uncertainty	Opportunity	Explicit risk (disaster) Implicit risk (alarmist)			
<i>Nielsen & Kjaergaard (2011)</i>	Scientific research Politics and policy-making (Public understanding of climate change)	Economy and business Technology and innovation		Scientific research Politics and policy-making Public understanding of climate change	Morality and ethics	
<i>Schmidt & Schäfer (2015)</i>	Freedom and resilience of people Fairness and effectiveness through market mechanisms Economic growth and Social justice			(Fairness and effectiveness through market mechanisms) Provident global government for people and planet International solidarity in an unequal world Economic growth and social justice		
<i>Olausson (2009)</i>				Certainty: -Collective international mitigative action -Collective local / national adaptive action		
<i>Dahinden (2005)</i>	Conflict	Economics Progress			Moral	
<i>Semetko & Valkenburg (2000)</i>	Conflict	Economic consequences		Responsibility	Morality	Human interest
<i>Zehr (2009)</i>		Environmentalist / economic hybrid frame				
<i>Antilla (2005)</i>	Uncertainty Debate ambiguous cause/effect Controversy			Valid science		
<i>Foust & O'Shannon Murphy (2009)</i>			Tragic apocalypse Comic apocalypse			
<i>Stephens, Rand & Melnick (2009)</i>		Economic risk / benefit Technical risk/benefit		Environmental risk / benefit		Health and safety risk / benefit
<i>Vihersalo (2008)</i>		Climate change as a problem of greenhouse gas emissions Climate change as a problem of vulnerability		Climate change as a problem of greenhouse gas emissions Climate change as a problem of vulnerability		

<i>Billett (2010)</i>				Responsibility: located in West Socio-environmental threat: located in unified South	
<i>Doulton & Brown (2009)</i>	Optimism	Rationalism		Ethical mitigation Self-righteous mitigation Disaster strikes Potential catastrophe	(Crisis)
<i>Brand & Brunnengräber (2012)</i>		Opportunity	Potential catastrophe	Opportunity	Transformation Anti-adaptation
<i>Maesele (2010)</i>	Scientific uncertainty	Maneagability Compatability Adaptation Technological fix / behaviour Scientific progress Economic prospects Development Cost-benefit	Pandora's box	(Scientific progress) (Economic prospects) (Development) (Cost-benefit) (Scientific uncertainty) (Pandora's box) (Alternative) (Corporate control) (Public accountability) (Ethics)	Scientific progress Economic prospects Development Scientific uncertainty Pandora's box Alternative Corporate control Public accountability Ethics
<i>Van Gorp & van der Goot (2009)</i>		Progress	Frankenstein	Progress Responsibility Undermining of fundamentals Mother Earth	
<i>Grittmann (2014) Visual frames</i>		Problem definition Polluters and causes Solutions		Problem definition Polluters and causes Solutions	Moral evaluation Problem definition
<i>O'Neill (2013) Visual frames</i>	Contested		Distancing		
<i>Borah (2009) Visual frames</i>				Political	Lives saved / lost Human interest Pragmatic
<i>Wessler et al. (2016) Multimodal frames</i>	Political negotiations	Global warming victims Civil society demands Political negotiations Sustainable energy		Global warming victims Civil society demands Political negotiations Sustainable energy	Global warming victims

Table 4: Climate change and environmental (e.g. GM food) frames in the literature. (The names of) frames which fit multiple categories are highlighted in grey.

4.4 Research Design

My corpus comprises articles from five Flemish media outlets: three mainstream newspapers (*De Standaard* (DS) (broadsheet, historical catholic and entrepreneurial background), *De Morgen* (DM) (broadsheet, historical social-democratic background) and *Het Laatste Nieuws* (HLN) (popular, liberal roots)) and the online websites of the two major alternative outlets *DeWereldMorgen* (DWM) (openly left-wing) and *MO* Magazine* (MO) (openly left-wing, with a special focus on globalization). The selection was based on maximum variation sampling (e.g. Mason, 2002; Ritchie, Lewis & Elam, 2003): The three mainstream outlets arguably represent the various ideological viewpoints found in the Flemish media landscape. Besides, the *De Standaard* and *De Morgen* represent the most influential (i.e. in terms of inter-media agenda-setting or the uptake by policy-makers) and widely circulated broadsheet dailies, while HLN is by far the most widely read (popular) newspaper among all strata of the Flemish population. In 2014-2015, *De Standaard* and its online news platform reached more than 350.000, *De Morgen* 230.000 and *Het Laatste Nieuws* more than 1.8 million people a day. *DeWereldMorgen* is the major alternative outlet in Flanders, reaching 15.000 readers a day. *MO** is the second alternative outlet. Except for its website, it has a three-monthly paper magazine, which reaches about 250.000 readers.⁵⁷ The articles which are published in the magazine also appear on the website, next to a number of contributions from various (external) sources (Blom & Lamberts, 2007; CIM.be, 2016; De Bens and Raeymaeckers, 2010; DeWereldMorgen.be; Durnez, 1985, 1993; Fransen, 1990; Maesele et al., 2014; mo.be; Pepermans, 2015) (see also Chapter 6).

Employing the search tools of the Belgian press archive Gopress and/or the archives of the individual outlets, I conducted key word searches ((Dutch) key words: ‘klimaatverandering/wijziging’ (‘climate change’), ‘opwarming van de aarde / planeet’ / ‘klimaatopwarming’, ‘opwarming van het klimaat’ (‘global warming’), ‘broeikaseffect’ (‘greenhouse effects’)). Additionally, I carried out a manual search in the paper archives of the Royal Library of Belgium (Brussels) and the library of Ghent University. The searches yielded a total of 1.256 articles for the period February 28 2012 to February 28 2014. Given my aim to provide a synchronic discussion of the most recent situation, the end date of the research period was determined based on the starting date of my research project. A two year period allows for a sample that is large enough to reflect the diversity of its parent population. As such, it permits comparison and the differentiation between more and less relevant variables (Mason, 2002; Ritchie, Lewis & Elam, 2003). All articles were downloaded, collected and saved. The articles found in the paper archives were photographed and digitally saved.

I have carried out an inductive-deductive qualitative framing analysis, largely inspired by grounded theory (Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Glaser & Strauss, 1968) as applied by Van Gorp (2006, 2007): First, I

⁵⁷ Belgium has a population of more than 11 million people. About 7 million people live in Flanders.

conducted an inductive-qualitative framing analysis on about 28 percent of the articles. Throughout phases of open coding, axial coding and selective coding – during which I continually compared, questioned or revised my data, preliminary findings, codes or categories, looking for negative or qualifying evidence – I allowed the frame matrices to gradually emerge. Following Entman (1991), only one (i.e. the most salient) frame was determined in each article: Ordinary readers, focusing on repetition or salient sections, are unlikely to discern, and be affected by, all frames in a text. In the process, and during the phase of open coding in particular, I heavily drew on the multi-level framing analysis toolkit which was introduced in Chapter 2 (2.3.3 Multimodal Framing Analysis: A Method), to identify potential (meaningful) framing and reasoning devices. By explicating my methodological toolkit I intend to further enhance the reliability and validity of my analyses (Lewis & Ritchie, 2003; Mason, 2002; Ritchie & Spencer, 1994). Summarizing, this first stage of (bottom-up) inductive-qualitative coding allowed me to thoroughly explore my data without being limited by earlier identified (‘ideological’) frames. However, this does not mean that my analyses were not informed by an extensive literature review. As Hertog and McLeod (2001) highlight, it is important for a researcher to be aware of earlier findings and to test them. As such, one may help to develop the framing field rather than to provide a unique set of (idiosyncratic) frames. Although they largely emerged from the data, (the names of) the (sub)frame matrices – and thus, the central organizing ideas and argumentations – were, indeed, strongly guided by my knowledge of (generally shared) myths, narratives, archetypes, stereotypes, values, themes and previously identified – but emptied out – frames (Maesele, 2010). However, my awareness of the existing research did not restrict my eventual decisions. That is, I tried to approach the data with an open mind. Also, I took broader contextual information into account (see Koetsenruijter & Van Hout, 2014; Mason, 2002; Matthes & Kohring, 2008; Reese, 2007; Ritchie & Spencer, 1994; Ritchie, Spencer & O’Connor, 2003; Saldaña, 2013; Spencer, Ritchie & O’Connor, 2003; Touri & Koteyko, 2015).

However, as this type of approach is rather labour intensive and, accordingly, only allows for the analysis of rather limited data sets, I complemented the inductive-qualitative analysis with a deductive-qualitative analysis to assess the remainder of the articles (see Hertog & McLeod, 2001; Van Gorp, 2006, 2007). Based on the frame matrices which I had constructed in the first phase of the analysis, I identified the most characteristic framing and reasoning devices of each (sub)frame. Subsequently, I identified which clusters of devices appeared most frequently and in the most salient parts (i.e. (sub)headings, leads, picture captions, closing paragraphs, photographs) of each of the articles (see Matthes & Kohring, 2008). As Matthes and Kohring (2008) argue, analysing (clusters of) devices rather than frames limits subjectivity and adds to reliability and validity. The deductive analyses allowed me to further test and develop the frame matrices, adapting or enriching them where necessary. Theorizing – based on my literature review and analogical patterns within other frames – I added one complementary Biocentric Subframe, ‘Gaia’. I did not find this in my corpus, but it could – potentially

– appear in other sources and/or contexts.

I combined manual coding with electronic coding, facilitated by the computer software package NVivo. The former allowed me – especially during the initial stages of the research – to get more control and ownership over the data and develop a preliminary understanding of the working of qualitative framing analysis (Saldaña, 2013).

For purposes of validity, I maintained peer debriefing sessions with colleagues with backgrounds in environmental, media and/or visual communication, who pointed out problems or inadequacies in, and helped to improve, methods, analyses or argumentations (Koetsenruijter & Van Hout, 2014; Mason, 2002; Ritchie & Lewis, 2003).

4.5 Results

Based on my analyses, I introduce a frame set of five frames and ten subframes (see Figures 4 and 5):

1. ‘Cycles of Nature Frame’ – ‘Scala Naturae Subframe’ and ‘Natural Web Subframe’;
2. ‘Human Rights Frame’ – ‘Consumer Rights Subframe’ and ‘Civil Rights Subframe’;
3. ‘Environmental Justice Frame’ – ‘Unequal Vulnerability Subframe’ and ‘Unequal Attribution Subframe’;
4. ‘Economic Challenge Frame’ – ‘Rights of the Free Market Subframe’ and ‘Human Wealth Subframe’;
5. ‘Inscrutable are the Ways of the Nature Frame’ – ‘Natural Machine Subframe’ and ‘Gaia Subframe’.




Figure 4: Schematic overview of the climate change frames and their subframes. The green frame highlights the special position of the marked subframes: ‘Rights of the Free Market’ and ‘Nature is a Machine’ represent a status-quo thinking. The sceptical ‘Gaia Subframe’ is purely theoretical (i.e. it was not identified in the corpus) and does not encourage climate action either (see below).

The frame matrices of each of these frames and subframes (see below) summarize their underlying narratives or argumentative structures, providing an overview of the main reasoning and framing devices (see Appendix 2: Frame Matrices).

Firstly, I will draw out the broad lines of the climate change framing field in Flanders, discussing each of the frames in more detail. As such, I intend to demonstrate the mutually exclusive character of my set of frames (Tankard, 2001). Secondly, clustering the hegemonic subframes, on the one hand, and the counter-hegemonic subframes, on the other hand, I will point out the remarkable similarities across frames, and differences within frames. In order to highlight recurring patterns, I have added the hegemonic Anthropocentric Masterframe and the counter-hegemonic Biocentric Masterframe. Finally, I will also elaborate on the most defining features of each individual subframe. Throughout my discussions, I will refer to the literature which informed my findings and sustains my interpretations. As said, my qualitative discussions will be complemented with a brief quantitative overview.




Figure 5: Venn diagram visualizing the relations between the Anthropocentric and Biocentric Masterframes, the frames and the Anthropocentric and Biocentric Subframes: the grey area highlights the Anthropocentric Subframes while the Biocentric Subframes can be found in the green area.

4.5.1 Five Frames

4.5.1.1 *'Cycles of Nature'*

Cycles of Nature refers to the multiple small and large-scale cycles in nature which animals, plants and non-living elements are part of, such as life cycles, water cycles, chemical cycles. Accordingly, the frame takes a broad perspective on climate change: Due to human activities (e.g. contempt for the (characteristic of) nature) (cause), the natural system as we know it is under threat. Humans are secondary victims, since they are continuously interacting with nature (problem). Hence, humans – especially those best equipped – need to rethink and change the ways in which they act and interact with other (non-)living beings and processes (solution). This frame is characterized by the repetition of terms like 'nature', 'the world' or the juxtaposition of humans (e.g. 'we') and nature. Exemplary argumentations which highlight the main responsibilities and solutions are the following: "Every year we dig up more from the Earth, emit more GHG and consume more energy" (DS, 25/04/2013, p.10) [1] or "(...) all energy is produced by wind turbines, hydraulic pumps and solar panels" (HLN, 27/10/2012, p.85) [2].

4.5.1.2 *'Human Rights'*

The modern (twentieth and twenty-first century) conception of human rights for all (e.g. The UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights) encompasses a number of 'universal' principles – going from the rights to life to freedom of speech – which all human beings are (supposed to be) equally entitled to, just because they are human. No human should take away the rights of others. While one should be critical about the 'universal' character of (the content of) these principles (i.e. the dominant western(ized) thinking has shaped them to a large extent) (see Bankoff, 2001; Beck, 2000; De Lucia, 2009; Fraser, 2000, 2005; Sen, 1999, 2009), such declarations do highlight the pivotal role humans across nations and cultures attach to inter-human relations and respect in general (i.e. as broadly defined ideals). Accordingly, the Human Rights Frame exclusively highlights the fate of the human species, whose rights, freedoms, well-being or ways of living are being threatened. Yet, ordinary people across the globe are among the ones who are affected most severely: They currently lack the (mental) ability and means to sufficiently protect themselves (problem). Although climate change constitutes a threat, it is people – particularly, but not exclusively, the elites – who are endangering their own kind, being blinded by short-term (egocentric) interests (cause). Therefore, it is the moral and legal obligation of all humans – led by those who are best equipped – to take responsibility for their collective long-term fate (solution). The frame is characterized by a particularly strong focus on the human world (e.g. repetition of terms like 'human' or 'society'). The following sentence more or less summarizes the underlying argumentation of this frame: "For years now, scientific and legal research has shown that climate change

is caused by humans, that it is life-threatening and that it will cause violations of human rights, also in Belgium and the Netherlands” (DM, 09/11/2013, p.72) [3].

4.5.1.3 ‘Environmental Justice’

Environmental justice is a story told in various contexts and by various groups to denounce the disproportionate suffering of groups with particular socio-economic, gender, ethnic and/or cultural characteristics, due to environmental decay caused by others (mainly elites). The lines of benefit and burden usually run more or less along (post-)colonial boundaries between, and within, ‘the West’ and ‘the South’ (e.g. Agyeman, Bullard & Evans, 2002; Benford & Snow, 2000; Čapek, 1993; Kasperson & Kasperson, 2001; Phillips & Sexton, 1999; Rees & Westra, 2003; Shiva, 1988, 1993; Sze & London, 2008; Taylor, 2000). Hence, the underlying narrative of the Environmental Justice Frame can be summarized as follows: Particular groups of people – mainly, but not exclusively, (in) the South – will pay the bill of climate change since they are more sensitive to changes and/or lack coping abilities (problem). The most powerful and dominant groups – mainly, but not exclusively, (in) the West – carry the major responsibility for the problems, and thus for the loss of lives, livelihoods, cultures..., due to their misguided (i.e. egocentric) priorities and beliefs (cause). Particular – socio-economic, cultural, ethnic, gender... – groups will need to solve the problems, by means of mitigation and/or adaptation (solution). Clearly, the contrast between groups of people (‘us’ and ‘them’) is pivotal in this frame. Besides, rhetorical devices like metaphors, hyperboles or numerals emphasize the extraordinary character of the natural forces which hit the affected groups. References to key events like Typhoon Haiyan or the 2004 Tsunami play a similar role. Characteristic argumentations are, for instance “We pollute and they pay the price” (DWM, 20/09/2013) [4] or “(...) the industrialized countries have the responsibility to support adaptation in the developing countries” (MO, 12/11/2012) [5].

4.5.1.4 ‘Economic Challenge’

Economic challenges are important concerns in today’s global society, as also suggested by the prevalence of economic frames in the literature (e.g. Dahinden, 2005; Nisbet, 2009; O’Neill et al., 2015; Schlichting, 2013; Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000; Shehata & Hopmann, 2012; Stephens, Rand & Melnick, 2009; Weathers & Kendall, 2015; Zehr, 2009). Note that, while most of those identified frames have an explicit or implicit capitalist colour, the Economic Challenge Frame (i.e. its subframes) in my frame set may – at least in theory⁵⁸ – also help to promote other ideological views, like (those inspired by) communism. The Economic Challenge Frame contends that the wealth, accomplishments and economic interests of (particular groups of) humans are under threat (problem). This is due to climate change and, particularly, the inappropriate response of (mostly) elite groups to the changes it brings about: Fundamental economic interests are overlooked (cause). Hence, it is argued that an optimal

⁵⁸ I found no examples in my corpus.

reaction – facilitated by human ingenuity – at least needs to guarantee the status-quo situation, but ideally will amplify human prosperity and ‘optimize’ economic relations (solution). Clearly, this frame presupposes that the world is, in essence, economic and humans are merely producers or consumers. Accordingly, numbers, comparatives or superlatives indicating economic loss or gain are prevalent, as is economic terminology. Intertextual references encompass stock market reports or financial news (pages). A focus on a threatening present or future is balanced with the ideal of (economic) development, which is considered as positive and desirable. Sentences like “(...) independence from oil countries and nuclear power but also the creation of ten thousands of jobs (...)” (DM, 13/12/2012, p.2) [6] or “ ‘There is a lot of money to be earned’, says Michael Liebrich, ceo of Bloomberg New Energy Finance” (MO, 16/01/2014) [7] are exemplary.

4.5.1.5 *‘Inscrutable are the Ways of Nature’*

The last frame evokes an idea that can be found across various ideologies and religions: humans ought to respect nature, which they cannot fully understand (e.g. Dryzek, 1997; Lovelock, 1988; Shiva, 1988, 1993; Verhagen, 2008). As the only (rather) sceptic frame found in my corpus, it depicts climate change as a largely natural variance: While it is accepted that developments can be witnessed in the natural system (problem), these are considered to be internal to the system, and – largely – due to particular actors within this system. Humans are not to be blamed or, at least, human action does not make a fundamental difference (cause). If needed, the natural system will mitigate these flaws or adapt to it. Hence, the help of humans is not required (solution). In short, the influence of humans (as cause or solution) is unimportant. The latter is, among others, suggested by the prevalence of nominalizations, passivizations or (visual) deletions. Also, the focus lies on entirely natural environments (and continuous time frames). The current changes are compared to, or equated with, similar system changes in the past. Statements like ‘Man-made climate change is a hoax / myth’ or ‘Climate change is a natural phenomenon’ (e.g. by Republicans in the US or conservative think tanks, industry) constitute key intertextual references. Scientific consensus reports are introduced, only to demonstrate how they are faulty, misleading and/or the result of conspiracies (based on ‘alternative’ scientific reports) (see Antilla, 2005; Jacques, Dunlap & Freeman, 2008).

4.5.2 Hegemonic Masterframe

4.5.2.1 *One Common Anthropocentric Narrative*

Six of the identified subframes – ‘Scala Naturae Subframe’, ‘Unequal Vulnerability Subframe’, ‘Human Wealth Subframe’, ‘Consumer Rights Subframe’, ‘Rights of the Free Market Subframe’ and ‘Natural Machine Subframe’ – promote a hegemonic environmental ideology. More specifically, they reproduce an anthropocentric view, which highlights values like (economic) development, competition and

hierarchy or human ingenuity. Also, humans and nature are clearly separated: humans are outside of nature (e.g. Adamson, 2014; Alexander, 2007; Cox, 2010; Dryzek, 1997; Hopwood, Mellor & O'Brien, 2005; Larson, 2011; Shanahan & McComas, 1999; Shepard, 2015; Shiva, 1988, 1993; Stibbe, 2005, 2015; Unmüßig, Sachs & Fatheuer, 2012; Verhagen, 2008). Accordingly, all these subframes share particular framing devices which help to support this thinking:

- The 'nature is a machine' metaphor is pivotal: Nature is a distant object that can be manipulated by humans and that mainly exists to fulfil human (economic, scientific, aesthetic...) needs. As such, it constitutes the backbone of a largely economic society, populated by (individual) consumers and producers. Nature encompasses (groups of) largely disconnected processes and (non-)living beings (see Dryzek, 1997; Heuberger, 2007; Larson, 2011; Remillard, 2011; Shanahan & McComas, 1999; Stibbe, 2015; Verhagen, 2008). Globes or maps – especially world maps with highlighted areas (i.e. colour symbolism) – often reinforce such decontextualizations (e.g. Doyle, 2007, 2009, Hughes, 2012; Lester & Cottle, 2009; Mahony & Hulme, 2014; Manzo, 2010a, 2010b).
- Climate change, its consequences (e.g. floods) and/or causes (mainly GHG), or nature in general, are usually quite independent and largely external agents. They are often depicted as actors in material processes or carriers / identifieds in relational processes. Visually, 'sublimations' (e.g. Cottle, 2000; Chouliaraki, 2006; Grittmann, 2014; Hughes, 2012; Messaris, 1997) externalize the natural forces (Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Ritchie & Thomas, 2015; Swyngedouw, 2010). If human agency regarding GHG emissions is acknowledged, it is often backgrounded, abstracted or merely implied (see decontextualization).
- Decontextualization strategies, such as nominalizations, passivizations, personifications, (visual) deletions or stereotypes, can be found throughout the argumentations of this masterframe. That is, the discussion usually focuses on the (direct) causes and/or consequences of GHG emissions or climatic changes and the various ways to deal with those. More structural or fundamental problems, causes or solutions (i.e. interacting economic, social, cultural, political, environmental problems due to the hegemonic ideology) are backgrounded or completely absent (see e.g. Cameron, 2012; Fuchs & Graff, 2010; Hart, 2011; Iyengar, 1990; Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Machin & Mayr, 2012; Pepermans, 2015; Swyngedouw, 2010).
- Numbers, percentages and graphs – specifying the exact extent of GHG emissions (Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Nerlich, 2011; Swyngedouw, 2010), or the loss / gain of lives or of (economic) resources – highlight the scientific, rational character of this masterframe (De Lucia, 2009; Fowler, 1996; Grunwald, 2016; Larson, 2011; Lohmann, 2008; Stibbe, 2005, 2015; Unmüßig, Sachs & Fatheuer, 2012; van Dijk, 1988).
- The main claims-makers who are allowed to act as sources, including the authors of op-eds, belong to ('western(ized)') elite groups, mostly scientists, (inter)national politicians, economic

players or NGOs (see e.g. Farbotko, 2005; Nisbet, 2009; Olausson, 2009; Roosvall & Tegelberg, 2012, 2013, 2015; Schlichting, 2013; Weathers & Kendall, 2015; Wessler et al., 2016). The journalists are usually (part of a small group of western(ized)) professionals (Gans, 1979; Shoemaker & Reese, 2014; Tuchman, 1978).

4.5.2.2 Two Underlying Directions

Although the distinction is not clear-cut, I contend that the Natural Machine and Rights of the Free Market Subframes rather reproduce a ‘Status Quo view’, while *Scala Naturae*, *Unequal Vulnerability*, *Human Wealth* and *Consumer Rights* align more closely with the ‘Reform discourse’, as described by Hopwood, Mellor and O’Brien (2005) (drawing among others on Dryzek (1997)).

Status Quo does not, or barely, question unlimited (economic) growth and development. Accordingly, the underlying narrative of both subframes highlights that the activities of particular players threatens the full access of humans to the natural services nature provides, and thus to development (maldistribution). The answer to this problem largely lies in nature (i.e. the natural machine) itself, if allowed to do what it was designed for (redistribution) (Cox, 2010; Dryzek, 1997; Fraser, 2000; 2005; Hopwood, Mellor & O’Brien, 2005; Verhagen, 2008):

- Common to both Natural Machine as well as Rights of the Free Market is that they take the decontextualization of climate change (see above) to an extreme. Human responsibility for the changing climate is backgrounded or entirely absent; nature is a fully independent player (e.g. Hart, 2011; Iyengar, 1990; Machin & Mayr, 2012; van Dijk, 1998).
- Individualized and identified actors – rather than more fundamental or structural processes – are responsible for jeopardizing the services of nature to human. Natural Machine highlights the responsibilities of natural actors. Rights of the Free Market focuses, in particular, on the participants which give rise or contribute to the (unequal) human competition for natural resources. The latter is seen as a threat for economic aspirations and economic growth, rather than for the climatic system (e.g. Hart, 2011; Iyengar, 1990; Machin & Mayr, 2012; van Dijk, 1998).
- The ‘Santa Claus’ metaphor (Dryzek, 1997) is dominant in both subframes: Nature is a forgiving force with a corrective capacity. Accordingly, human is absent when it comes to providing solutions or, at the most, shares agency with natural forces as an ingenious Prometheus who knows how to take advantage of the treasures nature provides. Accordingly, alarmist accounts regarding human-made climate change (consequences) are revealed and delegitimized as hyperbolic and misleading.

The hegemonic subframes which are leaning more closely towards reform, could be abstracted as follows: Human-induced climate change is a largely external force which threatens certain groups, particularly those group members who are already internally vulnerable and less able to cope (maldistribution, identity misrecognition). Some actors – particularly, but not exclusively, the elites – carry a larger responsibility for the problems. Therefore, it is the latter who have the obligation (and potential) to act and share their accomplishments with others. The solutions are mainly related to the improvement (i.e. reform) of nature and current human-nature relations, to keep human growth within the boundaries of the planet (redistribution, identity recognition) (i.e. development of ‘human-external’ world) (Baer et al., 2000; Cox, 2010; De Lucia, 2009; Dryzek, 1997; Fraser, 2000, 2005; Grunwald, 2016; Hopwood, Mellor & O’Brien, 2005; Unmüßig, Sachs & Fatheuer, 2012):

- The war metaphor is prevalent and mainly helps to highlight an external, natural threat: climate change. Yet, contrary to the Status-Quo subframes, Reform fully accepts the collective underlying human responsibility (‘inclusive / collective we’) for GHG emissions (Cohen, 2011; Dryzek, 1997; Grunwald, 2016; Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Maniates, 2001; Ritchie & Thomas, 2015; Swyngedouw, 2010; Unmüßig, Sachs & Fatheuer, 2012). In most cases, however, particular (generalized or identified) responsible agents are singled out. Especially elite (i.e. top-down groups) are held responsible for their destructive role, ignorance or unwillingness to act. This backgrounds (i.e. decontextualizes) structural, more fundamental or collective responsibilities (e.g. Hart, 2011; Iyengar, 1990; Machin & Mayr, 2012; van Dijk, 1998).
- Each of these subframes essentializes the internal weakness of a certain (bottom-up) group of victims, while often also suggesting the broader vulnerability (of human): (singled out parts of) nature (Scala Naturae), particular (socio-economic, ethnic, gender, cultural) groups (Unequal Vulnerability) or (ordinary) humans as consumers or producers (Consumer Rights, Human Wealth). These are often identified (e.g. as ‘vulnerable’) and lack the (sovereign) agency or knowledge to act for themselves. Relational and behavioural processes are dominant. Clearly, then, the idea of the ‘ladder’ or ‘hierarchy’ is extended to the relations among humans (e.g. Alexander, 2007; Bankoff, 2001; Chouliaraki, 2006; Cottle, 2000; Lester & Cottle, 2009; Remillard, 2011; Schmidt & Schäfer, 2015; Shanahan & McComas, 1999; Vihersalo, 2008).
- The main problems are economic / material maldistribution, for instance, the destruction of livelihoods. Some references can also be found to cultural identity misrecognition, like the loss of long-standing traditions in human societies or nature. Solutions need, accordingly, to focus on redistribution (and identity recognition) (Fraser, 2000, 2005). Again, decontextualization strategies (e.g. Hart, 2011; Iyengar, 1990; van Dijk, 1998) draw the attention away from more fundamental injustices. For instance, generic visual metonyms or metaphors – the suffering woman and/or child in the South, cracked (farming) land, the polar bear – contribute to the oversimplification of the problems (e.g. Ali, James & Vultee, 2013; Chouliaraki, 2006; Doyle,

2007, 2009; Hansen & Machin, 2008; Léon & Erviti, 2015; Manzo, 2010a, 2010b; O’Neill, 2013, 2017; Smith & Joffe, 2009).

- Particular groups of elites – mostly (western(ized)) scientists, politicians, industry and/or social services – are depicted as the main responsible agents who are expected to provide solutions. They are usually depicted as actors in material (economic) processes (see ‘responsible actors’ in Table 4). Strong modality emphasizes the urgency of their actions and/or the extent of their responsibilities. Renewable energy, emission trading, efficiency or techno-fix are key solutions, as is aid offered to the most vulnerable groups. That is, both adaptation and mitigation strategies mainly sustain the ideal of green economy / technology or sustainable development (e.g. Dryzek, 1997; Grunwald, 2016; Hopwood, Mellor & O’Brien, 2005; Unmüßig, Sachs & Fatheuer, 2012). It is (human interactions with) nature and other social groups which need fixing or improvement (see e.g. Brand & Brunnengräber, 2012; Doulton & Brown, 2009; Nielsen & Kjaergaard, 2011; Nisbet & Lewenstein, 2002; Pepermans, 2015; Schlichting, 2013; Wessler et al., 2016). If ordinary humans act, they mainly function as consumers (or producers) who (are expected to) follow up top-down instructions on how to alter their consumption (or production) habits. In other words, they do not take independent, self-conscious decisions. Again, this illustrates a hierarchy among (top-down and bottom-up) groups in human society (Berglez, Höijer & Olausson, 2009; Dryzek, 1997; Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Maniates, 2001; Shanahan & McComas, 1999; Stibbe, 2005, 2015; Unmüßig, Sachs & Fatheuer, 2012).
- Finally, it is remarkable that these subframes mostly focus on a threatening, dramatic climate present and/or future, with stories of suffering, loss or decay (see ‘alarmism / disaster’ in Table 4). Depictions, for instance, often focus on the dreadful consequences of climate change, such as the (material) destruction after a storm, (human) suffering or death. Clear solutions or positive alternatives are in many cases (visually) absent, only implied or rather abstract (e.g. Brulle, 2010; Foust & O’Shannon Murphy, 2009; O’Neill, 2017; O’Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 2009; O’Neill et al., 2013).

4.5.2.3 Six Hegemonic Subframes⁵⁹

4.5.2.3.1 Scala Naturae Subframe

Scala Naturae is a typical anthropocentric metaphor: Humans are at the top of the natural ladder, which represents a hierarchy of perfection. Every lower step is there to support the higher ones. Accordingly, humans are affected by all changes on lower levels (Shepard, 2015; Verhagen, 2008). Hence, I summarize the underlying narrative of the Scala Naturae Subframe as follows: Human-induced climate change (causes and consequences) threatens the natural system, some parts and layers more than others:

⁵⁹ See Appendix 3 (Exemplary News Articles) for all original article texts and images.

They are getting weaker, are undergoing change, are endangered. These changes (will) also affect humans. Although all of us are responsible for disregarding the functions and services of nature, some countries, politicians or corporate organizations are more guilty than others. Therefore, as nature lacks internal resilience or coping abilities, human intervention is imperative. The elites play a pivotal role in the intervention. This frame is reminiscent of the ‘climate change’ frame of Shehata and Hopmann (2012) and, to a certain extent, ‘provident global government for people and planet’ of Schmidt and Schäfer (2015) or ‘ecology / science’ of Gordon, Deines and Havice (2010).

An article that is exemplary for this subframe is “Climate summit does not fix the environment”, published in the popular mainstream outlet *Het Laatste Nieuws* (HLN, 21/06/2012, p.6). Discussing the results of the Rio+20 summit, it highlights the responsibilities of humans towards nature. The article is written by a journalist of the newspaper. The main source is a professor in Environmental Policy. His views are (made) particularly salient and are legitimated as trustworthy and authoritative throughout the article. Also, the article contains intertextual references to scientific reports by leading (top-down) organizations (e.g. “recent UN report”). Accordingly, in spite of discussing nature as such, the article mainly focuses on a largely (human) political-scientific context.

The focus on the collective responsibility of humanity (‘inclusive or global we’ / metonym – mainly as consumers) for causing climate change stands out. Yet, passive voice, nominalizations or abstractions also help to deflate and background (exact) responsibilities or agency: “The battle against climate change was not successful, if you know that the emissions have increased with forty percent since 1990”. If a more specific villain is foregrounded, it is often a particular (individualized) country or corporate organization, for instance, “In fast-developing economies like China, India and Brazil the GHG emissions even increased with 64 percent”. Individualized elites and generic human are, accordingly, also held responsible for providing solutions (mainly as actors in material processes or sensors in mental processes), with the former taking the lead and the latter following up instructions (e.g. Berglez, Höijer & Olausson, 2009; Brand & Brunnengräber, 2012; Brulle, 2010; Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Maniates, 2001; Shanahan & McComas, 1999; Stibbe, 2005, 2015; Unmüßig, Sachs & Fatheuer, 2012). This interaction (and contrast) between largely individualized villains and heroes does, as already discussed, mainly serve to decontextualize the discussion, drawing the attention away from more structural, fundamental processes and responsibilities (see above). The same is true for the particularly strong focus in *Scala Naturae* for GHG as *the* central problem (e.g. Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Swyngedouw, 2010). Depictions of smokestacks are used here as stereotypical metonyms for human – and particularly elite – GHG emissions, elaborating (see exposition) the verbal discussion with equally abstract arguments (Doyle, 2007, 2009; Grittmann, 2014; Léon & Erviti, 2015; O’Neill, 2013). The accompanying (blue-red) numbers in the visual area indicate the exact developments since 1992 (Rio Summit), reinforcing the numbers in the verbal mode; the red colours – opposed to the blue ones – convey a sense of danger

(see colour symbolism / sensory truth), congruent with (but more salient than in) the verbal text (see Doyle, 2007, 2009; Mahony & Hulme, 2014; Manzo, 2010b; O'Neill, 2013, 2017). Underlying to this whole discussion is the idea that humans prefer short-term development and prosperity (causing GHG) over the long-term services which nature offers (“our natural capital”) (see Dryzek, 1997; Hopwood, Mellor & O'Brien, 2005; Verhagen 2008).

The climatic changes and detrimental consequences for nature (and human), such as decay, vulnerability, loss of certain characteristics or services, are usually (visually / verbally) depicted in a limited number of ways. Several of them can be found in the exemplary article. Contrasts between (a safe) past and (a threatening, uncertain) present / future are prevalent, both in the verbal as well as in the visual mode (see repetition / synonymy) (Brönnimann, 2002). For instance: “The temperature in Belgium is about 2,3 degrees higher than it was before the industrial period and there is more heavy rainfall”. The globe, as typical visual metaphor, is also present. According to Hughes (2012), Lester and Cottle (2009), Messaris (1997) or Doyle (2007, 2009), air views or globes highlight the vulnerability of nature (and human, accordingly), while simultaneously distancing the spectator from the problems. Yet, they may also highlight the major human responsibility for the large-scale changes and the human control (i.e. power and scientific knowledge) and ability to act (i.e. develop or manipulate nature). These ideas and associations are further supported by references to ‘sublime nature’. In this case, we find the juxtaposition of a smokestack and beautiful tall tree (metonym / metaphor for ‘nature as it should be’). This may evoke long-standing conventions of pristine and untouched nature, which needs to be protected (for future generations) from threatening human development. These culturally resonant symbols are likely to intertextually refer to, and evoke, similar depictions. This is likely to add salience (see Cottle, 2000; Grittmann, 2014; Hansen & Machin, 2008; O'Neill, 2013, 2017; O'Neill et al., 2013; Remillard, 2011). While some of these ideas are also (implicitly) conveyed by the verbal text (e.g. collective human responsibility for nature), the salient visual depiction elaborates and extends the argumentations. Finally, particular areas are singled out as disproportionately vulnerable compared to others, by means of colour symbolism (e.g. red stands for temperature rise but also danger) (see Mahony & Hulme, 2014; O'Neill, 2013, 2017). Larson (2011) refers in that context to ‘pigeonholing’, which largely prevents us from seeing the interconnection between various problems, victims or areas. This is congruent with choices in the verbal text, such as the decontextualized discussion of the climatic (weather) consequences in one particular area, Belgium (see metonymy). Clearly, the visual adds salience to the idea of danger and negative consequences, while visualizations of positive alternatives (e.g. wind turbines) are absent although these are more likely to engage us (e.g. Léon & Erviti, 2015; O'Neill, 2017; O'Neill et al., 2013).

4.5.2.3.2 Consumer Rights Subframe

Rather than as a collective group of citizens, the anthropocentric worldview approaches (ordinary) humans as individual, rather passive consumers (or producers) of economic products or political policies (e.g. Berglez, Höijer & Olausson, 2009; Brulle, 2010; Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Maniates, 2001; Shanahan & McComas, 1999; Stibbe, 2005, 2015). Hence, ‘human rights’ become ‘consumer rights’. The underlying narrative of the Consumer Rights Subframe contends that humankind’s well-being, (mental / physical) health and safety are vulnerable to changes in the (human) environment. Yet, some (mainly bottom-up) individuals are more vulnerable than others as they lack the necessary knowledge or means to protect themselves. Although a strong emphasis is put on human-made climate change as an immensely powerful and largely external threat, particular (mainly political elite) groups are also identified as villains: Although they do possess the required knowledge or means, they do not yet use them in the most efficient ways, for the common purpose. Therefore, politics, public services and science are urged to take up their responsibility (focus on adaptation), providing solutions and encouraging individual consumers to change their habits (focus on mitigation). Many of the frames from the literature which I categorized as ‘health and safety’ frames tilt towards Consumer Rights (e.g. Borah, 2009; Fletcher, 2009; Gordon, Deines & Havice, 2010; Nisbet, 2009; O’Neill et al., 2015; Stephens, Rand & Melnick, 2009; Weathers & Kendall, 2015; Wessler et al., 2016). Besides, I will also argue below that this frame touches most clearly upon ‘alarmist’ frames (e.g. Doulton & Brown, 2009; Foust & O’Shannon Murphy, 2009; Hulme, 2009; Kenix, 2008a, 2008b; Nisbet, 2009; O’Neill, 2013; O’Neill et al., 2015; Painter, 2013; Van Gorp & van der Goot, 2009).

An exemplary article is the following one, which was published in the mainstream leftist outlet *De Morgen* (DM, 20/11/2013, p.5): “Flash floods as ‘water bombs’ on Sardinia. Cyclone Cleopatra increases water level up to three meters: 18 dead”. The news article is written by a journalist of the newspaper and gives a voice to local Italian and national politicians, and to NGOs.

The article relates the events during and directly after the passing of Cyclone Cleopatra (responsible agent – ‘climate change is a monster’ metaphor) over the island Sardinia, which caused extreme rainfall and flooding. The focus lies on the consequential suffering and death (i.e. loss of health and safety due to the loss of safe environments) of visually and verbally generalized and identified human patients, located in recognizable (western) contexts. Verbally, we find, for instance, phrases like “18 dead, among whom four children”. Clearly, numbers are mainly used to highlight the lost, threatened or saved lives. However, they also turn the victims into rather abstract, faceless – and thus, distant – groups. The visual mode further elaborates on this. The four pictures accompanying the verbal text show distant (public distance) and rather abstract (references to) human, like a truck and passenger bus trapped by the water in a tunnel (sense of passivization) or a back view of a lonely man wandering through a flooded street (conditional agency at most (see Chouliaraki, 2006)). Due to the long shots, the focus lies on the water

(often as active natural agent) – a stormy sea, fast flowing or swirling water or quiet flooded landscapes – rather than on the (small) human patients, which it literally engulfs. Clearly, the combination of climate change consequences and references to humans can be considered as *the* metonym of this subframe. As argued before, such aesthetic, sublime and rather generic views – lacking recognizable human faces (Graber, 1988, 1996; Hart, 2011; Höijer, 2004; Jewitt & Oyama, 2001; Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; Manzo, 2010b; Messaris, 1997; Small & Loewenstein, 2003) – may invite us to contemplate the extraordinary power of nature or even ‘the beauty of destruction’, rather than to feel responsible or to truly engage (see e.g. Cottle, 2000; Chouliaraki, 2006; Grittmann, 2014; Hughes, 2012; Messaris, 1997). Chouliaraki (2006), Hanusch (2013), Borah (2009) and Borah and Bulla (2006) argue, more specifically, that if the ill fate of the us-group is shown, distancing is often used to prevent this close-by suffering from becoming overly emotional to the audience. That is, it may (psychologically / emotionally) protect the readers or viewers, who are also potential victims. Visualizations of dead people are, for instance, avoided, while they do – occasionally – appear in the context of Unequal Vulnerability, which deals with the suffering of distant (out-groups of) people. Even so, the overall visual-verbal style of this frame is alarmist and rather emotional: As suggested, the fact that the threat is localized in familiar or recognizable western time-spaces (“Sardinia”, a typical highway tunnel many of which can be found throughout the West) may already heighten a sense of urgency among the audience (e.g. Hulme, 2004; Lester & Cottle, 2009; Nicholson-Cole, 2005; Nurmis, 2015; O’Neill, 2017; O’Neill et al., 2013; Smith & Joffe, 2009). The hyperboles “water bombs” (metaphor) or “a true apocalypse” (simile) might evoke associations with war (see above), while also (intertextually) referring to – culturally resonant – universal flood myths (Gavin, Leonard-Milsom & Montgomery, 2011; Salvador & Norton, 2011). These may evoke strong associations or feelings among the audience. As such, this subframe most clearly touches upon the alarmist frames found in the literature. The lack of intimacy (and thus, identification with the victims), however, probably prevents us from truly imaging ourselves as part of the problem (i.e. as potential victims) (Nixon, 2015).

Apart from the human-nature contrast, the opposition between active (generalized / individualized) elites – including politics, public services and science – and (mostly passive) ordinary people is pivotal: One of the pictures shows citizens being saved by firefighters (functionalization) from their flooded houses (vectors start with the latter and are aimed at the former, indicating a transactive action / material process). Note that the lack of a visual gaze (i.e. contact among viewer and victims) may also reinforce this idea of passivity. This is reinforced by (verbal) sentences like: “(...) Rome frees up extra money and means for emergency aid” (identification). Clearly, the focus lies here on the adaptation, facilitated by politicians and/or social services. Yet, the verbal extends the visual by including references to the (secondary) responsibility of (generalized / identified) ordinary humans (‘inclusive / collective we’): “NGOs hope that the disaster will make the ordinary Italian citizen realize that urgent measures are needed all over the world”. Apparently, citizens – who currently lack a sense of urgency or the required

insights – need to be instructed about the need to act (mental process). The nature of these needed measures remains, however, unclear. Machin and Mayr (2012) refer, in that context, to ‘corporate speak’, vague language which prevents us from truly seeing what action can or must be taken to deal with (fundamental) problems (see Hansen & Machin, 2008). As such, the idea of fundamental change or a different, positive future is largely absent. Just like the focus on the passivity of ordinary people (i.e. the us-group), this may also prevent a sense of (self-)efficacy (e.g. Foust & O’Shannon Murphy, 2009; Kellstedt, Zahran & Vedlitz, 2008; O’Neill, 2017; O’Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 2009; O’Neill et al., 2013; Painter, 2013; Spence & Pidgeon, 2010; Spence, Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2012; von Engelhardt & Jansz, 2014).

4.5.2.3.3 Unequal Vulnerability Subframe

Central to this subframe is the acceptance that the inequality of humans – along socio-economic, ethnic, cultural, gender... lines – is given by nature, a constant fact which we ought to deal with (e.g. Bankoff, 2001; Dalhgren & Chakrapani, 1982; Farbotko, 2005; Fraser, 2000, 2005). The story underlying the Unequal Vulnerability Subframe can be summarized as follows: Some groups – mainly, but not exclusively, (in) the South – are characterized by internal (structural) weaknesses: They are economically, socially, culturally, politically, physically and/or psychologically underdeveloped. As such, they are disproportionally vulnerable to and less able to cope with climate change consequences. Although climate change (and its causes and consequences) constitutes a major external threat, elite groups – mainly, but not exclusively, the West(ernized) – bear the underlying responsibility: They do not sufficiently recognize the lives, economies, cultural identities or right to develop of others. In order to save and improve (and thus recognize) the latter, the elites – who also possess the required knowledge or means – have the responsibility to rectify their wrongs. The frames of Billett (2010) (‘responsibility: located in West’, ‘socio-environmental threat: located in unified South’), Viherala (2008) (‘climate change as a problem of greenhouse gas emissions’ and ‘climate change as a problem of vulnerability’), Schmidt and Schäfer (2015) (‘international solidarity in an unequal world’) and Dreher and Voyer (2015) (‘victims’, ‘refugees’), or the discourses (except for ‘crisis’) of Doulton and Brown (2009) contain one or multiple elements or arguments which can also be found in Unequal Vulnerability.

A prototypical example of this subframe can be found in the article “This should make us think about climate change” (DS, 12/11/2013, p.6). The article describes the response of the parties at COP19 in Warsaw to Typhoon Haiyan, which hit the Philippines during the climate summit. The article is written by a journalist of the newspaper. The main, legitimized sources are western politicians (i.e. negotiators) and a NGO representative. Yet, a negotiator of the Philippines, Yeb Saño, is also allowed to speak (one of his quotes is even lifted out and made more salient), though merely as a representative of the victims, and thus as a ‘victim-witness’ (Roosvall & Tegelberg, 2013).

This natural disaster is clearly identified as a – human-induced – climate disaster (see for instance, the heading) and an extreme force: The infographics accompanying the verbal text elaborate and enhance the argumentation of the latter; comparing the consequences of various categories of storms, they take Haiyan out of the ordinary (metaphor: sublime nature) (e.g. Chouliaraki, 2006; Grittmann, 2014). The numbers and factual information in the visual space may add to the scientific truth (strong modality); the colours – ranging from orange (minor storm) to deep red (most extreme storm) – underscore the idea of increasing levels of danger (see colour symbolism / sensory truth) (see Doyle, 2007, 2009; Mahony & Hulme, 2014; Manzo, 2010b; O’Neill, 2013, 2017).

Yet, a specific group of responsible human agents (‘inclusive we’, including the author / source and the addressed (western) audience; as actors, carriers or behavers) is implicitly and explicitly foregrounded. For example, “(...) the historical responsibility of the West for the increasing greenhouse gases (...)” (note, however, that the ‘West’ is not central to the action (i.e. backgrounded) in this nominal construction). Besides, within this group, individualized villains (e.g. “big polluting countries like the US or China”) are often singled out and opposed to ‘heroes’, like “the European Union” who (are willing to) reduce their emissions. As pointed out earlier, this mainly serves to background (decontextualize) the bigger picture, that is society-wide responsibilities. Anyhow, the underlying idea is that some groups in society prioritize their own (economic) interests over the rights of others (beyond their time-spaces). These – rather abstract – argumentations are only made manifest in the verbal text, which extends (or enhances), as such, the visual part of the frame.

Those affected by the actions of the elites – and thus, those facing socio-economic loss, suffering, death or the loss of cultural traditions – are usually represented as (generalized and identified) passive victims (see Bankoff, 2001; Batziou, 2011; Chouliaraki, 2006; Dalhgren & Chakrapani, 1982; Dreher & Voyer, 2015; Farbotko, 2005; Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012; Martello, 2008; Scott, 2014). The visual mode largely exemplifies and enhances the verbal text, which only makes brief references to the ‘vulnerability’ (identification) of the Philippines. The large photograph foregrounds, for instance, the destruction, debris and despair in a southern area. The spatial context is suggested by the – generic – palm trees in the picture. As Scott (2014) argues, the palm tree is often used as a symbol (metonym) of a homogeneous and abstract distant area, beyond the (concrete) time-space of the viewer (see also Brönnimann, 2002). The caption, however, further identifies the location as “Tacloban”. Yet, in the context of this subframe, this more specific localization is unlikely to bring the audience much closer to the events (Chouliaraki, 2006; Dalhgren & Chakrapani, 1982). Central in this scene are a mother and (a barefooted) child, *the* western metonyms representing the vulnerability and helplessness of their group at large (Ali, James & Vultee, 2013; Höjjer, 2004; Manzo, 2010a, 2010b; Perlmutter, 1998). They are depicted at a social distance and from a side view, which prevents us from seeing their faces. This may distance them from the audience, inhibiting identification (Chouliaraki, 2006; Batziou, 2011; Graber, 1988, 1996; Hart,

2011; Höijer, 2004; Jewitt & Oyama, 2001; Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; Manzo, 2010b; Martello, 2008; Messaris, 1997; Small & Loewenstein, 2003). Note that the infographics, which show from a bird's eye perspective the effects of various types of storms in an abstract southern space (containing a simple house and, again, a palm tree), may have similar implications. While the drawings are clear and easily understandable for everyone (e.g. Pauwels, 2005), the lack of detail or colour modulation only produce a low level of naturalistic truth modality. This may help to render the events less realistic (i.e. 'fictional') for (i.e. more distant from) the audience (see Chouliaraki, 2006; von Engelhardt & Jansz, 2014).

Rather than acting for their own sake, the generic 'distant others' in the central photograph are looking up at an airplane that is flying in, symbolizing (metonym) the power and means of the West to intervene (see the literal contrast between top-down and bottom-up). The verbal discussion makes this western responsibility more explicit (elaboration – exemplification), repeatedly foregrounding the developed countries as active responsible agents. For instance, it is argued that they need to provide "more money to help the poor communities and developing countries to reduce their vulnerability to climate change (...)". That is, the West must support the development of the South towards a superior (western) ideal, as this is the only way for them to protect themselves against climatic changes (see Bankoff, 2001; De Lucia, 2009; Grunwald, 2016; Schmidt & Schäfer, 2015; Vihersalo, 2008). The argumentation is largely based on the Kyoto Protocol (1997), which is mentioned a few times as a key event (see intertextual references). These stereotypical, long-standing and culturally resonant multimodal depictions may add to an intertextual opposition (across outlets and articles) between 'them' (passivity and helplessness) and 'us' (superior power and domination) (e.g. Batziou, 2011; Dalhgren & Chakrapani, 1982; Dreher & Voyer, 2015; Farbotko, 2005; Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012; Martello, 2008; Roosvall & Tegelberg, 2012, 2013, 2015). In the process, the timelessness of the 'internal backward state' of the victims is implied. That is, there is no room for development or change (e.g. Chouliaraki, 2006; Dalhgren & Chakrapani, 1982; Scott, 2014).

4.5.2.3.4 Human Wealth Subframe

The Human Wealth Subframe highlights the negative economic, technological and/or cultural (i.e. mostly commercially inspired cultures, like winter sports or travelling) consequences of human-induced climate change for human, as producer and/or consumer. While we all run a risk, it is especially those (bottom-up) groups which currently lack the necessary knowledge, means or incentives to protect their own possessions, who (will) suffer heavy losses. Yet, those who are well-aware of the risks and able to react (mainly political, economic elites), are too preoccupied with short-term gain to act for the sake of long-term benefits. Therefore, it is those groups which need to take the responsibility to act, and facilitate the acting of others. These investments are likely to stir further development and prosperity. This subframe seems to be most closely related to several of the frames which I situated in the category

‘economics (/ technology)’, such as the ‘economic / environmentalist’ frame described by Zehr (2009). However, the descriptions many authors provide do not always allow to decide whether the underlying arguments of these frames support a Reform thinking, a Status Quo thinking (see the Rights of the Free Market Subframe below) or, perhaps, both (see the Economic Challenge Frame above) (e.g. Fletcher, 2009; Nielsen & Kjaergaard, 2011; Nisbet, 2009; O’Neill et al., 2015; Schlichting, 2013; Shehata & Hopmann, 2012; Stephens, Rand & Melnick, 2009; Weathers & Kendall, 2015).

An exemplary article is “Warning lights of world economy light up”, published in the alternative outlet *DeWereldMorgen* (DWM, 25/06/2012). As the title suggests, the article foregrounds (the health of) the economy and human welfare as main reasons to take climate action. The author of this op-ed piece is a Belgian (left-wing, socialist) politician who has been concerned with sustainable development throughout his career. The Stern Review (2006) – a famous report on the economic consequences of climate change – is referred to as an authoritative source (see also key events / intertextual references). The article lacks a prototypical visual. This seems, however, to be characteristic for articles employing the Human Wealth Subframe: Apparently, the economic story is very hard to visualize. At most, I found photographs of claims-makers, often farmers or other producers, affected by climate change (in many cases as victim-witnesses (Roosvall & Tegelberg, 2013)), their affected (material) possessions, like fields of crops or ski runs, or Nicholas Stern, the author of the famous report.

In the lead of this article a small group of (generalized, identified) elite political decision-makers – “180 sovereign states” – are foregrounded as the main responsible agents (actors, carriers or behavers – often in negated / negative processes): Due to their ignorance and lack of vision, ‘(inclusive / collective) we’ (generalized, identified patients) are all suffering economic decay: “According to the influential Stern report, the increasing global warming will cost us about five to twenty percent of the global GDP, more than the Great Depression in the thirties”. The current economic crisis (and thus, short-term economic interests) is partly held responsible for this inertia – primarily by the human villains themselves. The nominalization / personification in the following sentence, for instance, inflates the power of the debt crisis (as an agent) to prevent long-term actions, deflating and backgrounding the actual responsibilities and choices of the (elite) human agents: “The debt crisis which has taken hold of Europe, does not leave any room for governments to increase sustainable investments”. However, ‘(inclusive / collective) we’ are also held responsible for endangering our own economic well-being: “We are cutting the branch we are sitting on”.

A main consequence (i.e. problem) of this ‘short-sightedness’ is the loss of “our natural capital”, “natural stocks” or “ecosystem services”, due to climatic changes: “Commercial fish stocks have declined up to ninety percent”. Clearly, the ‘nature is a machine’ metaphor is particularly pervasive; the environment is approached from a narrow utilitarian perspective (see Larson, 2011; Remillard, 2011; Shanahan & McComas, 1999; Shepard, 2015; Stibbe, 2005, 2015; Verhagen, 2008). However, the status-quo

situation also gives rise to a more direct economic threat: It causes an unfavourable trade balance for the EU (in-group of the audience), which is – in the current fossil fuel economy – forced to import gas and oil. For example, “Last year, the total bill for the net import of oil and gas in the European Union ascended to more than 600 billion dollar, more than the total foreign debt of Greece!” Therefore, human (generalized, identified – often as actor) needs to invest in a “low-carbon circular economy” and a “third industrial revolution, which will offer us ‘liberation technology’ ”. That is, economic-technological development (i.e. a different kind of development) will help us to manage and protect our natural wealth, and even to decouple economic growth from nature (and from other – competitive – human groups). A recurrent (i.e. salient) argumentation is, for instance, that solutions must be aimed at the “creation and distribution of wealth within the boundaries of the natural system”. Note that only the natural system, but not human (economic) development, is said to have (absolute) boundaries. In short, progress means economic / material prosperity and independence (see e.g. Arrow et al., 1996; Dryzek, 1997; Grunwald, 2016; Hopwood, Mellor & O’Brien, 2005; Unmüßig, Sachs & Fatheuer, 2012). The special role of (political) elites in the process is mainly implied, for instance by references to “financial or taxes on fuel of international air and maritime traffic”, which need to facilitate and encourage the sustainable development. That is, economic incentives in the short-run may urge producers and consumers to recognize the economic value and profits of more sustainable actions in the long-run.

Summarizing, the main motivation for climate action lies in the promise of (increased) economic development and profit: “The Stern Report shows that the costs of controlling climate change are about a tenth of the economic loss caused by an unrestrained warming”. This is a prototypical one-liner, which can be found – intertextually – across various outlets and articles. Besides, as the various examples show, numbers (indicating loss or gain) and economic terminology (e.g. “bill”, “interests”, “capital”, “economic value / loss”, “taxes”, “consumers”, “world market”) – including the utilitarian view on nature – are also dominant (i.e. salient). The economic outlook is further reinforced by references to major key events, mainly economic crises such as the Greek Debt Crisis or the Great Depression (see the comparative above) or “times of financial and economic crisis” in general. Clearly, climate and economy are tightly and unquestionably interconnected (i.e. juxtaposed) (e.g. Zehr, 2009).

4.5.2.3.5 Rights of the Free Market Subframe

Deeply entrenched in the Status-Quo thinking (see Dryzek, 1997; Grunwald, 2016; Hopwood, Mellor & O’Brien, 2005), the highly reactionary Rights of the Free Market Subframe highlights that there are no limits to human development and prosperity as nature is forgiving and has corrective capacities. Due to overly rigorous environmental policies and/or unfair competition, however, some economic / political stakeholders are hampered in their struggle for the wealth, resources or opportunities nature, and climate change in particular, keeps providing. As such, they are faced with revenue loss, inefficiency or a weak political / economic position. Accordingly, these pressures need to be lifted to allow those players to

prosper, drawing on technological development and ingenuity. As argued before, many researchers have identified ‘economic frames’. However, only some of those can be clearly linked to (some of) the argumentations of the Rights of the Free Market Subframe. That is, among others, the case for the ‘socio-economic consequences’ frame of Schlichting (2013) or the ‘freedom and resilience of people’ frame of Schmidt and Schäfer (2015), both of which are (slightly) sceptical about (the detrimental consequences of) climate change, weighing of costs and benefits. Both consider (political) responses, such as the Kyoto Protocol (1997), rather than climate change as such, as the major threat (see also Lakoff, 2010).

“The high North is hot”, published in the mainstream outlet *De Standaard* (DS, 10/03/2012, p.38), is a prototypical example of this argumentation. The author is a journalist (i.e. the climate specialist) of the centrist outlet, who joined a European political-economic mission to the Arctic. The major sources are political elites but also researchers specialized in economics and/or politics (rather than natural sciences) are quoted. The major political sources, the Nordic minister of Foreign Affairs, Jonas Gahr Store, and Catherine Ashton, the European High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security, are also visually represented and legitimated. That is, one of the photographs depicts them in a helicopter in the region during prospection work. Hence, it is implied that these sources are to be trusted, not only because of their title and elite status but also because they can buttress their views with their own experiences and ‘research’ on the ground (Lester & Cottle, 2009). The bright colours of their clothing – in the predominantly white context of the Arctic – is likely to draw the attention of the audience.

Focusing on the case of Europe (individualized / identified), the article discusses the rush to the North of various nations (mostly distant, focus on ‘exclusive them’) who start to recognize the growing economic importance of the region (see intertextual references to the ‘Arctic strategies’ of several nations). For example, “According to the American Institute for Geology, thirty percent of the world’s gas reserves and thirteen percent of the oil reserves are under that Arctic ice”; “Besides, shorter shipping lines for large sea ships come into existence (...). A journey which would normally last forty days, can be done in 22 days, which equals a reduction of 580 tons of fuel.” The visual part of the frame elaborates the claims, making them more tangible: Three infographics (depictions of the globe, showing the poles) illustrate the exact locations of the shorter shipping lines and the unexploited gas and oil reserves. Making use of the typical climate iconography – melting poles, the globe (e.g. Doyle, 2007, 2009) – the infographics associate climate change, as an accepted scientific fact (see verbal phrases like “That the Arctic ice is increasingly becoming thinner and more vulnerable is crystal clear for all scientists in this region”), directly with an economic discussion about profit. The abstractions, numbers or clear colour scales may give rise to a strong sense of scientific truth. This may make the discussion more salient, convincing, trustworthy, ‘neutral’ (Nocke, 2014). By foregrounding the economic opportunities, however, (ecological) problems in these regions – including the detrimental effects of this ‘gold rush’ – are largely backgrounded (see litotes / ellipsis / decontextualization / ‘corporate speak’) (Machin &

Mayr, 2012). Note that I have argued before, based on Hughes (2012), Manzo (2010a, 2010b), Lester and Cottle (2009) or Doyle (2007, 2009), that globes or air views often cause decontextualization and abstraction. Similarly, the text only refers in passing to the environmental consequences of climate change (which require research and intervention of humans), while the economic interests are made salient in the heading, in the beginning of the article and in the pull quote. Overall, the depictions and the congruent word choices in the verbal text (e.g. “90 billion barrels”, “reserves”, “exploitation”) foreground nature – more than in any other subframe – exclusively as a rather abstract and passive human resource or storage room. It is, for instance, remarkable that none of the visuals depicts the Arctic region without human elements. The largest visual in the article, for instance, shows the northernmost human settlement (the colours of the wooden houses contrasting with the whites of the icy environment), used as basis by scientists who follow up the melting of the ice in the region. Again, this foregrounds nature merely as an object, which is – and should be – studied, ‘conquered’, controlled or manipulated by humans (e.g. Hughes, 2012; Larson, 2011; Remillard, 2011; Shanahan & McComas, 1999; Verhagen, 2008). As the examples above illustrate, numbers (indicating ‘efficiency’ or ‘profit’) and comparatives / superlatives (positive evolutions) are also pivotal in the visuals and the text (repetition / synonymy). The close interconnection (i.e. juxtaposition) of climate and economy is also suggested by the title, which plays with the multiple meanings and associations of the word “hot”.

However, in the highly competitive context of the ‘Arctic rush’, the economic interests of Europe are being threatened (war metaphor / contrast: country versus country, us / them versus them). Particular (individualized) countries (agents) hamper the advancement of Europe and its governments and industries (patients). Unfair competition is the main threat here. For example, “Only five year ago Russia planted its flag on the sea floor of the Arctic Ocean, clearly claiming, as such, all potential resources”, or “Russia and Canada are not really in favour of the EU engagement and voted against the permanent observer status (...)” (mainly material and verbal processes). Throughout such statements, we can find (intertextual) references to the Cold War. The term is, for instance, used as one of the subheadings. Trying to overcome this threat, however, “(...) the European Union has to and will pay more attention to this strategically crucial region” (note the strong modality). Thus, governments and corporate organizations need to overcome these barriers, acting in material, verbal or mental processes. Well-informed alliances and scientific research are the key goals here. While these argumentations are mainly developed in the verbal part of the frame (see enhancement / extension), proactive steps taken by European elites (with Jonas Gahr Store and Catherine Ashton as metonyms for the latter) are also visually depicted, or at least implied (see elaboration). As discussed, the two politicians are photographed during a visit to the Arctic region, sitting in a helicopter. A connection with the (European) audience – whom they are supposed to represent – is facilitated through the gazes and the friendly smiles (see also frontal perspective, social distance). This may add to the agency of the politicians, who – one

could argue – demand the audience to bear with them and support the strategic actions, outlined in the verbal text, which they (plan to) take in the Arctic for the sake of the European people.

4.5.2.3.6 Natural Machine Subframe

Natural Machine is a metaphor commonly found in the anthropocentric discourse and thinking. Nature is considered as a perfectly designed (or even divine) machine or clockwork, serving the needs of ‘higher living beings’, humans in particular (Larson, 2011; Verhagen, 2008). The Natural Machine Subframe argues that the changes in humans’ (natural) environment are mainly due to the GHG emissions caused by particular natural mechanisms and species. However, the natural machine can regulate, mitigate or adapt to these changes; (other) species or processes are designed so that they can adapt to their particular (new) environments. Human intervention is (largely) unnecessary. Uncertainty about the human responsibility for climate change is, clearly, central in this frame. Hence, some of the frames from the literature which I categorized as ‘uncertainty / conflict’ (see Table 4) frames may (partly) account for the underlying argumentations of this frame (e.g. Antilla, 2005; O’Neill, 2013; O’Neill et al., 2015). However, these generic frames can certainly not be equated to the Natural Machine Subframe as most of them are supposed to capture all types and levels of political and/or scientific debates (which can, for instance, also be found in the context of articles which employ any other type of (sub)frame, particularly *Scala Naturae* or Rights of the Free Market).

This subframe is well illustrated by the article “Earthworms cause global warming”, published in the popular outlet *Het Laatste Nieuws* (HLN, 5/02/2013, p.24). The author is a journalist of the newspaper. Scientists – including an international research team (legitimized through their affiliation “of four international universities”) – are the main sources. One biologist provides a more critical, nuancing counter-perspective near the end of the article. This is, however, less salient than the views in the title or visual. Put differently, ‘alternative scientific facts’ are set against the scientific consensus view regarding climate change (see IPCC, 2014a, 2014b). As Boykoff (2007) and Boykoff and Boykoff (2004) point out, journalistic balance (e.g. Tuchman, 1972) may suggest that both views are equal. In this case, however, the consensus view is even backgrounded. This appears to suggest inequality (Antilla, 2005; Fahy, 2017; Hiles & Hinant, 2014).

The earthworm is foregrounded here as the (individualized) independent agent (actor, carrier or identified) which carries a major responsibility for the emission of GHG: “Earthworms are the real villains when it comes to climate change (...)”. “Real” may suggest, or presuppose, that other possible villains only play a secondary or tertiary role, in the (typical) ranking of climate villains. The focus on the (exact) amounts (i.e. numbers) of GHG emissions is notable and adds to the scientific character. For instance, “The scientists posit that earthworms increase the emission from the soil of carbonic acid gas with about 33 percent, and of nitrous oxide even with 42 percent”. Throughout the article, “earthworms”

and related (generic, ‘mechanical’) terms such as “this mechanism” are repeated numerous times. Terms like “use” or “downside” imply the – fundamentally – utilitarian purpose of the animals (Larson, 2011; Remillard, 2011; Shanahan & McComas, 1999; Stibbe, 2015; Verhagen, 2008). Similarly, the image accompanying the article depicts a single earthworm, omitting all other suggestions to broader processes or human responsibility (see decontextualization). The lack of a concrete time-space (i.e. the timelessness of the depiction) may, thereby, distance the audience even further from the causal responsibility. This helps – in interaction with the verbal text (see elaboration) – to make the idea of a(n abstract) natural villain particularly salient. Although not clearly stated, it is suggested – in line with comparable news reports – that solutions can also be found in nature. Yet, the scientists also promote themselves as ‘mechanics’, who may fix this small defect in the natural machine (Verhagen, 2008): “(...) they also want to work on a solution to decrease the production of gas”. In short, the Natural Machine Subframe highlights the interplay of natural villains and – in some cases – natural heroes.

4.5.3 Counter-Hegemonic Masterframe

4.5.3.1 *One Biocentric Narrative*

The four remaining subframes – ‘Natural Web Subframe’, ‘Unequal Attribution Subframe’, ‘Civil Rights Subframe’ and ‘Gaia Subframe’ – all promote a more biocentric way of thinking. Biocentric views tend to denounce the current capitalist system (and Euro-American anthropocentrism, accordingly), including the ways in which (western(ized)) humans interact with nature and other social groups, as the roots of various interconnected problems and injustices. Climate change is just one detrimental consequence. Other problems encompass, among others, social, economic, cultural or democratic injustices. Drawing on Fraser (2000, 2005), I summarize these as multi-layered (material / economic) maldistribution, cultural status misrecognition and political misrepresentation (e.g. Agyeman, Bullard & Evans, 2002; Alexander, 2007; Brulle, 2010; Grunwald, 2016; Lohmann, 2008; Remillard, 2011; Roosvall & Tegelberg, 2012, 2013, 2015; Sen, 1999, 2009; Shiva, 1988, 1993; Unmüßig, Sachs & Fatheuer, 2012). Accordingly, the biocentric view provides alternatives based on the ideas of harmony, diversity, mutual interconnectedness and dependence, cooperation, respect and the equality of all living beings. Humans are part of nature, not separate from it; nature is considered as an important touchstone for humans. Hence, humans are urged to show more moderation (e.g. Adamson, 2014; Dryzek, 1997; Hopkins, 2008; Hopwood, Mellor & O’Brien, 20015; Larson, 2011; Naess, 1973; Shanahan & McComas, 1999; Shepard, 2015; Stibbe, 2015; Unmüßig, Sachs & Fatheuer, 2012; Verhagen, 2008). These subframes fall under the only alternative category, ‘transformation’, which I discerned in the literature (see Table 4). To the best of my knowledge, only Brand and Brunnengraber (2012) (‘transformation’ and ‘anti-adaptation’) and Maesele (2010) (‘alternative’, ‘corporate control’, ‘public accountability’ and ‘ethics’) have identified climate change or environmental frames which could be considered as counter-hegemonic. Doulton and Brown (2009) discuss a fairly critical discourse

(‘crisis’) in the context of climate justice. Pepermans (2015) describes counter-discourses with regard to climate policies and reports: The dominant views of globalization and capitalism are criticized from the perspective of bottom-up groups. In the process, the (alternative) values and interests of the latter introduced.

Again, it is possible to identify a number of common devices within the Biocentric Subframes, which stem from the common underlying narrative they share. However, although it also draws on biocentric views, the ‘Gaia Subframe’ seems to constitute an exception: it calls for passive scepticism rather than (active) positive engagement with the current multi-layered problems. Therefore – and since my description of this subframe is only based on theorizations – I will not include it in the following discussion. I will, however, highlight its particular characteristics while discussing the four separate subframes (4.5.3.2 Four Counter-Hegemonic Subframes).

I summarize the common underlying non-hegemonic narrative as follows: Nature, as well as those (bottom-up) human groups which stand close to nature, are being victimized by the hegemonic socio-economic system in multiple ways (maldistribution, status misrecognition, misrepresentation) (external pressures). This makes them disproportionately vulnerable to climate change and other crises. The hegemonic thinking is largely – but not exclusively – sustained by western(ized) elites (human-internal cause). Therefore, the victimized groups – who draw on alternative (biocentric) values – must become equal partners in the debate: they are the ones able to instigate a (funda)mental transformation of society (human-internal solutions) (redistribution, status recognition, representation).

- The Biocentric Masterframe contextualizes causal responsibilities (e.g. Bankoff, 2001; Brand & Brunnengräber, 2012; Cameron, 2012; de Onís, 2012; Doulton & Brown, 2009; Fraser, 2000, 2005; Grunwald, 2016; Iyengar, 1990; Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Maesele, 2010; Pepermans, 2015): Structural hegemonic processes are foregrounded (through personifications, nominalizations, passivizations), rather than singled out (human) agents. (Generalized) political / economic elite agents (actors, sensors, carriers or identifieds, often in negative / negated processes) mainly act as metonyms for the ideological system they try to uphold. The focus lies on mental processes, particularly the inability to think outside the ‘anthropocentric box’. Anthropocentric processes like ‘(sustainable) development’, ‘green economy’ or ‘survival of the fittest’ are revealed and denounced as deceptive ‘semantic reversals’ (Heuberger, 2007; Larson, 2011; Stibbe, 2015).
- Nature *and* humans (the whole natural web) are victims. Depending on the subframe, however, the emphasis may rather lie on nature (Natural Web Subframe) or on humans (Unequal Attribution and Civil Rights Subframes). Those bottom-up groups ‘closer to nature’ (from an anthropocentric perspective; ‘on the natural ladder’) are, in particular, foregrounded (e.g. Adamson, 2014; Alexander, 2007; De Lucia, 2009; Huggan & Tiffin, 2015; Norton, 2014; Sen,

1999, 2009; Shiva, 1988, 1993; Shepard, 2015; Verhagen, 2008). However, they are not depicted as essentially weak. Rather, it is highlighted that they are being victimized (see contextualization) (e.g. Bankoff, 2001; Douilton & Brown, 2009; Dreher & Voyer, 2015; Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012; Hart, 2011; Iyengar, 1990; Maesele, 2010; Pepermans, 2015; van Dijk, 1998; Weik von Mossner, 2011). Visually and verbally, we can, for instance, find balances between passivity and resilience. Processes highlighting a lack of / limited agency (e.g. relational or behavioural processes, passive voice, conditional agency (Chouliaraki, 2006)) are combined with the focalization or foregrounding – versus deletion or backgrounding – of responsible agents or causes. That is, it is emphasized that certain groups are victims of circumstances and these circumstances are clearly explicated. (Material / economic) multi-levelled maldistribution (e.g. economic loss due to climate change *and* unfair trade relations), cultural status misrecognition (e.g. ignoring the value of biocentric alternatives) and/or political misrepresentation (e.g. undemocratic processes) are described as major causes (Fraser, 2000, 2005).

- The bottom-up groups – ‘(in/exclusive / collective) we’ – are also the ‘victim-heroes’ who can facilitate redistribution (Roosvall & Tegelberg, 2012, 2013). That is, if they are allowed to act as equal partners, or leaders (recognition, representation) (Fraser, 2000, 2005). They are visually and verbally presented as humanized agents, fully able to feel, reflect and act upon their own fate (i.e. sovereign agents, actors, sensors and/or sayers) (Chouliaraki, 2006; Dreher & Voyer, 2015; Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012; Figenschou, 2011; Martello, 2008; Weik von Mossner, 2011). They promote a (funda)mental transformation, combining sustainable development and biocentric alternatives (Grunwald, 2016; Hopwood, Mellor & O’Brien, 2005; Maesele, 2010; Pepermans, 2015; Unmüßig, Sachs & Fatheuer, 2012). Hence, the global economic society governed by elites is substituted for (local) civil society/ies, ‘Universal Justice’ for ‘local justices’ (e.g. Alexander, 2007; Brulle, 2010; De Lucia, 2009; Sen, 1999, 2009; Shiva, 1988, 1993). Accordingly, the opposition between legitimized bottom-up (‘us’) (hyperbole) and backgrounded, delegitimized top-down (‘them’) (ellipsis / litotes) is pivotal (van Dijk, 1998). The latter are ‘villain-facilitators’ (see Roosvall & Tegelberg, 2012, 2013) at most.
- Nature, however, is not fully restored as equal partner. The natural web (inclusive, complex, harmonious nature) and Mother Earth (nature as active, responsive agent) metaphors are, verbally and visually, juxtaposed with the ‘natural machine’ metaphor (Larson, 2011; Lovelock, 1988; Naess, 1973; Shepard, 2015; Shiva, 1988, 1993; Verhagen, 2008). The (temporal-spatial) contexts are usually limited to the here and now of (western(ized)) humans, largely omitting references to nature (Adamson, 2014; Norton, 2014; Shanahan & McComas, 1999). Clearly, the human-nature dualism is still largely there (Remillard, 2011); humans often act as stewards for nature (Dryzek, 1997; Prelli & Winters, 2009).

- Bottom-up voices are the dominant sources: (Representatives of) alternative think tanks or NGOs, (southern) grassroots groups, local, ordinary citizens... Citizen journalists – often members of these groups – work next to western and southern professional journalists (e.g. Atton, 2002, 2003; Downing, 2001, 2003; Groshek & Han, 2012; Harcup, 2003, 2014).
- Negative and disillusioning images of today’s reality (deconstruction) – the threat of climate change *and* the hegemonic thinking – are balanced with positive, promising stories of a better (‘the good’) life (reconstruction) (e.g. Atton, 2002, 2003; Gunster, 2011, 2012; Harcup, 2014; Pepermans, 2015), which may be more engaging than the hegemonic focus on doom and gloom (e.g. Brulle, 2010; Foust & O’Shannon Murphy, 2009; O’Neill, 2017; O’Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 2009; O’Neill et al., 2013).

4.5.3.2 *Four Counter-Hegemonic Subframes*

4.5.3.2.1 Natural Web Subframe

Natural web is a central metaphor of the biocentric thinking, highlighting the interdependence and equality of all (non-)living beings, including (all) humans (e.g. Adamson, 2014; Norton, 2014; Shepard, 2015; Verhagen, 2008). Accordingly, the central organizing idea of the Natural Web Subframe is this: The hegemonic anthropocentric worldview – mainly, but not exclusively, reproduced by a small group of elites – is responsible for several interconnected (environmental, economic, cultural, political...) problems, apart from the disproportionate emission of GHG. That is, the dominant thinking – particularly the ideal of unlimited (elite) human development and control – harms the resilience of the whole natural web, but also prevents the redressing of the distorted human-nature relations. Human stewards (mainly citizens, grassroots groups, NGOs, activists) who are able to look beyond the ruling system, can and are willing to speak up for the natural web. However, these bottom-up groups are largely silenced in mainstream debates. Hence, only by recognizing the crucial role of these groups, we may evolve – through moderation or long-term adaptation – towards a more harmonious, just and mutually dependent (biocentric) coexistence.

A characteristic article which employs this subframe, was published on 14 November 2013 in the alternative outlet *MO**: “Habib Maalouf: Religion and development dogma are disastrous for environment”. The interview – by a (intern) journalist who is also engaged as a volunteer in various NGOs – gives a voice to the ‘alternative’ Lebanese professor Habib Maalouf, the president of the Lebanese Organization for Environment and Development and co-founder of Euromed Civil Forum (MEDEA). The article allows the ‘alternative thinker’ to extensively elaborate on his views. Accordingly, it is heavy with (legitimated) quotes of the speaker. The visual reinforces the legitimation in the verbal text (see also: a professor who “published two books on environmental philosophy”): As Tuchman (1978) argues, the social distance, eye-level and head-on perspective may help to legitimate a

source, conveying an air of truth and trustworthiness. Anyhow, it is a convention which is often used in the media to depict (elite) speakers. Also, a connection is made with the audience through the gaze (and friendly smile), which places Maalouf (as an agent) in the same reality as the viewer. The latter is invited to interact with the speaker as equals, to respond to his ‘invitation’, to pay attention to the views he wants to share (in the verbal text). The ornamentations and stained glass with natural patterns behind Maalouf (setting) (Lester & Cottle, 2009) – and possibly some physiognomic characteristics – suggest his non-western background (i.e. differential positionality (Pulido & Peña, 1998; Taylor, 2000)), which is further developed (metonymy / amplification) in the verbal text.

As illustrated by the title, the article – contextualizing causal responsibilities (see above) – mainly targets the system. We can find, among others, personifications like “religion”, “development dogma” or “consumption society”, which are all – to a certain extent – expressions of the anthropocentric thinking (e.g. Grunwald, 2016; Prelli & Winters, 2009; Unmüßig, Sachs & Fatheuer, 2012). Throughout the article, these (actors or carriers / identifieds) are revealed and denounced as semantic reversals (Heuberger, 2007; Stibbe, 2015): They do not allow for solutions, but keep reproducing or even exacerbate the current situation of fundamental inequality and injustice (e.g. through rebound effects). For instance, “The type of development which is dominant in the world, that is the real villain, the foundation of the problem”. It is implied – as in most counter-hegemonic articles – that the elites (e.g. (international) politics, corporate organizations) sustain the system of unlimited growth and control for their own benefit (see, among others, Brulle, 2010; De Lucia, 2009; Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Maesele, 2010; Mouffe, 2005; Pepermans, 2015; Pepermans & Maesele, 2014; Swyngedouw, 2005). For example, “The Lebanese government is like all other governments: development and progress are their priorities” (see ‘exclusive they’, usually as actors, sensors, sayers, carriers or identifieds – often in negated / negative processes). As illustrated in this example, it is often the current (political) decision-making process that is criticized (see De Lucia, 2009; Fraser, 2000, 2005; Sen, 1999, 2009). Yet, the article also strongly focuses on our collective guilt (‘inclusive / collective we’): Immersed into the anthropocentric paradigm, we (unwittingly) contribute to its reproduction, often as sensors (or actors): “Development above all else is the dominant idea in the world. No one wants to understand that this idea has become catastrophic”. Again, negated or negative processes are particularly prevalent. Accordingly, we can find the – salient – denouncing of the metaphor “human is a god” (or predator). For instance, “We act as gods. That’s the basis of the environmental problems”. Summarizing, our (mental) beliefs and presuppositions constitute the fundamental cause of the current problems (e.g. Heuberger, 2007; Larson, 2011; Shanahan & McComas, 1999; Stibbe, 2015).

Nature – often, but not necessarily, referred to in quite generalizing and inclusive terms – is the main victim of the current anthropocentric system: “The dominant religions make humans believe that they are special. And if they think that they are special, (...) they are allowed to devalue other species” (see

Dryzek, 1997; Prelli & Winters, 2009). This clearly implies the intrinsic – but victimized – equality and resilience of nature. However, (future) humans are also foregrounded as important patients in the story (e.g. Adamson, 2014; Larson, 2011; Lovelock, 1988; Norton, 2014; Shepard, 2015; Shiva, 1988, 1993; Verhagen, 2008). In some realizations of the subframe, those humans (‘in / exclusive we’) who try to speak up for nature even take precedence over nature itself as main victims. Nature is backgrounded or even deleted (Dryzek, 1997; Prelli & Winters, 2009). In other words, natural environments are often backgrounded for the sake of – largely – human environments (Adamson, 2014; Norton, 2014; Shanahan & McComas, 1999) (see also the lack of nature in the visual). Anyhow, both groups are the victims of interconnected injustices: They suffer loss, decay or vulnerability due to climate change *and* other detrimental human acting (e.g. “To sustain our ways of living, we destroy other life” (contrast human (masses / consumers) versus nature)). Also, their exemplary role is disregarded or even destructed. For example, “Development in nature is limited. Flowers get fruits, fruits fall and die. That is how development works; it comes to an end. What human is doing now, has no end”. Besides, they (particularly the ‘people in the future’) do not get a(n equal) say in decision-making processes (Fraser, 2000, 2005).

Accordingly, it is argued that true change lies in the redressing of these (three groups of) injustices. More specifically, those (bottom-up) groups which are able to look beyond the hegemonic paradigm – mainly (generalized) NGOs or “civil society” (‘inclusive / exclusive we’) – should be recognized as important and equal participants (actors, sensors, sayers) in the debate. As representatives of nature, they may lead a “universal ecological revolution”, the transformation towards a more equal, inclusive and modest coexistence, with nature as a leading example (Adamson, 2014; Brulle, 2010; De Lucia, 2009; Fraser, 2000, 2005; Grunwald, 2016; Hopkins, 2008; Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Pepermans, 2015; Sen, 1999, 2009; Shanahan & McComas, 1999; Unmüßig, Sachs & Fatheuer, 2012). This idea of participatory parity (as a means and a goal) is, among others, implied in the exemplary article through the verbal-visual legitimization (as an authoritative source) of the Lebanese ‘alternative thinker’ Habib Maalouf. He is foregrounded as an active agent, with an own view, a voice, a different yet important perspective (see above). He can be considered as a representative (metonym) of a larger bottom-up movement and, arguably, of the natural web as a whole. Notable is, in particular, the contrast between the exclusive presence of Maalouf and the (visually) deleted top-down sources / actors. His ideas and acting can be inspiring for others (‘inclusive / collective we’):

I am a religious man, but I have redefined religion for myself. I believe in God as the creator, but I also believe in equality and that human should live in harmony with nature. (...) We really need to stop the way we are living now. A universal ecological revolution is necessary.

Throughout the article we can find (implicit) intertextual references to the views voiced in the ‘Universal Declaration on the Rights of Mother Earth’, a bottom-up document which was drafted at the 2010 World

People's Conference on Climate Change in Bolivia (in Adamson, 2014). When it comes to solutions, however, Mother Earth (again) only plays a secondary (or even background) role in this exemplary article, and in most other realizations of the Natural Web Subframe alike. Apart from brief references to the exemplary role of nature (see above) or rather dramatic statements like “The end [of unlimited development] will come when nature herself ends it” (nature as actor) – which are reminiscent of the Gaia Subframe, which I will discuss below (4.5.3.2.4 Gaia Subframe) – the responsibility for providing solutions is largely attributed to (bottom-up) humans (see Dryzek, 1997; Prelli & Winters, 2009).

4.5.3.2.2 Civil Rights Subframe

From a biocentric perspective, human rights are first and foremost the rights of the civil society. Indeed, rather than individual and egocentric consumers, we are all equal and interconnected citizens in a community (e.g. Brulle, 2010; Dryzek, 1997; Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Shanahan & McComas, 1997; Shepard, 2015; Stibbe, 2005, 2015; Verhagen, 2008). Accordingly, I named the biocentric realization of the ‘Human Rights frame’, the ‘Civil Rights Subframe’. This subframe argues, more specifically, that the hegemonic socio-economic system victimizes all citizens, turning us into passive consumers (of the products or policies we are provided with). Preoccupied with our own surviving – or prospering – within the system, we are not able (nor allowed) to be critical, let alone to provide alternatives. However, this makes us disproportionately vulnerable to (climate) crises. Accordingly, civil society is the victim of multiple, interconnected injustices (social, economic, environmental, cultural, political...). Yet, we carry part of the responsibility ourselves as long as we accept our consumer role and – unwittingly – aid the elites to sustain this system. Therefore, we need to reclaim our collective citizenship. As such – drawing on biocentric alternatives like sufficiency, harmony or (e)quality – we may work together towards a different future and more meaningful and better human lives. This is a collective but mostly bottom-up endeavour. The Civil Rights Subframe is, at least to a certain extent, reminiscent of some of the frames which Maesele (2010) identifies in the context of the GM food debate, particularly ‘corporate control’, ‘public accountability’ and ‘ethics’.

This subframe can, for instance, be found in the article “Everyone political. Reclaiming our future” published in the alternative outlet *DeWereldMorgen* (DWM, 21/11/2013). The author is the coordinator of the Flemish socio-ecological think tank *Oikos*. The unlimited space of the online news platform allows him to thoroughly develop his argumentations in a long contribution. Throughout the article text he gives a voice to a number of (alternative) philosophers and thinkers, such as Harald Welzer, who he legitimates as authoritative and exemplary sources. The author calls for a different future, based on the collective – political – engagement of citizens.

As expected, the underlying presupposition is that “(...) neoliberalism is a sickening system”. Such personifications or nominalizations – which highlight the systematic problems in society

(contextualization) – can be found next to references to (generalized) political or economic elite agents sustaining the system (as actors, sensors, carriers or identified). For example, “While the government leaves the financial elites alone, the socially weaker groups are increasingly being disciplined”. However, ‘(inclusive / collective) we’ are also held responsible. Indeed, we (mainly carriers / identified, sensors or conditional agents) allow ourselves to be seduced and deceived by the belief that consumption, individualism or (endless) development are the most efficient answers to all social, political-economic, cultural or ecological questions, and the key to instant happiness. As such, we help to reproduce the system: “We do not care whatsoever about the future of our children! It seems as if our preoccupation with instant consumption satisfaction has deprived us from the ability to care about the future”.

As suggested by the last examples, however, it is simultaneously highlighted that (generalized / identified) humans are also – primarily – victims of the system, on several levels: While climate change threatens “the lives of millions of people worldwide” (maldistribution – level 1), “social rights are being cut” in the market society (patients) (maldistribution – level 2). Meanwhile, being ‘programmed’ as “individual consumers” “locked up in the current economic system” (denounced metaphor: ‘human as a machine’), we (are made to) forget about other values (patients / sensors). “Like Rutger Bregman argues, we were taught that dreams about society are dangerous; they tend to change into nightmares. After all, society is not makeable” (misrecognition). What is more, we are only allowed to participate in “a harmless way in decision-making” (conditional agents), in a “depoliticized society” (Brulle, 2010; Fraser, 2000, 2005; Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Maesele, 2010; Mouffe, 2005; Pepermans, 2015; Pepermans & Maesele, 2014; Sen, 1999, 2009; Swyngedouw, 2010) (misrepresentation). Rather than as abstract and distant numbers (‘them’) (see the Consumer Rights Subframe), the main victims are more often represented as ‘(in/exclusive / collective) we’ (e.g. “we, Belgians”). This reversal of us-them roles may encourage identification (see Chouliaraki, 2006).

The victimization of citizens by the system is well-captured by the (denounced) (visual) metaphor of ‘blind’ or ‘suffocated human’, which is salient throughout the realizations of Civil Rights. A cartoon in the alternative outlet *MO** (11/03/2013), for instance, elaborates on – often more implicit / abstract – verbal evocations of ‘blindness’ or ‘deceit’ (e.g. “(...) we, blinded by instantaneousness (...”). It shows a single person standing in a flooded area. His only protection against the pouring rain (metonym for climate change consequences) (e.g. Doyle, 2007, 2009; Grittmann, 2014; Nicholson-Cole, 2005; O’Neill et al., 2013; Smith & Joffe, 2009) is an umbrella (metonym / metaphor for the current – insufficient – climate change action). Simultaneously, however, the umbrella – filled with dark clouds circling around the person’s head – can be considered as a metaphor for the hegemonic system that blinds us for the true dangers to which we are exposed as well as more constructive alternatives (i.e. a false idea of protection). The lowered modality (e.g. lack of details or colour modulation, no background, unrealistic colour

pattern...) of this drawing may help to draw the attention to its symbolic potential (see visual symbolic processes (relational processes)).

In order to be truly able to protect ourselves, '(in/exclusive / collective) we' must, therefore, discard the passive role of individual consumers and reclaim our active role as (generalized, identified) citizens (note the contrast) (e.g. Brulle, 2010; Fraser, 2000, 2005; Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Sen, 1999, 2009). Despite its 'collective character' (e.g. "we will have to learn to cooperate with many different actors") it is suggested that this is, in the end, primarily a bottom-up endeavour (see e.g. top-down – bottom-up contrasts or phrases like "citizens who do not longer wait for market or state (...)"). Anyhow, as equal participants or 'ecological citizens' in the debate, all of us will be able to collectively take our own future in our hands, in an act of self-determination (representation):

(...) the social movement that does not know yet that it exists. We decide today if we will build a future. And the latter is the core of being political. However, we will need to dare think and dream a future again. (italics in original)

Only if we can imagine again a different future for ourselves, position ourselves, the society will become makeable again. Not as machine, which we can manipulate by pushing some buttons, though. Rather, we will need to collectively focus on positive changes, which can reinforce each other in beneficial ways (...).

Note the (in)direct references to politicization in both excerpts (see Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Mouffe, 2005; Pepermans, 2015; Pepermans & Maesele, 2014; Swyngedouw, 2010) and the denouncing of the machine metaphor (society / environment as a machine) in the second quote, which is typical for the anthropocentric thinking (e.g. Shepard, 2015; Verhagen, 2008). Furthermore, the pivotal role of mental processes, next to material processes, is notable in both examples. The former, in particular, might remind us of the famous 1963 speech of Martin Luther King, 'I have a dream', a call for civil rights, freedom, equality and participatory parity (key event / intertextual reference) 'Dream' and comparable verbs are also repeated several times, especially in the closing paragraphs of the article. Throughout – and facilitated by – these active processes, the author argues, we will evolve from a society preoccupied with "possessing" and "individualism" (anthropocentric values) to a society in which collective (more biocentric) values and practices like "trading, sharing and giving away" are pivotal. The author refers to various, interacting bottom-up initiatives, like complementary coin systems, (collective) city farming projects or repair cafes. For example, "I dream about a society in which we consume less and invest the saved money in sustainable infrastructures for the futures: we all become co-owners of wind and watermills, tramways and collective gardens" (recognition). As such, the preoccupation with our individual, short-term interests is contrasted with the focus on a collective future that is safe and sustainable for all. What is more, we must aspire "a world with less stuff and more social contacts which give significance and meaning" to our lives (redistribution) (Fraser, 2000, 2005). The latter refers to a secondary, positive consequence of collective, alternative actions: more enjoyable, satisfying and

meaningful lives for all. However, care for others in our society cannot be separated from care for the environment (e.g. Grunwald, 2016; Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Unmüßig, Sachs & Fatheuer, 2012).

Note that the focus on humans is also apparent in the precedence of largely human environments. For instance, “the Earth is the place where we must build our world”. While (deictic) ‘we’ or ‘our’ are slippery and rather vague pronouns, which may adopt various meanings, other references to humans in the direct context of the article help to disambiguate them, suggesting a human-exclusive interpretation (Fairclough, 2000; Langacker, 1993). As suggested, for instance, repetitions of nouns like “consumers” or “citizens” are salient. The generic character of the foregrounded environments might also imply ideas of collaboration and collectivity, rather than individualization (i.e. pigeonholing (see Larson, 2011)).

4.5.3.2.3 Unequal Attribution Subframe

Rather than the unequal vulnerability of some groups, the Unequal Attribution Subframe highlights the unequal appropriation of resources, freedoms or rights as the main problem of environmental justice. As such, it represents an alternative, bottom-up view on the matter, as can – for instance – be found in Dreher and Voyer (2015), Farbotko and Lazrus (2012) or Weik von Mossner (2011). Indeed, by enforcing ‘development’ upon those who do not meet their ideals, western elites – including westernized elites in the South – have built up considerable multi-levelled debts: They threaten the resilience and independence of those who are considered to be ‘underdeveloped’ (mainly, but not exclusively, (in) the South), rendering them disproportionately vulnerable to climate change or other hazards. Yet, it is exactly the internal resilience and knowledge of these bottom-up groups which allow them to provide true alternatives, as a response to the current problems. That is, if recognized by other groups as equal(ly developed), these people are able to help themselves but also to encourage – as inspiring hero-victims (Roosvall & Tegelberg, 2012, 2013) – the rest of the world to work (together) on a (funda)mental transformation, which may be beneficial to all. While focusing on the framing of the citizens in the affected regions rather than on environmental justice as such, Dreher and Voyer (2015) provide some examples of more alternative types of frames (‘human rights and self-determination’, ‘agents’, or ‘migration with dignity’) which partly confirm the underlying narrative of the Unequal Attribution Subframe. The ‘crisis’ discourse of Doulton and Brown (2009) also presents some arguments which are reminiscent of the argumentation described above (e.g. ‘multinationals and rich, selfish West actively harming poor’; ‘society needs a change of course’).

An example of this subframe is provided by the article “We must take care to ensure that one disaster does not follow another”, published in the leftist outlet *De Morgen* (13/11/2013, p.31). The op-ed is written by the representative of a Flemish NGO (11.11.11), who pleads for an equal world without poverty. Thus, we mainly hear the voice of the western mediator who is granted ample space to

develop his argumentations. Nevertheless, he does allow local bottom-up voices (“our partners”) to speak up as legitimate and equal sources, though mainly in the background.

The article deals with the western emergency aid offered to the Philippines in the aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan. While the author draws the attention to the (‘direct’) devastation caused by this (human-made) natural force (see the intertextual reference to the 2004 Tsunami below), climate change is again mainly used as a vehicle to raise awareness for more fundamental debts caused by the hegemonic thinking. Apart from denouncing more general processes like emission trading, the Unequal Attribution Subframe tends to zoom in on the detrimental consequences of (neo-)colonialism or capitalist imperialism (see e.g. Adamson, 2014; Alexander, 2007; Cameron, 2012; De Lucia, 2009; Huggan & Tiffin, 2014; Lohmann, 2008; Rees & Westra, 2003; Roos & Hunt, 2010; Sen, 1999, 2009; Shiva, 1988, 1993). The case study article uses the wave metaphor to reveal the mainstream ideal of “aid” as a hegemonic semantic reversal (Heuberger, 2007; Stibbe, 2015):

Just like the typhoon, which raged through the country, a ‘second wave’ will hit the Philippines soon: the wave of international emergency aid. This week and the following weeks, the affected region will be flooded by boats, planes and jeeps, filled with goods and aid workers.

Offering – uncoordinated and/or unilateral help – the consciously acting West (governments, NGOs, aid workers) is equally devastating as, or even worse than, accidental natural disasters (Weik von Mossner, 2011). Their help only renders the South more dependent or vulnerable, supporting the western power and economic interests (see Bankoff, 2001; Dalhgren & Chakrapani, 1982). These views – which may well be summarized by means of the ‘elites as predators’ metaphor – are further sustained by various phrases in which the elite agents (or metaphors / metonyms referring to these elites) are involved in negative or negated material, behavioural, relational and/or mental processes. The following sentence is illustrative: “If they are not managed well, the enormous flows of money, which are now coming on stream, can fundamentally change the social relations in the affected region”. The wave metaphor introduced above is further developed in this example. These rather abstract argumentations are largely communicated through the verbal text, which enhances and extends, as such, the arguments in the visual.

Similar to its hegemonic counterpart, the Unequal Attribution Subframe depicts particular – socio-economic, cultural, ethnic, gender – groups ((in) the South) as main victims: Throughout the article, they are represented as an abstract and distant group of “dead” and “needy” people (identifications, generalizations), often in a patient role (e.g. “(...) the developing countries are being hit right now”). Particularly powerful is, furthermore, the (intertextual) reference to the 2004 Tsunami: “The horrible images from the Philippines are reminiscent of those of the Tsunami in December 2004. Complete destruction, distress and images of dead people floating in the water”. As a key event, the Tsunami might work as a powerful (mental) frame, prompting images of death and despair among the audience, on top of those made explicit in the text. The picture further elaborates these ideas, focusing on a helpless child

in the centre of the picture space. As discussed above, this is *the* stereotypical western symbol (metaphor / metonym) of the vulnerability and helplessness of the ‘other’ (Ali, James & Vultee, 2013; Chouliaraki, 2006; Höijer, 2004; Manzo, 2010a, 2010b; Perlmutter, 1998). The motionless child has its back turned to us and does not look us in the eye. This visual ‘offer’ reinforces the ideas of passivity and distance in the text. The faceless mass surrounding the toddler may sustain these ideas. Yet, this – seemingly – hegemonic narrative of the undeveloped and helpless other (e.g. Bankoff, 2001; Chouliaraki, 2006; Dreher & Voyer, 2015; Roosvall & Tegelberg, 2012, 2013, 2015; Scott, 2014) is taken to a deeper level, and thus contextualized (e.g. through the adding of verbal / visual agents or causes): ‘The South’ is not essentially weak but victimized by the acting of ‘the West’ (see above). As discussed, this victimization encompasses several levels: multi-layered vulnerability due to climate-induced loss *and* ‘aid’ (e.g. “This week and the next weeks the affected area will be flooded by boats, planes and jeeps, filled with goods and aid workers”); the disregarding and/or destruction of alternative, local knowledge and (aid) organizations (e.g. “What do all those organizations say that put aside the existing structures? That they are not good enough?”); the lack of a democratic voice for the ‘South’ both during local debates (with aid workers) as well as during international climate summits (Fraser, 2000, 2005). The picture elaborates on these argumentations, shedding a critical light on the stereotypical child metaphor by contrasting – and balancing – it with the father (and mother) metaphor (i.e. a depiction of parents protecting their child against external threats). Singling out two individuals from the anonymous mass and showing them at a personal distance, the visual foregrounds the often denied or destructed resilience of the locals (see Chouliaraki, 2006; Dreher & Voyer, 2015; Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012; Figenschou, 2011; Martello, 2008; Weik von Mossner, 2011).

This nuanced problem definition already suggests a reversal of roles, which is fully developed in the discussion of the solutions: The bottom-up groups ((in) the South) are not waiting for external help (as victims), but are perfectly able to take care of themselves, as ‘victim-heroes’ (Roosvall & Tegelberg, 2012, 2013). What is more, “It is crucial that the ownership of the aid coordination largely remains with the Philippine government”. The strong modality highlights the idea that only local leadership or – at least – participation will provide true solutions for the current, multi-level problems. The active role of the locals is communicated by functionalizing names or predications (e.g. “partners”, “locally embedded movements”). Also, it is highlighted in (sovereign) material or mental processes such as “They are currently relieving the most precarious needs” or “They know very well which mechanisms play in the field” (see Chouliaraki, 2006; Figenschou, 2011; Martello, 2008; Weik von Mossner, 2011). Indeed, (local) social and environmental knowledge, cultures or traditions are foregrounded as highly valuable (e.g. Bankoff, 2001; Dreher & Voyer, 2015; Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012; Lohmann, 2008; Martello, 2008; Shiva, 1988, 1993; Smith, 2007; Tanjeela, 2014). Accordingly, representatives of the communities (‘exclusive we’ / ‘I’) are often given a voice (verbal processes). This also helps to foreground their perspective on the matter and may further humanize them, encouraging identification (reversing ‘us-

them' roles) (van Dijk, 1998). Again, the visual elaborates on the verbal arguments (and vice versa), adding a more abstract, rhetorical level (exemplification). The father and mother in the picture are independent actors who take care of their child (i.e. their most vulnerable fellow citizens). This is conveyed through the vectors: The arms of the man and woman cross in a protective gesture (see 'transactive actions'); their interwoven hands may symbolize togetherness and cooperation. As they do not look at the spectator, we could conclude that they do not seek our help (demand), but rather offer us a view of their resilience. Giving 'the other' a face, the parents – depicted from a social distance and a profile angle – contribute to the humanization. Besides, (intertextually) interacting with comparable visuals of southern heroes or militants (as metonyms), the picture may help to generalize – and give salience to – the idea of bottom-up resilience or harmony, adding a sense of timelessness. Also, humanization and connection is facilitated by means of a clear localization of the visual (and thus, the accompanying narrative) in the human world (i.e. Tacloban), which is – in this case – a concrete space populated by (inter)acting people like us, rather than an abstract 'backward' region, symbolized by the generic symbol of the palm tree (Adamson, 2014; Chouliaraki, 2006; Dalhgren & Chakrapani, 1982; Huggan & Tiffin, 2015; Manzo, 2010b; Martello, 2008; Norton, 2014; Scott, 2014; Shanahan & McComas, 1999).

While the "leading role" (subtitle) of the bottom-up groups is made highly salient throughout the realizations of this Biocentric Subframe, the (generic, faceless) 'West' is largely restricted to a secondary role, as facilitator for southern acting (i.e. 'villain-facilitator') (Roosvall & Tegelberg, 2012, 2013). For instance, "Money is needed, here and elsewhere, to reinforce the lines of defence. Provide this and do something about the GHG emissions". Note the deontic modality in this example, which may give weight to the argumentation. It is telling that the power to instruct and 'control' lies here with (a representative of) the bottom-up groups and is aimed at the top-down groups, rather than the other way around (i.e. in the top-down subframes). The background role is also highlighted in the visual, where the dominant groups are deleted ('ellipsis') at the expense of the bottom-up agents ('hyperbole'). However, some verbal claims, like the following pull quote, refer to interactions or cooperation among 'equals': "(...) Help is needed, right now. But this emergency aid situation can only be inverted if one respects the local capacities and habits" (see also 'inclusive / collective we'). Concluding, bottom-up capacities must – in one way or another – go hand in hand with top-down contributions (e.g. Dreher & Voyer, 2015; Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012; Hulme, 2009; Martello, 2008; Pepermans, 2015; Roosvall & Tegelberg, 2012, 2013; Sen, 1999, 2009; Shiva, 1988, 1993).

4.5.3.2.4 Gaia Subframe

Gaia – going back to Greek mythology (i.e. the goddess Gaia was like a Mother Earth) – is a well-known metaphor and theory, especially since it has extensively been described by Lovelock in 1988. Summarizing, the Earth is considered as an active, self-organizing and self-renewing subject, which

constantly strives for internal balance. “In Gaia we are just another species, neither the owners nor the stewards of this planet” (Lovelock, 1988, p.14). Rather, humans owe Gaia respect as they completely depend on her for their survival (Adamson, 2014; Verhagen, 2008).

I was not able to identify a Biocentric Subframe of Inscrutable are the Ways of Nature in the corpus. Obviously, however, its absence in the analysed time-space does not mean that this subframe may not exist elsewhere (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Van Gorp, 2006, 2007). This hypothesis is supported, among others, by my own finding that biocentric views have the potency to manifest themselves within the context of the other detected frames. Also, Gibbons (2015) discusses argumentations which one may expect in the context of such a subframe. Clearly, then, the underlying narrative of the Gaia subframe I describe here – as well as the devices suggested in the frame matrix – are based on theorizations (Gibbons, 2015; Lovelock, 1988; Verhagen, 2008). I expect this Biocentric Subframe to highlight the current pressures on Gaia’s balanced state – the whole of harmonious, interconnected ecosystems – as problematic. The main cause are changes in the GHG balance. On the one hand, these are due to natural developments in the system, part of the self-renewing processes. On the other hand, humans have – increasingly – been exerting pressures. As they are interconnected with all other organisms, humans’ changes might affect the whole system, causing imbalances. Their excessive GHG emissions, as such, are not the major problem, though. If left alone, Gaia would be perfectly able to absorb these. The fact that humans are simultaneously destroying other systems might have a greater impact. In the end, however, Gaia remains largely immune to these influences. Indeed, if necessary she might jump to a new stable state. This may, nevertheless, constitute a far less comfortable (and forgiving) living space for humans than they have experienced up till now.

I expect this subframe to focus on contexts characterized by multi-layered complex nature (i.e. natural web) as well as terms which compare (simile / metaphor) the workings of the self-regulating Earth with the human body, or other anthropomorphisms / personifications.

4.5.4 Quantitative Overview

As discussed before, the research aim of this study is first and foremost to provide in-depth, qualitative discussions of the climate change masterframes, frames and subframes (re)produced in the context of three mainstream and two alternative media outlets in Flanders. I do not purport to present quantitatively generalizable findings based on the fairly small sample.⁶⁰ However, in order to illustrate some general tendencies in my corpus, I will briefly discuss some quantitative data based on (i.e. deduced from) the qualitative analyses.⁶¹ These mainly have indicative purposes.

As Graph 1 illustrates, the Anthropocentric Subframes *Scala Naturae*, *Unequal Vulnerability*, *Human Wealth* and *Consumer Rights* are the most prevalent subframes identified. This is not only so in the mainstream but also in the alternative outlets. Only the popular outlet *HLN* rarely produces *Unequal Vulnerability* Subframes. Clearly, this illustrates the pervasiveness of the anthropocentric worldview in the media. This both reflects as well as (helps to) reproduce(s) the dominance of this thinking in society at large (e.g. Fairclough, 1995, 2000; Fowler, 1996; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; van Dijk, 1988, 1998; 2001; Van Gorp, 2006). As authors like Pepermans (2015) or Pepermans and Maesele (2014) point out, the mainstream media fail to look beyond the hegemonic consensus view, out of moral, technocratic or market-oriented considerations. These findings seem to be consonant with general patterns in the literature on (climate change) framing: *Scala Naturae* – by far the dominant subframe in the corpus (49,5 percent) (Graph 1) – is, for instance, also the dominant subframe during international summits and in scientific reports, particularly the IPCC (2014a, 2014b) (see Maesele et al., 2014; Pepermans, 2015). The IPCC is generally considered as the leading or at least a highly authoritative source (e.g. Hulme, 2009; Mahony & Hulme, 2014; Olausson, 2009; O'Neill et al., 2015). *Unequal Vulnerability* – the secondary subframe in the corpus – is also (at least) a secondary subframe in such reports (e.g. De Lucia, 2009; Vihersalo, 2008). As pointed out by various authors (e.g. Fletcher, 2009; O'Neill et al., 2015; Schlichting, 2013; Schmidt & Schäfer, 2015; Wessler et al., 2016; Zehr, 2009), economic development and growth have been foregrounded as central concerns in many debates in the western capitalist society (Dryzek, 1997; Grunwald, 2016; Hopwood, Mellor & O'Brien, 2005; Unmüßig, Sachs & Fatheuer, 2012; Stibbe, 2005), including the climate debate in which environmentalism and economics have increasingly been recognized as mutually supportive concerns. Finally, many frames can be found in the literature which foreground the fate and well-being of 'collective (human) we', trying to raise concern among the audience (e.g. Nisbet, 2009; O'Neill et al. 2015; Stephens, Rand & Melnick, 2009). Apparently, counter-voices are prevented from truly entering the debate, are / feel obliged to adapt their

⁶⁰ Yet, the chi-square test (see the captions of the graphs below) shows that the findings are statistically significant.

⁶¹ I used the computer software programme SPSS to keep track of my data and analyses. Each article in my corpus was entered in SPSS along with a number of variables such as the name of the outlet, the publication date (month and year), the author and, most importantly, the analysed frame. This allowed me to generate a number of tables and graphs with quantitative data (numbers and percentages).

views to the boundaries set by the hegemonic groups and/or find their messages mis/reframed by the media. As I will discuss in more detail in Chapter 6, the latter may happen consciously or rather unconsciously (e.g. Entman & Rojecki, 1993; Farbotko, 2005; Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993; Gitlin, 1980; Groshek & Han, 2011; Mouffe, 2005; Piotrowski, 2013; Roosvall & Tegelberg, 2015; Takahashi & Meisner, 2012).

While the Biocentric Subframes – Natural Web, Unequal Attribution and Civil Rights – are present, they constitute a minority. They are most prevalent in the context of the two progressive alternative media outlets, especially *DWM* (about 17 percent of the coverage) but also *MO** (about ten percent of the coverage). That is no surprise. As discussed in Chapter 3 (3.1.2 Alternative Media), other authors (e.g. Cherian, 2003; Doğu, 2015; Gunster, 2011; Hopke, 2012) also found a larger number of ‘collective action’ (sub)frames (Benford & Snow, 2000; Hopke, 2012; Taylor, 2000) which – foregrounding the ‘voices of the voiceless’ – tend to deconstruct the hegemonic system, construct positive, collective and bottom-up alternatives, emphasize ‘alternative’ (non-hegemonic) human values and/or strongly draw on the opposition between us and them (see also Pepermans, 2015). As such, they may (help to) politicize the debate, bringing in alternative worldviews (see Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Pepermans & Maesele, 2014; Swyngedouw, 2010). Put differently, the (sub)frames seem to largely reflect the traces (i.e. consequences) of the bottom-up context, content and production process which characterize (progressive) alternative media (e.g. Atton, 2002, 2003; Downing, 2001, 2003; Harcup, 2003, 2014). As the percentages illustrate, however, the influence of the alternative subframes remains limited, even in these rather supportive contexts. This confirms the findings of Brand and Brunnengraber (2012) but also of Gunster (2011) or Hopke (2012), who point out as well that the influence of the ‘collective action’ (sub)frames remains fairly limited or – at least – that the alternative (sub)frames are counter-balanced with more salient hegemonic (sub)frames. However, my study also shows that the Biocentric Subframes appear, at times, beyond the (fairly limited) context of the alternative sphere (see Hopke, 2012). Some realizations can be found in the broadsheet mainstream media outlets, particularly in the leftist outlet *DM*. This can probably be explained by various factors. As discussed by authors like Hanitzsch (2007), Kovach and Rosenstiel (2007), Reinemann et al. (2012) or Uribe and Gunter (2004), for instance, mainstream broadsheets are often – more than their popular counterparts – concerned with ‘investigative’ types of journalism, trying to provide broader backgrounds, contexts or explanations (i.e. thematic rather than episodic framing; consonance rather than correspondence). Apparently, these may – at times – touch upon worldviews which go beyond the hegemonic perspective. The leftist outlet *DM*, in particular, purports that it wants to ‘swim against the current’, providing critical perspectives beyond the consensus view (Boesman and Van Gorp, 2016). The idea of ‘disobedient dependence’, introduced by Carlson (2009) (based on Eason, 1988), may also provide an explanation. While mainstream journalists tend to draw on rather small groups of hegemonic sources (as providers of content and legitimacy / ‘objectivity’), they may at times diverge from these hegemonic views in order to confirm

their critical independence and unattachment. This is especially so when they have to deal with unexpected events, accidents or tragedies, like natural (or climate) disasters (see Molotch & Lester, 1974; Van Gorp, 2006). In any case, the presence of non-hegemonic subframes in the context of the mainstream outlets is crucial as it may illustrate and/or contribute to a broader public awareness (Groshek & Han, 2011; Roosvall & Tegelberg, 2015). Indeed, as demonstrated in the research design section above (see 4.4 Research Design), the alternative media only reach a very limited share of the market, while the mainstream media serve a considerable percentage of the Flemish population. Besides, mainstream broadsheets are more likely to ((in)directly) exert an influence on other media *and* on policy-makers (e.g. Boykoff, 2008; Crouse, 1973; Gans, 1979; Lopez-Escobar et al., 1998). The large number of climate articles produced by the two alternative media (n=707) in the selected period may also suggest that these media consider climate change as a more important topic than the three mainstream media, which produced a total of 549 articles. That is, more than half of the articles in the corpus come from the alternative outlets. As I will discuss in Chapter 6, however, these results may also (partly) be explained by other factors, like pragmatics.

While one may ask the question whether the small share of Biocentric Subframes are, at the moment, really able to counter-balance the hegemonic subframes, it is definitely important that they are there. As Groshek and Han (2011) point out, their presence may give rise to more inclusive and ideologically diverse media discussions, which may help to advance alternative ideas in society. As such, the ‘absolute rule’ of the hegemonic consensus view may be broken. This may constitute a first step towards politicization (see Brulle, 2010; Fraser, 2000, 2005; Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Pepermans, 2015; Pepermans & Maesele, 2014; Mouffe, 2005; Sen, 1999, 2009; Shiva, 1988, 1993; Swyngedouw, 2010). The more inclusive character of the debate is directly reflected in the broader range of ‘narrators’ who are allowed to have their say in the context of the alternative media. Apart from the hegemonic (e.g. professional journalists, political or scientific opinion-makers) narrators, who are dominant in the mainstream media, various non-hegemonic ‘reporters’ (e.g. citizen journalists, alternative thinkers) write for the alternative outlets (see Graph 3). As I will discuss in more detail in Chapter 6, this is the result of newsroom policies, but it is also facilitated by other factors (e.g. the online / less commercial character of the alternative outlets, financial constraints, pragmatics) (e.g. Atton 2002, 2003; Brulle, 2010; Bruns, 2003; Deuze, 2005b; Downing, 2001, 2003; Harbers, 2016; Harcup, 2003, 2014; Platon & Deuze, 2003; Silcock & Schwalbe, 2010; Waltz, 2005). As Graph 2 shows, non-hegemonic contributors, like citizen journalists and representatives of bottom-up groups, alternative thinkers, spokespeople of think tanks, (non-professional / non-western) journalists writing for the alternative press agency IPS (International Press Services) (ipsnews.net) or NGO representatives are most likely to reproduce non-hegemonic subframes. However, the professional (alternative newsroom) journalists are also responsible for a considerable share of the articles featuring Biocentric Subframes, particularly in *MO**. Many of these contributors are, for instance, (likely to be) influenced by other life experiences, values

or worldviews (see positionality (Pulido & Peña, 1998; Taylor, 2000)) than hegemonic reporters are. In a similar way, the visuals which accompany the article texts are mostly provided by (international) photo agencies or professional photojournalists in the mainstream media, while the alternative media usually work with creative commons images and/or visuals produced by non-professional and/or non-western citizen (photo)journalists.⁶² However, the graph (see Graph 2) also demonstrates that it is not exceptional for the contributions of the alternative press agency reporters, NGOs or citizen journalists, in particular, to promote Anthropocentric Subframes, either. While each of these groups still encompasses a variety of voices – for instance, individuals with various backgrounds or experiences; less or more progressive NGOs or trade unions – multiple other influences are also likely to affect the outcome of frame-building processes (e.g. Bissell, 2000; Gans, 1979, 2004; Gitlin, 1980; Molotch & Lester, 1974; Nurmis, 2017; Seelig, 2005; Shoemaker & Reese, 2014; Tuchman, 1978). Summarizing, this demonstrable difference between alternative and mainstream media may provide just one factor which may help to explain the differences among the dominant subframes in various media types. In Chapter 6 I will discuss in more detail (some of) the interacting, multi-level influences, drawing a far more complex and nuanced image.

Environmental Justice, in particular, appears to be a central topic of concern in the two alternative outlets. While the Biocentric Unequal Attribution Subframe is the most salient counter-hegemonic frame in both *DWM* (8,2 %) as well as *MO** (6,5 %), a considerable share of the hegemonic subframes draws our attention to Unequal Vulnerability (respectively 21 % and 21,8 %). This may, at least partly, be explained by the social engagement of both progressive outlets: They cooperate, in particular, with social (justice) movements, like *11.11.11* (a Flemish cooperation of North-South movements), *VECO* (including the Flemish NGO *Rikolto Vredeseilanden*) and various trade unions (especially *DWM*), and less with environmental movements, like *Friends of the Earth*. Also, the alternative non-profit press agency *IPS* (*ipsnews.net*), which provides a major share of the articles in both outlets (Graph 3), is responsible for 48,5 percent of the Unequal Vulnerability Subframes and 42,9 percent of the Unequal Attribution Subframes (Graph 2). The organization – which aims to ‘give a voice to the voiceless’ – works, for instance, with a world-wide network of (citizen, grassroots) journalists, who often provide us with their perspectives on the socio-environmental problems in their countries or communities. These may or may not have a non-hegemonic colour. Of course, other influences are also at play. These will be further addressed in Chapter 6.

As discussed in Chapter 3 (3.1.1.2 Popularization and Ideology), previous research has shown differences among the dominant frames found in popular and broadsheet outlets and in outlets with varying ideological leanings. I found comparable tendencies in my study. I will discuss the major differences below, along with some general explanations based on the literature. As I have repeatedly

⁶² Note that this statement is not based on quantitative data (a variable for ‘visual source’ was not included) but on my evaluation of general tendencies (i.e. recurring patterns) during the qualitative analyses.

pointed out, however, the presence or dominance of a frame can never be explained by one factor. In Chapter 6 I will, therefore, try to draw a more thorough and nuanced image of various, interacting influences. The popular mainstream outlet *HLN* (liberal roots) – which has, as expected, the smallest number of climate change articles (n=127) (Boykoff, 2008; Orgeret & d’Essen, 2012; Maesele et al., 2014; Vicsek, 2013) – reproduces more often Consumer Rights and Natural Machine Subframes than the other (broadsheet) mainstream outlets (Graph 1). Similar findings are presented by, among others, Boykoff (2008), Ereaut and Segnit (2006) and Semetko and Valkenburg (2000). More than any other (Anthropocentric) subframe, Consumer Rights tries to bring climate change home, connecting it to the human (western) time-space in which the audience lives. That is, it is mainly concerned with the lives of ordinary people. Also, I argued that the subframe tends to have a more sensational, emotional or alarmist (visual) style than other subframes. As such, it reflects some of the features which are considered as more characteristic for popular media (e.g. Deuze, 2005a; Hanitzsch, 2007; Reinemann et al., 2012; Uribe & Gunter, 2004). The same could be argued for the sceptical Natural Machine Subframe, which promotes a Status-Quo thinking. Popular media work more often than broadsheets with generalist reporters or ‘jacks of all trades’, who are expected to be flexible and may be assigned to all kinds of articles. As Brüggemann and Engesser (2014) point out, however, non-specialized reporters are more likely to allow sceptics access to the debate and to legitimate their voices. That is, lacking sufficient experience, background knowledge and/or time, they are less able or less inclined to evaluate the legitimacy, authority or representativeness of the various perspectives (see Boykoff & Mansfield, 2008; Gibson et al., 2015). Furthermore, sceptical frames allow for more sensation and conflict or other news values like novelty or surprise (Bednarek & Caple, 2012; Galtung & Ruge, 1965, 1973; Gans, 1979; Harcup & O’Neill, 2001, 2017). Nevertheless, the overall number of Natural Machine Subframes remains limited (3,1 % of the coverage in *HLN*). Besides, the broadsheet, centrist outlet *DS* has some sceptic subframes too (2,2 %). This is consonant with the findings of other authors, who have also shown that more conservative news outlets are more likely to promote more sceptical views (e.g. Carvalho, 2005, 2007; Dirikx & Gelders, 2010; Ereaut & Segnit, 2006). Note, besides, that *DS* and *HLN* are comparable in terms of the number of climate articles they produced during the selected period. My corpus comprises 134 articles published in *DS* and, as said, 127 news articles from *HLN*.


Rights of the Free Market, then, can exclusively be found in the two broadsheet mainstream outlets. Unequal Vulnerability is far more prevalent in these outlets than it is in the popular newspaper. Boykoff (2008) and Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) laid bare similar patterns, pointing out that broadsheets are more concerned with the public sphere (see ‘hard news’, more socially and politically relevant topics) and issues which are less directly related to the ‘here and now’ (see Hanitzsch, 2007; Reinemann et al., 2012; Uribe & Gunter, 2004). It appears that Unequal Vulnerability is slightly more salient in the leftist broadsheet *DM* (which produces, overall, 288 climate articles), while the sceptical Rights of the Free Market Subframe is more characteristic for *DS* (Graph 1). In a similar vein, Pepermans (2015) and

Maesele et al. (2014) point out that *DS* tends to approach climate change from a more economic angle. Also, the authors found that the newspaper appears to be more pessimistic about (the course and progress of) current political action. International research (e.g. Carvalho, 2005, 2007; Dirikx & Gelders, 2010; Ereaut & Segnit, 2006) highlights that conservative news outlets are more likely to defend a status-quo situation. This may, among others, be of interest to the (more conservative) political-economic elites they primarily try to address, as well as to advertisers or business partners (e.g. Gans, 1979; Hamilton, 2004; McChesney, 2008; Shoemaker & Reese, 2014). Ereaut and Segnit (2006) identify, for instance, repertoires like ‘free-market protection’ or ‘warming is good’. Carvalho (2005), Pepermans (2015) and Maesele et al. (2014) demonstrate that left-wing media are more inclined to cover climate change from the viewpoint of the South, discussing their rights and responsibilities. Over all, leftist media are more likely to call for urgent action and to criticize the inertia of the government (Carvalho, 2005, 2007; Dirikx & Gelders, 2010; Ereaut & Segnit, 2006; Maesele et al., 2014; Pepermans, 2015). Unsurprisingly, then, I also found that *DM*, more than *DS*, allows representatives of socio(-environmental) movements, like *11.11.11*, to write op-eds (see Graph 3). As discussed before, these are one of the major sources of Environmental Justice Frames (see Graph 2).

However, despite these differential emphasises, the overall patterns – across the outlet(type)s – are quite similar. After all, the hegemonic *Scala Naturae*, Consumer Rights and Human Wealth are the dominant subframes in all three mainstream outlets. As discussed above (3.1.1.2 Popularization and Ideology), Gans (2009), Costera Meijer (2001) and Bird (2009) contend that popular media are crucial as they may create alternative public spheres (see Habermas & Burger, 1989). That is, they may provide those who are not reached by the broadsheet outlets with the ‘information (substance) they need to know’ to function as citizens by presenting this information in more accessible ways. Indeed, the presentation of the dominant subframes in the context of *HLN* is, more often than in the broadsheet dailies, characterized by simplification, brevity, emotion, personalization or visualization. Many of these characteristics can, however, rather be situated on the (‘more superficial’) narrative level than on the more profound framing level. Yet, as Wozniak, Lück and Wessler (2015) point out, these narrative strategies may help to make (parts of) frames more salient. Obviously, different views exist as regards to ‘what people need to know’. One may, for instance, argue that (all) mainstream media largely prevent the audience to get access to non-hegemonic perspectives (e.g. Mouffe, 2005; Pepermans, 2015; Pepermans & Maesele, 2014; Swyngedouw, 2010). However, judging the popular outlet from within the hegemonic context, one may conclude that it does not perform considerably worse (or better) than the broadsheets when it comes to the range of salient (sub)frames it presents. What is more, one may argue that it does a better – or, certainly, more important – job if it, indeed, renders (sub)frames more salient, or at least accessible, to larger groups in the population.


Summarizing, rather than a complete opposition, the mainstream – alternative field constitutes a continuum. The popular outlet (*HLN*) can be situated more closely to one extreme than the centrist broadsheet *DS* and, especially, the leftist broadsheet *DM*, which can be found closer to the centre. The alternative outlets *MO** and, particularly, *DWM* tilt more closely to the other extreme. Clearly, then, this illustrates that all outlets – even those which belong to the same ‘media types’ – still have their own character and are, thus, likely to produce (slightly) different (sets of) subframes.

Anthropocentric and Biocentric Subframes in Five Flemish Mainstream and Alternative Outlets




Graph 1: Overview of the number (percentages) of subframes identified in the studied news outlets. The grey shades cluster the subframes which have an anthropocentric colour while the green shades highlight the Biocentric Subframes. Y-axis = subframes; x-axis = news outlets (Chi-square (32) = 161.177, p < 0.001).

Authors of the Anthropocentric and Biocentric Subframes



Graph 2: Overview of the number (percentages) of subframes per author (reporter) type. The grey shades cluster the subframes which have an anthropocentric colour while the green shades highlight the Biocentric Subframes. Y-axis = subframes; x-axis = authors (Chi-square (64) = 455.313, p < 0.001).

Reporter Types per News Outlet



Graph 3: Overview of the number (percentages) of reporter types per news outlet. Y-axis = news outlets; x-axis = types of reporters (Chi-square (32) = 1300,725; p < 0.001).

4.6 Discussion and Conclusions

At the outset of this chapter, I discussed a number of problems which exist with most (climate change) frames which are currently provided:

1. They are only based on the analysis of mainstream media;
2. They are – for the larger part – used as (thematic) labels, which lack a clear set of framing and reasoning devices (and thus, a central organizing idea). As such,
 - a. they do not allow for comparison and generalization;
 - b. they do not account for the ideological nature of framing;
3. They are mostly monomodal.

Drawing on the analysis of three mainstream and two progressive alternative outlets, I have therefore attempted to contribute to the existing research. I believe that my study may constitute a first step towards a more comprehensive inventory of (a limited number of mutually exclusive) multimodal climate change frames: the Cycles of Nature Frame, the Environmental Justice Frame, the Human Rights Frame, the Economic Challenge Frame and the Inscrutable Are the Ways of Nature Frame, and their respective subframes. The comparing of the different types of media sources (particularly mainstream-alternative) indeed allowed me to discern more elaborate sets of framing and reasoning devices and – in particular – more nuanced patterns (i.e. subframes) underlying the frames, beyond the hegemonic (‘common-sense’) argumentations. These would probably have remained unnoticed (and unproblematized) if I had focused on one media type (Entman, 1991; Hertog & McLeod, 2001, p.150). For instance, most Biocentric Subframes are not present, or at least (quantitatively) underdeveloped (i.e. easily overlooked) in the mainstream outlets.

Throughout this chapter I have, firstly, explained the structure of my frame set, highlighting the relations and interactions, differences and similarities along horizontal and vertical lines. Secondly, I have thoroughly discussed all frames and subframes, as well as the overarching hegemonic (Status-Quo and Reform) and counter-hegemonic masterframes, clarifying their central organizing ideas and their reasoning and framing devices. The detailed, extensive frame matrices extend and ‘visualize’ the discussions in the text. Finally, I have provided and discussed some quantitative data, illustrating the main patterns and tendencies in the corpus of mainstream and alternative, popular and broadsheet and conservative and progressive news media. This confirmed, among others, that Biocentric Subframes are, as expected, more likely to appear in the context of (progressive) alternative media, which are, among others, more likely to allow alternative, bottom-up voices to access the debate. Now I will situate my frames within the broader academic (and public / political) debate. As such, I want to illustrate exactly how my frame set interacts with (i.e. builds from and may contribute to) the existing discussions and how it (attempts to) respond(s) to previously formulated criticism.

As discussed before, my framing analysis drew both on (the devices found in) the multimodal texts in my corpus (inductive), as well as on the frames which have previously been detected by other authors (deductive). That my frames indeed build upon – and expand – a valuable tradition, can, among others, be illustrated by the following figure (Figure 6). Mapping my frames on a number of continuums clearly illustrates that the ‘frame categories’ which I deduced from the literature can be found to a greater or lesser extent throughout all (sub)frames:⁶³




Figure 6: The relative position of the (sub)frames on five continuums, based on the ‘framing categories’ found in the literature.

⁶³ Note that this is – to a certain extent, at least – also (implicitly) acknowledged by the framing studies in the literature that provide more extensive descriptions of underlying argumentations (framing devices, reasoning devices and/or central organizing idea). In the overview matrix (see Table 4) none of the frames from these studies could be situated in only one ‘frame category’ (e.g. Maesele, 2010; Van Gorp & van der Goot, 2009). Note, however, that the fact that a ‘frame’ cannot be readily situated in one of the broadly circulated categories does not automatically mean that it has a well-developed underlying argumentation.

The opportunity-threat continuum refers, on the one hand, to the ‘alarmism / disaster’ frame types prevalent in the literature and, on the other hand, to the ‘opportunity’ or ‘progress’ frames, which are sometimes identified. Scepticism – non-scepticism is based on the ‘uncertainty / conflict’ frame types, which are often discussed, contrasting them with the remainder of the frame types. ‘Human affected’ versus ‘natural system affected’ draws mainly on the (‘human interest’) ‘health and safety’ type of frames, providing an (ecological) alternative that is hardly ever (directly) addressed. Similarly, economic solution / techno-fix versus non-economic / non-technical solution (see ‘transformation’) questions the dominant ‘economic / technology frames’. Finally, the individualized top-down heroes versus collective bottom-up heroes continuum broadens the interpretation of the ‘responsibility’ category. After all, most ‘responsibility’ or ‘accountability’ frames are mainly concerned with the actions and responsibilities of a rather narrow top-down group (e.g. politicians, scientists). I did not provide a continuum based on the ‘morality and ethics’ frames. As each frame, subframe or masterframe is, in one way or another, concerned with ‘morality and ethics’ as one of the four reasoning devices (Entman, 1993, 2004), I did not consider it useful to look for a separate ‘morality continuum’.

The continuums allow for broad summaries of each (sub)frame. That is, each (sub)frame is a unique cluster of the selected variables or arguments but also a (large) number of other variables. For instance, they illustrate that the Consumer Rights Subframe is a non-sceptical subframe that considers humans as the main victims and employs the most alarmist style. Economics or technology are considered as the solution. Top-down (political / economic) elites must take up responsibility. Rights of the Free Market, on the other hand, is a rather sceptical subframe and considers climate change as an opportunity (i.e. non-alarmist style). Yet, it also foregrounds human victims and relies on economics and technology, provided by top-down actors, to solve the problems. Gaia is rather sceptical too. Besides, it highlights the threatening nature of climate change. Nevertheless, its focus lies on nature as a victim. The solutions, which have a collective (ecological system-internal) character, lie beyond techno-economics. The Unequal Attribution Subframe, finally, is a more balanced subframe: It is non-sceptical and considers climate change neither as a threat, nor (solely) as an opportunity. Economics and technology may play a role in the solutions, but the focus lies on alternatives. Accordingly, collective bottom-up groups must be recognized as the main agents which may provide solutions. The natural system at large is under threat, yet the human face is still particularly salient. Clearly, then, the majority of the previously detected generic and issue-specific ‘frames’ constitute a good starting point, as crucial arguments or structural elements of the ‘generic substance (sub)frames’ (Baden, 2010), which I have presented. That is, they pave the way for particular (sub)frames, but do not suffice as frames in their own right. The three latter continuums, in particular, confirm that most (substantive, issue-specific) frame categories discerned in the literature – human affected (‘health and safety’), economic solution / techno-fix

(‘economics’, ‘technology’), individualized top-down heroes (‘responsible actors’⁶⁴) – are indeed rooted in and only allow to fully account for (unacknowledged) hegemonic ideological views. That is, in each of these continuums the non-hegemonic subframes can be found near the left end, where the widely circulated ‘framing categories’ are situated. While the non-hegemonic subframes may include some of the devices or arguments, they go beyond them. That is, they are situated in the centre of the continuum or closer to the right extreme, where the non-hegemonic devices or arguments are to be found (see below). The two former continuums illustrate, in particular, the overly broad character of the generic ‘frames’ in the literature, which are applicable to – and do not allow to clearly discern among or cluster – various types of (more substantive) argumentations. My discussions illustrate, for instance, that the news values – especially conflict, tragedy or human interest – to which generic ‘frames’ are often equated, may in fact facilitate various types of (sub)frames (see Boesman et al., 2017; Vossen, Van Gorp & Schulpen, 2017). More generally speaking, I have shown that mythological archetypes – e.g. villains (see ‘responsible actors’ or ‘alarmism / disaster’), heroes (see ‘responsible actors’) or victims (see ‘health and safety’) – are defined differently depending on the character of the subframes (i.e. the underlying masterframes) (Barthes, 1972; Lule, 2001, 2002). Summarizing, most existing frame sets are not mutually exclusive and not exhaustive (Tankard, 2001). A major contribution of my study, therefore, is that it takes the existing findings to a higher level and reorganizes them, drawing on an in-depth qualitative framing analysis.

Clearly, then, the resulting (sub)frames are not only nuanced and rich, but also allow for easy comparison and generalization. As such, they account for – and reflect – the ideological workings of the framing process, which are often absent in framing studies. Indeed, as Coy, Woehrle and Maney (2008, 12.1) contend, “(...) framing analysis has often ignored ways that power-laden, macro-level discourses [or masterframes] influence meso and micro-level efforts at political persuasion, mobilization, and change”. The figure below (Figure 7) clearly visualizes the diversity of ideological perspectives underlying the five identified frames. Accordingly, it may contribute to more profound insights as regards to the potential of frames to function as sites of ideological struggles (e.g. Carragee & Roefs, 2004; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Gamson & Stuart, 1992; Hänggli, 2012; Hänggli & Kriesi, 2012; Reese, 2001; Maesele, 2010; Trumbo, 1996; Van Gorp, 2006):




Figure 7: Position of the subframes on the ideological continuum anthropocentrism – biocentrism.

⁶⁴ Note that ‘responsibility’, as such, can also be considered as a generic’ type of ‘frame’.

The parallels between this continuum and several of the continuums above confirm, indeed, that many frame categories in the literature are more than neutral or universal representations or labels. Rather, they reflect underlying ideological worldviews. For instance, scepticism is (most) typical for the Status-Quo Anthropocentric Subframes; Anthropocentric (Reform) Subframes are most concerned with the fate of human, as one species separated from the others, while Biocentric Subframes – often highlighting positive alternatives – usually look for (collective) transformation beyond (hegemonic) techno-economic solutions. As discussed above (4.3 Environmental Frames in the Literature), the ideological colour of many of the ‘frames’ identified in the literature is, as such, not problematic. However, I do argue that researchers who do not acknowledge the ideological colour of their frame sets may contribute to the depoliticization of academic, public, political and/or media debates, naturalizing a particular worldview as a ‘neutral frame’ (De Lucia, 2009; Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Mouffe, 2005; Pepermans, 2015; Pepermans & Maesele, 2014; Swyngedouw, 2010). As discussed at the end of the results section (see 4.5.4 Quantitative Overview), this study confirms the lack of ideological diversity (i.e. depoliticization) in the mainstream media, denounced by other researchers, and exposes a (slightly) more inclusive debate (Groshek & Han, 2011) in the two alternative outlets (i.e. politicization).

My study, then, attempts to contribute to the politicization of the debate or, at least, to a more deliberate and critical approach towards the current (hegemonic) tendencies in the media. Integrating and operationalizing framing and hegemony research (Carragee & Roefs, 2004), it tries to further exploit the potentials of framing as ‘a bridging model’ (Reese, 2007). As such, it is – to the best of my knowledge – one of the first to give a more tangible form to the argumentations of authors like Brulle (2010) or Gamson and Ryan (2005), who call for ‘deconstruction-reconstruction’ frames. They do so drawing on insights from various empirical (reception) studies which highlight the need to combine fear with information about alternatives (e.g. Foust & O’Shannon Murphy, 2009; O’Neill, 2017; O’Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 2009; O’Neill et al., 2013) (see Chapter 1). As demonstrated in the results section, the identified Biocentric Subframes indeed question and denounce the workings and presuppositions of the hegemonic worldview (multi-level maldistribution, status misrecognition and misrepresentation) and provide feasible, positive alternatives (multi-level redistribution, status recognition, and representation) (Fraser, 2000, 2005) beyond the scope of the hegemonic thinking. In the process, they take a number of other frequently discussed communication strategies to a higher level (see Chapter 1). For instance, contextualizing causes, problems and solutions as part of larger societal and/or environmental systems (Hart, 2011; Iyengar, 1990), they provide a glance of a ‘global natural web’ with active (human) participants interacting as equals (Adamson, 2014; Norton, 2014; Shepard, 2015; Verhagen, 2008). That is, suggesting intimacy next to – or even more than – holism (Nixon, 2015), they encourage us to imagine ourselves as part of the problem (as responsible agents and victims). Put differently, as we collectively constitute or ‘make’ these systems, we can no longer simply ignore or downplay our roles as heroes, villains *and* victims. As such, the Biocentric Subframes may help to counter-act representations which

feed a sense of (psychological, temporal and/or spatial) distance among the audience and the global climate problem (Darnton & Kirk, 2011; Davis, 1995; Hulme, 2004; Leiserowitz, 2006, 2007; Nisbet, 2009). In this context, problems and solutions are (and can) no longer (be) ‘owned’ by individual consumers but rather by collective groups of active citizens (Corner, Webster & Teriete, 2015; O’Neill, 2017). This may contribute to the – much needed – idea of peer support: to engage, people need to know or see that others are also taking action (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Graber, 1988; Hart, 2011; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Also, the openness of the debate in the Biocentric Subframes suggests that one, final solution is not desirable nor feasible. This may strengthen a sense of self-efficacy among the audience (e.g. McIntyre, 2015): Every contribution may have its value as it may spur the continuously developing process of climate action or put it into another light (e.g. Stibbe, 2015). In other words, (contextualized) conflict (see Corbett & Durfee, 2004; Leiserowitz, 2007) is used as a means to engage broader groups of voices to make sense of issues rather than as a goal to present a certain (consensus) view in a neutral way (e.g. Carpentier, 2008; Gans, 1989; Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2007). Several authors have also argued that frames need to bring climate change ‘home’ by associating it with the values and interests of (particular groups in) the audience (e.g. Lakoff, 2010; Leiserowitz, 2006, 2007; Nisbet, 2009; Myers et al., 2012; Weathers, Maibach & Nisbet, 2017; Whitmarsh, O’Neill & Lorenzoni, 2013). While foregrounding more engaging ‘intrinsic’ (or biocentric) human values (see Crompton & Smith, 2015; Grouzet et al., 2005; Lakoff, 2010; Schwartz, 1994), like equality, harmony, mutual dependence or humility, as means and goals, the Biocentric Subframes do not necessarily or fully exclude other (more ‘extrinsic’ / anthropocentric) types of values (e.g. Dryzek, 1997; Larson, 2011; Shiva, 1988, 1993; Stibbe, 2015; Verhagen, 2008). As such, they show openness towards – and may resonate with – large groups of humans, highlighting that the answer to climate change does not lie in one small set of ‘superior’ or ‘rational’ values but rather in the interaction of views (e.g. De Lucia, 2009; Pepermans, 2015; Pepermans & Maesele, 2014; Sen, 1999, 2009; Shiva, 1988, 1993).

Concluding, conceptual and empirical framing – in particular, the multimodal framing of issues like climate change – is still a heterogeneous field in development (e.g. Entman, 1991; 2004; Reese, 2007; Tankard, 2001). I hope that this research may contribute to its development and enhancement. I believe, more specifically, that this study may constitute a first step towards a more comprehensive and developed set of multimodal frames (and frame matrices). The frames provided allow for reiteration. As such, they may help to inform the framing research regarding climate change communication, and beyond. Indeed, (some of) the provided (cultural) frames (Van Gorp, 2006, 2007) may also appear in debates on other topics and issues, like air pollution, animal rights, migration, economic crises or mental health.⁶⁵ Besides, the underlying Anthropocentric and Biocentric Masterframes are likely to be found in the context of other frames as well, which I have not identified here. As such, the provided masterframes

⁶⁵ I have tested the applicability of (some of) my (sub)frames in other contexts based on a case study on mental health reporting.

might be of particular interest to other researchers conducting framing research. It may, for example, be highly instructive to compare the prevalence of the Anthropocentric and Biocentric Masterframes across outlets and/or throughout time. However, analysing discussions on the level of frames or subframes is equally valuable. Synchronic and/or diachronic follow-up studies concerned with the frame level may tell us a lot about the differential / evolving dominance of different topics of concern and particular argumentations across time and space. Looking at discussions on the level of the subframes may make the interaction between particular topics of concern and the more fundamental ideological motives or positionalities graspable. It may demonstrate, for instance, that Consumer Rights and Scala Naturae are used by different groups to argue for similar ideals (i.e. the reform of society for the sake of human). But it might also reveal that various groups use the same frame, for instance Cycles of Nature, to argue for oppositional interests and values.

Nevertheless, being based on a relatively limited corpus collected in one western European country, my findings ought to be tested further, by other researchers, from other cultural and academic backgrounds, looking at different topics and issues. After all, framing is a dynamic process, with frames taking shape across time, media outlets, topics, texts. Hence, looking at as many cases as possible will provide a fuller image of the frames I presented here. Besides, different contexts may allow for other culturally available frames, which did not emerge from my corpus (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). Also, follow-up research may help to make the Gaia Subframe more (empirically) solid or to fill out other (apparent) gaps in my frame set. For instance, it remains unclear whether biocentric realizations of the Economic Challenge Frame are in circulation and how exactly we can summarize their underlying argumentations. Also, the interpretations of each researcher may differ from those of others, and of the audience (see positionality (Pulido & Peña, 1998; Taylor, 2000)). Thus, further research may help to contextualize my findings or put them in perspective. Summarizing, I hope that the assessment, application and testing of my frame set by others in different contexts may help to further develop, improve and expand it or repeal and redress it where necessary.

Original Dutch Quotes

[1] “Elk jaar halen we meer uit de grond, stoten we meer CO₂ uit en verbruiken we meer energie.”

[2] “(...) alle energie wordt opgewekt door windturbines, hydraulische pompen en zonnepanelen.”

[3] “Wetenschappelijk en juridisch onderzoek toont al jaren dat de klimaatverandering veroorzaakt wordt door de mens, levensbedreigend is en tot mensenrechtenschendingen zal leiden, ook in Nederland en België.”

[4] “Wij vervuilen en zij betalen de prijs.”

[5] “(...) de industrielanden- hebben de verantwoordelijkheid om adaptatie in de ontwikkelingslanden te steunen.”

[6] “(...) onafhankelijkheid van de olielanden en kernenergie ook de creatie van tienduizenden banen (...).”

[7] “Er valt veel geld te verdienen”, zegt Michael Liebrich, ceo van Bloomberg New Energy Finance.”

5 Framing Human-Human and Human-Nature Injustices: Two Case Studies

In Chapter 4, I have provided a conceptual overview of all the frames, the ideologically coloured subframes and the overarching masterframes which I identified in my corpus of Flemish mainstream and alternative media articles. As such, the chapter already illustrated the ideological anthropocentric-biocentric fault lines underlying climate change frames. Accordingly, I pointed out the strong (ideological) differences that exist within the context of frames and the remarkable similarities across various frames. In the current chapter, I will discuss two frames in more detail. Both explicitly foreground injustice as central topic of concern: Environmental Justice and Cycles of Nature. Injustice is key to thoroughly understanding climate change and to addressing it more effectively; (in)justice and (in)equality are also the main subjects at stake in processes of depoliticization and politicization. Section 5.1 (Reversed Positionality, Reversed Reality? The Multimodal Environmental Justice Frame in Mainstream and Alternative Media) will provide a more in-depth discussion of the Environmental Justice Frame. It will show exactly how various ideologically coloured realizations of the frame take shape and interact, in the visual and verbal parts of multiple articles (rather than in individual case study articles as in Chapter 4). In section 5.2 (Fighting Carbon Dioxide or Fighting Human? The Ideological Fault Lines Underlying Two Climate Change Frames) I will provide a comparison of the Environmental Justice and Cycles of Nature Frames. Throughout the analyses, I will elaborate further on the fundamental entanglement of injustices toward humans, on the one hand, and nature, on the other. I will problematize, in particular, the unequal standards of justice and equality adopted toward humans and non-humans, even in the context of the Biocentric Subframes.

5.1 Reversed Positionality, Reversed Reality? The Multimodal Environmental Justice Frame in Mainstream and Alternative Media⁶⁶

5.1.1 Introduction

Sea level rise threatening small island states, typhoon Haiyan hitting the Philippines, droughts affecting central Africa. Ecological degradation is often intertwined with socio-economic inequity (e.g. Agyeman, Bullard & Evans, 2002; Alexander, 2007; Rees & Westra, 2003; Shiva, 1988, 1993). As the most pressing environmental problem of this age, climate change (IPCC, 2014a, 2014b) has the potential to raise awareness for such environmental injustices. Environmental injustice may be defined as some groups in society suffering earlier and more severely from the consequences of climate change than

⁶⁶ A more concise version of this chapter is available as journal article: Moernaut, R., Mast, J., & Pepermans, Y. (2017). Reversed Positionality, Reversed Reality? The Multimodal Environmental Justice Frame in Mainstream and Alternative Media. *The International Communication Gazette*. Doi: 10.1177/1748048517745258.

others because they are more sensitive and/or are not able to cope. They belong to certain socio-economic, gender, ethnic and/or cultural groups (e.g. lower socio-economic classes, women, non-whites...), mostly – but not exclusively – in the Global South. That is, they partly belong to the subsistence class. Other groups, however, bear a large part of the responsibility for the problems. They mainly consist of the (elite, male, white...) consumer class living in the dominant global regions (the West), as well as the westernized elite groups in the South⁶⁷ (Adamson, 2014; Agyeman, Bullard & Evans, 2002; Huggan & Tiffin, 2015; IPCC, 2014a, 2014b; Kasperson & Kasperson, 2001; Rees & Westra, 2003; Shiva, 1988, 1993; Taylor, 2000).⁶⁸

The ways in which people think and talk about environmental justice may, however, differ depending on their socio-economic position, cultural background, racial identity, gender, life experiences or beliefs (e.g. De Lucia, 2009; Hulme, 2009; Sen, 1999, 2009), or, in short, their ‘positionality’ (Pulido & Peña, 1998; Taylor, 2000). The main groups which put environmental justice on the (inter)national agenda consist of elites such as (western(ized)) politicians, experts, corporate organizations and NGOs. They mainly (re)produce the hegemonic (i.e. dominant) ‘Euro-American anthropocentric perspective’. Highlighting economic growth and (the right to) develop(ment) or the superiority of (western) humans, this view clearly caters to their interests (e.g. Alexander, 2007; Bankoff, 2001; De Lucia, 2009; Greenberg, Knight & Westersund, 2011; Huggan & Tiffin, 2015; Rees & Westra, 2003; Roosvall & Tegelberg, 2015; Shiva, 1988, 1993). This same thinking is, however, also the main cause of many socio-environmental problems (Grunberg, 2016). Accordingly, Scandrett, Crowther and McGregor (2012) highlight that a top-down outlook on the issue only serves “(...) to deliver to subaltern interests without threatening vested power bases” (p.280). That is, only the claims that comply to the hegemonic thinking are legitimated while other claims are delegitimized and are not allowed to be part of the debate. Similarly, Shiva (1998, p.46) contends:

As long as this paradigm with its assumptions of linear progress prevails, 'environmentalism' and 'feminism' independently ask only for concessions *within* maldevelopment, because in the absence of oppositional categories, that is the only 'development' that is conceivable. Environmentalism then becomes a new patriarchal project of technological fixes and political oppression. It generates a new subjugation of ecological movements and fails to make any progress towards sustainability and equity. (*italic in original*)

(see Farbotko, 2005; Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993; Gitlin, 1980; Takahashi & Meisner, 2012, 2013). Summarizing, by depoliticizing the issue, a democratic discussion of the hegemonic model and possible

⁶⁷ To keep my discussion sufficiently comprehensive, I will use the homogenizing labels ‘the West’ and ‘the South’ to refer to these two groups. As discussed, however, the former also includes the ‘westernized’ elites in the South, while the latter also comprises the affected (‘lacking’) groups in the West.

⁶⁸ See also: Adamson, Evans and Stein (2015), Cameron (2012), Čapek (1993), De Lucia (2009), de Onís (2012), Kurtz (2003), McLaren (2003), Philips and Sexton (1999), Sen (1999, 2009), Sze and London (2008).

alternatives is precluded (Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Mouffe, 2005; Pepermans, 2015; Pepermans & Maesele, 2014; Swyngedouw, 2010).

Media have the potency to influence politics and public opinion, strongly defining the boundaries of the debate (e.g. Scott, 2014; Spence, Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2012). Visuals, in particular, have been shown to be highly pervasive: They are, among others, likely to enhance information acquisition and memory or to evoke (strong) emotions and engagement (e.g. Abraham & Appiah, 2006; Geise & Baden, 2015; Graber, 1988; Spence & Pidgeon, 2010). Yet, mainstream media mainly reproduce the dominant top-down perspective on environmental justice (Doulton & Brown, 2009; Dreher & Voyer, 2015; Farbotko, 2005; Manzo, 2010b; Roosvall & Tegelberg, 2012, 2013; Vihersalo, 2008). This can, at least partly, be explained by the privileged access of elite claims-makers (Farbotko, 2005; Gans, 1979, 2004; Gitlin, 1980; Shoemaker & Reese, 2014; Roosvall & Tegelberg, 2012, 2013, 2015). Alternative media, however, are more likely to reinforce the bottom-up voices of counter-movements or grassroots groups, who are often silenced in the mainstream debate (e.g. Atton, 2002, 2003; Downing, 2001, 2003; Groshek & Han, 2011; Harcup, 2003, 2014). One may therefore expect alternative media to reflect alternative (biocentric) views and values like equality, harmony, mutual dependence or human moderation (e.g. Shiva, 1988, 1993; Verhagen, 2008) more frequently, although this may not be necessarily so (e.g. Brand & Brunnengräber, 2012; Gunster, 2011, 2012; Hopke, 2012; Pepermans, 2015) (see 4.5.4 Quantitative Overview). This may help to politicize the debate and allow for discussions among various positionalities (Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Mouffe, 2005; Pepermans, 2015; Pepermans & Maesele, 2014; Swyngedouw, 2010). This is considered to be crucial for more effectively addressing climate change and environmental justice (e.g. De Lucia, 2009; Fraser, 2005; Sen, 1999, 2009; Shiva, 1988, 1993). Yet, as Roosvall and Tegelberg (2015) point out, only when mainstream media legitimate these alternative views can a broader audience be reached.

The number of studies that address (certain aspects) of environmental justice media representations have been growing over the last decade (e.g. Billett, 2010; de Onís, 2012; Doulton & Brown, 2009; Dreher & Voyer, 2015; Farbotko, 2006; Jia et al., 2011; Manzo, 2010b; Martello, 2008; Roosvall & Tegelberg, 2012, 2013; Schmidt & Schäfer, 2015; Takahashi & Meisner, 2012, 2013; Vihersalo, 2008; Weik von Mossner, 2011). Yet, they still show limitations. Firstly, most are too partial, providing rather general descriptions of some aspects of the environmental justice discourse. For instance, Dreher and Voyer (2015) problematize the hegemonic framing of Tuvaluans while de Onís (2012) sheds light on the role of the metaphor ‘Looking Both Ways’ in a document on reproductive justice. Roosvall and Tegelberg (2012, 2013) criticize the ‘misframing’ (see Fraser, 2005) of indigenous people as passive victims – victim-witnesses at most – who are allowed to ask for redistribution at most (see Dreher & Voyer, 2015; Farbotko, 2006; Vihersalo, 2008). Although such studies provide interesting contributions, their rather loose sets of findings prevent a fuller understanding of the matter. Framing may allow for more

structured and comprehensive insights (Entman, 1991, 2004; Van Gorp, 2006, 2007). The “(...) crucial importance of framing to every question of social justice” (Fraser, 2005, p.77) seems to make the concept particularly fit for addressing environmental justice. Yet, to the best of my knowledge, no qualitative framework showing exactly how the Environmental Justice Frame takes shape in the media has yet been developed.

Secondly, the available research largely disregards the role of visuals in the communication of environmental justice (apart from some occasional references in, among others, Manzo (2010a, 2010b), Martello (2008) or Roosvall and Tegelberg (2012, 2013)). The ‘visual framing’ study of Borah (2009) (see also Borah & Bulla, 2006), which is concerned with the media representations of Hurricane Katrina (2005) and the Indian Ocean Tsunami (2004), provides some interesting insights, but is only loosely related to the environmental justice issue. Besides, the rather thematic frames fail to highlight underlying argumentations, let alone worldviews (see Carragee & Roefs, 2004; Entman, 1991, 1993, 2004; Van Gorp, 2006, 2007). This reflects the more general lack of visual and, particularly, multimodal (framing) research in media and communication studies (see Chapter 2). However, the separation of the visual and verbal is likely to limit our understanding of media events: The two modes – each with their own affordances or limitations – always work in tandem, conveying messages that would be unattainable in a single mode (e.g. Coleman, 2010; Geise & Baden, 2015). My research aims, therefore, to contribute to the development, and particularly the application (i.e. illustration), of a multimodal framing method (see 2.3.1 Framing and the Special Attributes of the Visual).

Finally, as Roosvall and Tegelberg (2015) claim, the status and interaction of bottom-up and top-down perspectives across various media outlets has not sufficiently been addressed in empirical media research (see Pulido & Peña, 1998; Taylor, 2000). Exceptions are Cameron (2011), Hopke (2012), Roosvall and Tegelberg (2013) or Weik von Mossner (2011). Probably, that is largely due to the fact that most framing studies are concerned with mainstream media. However, only by taking a broader range of sources into account, one might be able to draw a more comprehensive picture of the frames which are currently made available by the media. Besides, by exposing oneself to different ways of seeing the world, one has a better chance to identify the dominant assumptions (i.e. the dominant frames) one lives by – and which determine his / her framing (analyses) – and to take a more critical distance (Bankoff, 2001; Gunster, 2012; Hertog & McLeod, 2001; Shiva, 1988). Thus, by introducing the concept of (hegemonic and counter-hegemonic) subframes, my research will also attend to ideological diversity, in mainstream and alternative media. This may shed more light on the – assumed – ability of the latter to facilitate democratic debate and the exchange of ideas (e.g. Brulle, 2010; Groshek & Han, 2011; Gunster, 2012; Harcup, 2012; Jacobson, 2016).

By comparing three mainstream newspapers and the two major (online) alternative news outlets in Flanders, I will attempt to provide answers to the following research questions:

- (1) How do two oppositional socio-environmental paradigms – anthropocentrism and biocentrism – visually and verbally take shape in the Environmental Justice Frame?
 - a. How do these subframes relate to one another?
- (2) What is the status – and what are the potential implications – of both subframes in mainstream and alternative media?
 - b. To what extent do the alternative media (and, more specifically, the alternative subframe) allow for politicization?

5.1.2 Socio-Environmental Paradigms

The views and actions of western(ized) humans vis-à-vis nature and other groups in society, who are considered to be less developed and closer to nature, are guided by the same paradigm: Euro-American anthropocentrism (Alexander, 2007; Huggan & Tiffin, 2015). This highlights values as (technological-economic) development and growth, utilitarianism, individualism, competition, hierarchy and human-nature dualisms (Dryzek, 1997; Hopwood, Mellor & O'Brien, 2005; Shanahan & McComas, 1999; Shepard, 2015; Shiva, 1988, 1993; Stibbe, 2005, 2015; Unmüßig, Sachs & Fatheuer, 2012; Verhagen, 2008).⁶⁹ The paradigm is, however, increasingly criticized, as it is based on the exploitation of nature and certain human groups: (unlimited) development and growth in some areas and among some groups cannot but happen at the expense of other areas and other groups. That is clearly illustrated by the climate issue: the climate consequences caused by the (historical) disproportionate emissions of GHG by the (elites in) industrialized countries are already, most severely, experienced by others (in the Global South). Similarly, PCs, laptops or cell phones from the West are dumped on African 'electronic graveyards'. International companies prosper thanks to the exploitation of under-paid workers or the mining of natural resources in the South. In short, development in one time-space usually has (un)expected or (un)intended side-effects in other time-spaces (e.g. Agyeman & Evans, 2004; Bankoff, 2001; Grunwald, 2016; Huggan & Tiffin, 2015; IPCC, 2014a, 2014b; Kasperson & Kasperson, 2001; McLaren, 2003; Rees & Westra, 2003; Shiva, 1988, 1993; Taylor, 2000; Toll et al., 2004). Unmüßig, Sachs and Fatheuer (2012) summarize, accordingly:

Economic growth often has cannibalistic features: it devours the natural environment as well as the people, spewing out wastes and emissions of all sorts in the process. The shiny side of development has a shadow side of displacement and dispossession. This is why economic growth regularly produces poverty as well as wealth (p.44).

If the destructive consequences of the (western) growth paradigm are recognized, however, they are mostly considered as unfortunate side-effects ('collateral damage') – which can be rectified through further development – rather than structural problems, which call the fundamentals of the capitalist market

⁶⁹ See also: Adamson (2014), Prelli and Winters (2009), Larson (2011), Rees and Westra (2003), Remillard (2011), Ritchie and Thomas (2015).

thinking into question (Dryzek, 1997; Grunwald, 2016; Hopwood, Mellor & O'Brien, 2005; Unmüßig, Sachs and Fatheuer, 2012). Nevertheless, it has been generally accepted now that any viable and acceptable response to climate change must recognize equity and justice as crucial considerations. Industrialized countries are called upon to mitigate their emissions and help the most vulnerable, 'underdeveloped' groups to adapt (Bankoff, 2001; Baer et al., 2000; Dalhgren & Chakrapani, 1982; De Lucia, 2009; Shiva, 1988, 1993). After all, climate change is considered as a(n extra) threat to the development of the latter. The (European) ecomodernist view, for instance, accepts some limitations to growth in the Global West, but emphasizes the need for the 'underdeveloped' Global South to further develop as this will help to solve the socio-environmental problems. The IPCC (2014a, 2014b) reports emphasize the need for technological development (e.g. renewable energy), social interventions (e.g. education), poverty alleviation (e.g. insurance schemes) or land-use planning (e.g. providing adequate housing), especially for the most vulnerable groups (see Baer et al., 2000; De Lucia, 2009; Endres, 2012; Vihersalo, 2008).

Several (non-hegemonic) voices (e.g. Adamson, 2014; Alexander, 2007; De Lucia, 2009; Huggan & Tiffin, 2014; Lohmann, 2008; Rees & Westra, 2003; Roos & Hunt, 2010; Sen, 1999, 2009; Shiva, 1988, 1993), however, take this criticism a few steps further, arguing that the socio-environmental views which originate in the context of the top-down anthropocentric thinking, prevent us from seeing, let alone addressing, the actual issues of (climate) injustice and inequality. While they (seem to) provide solutions (Roos & Hunt, 2010), they reproduce, naturalize or even exacerbate the inequalities among humans (and humans and nature). After all, the exploitation of 'inferior' groups is exactly what keeps this capitalist market system running. The acting is, however, largely justified and rationalized by depicting western humans as offering the 'gift of civilization' to the 'underdeveloped, poverty-stricken, disaster-prone and/or disease-ridden others' (Alexander, 2007; Bankoff, 2001; Dalhgren & Chakrapani, 1982; Huggan & Tiffin, 2015; Scott, 2014). Accordingly, many – well-intended – (climate change) aid programmes, western development missions, as well as globalization, today are not so different from colonialism or imperialism in the past. All these endeavours are guided by the belief that development towards the 'superior' western model must be equally distributed among all people and regions: This will increase human well-being, alleviate poverty and reverse environmental degradation. Conversely, the 'superior' groups have little interest in the knowledge that the local people might have to offer.

Clearly, however, the transfer of money, knowledge or technology is not neutral. It is considered to reproduce hierarchical relations, forcing non-western(ized) groups to become part of a global liberal market based on inequality while destroying (access to) nature and livelihoods (economic / material maldistribution), local knowledge (cultural misrecognition) or democracy (political misrepresentation or procedural injustice) (Beck, 2000; Čapek, 1993; Fraser, 2000, 2005; Kasperson & Kasperson, 2001; Sze & London, 2008). Indeed, as Norton (2014) summarizes, no hierarchy is possible without violence.

For example, ‘developed countries’ help ‘developing countries’ to mitigate and adapt by providing them, among others, with large-scale hydraulic dams, (alien) fast growing trees or (genetically modified) crops. However, they overlook that these may actually threaten livelihoods or ecosystems, including (sustainable) relations of co-existence between nature and local people. (Certain) emergency aid missions which rush in after (climate) disasters to aid the victims, may ignore and jeopardize local traditions, knowledge or social relations. Put differently, they may (partly) destruct local resilience and increase the need for external help (i.e. they confirm the superiority of the global West and the dependence of the global South). In a similar vein, subsistence classes who are considered as ‘poor’ from a western(ized) perspective are provided with ‘more developed types of housing’. However, these might actually be inferior to the traditional houses, which are better adapted to the local climatic and environmental conditions. During international climate conferences the debates regarding, among others, justice and climate aid, take place among the representatives of (elite) nations, transnational corporations and international organizations. Non-territorial or extra-territorial voices like grassroots groups or ethnic minorities (or their representatives) are consulted, but are usually not recognized as equal contributors who can ‘author first order claims’ (Fraser, 2005). Besides, a heavy dependence on (‘neutral, scientific’) jargon from the part of the ‘elite experts’ also prevents those who do not share this language to fully partake in the debate (e.g. Adamson, Evans & Stein, 2015; Bankoff, 2001; Endres, 2012; Fraser, 2000, 2005; De Lucia, 2009; Huggan & Tiffin, 2015; Lohmann, 2008; Rees & Westra, 2003; Roosvall & Tegelberg, 2012, 2013, 2015; Sen, 1999, 2009).⁷⁰ Clearly, environmental justice is not a clear-cut (scientific / technocratic) problem, but a multi-level problem that connects several injustices and is structurally related to global capitalism. Thus, as de Onís (2012) argues, we need to look in several directions, rather than one direction if we want to fully understand environmental justice.

Therefore, Shiva (1993) contends that the western monoculture (i.e. the accepted ‘consensus’ view) must be replaced by cultural (and natural) pluralism (Alexander, 2007; de Onís, 2012; Fraser, 2005; Scandrett, Crowther & McGregor, 2012). This may allow the affected groups to contribute to the democratic debate and decide how development will look like for them, based on their contexts (Sen, 1999, 2009) *and* on “(...) thought and action which make survival possible, and which therefore make justice and peace possible” (Shiva, 1988, p.xvii). This is reminiscent of the discussion of Pulido and Peña (1998) and Taylor (2000) who point out that one’s positionality strongly defines how one thinks and talks about environmental issues, including justice. Similarly, De Lucia (2009) concludes that (the western ideal of) justice cannot be exported and argues that so-called ‘Universal Justice’ (i.e. redistribution, and thus the right to develop) must be replaced by a diversity of locally defined justices. Being recognized as equal, they could interact and inform each other. In other words, facilitated by

⁷⁰ See also: Adamson (2014), Alexander (2007), Brulle (2010), Cameron (2012), Grunwald (2016), Hopke (2012), Hendry (2010), Huggan and Tiffin (2015), Remillard (2011), Roos and Hunt (2010), Smith (2007), Sze and London (2008), Unmüßig, Sachs and Fatheuer (2012).

processes of (status) recognition and representation (next to redistribution) (Fraser, 2000, 2005), the debate must be injected with more biocentric values, such as equality, mutual interconnectedness, respect, cooperation and diversity (e.g. Adamson, 2014; Beck, 2000; Dryzek, 1997; Hopkins, 2008; Hopwood, Mellor & O'Brien, 2005; Naess, 1973; Shiva, 1988, 1993; Stibbe, 2015; Verhagen, 2008).⁷¹ These are both means as well as goals of change (Brulle, 2010) and may help to address the socio-environmental problems more effectively than separation and hierarchy (see Norton, 2014). Summarizing, there can be no real justice without true democratic debate (see also Agyeman, Bullard & Evans, 2002; Agyeman & Evans, 2004; Bankoff, 2001; Brulle, 2010; Cameron, 2011; Endres, 2012; Hopwood, Mellor & O'Brien, 2005; Hulme, 2009; Roos & Hunt, 2010; Rees & Westra, 2003; Sen, 1999, 2009; Taylor, 2000).

Various local traditions and experiences feed into this (alternative) 'environmental justice paradigm' (Benford & Snow, 2000; Čapek, 1993; Taylor, 2000). This gives rise to more diversity than the above may suggest. Smith (2007) discusses, for instance, the African-American environmental thought, which has strongly contributed to the paradigm (Agyeman, Bullard & Evans, 2002; Roos & Hunt, 2010). This non-anthropocentric tradition highlights (inter-human) equality, the sacredness of Mother Earth and the need for sustainable human action. Yet, having emerged from a Christian tradition, it also depicts humans as stewards, responsible for giving meaning to and modifying nature to make it an appropriate home for their communities (see 'Green Rationalism' (Dryzek, 1997)). I do acknowledge the diversity within the non-anthropocentric view. The limited scope of this chapter prevents me, however, from discussing this to a greater extent.

5.1.3 Mainstream and Alternative Framing

I have extensively defined framing in Chapter 2 (2.2 Defining Frames and Framing). Drawing on authors like Entman (1991, 1993, 2004), Gamson (1989, 1992), Gamson and Modigliani (1989), Stibbe (2015), Tankard (2001) and Van Gorp (2006, 2007), I argued that a frame is an immanent structuring idea which gives coherence and meaning to a text. Framing, then, is applying a particular frame to structure an area of life: It involves selecting, omitting, expanding and giving salience to certain aspects of a perceived reality in a text, providing context and suggesting a particular problem definition, causal responsibility, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation to the audience. Frames always help to naturalize or reproduce ideologies.

In Chapter 3 (3.1.2 Alternative Media) I argued that mainstream and alternative media have differing positionalities (Pulido & Peña, 1998; Taylor, 2000). Mainstream media tend to have a top-down positionality, while alternative media are rather bottom-up, in terms of their position in the broader

⁷¹ See also: Larson (2011), Remillard (2011), Roos and Hunt (2010), Shanahan and McComas (1999), Shepard (2015), Unmüßig, Sachs and Fatheuer (2012).

(political, economic, cultural) context, their content, and their production process (e.g. Atton, 2002, 2003; Downing, 2001, 2003; Harcup, 2003, 2014). Depending on their positionality, media are likely to promote different types of (sub)frames (see 4.5.4 Quantitative Overview): It is more likely for alternative media than for mainstream media to promote counter-hegemonic ideologies. Yet, that does not preclude the possibility that they may also reproduce hegemonic views or that mainstream outlets employ alternative subframes (Brand & Brunnengräber, 2012; Doulton & Brown, 2009; Farbotko, 2005; Gunster, 2011, 2012; Hopke, 2012; Pepermans, 2015; Schmidt & Schäfer, 2015; Viheralo, 2008).

5.1.4 Research Design

The research design which I discussed in Chapter 4 is also applicable here. Inspired by the methodology presented by Van Gorp (2006, 2007), I conducted an inductive-deductive qualitative framing analysis (see Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Glaser & Strauss, 1968) on a corpus of 1.256 climate change news articles from three mainstream and two alternative news outlets in Flanders. For this chapter, however, I separated the articles applying a dominant Environmental Justice Frame (n=262) from the rest of the corpus after finalizing the whole analysis. Drawing on the frame matrices which I had compiled (see Chapter 4), Yves Pepermans, a colleague from the University of Antwerp with a background in environmental (media) communication, coded 28 percent of these articles in a deductive-qualitative way. Methods, frames and results were discussed during intervision moments. The test result (Krippendorff's $\alpha = 0.97$) indicated a high level of agreement (Hayes and Krippendorff, 2007).

5.1.5 Results

The underlying narrative, or the central organizing idea, of the Environmental Justice Frame can be summarized as follows: Some (socio-economic, cultural, ethnic, gender...) groups in society are disproportionately vulnerable to climate change consequences (problem). A major responsibility for these problems lies with the most powerful and rich groups in society (cause). Mitigation and/or adaptation will need to provide solutions. This is the storyline both subframes share. Yet, each adds a distinctive (ideologically coloured) narrative layer.

The names I propose for the Environmental Justice Subframes are my best attempt to capture their central organizing ideas. The (hegemonic / anthropocentric) 'Unequal Vulnerability' Subframe emphasizes the *internal vulnerability* of the victims (problem) to human-induced climate change (cause), hence calling for the *external intervention* of the 'western(ized) hero' (solution). Similar argumentations are – partly – identified by, among others, Doulton and Brown (2009) ('potential catastrophe' discourse), Viheralo (2008) ('climate change as a problem of vulnerability' and 'climate change as a problem of greenhouse gas emissions' frames), Schmidt and Schäfer (2015) ('international solidarity in an unequal world' frame) or Dreher and Voyer (2015) ('proof', 'victims' and 'refugees'

frames). The (counter-hegemonic / biocentric) ‘Unequal Attribution’ Environmental Justice Subframe, however, foregrounds the unjust attribution and/or deconstruction of common goods by elite groups as an *external pressure* (cause) that strongly harms the *internal resilience* of others in society (problem); yet, the latter is key to addressing climate change (solution) (see, among others, Dreher & Voyer, 2015; Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012; Manzo, 2010b; Pepermans, 2015).

5.1.5.1 Hegemonic and Counter-hegemonic Narrators

The mainstream outlets, which produce most Unequal Vulnerability Subframes, mainly work with a rather small pool of (western) professional journalists. The alternative outlets, which have most counter-hegemonic frames, publish more articles written by (local) (western or southern) citizen journalists or opinion makers, who often show familiarity with local situations and/or have extensive grassroots networks. They act as activist journalists (Atton, 2002; Downing, 2003) or moral journalists (Wiesslitz & Ashuri, 2011), who try to shed light on, and denounce, unjust situations in which they are involved themselves or which they have witnessed (see 4.5.4 Quantitative Overview). Accordingly, the mainstream subframe mainly focuses on top-down sources, such as western officials, scientists, or NGOs, who are visually / verbally depicted as legitimate and trustworthy (Farbotko, 2005; Roosvall & Tegelberg, 2012, 2013, 2015; Takahashi & Meisner, 2012). The bottom-up sources (mostly southern elites or prominent leaders like Yeb Saño, the climate negotiator for the Philippines (e.g. HLN, 13/11/2013, p.2)) are scarce and, if present, usually function as secondary (less salient / less legitimate) sources and/or ‘victim-witnesses’ rather than as equal participants in the debate (Roosvall & Tegelberg, 2013). Besides, they do generally not provide us with a different perspective. As Farbotko (2005) argues, affected people often mimic the discourse of other groups in order to be heard or they are only allowed to do so by the media (see also Bankoff, 2001; Beck, 2000; Billett, 2010; Entman & Rojecki, 1993; Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012; Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993; Gitlin, 1980; Takahashi & Meisner, 2012). For instance, they often exclusively ask for redistribution (De Lucia, 2009; Roosvall & Tegelberg, 2013). Therefore, Roosvall and Tegelberg (2015) contend that mainstream media reproduce injustice, preventing alternative voices from truly challenging the forces which oppress them (Fraser, 2000, 2005). Unequal Attribution, however, does amplify and legitimate the voices of a diversity of counter-hegemonic sources, including ordinary citizens, grassroots movements, local officials and experts. These sources tend to position themselves more often as resilient ‘victim-heroes’ (Roosvall & Tegelberg, 2013), telling different stories from those provided by the ‘victim-witnesses’ above (Dreher & Voyer, 2015; Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012; Figenschou, 2011; Martello, 2008; Sen, 1999, 2009; Weik von Mossner, 2011). The top-down perspective is present as well, especially in mainstream media accounts. Western NGOs and other intermediaries, who speak on behalf of the locals, also act as legitimated sources. Their stories are, however, far more inspired by the bottom-up perspective than the ones they (are allowed to) tell in the context of the mainstream subframe (see Brulle, 2010; Eliasoph,

1988; Greenberg, Knight & Westersund, 2011; Groshek & Han, 2011; Gunster, 2011, 2012; Hopke, 2012; Harcup, 2014).

I will now focus on each of the reasoning devices separately and highlight how each takes shape in the frame and in the two subframes.

5.1.5.2 Causal Responsibility

Both subframes depict responsibility as the interplay of natural forces and human action. Nevertheless, each elaborates on this idea differently.

1) Environmental Justice Frame: Nature as Raging Actor. On a first level, the underlying narrative (verbally) highlights climate change, including its consequences and causes (GHG), as a quite independent, but also extraordinary powerful agent (in material processes). It is an out-of-the-ordinary power, which can no longer be considered a normal natural phenomenon (see Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Larson, 2011; Ritchie & Thomas, 2015; Swyngedouw, 2010). Verbal comparisons, exemplars, comparatives and superlatives, numbers or intertextual references help to express this view. The accumulation of such rhetorical and intertextual strategies in the following example (DWM, 11/11/2013) is illustrative:

Haiyan certainly was a very powerful storm. According to meteorologists, Haiyan is number four on the list of the most powerful typhoons ever. It is apparently also the strongest which actually came ashore. Wind blows reached spikes of 380 kilometres an hour. That is much more powerful than Hurricane Katrina, which hit New Orleans in 2005, and powerful enough to crush glass and eradicate trees. [1]

The intertextual reference to Hurricane Katrina can, for instance, be particularly powerful. As a key event it may evoke certain associations, feelings or images (i.e. mental schemata or frames) among the audience about (human) suffering and despair, which – as argued in the text – pale next to the consequences of Haiyan. These may help to reinforce the argumentation of the frame as for the exceptional, almost unimaginable power of the typhoon as a threatening (external) force (see Kepplinger & Habermeier, 1995; Van Gorp, 2006; Zelizer, 2004). This is further reinforced and made salient by the other strategies.

1.1) Unequal Vulnerability Subframe: Sublimation. Only the Unequal Vulnerability Subframe, however, continually conveys this idea of a natural (i.e. largely human-external) agent in the visual mode, rendering it particularly salient (see elaboration). Depictions highlighting devastating consequences, as metonyms for natural causes, are remarkably prevalent (Grittmann, 2014; Hahn, Eide & Ali, 2012). For instance, spectacular air views are often used to show destroyed cities or flooded landscapes, standing for the hurricanes or other climate disasters which caused them. Being mutually interchangeable and reminiscent of previous key events, they may evoke ‘sublimation’ (Chouliaraki, 2006): The focus on

spectacular nature may encourage spectators to gaze at such fascinating ‘tableaux vivants’ from a distance, contemplating the immense consequences of natural disasters. As such, decontextualizing (the causes of) the suffering, they are likely to set aside feelings of responsibility, (self-)efficacy or engagement. Hughes (2012) argues, accordingly, that air views in particular provide us with a “(...) point of view that favours large scale dramatic impacts carrying with them the implication that individual human perspectives in the here and now are irrelevant in the face of such catastrophe” (p.90). Messaris (1997) points out that the timelessness and eternal qualities of the scene put us (largely) outside of it, while Adamson (2014) adds that the focus on spectacular events keeps us from considering, and understanding, the underlying, large-scale causes of injustice. In any case, humans are largely backgrounded as responsible agents (see Cottle, 2000; Dalhgren & Chakrapani, 1982; Doyle, 2007, 2009; Grittmann, 2014; Hansen & Machin, 2008; O’Neill, 2013, 2017; O’Neill et al., 2013; Remillard, 2011).

2) *Environmental Justice Frame: Humans as Underlying Cause*. This sublimation may convey the sense of uncertainty concerning the exact responsibility of western(ized) human in the mainstream debate, or even conceal this responsibility (Doulton & Brown, 2009; Wu, 2009). Nevertheless, throughout their realizations in various articles and outlets, both subframes do not refrain from identifying the agents (fully / partly) responsible for the climatic changes. That is, they do not (completely) deny human responsibility. Frequently identified villains encompass the (collectivized / generalized) ‘developed’ or ‘industrialized countries’, ‘the West’, ‘(inclusive) we’ (i.e. the in-group of the Belgian / western author and his/her readers), or individualized politicians or countries (Billett, 2010; Eide, 2012; Hendry, 2010; Schmidt & Schäfer, 2015; Vihersalo, 2008; Wu, 2009). Thus, while the responsible agent is often collectivized, more individualized scapegoats are frequently singled out. Such individualizations, in particular, may draw the attention away from the bigger picture (e.g. Hart, 2011; Iyengar, 1990; Scott, 2014; van Dijk, 1998). Collectivizations often include the dominant in-group of the audience, which might – but not necessarily does – encourage identification.⁷² On the visual level, this is often reinforced through gazes, facial expressions, and/or pointing (vectors), as metonym for guilt (Catalano & Waugh, 2013), of the depicted victims vis-à-vis the spectator (e.g. MO, 21/01/2014; DWM, 27/02/2014). Also, visual symbols like smoke stacks, as metonyms for (elite) human emissions (Cottle, 2000; Doyle, 2007, 2009; Grittmann, 2014; León & Erviti, 2015; O’Neill, 2013, 2017), are firmly situated in the space-time of the audience through verbal references. ‘Flanders’ (DWM, 08/01/2014) or ‘Canada’ (MO, 29/02/2012) in the title, lead or photo caption, for instance, make this responsibility manifest. Accordingly, the verbal focus lies on material / behavioural processes that emphasize the responsibility of certain social groups for impacting other groups and nature through the prioritizing of *particular*

⁷² According to Jang (2013), people who are faced with information that emphasizes the responsibilities of their in-group, are more likely to attribute climate change to an external, uncontrollable (natural) agent than people who are made aware of the excessive energy use of an out-group.

goals (see Viherala, 2008; Schmidt & Schäfer, 2015). For instance, “The US did not ratify the Kyoto protocol, for fear that it would harm the *economic interests*” (DS, 12/11/2013, p.6) [2] or “(...) the rich industrialized countries have been causing the most severe CO₂ emissions for decennia (...)” (DM, 4/04/2012, p.10) [3]. Summarizing, the emphasis lies on the disproportionate (technological-economic) growth and, accordingly, the GHG emissions caused by particular (dominant) groups in society.

2.1) *Unequal Attribution Subframe: Multi-layered Debt*. However, only Unequal Attribution takes this story of elite responsibility to a deeper level, providing a broader context (Chouliaraki, 2006; Iyengar, 1990; van Dijk, 1998). In these instances, climate change functions mostly as a vehicle to raise awareness for and to denounce the under-lying Euro-American anthropocentrism, which lies at the roots of various, interconnected injustices. As discussed above, climate change is only one of those. In particular, perverse or counterproductive consequences of the modernist (economic-technological) development ideal – loss or damage of, among others, habitats, local knowledge or democracy – are targeted as the main causes of inequality and vulnerability (e.g. Bankoff, 2001; Dalhgren & Chakrapani, 1982; Fraser, 2000, 2005; Grunwald, 2016; Lohmann, 2008; Shiva, 1988, 1993; Unmüßig, Sachs & Fatheuer, 2012). Compared to realizations in the alternative outlet, mainstream realizations of this subframe tend to be less complex, focusing on one or a few underlying injustices (Brand & Brunnengräber, 2012; Doulton & Brown, 2009). For instance, the article “We need to take care that one disaster does not follow another. The ownership of the aid coordination needs to remain for the greater part with the Philippine government” [4] denounces the detrimental consequences of (some types of) emergency aid missions. However, it fails to address the origins of “existing wrong power balances” (e.g. among various socio-economic classes), which are said to be exacerbated by the interventions of aid workers. Unequal Vulnerability Subframes in the alternative outlets, in contrast, are more likely to contextualize such inequalities, discussing, for instance, the westernization of particular (leading) classes or the imperialistic interventions of the Global West. Those encouraged, among others, corruption, economic inequality or civil wars (i.e. the increased vulnerability of certain groups). The following commentary by the chief editor of *MO** is exemplary (MO, 05/01/2014):

In Africa, the precarious balance between the two groups has been radically disturbed by colonial boundaries and national development programmes. Besides, the increasingly visible climate change has further sharpened the opposition and has already caused more than one civil war for essential resources of survival [5].

Again, the responsibility is firmly allocated to the same – often generalized – group of elite agents, like ‘industrialized countries’, ‘the West’ or ‘we’. Sometimes, more specific (individualized) actors are also introduced. Those may include the westernized elites in the South as (secondary) responsible agents. The actors are, however, involved in quite different active (mainly) material processes, such as ‘to rob’, ‘to exploit’, ‘to take advantage’ or ‘to drive away’. The following example highlights, for instance, the destructive actions of the US and Spain (individualization) during colonial times. Those are described

as having (partially) heightened the vulnerability of the Philippines to climatic changes (DWM, 11/11/2013):

The Spanish imposed upon the Filipinos the catholic faith and the feudal system. The US introduced language and culture to shape local, cheap workers as well as more developed production methods such as plantations, mining and limited industrial activity. As such, it could take advantage of the natural richness of the archipelago [6].

In many cases throughout the Unequal Attribution articles, however, broader processes (i.e. the system) are targeted rather than (individual) human actors (see also nominalizations or personifications). For instance, “Debts which should have been forgiven years ago, abridge the capacities of the Philippines to prepare for future emergency situations” (MO, 24/12/2013) [7]. Although clearly depicted as a creation of the western(ized) elites (in this case the corrupt leader Ferdinand Marcos, who was an ally of the West during the Cold War), these non-human agents may give rise to dehumanization and generalization. I argue, therefore, that identification with the (‘top-down’) group which the ‘western’ audience belongs to, may go hand in hand with – and be moderated by – distancing or ‘othering’ (strategies) (Chouliaraki, 2006; Dalhgren & Chakrapani, 1982; Scott, 2014). Likewise, the comparing of human and nature in various articles may encourage the audience to take some distance from their in-group: (Western(ized)) humans, deliberately acting in their own interest, are described as equally devastating as, or even worse than, natural forces. After all, the latter are always accidental and never target one particular group or deliberately create injustice (see Weik von Mossner, 2011). This confrontation with (elite) human as a ‘conscious criminal’, committing crimes against humanity, may encourage the (elite) audience to take a more critical and distant outlook on their own acting. We are, after all, inclined to associate the ‘negative’ with the ‘out-group’ rather than with ourselves (e.g. Dalhgren & Chakrapani, 1982; Scott, 2014; van Dijk, 1998). Consider, for instance, the use of metaphor and simile in the following examples, introducing the idea of the ‘human predator’ responsible for fundamental (social) “breakdowns” (DM, 13/11/2013, p.31, subheading): “The same prosperous West carries a heavy responsibility. It could only grow by sucking out the colonies like a parasite, till nothing was left” (DWM, 11/11/2013) [8]; “Just like the typhoon, which raged through the country, a second wave will hit the Philippines soon: the wave of international emergency aid” (DM, 13/11/2013, p.31) [9] (metaphor). The latter, in particular, may help to reveal the mainstream ideals of certain types of ‘charity’ or ‘aid’ as hegemonic semantic reversals: western help’ renders the ‘South’ more dependent and helpless, supporting the hegemonic narrative and interests (Heuberger, 2007; Stibbe, 2015). In this case, the flood of unorganized ‘western help’ is said to disrupt local networks and social relations (Bankoff, 2001; Dalhgren & Chakrapani, 1982; Cameron, 2012; Lohmann, 2008; Sen, 1999, 2009; Shiva, 1988, 1993).

Due to their abstract character, these ideas are not often visually sustained (i.e. elaborated on), although some exceptions can be found. Those often draw on (multimodal) contrasting. In an article on land

grabbing, for example, two large photographs are juxtaposed. The one on the left depicts a local female farmer (in the centre) in a landscape where the original nature is partially supplanted, and destroyed, by palm plantations (i.e. unsustainable cash cropping resulting in (impoverished) monocultural landscapes). The woman – pouring water in a tub, the bucket hiding her face – may represent (metonym) the small-scale farmers in the region, practicing their profession based on long-standing traditions. This includes the sustainable and harmonious interaction with (diverse) ecosystems. In this picture, for instance, the ‘frozen’ water may function as a vector (see transactive actions) that connects the woman to the tub. The latter is – presumably – part of small-scale irrigation system. A large truck, shown from below, dominates the (centre of) the image at the right-hand side. This may symbolize (metonym) the top-down forces (see western(ized) technological development) which threaten those grassroots traditions as well as the land rights of the local farmers (DM, 07/02/2013, p.12). This argumentation is elaborated on, and extended, in the caption and in the body text of the article (see e.g. Bankoff, 2001; Lohmann, 2008; Rees & Westra 2003; Shiva, 1988, 1993). Note that the black and white colours may suggest a ‘documentary’ type of photography. This may contribute to the trustworthiness – and thus, salience – of the argumentation (Kaml, 2005; Mendelson, 2005).

The criticism of the development thinking voiced throughout the Unequal Attribution Subframe echoes the ‘Principles of Environmental Justice’. This (bottom-up) document, adopted in 1991 by the First People of Colour Environmental Leadership Summit, allows the threatened communities to speak for themselves (in Taylor, 2000). Indeed, several articles contain (implicit) intertextual references to (statements drawing on) this document. The mainstream Unequal Vulnerability Subframe, contrariwise, completely fails to contextualize the destructive acting of the western(ized) elites. As I will discuss in the next section, it presents the disproportionate vulnerability of the ‘South’ as an internal characteristic. Accordingly, the articles reflecting this subframe are more likely to intertextually refer to the (top-down) discourse and rationale of the Kyoto Protocol (1997), Millennium Development Goals (see e.g. Mugambiwa & Tirivangasi, 2017) or the IPCC reports (2014a, 2014b) (see Vihersalo, 2008).

5.1.5.3 Problem Definition

Environmental Justice Frame: The Victim Group is Sensitive and Lacks Coping Abilities.

Unequal Vulnerability Subframe: Internal Defect. Indeed, being deeply entrenched within the mainstream ideology, Unequal Vulnerability fails to provide contextualization (see Cameron, 2012; de Onís, 2012; Hart, 2011; Iyengar, 1990; Takahashi & Meisner, 2012; van Dijk, 1998). Hence, it usually represents the others as internally weak, or at most as victims of circumstances (Bankoff, 2001; Chouliaraki, 2006; Dalhgren & Chakrapani, 1982; Dreher & Voyer, 2015; Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012; Manzo, 2010b; Roosvall & Tegelberg, 2012, 2013, 2015; Schmidt & Schäfer, 2015; Scott, 2014; Vihersalo, 2008). In the process, physical vulnerability is uncritically linked to social, cultural or

political vulnerability (Farbotko, 2005). Identifying names or predications (highlighting what one is or has), like ‘vulnerable’, ‘dependent’, ‘victims’, ‘poor communities’ or ‘affected areas’, are common, as are (synonymous) visuals of wounded, starving or dead people (e.g. DM, 14/11/2013, p.9; DS, 12/11/2013, p.4). As western metaphors for vulnerability, visual (and verbal) depictions of elderly people, women and children stand for the weakness and passivity of the victims as a whole (metonym) (Ali, James & Vultee, 2013; Chouliaraki, 2006; Hahn, Eide & Ali, 2012; Höijer, 2004; Jia et al., 2011; Perlmutter, 1998) (e.g. HLN, 28/09/2013, p.8; DS, 12/11/2013, p.6; MO, 14/11/2013). Manzo (2010a) argues, for example, that the child constitutes an over-determined signifier of global problems. While the stereotypical image may raise compassion, it usually fails to encourage action (see O’Neill, 2017). Höijer (2004) adds, however, that the latter strongly depends on the viewer (e.g. men versus women). Blue colours, a metaphor for passivity according to Huxford (2001), are prevalent too, for instance in long shots of landscapes covered in water. Nevertheless, (verbal) functionalizations (focusing on what one does) also appear once in a while. The most common one, ‘developing countries’, however, only adds to the idea of helplessness: the doing (‘developing’) is here mainly ‘directed towards a superior (western) ideal’, suggesting a current lack, a backward state. Similarly, ‘climate refugee’ also highlights a dependent acting (see Bankoff, 2001; Dalhgren & Chakrapani, 1982; Dreher & Voyer, 2015; Farbotko, 2005; Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012; Scott, 2014).

This focus on passivity may distance the audience from the ‘O/others’, hampering identification (Chouliaraki, 2006). The same goes for generalizing terms such as abstract wordings, uncountable or mass nouns (e.g. ‘the population’, ‘the underdeveloped countries’, ‘the South’), or numbers and percentages (e.g. ‘thousands of people’) (Cameron, 2012; Farbotko, 2005; Scott, 2014). Furthermore, the victims are often referred to as (generic, exclusive) ‘they’. This is congruent with, and amplified by, the visual choices: Stereotypical elements often deprive people of their individuality. Cultural and physiognomic attributes, like traditional garments (e.g. DM, 25/01/2014, p.54), for instance, signal a stereotypical group of others. Fraser (2000, 2005) and Roosvall and Tegelberg (2013) refer in this context to ‘cultural identity recognition’: If there is attention (and respect) for grassroots cultures and traditions, large groups of ‘others’ are understood through (or equated to) generalizing and rather static cultural identities. These do, however, not leave room for individualism, diversity, complexity or change (see Bankoff, 2001; Batziou, 2011; Dalhgren & Chakrapani, 1982; Lester, 2005; Lippmann, 1922; Martello, 2008; Scott, 2014; Sibley & Osborne, 2016; Wright, 2011). Besides, along with their representatives, these traditions and cultures are merely represented as ‘weak’ or ‘under threat’. In other words, it is overlooked that they could supply (potentially) valuable insights in the light of the current climatic changes (e.g. Bankoff, 2001; Shiva, 1988, 1993). Roosvall and Tegelberg (2015) add, for instance, that grassroots groups wearing traditional clothing and performing local dances during climate summits provide the media with interesting visualizations (see the ‘human interest’ news value) of ‘what (or who) is threatened with extinction’ (Hahn, Eide & Ali, 2012). As Fraser (2000) highlights, this

misrecognition by others may also lead to a distorted self-identity by these groups. Further, we often encounter large groups of anonymous or faceless people, connected through similarity, consonance or overlap. These are presented in profile, from a public or social distance and a high angle, hence lacking much detail; that is, of course, if they are represented in the first place (e.g. MO, 26/09/2012). Indeed, depictions often make people entirely invisible, ‘Othering’ them completely (Chouliaraki, 2006; Scott, 2014). In these cases, we usually see a ‘primitive’ or devastated landscape from above (e.g. air views of flooded areas, maps) or from an eye level. The Other is reduced to a dot, while the spectacular replaces contextualization (e.g. DS, 27/11/2013, p.21; MO, 09/03/2012). Put differently, the victims are not located in clearly identifiable, concrete time-spaces which the audience can connect to (or clearly situate in relation to) their own specific time-spaces, and thus their own acting (Borah, 2009; Batziou, 2011; Chouliaraki, 2006; Hansen & Machin, 2008; Huxford, 2001; Lester & Cottle, 2009; Manzo, 2010a, 2010b; Messaris, 1997; O’Neill, 2017; Scott, 2014).

Accordingly, prevalent relational, existential and intransitive behavioural processes in both modes reinforce each other. The former two processes, in particular, reinforce the idea of these groups as merely ‘being’ and/or ‘(not) having’, by allocating the attributes, names or symbolic (metonymic / metaphoric) associations to them which I described above. All processes depict the victims as not or barely interacting with their environments, let alone improving their situation. Visually, we often see people who are just sitting or standing, ‘presenting themselves to the audience’. As said, (world) maps, which help – in interaction with the text – to identify the most vulnerable groups (indicated by dots or colour codes), are prevalent too. We see people aimlessly walking around in devastated landscapes (see analytical and symbolic (suggestive) processes, non-transactional actions). Verbally, we find phrases like ‘they are vulnerable / poor’, ‘they have no means’, ‘the infrastructure is not resistant against climate consequences’, ‘they live in the most vulnerable regions’ or ‘they wait for help’. Even if they interact with their environment in material processes, they merely hold ‘conditional agency’ (Chouliaraki, 2006): the acting (or merely ‘happening’) will not fundamentally change their situation, is involuntary and/or only heightens their vulnerability. For instance, ‘they bury the dead’. A photograph shows a father holding his child in his arms (as vectors). According to the caption, however, the child is deceased (DS, 12/11/2013, p.4). Finally, (verbal) dehumanizing processes (nominalizations, personifications) often completely omit all human actors. That is for instance the case in the following sentence, void of contextualization: “Seventy percent of the cities in the country are situated on the shore of a river or waterway. Extremely poor settlements are expanding in these [vulnerable] regions” (DWM, 26/07/2012) [10]. This may add to the idea of vulnerability as an objective ‘fact’.

Frequently, the *victims* also play a ‘patient’ role (goal, beneficiary or recipient). For instance, “*Some of them* had to wait for days in this storm on the rooftops of their houses to be saved from drowning by helicopters. *Children* were surprised and were dragged along with the powerful stream” (DWM,

12/02/2013) [11] (see Dreher & Voyer, 2015; Farbotko, 2005; Fraser, 2000, 2005; Roosvall & Tegelberg, 2012, 2013, 2015; Scott, 2014). Visually, the lack of gaze (i.e. contact) between the spectator and the depicted victims – in combination with the general lack of vectors – also foregrounds the affected groups as passive others, being watched (offer). Their passivity distances them from the active spectators (Batziou, 2011; Chouliaraki, 2006; Scott, 2014). A minority does make visual contact by looking the spectator in the eye. This may humanize them, reducing the distance somewhat. However, they merely seem to formulate a demand for help, as suggested by their passive state or facial expressions. Also, this gaze is often combined with a high angle, with the victims – literally – ‘looking up’ at us for help. For example, in the article “Island Samoa can barely endure natural violence” (MO, 12/12/2013) Prime Minister Tuilaepa Lupesoliai Sailele Malielegaoi (an elite, ‘southern’ source) is given a voice. The photograph depicts the man during one of his speeches at a conference, which is – as described in the article – mostly a cry for help. Reinforcing the ideas conveyed in the verbal mode, the picture shows a rather depressed-looking man who is passively standing (no vectors) behind a desk. He directly looks us in the eye, formulating a visual cry for help.

Another article shows two starving African mothers, holding their emaciated babies, helplessly staring at the spectator (HLN, 09/08/2012, p.12). Elaborating on and enhancing the verbal text, which discusses the problem of famine in the Global South in more detail, the visual may suggest that these women are unable to feed their own children and therefore seek the help of the elites (in the West), including the audience. I argue that the depiction (intertextually) draws upon the mother (or, more generally, parent) archetype (see Lule, 2001, 2002). More specifically, it seems to question the presence of the characteristics of nurturing, soothing and protecting in the depicted group, which are generally associated with the mother / parent figure. These defects, it is argued, jeopardize the safety and innocence of the child (who looks undernourished). To restore the situation (i.e. ‘the mother/parent-child relationship’) the intervention of an external ‘full-fledged’ parent is required. In the process, the dependent ‘child’ status is arguably transferred to the whole group of passive, needy victims. In short, depictions like this may help to reproduce and reconfirm the paternalistic positionality of the western(ized) elites (Ali, James & Vultee, 2013; Chouliaraki, 2006; Hahn, Eide & Ali, 2012; Højjer, 2004; Jia et al., 2011; Perlmutter, 1998). Note that the depicted women are taken out of their contextual frame: This lack of spatial context may help to generalize the idea of passivity to the abstract group of others in the South, while the lack of (visual / verbal) tense implies the timelessness of this passivity. As suggested above, such (temporal-spatial) decontextualizations may increase the distance between the viewer and the viewed (Borah, 2009; Chouliaraki, 2006; Hansen & Machin, 2008; Huxford, 2001; Lester & Cottle, 2009; Manzo, 2010a, 2010b; Messaris, 1997; O’Neill, 2017; Scott, 2014).

Unequal Attribution Subframe: External Victimization. Rejecting this hierarchical view, the Unequal Attribution Subframe provides a more balanced picture of vulnerability. The idea of innocent victims,

which is a precondition for the audience to engage (Höijer, 2004), is not completely discarded. Yet, the suffering is contextualized as the consequence of particular beliefs and actions (e.g. Bankoff, 2001; Cameron, 2012; Chouliaraki, 2006; Dalhgren & Chakrapani, 1982; de Onís, 2012; Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012; Iyengar, 1990). As such, the audience encounters participants who are neither agents nor victims, neither fully equal to them nor completely different. As Grittmann (2014) argues, the depictions are still concerned with vulnerability, but largely refrain from formulating dramatic calls for compassion and empathy. Instead, they are concerned with personalized stories of ordinary people and scenes of daily life, which are – presumably – more likely to engage the audience (see Lester & Cottle, 2009; Manzo, 2010b; O’Neill, 2017).

For instance, the participants are often visually / verbally functionalized (repetition), among others as ‘farmers’, ‘land owners’ or ‘employers’. This legitimizes them as active ordinary people like the reader / spectator. Functionalizations also leave room for progress, change, interaction. This may start to facilitate the ‘status recognition’ (Fraser, 2000, 2005) of individuals as full partners in social interactions, thereby delegitimizing depictions of others as deficient (Dreher & Voyer, 2015; Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012; Figenschou, 2011; Martello, 2008; Roosvall & Tegelberg, 2013, 2015; Weik von Mossner, 2011). Identifications are not uncommon either and, at first glance, even look highly comparable to their hegemonic counterparts. Verbally, I found, for instance, references to ‘dead people’ or ‘poor, landless peasants’. Also, terms like ‘developing country’ (see above) – highlighting a dependent acting – are not uncommon, especially in the articles published in the mainstream media. As Bankoff (2001) stresses, the development thinking is so pervasive that it is even for those living in these countries very hard to define themselves in other ways. Or, at least, they ascribe to the language of the elites in order to be heard by the latter. As argued above, Fraser (2000) points out that the misrecognition by others may also lead to distorted self-identification (see Farbotko, 2005; Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012; Roosvall & Tegelberg, 2012, 2013; Takahashi & Meisner, 2012). Besides, I also contend that the ‘Englishization’ of the world – particularly certain characteristics of English (and related ‘western’ languages, as Dutch) like the lack of alternative terms for ‘the South’ – may exert some influence in the (translated) alternative articles (Anderson, 2007). Either way, it is telling that the term is not completely abandoned in many realizations of the Unequal Attribution Subframe, despite the general denouncing of the system underlying it. Visually, the child is still used as a metaphor / metonym (e.g. DM, 13/11/2013, p.31), as this often happens in the Unequal Vulnerability Subframe. Nevertheless, through the balancing with neutral or empowering (visual) descriptions, like the father and mother metaphor (see the archetype described above (Lule, 2001, 2002)), the focus lies on the resilience of the locals, who are taking care of their most vulnerable citizens.

Individualizing terms like names (i.e. nominations) or (at times detailed) descriptions (e.g. age, living conditions, family situation, occupation) often foreground ordinary locals, for example, “Shajahan

Mallik, a 53 year old former fisherman, who is now the head of the commission of new landowners” (MO, 21/12/2012) [12]. Likewise, most pictures zoom in on one or a few individuals, who tend to be shown frontally, at eye level and from a personal or intimate distance. Salient cultural or physiognomic attributes are exchanged for a focus on personal traits and other details. Such individualizing choices may humanize the victims, encouraging engagement (e.g. DWM, 21/11/2013) (Chouliaraki, 2006; Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012; Weik von Mossner, 2011). However, these representational choices are balanced with distancing features, which firmly position the audience in the onlooker role. ‘They’ is still the dominant pronoun. Some verbal generalizations can be found. Some participants are depicted at a public distance, viewed from the back (e.g. DWM, 29/08/2013). Besides, only a minority of the visually represented victims are also verbally identified. This may help to depict the individuals as representatives of broader groups, giving more weight to the discussion (Chouliaraki, 2006; Fowler, 2016; Perlmutter, 1998; van Dijk, 1988). However, it might also confront the audience with (i.e. invite them to take) the dominant top-down perspective, which a majority of them do not question, demonstrating, within the broader context of the counter-hegemonic subframe, how it still victimizes the others (see Rose, 2001). Note that the victimized participants may or may not be situated in visually and/or verbally clearly defined (but not overly specific) time-spaces, which the (western) audience may readily locate on a world map, linking them – as such – to their own time-spaces. For example, ‘the most vulnerable coastal regions of Bangladesh’ (DWM, 21/12/2012). Contrary to generic (e.g. ‘the South’, the metonym of the palm tree) or overly specific time-spaces (e.g. the name of a particular, unfamiliar village in an African country), those are more likely to facilitate engagement and feelings of interconnection. That is, we live in the same (global) time-space (see Chouliaraki, 2006; Lester & Cottle, 2009).

Balance is also key to the dominant processes: The participants are often engaged in behavioural, **relational** or (active or passive) material processes which are comparable to those found in the Unequal Vulnerability Subframe. These highlight their victim role on the most apparent level (material / economic maldistribution (Fraser, 2000, 2005)). For instance: “Whether by the rising sea level or the power of typhoons, developing countries are being hit right now.” (DM, 13/11/2013, p.31) [13]. However, the subframe usually takes this material / economic vulnerability to a deeper level, linking it to the multi-layered injustices caused by the hegemonic (anthropocentric) system. In other words, contextualization does away with the idea of vulnerability as an internal and eternal characteristic of certain groups (Bankoff, 2001; Chouliaraki, 2006; Dalhgren & Chakrapani, 1982; Hart, 2011; Iyengar, 1990; van Dijk, 1998; Weik von Mossner, 2011). Contextualization is offered through the adding of *circumstances* or the presence (as opposed to deletion) of responsible (human) *agents* to the typical processes: “Women and girls are affected more severely *as they are the last ones allowed to eat or to get access to health care because of their social status*” (DWM, 24/08/2013) [14]; “This week and the following weeks, the affected region will be flooded *by boats, planes and jeeps, filled with goods and*

aid workers (...)” (13/11/2013, p.31) [15]; “The poorest **live** in the low-lying coastal areas [i.e. most vulnerable areas] *because these are the only places where they are able to build a shack*. There too ‘*development*’ has wiped out the natural protection of mangrove trees” (DWM, 11/11/2013) [16]. Furthermore, the broader context may be evoked through the choice for other types of verbs. For example, the sentence “The smaller ones cannot compete with the large farms (...)” (DWM, 20/12/2013) [17] addresses the more profound processes (i.e. the globalization of a free market system) which underlie this victimization (e.g. Rees & Westra, 2003; Shiva, 1988, 1993).

As I will discuss in more detail below, congruent balancing strategies are used in the visual part of the subframe. For instance, a lack of gaze might, again, distance or ‘other’ (Chouliaraki, 2006) the victims, evoking the top-down view. However, the fact that the affected participants are taking action (i.e. presence of vectors) rather than passively waiting for help, suggests their underlying resilience, which is often overlooked or denied from the traditional perspective. The lack of temporal contextualization, then, may add a sense of timelessness to the idea of (denied) resilience (Chouliaraki, 2006; Huxford, 2001).

5.1.5.4 Treatment Recommendation

Environmental Justice Frame: Mitigation and Adaptation.

Unequal Vulnerability Subframe: External Aid. The main participants responsible for solving the problems – addressing the causes as well as the destructive consequences of climate change – are identified as the villains who are said to be causing them. Those include (generalized or individualized) western(ized) regions, countries, politicians, industries or their subgroups, or at least those who are ‘developed’, ‘rich’, and ‘powerful’ enough to provide solutions (Billett, 2010; Doulton & Brown, 2009; Farbotko, 2005; Grittmann, 2014; Schmidt & Schäfer, 2015; Vihersalo, 2008; Wu, 2009). More specific (individualized) actors are, for instance, ‘the minister of Development and Cooperation’ (identification), ‘emergency workers’ or ‘donors’ (functionalizations). Clearly, the dominant in-group (‘inclusive we’) of the audience – living in a ‘rich, developed, powerful region’, carrying historical debt – is regularly included or implied. This may encourage identification, especially as the responsible agents are usually depicted in positive terms, as ‘heroes’ (Bankoff, 2001; Dalhgren & Chakrapani, 1982; Jia et al., 2011, Schmidt & Schäfer, 2015; Scott, 2014; van Dijk, 1998; Vihersalo, 2008). The visual mode often reinforces this hierarchical perspective, inviting the spectator to – literally – look down on the victims from a high angle (e.g. MO, 12/11/2013) (Chouliaraki, 2006). Alternatively, top-down agents are depicted within the time-space of the others, like an airplane (metonym for the technological / economic prowess and development of the West) that is literally hovering over the victims (DS, 12/11/2013, p.6) or (western) aid workers who are separated from the locals by their physiognomic characteristics, like a white skin colour and/or high-visibility clothing (which may help to foreground them, reinforcing their

central, authoritative role) (DM, 13/11/2013, p.4). Summarizing, neither the superiority of the dominant classes nor of the system that they defend, is (thoroughly) questioned (Doulton & Brown, 2009; Fuchs & Graf, 2010; Kenis & Mathijs, 2014).

We mainly find active material and behavioural processes. These emphasize the ‘internal’ obligations of the elites. For instance: “[We need to] adapt our behaviour and emit less GHG (...). And the government needs to direct our (energy) consumption to that effect” (HLN, 13/11/2013, p.2) [18]. Economic or technological interventions (i.e. development) are presented as possible goals or circumstances which might aid mitigation. Verbs like ‘to help’ or ‘to support’ also endorse the idea of special agency of the elite agents. For example, “Developing countries find that the rich, western countries are responsible for the historical pollution with GHG, and that they therefore need to help the poor countries to adapt to the consequences of climate change” (MO, 28/11/2012) [19]. While this ‘helping’ is often merely suggested in the visuals, by the high angle (e.g. ‘dropping aid packages’), some of the actions are literally going on in the pictures, such as soldiers carrying victims to a plane (DM, 13/11/2013, p.4) (repetition). In this last example, the vectors are formed by (the arms of) the elite actors and are directed towards the motionless victims (see transactive actions). Thus, apart from reducing emissions by means of a ‘green economy’, ‘sustainable development’ or ‘emission trading’ (mitigation), the elites (must) show charity by transferring ‘money’, ‘emergency aid’, ‘knowledge’ or ‘technology’ to the ‘backward regions’ (e.g. DS, 18/10/2013, p.21). In both contexts, numbers – indicating an amount of money or the emissions which various players are allowed to produce – are usually very salient (e.g. DM, 14/11/2013, p.9). Clearly, then, the answer to the (material / economic) maldistribution is quite straightforward (de Onís, 2012): (material / economic) redistribution (De Lucia, 2009; Fraser, 2000, 2005). This will stimulate the development of the victims (adaptation). After all, it is accepted as a fact that development – including the right to develop for the ‘underdeveloped, vulnerable regions’ – is the main answer to the current socio-environmental problems (e.g. Brand & Brunnengräber, 2012; Cameron, 2012; Grunwald, 2016; Lohmann, 2008; Unmüßig, Sachs & Fatheuer, 2012). For example, “The money from the fund is meant for the transition towards a low-carbon economy and must arm Guyana against the consequences of climate change” (MO, 12/11/2013) [20] or “Green energy is the only way to pull billions of people out of energy poverty and to avert a climate disaster, says a new study” (DWM, 26/02/2013) [21]. The reference to a scientific source, ‘a new study’ – which is further elaborated on throughout the verbal text, being associated with influential organizations like the World Bank – may help to legitimate the argumentations as rational, convincing, trustworthy and, thus, salient. Also, the last four examples (18, 19, 20, 21) make use of strong (deontic / epistemic) modality, implying the need and urgency to act and leaving little room for alternatives (i.e. not acting at all or acting in different ways, beyond the hegemonic thinking). As discussed, however, this exact ‘help’ is deconstructed by the Unequal Attribution Subframe as a semantic reversal.

In some cases, the (individualized) victims are legitimated as agents and credible sources. For instance, the typical visual conventions – social distance, eye-level and a head-on perspective (see Tuchman, 1987) – may be used to convey an air of trustworthiness (e.g. DM, 13/11/2013, p.3). Nevertheless, their (mainly) verbal actions mostly reinforce the idea of vulnerability, dependence and ‘conditional agency’ (Chouliaraki, 2006). The affected groups cannot fundamentally improve their own situation, but look to elite intermediators for help. For instance, “‘I call upon the world leaders to finally recognize the reality. That is what 7 billion people ask us to do’, he [Philippine negotiator Yeb Saño] said, with tears in his eyes.” (DS, 08/12/2012, p.36) [22]. The idea of helplessness is further reinforced by the phrase ‘with tears in his eyes’. This may help to convey particular associations with regard to this source. For example, he is approached as emotional rather than rational, undergoing rather than acting. So, if (elite) ‘victim-witnesses’ (Roosvall & Tegelberg, 2013) may speak for themselves (‘I’ / ‘we’), they are only allowed to second the hegemonic perspective (Bankoff, 2001; Beck, 2000; Entman & Rojecki, 1993; Farbotko, 2005; Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012; Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993; Gitlin, 1980; Takahashi & Meisner, 2012). Summarizing, being fully or largely prevented from making first-order claims concerning fundamental aspects of justice, these groups are ‘misframed’ (De Lucia, 2009; Fraser, 2005; Roosvall & Tegelberg, 2012, 2013, 2015; Sen, 1999, 2009). They are acting mostly as ‘objects of charity or benevolence’ (Fraser, 2005, p.77), being granted ‘cultural identity recognition’ (Fraser, 2000, 2005; Roosvall & Tegelberg, 2013). As endangered, unique species, they seek our help for their survival.

Unequal Attribution Subframe: (External Restoration of) Internal Resilience. As Fraser (2005) argues, the liberalist-capitalist system – as major vehicle of injustice – can only be thoroughly transformed if struggles for economic (‘redistribution’), cultural (‘status recognition’) and political (‘representation’) justice are combined. Participatory parity is the goal and the means (e.g. Brulle, 2010; De Lucia, 2009; Fraser, 2000, 2005; Sen, 1999, 2009; Shiva, 1988, 1993).

The non-hegemonic group is recognized in a ‘victim-hero’ role (Roosvall & Tegelberg, 2013), as ‘communities who are organized and able to react’, ‘resistant grassroots movements’ who have a ‘leadership role’ or who act as ‘partners’ (functionalizations), ‘locally embedded organizations’ or ‘valuable social networks’ (identifications). We often encounter humanized and historical individuals, feeling, reflecting, and acting on their own fate (e.g. the (visual) father and mother metaphor) (Dreher & Voyer, 2015; Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012; Figenschou, 2011; Martello, 2008; Weik von Mossner, 2009).

Many traditional societies have been living in close interaction with nature for a long time. Undergoing extreme weather events, they were forced to adapt. This results in their possessing of valuable ‘knowledge’ and ‘traditions’, such as ‘climate clever agriculture’ (DWM, 27/08/2012). This traditional ecological knowledge (TEK) may be highly valuable for living through precarious situations, including recent climate change consequences, and might also be instructive for the western(ized) humans who are less experienced in this regard (e.g. Bankoff, 2001; Dreher & Voyer, 2015; Martello, 2008; Farbotko

& Lazrus, 2012; Hopwood, Mellor & O'Brien, 2005; Lohmann, 2008; Manzo, 2010b; Shiva, 1988, 1993; Smith, 2007; Tanjeela, 2014). The close interconnectedness of humans and nature is visually highlighted (see elaboration) through the depiction of circumstances. Spatial contexts are regularly characterized by harmonious nature, showing the constructive traces of human interaction. For instance, a female vendor is completely surrounded by fruits and vegetables, blending with them through proximity, the absence of frame lines or the consonance of bright colours (Huxford, 2011) (DWM, 18/04/2012). In some examples, the lack of temporal contextualization may, arguably, convey a sense of long-term traditions necessary for the survival of multi-natural worlds (Adamson, 2014; Alexander, 2007; Shiva, 1988, 1993). Furthermore, there are more general references to locals' resilience or superior familiarity with their own culture and society (see Bankoff, 2001; Sen, 1999, 2009). In mainstream realizations these are more salient than the TEK, which is only marginally referred to. Summarizing, local justices (De Lucia, 2009; Sen, 1999, 2009) – and thus cultural (and natural) pluralism – may reduce the vulnerability of all and allow for more sustainable ways of living (De Lucia, 2009; de Onís, 2012; Hulme, 2009; Shiva, 1988, 1993).

Mainstream or, particularly, alternative arenas (e.g. the Continental Summit of Indigenous Peoples (DWM, 21/11/2013)), including the media themselves, (are) frequently (said to) allow these groups to speak up, legitimizing them as 'sovereign agents' (Chouliaraki, 2006, pp.158-159). Material (and behavioural) active processes complement the verbal processes, for example,

The general coordinator of the CAOI [i.e. Andean Coordinator of Indigenous Organizations] emphasized that the indigenous people have more than thousand years of experience and can adapt to the natural climate symptoms. 'And now, when these climate changes are the produce of human behaviour, we can tackle these consequences drawing upon our traditional knowledge and the circumstances imposed upon us by modernity. We simply change the sowing and mowing dates and plan the cultivation of the crops' (DWM, 18/04/2012) [23].

Note the use of the ('exclusive') personal pronouns 'we' and 'us' (Dreher & Voyer, 2015). The idea that the victim-agents have something to offer, rather than demand, is also highlighted through the voice of the visuals (consonance / elaboration). Many depicted actors do not look the spectator in the eye, foregrounding them as 'sovereign agents' like ourselves (Chouliaraki, 2006) who do not require the help of others. They independently act in material processes (i.e. vectors originating with these participants give rise to transactive actions), for instance managing their environment in sustainable ways (e.g. DWM, 31/01/2013; MO, 21/12/2012) or rebuilding their houses after a climate disaster (DWM, 19/11/2013). We are invited to observe these activities but not to intervene with them. Therefore, instead of us offering them our knowledge and means, they provide us with alternative knowledge (inversion of roles) (van Dijk, 1998). This may foster a sense of inequality, regarding differential experiences and responsibilities (Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012). That is, however, slightly mitigated by depictions that suggest contact among equals. Some visuals represent the locals as looking the spectator in the eye: their

non-verbal communication (e.g. self-confidence and pride implied by a self-assured smile) and the interaction with the verbal part of the subframe (including the picture captions) may help to concretize these as demands for respecting their rights and traditions (e.g. DWM, 21/12/2012; MO, 05/01/2014), rather than as requests for help.

As discussed above, the lack of recognition for the resilience and equality of other groups is the fault of the elite, dominant groups. Accordingly, they – often depicted as generalized and rather faceless groups – are also assigned a minor agent role in some cases (Dreher & Voyer, 2015; Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012; Martello, 2008; Weik von Mossner, 2011): they are responsible for restoring the (economic / cultural / political) rights of the South and allowing the locals to participate as full agents (Fraser, 2000, 2005; Roosvall & Tegelberg, 2012, 2013, 2015). Accordingly, many material processes in which the dominant groups are involved refer to deeper levels of responsibility and go beyond the reduction of GHG emissions or the ‘redistribution of development’. For example, “The restoration and protection of the collective progenitorial knowledge of indigenous people needs to be guaranteed [by the elites]” (DWM, 18/04/2012) [24]. As such, being reduced to – largely voiceless – villain-onlookers or facilitators, the elites – I argue – are subject to misrecognition and misrepresentation (Fraser, 2000, 2005).

This is most salient throughout the alternative outlets, where the bottom-up voices are numerous. The mainstream outlets, where it is mostly western NGOs and other intermediaries (i.e. acting across borders, nations, cultures (Beck, 2000)) who speak, tend to nuance this depiction, particularly in the verbal mode (extension): The elites play a more substantial and positive role as villain-heroes or partners (e.g. being called ‘professionals’). It is, for instance, more often argued that local knowledge should be united with top-down solutions (Hulme, 2009; Martello, 2008; Roosvall & Tegelberg, 2013). For instance, “Where one actually employs the local knowledge and involves local citizens, the help can even make the situation better than it was before” (DM, 13/11/2013, p.31) [25]. Clearly, the idea of development – through the transfer of money, means or knowledge – is still partly there. That is no surprise. It is unlikely for NGO representatives to completely do away with the responsibility of their own organization, and therefore, their *raison d’être* (Anderson, 1991; Cox & Schwarze, 2015; Greenberg, Knight & Westersund, 2011; Mormont & Dasnoy, 1995; Ryan & Freeman Brown, 2015; Wozniak, Wessler & Lück, 2017). Simultaneously, however, the political representation and status recognition of the bottom-up groups is backgrounded (Fraser, 2000, 2005). These arguments can also be found in the alternative outlets, especially in contributions of NGO representatives, but are – overall – less important, or salient, in these contexts. One of the Unequal Attribution articles in *MO** (29/06/2012), “Women give farmers climate advice on Kenyan radio”, written by a local (citizen) journalist, provides, however, an interesting exception:

‘We usually invite people in the studio who are experts or who have relevant experiences about these types of issues’, says Dominic Mutua, head programming. ‘If

we talk about the best time for planting, we combine scientific forecasts with traditional knowledge.’ [26]

5.1.6 Discussion and Conclusions

The main goal of this chapter was to provide an in-depth multimodal discussion of the differential realizations of the Environmental Justice Frame. In Chapter 4, I have already introduced and discussed the frame matrices of the Environmental Justice Frame, the Unequal Vulnerability Subframe and the Unequal Attribution Subframe, which help to summarize the more elaborate discussions in the results section above. Based on the matrices, I draw more general conclusions as regards to the status and potential implications of both subframes, foregrounding some points of comparison.

The Unequal Vulnerability Subframe matrix (see Appendix 2: Frame Matrices) highlights the most salient devices, for instance, the contrast between active ‘us’ and passive and collectivized ‘them’, used to present the others as victims in need of help. As such, this subframe signals injustice, potentially bringing about the ‘politics of pity’ (Chouliaraki, 2006; Höjjer, 2004). Yet, the only justice claims made are those for (limited) redistribution and identity recognition, which fall well within the boundaries of the socio-economic system: The fundamental problems produced by the hegemonic system remain unquestioned and are even reproduced or reconfirmed (Bankoff, 2001; Cameron, 2012; De Lucia, 2009; Fraser, 2000, 2005; Lohmann, 2008; Rees & Westra, 2003; Sen, 1999, 2009; Shiva, 1988, 1993). That is, there is still a relation of inequality and dependence between elite heroes – with superior (rational) knowledge and means – and ‘objects of charity or benevolence’ (Fraser, 2005), of which the fascinating, yet primitive (irrational), cultures are under threat. As Chouliaraki (2006) puts it, these kinds of representations mainly encourage ‘ironic spectatorship’ or ‘communitarianism’. Clearly, the subframe only ‘looks in one direction’ (de Onís, 2012), that is, the (scientific) climate problem. As such, it is unlikely to galvanize true change.

The Unequal Attribution Subframe, on the other hand, employs devices like the reversal of alignments (see Appendix 2: Frame Matrices), which may help to give rise to three-dimensional justice claims: (multi-level) redistribution, status recognition and political representation (De Lucia, 2009; Fraser, 2000, 2005; Sen, 1999, 2009; Shiva, 1988, 1993). Playing around with, and questioning, the positionality of the audience, this subframe is more likely to evoke ‘reflexive identification’, encouraging the audience to engage with their ‘fellow human beings’, while contemplating and acting more systematically upon the *why* of the suffering (Chouliaraki, 2006). More than ‘emergency news’, which Chouliaraki (2006) describes as the category of news which is best able to give rise to cosmopolitan spectators, however, Unequal Attribution truly foregrounds the non-western actors, views and values as pivotal (at the expense of the western(ized) actors, views and values). Anyhow, the introduction of alternative views urges us to ‘look in both / several directions’ (de Onís, 2012).

As illustrated in Chapter 4 (4.5.4 Quantitative Overview), Unequal Vulnerability prevails in the mainstream newspapers while Unequal Attribution is characteristic for the alternative outlet. However, I found that the Unequal Vulnerability Subframe not only dominates the mainstream media but also the alternative outlet (see Brand & Brunnengräber, 2012). This highlights the pervasiveness of the hegemonic thinking. Counter-voices are prevented from truly entering the debate and find their messages mis/reframed by the media (consciously or unconsciously, e.g. due to practical restraints or pervasive pictorial / ideological traditions) or they are / feel obliged to adapt their views to the boundaries set by the hegemonic groups (e.g. Baysha, 2014; Beck, 2000; Billett, 2010; Entman & Rojecki, 1993; Farbotko, 2005; Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993; Gitlin, 1980; Groshek & Han, 2011; Mouffe, 2005; Roosvall & Tegelberg, 2015; Takahashi & Meisner, 2012). Moreover, my analysis demonstrates that the counter-hegemonic subframe is also qualitatively weaker than its hegemonic counterpart. Unequal Vulnerability is verbally *and* visually well-developed, with strong, culturally resonant symbols and strategies in both modes which seem to mutually reinforce (i.e. elaborate, extend or enhance) each other. Unequal Attribution, however, is struggling to find a salient and recognizable multimodal – and particularly, visual – language to depict complex and less familiar views (see Doyle, 2007, 2009; Grittmann, 2014; Hulme, 2004; Léon & Erviti, 2015; Manzo, 2010a, 2010b; O’Neill, 2017; O’Neill et al., 2013). Its lack of consonance, visibility or unambiguity (Bednarek & Caple, 2012; Galtung & Ruge, 1965, 1973; Gans, 1979; Graber, 1988; Harcup & O’Neill, 2001, 2017; Joye, 2010; Shoemaker & Reese, 2014; Smith & Joffe, 2009) does not help its case (particularly in mainstream contexts) and it only seems to lead to a Catch-22 situation.

Besides, combining my findings with van Dijk’s (1998, p.33) ideological square (Table 5) lays bare the fundamental problem that both subframes share: their essentializing of antagonisms (see Mouffe, 2005). Hero-victim or hero-villain dualisms tend to oversimplify complex realities, cultivating romanticized stereotypes like the ‘white hero’ or ‘noble savage’. These crisps dualisms are likely to prevent mutual understanding, cooperation or debate (Fraser, 2000; Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Ritchie & Thomas, 2015): Despite various suggestions of equality, the focus on differential experiences or the uncontested expertise of the grassroots voices prevails in the Unequal Attribution Subframe, mainly in the alternative outlets. Obviously, it is too simplistic to always, unquestionably, equate southern groups with traditional knowledge, let alone just and sustainable alternatives (Dreher & Voyer, 2015; Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012; Martello, 2008; Fraser, 2000). Höijer (2004) argues that people tend to hold on to their existing mental frames and schemata when being faced with alternatives which are perceived as threatening to their own identity (see Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Graber, 1988; Norgaard, 2006; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Sandvik, 2008). Put differently, extreme oppositions may only evoke reactionary responses and a return to familiar in- and out-group thinking. Similarly, Piotrowski (2013) contends that oversimplified dualisms may disengage the ‘villains’ or ‘victims’ as they are delegitimized and reduced to listeners who are told they cannot understand the situation unless the ‘heroes’ explain it to them. That is, the recognition and

representation of one group goes hand in hand with the misrecognition and misrepresentation of the other (Groshek & Han, 2011; Niederdepppe et al., 2013). Yet, dialogue between various equal players and viewpoints (i.e. responsiveness / inclusiveness (Groshek & Han, 2011) or agonism (Mouffe, 2005)) is *the* necessary precondition for truly addressing the multi-levelled problems. In other words, only explicit democratic debate may give rise to politicization (see Brulle, 2010; Fraser, 2000, 2005; Hulme, 2009; Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Mouffe, 2005; Pepermans, 2015; Pepermans & Maesele, 2014; Sen, 1999, 2009; Shiva, 1988, 1993; Swyngedouw, 2010). Currently, however, the two subframes mainly seem to inspire parallel monologues (i.e. they are largely exclusive and nonresponsive).

The (Reversed) Ideological Square		
	The subaltern groups = Us (dominant <u>in-group</u> counter-hegemonic frame) = Them (dominant <u>out-group</u> western audience)	The elites = Us (dominant <u>in-group</u> western audience) = Them (dominant <u>out-group</u> counter-hegemonic frame)
Positive	<u>Victim-heroes</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Not intrinsically passive (victims) but victimized by the elites • <u>Resilient</u> grassroots groups, drawing on (biocentric) local experience, traditions, knowledge <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ ‘<u>Local justices</u>’: stemming from / catering to the needs of local nature-cultures • <u>Leaders, or at least partners</u>, in addressing climate change = <u>Cultural status recognition, political representation, (economic) redistribution</u>	<u>(Villain-)heroes</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>Leaders of the climate change battle</u>, due to responsibility and/or accomplishments • Solutions drawing on achievements of the elites (<u>techno-economic solutions, development, transfer of technology, money, means, aid...</u>) = <u>(Material / economic) redistribution</u>
Negative	<u>Victim-witnesses</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ‘<u>Backward</u>’, ‘<u>undeveloped</u>’... • Eternal and internal <u>vulnerability</u> • <u>Passively waiting</u> for external help • <u>Cultural identity recognition</u> (i.e. unique, endangered traditions) 	<u>Villain(-facilitator)s</u> Holding on to <u>Euro-American anthropocentrism</u> : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>Source of multi-layered debt</u>: environmental debt, social debt, economic debt, cultural debt, political debt... • Reproducing stories (frames) which <u>naturalize this thinking</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ ‘<u>Universal Justice</u>’: The right to develop (towards a western ideal) • <u>Secondary agent role</u>: cultural status recognition, political representation, (economic) redistribution

Table 5: Unmarked = the emphasis inspired by the ‘top-down’ positionality of the Unequal Vulnerability Subframe. Marked = the emphasis fostered by the ‘bottom-up’ positionality of the Unequal Attribution Subframe. Based on the ideological square of van Dijk (1998, p.33).

Nevertheless, it remains important that the audience is provided with non-hegemonic *and* counter-hegemonic perspectives (i.e. subframes) across outlets and within the scope of single outlets. That is, the democratic struggles are, at least, often implied (rather than explicitly exposed) (Mouffe, 2005). This might, however, already help to inform and engage citizens, although requiring more active efforts from the latter to (consult various outlets and) explore and balance different viewpoints (Groshek & Han, 2011).

In this regard, it is interesting that my research is one of the first to demonstrate the – limited – presence of Unequal Attribution beyond the ‘marginal’ context of the alternative outlets (see 4.5.4 Quantitative Overview). This is crucial, as it is the only way to reach a broader audience (Groshek & Han, 2011; Roosvall & Tegelberg, 2015). More often than in the alternative context, the subframe has been adapted in the mainstream media (see the ‘crisis discourse’ (Doulton & Brown (2009)), where intermediary (i.e. less extreme) participants are the main sources. Being largely stripped from its ‘collective action’ layer (e.g. Benford & Snow, 2000; Hopke, 2012; Taylor, 2000) (see 3.1.2 Alternative Media), it partly deconstructs the (exclusive) ‘victim-hero’ role of the ‘South’ (Roosvall & Tegelberg, 2013), while reinstating western(ized) humans as ‘villain-heroes’ or, at least, important partners. Yet, the agency and status as legitimate sources of the bottom-up groups (and their TEK) tends to be overly de-emphasized. Accordingly, these realizations also fail to depict collaborations or dialogues among true equals. They might, however, already constitute a less complex and more engaging realization of Unequal Attribution to the western target audience and possibly offer a glance of a less extreme alternative subframe. Such realizations best resemble ‘emergency news’ as described by Chouliaraki (2006). As pointed out above, the authors argues that this type of representation is best able to engage western spectators by turning them into ‘cosmopolitan spectators’.

In conclusion, even when reproducing the hegemonic subframe with the intention to denounce injustice, the media end up largely reinforcing and enacting injustice, hampering true dialogue. The available alternatives are promising, yet insufficient. Clearly, only if resulting from the dialogue among various groups in society, an alternative Environmental Justice Subframe might move away from the extreme and become a real tool for collaborative change. I hope that my study helps to render the current problems (and subframes) more tangible, raising awareness and inciting more discussion among academics, media producers, politicians, NGOs and citizens from various backgrounds.

In particular, I hope to reach those concerned with representations of environmental justice in (media) communication. Indeed, it is important for researchers working in various cultural contexts, fields of communication or disciplines to be able to critically assess and compare (multimodal) accounts of environmental justice across time and space. As such, they may provide valuable contributions to the debate, raising awareness for current practices and suggesting, or pointing out, alternative, more balanced approaches. That way, they may contribute to a fuller understanding of environmental justice, and potentially, more appropriate responses. My comprehensive framework is one of the first that may stimulate and facilitate such important scholarly work. Besides, it allows for translation to the professional field.

I illustrate the latter by proposing some preliminary suggestions for communication and media professionals (Jacobson, 2016). I do this, however, with the understanding that fundamental change can only stem from multi-level evolutions within and outside media organizations (e.g. Shoemaker & Reese,

2014). Based on my findings as well as insights drawn from slow journalism (e.g. Drok & Hermans, 2016; Gess, 2012; Harbers, 2016; Le Masurier, 2015; Mendelson & Creech, 2016) and constructive journalism (e.g. Curry, Stroud and McGregor, 2016; McIntyre, 2015), I suggest these initial steps towards fairer and more responsible types of journalism (or communication in general): Journalists and editors should provide more context. This could, among others, be done by consulting other (bottom-up) sources and by not exclusively looking at the problems through a (professional) western camera lens. The Inter Press Service News Agency (IPS) (ipsnews.net), which often works with local reporters and photographers, can be helpful, as well as NGOs with strong local ties. Besides, it is necessary to question the current preoccupation with ‘what will sell’, and accordingly, news values like consonance, novelty, unambiguity or visibility (e.g. Galtung & Ruge, 1965, 1973; Harcup & O’Neill, 2001, 2017). The potential of perspectives to contribute to (or galvanize) debates – rather than newsworthiness as such – should be a decisive factor when it comes to the selection and organization of news. Further, professionals ought to become more aware of stereotypes, like the suffering child, which take away all agency and power from certain participants. If those cannot be avoided – due to a lack of alternatives, for instance – they can at least be put into perspective. Finally, it is important to ask questions like “who is ‘us’ in this narrative, and who is ‘them’?” or “who are the heroes, villains and victims?”. Most likely, the story can be rewritten to make those (pro)nouns more inclusive and interactive (see Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 for a more comprehensive and detailed discussion of these suggestions).

Original Dutch Quotes

[1] “Haiyan was wel degelijk een zeer krachtige storm. Volgens meteorologen is Haiyan nummer vier op de lijst van de krachtigste tyfoons aller tijden. Het zou ook de sterkste zijn die effectief aan land ging. Windstoten bereikten pieken tot 380 kilometer per uur. Dat is veel krachtiger dan orkaan Katrina die in 2005 New Orleans teisterde en ruim krachtig genoeg om glas te verbrijzelen en bomen te ontwortelen.”

[2] “De VS ratificeerden het Kyoto-protocol niet, uit angst dat het de economische belangen zou schaden.”

[3] “(...) de rijke industrielanden sinds decennia de zwaarste CO₂-uitstoot veroorzaken (...).”

[4] “Opletten dat de ene ramp niet op de andere volgt. Hulpcoördinatie dient grotendeels bij Filipijnse overheid te blijven.”

[5] “In Afrika werd het altijd precaire evenwicht tussen de twee groepen grondig verstoord door koloniale grenzen en nationale ontwikkelingsprogramma’s, en heeft de steeds duidelijker optredende klimaatverandering de tegenstelling verder aangescherpt en al voor meer dan één burgeroorlog om levensnoodzakelijke bronnen geleid.”

[6] “Schulden die jaren geleden kwijtgescholden hadden moeten zijn, zetten een rem op de capaciteit van de Filipijnen om zich voor te bereiden op toekomstige noodsituaties”.

[7] “Van de Spanjaarden kregen de Filipino's het katholieke geloof en het feodale grootgrondbezit opgedrongen. De VS introduceerde taal en cultuur om de lokale, goedkope werkkrachten te vormen en ook modernere productiemethoden zoals plantages, mijnbouw en een beperkte industriële activiteit zodat het kon profiteren van de natuurlijke rijkdommen van de eilandengroep.”

[8] “Hetzelfde rijke Westen draagt immers een zware verantwoordelijkheid. Het is groot geworden door als een parasiet de kolonies leeg te zuigen.”

[9] “Net als de tyfoon over het land raasde komt er nu voor de Filippijnen een 'tweede golf' aan: die van de internationale noodhulp.”

[10] “70 procent van de steden in het land ligt op een oever van een rivier of waterweg. De extreem arme nederzettingen dijen uit in deze gebieden.”

[11] “Sommigen moesten dagen in het noodweer wachten op de daken van hun huizen om met helikopters gered te worden van de verdrinkingsdood. Kinderen werden verrast en met de sterke stroming meegesleurd.”

[12] “Shajahan Mallik, een 53-jarige voormalige visser, die nu hoofd is van de commissie van nieuwe landeigenaren.”

[13] “Zij het [door] de stijgende zeespiegel of de kracht van tyfoons, ontwikkelingslanden worden nu geraakt.”

[14] “Vrouwen en meisjes worden hierdoor extra getroffen omdat ze door hun status pas als laatste eten krijgen of toegang tot gezondheidszorg.”

[15] “Het getroffen gebied zal deze en volgende weken overspoeld worden door boten, vliegtuigen en jeeps, gevuld met goederen en hulpverleners.”

[16] “De armsten wonen er in de lager gelegen kustgebieden omdat dit de enige plaatsen zijn waar ze een krotwoning kunnen opbouwen. Ook daar heeft de “vooruitgang” de natuurlijke beschutting door de mangrovebomen doen verdwijnen.”

[17] “(...) de kleintjes niet kunnen concurreren met de grote landbouwbedrijven (...).”

[18] “Ons gedrag aanpassen en minder CO₂ uitstoten (...). En de overheid moet onze (energie)consumptie maar in die zin sturen.”

[19] “Ontwikkelingslanden vinden dat de rijke, westerse landen verantwoordelijk zijn voor de historische vervuiling met broeikasgassen, en dat ze daarom armere landen moeten helpen zich aan te passen aan de gevolgen van de klimaatverandering.”

[20] “Het geld uit het fonds is bedoeld voor de transitie naar een koolstofarme economie en moet Guyana wapenen tegen de gevolgen van de klimaatverandering.”

[21] “Groene energie is de enige manier om miljarden mensen uit de energiearmoede te halen en een klimaatramp af te wenden, stelt een nieuwe studie.”

[22] “ ‘Ik roep de wereldleiders op hun ogen te openen voor realiteit. Dit is wat zeven miljard mensen ons vragen te doen’, zei hij met tranen in de ogen.”

[23] “De Algemene Coördinator van de CAOI beklemtoonde dat de inheemse volkeren een duizendjarige ervaring hebben en zich aanpassen aan de natuurlijke klimaatverschijnselen. En nu deze klimaatveranderingen product zijn van het menselijk handelen, kunnen wij ook de gevolgen aanpakken wegens onze traditionele kennis en de omstandigheden die ons worden opgelegd door de moderniteit. We veranderen gewoon de data van het zaaien en maaien en we plannen de kweek van de gewassen.”

[24] “Het herstel en de bescherming van de collectieve voorouderlijke kennis van inheemse volkeren moet worden gewaarborgd.”

[25] “Daar waar men daadwerkelijk gebruikt maakt van de aanwezige kennis en de bevolking zo betreft, kan de hulp de situatie zelfs beter maken dan voordien.”

[26] “ ‘We nodigen meestal mensen in de studio uit die expert zijn of relevante ervaring hebben over dit soort zaken’, zegt Dominic Mutua, hoofd programmering. ‘Als we praten over het beste tijdstip om te planten, combineren we wetenschappelijke weersvoorspellingen met traditionele kennis daarover.’ ”

5.2 Fighting Carbon Dioxide or Fighting Human? The Ideological Fault Lines Underlying Two Climate Change Frames⁷³

5.2.1 Introduction

The second part of Chapter 5 will provide an in-depth discussion and comparison of two frames which are especially illustrative when it comes to the depoliticization and politicization of the climate debate. That is, they allow, in particular, for a more thorough understanding of the crucial importance and (potential) far-reaching implications of the ideological nature of, and the ideological struggles underneath, various frames (see Chapter 4 for the conceptual overview of all frames and subframes): the Cycles of Nature Frame and the Environmental Justice Frame. While the first highlights the impact of human-made climate change on the natural system at large, the latter focuses on the unequal distribution of benefits and burdens among various groups in human society. As discussed in Chapter 4 (4.5.4 Quantitative Overview), Cycles of Nature is, by far, the dominant frame across various Flemish news outlets. Environmental Justice is, in particular, pivotal to (the editorial goals of) the alternative outlets, which – among others – try to give a voice to the voiceless (Atton, 2002, 2003; Cameron, 2012; Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012; Groshek & Han, 2011; Gunster, 2011, 2012; Harcup, 2014; Hopke, 2012; Pepermans, 2015). Yet, the frame is not uncommon in the (broadsheet) mainstream outlets, either. This suggests the central role of the frames in the climate debate and, apparently, of questions of human-nature and human-human (in)justice. Indeed, more than in other frames, inequality and injustice are explicit, defining elements of the underlying argumentations of the selected frames: they highlight that development in some time-spaces (western human societies) always entails (un)expected and (un)intended consequences in other time-spaces (non-western societies, natural systems). Sze and London (2008) contend, for instance, that the roots of the climate change problems lie exactly in differential power and global inequalities. Accordingly, Kasperson and Kasperson (2001) point out that understanding inequality is a precondition for understanding (the meaning of) climate change and addressing it more effectively (see also Agyeman, Bullard & Evans, 2002; Agyeman & Evans, 2004; De Lucia, 2009; McLaren, 2003; Rees & Westra, 2003; Scandrett, Crowther & McGregor, 2012). As discussed above, (in)equality and differential power are also the main subjects of concern of authors who subscribe to the depoliticization-politicization debate (e.g. Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Mouffe, 2005; Pepermans, 2015; Pepermans & Maesele, 2014; Swyngedouw, 2010). Accordingly, I contend that a more thorough understanding (of the status / development) of the differential ideological views reproduced and naturalized by Cycles of Nature and Environmental Justice is crucial to fully grasp the current problems which stifle most progress in climate change debates (and courses of action). This

⁷³ A more concise, peer reviewed and edited version of this chapter is available as a journal article: Moernaut, R., & Mast, J. (forthcoming). Fighting Carbon Dioxide, or Fighting Human? The Ideological Fault Lines Underlying Two Climate Change Frames. *International Journal of Media & Cultural Politics*, 14(2).

awareness and understanding may constitute the first steps towards more critical approaches, (broader) discussions and, possibly, (fundamental) change. Even so, environmental justice has received barely any framing research yet (see 5.1.1. Introduction). Besides, most of the existing studies only illuminate particular aspects of the issue (Billett, 2010; Doultou & Brown, 2009; Dreher & Voyer, 2015; Jia et al., 2011; Martello, 2008; Schmidt & Schäfer, 2015; Viherala, 2008). Moreover, few researchers have identified a frame that addresses human-nature relationships as such (see Table 4). The ideological struggles underlying these frames, in particular, have almost completely been overlooked.

Hence, attending to mainstream and alternative media and approaching frames as multi-level ‘frame packages’ (Van Gorp, 2007, pp.64-65), this qualitative case study will attempt to provide answers to the following research questions:

- (1) How exactly do (i.e. what is the nature of the) hegemonic struggles (which) take shape in the context of two crucial (resonant) frames in the global climate debate, Environmental Justice and Cycles of Nature?
 - a. What (latent) patterns (similarities) can be identified across the two frames?
 - b. What differences can be found between the two frames?
- (2) What is the status / nature and level of development of the anthropocentric and biocentric perspectives in the context of two differential frames?

As such, the study may illustrate and allow for broader insights into the construction and naturalization of meanings and assumptions regarding climate change and, accordingly, the crucial issue of justice. Obviously, it will also take into account the particular contexts in which the frames are produced.

5.2.2 Socio-Environmental Paradigms

Environmentalism is approached and defined from various backgrounds (Dryzek, 1997; Hopwood, Mellor & O’Brien, 2005). However, ecomodernism / reform can nowadays be considered as the dominant perspective when it comes to the struggle against (disproportionate) environmental degradation (including climate change). Drawing on a belief in full human control over (instrumentalized) nature, it argues that natural limits can be pushed back through (economic) technological progress (e.g. renewable energy) as the main problem-solver. That is, human civilization can be completely decoupled from nature; human growth and development can go on without further affecting the environment. In short, the hegemonic view looks for answers within the liberalist-capitalist society in order to handle some (unintended / unexpected) negative consequences of the development thinking (Grunwald, 2016; Unmüßig, Sachs & Fatheuer, 2012; Verhagen, 2008). Underlying this view, one may recognize the ideals of the anthropocentric paradigm. As pointed out before, this worldview – which is central to, among others, Judeo-Christian traditions – highlights values

such as (economic) development, competition and hierarchy, human ingenuity and control over nature (Dryzek, 1997; Hopwood, Mellor & O'Brien, 2005; Shanahan & McComas, 1999; Shepard, 2015; Shiva, 1988, 1993; Stibbe, 2005, 2015; Unmüßig, Sachs & Fatheuer, 2012; Verhagen, 2008).⁷⁴

Ecological sustainability and socio-economic concerns are closely intertwined. Justice connects them (e.g. Adamson, 2014; Adamson, Evans & Stein, 2015; Roos & Hunt, 2010). Western environmentalism has always partly / mostly revolved around human interests. For example, a major motive to try and halt environmental degradation is the economic well-being and safety of current and future generations, as well as the joy that 'sublime' nature provides (e.g. Agyeman & Evans, 2004; Cottle, 2000; Dryzek, 1997; Grunwald, 2016; Hopwood, Mellor & O'Brien, 2005; Remillard, 2011; Taylor, 2000; Unmüßig, Sachs & Fatheuer, 2012). More recently, environmental justice has evolved as a broadly acknowledged issue within the hegemonic debate (e.g. during the meetings of the Conference of the Parties or 'COPs' (e.g. Vihersalo, 2008)) on climate change: Certain socio-economic, gender, ethnic and/or cultural groups in society will suffer earlier and more severely from climate change consequences as they are more sensitive and/or less able to cope. These mainly encompass the subsistence class in the South but also ethnic minorities, lower socio-economic classes or women. Other groups, however, bear a large part of the responsibility for the climate problems. These mainly, but not exclusively, consist of the (elite) consumer class living in the 'dominant global regions' (the West) (Adamson, 2014; Agyeman, Bullard & Evans, 2002; Huggan & Tiffin, 2015; IPCC, 2014a, 2014b; Kasperson & Kasperson, 2001; Rees & Westra, 2003; Shiva, 1988, 1993; Taylor, 2000).⁷⁵

Summarizing, it has been quite generally accepted now that some (unintended / unexpected) side-effects of the modernist development thinking may lead to socio-economic and/or environmental injustices. Climate change is exemplary: development in some time-spaces has some – unavoidable – consequences for other time-spaces. However, these are, presumably, mainly due to a combination of (small) system faults – like political misuse or unethical or suboptimal applications of technology, knowledge or power – as well as the 'underdeveloped', 'primitive' or 'passive' state of certain areas, species or social groups, which is further exacerbated by extra stresses like climate change. Hence, it is argued that both (i.e. system faults and underdevelopment) can be rectified through faster development (Alexander, 2007; Baer et al., 2000; Bankoff, 2001; Dalhgren & Chakrapani, 1982; De Lucia, 2009; Dryzek, 1997; Grunwald, 2016; IPCC, 2014a, 2014b; Huggan & Tiffin, 2015; Meister, 1997; Shiva, 1988, 1993; Verhagen, 2008).

⁷⁴ See also: Adamson (2014), Prelli and Winters (2009), Larson (2011), Rees and Westra (2003), Remillard (2011), Ritchie and Thomas (2015).

⁷⁵ See also: Adamson, Evans and Stein (2015), Cameron (2012), Čapek (1993), De Lucia (2009), de Onís (2012), Kurtz (2003), McLaren (2003), Philips and Sexton (1999), Sen (1999, 2009), Sze and London (2008).

Clearly, this view fails to fundamentally question the premises of the modernist economic-technological growth ideal (and thus, the liberalist-capitalist society) that has caused the very (multi-level) socio-environmental problems which we are facing today. This includes the rebound effects of the solutions provided by this thinking. That is, the existing hegemonic responses to climate change have been criticized for preventing us to see what the actual issues of climate change – and, thus, climate injustice – are, and to act on them accordingly. In short, as long as the modernist progress thinking defines our environmental thinking, true change is impossible. Several critical voices point out that environmental views rooted in ‘Euro-American anthropocentrism’ merely help to justify and naturalize the exploitation of both distant and abstract nature as well as those human beings who are considered to be closer to nature and/or less developed. The domination of western (male) elites over other humans (e.g. women, the South) is said to lead to, and reinforce, the domination over nature and vice versa (e.g. Adamson, 2014; Alexander, 2007; Huggan & Tiffin, 2014; Lohmann, 2008; Rees & Westra, 2003; Roos & Hunt, 2010; Sen, 1999, 2009). Shiva (1988) argues, for example:

The domination of the South by the North, of women by men, of nature by westernized man are now being identified as being rooted in the domination inherent to the worldview created by western man over the last three centuries through which he could subjugate or exclude the rest of humanity on grounds of humanity (p.28).

More specifically, ‘development’ – the globalization of the ‘rational consensus’ of anthropocentric thinking and acting through the transfer of money, means or knowledge – is said to lead to and reinforce several levels of injustice. Reconfirming human-human and human-nature inequalities, hegemonic (top-down) solutions are likely to give rise to various rebound effects. Fraser (2000, 2005) contends that they may destruct livelihoods or ecological systems (material / economic maldistribution), local / bottom-up knowledge or the guiding role of nature (cultural misrecognition) as well as democracy (political misrepresentation) (e.g. Adamson, 2014; Agyeman, Bullard & Evans, 2002; Bankoff, 2001; Beck, 2000; Čapek, 1993; De Lucia, 2009; Grunwald, 2016; Huggan & Tiffin, 2015; Norton, 2014; Rees & Westra, 2003; Sen, 1999, 2009; Shiva, 1988, 1993; Unmüßig, Sachs & Fatheuer, 2012).⁷⁶ Lohmann (2008) argues, for example, that carbon trading draws the attention away from fundamental, long-term changes and encourages ‘scattered stop-lap measures’. Allowing countries, companies or other players to buy emission cuts, it tends to abstract where and how the cuts are made and whether they actually contribute to change. The author points out, for instance, that hydraulic dams or wind farm sites in the Global South (funded by the Global West) may – in theory – contribute to GHG reduction, but – in practice – may have detrimental socio-economic consequences for local communities (e.g. destroying livelihoods) or unpredictable effects on ecosystems (e.g. cutting of migration paths of animals). Besides, they may result in the loss of valuable local knowledge, for instance of sustainable farming traditions like low-carbon

⁷⁶ See also: Adamson, Evans and Stein (2015), Agyeman and Evans (2004), Alexander (2007), Brulle (2010), Cameron (2012), Endres (2012), Hopke (2012), Remillard (2011), Roosvall & Tegelberg (2012, 2013, 2015), Smith (2007), Verhagen (2008), Sze and London (2008).

irrigation systems. As the latter are considered as primitive and unproductive, they are displaced by 'more developed' technologies. That is, while the important (potential) contributions of the latter are ignored, the focus lies on influential heavy polluters with access (means, money, knowledge) to technological innovations. The cutting of rainforests to sustain the globalized (unsustainable, unjust) meat and milk industries is an other telling example of the ways in which the survival, safety or harmony of the global natural system (including humans) are sacrificed for the sake of the economic interests (and beliefs) of a small group.

Perspectives that try to provide a fundamental alternative are, accordingly, concerned with the 'transformation' of society (Hopwood, Mellor & O'Brien, 2005) or 'degrowth' (Grunwald, 2016). Drawing on biocentric ideals – which are pivotal in more traditional natural societies and religions, such as Shintoism or Celtic religion – they denounce growth as perverse and call for human moderation. Central values are equality among all humans and humans and nature, mutual interconnectedness, cooperation and diversity. All living beings are recognized as possessing intrinsic value and autonomy (e.g. Adamson, 2014; Dryzek, 1997; Hopkins, 2008; Hopwood, Mellor & O'Brien, 2005; Naess, 1973; Shiva, 1988, 1993; Stibbe, 2015; Verhagen, 2008).⁷⁷ Transformation or de-growth does not necessarily exclude technology as an answer to the current socio-environmental crisis, but incorporates it into a broader context of fundamental socio-economic, political and cultural change. Put differently, only a combination of material / economic redistribution (e.g. restoring livelihoods or ecosystems or simply leaving them be), cultural recognition (recognition of what nature or local, grassroots traditions may teach us) and political representation (democracy, equality of all) can give rise to true justice (Alexander, 2007; Bankoff, 2001; De Lucia, 2009; de Onís, 2012; Dryzek, 1997; Fraser, 2000, 2005; Hulme, 2009; Roos & Hunt, 2010; Sen, 1999, 2009; Scandrett, Crowther & McGregor, 2012; Shanahan & McComas, 1999; Shiva, 1988, 1993; Verhagen, 2008). Living in harmony with nature and with others may reduce the vulnerability of all (see Agyeman & Evans, 2004).

Summarizing, then, injustice and inequality are at the roots of climate change; understanding inequality is understanding climate change (e.g. Agyeman, Bullard & Evans, 2002; Agyeman & Evans, 2004; De Lucia, 2009; Kasperson & Kasperson, 2001; McLaren, 2003; Rees & Westra, 2003; Sze & London, 2008; Scandrett, Crowther & McGregor, 2012). In other words, (unlimited) human development – that is, the appropriation of global commons by small groups – is at the roots of the climate problem. This anthropocentric system can only be sustained through the suffering of human and natural out-groups. As demonstrated, these inequalities can be situated on various levels. Injustice (towards other humans and nature) is defined in different ways (e.g. Agyeman & Evans, 2004; De Lucia, 2009; Čapek, 1993; Huggan & Tiffin, 2015; Philips & Sexton, 1999; Scandrett, Crowther & McGregor, 2012; Shiva, 1988,

⁷⁷ See also: Larson (2011), Remillard (2011), Roos and Hunt (2010), Shanahan and McComas (1999), Shepard (2015), Unmüßig, Sachs and Fatheuer (2012).

1993; Taylor, 2000): It is generally recognized now that the capitalist-liberalist development project has more negative consequences for some groups and some areas than for others. However, it is usually overlooked that (the reproduction of) fundamental human-human and human-nature inequalities is the very ingredient that sustains this hegemonic thinking. As argued, one's positionality strongly defines how one thinks and talks about, and thus constructs, climate and climate justice (Pulido & Peña, 1998; Taylor, 2000). Depending on one's interpretation and definition of inequality, one is likely to come up with other – more or less constructive – solutions. As inequality and injustice are at the very heart of (the argumentation of) the two selected frames, Environmental Justice and Cycles of Nature, those are even more than other frames crucial for the naturalization, rationalization or universalization of particular – more or less constructive – views on (climate) justice. Therefore, a critical, in-depth discussion of the status and development of the various ideological perspectives (i.e. the hegemonic struggle) underlying these frames is paramount. By raising more awareness and a more thorough understanding of the climate debate, this discussion may constitute a first step towards more fundamental justice and equality.

5.2.3 Mainstream and Alternative Framing

I have extensively defined framing in Chapter 2 (2.2 Defining Frames and Framing). Drawing on authors like Entman (1991, 1993, 2004), Gamson (1989, 1992), Gamson and Modigliani (1989), Stibbe (2015), Tankard (2001) and Van Gorp (2006, 2007), I argued that a frame is an immanent structuring idea which gives coherence and meaning to a text. Framing, then, is applying a particular frame to structure an area of life: It involves selecting, omitting, expanding and giving salience to certain aspects of a perceived reality in a text, providing context and suggesting a particular problem definition, causal responsibility, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation to the audience. Frames always help to naturalize or reproduce ideologies.

In Chapter 3.1.2 (Alternative Media) I argued that mainstream and alternative media have differing positionalities (Pulido & Peña, 1998; Taylor, 2000). Mainstream media tend to have a top-down positionality, while alternative media are rather bottom-up, in terms of their position in the broader (political, economic, cultural) context, their content, and their production process (e.g. Atton, 2002, 2003; Downing, 2001, 2003; Harcup, 2003, 2014). Depending on their positionality, media are likely to promote different types of (sub)frames (see 4.5.4 Quantitative Overview): It is more likely for alternative media than for mainstream media to promote counter-hegemonic ideologies. Yet, that does not preclude the possibility that they may also reproduce hegemonic views or that mainstream outlets employ alternative subframes (Brand & Brunnengraber, 2012; Doulton & Brown, 2009; Farbotko, 2005; Gunster, 2011, 2012; Hopke, 2012; Pepermans, 2015; Schmidt & Schäfer, 2015; Viherala, 2008).

5.2.4 Research Design

The research design which I discussed in Chapter 4 is also applicable here. Inspired by the methodology presented by Van Gorp (2006, 2007), I conducted an inductive-deductive qualitative framing analysis (see Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Glaser & Strauss, 1968) on a corpus of 1.256 climate change news articles from three mainstream and two alternative news outlets in Flanders. After finalizing my analyses, I separated the articles that employ a dominant Cycles of Nature Frame (n=652) or Environmental Justice Frame (n= 262) from the rest of the corpus.

After briefly discussing the Environmental Justice and Cycles of Nature Frames, this paper will provide an extensive, qualitative discussion of the subframes underlying these frames. First, I will shed light on the anthropocentric paradigm and the ways in which it manifests itself in both hegemonic subframes. Afterwards, I will compare these findings in a qualitative discussion of the non-hegemonic subframes.

5.2.5 Results

In Chapter 4 and 5.2, I have already (briefly) introduced the Cycles of Nature and Environmental Justice Frames as well as the frame matrices (see Appendix 2: Frame Matrices) which help to summarize them. Clearly, the topics of concern highlighted by these two frames are quite different. The Cycles of Nature Frame argues that the natural system, including humans, is being threatened by the acting of humans. Hence, humans are responsible for changing their acting and interacting with the rest of the world. The Environmental Justice Frame, on the other hand, highlights the unequal distribution of benefits and burdens among various human groups in society.

The aim of the following discussion, however, is to demonstrate exactly how the anthropocentric-biocentric ideological fault line is realized through the subframes underlying these two differential frames. As for the Cycles of Nature Frame I will make a distinction between the anthropocentric Scala Naturae Subframe (Shepard, 2015; Verhagen, 2008) and the biocentric Natural Web Subframe (Shepard, 2015; Verhagen, 2008). Authors like Brand and Brunnengräber (2012), Gordon, Deines and Havice (2010) or Olausson (2009) introduce ‘frames’ which contain one or several of the arguments underlying either or both of these subframes. The Environmental Justice Frame overarches the anthropocentric Unequal Vulnerability Subframe and the biocentric Unequal Attribution Subframe (e.g. Billett, 2010; Doulton & Brown, 2009; Dreher & Voyer, 2015; Hopke, 2012; Jia et al., 2011; Manzo, 2010b; Martello, 2008; Schmidt & Schäfer, 2015; Vihersalo, 2008; Weik von Mossner, 2011).

5.2.5.1 *Hegemonic and Counter-Hegemonic Narrators*

The mainstream outlets, which produce most Anthropocentric Subframes, mainly work with (western) professional journalists. The alternative outlets, which have most counter-hegemonic subframes,

primarily publish articles written by alternative thinkers or think tanks, representatives of socio-environmental (grassroots) movements or (western or southern) citizen journalists. Those often show great familiarity with local situations or bottom-up concerns. As activist journalists (Atton, 2002; Downing, 2003) or moral journalists (Wiesslitz & Ashuri, 2011), they try to shed light on, and denounce, unjust situations in which they are involved or which they have witnessed, such as the exploitation of nature and/or humans. Mainly appearing in op-eds, however, the biocentric Natural Web Subframe is promoted by a small, rather homogenous group of authors, most of them with backgrounds in NGOs or alternative think tanks (see 4.5.4 Quantitative Overview). Accordingly, the hegemonic subframes mostly focus on top-down sources, such as (western) officials, economic sources, (mainstream) NGOs or scientists. These are presented as authoritative and trustworthy (see e.g. Farbotko, 2005; Nielsen & Kjaergaard, 2011; Nisbet, 2009; Roosvall & Tegelberg, 2012, 2013, 2015; Schlichting, 2013; Weathers & Kendall, 2015; Wessler et al., 2016). If bottom-up groups are quoted, they are merely secondary (less salient / less legitimate) sources and/or '(victim-)witnesses' (Roosvall & Tegelberg, 2013), who (are) only (allowed to) mimic the hegemonic discourse in order to be heard (e.g. Bankoff, 2001; Beck, 2000; Entman & Rojecki, 1993; Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012; Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993; Gitlin, 1980; Takahashi & Meisner, 2012). Besides, due to a particularly strong focus on scientific sources, *Scala Naturae* largely depicts climate as a scientific issue (see Antilla, 2005; Gordon, Deines & Havice, 2010; O'Neill et al., 2015). Overall, it is implied that climate change is mainly a (scientific-technological or economic) problem to be addressed by a top-down, elite group (e.g. De Lucia, 2009; Dryzek, 1997; Grunwald, 2016; Lohmann, 2008; Larson, 2011; Swyngedouw, 2010). Unsurprisingly then, many articles contain (implicit) intertextual references to the IPCC (2014a, 2014b) reports or other scientific documents, which are presented as *the* authoritative (rational) sources when it comes to climate change. In the context of *Unequal Vulnerability*, in particular, we can also find references to top-down documents like the Kyoto Protocol (1997) or the Millennium Development Goals (see e.g. Mugambiwa & Tirivangasi, 2017). The Biocentric Subframes, however, often amplify and legitimize the voices of bottom-up sources, like citizens or grassroots groups, or those speaking on their behalf. In the Natural Web Subframe, (non-hegemonic, bottom-up) NGOs and alternative think tanks are especially salient. These bottom-up groups are most often foregrounded as 'victim-heroes' (Roosvall & Tegelberg, 2013). Yet, other voices are also included (see Eliasoph, 1988; Greenberg, Knight & Westersund, 2011; Groshek & Han, 2011; Harcup, 2014). Hence, I argue that the non-hegemonic subframes take the discussion on climate change out of the elite scientific realm and bring it (closer) to (the bottom-up sphere in) society (Brulle, 2010; De Lucia, 2009; Fraser, 2000, 2005; Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Mouffe, 2005; Pepermans, 2015; Pepermans & Maesele, 2014; Sen, 1999, 2009; Shiva, 1988, 1993; Swyngedouw, 2010). The (implicit) intertextual references connect the argumentations to bottom-up documents such as the 'Principles of Environmental Justice' (in Taylor, 2000), adopted in 1991 by the First People of Colour Environmental Leadership Summit (*Unequal Attribution*), or the 'Universal

Declaration on the Rights of Mother Earth' (Natural Web). The latter was drafted at the 2010 World People's Conference on Climate Change in Bolivia (in Adamson, 2014).

5.2.5.2 Anthropocentric Paradigm

Causal Responsibility – Level 1: Natural Agent. Both Anthropocentric Subframes identify climate change, its consequences and (direct) causes (i.e. GHG emissions) as major independent agents. For instance, they often function as actors in material processes, like “[w]arming stimulates late winter weather” (DM, 26/03/2013, p.11 (heading)) [1] or “The sea-level rise can wipe them off the map, while the exhaustion of the oceans can deprive them of their incomes” (DWM, 12/11/2013) [2]. Alternatively, they are presented as causes (circumstances) in passive sentences or carriers in relational processes. Climate change is a quantifiable and controllable scientific fact: Numbers and percentages – characteristic for today's economic society and the scientific outlook – are prevalent (De Lucia, 2009; Grunwald, 2016; Larson, 2011; Lohmann, 2008; Stibbe, 2005, 2015; Unmüßig, Sachs & Fatheuer, 2012). For example, there is a remarkably strong focus on numbers and percentages in relation to the (increasing) GHG emissions, especially in the verbal mode (Nerlich, 2012). Graphs – as visual-verbal composites (see ‘relay’ (Martinec & Salway, 2005)) – also add to the salience of numerical data (e.g. DS, 13/09/2013, p.44; HLN, 21/06/2012, p.6; MO, 01/02/2014), giving rise to scientific truth (Nocke, 2014) (see below). These are, however, almost exclusive to the Scala Naturae Subframe. Further, phrases like “the battle against global warming” (DS, 25/11/2013, p.14) [3] foreground a largely human-external villain, making the war metaphor pivotal. Scala Naturae, in particular, highlights climate change as an enemy that we need to collectively fight. A phrase such as “The collective enemy is climate change (...)” (MO, 24/11/2012) [4] is exemplary (Cohen, 2011; Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Ritchie & Thomas, 2015; Swyngedouw, 2010; Vihersalo, 2008).

The visual elaborates on and extends the verbal strategies. The previously discussed ‘sublimation’ strategy (see 5.1.5.2 Causal Responsibility) is crucial in this regard (see e.g. Chouliaraki, 2006; Cottle, 2000; Grittmann, 2014; Hansen & Machin, 2008; Hughes, 2012; Messaris, 1997; O’Neill, 2013, 2017; O’Neill et al., 2013; Remillard, 2011). Both subframes often show us spectacular air views or satellite images of devastated landscapes, flooded areas (e.g. DWM, 20/11/2013), communities or eco-systems on the verge of extinction (e.g. DS, 18/10/2013, p.21), melting polar caps (e.g. DM, 26/07/2012, p.2), burning woods. These devastating consequences stand, as metonyms, for the natural causes (Grittmann, 2014; Hahn, Eide & Ali, 2012). Just like the globes in Scala Naturae (e.g. DWM, 28/08/2012; HLN, 21/06/2012, p.6) or maps in both subframes (e.g. DM, 15/09/2012, p.8-9; DS, 18/10/2013, p.21; HLN, 09/08/2012, p.12), they are likely to distance us from the scenes ‘below’, inviting us to contemplate the large-scale (external) natural forces rather than to feel responsibility or engagement. Scala Naturae, in particular, often visually depicts the idea of climate change by means of warm (red, orange) hues (e.g. DWM, 21/11/2013), standing for heat or danger. This conventional colour symbolism (Kress & van

Leeuwen, 2006) is also likely to oversimplify the current causes, narrowing them down to (heat) changes in the environment. As said, being connected with sensory truth (see Doyle, 2007, 2009; Mahony & Hulme, 2014; Manzo, 2010b; O'Neill, 2013), colour metaphors / metonyms may add to the salience of the argumentation.⁷⁸

Generally speaking, I conclude that the prevalence of visual sublimations or symbolism and verbal nominalizations or personified inhumane processes as well as the (visual-verbal) emphasis on numbers in both subframes serves to largely background the underlying human agent, focusing on the threat of climate change instead. Combined with recurring (visual-verbal) dramatic style choices (e.g. accumulations, hyperboles, (colour) contrasts), the hegemonic subframes convey a sense of urgency (Doulton & Brown, 2009; Foust & O'Shannon Murphy, 2009; Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Nisbet, 2009; O'Neill, 2013, 2017; O'Neill et al., 2015; Painter, 2013; Swyngedouw, 2010).

Causal Responsibility – Level 2: Underlying Human Agent. Nevertheless, the Anthropocentric Subframes do identify the underlying responsibilities of humans: emitting GHG, sticking to the status-quo ideal of excessive growth (i.e. strong dependence on fossil fuels as sources of GHG emissions) and/or refusing to adapt or mitigate their emissions (Shehata & Hopmann, 2012). However, as already suggested, there is quite a high level of backgrounding and abstracting of responsibilities. For instance, several articles (largely) delete references to responsible human, focusing on nature as such (see above). If (generalized) 'humans' do get identified as responsible agents, their exact agency is often abstracted or backgrounded. That is, passivizations, nominalizations or attributes are used to present humans as less central to the action. For instance: "That is about a third of the amount of carbon which is emitted by human every year, and thus, it is certainly not to be neglected" (DM, 16/08/2013, p.10) [5]; "That is related to the human greenhouse effect" (HLN, 16/07/2012, p.3) [6]; "Last year, the consumption and production of coal increased in Europe, respectively with 3,6 and 2,6 percent" (DS, 15/11/2012, p.44) [7]. This is congruent with the visual mode which often depicts smoke stacks as metonyms for the (abstracted) idea of human GHG emissions (Cottle, 2000; Doyle, 2007, 2009; Grittmann, 2014; León & Erviti, 2015; O'Neill, 2013). As O'Neill (2013, 2017) points out, however, such industrial scenes – through encouraging strong negative feelings and concern – distance the responsibility from the everyday lives of ordinary humans, foregrounding the (industrial) elites as main villains (e.g. DM, 20/06/2012, p.13; HLN, 14/05/2013, p.5).

In some cases, however, human does get foregrounded as actor in material processes, or (les active) carrier in relational processes. Even then, however, full responsibility of the whole (human) in-group is not acknowledged, or only on a quite abstract level (Berglez, Höijer & Olausson, 2010; Nossek &

⁷⁸ According to Jang (2013), people who are faced with information that emphasizes the responsibilities of their in-group, are more likely to attribute climate change to an external, uncontrollable (natural) agent than people who are made aware of the excessive energy use of an out-group.

Kunelius, 2012; Olausson, 2010; Hallahan, 1999). Hero-villain narratives (Billett, 2010; Eide, 2012; Harrabin, 2000; Hendry, 2010; Wozniak, Lück & Wessler, 2015; van Dijk, 1988; Wu, 2009) are, for instance, prevalent: In the *Scala Naturae Subframe* this singling out of a multitude of individualized (e.g. ‘Canada’, ‘Shell’, ‘Obama’, ‘BMW’) or more generalized agents (mainly ‘industry’) as scapegoats tends to divert attention away from the broader context of more fundamental socio-political problems and systematic responsibilities (Cameron, 2012; Iyengar, 1990; van Dijk, 1998). In other words, these individualized villains function as metonyms for the ‘flaws in the system’ that are recognized and targeted (Dryzek, 1997; Grunwald, 2016; Hopwood, Mellor and O’Brien, 2005; Unmüßig, Sachs & Fatheuer, 2012). An argumentation like the following one is exemplary (MO, 01/08/2012):

By 2015 the Chinese CO₂ emissions will increase with another 57 to 75 percent, depending on the chosen political path. In 2010, China was still the largest producer of coal, with 3.162 billion ton. (...) The second on the ranking, the US, is far behind, with 932 billion ton [8].

It also illustrates the climate rankings of countries’ GHG emissions – visualized, for instance, in the depiction that accompanies the verbal text in which I found the quote above. Those are typical for a society preoccupied with numbers, competition and efficiency (De Lucia, 2009; Grunwald, 2016; Larson, 2011; Lohmann, 2008; Stibbe, 2005, 2015; Unmüßig, Sachs & Fatheuer, 2012). They are often made salient through their repetition across the (visual, verbal and visual-verbal) modes (elaboration). Graphs indicate, for instance, the exact amounts of GHG for which various countries (‘the largest emitters’) are responsible (DS, 26/11/2012, p.14). As Nocke (2014) points out, however, the focus on (exclusively) scientific truths may contribute to decontextualization: Reducing climate change to the essential truth of disproportionate human-induced GHG emissions may background human causes (and problems or solutions) that go beyond this measurable, natural ‘reality’ (see 2.3.3.5 Modality). The material acting often has an economic character, for example in the heading “EU bank ‘finances polluters’ ” (DWM, 15/07/2013) [9]. The responsible agent (‘they’, ‘s(he)’, ‘it’) does, in most cases, not belong to the in-group of the (Western-European) reader (van Dijk, 1998). This is likely to inhibit identification.⁷⁹ There are exceptions, though. For instance, “We are currently consuming every year fifty percent more natural resources than the Earth is able to produce during that time period. We are not only using up interests, but are also cutting into our capital” (HLN, 21/06/2012, p.6) [10]. Note the economic-utilitarian character of the argumentation, and the outlook on nature (e.g. ‘interests’, ‘our capital’) (see Problem Definition below).

However, the ‘we’ in the last example can be interpreted as an ‘inclusive we’ or rather as a ‘broader, collective we’. Indeed, as Fairclough (2000) points out, ‘we’ is a slippery and vague (deictic) pronoun, which can denote different groups in different (communication / interpretation) contexts (see Langacker,

⁷⁹ Jang (2013) points out that attributing responsibility to an out-group prevents awareness among the audience (‘in-group’) concerning the larger human responsibilities (and, accordingly, their own responsibilities).

1993; Machin & Mayr, 2012; Richardson, 2007; Verschueren, 2011). More specifically, the potential implications of ‘we’ and ‘us’ largely depend on broader argumentations or the interaction with other framing and reasoning devices. In the context of *Scala Naturae* it can, for instance, both be used to (implicitly) single out particular (individualized) villains (e.g. the in-group of the Belgian author and his / her readers) as well as to overgeneralize the idea of human responsibility (‘collective we’, generic, global human, disconnected from specific time-spaces). The latter may help to background the (historical) inequalities among the responsibilities of various human groups (see Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Manzo, 2010a, 2010b; Swyngedouw, 2010). The same could, moreover, be said about the abstracting strategies (passivizations, nominalizations or attributes, like ‘human-induced emissions’) or the visual metonym of the smoke stack described above. At first glance, the two interpretations seem to contradict each other. In the end, however, both individualizations as well as overgeneralizations may strongly simplify responsibilities, largely preventing us from seeing structural socio-political, economic or cultural problems or inequalities. The latter can, arguably, be situated on a level in-between the overly specific and the overly abstract, where various participants interact in complex ways in particular time-spaces (see decontextualization (Cameron, 2012; Iyengar, 1990; van Dijk, 1998)).

Obviously, ‘we’ may also act as a diffuse pronoun in the context of *Unequal Vulnerability* (see also the decontextualizing passivizations, nominalizations or attributes referred to above). However, being embedded in an argumentative context that implicitly / explicitly draws our attention to the disproportionate responsibility of western humans, the inclusive interpretation (the in-group of the Belgian / western author and his readers) is usually made more salient than the collective one. For example, rather vague references to ‘we’ or ‘us’ are often juxtaposed with identifications of ‘the West’ or ‘the industrialized / developed countries’ as main responsible agents. These (generalized) agents usually act in abstract (destructive) material processes, the abstractions largely backgrounding the actual responsibilities or the nature of the actions (see Machin & Mayr, 2012). For example, “The industrialized North has emitted by far the most GHG since the beginning of the industrialization (...)” (MO, 20/05/2012) [11]. Individualized foes (e.g. ‘the US’) are frequently singled out from the more general us-group and located outside of it (‘they’), as often happens in the *Scala Naturae* Subframe (see decontextualization). Accordingly, the smoke stacks in the visual mode are often firmly situated in the (western) space-time of the audience and/or in a particular (western) country through verbal references in caption, title or body text. For instance, a photograph shows a smoke stack during nighttime on which Greenpeace is projecting the text: “Climate change starts here”. The caption reads: “During COP19 Greenpeace is campaigning against the polluting industry in Poland” (DWM, 14/11/2013) [12]. ‘COP19’ refers to the (elite) nations who had gathered in Poland at the time to discuss climate change (action) and which may be linked – it is suggested – to the implied responsibility in the depiction. ‘Poland’, however clearly singles out a more specific scapegoat (elaboration, enhancement). Summarizing, the issue is, again, often decontextualized, as a battle between the good ‘small emitters’

and the bad ‘big emitters’ (Billett, 2010; Schmidt & Schäfer, 2015; Vihersalo, 2008; van Dijk, 1998; Wu, 2009).

The collective of visual-verbal strategies in both subframes – that is, the focus on a natural agent; the representation of abstract, generic ‘human’ or ‘the West’ as responsible agent, distant from people’s daily experiences; the singling out of external foes (‘they’) – may distance the western audience from their responsibilities (see O’Neill, 2013, 2017). That is, people are likely – and are invited – to partly ignore a reality that is threatening their own identity and (economic) interests (see Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Graber, 1988; Norgaard, 2006; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Sandvik, 2008; van Dijk, 1998).

Problem Definition. Clearly, the reasoning underlying the Unequal Vulnerability Subframe does not leave any doubt about its human-centred character. *Scala Naturae*, on the other hand, appears to take a broader scope. In the end, however, all comes down to the interests of (‘western’) human, at the top of the natural ladder (e.g. Dryzek, 1997; Hulme, 2004; Larson, 2011; Remillard, 2011; Shanahan & McComas, 1999; Shepard, 2015; Verhagen, 2008). For instance, quite some references can be found to ‘our planet’ or ‘climate’ under threat or to climate change consequences (often in terms of weather) which may affect the whole system. Nevertheless, through strategies such as salience, contrast or juxtaposition it is usually human who is foregrounded and distanced from the rest of the system. For instance, in the phrase “We have been aware for a while now that the polar caps are going to melt and all of us will get wet feet soon. But the warming of our climate also has more direct consequences” (DS, 17/10/2013, p.9) [13] the ambiguous ‘we’ or ‘us’ (Fairclough, 2000; Langacker, 1993) implicitly gets an exclusive human interpretation through the reference to ‘feet’, which is not used for most other species. The usage of the possessive ‘our’ implies that nature is there for human usage (Heuberger, 2007; Stibbe, 2015). The visual mode elaborates on this. For instance, when depicting extreme weather events as metonyms for climate change (e.g. Brönnimann, 2002, Manzo, 2010a) – like heat waves or excessive rainfall – human agents or human environments, like cityscapes, are usually singled out (e.g. HLN, 31/12/2013, p.16-17).

Indeed, common to both subframes is that they clearly separate human from the rest of nature. The environment is often largely or entirely backgrounded as an abstract scientific object or resource for humans (Dryzek, 1997; Heuberger, 2007; Meister, 1997; Remillard, 2011; Shanahan & McComas, 1999; Stibbe, 2015; Verhagen, 2008). That is, nature is mainly depicted as the EN-vironment, which surrounds humans and serves their needs (e.g. ‘fossil fuel and oil fields’). If it fails to do so, it is meaningless (Larson, 2011). The prevalent air views, satellite images or globes, for instance, position humans (as ‘pilots’, ‘astronauts’ or ‘scientists’) above abstract nature and render the latter manageable and easy to control and manipulate (e.g. Hughes, 2012; Manzo, 2010a, 2010b). However, its weakening

and changing is also likely to affect humans and their interests.⁸⁰ As Ritchie and Thomas (2015) contend, the (verbal / visual) metaphor / metonym of the globe may also stand for – or be associated with – the (vulnerability) of the humans ‘down there’, with their hopes, dreams, traditions, daily activities (see Hughes, 2012). It may, however, overgeneralize the idea of vulnerability too, deflating the actual unequal suffering of various groups in nature and among humans. That is, it may largely do away with nuance and broader contextualizations (see Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Lester & Cottle, 2009; Manzo, 2010a, 2010b; Swyngedouw, 2010). The frequent juxtaposition of extreme weather and humans, which I referred to above, is also illustrative. This is a particularly prevalent strategy in the context of Unequal Vulnerability (DWM, 14/01/2014). Further, sentences like “Far too few people realize that the Arctic is *the* climate controller – let us say, the air conditioning – of this globe” (HLN, 16/10/2012, p.12) [14] illustrate the underlying metaphor, ‘nature is a machine’, which is dominant throughout the hegemonic paradigm (Verhagen, 2008).

In many cases, however, the subframes may zoom in very strongly on one part of the ‘machine’ that is affected or ‘broken’. *Scala Naturae* is mainly concerned with particular species like the polar bear (e.g. DM, 07/12/2013, p.49; MO, 05/02/2013), the hedgehog (e.g. HLN, 18/12/2013, p.9) or the butterfly (e.g. DS, 29/05/2012, p.9), or with specific ecological systems, such as the Arctic (e.g. DM, 20/09/2013, p.4) or the Baltic sea (e.g. DWM, 23/10/2012). Both subframes, and Unequal Vulnerability in particular, foreground certain areas (and their inhabitants), such as Kiribati (DS, 18/10/2013, p.21) or ‘Uummannaq, an old settlement in the North of Greenland’ (DM, 25/01/2014, p.54), or crops, like coffee (MO, 01/10/2012). Articles focusing on one (or multiple) of those victims usually provide a photograph of the singled out victims, area or ecosystem in question (repetition / congruence). However, maps with colour codes or labels are also often used to pinpoint particular (the most) vulnerable groups or areas (e.g. DS, 26/09/2012, p.10; HLN, 09/08/2012, p.12; DM, 15/11/2013, p.12-13) (elaboration). As Larson (2011) contends, however, this ‘pigeonholes’ and decontextualizes the threat, hampering our understanding of the extensive, complex and interactive natural web, which includes all living beings, also humans (Doyle, 2007, 2009; Hansen & Machin, 2008; Hart, 2011; Iyengar, 1990; Lester & Cottle, 2009; Manzo, 2010a, 2010b; van Dijk, 1998; Verhagen, 2008). In short, it separates us from the rest of the system, preventing us from seeing how the victims are connected to our own time-space (and thus, our actions to theirs, and vice versa). This is further reinforced by the multimodal choices which I will discuss in the next two paragraphs. The choice for a particular piece of the system is largely based on the (economic, aesthetic, scientific...) values humans allocate to it. So, in the end, it largely comes down to the superior human interests. For instance, “Caribbean banana industry endangered” (DWM, 27/01/2014) [15] or “Mighty species are still living on Antarctica today; next to penguins, there are

⁸⁰ See Asplund, Hjerpe and Wibeck (2013), Billett (2010), Doulton and Brown (2009), Foust and O’Shannon Murphy (2009), Gordon, Deines and Havice (2010), Jia et al. (2011), Kenix (2008a, 2008b), O’Neill et al. (2015), Nisbet (2009), Painter (2013), Schmidt and Schäfer (2015), Shehata and Hopmann (2012), Vihersalo (2008), Weathers and Kendall (2015)

immense squids, wild seals, predators and precious kinds of birds” (DM, 17/07/2013, p.2) [16]. Note that the enumeration / accumulation may add salience to the argument. Grittmann (2014), Cottle (2000) or Remillard (2011) contend that visuals, in particular, are often aimed at activating pervasive (western / anthropocentric) traditions of sublime, beautiful, untouched nature which is there for humans to enjoy. They maintain that contrasting this ideal with the devastation caused by human(-induced climate change) may evoke strong emotions. In this context, the polar bear has been described as a particularly powerful, awe inspiring ‘condensation symbol’ that represents human fear for climate change (Cox, 2010; DiFrancesco & Young, 2010; O’Neill, 2013, 2017; Swim & Bloodhart, 2015). Smith and Joffe (2009) argue, for instance, that the contrast of the powerful mammal and the idea of death through climate change may incite feelings of despair. However, being turned into a visual cliché or ‘visiotype’ (Hahn, Eide & Ali, 2012) it may also become a meaningless or even counter-productive image (Grittmann, 2014; Manzo, 2010a). As I will point out below, I found this (visual) symbol throughout my corpus.

As expected, the Unequal Vulnerability Subframe expands this hierarchal view to humans living in close interaction with nature. Accordingly, both subframes apply similar strategies for highlighting the ‘o/Otherness’ (Chouliaraki, 2006) of particular human and natural ‘out-groups’ (van Dijk, 1998): They separate ‘western human’ from ‘nature’ as well as ‘the South’ depicting the latter two groups as (internally / eternally) weak, passive, helpless and unable to change. This happens, among others, through the frequent usage of identifications (which highlight ‘who or what one is’). ‘Vulnerable’ is a common linguistic predication in both subframes, as is a name like ‘victim(s)’. *Scala Naturae* often refers to species as being ‘endangered’ while the Unequal Vulnerability Subframe describes people as ‘defenceless’, ‘dependent’ or ‘the poor’. Both subframes draw on congruent strategies in the visual mode, employing, for instance, symbols (i.e. metonyms / metaphors) of vulnerability or helplessness. As said, polar bears (or other singled out species) often function as ‘visiotypes’ (Hahn, Eide & Ali, 2012) in the *Scala Naturae* Subframe. *The* (western) metaphor of the Unequal Vulnerability Subframe is the vulnerable child in the South, which stands for the vulnerability of a whole group of people (metonym) (Ali, James & Vultee, 2013; Chouliaraki, 2006; Hahn, Eide & Ali, 2012; Höijer, 2004; Jia et al., 2011; Manzo, 2010a, 2010b; Perlmutter, 1998) (e.g. HLN, 28/09/2013, p.8; DS, 12/11/2013, p.6; MO, 14/11/2013). Clearly, both replace the individual (with particular characteristics, living in a particular time-space) with the (overgeneralized, generic) ‘type’, contributing to the oversimplification and decontextualization (of the causes) of the suffering (e.g. Cameron, 2012; Hansen & Machin, 2008; Hart, 2011; Iyengar, 1990; van Dijk, 1998). Overall, the victims tend to appear in groups or as abstract entities, rather than as individuals: Verbally, they are referred to in generic, collectivizing terms, uncountable or mass nouns or numbers and percentages. This also distances them and hinders audience identification (e.g. Chouliaraki, 2006; Hart, 2011; Manzo, 2010a, 2010b; Swim & Bloodhart, 2015). For instance: “(...) a fraction of the total polar bear stock, which is estimated to be more than twenty

thousand animals” (DM, 13/08/2013, p.10) [17]; “In the South, the majority of the population lives in the most vulnerable areas (...)” (DWM, 29/10/2012) [18]; “Out of every 100 Dominicans, 34 are poor and 10 are very poor, according to the United Nations” (MO, 26/07/2012) [19] (e.g. Batziou, 2011; Chouliaraki, 2006; Dreher & Voyer, 2015; Farbotko, 2005; Heuberger, 2007; Larson, 2011; Martello, 2008; Roosvall & Tegelberg, 2012, 2013, 2015).⁸¹ Visually, the people in the Unequal Vulnerability Subframe are often depicted as large groups of anonymous or faceless victims, connected through similarity, consonance or overlap (e.g. MO, 12/07/2012). In both subframes, we often see humans *and* natural victims from a public or social distance and a high angle. The previously discussed air views, maps, satellite images or globes (e.g. DM, 28/12/2012, p.12; DWM, 23/10/2013; MO, 21/09/2012) take this to an extreme: They abstract the victims or make them largely or entirely invisible. As such, they are likely to ‘Other’ (Chouliaraki, 2006) them completely (e.g. Borah, 2009; Batziou, 2011; Hansen & Machin, 2008; Hughes, 2012; Huxford, 2001; Lester & Cottle, 2009; Manzo, 2010a, 2010b; Martello, 2008; Messaris, 1997; Scott, 2014). As argued before, this is likely to completely conceal the ways in which the time-space of the audience is connected to the time-space of the ‘O/others’.

The processes in which these vulnerable groups are involved further underscore the idea of internal weakness and passivity, highlighting the contrast and distance between the active us-group and the passive other (‘them’). For instance, relational, existential and intransitive behavioural processes (see visual analytical and symbolic (suggestive) processes, non-transactional actions) are quite dominant in the visual and verbal modes, reinforcing each other. Relational and existential processes emphasize the idea of these groups as merely being, associating them with the attributes, names or symbolic (metonymic / metaphoric) associations referred to above. All types of processes emphasize, furthermore, that the victims are not or barely able to interact with their environment, let alone to improve their situation. For instance, ‘they are vulnerable’, ‘they are under threat’, ‘they suffer’, ‘they do not have the means’. Visual depictions of humans or animals just standing, sitting, walking, ‘being’ (i.e. lacking vectors originating with the victims) are prevalent. Exemplary are, among others, the images of polar bears, (motionlessly) standing on floating ice shelves. Similar conventions are also used to depict vulnerable humans in the polar regions (e.g. DWM, 12/11/2012; DM, 21/05/2013, p.16) (see intertextuality). The sense of passivization is further reinforced by the prevalent (world) maps, air views, satellite images or globes. Those also mainly suggest a relation between a carrier (a certain group) and an attribute (e.g. vulnerability, often conveyed through colour symbolism) (see above). But even if the affected participants are depicted as agents in (negated) material processes, the same ideas are usually reinforced: They only hold ‘conditional agency’ (Chouliaraki, 2006); the acting (or merely ‘happening’) will not fundamentally change their situation, is involuntary (based on instinct) and/or only heightens

⁸¹ See also Bankoff (2001), Cameron (2012), Cottle (2000), Dalhgren and Chakrapani (1982), Farbotko (2005), Lester & Cottle (2009), Manzo (2010a, 2010b), Remillard (2011), Schmidt and Schäfer (2015), Scott (2014), Shanahan and McComas (1999), Shiva (1988, 1993), Stibbe (2015), Verhagen (2008), Vihersalo (2008).

their vulnerability. For instance, ‘they bury the dead’, ‘they lose’ or ‘they do not alter’ their habits (e.g. HLN, 18/12/2013, p.9; DM, 25/01/2014, p.54). The changes in nature (i.e. the loss of resilience, diversity, size etc.) are often suggested by means of visual contrasts. For instance, a satellite photo shows the extent of glacial ice in 2000 and 2010 (DWM, 19/06/2012) (see Brönnimann, 2002; Doyle, 2007, 2009; Huxford, 2001; León & Erviti, 2015; Manzo, 2010a). Those strategies interact – and are congruent – with the dominant passive constructions: Verbally, the victims often appear as patients, goals, beneficiaries or recipients, merely undergoing the actions of others. For instance: “On the 25th of October last year, the island was hit by hurricane Sandy. Eleven people got killed” (MO, 10/06/2013) [20] or “Climate change affects half of the animals and a third of the plants” (HLN, 14/05/2013, p.5) [21]. Visually, the lack of gaze, and thus contact, between the spectator and the depicted victims foregrounds the latter as passive, distant others (offer) (Batziou, 2011; Chouliaraki, 2006; Scott, 2014) (see visual-verbal congruence). They are being watched by the spectators, but they do not have the power to return their gaze. For instance, a depiction of a group of polar bears staring into the distance (DWM, 05/02/2013) is not so different from a photograph of a group of young survivors whose gazes are directed outside of the picture frame (DS, 12/11/2013, p.4). As described above, no vectors are originating with these participants. However, a minority does make visual contact by looking the spectator in the eye. This may bring them somewhat closer to the audience. The ability to formulate visual demands for help (see conditional agency) is mostly associated with the human victims in the Unequal Vulnerability Subframe rather than with the animals in Scala Naturae (e.g. MO, 15/05/2013; DM, 26/12/2013, p.8). Summarizing, then, the out-groups are largely deprived of the possibility to act for themselves or even to make justice claims (Dreher & Voyer, 2015; Farbotko, 2005; Fraser, 2000, 2005; Roosvall & Tegelberg, 2012, 2013, 2015; Scott, 2014; Stibbe, 2015).

As the examples illustrate, the focus mainly lies on material and/or economic injustices, like the loss of lives, health, safety or economic stability. Secondly, there are some references to cultural identity misrecognition: Due to climatic changes, human or natural traditions (e.g. ways of living, migration patterns) are disrupted or endangered (Fraser, 2000, 2005). For example, “The mild weather confuses nature. The song thrushes are in spring mood, pigeons are building nests and the catkins at the hazel trees are swelling” (HLN, 18/12/2013, p.9) [22]. In *De Morgen* (DM, 25/01/2014, p.54), a rather emotional (i.e. potentially salient) narrative about the quickly changing traditions (from hunting and fishing to ‘modern’ activities, like running shops) in the North of Greenland concludes with the words: “But that is how life goes now for Uunartoq Lovstrom, Alberth Lukassen and those other small Greenlanders. For a little longer” [23]. While this particular example does foreground a number of individuals, they mainly function as passive (identified) ‘victim-witnesses’ (Roosvall & Tegelberg, 2013), bearing witness of / representing a vulnerable group and culture at the verge of extinction, rather than as independent (functionalized) agents, which may be able to take their fate in their own hands. That is, they mainly confirm the idea of eternal and internal vulnerability. Accordingly (see elaboration

/ extension), the photographs accompanying the article text show us aesthetic depictions of the threatened people and their traditions: soft focus, harmonious white and blue colours or colour contrasts (e.g. red blood on white ice; human figures against the icy backgrounds), a distant human figure – covered in fog – standing on an ice shelf (see the intertextual references to *the* climate victim, the polar bear, described above). Overall, these choices are reminiscent of the strategies described by Grittmann (2014). Those are often used to foreground sublime nature, contrasting it – in interaction with the verbal mode – with the impending threat of (human-induced) climate change (see e.g. “For a little longer” in the verbal text). This may help to highlight that the depicted species, landscape, natural system or, by extension, human group (‘the O/other’) needs saving, because of its (traditions’) sublime – beautiful, intriguing, peculiar – character. Although the existence and particular character of these traditions are recognized, their potential value – as inspiring alternatives or leading examples – in the light of the current climate challenge is not acknowledged (e.g. Bankoff, 2001; Roosvall & Tegelberg, 2012, 2013, 2015; Shiva, 1988, 1993). Articles which employ the Unequal Vulnerability Subframe, in particular, highlight the insufficiency of local (‘primitive’) traditions or knowledge. For instance “(...) bad farming methods” (MO, 1/10/2012) [24].

Although the impact of nature on (western) human is continually implied throughout the Scala Naturae Subframe, direct references to human vulnerability or helplessness, comparable to the descriptions above, are rare. For instance: “Major cities like New York are particularly vulnerable” (DWM, 05/12/2013) [25]. Besides, these ideas of vulnerability are continually balanced and deflated through references to (western) human’s active addressing of the issue.

Treatment Recommendation. As described above, both Anthropocentric Subframes strongly focus on a rather simple, external problem: human-made GHG emissions. This calls for a rather straightforward and pragmatic solution: We need to fight (i.e. reduce) the GHG emissions (Cohen, 2011; De Lucia, 2009; de Onís, 2012; Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Nerlich, 2011; Nocke, 2014; Shehata & Hopmann, 2012; Swyngedouw, 2010; Vihersalo, 2008). For instance, “Every man and woman in the street of Bangladesh will tell you this: Stop emitting GHG” (DM, 09/11/2013, p.80) [26]. Hence, both subframes promote reduced dependency on fossil fuels, more efficiency and/or heightened investments in renewable, green energy. (Technological) development is the main key to these changes (e.g. Arrow et al., 1996; Grunwald, 2016; Lohmann, 2008; Unmüßig, Sachs & Fatheuer, 2012): ‘Emission trading’, as an economic incentive to encourage change, is particularly dominant as are sentences like “Investments in energy in particular have to move rapidly from unsustainable sources to energy efficiency and renewable energy” (DS, 30/09/2013, p.44) [27]. The latter also illustrates the sense of urgency – that is, the call for quick, pragmatic solutions – which recurs throughout the corpus (see Fuchs & Graff, 2010). Besides, the strong modal verb ‘have to’ underscores the presupposition that there is only one possible solution to the current crisis. Such argumentations remain, however, largely restricted to the verbal mode (i.e.

the verbal extends / enhances the visual). Apart from mitigating by means of greening the economy or developing in more sustainable ways, both subframes – and the Unequal Vulnerability Subframe in particular – also highlight the need for western(ized) elite agents to (support) adapt(ation): (financial or emergency) aid, means, knowledge or technology need to be transferred from the (elite) human agents to the endangered ‘objects of charity or benevolence’ (Fraser, 2005, p.77), whether human or natural. That is, poorly developed humans and nature need the input of western human accomplishments (i.e. they need to develop) to defend themselves against the consequences of climate change. The western human steward is called upon to relieve the suffering (see Prelli & Winters, 2009). The similarities between sentences like “Many species would disappear from the Earth without this money” (DM, 31/07/2012, p.11) [28] (Scala Naturae), “The Belgian delegation and NGOs ask Belgium to donate 50 million euros climate financing for 2013” (DWM, 14/11/2013) [29] or “South Korea invests this year 7 million euros in pilot projects to protect the marine ecosystems of developing countries” (MO, 19/07/2012) [30] (Unequal Vulnerability) are apparent. Thanks to this development (“the right science and technique” (MO, 09/12/2013)), the affected groups can even prosper, in the end.

IT companies developed inexpensive cellphones for consumers with a low income. Ever since, farmers increasingly use mobile telephony to look up weather forecasts and to check the current market price for their crops. (MO, 15/03/2013) [31]

This will allow them to earn more money. In this last example, the equation of local farmers with (new) consumers and/or producers on the global market is notable. Concluding, the main solutions focus on techno-economic development (including the ‘right to develop’) compatible with the hegemonic interests (see e.g. Brand & Brunnengraber, 2012; Doulton & Brown, 2009; Gordon, Deines & Havice, 2010; Nielsen & Kjaergaard, 2011; Nisbet & Lewenstein, 2002; Schlichting, 2013; Vihersalo, 2008; Wessler et al., 2016). As such, material / economic redistribution is foregrounded (De Lucia, 2009; Fraser, 2000, 2005). This is, perhaps, most clearly demonstrated by the overall focus on numbers and percentages, referring to the amounts of money to be invested or the amounts of GHG to be reduced.

Further, this is also illustrated by the material processes, which prevail: These largely describe economic acting, or acting based on superior (scientific) knowledge or means. ‘To invest’, ‘to finance’, ‘to pay’, ‘to support’ or ‘to save’ are illustrative. As the examples above demonstrate, however, the particular steps which need to be undertaken often remain vague. For example, what does ‘reducing emissions’ exactly encompass? Machin and Mayr (2012) call this ‘corporate speak’, superficial language which conceals true responsibilities. Besides, it does not help us to deal with the structural problems as it obscures the hegemonic thinking which the solutions help to reproduce (i.e. the modernist belief in techno-economic development) (see Hansen & Machin, 2008). The Unequal Vulnerability Subframe, in particular, also adds vagueness concerning acting and agency through the prevalent usage of abstractions, nominalizations or passivizations. For instance, “The emissions decreased about three percent in Europe, and around two percent in the US and Japan” (DS, 19/07/2012, p.13) [32].

Nevertheless, throughout the various realizations of both subframes the agents are identified: Those responsible for providing solutions are largely identical to the ones who were identified as causing them. Put differently, decontextualizing the discussion, the subframes do not question the superiority of these elite ‘managers’ (or ‘heroes’ or ‘rational experts’) nor the hegemonic system they defend (Fuchs & Graff, 2010; Larson, 2011; Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Swyngedouw, 2010). The previously singled out villains – generalized or individualized (‘western’) industries or countries, or their subgroups – are called upon to rectify their wrongs. Science can also play an important role (see e.g. Billett, 2010; Borah, 2009; Gordon, Deines & Havice, 2010; Grittmann, 2014; Jia et al., 2011; Nielsen & Kjaergaard, 2011; Nisbet, 2009; Olausson, 2009; O’Neill et al., 2015; Schlichting, 2013; Schmidt & Schäfer, 2015; Vihersalo, 2008; Wessler et al., 2016). For example, “Governments, in particular, have to make more efforts to take drastic measures” (HLN, 07/11/2013, p.22) [33]. The strong deontic modality in this sentence may help to exclude other potential actors (and actions). These are often opposed to the (subgroup) heroes who have been acting in an exemplary way for a much longer period of time (Doulton & Brown, 2009; Berglez, Höijer & Olausson, 2010; Nossek & Kunelius, 2012; Olausson, 2010; Hallahan, 1999; van Dijk, 1998; Wu, 2009). The sentence “The EU is the only group of countries with binding agreements and clear goals (...)” (HLN, 21/06/2012, p.6) [34], for instance, includes the in-group of the reader.

Similarly, ‘we’ is often depicted or implied as agent in both subframes, either referring to the dominant (western) regions (‘inclusive we’ – the western author and his western audience) or to more generic human (‘broader, collective we’). The context often – but not necessarily – provides disambiguation (Fairclough, 2000; Langacker, 1993). For instance, “We need to produce more renewable energy, also in Flanders” (DM, 14/05/2013, p.18) [35] (note, again, the strong deontic modality). The positive acting of the in-group – clearly situated in the (time-)space of the audience – might encourage the reader to engage. However, the pronoun may also help to conceal agency and distance the audience, especially if ‘we’ is interpreted in its collective, generic sense. As argued before, such overgeneralizations may help, among others, to downplay the unequal responsibilities of various groups in human society (see Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Manzo, 2010a, 2010b; Swyngedouw, 2010). The context of *Scala Naturae* usually leaves more room for this interpretation than *Unequal Vulnerability*. Agency is, further, also concealed by the abstract material processes in which ‘we’ are involved (corporate speak) (Machin & Mayr, 2012). Besides, in those cases where more concrete acting is specified, the capitalist-liberalist thinking is openly reconfirmed: Clearly, ‘we’ mainly indicates consumers (rather than citizens) here, who are not allowed to come up with alternatives themselves, but rather are given instructions on how to adapt their consumption patterns: “Apart from singing, there are all kinds of things that we can do, like eating less meat and using the bike more often” (HLN, 27/10/2012, p.42) [36]. Again, this illustrates how the capitalist-consumerist society remains largely intact (Berglez, Höijer & Olausson, 2009; Brand & Brunnengräber, 2012; Dryzek, 1997; Eide, 2012; Grunwald, 2016; Hopwood, Mellor & O’Brien, 2005; Maniates, 2001; Shanahan & McComas, 1999; Stibbe, 2005, 2015; Unmüßig, Sachs & Fatheuer, 2012).

The visualization of solutions remains limited in both subframes. This confirms the findings of O'Neill (2013, 2017) that there is a general lack of positive alternatives. If alternatives are presented, they often are rather abstract or generic. This may add to the overall vagueness regarding responsibilities (and responsible agents) (see 'corporate speak') (elaboration). For instance, the actual steps which are or need to be taken in the climate change battle are absent. The few visualized solutions often merely seem to act as metonyms for the general idea of 'green technology'. Those solar panels, sun boilers or wind turbines are usually situated (by the caption, title or body text) in the global West (e.g. DM, 14/05/2013, p.81) and sometimes in the global South (MO, 27/12/2012), as the accomplishments that the western(ized) elites have shared with the developing groups. Although the top-down character (or source) of the solutions is emphasized in the verbal part of the articles, it is often solely implied by the visuals. For instance, a photograph taken on top of the upper part of a wind turbine (i.e. an inaccessible area for the larger public) literally foregrounds a top-down positionality (MO, 14/11/2013). More generally, the industrial scale of many of the visualized alternatives (e.g. large sun farms) takes them out of the life worlds of ordinary people in West and South (see Grittmann, 2014; O'Neill, 2013, 2017). The previously mentioned air or satellite views may also suggest the power, knowledge or elite character of the agents. Indeed, as Hughes (2012) argues, air views – requiring money and technology – may symbolize western(ized) human achievements. In some pictures we literally see airplanes flying in, coming to the rescue of the victims on the ground by dropping aid packages (e.g. DS, 12/11/2013, p.6) or water to extinguish (bush) fires (MO, 20/01/2014). Throughout the realizations of both subframes I also found quite some (visually legitimized) political 'talking heads' (e.g. DM, 03/06/2013, p.5; DS, 10/10/2013, p.14). These elaborate more explicitly the verbal argumentation that the solutions mainly lie with an elite western(ized) group.

5.2.5.3 Biocentric Paradigm

Causal Responsibility – Levels 1 and 2: Human-Induced Climate Change. Obviously, climate change, GHG emissions and (differential) human responsibility are also core to the rationale of both Biocentric Subframes (i.e. they are central devices of both climate change frames), especially in the verbal mode. However, they often remain unstated or they are only referred to in passing: Comparable strategies as the ones used in the hegemonic subframes can be found here. Yet, they are usually not salient. For instance, although climate change and its consequences (e.g. nominalizations like the "changing weather patterns" (MO, 22/11/2013) [37]) occur as independent agents, their acting is often not central to the story of the alternative subframes. Visual sublimations or colour metaphors suggesting a powerful, external threat are almost completely absent. Given its main focus, the Unequal Attribution Subframe also contains verbal references to the disproportionate GHG emissions of the dominant groups. The singling out of individualized villains is, however, largely absent in both subframes, especially in the Natural Web Subframe. In the few instances where a human GHG emitter gets identified in the latter, it

is usually generic ‘human’ or ‘(broader, collective) we’ (Fairclough, 2000). In short, the main problem is no longer the scientifically determinable and countable emission of GHG: the climate change problem, as such, is mainly the background, considered as ‘given’ for addressing deeper-lying, more systematic socio-economic and political problems (see Brand & Brunnengräber, 2012; Cameron, 2012; De Lucia, 2009; de Onís, 2012; Grunwald, 2016; Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Shanahan & McComas, 1999; Unmüßig, Sachs & Fatheuer, 2012).

Causal Responsibility – Level 3: Multi-Layered Injustices. Indeed, climate change is presented as just one symptom of the globalizing anthropocentrism, which both subframes wish to question and denounce: Currently, only the symptom and not the underlying cause is treated, it is argued. That is, as long as the main focus lies on values such as (technological and economic) growth, development or competition, no real solution can be found. Whether highlighting the broader picture – the natural web, which connects all living beings – or rather foregrounding human-centred problems of inequality, the Natural Web Subframe and Unequal Attribution Subframe shed light on the continuing appropriation and/or deconstruction of ‘common goods’, such as ecological and natural support systems, safe environments, habitats (material / economic maldistribution), democracy (political misrepresentation) or locally tailored (biocentric) traditions, habits, knowledge (cultural status misrecognition), by (western(ized)) humans (Fraser, 2000, 2005). In short, anthropocentric acting – including responses to socio-environmental problems – largely jeopardizes equality, justice, resilience and harmony.

The verbal contrasting strategies on this level are largely aimed at situating the problem within this broader scope. ‘The West’ (including westernized elites in the South), specified in recurring generalized terms as ‘governments’, ‘multinationals’ and ‘large NGOs’, functions as the foe in the Unequal Attribution Subframe. It is opposed to ‘(exclusive) us’, mainly but not exclusively ‘the South’. In a similar vein, the Natural Web Subframe refers to a small group of generalized actors like ‘international organizations’ or ‘the corporate world’. Those are situated in opposition to ‘(inclusive / exclusive) us’, the broader society. These impersonalized elite agents, I argue, mainly function as metonyms for the general ideological system which they try to uphold. Yet, a few references to ‘(inclusive / broader) we’, including the in-group of the audience, also help to firmly locate the problems within the broader society. The actors are mainly associated with (economic) material processes (e.g. ‘to exploit’, ‘to profit’, ‘to prosper’). However, verbal and mental processes are also remarkably prevalent, mainly in Natural Web. For instance,

2 out of 3 [Flemish people] mistakenly think that these [bio]fuels contribute to solutions for climate change. Clearly, Flemish people are not well informed about the problems. The EU and the Belgian government, on the other hand, are. (MO, 10/10/2013) [38] (emphasis added).

The rhetorical contrast in this last example saliently emphasizes the responsibility of an elite group (representing the hegemonic worldview), separating ‘them’ from ordinary people (‘inclusive we’) who are largely prevented from seeing the truth (e.g. the chopping of the rainforest for the sake of biofuel plantations). Similar patterns can be found in other excerpts: “We cannot imagine a different life than the one we have today” (DM, 27/10/2012, p.27) [39] or “*The dominant religions* make human believe that he is special. And if he thinks that he is special, worth more than another, he is allowed to devalue other species” (MO, 14/11/2013) [40]. The negated process in example [39] or the *personification* in [40] seem to imply that ‘we’ – as victims of a system – cannot but (unwittingly) reproduce the anthropocentric paradigm (cultural / political injustice (Fraser, 2000, 2005)). Summarizing, more than specific human actions and decisions as such, the underlying ideological discourse is depicted as problematic.

Overall, the fact that the system is targeted rather than individual actors, is implied by the dominance of passivizations, *nominalizations* and *personifications*. For example, “Over the last couple of decennia, with *the globalization of the market*, a system has been created in which everybody has to compete with everybody” (DWM, 23/08/2013) [41]) (note the use of the strong (dynamic) modal verb ‘has to’, which may imply that there is no room for (free) choice). As illustrated, the nominalizations and personifications foreground broader processes as agents, behavers or sensors. Other examples are ‘green economy’ or ‘sustainable development’. Natural Web elaborates on these ‘false solutions’, mainly situating them in a (neo-)liberalist-technocratic world (e.g. international summits) controlled by elite social groups (political / cultural injustice (Fraser, 2000, 2005)) (see Brand & Brunnengräber, 2012; Brulle, 2010; De Lucia, 2009; Grunwald, 2016; Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Unmüßig, Sachs & Fatheuer, 2012). For instance:

The truth about ‘sustainability’, and the meeting in Rio this month accordingly, is that it does not wish to strengthen our bond with nature, but rather human interests, autonomy and sovereignty. (DWM, 01/06/2012) [42]

Given its focus on human inequality on top of natural inequality, the Unequal Attribution Subframe takes an even broader scope. Though salient, ‘green economy’ features as only one destructive expression of the underlying ‘Euro-American anthropocentrism’, next to processes such as “land grabbing” (DWM, 05/12/2012; MO, 20/06/2013) or “[t]he enormous streams of money” which “may fundamentally change the existing structures in the affected regions” and may have a “mental impact which should not be underestimated” (DM, 13/11/2013, p.31) [43] (economic or material / cultural / political injustice (Fraser, 2000, 2005)). The latter refer more directly to the effects of (neo)colonization. In the process, hegemonic ‘objects of help’ – like ‘aid’ or ‘emission trading’ – are deconstructed and denounced as semantic reversals (Heuberger, 2007; Stibbe, 2015), which divert the attention away from the real structural problems and may even reinforce the latter (see Alexander, 2007; Bankoff, 2001;

Cameron, 2012; Doultou & Brown, 2009; Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012; Hagan & Tiffin, 2015; Lohmann, 2008; Rees & Westra, 2003; Shiva, 1988, 1993; Stibbe, 2015; Unmüßig, Sachs & Fatheuer, 2012).

Summarizing, both Biocentric Subframes background climate change as enemy only to replace it by a new foe, the anthropocentric thinking which dominates the globalizing human society. The naming and problematizing of structures may be the first step in a process of awakening and change. This view, which may be summarized as “The real enemy is human” (DWM, 01/06/2012 (heading) [44]), is expressed very saliently through rhetorical devices such as similes or metaphors: “The same prosperous West carries a heavy responsibility. It could only grow by sucking out the colonies like a parasite, till nothing was left” (DWM, 11/11/2013) [45] or “Meanwhile, however, human has become a ‘super predator’. Master of the universe” (DM, 27/06/2012, p.12) [46].

Yet, the rather abstract argumentation remains largely absent in the salient visual mode (i.e. the verbal elaborates, extends, enhances the visual). In 5.1.5.2 (Causal Responsibility), I discussed the visualization of land grabbing, in the context of the Unequal Attribution Subframe, through juxtaposed photographs (e.g. DM, 07/02/2013, p.12). The few other examples which I could identify also draw on interaction and juxtaposition, in this case among the visual and the verbal (caption) text. A visual that helps to sustain the argumentation of Unequal Attribution shows, for instance, three local Indian fishermen who are standing in a rice field (DWM, 31/12/2013). They are fishing in a sustainable, small-scale, traditional way (the vectors (their arms) suggest their active interaction with nature (see transactive actions)). The caption reads:

Fish are bred on rice fields. Combined farming methods have been being applied for ages by Chinese and Indian farmers, but *lost* their appeal due to the mechanization of export-oriented agriculture. [47]

The present perfect continuous tense emphasizes the idea of a long-standing tradition. This is, arguably, reinforced by the photograph not being clearly situated in time or space (except for some general indications regarding the eastern location, like the rice field or the physiognomic characteristics of the participants). It is argued, however, that this continuity (i.e. a much needed long-term perspective (Adamson, 2014; Alexander, 2007; Shiva, 1988, 1993)) has recently been interrupted and threatened (see *past simple*) by top-down, short-term and unsustainable forces (i.e. cash cropping) (e.g. Lohmann, 2008; Rees & Westra, 2003; Shiva, 1988, 1993). Clearly, this argumentation is elaborated on and enhanced in the verbal body text. One of the articles in the corpus which employs a Natural Web Subframe (DWM, 19/12/2012), also draws on a strong contrast. The article only has a characteristic picture of a (climate) summit, with a number of elite representatives sitting behind a desk (see Tuchman, 1978). Their eyelines (as vectors) and the proximity of microphones suggest that they are involved in verbal (and mental) processes. ‘They are the ones who (are allowed to) think and talk about climate action’. However, in the context of the article (“Drama in Doha: emission trade saved, climate change

goes on” [48]), and the Natural Web Subframe more generally, the photograph is likely to adopt critical associations or connotations. That is, the foregrounded elites are shown here as representatives (i.e. metonyms) of the elite group, or even the political system, which is denounced in the verbal text for preventing fundamental change and causing the “failure” of the climate summit. That is, the ones who are able to instigate change, fail to do so (i.e. they only protect the system which serves their interests). Through the contrast between the exclusive presence of the elites (see hyperbole) and the absence of bottom-up groups (see ellipsis) the image may elaborate on comparable arguments in the verbal text.

Problem Definition. Rejecting the hierarchical view on ‘other groups’ in human society, the Unequal Attribution Subframe provides a more balanced picture of vulnerability. Although it does not completely discard the idea of ‘innocent victims’ – a precondition for the audience to engage (Höijer, 2004) – the suffering is contextualized as the consequence of particular ideological beliefs and actions (Bankoff, 2001; Cameron, 2012; de Onís, 2012; Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012; Hart, 2011; Iyengar, 1990; Shanahan & McComas, 1999; van Dijk, 1998). Accordingly, we usually find a balance between victimization and underlying resilience.

Balance is, for instance, pivotal in the depiction of participants and the choice for predications, especially when it comes to the human victims in the South. Although visual and verbal identifications – highlighting a participant’s being or possessing (e.g. ‘the victims’) – remain common, quite some functionalizations, like ‘local farmer’, ‘employer’ or ‘coordinator’, can be found as well. The latter may add to the idea that the affected groups are active ‘ordinary people’ like the audience. As such, they may help to facilitate the ‘status recognition’ (Fraser, 2000, 2005) of individuals as full partners in social interactions. Furthermore, distancing generalizations (e.g. numbers, percentages, public distance, back view, ‘they’ as prevalent pronoun)⁸² are present next to individualizing and humanizing choices, such as the visual depiction of one or a few individuals (often shown at eye level, from a personal or intimate distance), names (nominations) or (at times detailed) descriptions (e.g. age, living conditions, family situation, occupation). For example, “66 year old Susan Wambua, owner of an acre of land in the village Makongeni” (MO, 29/06/2012) [49]. While the spatial contextualization in this example is overly specific (i.e. meaningless to the western audience), other references (e.g. ‘the Eastern part of Kenia’) throughout the article text do allow the reader to connect the (more tangible) time-space of the affected participants with their own specific time-spaces. Both strategies can be found throughout the corpus (Unequal Attribution Subframe) at large, the former suggesting distance, the latter facilitating a sense of interconnection (Dreher & Voyer, 2015; Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012; Figenschou, 2011; Martello, 2008; Roosvall & Tegelberg, 2013, 2015; Weik von Mossner, 2011). The visual metaphor (or metonym) of the vulnerable child is also still pivotal in the Unequal Attribution Subframe. However, it is balanced

⁸² This may also help to depict the individuals as representatives of broader groups, giving more weight to the discussion (Chouliaraki, 2006; Fowler, 2016; Perlmutter, 1998; van Dijk, 1988).

with neutral or even empowering representations like the father and mother metaphor. As such, the focus moves from passivity and helplessness to the resilience of locals and their ability to look after their most vulnerable citizens (e.g. DM, 13/11/2013, p.31) (see Lule, 2001, 2002). The composite of distancing strategies may, I argue, face the western audience with the (i.e. their own) top-down perspective which is – simultaneously – subverted by the contrasting strategies (e.g. the identifications and functionalizations). Potentially, (the invitation to adopt) the denounced (first person) perspective may add to the salience of the argumentations (see Rose, 2001).

Balance is also illustrated by the choice for particular verbs, and thus, processes. A majority of the human participants in the Unequal Attribution Subframe acts in behavioural and material processes. While several of these serve to highlight their victim role on the most apparent level (economic / material injustice (Fraser, 2000, 2005)), a majority addresses the more profound – economic, cultural and/or political – (negated) processes which underlie this victimization. This is also demonstrated in the following example:

‘Our own rice production has been destroyed *by dumping from the US*. Rice is there subsidized double: by a subsidy for the production to farmers and by an export subsidy. Haiti has an immense potential for rice production which is not utilized, but our farmers cannot compete with the American rice.’ (MO, 08/02/2013) [50]

As also illustrated in this excerpt, ‘stereotypical’ relational processes and passivizations (e.g. ‘has been destroyed’, ‘has’, ‘is not utilized’) are often contextualized through the adding of *causes (circumstances)* or the foregrounding rather than deleting of the *responsible agents*. For instance, “Women and girls are affected more severely *as they are the last ones allowed to eat or to get access to health care because of their social status*” (MO, 24/08/2013) [51]. I will discuss the congruent visual balancing strategies – for instance, the combination of a visual offer, conventionally used to suggest distance and passivity, and the presence of vectors, which may give rise to (often overlooked) agency and resilience – in more detail in the next section (Treatment Recommendation).

While foregrounding human-nature equality, harmony and interdependence, Natural Web is, in the end, also especially concerned with human victims. That is, it depicts ordinary citizens who stand up as representatives of nature (‘inclusive / exclusive we’) as the main victims of the elite agents (i.e. politics, industry) who try to maintain the anthropocentric system. In other words, being reduced to a passive consumer role, ‘we’ are also the victims of an (ideological) system which we are not able nor allowed to look beyond, let alone to criticize (mainly cultural / political injustice (Fraser, 2000, 2005)). As the examples below demonstrate, the exclusion of citizens and bottom-up groups from (democratic) debates, especially those during climate summits, is often criticized (see e.g. Brulle, 2010; Kenis & Mathijs, 2014). Accordingly, I found strategies that are comparable to those in Unequal Attribution. For instance, repeated (contextualized) passivizations – e.g. “(...) we, the ordinary people, were excluded from the preparatory negotiations (...)” (DWM, 01/06/2012) [52] – foreground cultural and/or political injustices

(Fraser, 2000, 2005). The same is true for negated mental processes (see [38], [39] and [40] above) or material processes:

A few years ago, more than 5.000 people faced the ice-cold water of the water cannons. Afterwards, however, the organizations and the state have joined forces and demonstrators do not longer get here. (DS, 26/01/2013, p.61) [53]

The visual mode only infrequently reflects such balancing and contextualization strategies. One of the articles which employs a Natural Web Subframe, however, elaborates on the argumentations in the verbal text (DWM, 15/11/2013): The photograph shows Yeb Saño, negotiator for the Philippines during COP19 in Warsaw, and a large group of climate activists outside the conference hall where the climate summit was taking place. The participants are just standing or sitting, ‘showing themselves to the viewer’ (see visual relational (i.e. symbolic) processes). Most are looking downwards and/or have their backs turned to the viewer, the lack of gaze suggesting passivity (see offer). While some of them are holding boards and banners (‘utterances’), they do not appear as ‘sayers’, being turned away from the outside world (i.e. lack of vectors). However, exactly their – deliberate – showing of themselves as being passivized and deprived from means and opportunities to act or speak for themselves, can – on a deeper level – be read as an act of resilience (see the foregrounding and – simultaneously – denouncing of the top-down perspective in the Unequal Attribution Subframe). Of course, this connotation at least partly derives from the interaction with the broader (con)text.

Does this recognition of intra-human equality go along with a recognition of nature’s resilience and equality, being denied and victimized within the context of the anthropocentric paradigm? Traces of the emerging biocentric perspective can indeed be found. This is mainly true for the Unequal Attribution Subframe, which often voices the perspective of locals living in close harmony with nature (see Shiva, 1988, 1993). Once in a while, nature is represented as a resilient agent and complex, living and (anthropomorphic) actor, whose rights have, however, been violated by human thinking and acting (mainly material / cultural injustice (Fraser, 2000, 2005)). Some Unequal Attribution articles also use the name Mother Earth (e.g. DWM, 04/18/2012), depicting nature as a ‘self-conscience and self-organizing’ subject (Lovelock, 1988; Verhagen, 2008). For instance, “All of this results in a heavy burden on the natural systems, which guarantee viability for human on Earth” (DWM, 05/05/2012) [54] (note the material process) or “The rainforest of the Amazon, also called ‘the lung of the world’ breathes carbon dioxide (CO₂) in and oxygen out on a large scale” (DS, 17/02/2014, p.8) [55] (note the use of the anthropomorphisms ‘lung’, ‘breathes’). As these two examples illustrate, there is no ‘anecdotal’ zooming in on decontextualized parts of the complex natural web (Larson, 2011). It is, however, remarkable that human wrong-doings vis-à-vis nature are often depicted in rather abstract, generalized terms, which may help to (partly) mask the real extent of the problematic behaviour (see the idea of ‘corporate speak’ of Machin and Mayr (2012)). The biocentric outlook is also more or less reflected in some of the visuals which accompany Unequal Attribution articles. More than in any other of the

(biocentric) subframes, we see harmonious interactions going on among humans and nature. For instance, lush, diverse natural scenes (implied, among others, by the richly modulated colours (see sensory truth)) are tended to by humans. That is, human hands (as vectors) rather than machines interact with nature (e.g. literally touching or holding plants or animals). Some of the humans show us the produce of their small-scale labour, suggesting that nature returns what is given to her. The harmony is also suggested by proximity, the absence of frame lines or colour consonance. That is, humans are amidst of nature rather than separated from it (see the prevalent top-down views in the hegemonic subframes or the lack of human presence in natural scenes) (Huxford, 2011) (e.g. MO, 21/12/2012; MO, 27/08/2012; DWM, 18/04/2012). Such depictions are absent in the Natural Web Subframe.

The Mother Earth metaphor remains, however, secondary to the human-centred metaphor ‘Nature as a Machine’ (Verhagen, 2008). Indeed, human interests and values are still pivotal, rendering nature absent or largely abstract, passive and primarily a human resource (Dryzek, 1997; Heuberger, 2007; Remillard, 2011; Shanahan & McComas, 1999; Stibbe, 2015; Verhagen, 2008), for instance as “forestry resources” (15/06/2012, DWM) [56], “50 to 80 million acres in the South” (MO, 30/05/2012) [57] or “one football field of fertile grounds” (DM, 07/02/2013, p.12) [58]. In the end, all comes down to human needs. This is clearly illustrated by the following juxtaposition, employing repetition and parallelism as rhetorical figures: “This has detrimental consequences for our elementary human rights, our societies and our ecosystem” (DWM, 21/11/2012) [59] (note the use of the possessive pronoun). Even the photographs which highlight harmony and mutual dependence of humans and nature (see above), do – in the end – contribute to a rather narrow image of nature. That is, the visuals of agricultural lands or natural produce solely foreground nature as a resource for humans to survive, largely surpassing the idea that nature also has value in its own right. One of the few realizations of the Natural Web Subframe that visually depicts nature strongly draws on the culturally resonant ideal of sublime nature (see intertextuality), separate from humans (see e.g. Cottle, 2000; Grittmann, 2014): Four smaller pictures show us air views of beautiful landscapes, often with contrasting or rather monochrome colours. A larger, fifth picture does, however, help to exemplify (see elaboration) some of the critical arguments in the text regarding the destructive impact of human mass consumption on the natural system. Nevertheless, contrasting a multicoloured sea of tourists (‘consumers’) and beach umbrellas on a crowded beach (i.e. mass tourism as an expression of mass consumption) with the beauty, peacefulness and harmony (e.g. harmonious colours) of the ‘uninvaded’ sea at the right margin of the picture (as well as – intertextually – the scenery in the four smaller images), it still taps into the ideal of a pristine (uninvaded) nature which needs protection from human development (DM, 27/06/2012, p.12).

I conclude, therefore, that justice towards nature is, overall, still interpreted in a narrow sense: material maldistribution and – at most – cultural (identity) misrecognition (Fraser, 2000, 2005). In many cases, natural rights are even almost completely invisible, solely featuring in the background of a human

struggle in the centre stage (Shanahan & McComas, 1999). That is particularly notable in the visual mode. Most visuals foreground human agents, literally backgrounding or omitting nature. Many articles do not even provide pictures. While complicating and deepening the mainstream discussion centred on ‘humans’ as victims of climate change, the Natural Web Subframe, in particular, strongly adds to the human-centeredness, mainly foregrounding human representatives of nature rather than natural participants.

Treatment Recommendation. Hence, the subframes contend that “[l]eaving problems to be solved by the ones who caused them, is unrealistic” (DM, 14/11/2013, p.30) [60]. Indeed, those who are the victims of the anthropocentric thinking and acting, those who are silenced in an undemocratic system – ordinary citizens, representatives of nature, grassroots groups (in the ‘South’), activists – are the ones who will provide positive alternatives, being able to look beyond the capitalist system which is largely enforced upon them (see Gunster, 2011, 2012; Hopke, 2012). At least, once the elites have restored their resilience (economic / material redistribution) and acknowledged their equality in the debate and (potential) valuable contributions (cultural recognition / political representation) (De Lucia, 2009; Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012; Fraser, 2000, 2005; Sen, 1999, 2009; Shiva, 1988, 1993). As such, the Biocentric Subframes seem to highlight, and criticize, the limits of the representative democracy and/or essentially unequal or hierarchical human relations within a (neo-colonial) liberalist economic society (e.g. Alexander, 2007; Brulle, 2010; Fraser, 2000, 2005; Habermas & Burger, 1989; Rees & Westra, 2003; Roosvall & Tegelberg, 2012, 2013, 2015).

As a consequence, both counter-hegemonic subframes are mainly populated by bottom-up groups. Top-down groups, on the contrary, are almost completely absent, or at least backgrounded (see ‘hyperbole’ versus ‘ellipsis’). That is especially salient in the visual mode. The Unequal Attribution Subframe extensively restores the resilience of the ‘southern’ victims, employing verbal naming and predicational strategies such as ‘communities who are organized and able to react’ (functionalization) or ‘locally embedded organizations’ (identification). The visuals present us, for instance, with one or a few individualized representatives of bottom-up movements, who usually get a name (i.e. nomination) in the caption or body text. One of the articles gives, for instance, a voice to the alternative thinker Vandana Shiva (MO, 31/08/2013). The legitimation in the verbal text (e.g. “Vandana Shiva (°1952), doctor in nuclear physics, is an icon in India and far beyond for those who are concerned with organic farming, social justice and ecofeminism” [61]) is congruent with the visual legitimation, which is conveyed by personal distance, eye-level and a head-on perspective. As Tuchman (1978) argues, these conventions may help to give rise to an air of truth and trustworthiness.

Similarly, the Natural Web Subframe often verbally specifies, and functionalizes, ‘(inclusive / exclusive) we’ beyond the consumer role. For instance, “We need an in-depth debate among anxious citizens, critical climate movements, green syndicalists and environmental activists about how to move

forward from here” (DWM, 19/12/2012) [62]. A few individualized representatives are also allowed to stand up and are legitimized as credible and authoritative sources. For instance, the alternative thinker Habib Maalouf is visually and verbally legitimated in one of the articles in *MO** (MO, 14/11/2013). The majority of the visuals, however, present us with large groups of citizens, activists or syndicalists during (street) protests (e.g. DWM, 10/11/2013). The perspective is often that of the citizen journalist (i.e. one of the demonstrators, who is usually given a voice in the verbal text as source or reporter) who stands amongst his/her equals, the latter usually presented from a personal or social distance and an eye level. We see people from frontal, profile and back views. The latter, in particular, may – in interaction with other visual-verbal devices – convey ideas of togetherness, closeness or a shared perspective. I argue that this may contribute to the idea of participatory parity (e.g. De Lucia, 2009; Brulle, 2010; Sen, 1999, 2009), as a means and a goal for fundamental change. The first person perspective (see Rose, 2001) may, thereby, add to the salience of the represented view, encouraging the audience to adopt it as their own (‘inclusive we’). Nurmis (2017) contends, however, that such unprofessional photographs often fail to convey much of a message, except for the claim ‘we were there’. I agree that this may, indeed, be the case. After all, I found that the contribution of protest visuals to the overall argumentation of the Biocentric Subframe is rather limited. They often mainly seem to signal that an article adopts the perspective of grassroots groups or NGOs on the ground (e.g. Graber, 1996). Similar photographs can also be found with articles from citizen journalists who employ hegemonic subframes.⁸³ Nevertheless, I believe that the ‘we were there’-claim may, in the context of the Scala Naturae Subframe, well support the idea of collective, bottom-up action: ‘we – represented by the protesters on the ground – were there to speak for ourselves, to contribute to the debate’ (see Chouliaraki, 2006). However, much depends on the viewer and the extent to which (s)he (is willing to) identify with this group of demonstrators and the views they stand for (see Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Kim, 2011). O’Neill (2017) and O’Neill et al. (2013) found, for instance, that protest imagery garners mixed responses with regard to issue salience and self-efficacy among various audience groups. Thus, depending on his/her positionality or context, a viewer may approach ‘us’ rather as ‘inclusive’ (including the audience) or as ‘exclusive’ (excluding the audience) (Fairclough, 2000; Langacker, 1993).

Similarly, the visual and verbal processes are mainly employed to emphasize the ‘sovereign agency’ (Chouliaraki, 2006, pp.158-159) of thoroughly humanized beings, feeling, reflecting and acting on their own fate. I mainly found material, mental and verbal active processes. These are especially numerous in the Unequal Attribution Subframe. Consider, for instance, the following quote by a representative of a local social movement in Haiti:

‘We [the local social movements] want to stand politically strong again and provide alternatives. (...) The two farmers’ organizations (...) work together again on two

⁸³ I have argued before that one single image may, indeed, be used to support various types of (sub)frames, and thus argumentations (2.3.2 Conceptualizing Multimodal Framing).

concrete projects: one against plantations for biofuels and one against the seeds of Monsanto, which the multinational was so generous to offer us after the earthquake!’ (MO, 08/02/2013) [63]

Note the usage of irony in the last sentence of this quote, which helps to identify and denounce western ‘(developmental) aid’ as a semantic reversal (Heuberger, 2007; Stibbe, 2015). ‘We’ can most readily be interpreted here as exclusively referring to (southern) bottom-up groups (i.e. the in-group of the audience is excluded). The visual mode uses a number of congruent strategies: Visual offers (i.e. a lack of gaze), combined with vectors suggesting (re)actions aimed at other humans or nature, foreground the victimized participants as ‘sovereign agents’ like ourselves (Chouliaraki, 2006), who do not require the help of others. We are, for instance, invited to observe young farmers who are taking care of their crops (material processes) in sustainable, traditional ways (MO, 14/06/2012). We are offered insights and knowledge, but we are not expected to interact. Visual demands (i.e. a gaze which connects the viewer with the viewed, as equals) can – in interaction with other variables (e.g. non-verbal communication) and in the context of the subframe – be read as requests for respecting locally defined rights and traditions (e.g. De Lucia, 2009; Sen, 1999, 2009; Shiva, 1988, 1993). For instance, an interview with Sunita Narain also contains a picture of the Indian researcher. Her gaze, it can be argued, demands our attention for the verbal arguments she makes (MO, 28/11/2012) (see verbal processes).

Similar ideas are also present in the Natural Web Subframe. However, the agency of the citizens is rather implied than directly stated. For instance, “To realize such a revolution, a sufficiently large critical mass *will be needed* worldwide, who *has* the will and the strength to change the power relations” (DWM, 18/08/2013) [64]. The passive voice and *relational processes* do not render the ‘critical mass’ very active. This may suggest that equality is not yet achieved. Other sentences do imply more agency, though. For instance:

By sharing more, building better communities and focusing on what is truly valuable, we can really make progress towards increased welfare. Anyhow, together we must take the future in our own hands. (DWM, 05/05/2012) [65]

Note the usage of devices that contribute to strong dynamic (e.g. ‘we can really’) and deontic (e.g. ‘will be needed’, ‘we must’) modality. The former may help to stress our ability to act for ourselves. The likelihood of certain actions, or a certain (better) future, requires – or presupposes – a certain response from ‘us’. The latter may help to emphasize one particular course of action, backgrounding alternatives. ‘We’ and ‘our’ are, again, rather ambiguous (Fairclough, 2000; Langacker, 1993). However, the collective character of the action (i.e. ‘collective we’) is implied by the adverb ‘together’ in the second sentence and the recurrent verbal and visual references to ‘citizens’ or collectivity throughout the article, and the subframe in general. Nevertheless, the strong criticism on the elites, who help to reproduce an unjust system, may imply that ‘we’ does not necessarily include all groups (to the same extent). This is also suggested by the prevalence of ‘visual offers’. That is, most depicted participants – except for the

few individual bottom-up representatives – do not look the spectator in the eye. This may create some distance and inequality among the viewer and the depicted ‘us-group’, inviting the former to simply observe the actions (suggested by vectors) of the latter rather than to intervene or to participate. However, the extent to which a viewer engages or identifies with the depicted group strongly depends on his/her perspective or positionality (Pulido & Peña, 1998; Taylor, 2000) (see above). More exclusive interpretations are also encouraged by the absence of elite agents in the visuals. As said, only (representatives of) bottom-up groups are visually legitimated as agents. One of the photographs (DWM, 21/11/2012) more explicitly foregrounds the contrast between the inertia (passivity) of the top-down villains and the agency / action of the bottom-up heroes. A board in the foreground, carried by a demonstrator, contrasts the text “bla bla bla” (in a yellow frame) at the top and “act now!” (in a black frame) at the bottom. The latter can easily be associated with the bottom-up groups in the background who are ‘collectively marching for change’. The link is, among others, implied through colour consonance (dark colours), proximity (the demonstrator who carries the board is surrounded by others) or the line of the black frame which seems to proceed along the heads of the participants in the back. As such, the visual also elaborates on the argumentation in the article text, which is summarized in the caption:

If we want change, we will need to organize ourselves from the bottom-up instead of blindly obsessing with the impasse in which the elites of this world have brought the climate negotiations. [66]

This visual argumentation again uses strong (deontic) modality. Note, however, that the agency of the bottom-up groups remains limited in the visual mode to the processes we can identify in this example (by means of vectors, utterances on the board, which, arguably, functions as a ‘speech bubble’): collectively marching (material process), proposing alternatives and demanding change via written messages (verbal processes). The latter, in particular, rather suggests ‘conditional agency’ (they cannot enact change without the intervention of others) than full ‘sovereign agency’ (Chouliaraki, 2006) (see below). This is congruent, it seems, with the limited agency some devices in the verbal mode imply.

More efficiency and renewable energy – central goals of the green economy – are not denounced by the Biocentric Subframes. However, it is argued that these can never bring about true change as long as (western(ized)) society keeps celebrating unlimited (economic) development and superiority. Hence, the solutions enacted in the subframes (framing devices) and suggested by the grassroots groups ((mostly) verbal reasoning devices, often in the context of quotes) mainly encompass a transformation towards a society that highlights very different values, like equality, moderation, respect, inclusiveness and mutual dependency (‘the good life’) (e.g. Brand & Brunnengräber, 2012; Grunwald, 2016; Unmüßig, Sachs & Fatheuer, 2012). Rather than techno-economic development, ideological (and thus mental) change is imperative: “All these dangers are caused by human interventions in natural processes and can only be overcome by changes in attitude and behaviour” (DWM, 01/06/2012) [67]. Similarly, quote [65] and

[66] also suggest that progress and development must be filled in differently (see Hopwood, Mellor & O'Brien, 2005).

Be that as it may, the Natural Web Subframe only comprises limited grassroots statements (reasoning devices) with regard to the actual changes needed, and most of them remain abstract or rather vague. Verbally, terms like 'circular economy', 'biomimicry' or 'lagom' are put forward once in a while, but often lack further explanation or tangible examples. Visual representations of bottom-up groups enacting alternatives are even completely absent. Only the general idea of collective action is visually conveyed (see above). However, visualizations exemplifying the verbal arguments may, in particular, make alternative more concrete or feasible for the audience (e.g. Graber, 1996). The following excerpt, however, does provide some strategies which are slightly more specific (MO, 10/12/2012):

'Lagom' is the Swedish term for 'just enough, sufficient, adequate'. We must think about a new concept of welfare, rather than presume that happiness is equal to ever increasing consumption; [we must] also drop GDP as the only instrument to measure development and progress; [we must] create new business models which leave room for long-term thinking and the long-term usage of objects: we can no longer follow the track of pursuing ever increasing profits by having people produce and consume ever increasing numbers of material goods which need to be thrown away quickly. [68]

Clearly, the ('western') bottom-up movements are still in search of a more comprehensive alternative model (Kenis & Mathijs, 2014). This seems, however, to be largely directed towards a more traditionally organized society in which growth has stagnated (Grunwald, 2016; Unmüßig, Sachs & Fatheuer, 2012). Nature is shown more respect as the system on which we depend or is even taken as a leading example, for instance as a touchstone for human (see 'biomimicry' or 'circular economy', based on the 'natural cycle') (Shepard, 2015; Verhagen, 2008). Nevertheless, the dominance of anthropocentric natural names or metaphors as well as the (visual) omission or backgrounding of nature as resource (see above) does not allow nature to emerge as a truly equal actor or stakeholder, as opposed to the various groups within human society. Indeed, I argue that the persistent human focus prevents a more profound questioning of the problematic human-nature relationships, and thus the development of a fully biocentric alternative (Larson, 2011). This is also true, to a certain extent, for the Unequal Attribution Subframe. However, as the ('southern') grassroots groups have been living in close interaction with nature for a very long time, their 'passed-on traditions' or 'local knowledge', such as "climate clever agriculture" (DWM, 27/08/2012) [69], are more likely to constitute elaborated alternatives. These may – but not necessarily do – call for true changes in our relationship with Mother Earth as an equal living being, based on human moderation and respect (e.g. DWM, 18/04/2012) (see Bankoff, 2001; Dreher & Voyer, 2015; Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012; Hopwood, Mellor & O'Brien, 2005; Lohmann, 2008; Martello, 2008; Shiva, 1988, 1993; Smith, 2007; Tanjeela, 2014). For instance:

I think that it is time to get rid of the icon of the globe, because it places us above it. I think it allowed us to approach nature in a more abstract way, as separate moving parts,

like the pieces on a chessboard. As such, we have lost contact with the Earth. The planet versus the Earth, if you like (DWM, 09/12/2013) [70].

This quote directly refers to the idea of ‘pigeonholing’ (Larson, 2011) as well as the abstract and distant symbol of ‘the globe’ (e.g. Doyle, 2007, 2009; Hughes, 2012; Lester & Cottle, 2009; Mahony & Hulme, 2014; Manzo, 2010a, 2010b). I have argued before that those are typical strategies used to represent the environment in the Anthropocentric Subframes (see 5.2.5.2 Anthropocentric Paradigm; 4.5.2 Hegemonic Subframes). As discussed above, the ideas of human-nature interdependence and harmony are also elaborated on in the visual mode. In the end, however, both subframes foreground grassroots humans –whether or not interacting with other groups as equals – as the (responsible) agents who are able to provide solutions, and not nature, which is unable to change (or to speak for herself, as a communicatory partner) (Cox, 2010; Milstein, 2009). Put differently, material redistribution only in some cases goes hand in hand with cultural recognition (or political representation). As Fraser (2000, 2005) argues, however, true equality always requires these three levels of justice.

Clearly, then, green rationalism (Dryzek, 1997), depicting conscious humans as stewards, is the main ideology that can be excavated from both Biocentric Subframes. This is intertwined, though, with the remains of the anthropocentric paradigm, which probably accounts for the lack of full equality among humans and nature. The fact that the Christian tradition has so strongly shaped the western(ized) cultures (among others through colonization or missionary work) has, no doubt, something to do with the pervasiveness of this thinking (see Prelli & Winters, 2009; Smith, 2007).

5.2.6 Discussions and Conclusions

As expected, my findings show strong similarities across the two selected frames, despite their different topics of concern: The Anthropocentric Subframes highlight a natural problem largely external to human, threatening a(n internally) weak system. Hence, they foreground external solutions provided by elite ‘managers’. The Biocentric Subframes focus on a systematic problem internal to human society which – being reproduced by the elites – largely destructs the (internal) resilience of other groups. Therefore, they suggest internal solutions, mainly provided by the latter. These findings clearly coincide with the statement of Larson (2011, p.115):

(...) we often frame environmental problems as ones related to nature. Hence, science becomes saviour and solution as if the problem really lies in what is ‘out there’ in the objective world that we can approach through natural science, rather than ‘in here’, in ourselves, in our social world, and in how we relate to the world.

In short, there is a need for change in heart and habits (Lovelock, 1988). In a similar vein, Stibbe (2015) calls for replacing the dominant problem-solution thinking with a predicament-response view. The latter highlights that the problems will never go away, necessitating us to think long-term, to keep working on

our society and our relations with all other living beings (Larson, 2011). Authors like Kenis and Mathijs (2014) or Swyngedouw (2010) argue in similar ways.

As demonstrated, the anthropocentric thinking is – qualitatively and quantitatively (see 4.5.4 Quantitative Overview) – persistent and highly salient in the context of both frames. It is a vivid discourse, employing deeply-rooted reasoning and framing devices (Lakoff, 2010), such as the culturally resonant (visual) ‘condensation symbols’ (Cox, 2010) of the suffering child and the polar bear. This begs the question whether the counter-subframes are effective enough to inspire change?

Quantitatively, Unequal Attribution is the best represented counter-hegemonic subframe in the corpus, particularly in the alternative outlets. However, it also appears – to a very limited extent, at least – in the broadsheet mainstream outlets. The latter goes counter to my expectations. It is important, as it may signal and/or help to raise a broader awareness (Groshek & Han, 2011; Roosvall & Tegelberg, 2015). After all, the alternative outlets (CIM.be, 2016; DeWereldMorgen.be; mo.be) remain rather marginal, mainly reaching audiences who already hold alternative views (i.e. people who turn to the alternative media to find the views which reflect their own convictions (see Cammaerts, 2007; Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Graber, 1988; Kim, 2011; Mouffe, 2005; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986)). Natural Web is marginal in both the alternative outlets (especially *MO**) as well as the broadsheet mainstream outlets. However, it is – again – important that the Biocentric Subframe is made available through the mainstream media.

Qualitatively, both alternative subframes call for and enact ‘true – multi-layered – justice’ (see De Lucia, 2009; Fraser, 2000, 2005; Sen, 1999, 2009). The realizations of Natural Web in my corpus especially focus on political representation (and cultural recognition) of citizens, apart from economic / material justice. Unequal Attribution generally highlights, and attempts to redress, the economic, cultural *and* political injustices due to (neo)colonial processes. That is, both subframes foreground certain problems caused by the current system while informing us about positive alternatives, often enacted by people like us. As such, they seem to politicize the debate or, at least, contribute to politicization (see Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Mouffe, 2005; Pepermans, 2015; Pepermans & Maesele, 2014; Swyngedouw, 2010). According to Brulle (2010), such ‘melodramatic frames’ are likely to galvanize civic engagement and expand the number of solutions considered (see Gunster, 2011, 2012). As I have discussed in the concluding paragraphs of Chapter 4, the counter-hegemonic subframes indeed draw on a number of strategies which are (more) likely to engage (broader) audiences. However, there are still problems with the operationalization of the two selected subframes. Those may, I argue, (partly) prevent the workings I have ascribed (based on the literature) to these types of counter-frames.

Firstly, the solutions provided by Natural Web are rather limited and abstract. The visual mode, in particular, fails to depict concrete or tangible alternatives (see below). Also, the more general or generic alternatives which *are* presented (e.g. ‘togetherness’) – and the people presenting them – may not

necessarily engage the audience, for instance because the latter may feel that ‘they’ are acting in another time-space. Hence, strongly foregrounding a substantial critique of the system (‘fear’), the subframe is more likely to be unsettling than to inspire (Brulle, 2010; Foust & O’Shannon Murphy, 2009; Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; O’Neill, 2017; O’Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 2009; O’Neill et al., 2013). Unequal Attribution – which has a longer and more robust tradition (see Adamson, 2014; Čapek, 1993; Huggan & Tiffin, 2015; Taylor, 2000) – generally does provide concrete, developed alternatives. Yet, that does not necessarily mean that these engage the intended audience (i.e. western human), either.

Indeed, both subframes quite strongly focus on the recognition and representation of a ‘climate change hero’ ((southern) bottom-up groups). While this might empower the latter, it may also disengage the identified villains (or victims) and, by extension, all of those who are not willing or who are unable to comply or agree with, or to live up to, the norms, worldviews or engagements foregrounded by the heroes ((western) elite humans, ‘in/exclusive we’). That is, they may feel passivized, their own views or contributions being denounced as irrelevant, unnecessary or even destructive (see Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Fraser, 2000; Graber, 1988; Höjjer, 2004; Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Norgaard, 2006; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Piotrowski, 2013; Ritchie & Thomas, 2015; Sandvik, 2008; van Dijk, 1998). Summarizing, the recognition and representation of one group goes hand in hand with the misrecognition and misrepresentation of another (Groshek & Han, 2011; Niederdeppe et al., 2013). This is problematic: democratic debate, mutual respect and collaboration (‘participatory parity’) are key to true solutions, and thus just, equal and sustainable alternatives (Brulle, 2010; Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012; Fraser, 2000, 2005; Habermas & Burger, 1989; Hulme, 2009; Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Mouffe, 2005; Pepermans, 2015; Pepermans & Maesele, 2014; Sen, 1999, 2009; Shiva, 1988, 1993; Swyngedouw, 2010). However, each realization of these subframes is different: Some articles – especially those written by and/or quoting NGO representatives or other intermediaries – refer more clearly and saliently to the need for cooperation, reinstating the top-down groups as partners (villain-heroes) (Roosvall & Tegelberg, 2013). Besides, I have also pointed out that the (deictic) personal pronouns ‘we’ or ‘they’ are rather slippery and vague. Hence, their meaning (potential) very much depends on the contexts in which and people by whom they are used and interpreted (Fairclough, 2000; Langacker, 1993). It has, indeed, been shown that two people may interpret the same (sub)frame in quite different ways. For instance, various readers with similar backgrounds (e.g. western citizens) may identify themselves to lesser or larger extents with the same hero (in-group) role, depending on their interpretations of ‘us’ as more or less exclusive and thus, the interaction of their mental frames and schemata with the news (sub)frame (see e.g. Kahan, Jenkins & Braman, 2011; Kim, 2011; Kolmus & Agyeman, 2002; White & Wall, 2008).

Thirdly, I found that the realization of both counter-hegemonic subframes – especially Natural Web – is underdeveloped in the visual mode. That is problematic. After all, visuals have been shown to add

clarity (e.g. Geise & Baden, 2015; Graber, 1996) and salience (e.g. Smith, 2005; Smith & Price, 2005), to enhance persuasion (Seo, Dillard & Shen, 2013) and (emotional) involvement (Brantner, Lobinger, Wetzstein, 2011) or to activate pre-existing cognitions and feelings in ways that may foster a carry over to other issues (Domke, Perlmutter & Spratt, 2002). For instance, both subframes seem to lack sufficiently powerful alternatives for the resonant polar bear and suffering child metonyms (or metaphors). The suffering child in Unequal Vulnerability strongly draws on – and may evoke – the universally shared (resonant) archetypes of the father and mother (Lule, 2001, 2002): The dominance of children in the context of the subframe raises the expectation (or requirement) that parents must also be around. After all, they are the ones who are expected to protect the child and/or to nurture and sooth it. Their absence, however, implies the failure of the ‘southern’ parents. They do not possess the required characteristics to look after their own children (and, accordingly, the most vulnerable members of their community or social group). This idea is reinforced by the passivity and helplessness of the ‘southern’ parents who do get visualized. It calls for the intervention of a ‘full-fledged’ external parent. Hence, both helpless children as well as adults come to be represented by the child metonym, evoking and reproducing the paternalistic view of the western(ized) elites (Ali, James & Vultee, 2013; Chouliaraki, 2006; Hahn, Eide & Ali, 2012; Höijer, 2004; Jia et al., 2011; Perlmutter, 1998). Similarly, the Scala Naturae Subframe strongly draws on the pervasive Euro-American anthropocentric convention of sublime nature under threat (e.g. Cottle, 2000; Cox, 2010; DiFrancesco & Young, 2010; Grittmann, 2014; Hahn, Eide & Ali, 2012; O’Neill, 2013; Remillard, 2011). As I have argued, the helpless polar bear is the most pervasive and recurrent expression of this view, highlighting the powerlessness of awe-inspiring nature in the light of climate change. This calls for the intervention of ‘the most powerful species of all, human’ (e.g. Cox, 2010; Manzo, 2010a; Smith & Joffe, 2009).

Trying to denounce and reverse the hegemonic approach to the father, mother and child, the Unequal Attribution Subframe foregrounds the father (and mother) metaphor, drawing the attention of the audience to the underlying argumentations by facing them with ‘people like them’ (Chouliaraki, 2006; Coleman, 2010; Graber, 1988, 1996; Hart, 2011; Höijer, 2004; Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; Manzo, 2010b; Messaris, 1997; Small & Loewenstein, 2003). That is, foregrounding local fathers and mothers who are interacting with or for the sake of their children, the metaphor may help to restore the local power, control or caring capabilities. Yet, the few examples which I was able to identify in the small sample of Unequal Attribution Subframes raises the question whether this alternative, emancipatory view may truly counter-balance the largely accepted western(ized) paternalistic interpretation. After all, I have argued before that the particularly pervasive and culturally resonant child metaphor may well be able to independently evoke the hegemonic argumentations which it is often associated with. It may even override the (counter-hegemonic) argumentations provided by the text and/or other visual devices (e.g. Domke, Perlmutter & Spratt, 2002; Geise & Baden, 2015) (see 2.3.2 Conceptualizing Multimodal Framing). In the end, the (visual) frame interpretations of the audience are largely guided by the mental

schemata and frames people have at their disposal. That is, those who lack the biocentric perspective, in particular, may be less inclined to adopt the counter-hegemonic interpretation (see 3.3 Frame Interpretations). Contrary to Unequal Attribution, however, the Natural Web Subframe has not yet provided a biocentric alternative that questions, reverses and/or contextualizes the paternalistic depiction of a distant, helpless other, in this case the polar bear (or nature, in general). Human bottom-up groups – separate from nature – populate most of the visuals. While they may speak up for the natural system at large, they do not provide a powerful, recognizable ‘condensation symbol’ (Cox, 2010). As Nurmis (2017) argues, for instance, the often rather ‘amateurish’ photographs tend to lack profound content and mainly make the claim ‘we were there’. Indeed, apart from the idea of ‘collective and/or bottom-up action’ protest visuals largely fail to convey, or support, the argumentations of the Natural Web Subframe. Appearing in the context of counter-hegemonic *and* hegemonic subframes they may, perhaps, rather be considered as shorthands to signal the – more generic – NGO or grassroots origin or character of a news article, rather than as a (substantive) symbol which may help to crystallize a particular worldview (Graber, 1996). As argued above, one may even ask the question whether the depicted group of (young) activist ‘heroes’ – who fail to enact concrete or tangible constructive alternatives – may truly convey an idea of ‘collective action’ or ‘togetherness’ to other groups in society (in other time-spaces, with other appearances, other worldviews or other mental schemata or frames) in the first place (see Kenis & Mathijs, 2014). O’Neill (2017) and O’Neill et al. (2013) argue, for instance, that the potential of protest imagery to evoke engagement and feelings of (self-)efficacy strongly depends on the backgrounds and characteristics of various audience groups.

Thus, while Unequal Attribution largely restores human-human equality, Natural Web fails to do the same for the human-nature relationship, which is pivotal to its underlying narrative. Instead, only the rights of the (secondary) human bottom-up groups (as representatives of nature) are (more or less) restored. While some of the human wrong-doing vis-à-vis nature is recognized, vague and generalized expressions may prevent the audience to grasp the extent of the problems, let alone to fully comprehend their deeply-rooted and pervasive character in (western(ized)) human-nature interactions. As active natural agents or sensors are also marginal in the Unequal Attribution Subframe, there clearly is a broader problem. Put differently, both alternative subframes still turn the spotlights towards the human actors in the injustice story. Rather than bringing nature to the forefront, on a par with humans, they entitle her at most with a secondary or supporting role. Usually, however, nature remains in the background, largely invisible. As Shanahan and McComas (1999) argue, the background is usually taken for granted; people are generally unaware of it. It is just there. The foreground, however, is questioned (see Meister, 1997). Apparently, that is what is happening here: the inter-human relations are most visible and, hence, the topic of most lively debate. It is remarkable, however, that even (most of) those who represent the natural system (i.e. are more aware of it) are lacking, or have lost, a rich, biocentric vocabulary, which would allow nature to ‘speak more directly to us’ and thus, to take an equal part in

the play. That is, most likely, due to the globalization of anthropocentric thinking – among others, in ('rational') science or international politics – and thus a quite narrow 'monolingualistic' (English) outlook on the world (Alexander, 2007; Heuberger, 2007; Larson, 2011; Shiva, 1988, 1993; Stibbe, 2015). As argued before, the 'export' of the Christian faith, at the cost of local, traditional and – generally – more biocentric religions, may provide at least one explanation for the pervasiveness of this language and thinking. This is confirmed by Smith (2007) who describes how African-American environmental views – having emerged from a Christian tradition – combine biocentric and anthropocentric thinking, such as the idea of the human steward and control over nature.

Anyhow, we cannot profoundly change our relation with nature as long as we do not change the ways in which we talk about or represent nature (Cox, 2010; Larson, 2011; Milstein, 2009; Shanahan and McComas, 1999; Verhagen, 2008). What is more, Larson (2011) argues that environmentally adequate language equals socially adequate language. Clearly, this applies both to verbal language as well as to 'visual language'. Thus, as long as we fail to fully recognize our equality with nature, we also keep doing (some level of) injustice to all humans – including ourselves – who are part of the natural web. That is, we do not truly recognize our intimate coexistence within this web in the first place. In short, taking care of nature, is taking care of ourselves (Norton, 2014; Roos & Hunt, 2010; Shepard, 2015). Shanahan and McComas (1999) argue, in a similar vein, that a particular view on nature (as a scene) helps to legitimize and naturalize particular ways of acting (in the foreground). Or, as Meister (1997) puts it: "(...) natural landscapes are important elements in a cultural system because they act as a signifying system through which a social system is communicated, reproduced, experienced, and explored". This also suggests that injustice, in its broadest sense, cannot be fully redressed as long as we do not fundamentally change our views and acting vis-à-vis nature. The recurrence of this fundamental, underlying injustice in both Biocentric Subframes indicates how strongly (and implicitly) this thinking is rooted in our world(view), which is mostly populated by people like, or who we recognize as similar to, us. Therefore, a contribution of this study is that it has tried to name these injustices and describe their status within two crucial climate change frames. This may be the first step in a process of awakening and change.

Summarizing, then, both subframes do not yet use their full potential to provide powerful alternatives to the anthropocentric thinking. This might be due to conscious or unconscious decisions. For example, alternative voices may feel / be obliged to adapt their views to the boundaries set by the hegemonic group. Also, the – inevitable – editing, rephrasing or translating (e.g. from minor languages to English / Dutch) by western journalists, (photo) editors or NGOs may inhibit the full transfer of the ideas promoted by bottom-up voices 'speaking directly to us' (see Baysha, 2014; Beck, 2000; Billett, 2010; Brand & Brunnengräber, 2012; Entman & Rojecki, 1993; Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012; Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993; Gans, 1979, 2004; Gitlin, 1980; Groshek & Han, 2011; Roosvall & Tegelberg, 2015;

Shoemaker & Reese, 2014; Takahashi & Meisner, 2012; Tuchman, 1978). Indeed, even the alternative outlet is situated in a largely anthropocentric (cultural / political / economic) context, which does influence its reporting to a certain extent. While this is rather problematic and difficult – if not impossible – to overcome, it is a relevant reality to take into account.

As I have argued before, I cannot ignore that I, as a western researcher, share a(n inescapable) top-down positionality with these (mainstream) media (Bankoff, 2001; Pulido & Peña, 1998; Roos & Hunt, 2010; Taylor, 2000). For a start, I live in my (Dutch / English) language, even if criticizing it (Larson, 2011). Hence, my research agenda, practices and discussions are also ‘framed’ in certain ways and cannot be free from critical scrutiny or self-reflection (e.g. Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2007). Following up on my own criticism, I could, for instance, have collaborated more closely with those holding a bottom-up positionality, like southern scholars or communities, or western alternative thinkers (e.g. Dreher & Voyer, 2015; Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012). However, this would have gone beyond the aim of the current research: Developing a comprehensive framework that can provide insights into the (robustness of) Biocentric Subframes (vis-à-vis Anthropocentric Subframes), as presented to the audience by (quite) broadly available media in a Western European country. Yet, I hope that my framework – more indirectly – may be scrutinized and developed by other (bottom-up) voices (in academics or beyond), drawing on local realities, experiences or different media (cultures), within or beyond Western Europe. Surely, this will help to further test and compare my findings, contributing to more nuanced and valuable understandings.

Original Dutch Quotes

[1] “Opwarming zwengelt laat winterweer aan.”

[2] “De stijging van de zeespiegel kan hen van de kaart vegen, terwijl de uitputting van de oceanen hen van hun inkomsten berooft.”

[3] “(...) de strijd tegen de opwarming van de aarde (...)”

[4] “De gemeenschappelijke vijand is de klimaatverandering (...)”

[5] “Dat is ongeveer een derde van de hoeveelheid koolstof die jaarlijks door de mens wordt uitgestoten en is dus absoluut niet te verwaarlozen.”

[6] “Dat heeft te maken met het menselijke broeikaseffect.”

[7] “Vorig jaar zijn het verbruik en de productie van steenkool in Europa weer toegenomen, respectievelijk met 3,6 en 2,6 procent.”

[8] “Tegen 2025 zal de Chinese CO₂ uitstoot, naargelang het gekozen beleidspad, met nog eens zevenenvijftig tot vijfenzeventig procent stijgen. In 2010 was China nog steeds de grootste producent van steenkool met 3162 miljoen ton. (...) Tweede in de ranglijst, de VS, komt ver achter met 932 miljoen ton.”

[9] “EU-bank ‘financiert vervuilers’.”

[10] “Momenteel verbruiken we elk jaar de helft meer natuurlijke rijkdommen dan de aarde in die tijd kan produceren. We nemen niet alleen rente op, maar happen ook in ons kapitaal.”

[11] “Het geïndustrialiseerde Noorden heeft sinds het begin van de industrialisering veruit de meeste CO₂ uitgestoten (...).”

[12] “Tijdens COP19 voert Greenpeace actie tegen vervuilende industrie in Polen.”

[13] “Dat de poolkappen gaan smelten en we hier straks allemaal natte voeten krijgen, dat beseffen we al een tijdje. Maar de opwarming van ons klimaat heeft ook meer rechtstreekse gevolgen.”

[14] “Nog veel te weinig mensen beseffen dat de Noordpool dé klimaatregelaar – zeg gerust dé airco – van deze aardbol is.”

[15] “Caraïbische bananenindustrie dreigt te verdwijnen.”

[16] “Op de Zuidpool leven nu nog machtige soorten, zoals naast de pinguïns kolossale inktvissen, wilde zeehonden, roofdieren en uitzonderlijke vogelsoorten.”

[17] “(...) een fractie van het totale ijsberenbestand, dat rond de noordpool op meer dan twintigduizend dieren wordt geschat.”

[18] “In het Zuiden leeft het grootste deel van de bevolking in de meest kwetsbare regio's (...).”

[19] “Van iedere 100 Dominicanen zijn er 34 arm en 10 zeer arm, volgens de Verenigde Naties.”

[20] “Op 25 oktober vorig jaar werd het eiland getroffen door orkaan Sandy. Daarbij werden elf mensen gedood.”

[21] “De klimaatverandering speelt de helft van de dieren en een derde van de planten parten.”

[22] “Het zachte weer brengt de natuur danig in de war. Zanglijsters raken in lentestemming, houtduiven bouwen nestjes en de katjes aan de hazelaar gaan aardig zwellen.”

[23] “Maar zo gaat het leven nu bij Uunartoq Lovstrom, Alberth Lukassen en die andere kleine Groenlanders. Nog even.”

[24] “(...) de slechte landbouwmethoden (...).”

[25] “Wereldsteden zoals New York zijn bijzonder kwetsbaar.”

[26] “Iedere man en vrouw in de straten van Bangladesh zal het je vertellen: stop met CO₂ uit te stoten.”

[27] “In het bijzonder investeringen in energie moeten razendsnel verschuiven van onduurzame bronnen naar energiebesparing en hernieuwbare energie.”

[28] “ ‘Zonder dit geld zouden veel diersoorten van de wereld verdwijnen.’ ”

[29] “De Belgische delegatie van ngo’s vraagt aan België 50 miljoen euro klimaatfinanciering voor 2013 in te zetten.”

[30] “Zuid-Korea investeert dit jaar 7 miljoen euro in proefprojecten om zee-ecosystemen van ontwikkelingslanden te beschermen.”

[31] “IT-bedrijven ontwikkelden bijvoorbeeld goedkope gsm’s voor consumenten met een lager inkomen. Sindsdien gebruiken boeren steeds meer mobiele telefonie om weersvoorspellingen op te zoeken en de huidige marktprijs van hun gewassen te controleren.”

[32] “In Europa daalde de uitstoot met 3 procent, in de VS en Japan met zo'n 2 procent.”

[33] “Vooraf overheden moeten meer inspanningen doen om drastische maatregelen te nemen.”

[34] “De EU is de enige groep landen met bindende afspraken en duidelijke doelstelling op de lange termijn.”

[35] “We moeten dus meer groene energie produceren, ook in Vlaanderen.”

[36] “Maar naast zingen kunnen we nog van alles doen, zoals minder vlees eten en meer de fiets gebruiken.”

[37] “(...) veranderende weerpatronen (...).”

[38] “2 op 3 denken echter verkeerdelijk dat deze brandstoffen bijdragen tot de oplossing voor de klimaatopwarming. Het is duidelijk dat Vlamingen niet goed op de hoogte zijn van de problemen. De EU en de Belgische regering zijn dat echter wel.”

[39] “We kunnen ons geen ander leven voorstellen dan dat wat we vandaag hebben.”

[40] “De dominante religies doen de mens geloven dat hij speciaal is. En als hij denkt dat hij speciaal is, dat hij meer waarde heeft dan een ander, is het toegestaan om andere soorten te devalueren.”

[41] “De afgelopen decennia is met de marktglobalisering een kader gecreëerd waarbij iedereen met iedereen moet gaan concurreren.”

[42] “De waarheid van 'duurzaamheid', en daarmee ook van de vergadering in Rio van deze maand, is dat het niet onze band met de natuur wenst te controleren, maar menselijke verlangens, autonomie en soevereiniteit.”

[43] “Indien niet goed beheerd kunnen de enorme geldstromen die nu op gang komen de verhoudingen in het getroffen gebied fundamenteel veranderen. Bovendien mag je ook de mentale impact niet onderschatten.”

[44] “De echte vijand is de mens zelf (...).”

[45] “Hetzelfde rijke Westen draagt immers een zware verantwoordelijkheid. Het is groot geworden door als een parasiet de kolonies leeg te zuigen.”

[46] “Ondertussen is de mens echter een 'superroofdier' geworden. Meester van het universum.”

[47] “Op rijstvelden worden ook vissen gekweekt. Gecombineerde landbouwproductiemethoden werden eeuwenlang toegepast door Chinese en Indiase boeren, maar verloren aantrekkingskracht met de mechanisering van de exportgerichte landbouw.”

[48] “Drama in Doha: koolstofhandel gered, klimaatverandering gaat door.”

[49] “De 66-jarige Susan Wambua, eigenaar van een stukje land van een hectare in het dorpje Makongeni (...).”

[50] “Maar onze eigen rijstproductie werd totaal kapot gemaakt door dumping vanuit de VS. Rijst wordt daar dubbel gesubsidieerd: door een subsidie voor de productie aan de boeren en door een exportsubsidie. Haïti heeft een immens onbenut potentieel voor rijstproductie maar onze boeren kunnen niet concurreren met die Amerikaanse rijst.”

[51] “Vrouwen en meisjes worden hierdoor extra getroffen omdat ze door hun status pas als laatste eten krijgen of toegang tot gezondheidszorg.”

[52] “(...) wij, het gewone volk, werden uitgesloten van de voorbereidende onderhandelingen (...).”

[53] “Enkele jaren geleden trotseerden hier nog meer dan 5.000 mensen het ijsskoude water van de waterkanonnen. Maar daarna hebben de organisatie en de staat de handen in elkaar geslagen en raken de betogers hier niet meer.”

[54] “Dit alles resulteert in een zware belasting van de natuurlijke systemen die de leefbaarheid voor de mens op aarde garanderen.”

[55] “Het regenwoud van de Amazone, ook wel 'de long van de wereld' genoemd, ademen [sic] op grote schaal koolstofdioxide (CO₂) in en zuurstof uit.”

[56] “(...) bosbestand (...)”

[57] “(...) 50 tot 80 miljoen hectare in het Zuiden (...)”

[58] “(...) een voetbalveld vruchtbare grond (...)”

[59] “Dit heeft nefaste gevolgen voor onze elementaire mensenrechten, onze samenleving en ons ecosysteem.”

[60] “Problemen laten oplossen door zij die ze veroorzaakt hebben is niet realistisch.”

[61] “Vandana Shiva (°1952), doctor in de kernfysica, is een icoon in India en vererbuiten voor wie begaan is met organische landbouw, sociale strijd en ecofeminisme.”

[62] “Er is nood aan een diepgaand debat onder verontruste burgers, kritische klimaatbewegingen, groene syndicalisten en milieuactivisten over hoe het nu verder moet.”

[63] “We willen opnieuw sterker staan op het politieke vlak en alternatieven aanbieden. (...) De twee boerenorganisaties (...) werken nu opnieuw samen in twee concrete projecten: tegen plantages voor biobrandstoffen en tegen de zaden van Monsanto, die deze multinational zo genereus geweest is ons te schenken na de aardbeving!”

[64] “Om zo een revolutie waar te maken zal er wereldwijd een voldoende grote kritische massa nodig zijn die de wil heeft en in staat is om de krachtsverhoudingen om te buigen.”

[65] “Door meer te delen, betere gemeenschappen op te bouwen en te focussen [sic] wat echt waardevol is, kunnen we echte vooruitgang boeken met meer welzijn. Maar dan moeten we de toekomst wel samen in handen nemen.”

[66] “Als we verandering willen, zullen we ons van onderuit moeten organiseren, in plaats van ons blind te staren op de impasse waarin de elites van deze wereld de klimaatonderhandelingen hebben gebracht.”

[67] “Al deze gevaren worden veroorzaakt door menselijke interventie in natuurlijke processen en ze kunnen enkel overwonnen worden aan de hand van veranderingen in attitude en gedrag.”

[68] “ ‘Lagom’ is de Zweedse term voor ‘juist genoeg, voldoende, adequaat’. We moeten een nieuw concept van welzijn uitdenken, in plaats van te stellen dat geluk bestaat uit steeds meer consumeren; afstappen ook van bnp als enige meetinstrument om ontwikkeling en vooruitgang te meten; nieuwe businessmodellen creëren, waarin er plaats is voor het lange termijn denken en voor een langere gebruikstermijn voor de voorwerpen; we kunnen niet langer doorgaan op het spoor van steeds meer winst nastreven door mensen steeds meer materiële goederen te laten produceren om te consumeren, die ze weer snel moeten weggegooid worden.”

[69] “(...) klimaatslimme landbouw (...).”

[70] “We moeten maar eens afstappen van dat icoon van de wereldbol, want zo gingen we erboven staan en bekeken we de natuur op een abstracte manier... en maar pionnen verschuiven als op een schaakbord. Zo verliezen we echter contact met de aarde onder ons. De planeet versus de aarde, zo je wil.”

6 Working Mechanically or Organically? Climate Change Journalist and News Frames in Mainstream and Alternative Media⁸⁴

6.1 Introduction

As Walter Lippmann concluded almost 100 years ago, the media constitute the most important bridge between the world “out there” and “the pictures in our heads” (Lippmann, 2006). In today’s global village (McLuhan, 1962), faced with major interconnected threats like climate change, terrorism or mass immigration, the media have more than ever an important part to play. They connect us to events and people we would not be able to know or interact with as they are beyond our limited time-spaces (see Tuchman, 1978). Most citizens living in the global West have, for example, had little first-hand experience with climate change. Hence, most ‘mental pictures’ come from written, online or audio-visual media. However, depending on the frames media provide us with, we are likely to think, talk and act in different ways about *the* global threat of the twenty-first century (e.g. Beck, 2000; Brantner, Lobinger & Wetzstein, 2011; Myers et al., 2012; Petersen & Ferruci, 2017). Accordingly, Hanitzsch (2011, p.491) summarizes the pivotal role of journalism (studies) in today’s society as follows:

In modern societies, journalism is the practice of indexing the present as it turns into history. As such, the journalistic field is central to the constitution of modern society, and its study is essential to the understanding of contemporary culture.

As I have pointed out earlier, framing is a process that encompasses frame-building by communicators, the textual frame in multimodal communication and the frame interpretations by the audience (or audience effects) (De Vreese, 2005; Druckman, 2001b; Entman, Matthes & Pellicano, 2009; Scheufele, D.A., 1999, Scheufele, B., 2006; Van Gorp, 2006; Vliegenthart & van Zoonen, 2011). The majority of the framing studies has, up till now, focused on the textual frames in (media) communication (e.g. Boykoff, 2008; O’Neill, 2013; Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). Borah (2011) shows, for instance, that only 2,3 percent of 379 recent framing studies investigate frame-building. However, in order to fully understand news frames, their underlying hegemonic power struggles (Carragee & Roefs, 2004) and their potential audience effects, it is imperative to incorporate frame-building into framing research (e.g. Boesman et al., 2017; Borah, 2011; Brüggemann, 2014; Scheufele, D.A., 1999). After all, journalists cannot but frame (Brüggemann, 2014). That is what they do, trying to make the complex and unstructured reality graspable (Van Gorp, 2006). Rather than functioning as individual gatekeepers

⁸⁴ A more concise version of this chapter has been published as a journal article: Moernaut, R., Mast, J., & Pauwels, L. (2017). Working Mechanically or Organically? Climate Change Journalist and News Frames in Mainstream and Alternative Media. *Journalism Practice*. Doi: 10.1080/17512786.2017.1387070.

(White, 1950), however, reporters are affected by a complex of influences (Shoemaker & Reese, 2014). Up till now, frame-building research has, for instance, demonstrated the role of journalists' mindsets and cognitive frames (e.g. Brüggemann & Engesser, 2016; Engesser & Brüggemann, 2016; Scheufele, B., 2006), the role of frame-sponsors and interpretive communities (e.g. Boesman et al., 2017; Brüggemann, 2014; Brüggemann & Engesser, 2014; Dan, 2017; Hänggli, 2012; Hänggli & Kriesi, 2012) or ideological or cultural views and norms (e.g. Borah & Bulla, 2006; Evans, 2016; Silcock, 2002; Strömbäck and van Aelst, 2010). Vliegthart and van Zoonen (2011) criticize several of these studies, however, for oversimplifying frame-building by attributing too much power to just one of the influencing factors, for instance by exclusively focusing on the micro level (e.g. individual journalists) or rather the macro level (e.g. cultural views and norms). De Vreese and Lecheler (2016, p.406) summarize: "How frames come into existence is a crucial but understudied phenomenon" (see Anderson, 2009).

Several authors have looked at the journalist as nucleus in the frame-building process (e.g. Boesman, d'Haenens & Van Gorp, 2016; Boesman et al., 2017; Brüggemann, 2014; Brüggemann & Engesser, 2016; Lewis & Reese, 2009; Vossen, Van Gorp & Schulpen, 2017). Engesser and Brüggemann (2016) have attempted to reconstruct the cognitive frames of climate journalists, considering those as one of the most important influences on the media coverage of climate change. However, the authors also called for the further validation of the journalist frames through qualitative approaches. Also, they argued that "[f]uture research should combine interviews with journalists and analyses of their articles in order to further investigate their role as secondary definers of social issues" (p.14). A recent study on the journalist and media frames in the context of poverty reporting in the Low Countries by Vossen, Van Gorp and Schulpen (2017) is – to the best of my knowledge – the first and only to respond to this call. It has partly informed the hypotheses and research design of the current study (see also Boesman et al., 2017; Boesman, d'Haenens & Van Gorp, 2016; Lewis & Reese, 2009).

Research concerned with the (climate change) frames produced by mainstream and alternative media laid bare some interesting differences (e.g. Brand & Brunnengräber, 2012; Gunster, 2011, 2012; Hopke, 2012). The general conclusion of my own research (see Chapters 4 and 5) is that Anthropocentric Subframes are dominant in the news output of mainstream media while progressive alternative media are more likely to provide both Biocentric Subframes as well as Anthropocentric Subframes. I argued, accordingly, that the former are more likely to depoliticize the climate debate while the latter may facilitate politicization (Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Mouffe, 2005; Pepermans & Maesele, 2014; Swyngedouw, 2010). Nevertheless, research into the frame-building of alternative media is – to the best of my knowledge – non-existent. Comparative studies, looking into mainstream and alternative media production, could therefore help us to better understand the origins of differential framing patterns (Atton, 2002; Groshek & Han, 2011; Hamilton, 2000). Besides, they allow to test, validate and/or

develop the previous claims concerning the relations among various influences and news frames. After all, only through comparison one may really understand the relevance and implications of certain newsroom choices and draw more convincing conclusions (Evans, 2016; Reese, 2001; Strömbäck & van Aelst, 2010).

Finally, frame-building research has, up till now, almost exclusively focused on verbal frames. Visual framing has been largely overlooked. In their systematic review of visual framing research, Brantner, Geise and Lobinger (2012) identify, for instance, only one out of 29 studies concerned with the communicator perspective. (More recent) exceptions are provided by Nurmis (2017), Dan (2017) and Grabe and Bucy (2009). As I discussed before (see 2.3 Visual and Multimodal Framing), visual frames have a particularly strong influence on audience perceptions (e.g. Messaris & Abraham, 2001). Besides, they have been directly connected to the practices of selection and construction characteristic for the (photographic) gatekeeping process (e.g. Buehner, 2012; Nurmis, 2017; Parry, 2010). More general research into the (newsroom) production of photographs provides some further suggestions as for the factors which might influence the visual part of news frames (e.g. Bissell, 2000; de Smaele, Geenen & De Cock, 2017; Grayson, 2013; Scoggin McEntee, 2016; Seelig, 2005). Journalistic routines, news values and interactions with sources may, for instance, play an important role. The same is true for audience considerations and broader (ideological / cultural) contexts. Further empirical validation of these claims is, however, required (Hansen & Machin, 2013; Rebich-Hespanha et al., 2013). Indeed, criticizing the preoccupation in academic research with the final visual product, Grayson (2013, p.319) concludes: “Yet I question this belief that one can read so much from the image in its final form. I propose the necessity of augmenting this with a review of actions of the image creator”.

Therefore, the scientific purpose of this study is to examine the major influences which help to explain the differing multimodal media frames produced by mainstream and progressive alternative media. Like Boesman et al. (2017) and Engesser and Brüggemann (2016) I will consider the individual journalists, and their cognitive frames, as nexus in the frame-building process (see also Brüggemann, 2014; Vossen, Van Gorp & Schulpen, 2017). My discussion will draw on a qualitative interview analysis: 26 climate journalists, news chiefs, photo editors and opinion-makers working in the context of three mainstream and two progressive alternative Flemish outlets were interviewed in late 2016 and early 2017. I connected the findings from the thematic content analyses (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003; Ritchie & Spencer, 1994), including the cognitive frames of the respondents, to the results of a framing analysis of the climate change articles (n=114) which were published in the five outlets between 24 October and 4 December 2016.

6.2 Frames and Framing

As I have pointed out before, framing is a bridging model between culture and cognition (Goffmann, 1986; Gamson et al., 1992; Reese, 2007; Van Gorp, 2007) and the individual and collective levels of society (Entman, Matthes & Pellicano, 2009). Accordingly, frames can be found in different areas. Within the context of media communication, we find, on the one hand, news frames (i.e. manifest realizations of frames in texts) and, on the other hand, cognitive interest-group frames, journalist, beat or newsroom frames, audience frames and generally shared cultural frames (Dahinden, 2005; Entman, Matthes & Pellicano, 2009; Scheufele, B., 2006; Scheufele, D.A., 1999; Van Gorp, 2006, 2007). These various types of frames mutually influence each other. Cognitive frames, including journalist frames, result from cultural frames and interactions with other communicators (' frames) but are also influenced by personal attitudes, experiences, values or reasoning (Engesser & Brüggemann, 2016; Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Graber, 1988; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Scheufele, B., 2006). "News frames, in contrast, are the product of professional collaboration and represent a mixture of different social and cultural frames, actor [i.e. interest-group] frames, editorial frames and journalist frames" (Engesser & Brüggemann, 2016, p.828). Clearly, then, journalist frames (and, by expansion, all cognitive frames) have a more individual, news frames a more social or collective character. Functioning in similar contexts, drawing on comparable experiences or being socialized in comparable ways, journalists in the same beats or newsrooms may, however, adopt beat or newsroom frames, which have a more collective (i.e. shared) character (see De Vreese, 2005; Entman, Matthes & Pellicano, 2009; Fillmore & Baker, 2009; Gamson, 1989; Scheufele, D.A., 1999; Vliegthart & van Zoonen, 2011). The major steps in the framing process are summarized as frame-building by (professional) communicators and frame effects on the audience (Vliegthart & van Zoonen, 2011). This chapter is concerned with the frame-building phase. See Chapter 3 for a more elaborate discussion regarding the framing process in general and frame-building in particular.

6.2.1 Frame-building as a Multi-level Process

I agree with Boesman et al. (2017) who consider the journalist the central link in the news production chain, and hence an interesting subject for analysis (see also Boesman, d'Haenens & Van Gorp, 2016; Brüggemann, 2014; Brüggemann & Engesser, 2016; Vossen, Van Gorp & Schulpen, 2017). The journalist frame, in particular, is pivotal. Dunwoody (1992) argues, for instance, that the absence of certain journalist frames is likely to result in deficient reporting. That is, frames must be mentally accessible to journalists for them to use them in the news production process. This is supported by Bertram Scheufele (2006) who demonstrates that newsroom frames, which are more or less shared among the journalists working in the same context, strongly affect the choice for particular news frames, especially during periods of routine reporting. That is, it seems that journalists prefer frames with are consistent with their own (socialized) views. In a more recent study, Engesser and Brüggemann (2016,

p.827) call the cognitive frames of climate journalists even “(...) one of the presumably most important influences on the media coverage and public understanding of climate change”. Vossen, Van Gorp and Schulpen (2017) nuance these findings in a more recent study on poverty framing. They argue that the journalist frames only have a limited predictive value. Based on the literature, I formulate the following research questions:

RQ1: What are the journalist frames (and shared newsroom frames) of climate change reporters working in three mainstream and two progressive alternative media outlets in Flanders?

RQ2: In which ways do the identified journalist (and newsroom) frames help to predict the news frames in these outlets, and vice versa?

Journalist frames are not idiosyncratic, nor has an individual journalist full control over the news frames that structure his/her news articles (i.e. frame-building) (Scheufele, B., 2006). Put differently, framing in the newsroom is a complex and multi-level process (e.g. Boesman et al., 2017; Van Gorp, 2006; Nurmis, 2017; Vliegthart & van Zoonen, 2011; Vossen, Van Gorp & Schulpen, 2017), affected by various actors, contextual influences, pressures, contingencies and intervening factors (see Bissell, 1998; Gans, 1979; Gitlin, 1980; Molotch & Lester, 1974; Scoggin McEntee, 2016; Shoemaker & Reese, 2014; Tuchman, 1978; Voakes, 1998). These factors may directly affect the cognitive frames of journalists and/or they may intervene in the process of frame-building.⁸⁵ Previous literature concerned with news production and (climate change) framing provides some indications of what these influences may be:

Individual Level. Factors such as knowledge (Wilson, 2000), expertise (Brüggemann & Engesser, 2014), attitudes towards climate change (Brüggemann & Engesser, 2016), gender (Rodgers & Thorson, 2003), role perception (Brüggemann & Engesser, 2016) or ideology (Carvalho, 2007) have been shown to affect the news reporting of reporters. Bissell (2000), de Smaele, Geenen and De Cock (2017) and Seelig (2005) contend that photo selection, in particular, is a highly subjective process, influenced by individuals’ political views, personal opinions, emotions or convictions but also by their gender or age. Bissell (2000) concludes:

Each decision made reflects one of a series of gates a photograph goes through to become a part of news. And most importantly, each decision reflects some portion of reality that has been selected out. What this means, then, is that the transparent window on the world has now become a few people’s perceptions of reality (pp.91-92).

Obviously, this statement is also applicable to the general media production process (i.e. frame-building). What is more, Brüggemann and Engesser (2014, 2016) contend that the views, assumptions and convictions of individual climate journalists are even more likely to permeate their reporting as many of them are experts who are highly experienced in the subject matter and thus enjoy more

⁸⁵ As will be clarified throughout the findings, this means that the ‘journalist frame’ can not simply be equated to the individual level of the ‘hierarchy-of-influences model’.

autonomy in the newsroom (see Dunwoody, 1980; Sachsman, Simon & Valenti, 2010). With regard to (climate change) framing, more specifically, Engesser and Brüggemann (2016) empirically show the relation between specialization (all-rounder versus expert), political alignment (left-wing versus right-wing), journalist roles and cognitive journalist frames. For instance, the ‘industrialized countries’ economic policies’ (i.e. industrialized countries are responsible for solving climate change, which has problematic social consequences, through emission reductions) and ‘global ecological discourse’ frames (i.e. the consequences of climate change are mainly ecological; better public understanding of ecology, and thus better communication, is required) were mainly found among those reporters who supported the views of the IPCC (2014a, 2014b) on anthropogenic climate change but not among sceptics. The ‘sustainability’ frame – which identifies the causes of climate change in the current hegemonic system and situates the solutions in the economic reform of the system and the voluntary restraint of consumers and producers – was more prevalent among those journalists who considered it as their responsibility (i.e. role) to raise ecological awareness. Several types of journalist roles have been described in the literature: Hanitzsch (2007, 2011) introduces the populist disseminator, detached watchdog, critical change agent and opportunist facilitator. Bro (2008) distinguishes among the watchdog, hunting dog, sheepdog and rescue dog. Atton (2003) describes the activist journalist who is involved in the issues or events (s)he wants to report about. Wiesslitz and Ashuri (2011) also identify the moral journalist, who reports about issues which (s)he only witnesses but is not directly involved in. Nevertheless, Van Dalen, De Vreese and Albaek (2012) point out a gap between role perceptions and enactment: reporters who identify with a particular role do not necessarily express this in their news production (news frames). That is, no doubt, due to other influences which also affect their (un)conscious decisions (see below). Vossen, Van Gorp and Schulpen (2017) contend, in a more general vein, that personal knowledge and visions rather affect topic or source selection than news frames as such.

Routines Level. Tuchman (1978), Gitlin (1980) and Dunwoody (1992) consider journalist frames as routines which help journalists to deal with the time-space constraints in media contexts (see Hall, 1973): “Frames enable journalists to process large amounts of information quickly and routinely: to recognize it as information, to assign it to cognitive categories, and to package it for efficient relay to their audiences” (Gitlin, 1980, p.7). Accordingly, some authors tend to equate news values (see Bednarek & Caple, 2012; Galtung & Ruge, 1965, 1973; Gans, 1979; Harcup & O’Neill, 2001, 2017; Joye, 2010) with frames (e.g. De Vreese, 2002). In their often quoted and replicated work, for instance, Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) identify a ‘conflict’ and a ‘human interest’ frame. I do not agree. Rather, I follow the view of Boesman et al. (2017) who show that news values often pave the way for particular frames (see also De Vreese, 2005). The authors argue, for instance, that their ‘Pact with the Devil’ frame draws upon the contrast between proximity / personalization and distancing: the frame contends that the young men – often described as enthusiastic soccer players or good students (‘the boy next door’) – (i.e. proximity, personalization) who became Syria fighters have been transformed, by their pact with the

devil, into extremist fighters in a remote civil war (distance) (see Brüggemann, 2014; Entman, 1991; Van Gorp, 2006). Nurmis (2017), discussing the visual frame-building of climate change reports, argues among others that the preference for drama contributes to the production of frames which lack a positive or constructive solutions focus (see also Mendelson, 2005). The interviewed reporters in the study of Vossen, Van Gorp and Schulpen (2017) identify news values as the single most important influence on their news production (see also Sachsman, Simon & Valenti, 2010).

Organizational Level (including Small Groups). Socialization in the newsroom, including feedback effects of the news frames journalists are expected to reproduce (Entman, Matthes & Pellicano, 2009; Gans, 1979; Gitlin, 1980; Shoemaker & Reese, 2014; Tuchman, 1978), may give rise to newsroom frames (Scheufele, B., 2006). Also, newspapers regularly have newsroom meetings during which (framing) approaches are discussed (e.g. Boesman, d’Haenens & Van Gorp, 2015; Boesman & Van Gorp, 2016). A more specific type of shared cognitive frames are beat frames (Brüggemann, 2014). Journalists in a beat system focus on particular institutions or topic areas, such as politics, economics or science. As a result, they are often specialists, mostly concerned with a rather small group of sources (e.g. political, economic or scientific sources) (Brüggemann & Engesser, 2014; De Keyser, Raeymaeckers & Paulussen, 2011; Gans, 1979; McCluskey, 2008; Sachsman, Simon & Valenti, 2010). McCluskey (2008) has shown that reporters tend to foreground or background other elements depending on their beats when covering climate change. That is, beat reporters are socialized in their beats. In a similar vein, Engesser and Brüggemann (2016) discuss the interactions between beats and various journalist frames. For instance, more politicized reporters are more inclined to support, among others, the ‘sustainability’ frame, which is more concerned with economic and political discussions and the need to reform society. Science beat reporters, however, were shown to denounce this frame, and stick more to the ‘neutral scientific facts’. That is, they were less inclined to intervene in matters of politics, economy or societal reform. As Berglez (2011) argues, however, climate change coverage actually requires breaking up the separations among beats: it may facilitate a broader integration of the various aspects and levels of the issue and thus more comprehensive discussions (see de Semir, 2000; Harrabin, 2000).

I have pointed out before that the various gatekeepers (Bissell, 2000; Bruns, 2003; de Smaele, Geenen & De Cock, 2017; Fahmy, 2005; McQuail, 2010; Scoggin McEntee, 2016; Shoemaker & Riccio, 2016; Silcock & Schwalbe, 2010; White, 1950) in a media organization have various degrees of power, influence and autonomy. I expect, accordingly, that the frames of the most influential gatekeepers – editors in chief, chiefs, senior journalists, experts – are more likely to be reproduced in news articles. After all, they usually feel less pressures to adapt their frames to certain expectations of seniors or they even have the power themselves to (in)directly affect the frame-building processes of others, especially early career journalists or generalist reporters (e.g. Breed, 1955; Brüggemann & Engesser, 2014, 2016;

Gans, 1979; Gibson et al., 2016; Gitlin, 1980; O'Neill, 2013; Sachsman, Simon & Valenti, 2010; Shoemaker & Reese, 2014). Photo editors have also been shown to be particularly influential gatekeepers (e.g. Bissell, 2000; Bruns, 2003; de Smaele, Geenen & De Cock, 2017; Fahmy, 2005; Newton, 2001; Nurmis, 2017; Scoggin McEntee, 2016; Seelig, 2005; Silcock & Schwalbe, 2010).

Extra-media Level (including Competition). “Journalists frame issues, but their interpretations are shaped, in part, by discourses external to news organizations” (Carragee & Roefs, 2004, p.219). Therefore, Carragee and Roefs (2004) highlight the need for scholars to be aware of and attend to the (hegemonic) power struggles underlying frame-building process. Vossen, Van Gorp and Schulpen (2017) argue that sources have one of the biggest influences on the frame-building process. As discussed before, Gans (1979, p.116) described the mutually dependent relationship among journalists and frame-sponsors (i.e. sources) as a dance, in which both parties need each other (in their search for visibility, legitimation, media input, efficiency) but with the frame-sponsors often taking the lead. However, the author also referred to the relationship as ‘a tug of war’ (Gans, 1979, p.117), with the sources trying to manage the news in order to present themselves – and their case – in the best possible way and the journalists trying to manage the sources in order to extract the information they want (see Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993; Gandy, 1982; Gitlin, 1980; Molotch & Lester, 1973; Shoemaker & Reese, 2014; Tuchman, 1972, 1978). In any case, journalists have, as gatekeepers, an important influence on the interest-group frames that are accepted, rejected or adapted, and can make certain views more salient while backgrounding or delegitimizing others (e.g. Brüggemann, 2014; Durham, 2001; Entman, 1993; Scheufele, D.A., 1999; Scheufele, B., 2006; Tankard, 2001; Vossen, Van Gorp & Schulpen, 2017). Carlson (2009), drawing on Eason (1988), refers in this context to the concept of ‘disobedient dependence’.

A majority of the frame-building research is concerned with the contributions of frame-sponsors to media frames. It has, for instance, been shown that access to and influence on frame-building depends on interests groups’ power and resources. That is, elites – like politicians or corporate organizations – often prevail in frame competitions while others – like ordinary citizens or NGOs – struggle to get occasional access at most (e.g. Entman & Rojecki, 1993; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993; Hänggli, 2012; Hänggli & Kriesi, 2012; Pan & Kosicki, 1993; Trumbo, 1996). Or, as Entman (1993, p.55) summarizes, frames are imprints of power. The term ‘hierarchy of access’ is often employed in this context (Gans, 1979, 2004; Molotch & Lester, 1974; Shoemaker & Reese, 2014; Tuchman, 1978). Bennett, Lawrence and Livingston (2006) demonstrate, for instance, that news coverage is indexed to the debate among official sources. That is, the frames reproduced by the media tend to reflect the (various) interest-group frames present in the political debate, but exclude those which are not used by the elites. According to Gitlin (1980), non-elite sources only get to respond to the frames initiated by others, but are usually not allowed to introduce their own frames (see also Entman &

Rojecki, 1993; Wozniak, Wessler & Lück, 2017). Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993) add that movements often feel inclined to reframe their argumentations in the dominant language (i.e. adapt them to the generally accepted views) in order to get coverage (see e.g. Takahashi et al., 2014). However, new, unfamiliar or unexpected events, like natural or human disasters, may give non-hegemonic sources the opportunity to – temporarily – exert stronger influence on the frame-building process (Carlson, 2009; Cottle, 2000; Gans, 1979; Molotch & Lester, 1974; Nilsson & Wadbring, 2015; Shoemaker & Reese, 2014; Tuchman, 1978). According to Bertram Scheufele (2006) and Dietram Scheufele (1999), journalists are most receptive for external input (i.e. frames) when dealing with new or unfamiliar issues (see Van Gorp, 2006, 2007).

Further, several studies found a connection between the use of certain sources and the prevalence of particular news frames (Dimitrova & Stömbäck, 2012). For instance, Dan (2017) demonstrates that ‘survivor’ frames, which stress the (mental / physical) strength of HIV and AIDS patients, were dominant in health communication if non-profit organizations or family and friends were used as sources. The ‘carrier’ frame – which stresses the lack of self-control of HIV and AIDS patients and depicts them as dangerous disease spreaders and outcasts – was used significantly more if representatives of law enforcement acted as sources.

In a study on climate change framing, Brüggemann (2014) made the various types of journalist-source interactions more concrete: He distinguished, more specifically, between frame-sending (i.e. the ‘neutral’ presentation of various interest-group frames), frame-setting (i.e. only (interest-group) frames consonant with the journalist frames are represented) and interpretive accounts (the journalist presents various frames, but depicts the external frames as less or not legitimate) (see Boesman et al., 2017; Scheufele, B., 2006).⁸⁶ This continuum can be linked to the (western) journalistic ideal of objectivity (Carpentier, 2008; Carpentier & Trioen, 2010; Deuze, 2005b; Hanitzsch, 2007; Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2007; Schudson, 2001; Schudson & Anderson, 2009). As argued before (see 3.1.1 Mainstream Media), journalists often use objectivity as a ‘strategic ritual’ to defend themselves against the risks of their trade, like deadline stress or expectations of their superiors in terms of quantity, efficiency or quality. Also, ‘objectivity as a goal’ (Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2007) or ‘ideal’ (Carpentier & Trioen, 2010) is a marketing strategy, which may attract broader audiences (Gans, 1979; Lewis et al. 2008; Shoemaker & Reese, 2014; Tuchman, 1972). Journalists try to appear impartial through, among others, quoting and/or balancing sources (Bennett, Lawrence & Livingston, 2006; Gans, 1979; Tuchman, 1972), supporting these claims by emphasizing the ‘photographic truth’ of visuals (e.g. Newton, 2000). In other words, they often appear to send frames. When it comes to the coverage of anthropogenic climate change,

⁸⁶ As Brüggemann (2014) points out, frame-sending can never be entirely free from frame-setting. Selecting and reproducing frames, gatekeepers are always influenced by their own cognitive frames or schemata. Similarly, frame-setting is never free from frame-sending. As pointed out, frame-building is never a completely individual process. Newsroom frames or beat frames may, for instance, intervene in the frame-setting process.

however, it seems that an increasing number of journalists are more inclined to abandon the traditional approach. Considering detached balance as bias (see Boykoff & Boykoff, 2004), most use a variety of tactics to show some degree of pro-environmental engagement: They make use of a cautious, informed type of balance, including the critical assessment of sceptics (see interpretive account); they reject balance, at least in scientific articles; they explicitly advocate for the climate or a particular cause (frame-setting); they open up the debate to as many different voices as possible (interpretive account / frame-sending). The latter two strategies are often combined with transparency about journalistic methods or personal biases, motives or assumptions (Carpentier, 2008; Deuze, 2005b; Fahy, 2017; Gans, 1979; Gess, 2012; Harbers, 2016; Hiles & Hinant, 2014; Le Masurier, 2015).⁸⁷ Kovach and Rosenstiel (2007) call this ‘objectivity as a means’. The goal, then, is to report as accurately as possible. According to Brüggemann and Engesser (2014), the international ‘interpretive community’ (see Berkowitz & TerKeurst, 1999; Zelizer, 1993) of like-minded climate change reporters also includes sources (see ‘pack journalism’ (Crouse, 1973)). The latter are the frame-sponsors who are most often consulted as they provide information consonant with the journalists’ views (frame-setting) (see Dunwoody, 1980; Tuchman, 1972).

Finally, Boesman et al. (2017) highlight the importance of inter-media competition or exclusiveness, which they call an ‘external news value’ in the process of frame-building: “(...) exclusivity was less decisive in what events to cover but more in how to cover these events” (p.15). The authors argue, for instance, that reporters tend to remain closer to the frame provided by a particular (elite) source if they know they will be the only one to bring the story. If this is not the case, they are more likely to look for other frames (e.g. of non-elites) to structure the information, as an attempt to rationalize why their outlet should bring news which has already been circulated. In both cases, however, ‘the news is in the frame’.

Ideology and Culture Level. As Shoemaker and Reese (2014) point out, all other levels add up to this last one. Ideology and culture can be situated both on the level of the individual (outlets) as well as in the broader society (e.g. Fairclough, 1995, 2000; Gramsci, 1980). The ideological leanings of outlets have been demonstrated to affect their (climate change) news frames (e.g. Bulla & Borah, 2006; Carvalho, 2005, 2007; Dirikx & Gelders, 2010; Maesele et al., 2014), but cultural(-ideological) differences among countries may also leave an imprint (e.g. Dirikx & Gelders, 2009, 2010; Johannessen, 2015; Shehata & Hopmann, 2012; Wu, 2009). For instance, in their study about Swedish and Belgian election coverage, Strömbäck and van Aelst (2010) have shown that the character of media-political systems (Hallin & Mancini, 2004) may affect media frames. According to Silcock (2002), the German national myth of ‘the Past’ influences story selection and framing in TV news. Lewis and Reese (2009) contend that journalists in the United States unwittingly reproduce the ‘war on terror’ frame, which

⁸⁷ See also: Boesman & Van Gorp (2016), Brüggemann and Engesser (2014), Carpentier and Trioen (2010), Hanitzsch (2007), Sachsman, Simon and Valenti (2010), Wiesslitz and Ashuri (2011).

became a naturalized way to look at the world in American politics and society at large. Evans (2016) demonstrates that the ideals of collectivism are far more reflected in the climate change coverage in the Philippines than in the western coverage, which is more concerned with individualism (see Berglez, Höjjer & Olausson, 2009). Gans (1979, pp.42-52), who describes news production in the context of four western (i.e. US) media outlets, indeed refers to a number of enduring values in the news. Individualism is one of those. Others encompass ethnocentrism, altruistic democracy and responsible capitalism.

Thus, based on the findings of colleague-researchers, I expect to find factors that influence frame-building on each of the levels of the 'hierarchy-of-influences model' (Reese, 2001b; Shoemaker & Reese, 2014). Accordingly, I formulate the following research question:

RQ3: Which influences affect frame-building in the context of five Flemish media outlets? Which factors help to explain the presence (or dominance) of certain climate change journalist and news frames? How do influences and frames interact?

6.2.2 The Importance of Comparison

As Entman (1991) highlighted, comparison is key in a (textual) framing analysis. It helps to reveal the framing choices which would otherwise have appeared natural and unproblematic. The same can be said for studies focusing on frame-building. Through comparison one may start to see the potential relevance and implications of newsroom choices in the context of the frame-building process. Also, only through comparison one may draw more convincing solutions. For instance, it is only possible to convincingly demonstrate the relation among an individualist culture and certain media frames by including media (and thus journalist-interviewees) which are less or not defined by this independent variable (Evans, 2016; Reese, 2001; Strömbäck & van Aelst, 2010).

As discussed before (see 3.1.2 Alternative Media), mainstream and alternative media have a number of strongly differing features. Surely, the opposition is not clear-cut and both the 'mainstream' as well as 'alternative media' encompass a spectrum of strongly differing outlets (see Cammaerts, 2007; Downing, 2001). For clarity's sake, however, I summarize that mainstream and (progressive) alternative media are quite oppositional in terms of content (e.g. hierarchy of access, the role of news values), position in the broader (political, economic, cultural) context (e.g. their more or less/no commercial or institutionalized character, the groups which function as their financial sponsors) and production process (e.g. the more or less hierarchical interaction among journalists and/or audiences) (e.g. Atton, 2002, 2003, 2008; Downing, 2001, 2003; Harcup, 2003, 2014). They do, among others, not fit in the dominant media system in Belgium, which is the 'Democratic Corporatist Model' (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). Also, their journalists are more likely to identify with other roles and responsibilities (Hanitzsch, 2007, 2011), for instance the role of activist or moral journalist (Atton, 2002, 2003; Wiesslitz & Ashuri, 2011). They are more likely to approach the 'objectivity concept' in quite different ways (e.g. openness about own

engagements or presuppositions, objectivity through interaction) (Deuze, 2005b; Hanitzsch, 2007; Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2007) or to reject and/or strongly adapt the application of news values (e.g. Eliasoph, 1988). Also, they usually integrate, or closely collaborate with, a much wider variety of sources (e.g. Fuchs, 2010; Harcup, 2003, 2014).

However, as Groshek and Han (2011) point out, little is known about the ways in which alternative media production actually contributes to certain contents (see Atton, 2002; Hamilton, 2000). Indeed, most of the studies listed above solely draw on the study of mainstream media (production). Clearly then, it is highly relevant to compare mainstream and alternative media: It allows to test the previous claims concerning the relations among influences in mainstream media and media frames, and – potentially – to provide some nuances or new insights. It will deepen our understanding of the relations among media production and news framing in alternative media. In particular, it will provide insights regarding the origin and development of Anthropocentric and Biocentric news Subframes in various contexts. Finally, it may give rise to some broader conclusions regarding the relative influence of each of the described dimensions of media production on media framing in general.

RQ4: Which are the main differences in the production process of mainstream and alternative media which may help to explain their differential framings?

6.3 Research design

The Flemish news outlets that I selected for this study are the same as those which I focused on in Chapters 4 and 5: *De Standaard* (DS) (broadsheet, centrist), *De Morgen* (DM) (broadsheet, leftist background) and *Het Laatste Nieuws* (HLN) (popular, liberal roots) are three mainstream newspapers. The two (progressive) alternative outlets are *DeWereldMorgen* (DWM) and *MO**. As I pointed out in Chapter 4, the selection is based on maximum variation sampling (e.g. Mason, 2002; Ritchie, Lewis & Elam, 2003): The three mainstream outlets arguably represent the various ideological viewpoints found in the Flemish media landscape. Besides, the two broadsheet newspapers represent the most influential (i.e. in terms of inter-media agenda-setting or the uptake by policy-makers) and widely circulated broadsheet dailies, while *Het Laatste Nieuws* is by far the most widely read (popular) newspaper among all strata of the Flemish population. In 2014-2015, *De Standaard* and its online news platform reached more than 350.000, *De Morgen* 230.000 and *Het Laatste Nieuws* more than 1.8 million people a day. *DeWereldMorgen* is the major alternative outlet in Flanders, reaching 15.000 readers a day. *MO** is the second alternative outlet. Except for its website, it has a three-monthly paper magazine, which reaches about 250.000 readers. The articles which are published in the magazine also appear on the website, next to a number of contributions from various (external) sources (Blom & Lamberts, 2007; CIM.be, 2016; De Bens and Raeymaeckers, 2010; DeWereldMorgen.be; Durnez, 1985, 1993; Fransen, 1990; Maesele et al., 2014; mo.be; Pepermans, 2015).

Based on purposive sampling (Mason, 2002; Ritchie, Lewis & Elam, 2003), I selected the period 24 October to 4 December 2016. This period encompassed a number of (attention-grabbing) climate events or ‘critical discourse moments’ (Chilton, 1987): the Paris Agreement entered into force; COP22 took place in Marrakech; (climate-disbeliever) Donald Trump was elected as president of the United States; the Flemish government organized a climate summit. As demonstrated by Boykoff and Boykoff (2007) such political (and scientific) events are likely to evoke debate, and thus (in-depth) media coverage (see Dirickx & Gelders, 2009, 2010; Pepermans, 2015). Employing the search tools of the Belgian press archive Gopress and/or the archives of the individual outlets, I conducted key word searches ((Dutch) key words: ‘klimaatverandering’ / ‘klimaatwijziging’ (‘climate change’), ‘opwarming van de aarde / planeet’ (‘global warming’), ‘klimaatopwarming’, ‘opwarming van het klimaat’ (‘climate warming’), ‘broeikaseffect’ (‘greenhouse effect’)). This yielded a corpus of 114 climate change articles.

As suggested by Boesman, d’Haenens and Van Gorp (2016), I made use of a multimethod model to study frame-building from a journalistic perspective and link it to the resulting news frames. In a first phase, I focused on the analysis of the news frames in the articles. I drew on the frame matrices I introduced in Chapter 4 and selected the most typical (framing and reasoning) devices for each ideologically coloured subframe. I used those as variables (i.e. ‘nodes’) in a deductive framing analysis, facilitated by the computer software package NVivo (see e.g. Van Gorp, 2006). Following Entman (1991), I identified the most salient news subframe in each article, drawing on variables like repetition, size, placement or rhetorical strength of the framing and reasoning devices. However, if other subframes were found to be repeatedly and saliently used as minor frames, I also included them in my analysis.

The second phase of my research was the interview phase (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009; Legard, Keegan & Ward, 2003; McCracken, 1988; Ritchie, Lewis & Elam, 2003; Ritchie, Lewis & O’Connor, 2003; Ritchie & Spencer, 1994). The interview analysis was inspired by grounded theory, as described by Glaser and Strauss (1968) and Corbin and Strauss (1990). Grounded theory approaches data selection and analysis as largely interrelated processes. I used the method of theoretical sampling. First, I selected an initial sample of reporters and photo editors who were most closely involved in the production of one or more of the articles in my corpus. These were identified directly, based on the names above or below articles, or indirectly, through the identification by our contacts in the news organizations. Some of the reporters, especially in the context of the alternative media, are situated outside the newsroom. These are representatives of NGOs, activists, scientists, citizen journalists but also reporters working for press agencies (see Ahva, 2017). Yet, I also consider them as climate reporters as they help to shape the debate on and public understanding of climate change, being (frequently) allowed to author articles and/or opinion pieces (see Brüggemann & Engesser, 2014).⁸⁸ Additionally, I selected a number of chiefs and

⁸⁸ Most of these ‘climate reporters’ are also – in the context of other articles and/or other outlets – (influential) sources and, thus, frame-sponsors. That is, they may adopt different roles depending on the context (including the openness of media outlets to allow non-professional journalists to author news pieces).

editors in chief who, I expected, would be able to provide me with broader context and background information. I sent out emails to the selected reporters to invite them for participation in an academic interview research. If needed, a maximum of three reminders was sent. In some cases, the reporters were contacted by telephone. After I had selected an initial sample and had conducted a preliminary analysis of the interview data (i.e. familiarization), I selected a further sample in order to test and develop the emerging categories. I repeated these steps until data saturation was reached and any next interview (analysis) would not produce additional insights. Eventually, I interviewed twenty six reporters (see Table 6).

The sampling was, however, partly restricted by the accessibility of the reporters, i.e. their willingness to participate. For instance, two of the mainstream outlets did only allow me to talk with their chief photo editors rather than to the photo editors who make the majority of the daily decisions. Also, I eventually included some reporters who did not contribute to an article during the selected period but who do so regularly or have been important contributors in the past. In most cases they have profiles which are comparable to the reporters who I could not access. For instance, I spoke with the science reporter of a mainstream medium who writes several climate articles a year and who is an important definer of the general newsroom view on climate change, although he did not produce any climate articles during the selected period. Time restrictions (on the part of the interviewees) and/or the inability or unwillingness of participants to go into their ‘personal views’ prevented me from identifying the cognitive (sub)frames for all interviewees. However, the group of interviewees for whom I could define journalist frames is sufficiently large (n=18) and diverse. That is, they allow for a reliable analysis of the relations between individual journalist frames and news frames, and their interaction with other factors.

I used semi-structured interviews. These provide general guidelines, but also allow to go deeper into subjects brought up by the interviewees. During the interviews I asked directly about the participants’ views vis-à-vis climate change (i.e. their cognitive journalist frames). More specifically, I asked them to imagine how they would cover climate change if they were able to decide independently (see Engesser & Brüggemann, 2016). I chose not to present them with the frames I had previously identified in the corpus (see above) as done by Vossen, Van Gorp and Schulpen (2017), to make sure that I would not sensitize them to my interpretations and push their answers into a particular direction (‘nudging’). Through other questions I tried to cover the wide range of factors identified in the literature (see above) which might influence the views, decisions and habits of the reporters. More specifically, I asked the interviewees to reconstruct the history of a news story (where possible). As such, I attempted to relate frame-building practices directly to the resulting news frames. I tried to conduct the interviews as briefly as possible after the publication of the articles as I wanted the reporters to recall as many specificities as possible (see Boesman et al., 2017). Thus, most of the interviews took place during November and

December 2016. Some additional or follow-up interviews were, however, organized in early 2017. I used a tape recorder upon consent of all participants. Most interviews were conducted at the work place of the interviewees. Three interviews, and one follow-up interview, were conducted by telephone or Skype. The interviews took, on average, about 45 to 60 minutes, with the shortest lasting 20 minutes and the longest 90 minutes. I transcribed the interviews verbatim (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009; Legard, Keegan & Ward, 2003; McCracken, 1988; Ritchie, Lewis & O'Connor, 2003; Ritchie & Spencer, 1994).

My thematic content analysis largely followed the phases of open coding, axial coding and selective coding described by Glaser and Strauss (1968) and Corbin and Strauss (1990), facilitated by the software NVivo. As suggested by the authors, I continually compared, questioned and revised my data, preliminary expectations, concepts and codes, looking for negative or qualifying evidence. Also, I tried to bring in broader (economic, political, cultural, historical...) structural conditions, which could aid my understanding. For the identification of the journalist frames, however, I used a deductive framing analysis. As I discussed above, I selected the most typical (framing and reasoning) devices for each ideologically coloured subframe and used those as variables (see Van Gorp, 2006). In other words, I looked for word or rhetorical choices, key words, phrases that might reveal the journalists' views vis-à-vis climate change. In line with the goals of qualitative research, I intended to describe in rich detail the worldviews, experiences and working conditions of a particular group of reporters, working in particular contexts. Rather than to generalize my findings to a broader population, I have sought for consistent patterns and concepts which may be useful to generate new insights or encourage other studies. It is up to other researchers to judge whether my findings are (partly) transferable to other contexts (i.e. peer validation). Referring to existing studies, I will already start to contextualize and assess the (potential) broader implications of my typologies, categories and concepts (see Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009; Legard, Keegan & Ward, 2003; McCracken, 1988; Ritchie & Lewis, 2003; Ritchie & Spencer, 1994).

Medium	Type	Experience	Background	Gender
Mainstream – broadsheet, leftist	Science journalist	More than 10 years	General interest in environment	Female
Mainstream – broadsheet, leftist	(Editor in) chief	/	/	Male
Mainstream – broadsheet, leftist	Political journalist	0 to 5 years	General interest in environment	Male
Mainstream – broadsheet, leftist	Chief photo editor	0 to 5 years	No photographer General interest in environment	Male
Mainstream – broadsheet, centrist	Economic journalist	More than 10 years	No special interest in environment	Male
Mainstream – broadsheet, centrist	Foreign affairs journalist	More than 10 years	Specific interest in environment – life experiences	Male
Mainstream – broadsheet, centrist	Chief photo editor	5 to 10 years	No photographer No special interest in environment	Male
Mainstream – broadsheet, centrist	Photo editor	More than 10 years	Photographer General interest in environment	Male
Mainstream – broadsheet, centrist	Science journalist	More than 10 years	Specific interest in environment – studies	Male
Mainstream – broadsheet, centrist	Science journalist	More than 10 years	Specific interest in environment – studies	Male
Mainstream – popular	(Editor in) chief	/	/	Male
Mainstream – popular	Generalist journalist	0 to 5 years	Specific interest in environment – life experiences	Male
Mainstream – popular	Chief photo editor	5 to 10 years	Photographer No special interest in environment	Female
Mainstream – press agency	News manager	/	/	Female
Mainstream + alternative – NGO	Staff member (energy)	0 to 5 years	Specific interest in environment – studies, life experiences	Male
Mainstream + alternative – NGO	General manager	/	Strong personal engagement – relevant practical activities & experience	Male
Alternative 1	Citizen journalist	0 to 5 years	Strong personal engagement – relevant practical activities & experience	Female
Alternative 1	Generalist but with a focus on environment, sustainability etc.	More than 10 years	Strong personal engagement – relevant practical activities & experience	Female
Alternative 1	Generalist but with a focus on environment, sustainability etc.	0 to 5 years	Strong personal engagement – relevant practical activities & experience – studies	Male
Alternative 2	Photo editor (and online news manager)	5 to 10 years	No photographer Strong personal engagement – relevant practical activities & experience	Male
Alternative 2	(Editor in) chief	More than 10 years	General interest in environment – relevant practical activities & experience	Male
Alternative 2	Citizen journalist – blogger	0 to 5 years	Strong personal engagement – relevant practical activities & experience	Male
Alternative 2	Generalist but with a focus on environment, sustainability etc. + coordinator	More than 10 years	Strong personal engagement – relevant practical activities & experience – studies	Female
Alternative – press agency	Generalist but with a focus on social issues	0 to 5 years	General interest in environment	Female
Alternative – press agency	Environmental / science journalist – freelancer	More than 10 years	Specific interest in environment – studies	Male
Alternative – grassroots movement	Activist	0 to 5 years	Strong personal engagement – relevant practical activities & experience – studies	Female

Table 6: Overview of the 26 interviewees and their characteristics (the medium they work for, their beat ‘type’, experience, background (interest, knowledge and/or education) and gender).

6.4 Findings

6.4.1 Journalist Frames and News Frames

	Scala Naturae	Consumer Rights	Human Wealth	Unequal Vulnerability	Natural Web	Citizen Rights	Unequal Attribution	Total
Mainstream journalist frames	8	5	3	5	/	/	1	9 (journalists)
Mainstream news frames	38 69,1 %	6 10,9 %	8 14,5 %	3 5,5 %	/	/	/	55 (articles)
Alternative journalist frames	4	3	1	3	5	4	6	11 (journalists)
Alternative news frames	27 45,8 %	4 6,8 %	5 8,5 %	10 16,9 %	3 5,1 %	5 8,5 %	5 8,5 %	59 (articles)

Table 7: Overview of the journalist frames and news frames in the mainstream and alternative outlets.

Tables 7 and 8 show an overview of, on the one hand, the climate change journalist subframes identified in the discourse of the interviewees. Table 7 provides a general overview of the dominant cognitive subframes per media type (mainstream versus alternative). This also gives an indication of shared newsroom frames. Table 8 summarizes the cognitive subframes per individual journalist. Not all journalists are present in this table. As I pointed out above, I was not able to identify (sub)frames for each interviewee. The interviews with the chiefs were generally too short to allow me to do so. Most photo editors I spoke to were also chiefs, who are less closely involved in the daily selection of visuals. Besides, it is almost impossible to define the (number of) resulting news frames they helped to give shape. Therefore, I decided to consider most chiefs as well as all photo editors as background sources, who could help to confirm or debunk certain patterns or expectations. On the other hand, the tables show the news frames in the climate change coverage of the mainstream and alternative media (Table 7) and the news articles of the individual journalists (Table 8).

As expected (see 4.5.4 Quantitative Overview), the Anthropocentric Subframes prevail among the mainstream reporters. Scala Naturae and Unequal Vulnerability, in particular, are quite widely shared as cognitive subframes. It is, however, interesting to see that one journalist also holds the Biocentric Unequal Attribution Subframe. This image is more or less reflected in the distribution of mainstream news subframes. Yet, it is remarkable that Unequal Attribution cannot be found in the mainstream media production. The cognitive subframes present among the journalists working for the alternative media reflect a far broader range of (anthropocentric and biocentric) views. Yet, the Anthropocentric cognitive Subframes could only be found among four journalists. The others all approach climate change exclusively from a biocentric background. This diverse picture is also more or less reflected in the

alternative news production. It is, nevertheless, noteworthy that the dominance of Biocentric journalist Subframes does not entail the dominance of Biocentric news Subframes. As illustrated by Table 8, however, this is largely due to the fact that a large share of the articles in the alternative media are produced by the alternative press agency of which both interviewed journalists hold Anthropocentric journalist Subframes. Further, Table 8 also shows that the cognitive subframes of individual journalists are often mirrored by the same / similar news subframes. At first glance, this might suggest a rather strong influence of the individual level (e.g. Brüggemann & Engesser, 2014, 2016). However, it is probably more correct to state that journalist and news subframes mutually reinforce each other.

Attending to each of the levels of news(room) production described above, I will now further discuss the relations among climate change journalist subframes and news subframes. I will, more specifically, highlight the influences which may help to explain the parallels or differences among the two types of subframes.

Medium	Type	Journalist frame	News frame	Number of articles
Mainstream – broadsheet, leftist	Science journalist	Scala Naturae, Consumer Rights, Human Wealth, Unequal Vulnerability	Scala Naturae (2)	2
Mainstream – broadsheet, leftist	Political journalist	Scala Naturae, Human Wealth, Unequal Vulnerability	Scala Naturae (3), Unequal Vulnerability (1)	4
Mainstream – broadsheet, centrist	Economic journalist	Scala Naturae, Consumer Rights	Human Wealth (2) (1)	2 (1 by similar source)
Mainstream – broadsheet, centrist	Foreign affairs journalist	Scala Naturae, Consumer Rights, Unequal Vulnerability	Scala Naturae (6), Consumer Rights (1), Unequal Vulnerability (1), Human Wealth (1)	9
Mainstream – broadsheet, centrist	Science journalist	Scala Naturae	Scala Naturae (1)	1
Mainstream – broadsheet, centrist	Science journalist	Scala Naturae	(Scala Naturae (2))	(2 by similar sources)
Mainstream – popular	Generalist journalist	Scala Naturae, Consumer Rights, Unequal Vulnerability	Scala Naturae (2)	2
Mainstream + alternative – NGO	Staff member (energy)	Human Wealth, Scala Naturae, Unequal Vulnerability, Consumer Rights	Human Wealth (1), Scala Naturae (1) (Alternative: Human Wealth (2))	2 (mainstream) (2 by similar source (alternative))
Mainstream + alternative – NGO	General manager	Unequal Attribution	Unequal Vulnerability (1)	1 (mainstream)
Alternative 1	Citizen journalist	Civil Rights, Unequal Attribution	Civil Rights (1)	1
Alternative 1	Generalist but with a focus on environment, sustainability etc. + coordinator	Scala Naturae, Consumer Rights	(Anthropocentric Masterframe + Biocentric Masterframe)	(Selection of several articles)
Alternative 1	Generalist but with a focus on environment, sustainability etc.	Natural Web, Civil Rights, Unequal Attribution	Scala Naturae (2), Unequal Attribution (1)	3
Alternative 2	(Editor in) chief	Natural Web, Unequal Attribution	Civil Rights (1), Unequal Attribution (1)	2
Alternative 2	Citizen journalist - blogger	Natural Web, Civil Rights	Natural Web (2)	2
Alternative 2	Generalist but with a focus on environment, sustainability etc. – freelancer	Natural Web, Civil Rights, Unequal Attribution	Unequal Attribution (3), Scala Naturae (2)	5
Alternative – press agency	Generalist but with a focus on social issues	Scala Naturae, Consumer Rights, Unequal Vulnerability	(Anthropocentric Masterframe (33) + Natural Web (2), Unequal Attribution (1))	36 by ‘alternative press agency’
Alternative – press agency	Environmental / science journalist – freelancer	Scala Naturae, Unequal Vulnerability		
Alternative – grassroots movement	Activist	Natural Web, Unequal Attribution	(Natural Web (2))	(2 by similar source (alternative))

Table 8: Overview of the journalist frames and news frames per reporter and the number of articles produced by each reporter. News frames and news articles produced by similar sources are also presented (within brackets).

6.4.2 Working Mechanically or Organically

In order to start to understand how newsroom organization, practices and various influences, pressures or constraints are related to certain journalist subframes and news subframes, I present two schematic visualizations which summarize my main findings (see Figures 8 and 9 below). As said above, all levels of the ‘hierarchy-of-influences model’ add up to the last one, the ideological or cultural level of news organizations. Obviously, this internal ideology is always in interacting with the ideology in society at large (Shoemaker & Reese, 2014). I argue that this is clearly illustrated here: Broadly speaking, the anthropocentric worldview (or masterframe), symbolized by the machine, permeates the logic, organization, values or routines on all levels of the mainstream media. Similarly, the biocentric worldview (or masterframe) – generally associated with an organism or web – influences the various levels of the alternative outlets.




Figure 8: Schematic representation of the newsroom organization of the mainstream media as a machine. The various boxes (and practices or values within) function as the sprocket-wheels of the machinery. Those which most directly operate together have been clustered. The right angles indicate the ‘mechanic’ logic of the values or practices (i.e. quantity, efficiency, hierarchy, individualism, etc.), while the rounded shapes indicate the presence of more ‘organic’ values (i.e. quality, horizontal cooperation, interconnection, etc.). In the upper left-hand corner, the overarching goals of the media outlets are clustered. In the upper right-hand corner and bottom left-hand corner, one finds the direct consequences (or translation) of these goals, for the organizational logic (right) and the professional roles – which directly correlate with particular routines and practices (left). The bottom right-hand corner, finally, foregrounds the masterframe, which is both an input as well as an output of this system.

As highlighted before, the academic literature often uses a ‘factory’ or ‘machine’ metaphor to describe the newsroom (e.g. Lewis, Williams & Franklin, 2008). Gans (1979), Hanitzsch (2007) Davies (2008), Richardson (2007) and Shoemaker and Reese (2014), for instance, refer to the newsroom ‘assembly line’ or audiences which are treated as consumers or commodity, especially by outlets which have the strongest market orientation. In a similar vein, a mainstream photo editor describes his role as “I am one little gear, a sprocket-wheel, in that machinery” [1]. Looking from a distance at my findings, ‘the machine’ indeed clearly emerges from the newsroom (practices) described by the interviewed mainstream reporters. Development, gain, efficiency, competition, individualism, hierarchy, control, order... are the pivotal values and norms which keep the system running. These are also the ideals of the anthropocentric worldview, which often uses the machine metaphor to describe the (natural) world (e.g. Dryzek, 1997; Larson, 2011; Verhagen, 2008). Yet, I also find habits and actions which demonstrate attempts to contribute to the larger (society and environmental) system. That is, the mainstream media workers feel the responsibility to not only inform audiences about but also engage them for, climate change (action). They want to instigate change or at least a public debate (Sachsman, Simon & Valenti, 2010). This is reminiscent of the public sphere, and public responsibilities of the media, as described by Habermas (Habermas & Burger, 1989). Accordingly, we can also find values like quality and collective decision-making regarding an editorial climate action plan, which I will identify as more characteristic for an ‘organic’ way of working below (see Navaz & Ferrer, 2012). However, these values are embedded within the larger defining structures and rationale of the machine. That is, they are secondary goals or considerations, which are only pursued as long as they do not harm – or, preferably, even facilitate – the overarching goals to produce, grow and compete (e.g. climate engagement as a marketing strategy). Summarizing, it is – on a very basic level, at least – not hard to see how a system like this can (almost) not but feed into, reinforce or reproduce the Anthropocentric (cognitive / news) Masterframe, especially since it functions in a part of the world where this worldview is the dominant one (e.g. Dryzek, 1997; Evans, 2016; Grunwald, 2016; Hopwood, Mellor & O’Brien, 2005; Stibbe, 2015; Unmüßig, Sachs & Fatheuer, 2012; Verhagen, 2008; Wasko, 2016).

Obviously, then, this broader societal context is largely the same for the (progressive) alternative newsrooms, which also function in a capitalist society and a highly competitive, liberal (news) market. Hence, they are constrained by hegemonic (‘mechanical’) pressures, which control their workings to a certain extent (see ‘quantity’, ‘efficiency’, ‘hierarchy’, ‘control’). Yet, (largely) taking sides with the counter-hegemonic voices and views in society, these media also (attempt to) counter-act these hegemonic perspectives and influences. Accordingly, the ‘organism’ (or ‘natural web’) metaphor which is central in the biocentric way of thinking (e.g. Dryzek, 1997; Larson, 2011; Navaz & Ferrer, 2012; Shepard, 2015; Stibbe, 2015; Verhagen, 2008), clearly emerges from my findings: Quality, diversity, harmony, cooperation, equality, inclusiveness, collectiveness, mutual dependence and interconnectedness, respect and (journalistic / human) modesty are recurring values. Besides, several

alternative journalists refer more directly to their organic way of working. For instance, “[t]his [the cooperation and interaction with colleagues] has grown in an organic and natural way” [2] (journalist of an alternative news agency). In short, contributing to the larger (societal / environmental) system in a harmonious and constructive way is the main goal of these outlets, not growth or competition for the sake of a minority. Again, I claim that the general culture or ideology of the newsroom is reflected in the news production, which is also diverse and inclusive: both Anthropocentric as well as Biocentric news Subframes can be found. As I will discuss in more detail below, the dominance of the hegemonic Anthropocentric Masterframe (rather than the Biocentric Masterframe) can be explained by a number of influences, of which the media-external hegemonic pressures are only one.




Figure 9: Schematic representation of the newsroom organization of the (progressive) alternative media, as (controlled) organism. The boxes (and practices or values within) represent the various parts which – in close interaction – make up the organism. Those which most directly interact or cooperate have been clustered. The rounded shapes indicate the ‘organic’ character of values or practices (i.e. quality, horizontal cooperation, interconnection, collectivity, equality, etc.) while the right angles highlight the presence or influence of the ‘mechanic’ logic (i.e. quantity, efficiency, hierarchy, etc.). In the upper left-hand corner, the overarching purposes of the media outlets are clustered. In the upper right-hand corner and bottom left-hand corner, one finds the direct results of these purposes, for the organizational logic (right) and the professional roles – which directly correlate with particular routines and practices (left). The bottom right-hand corner, finally, foregrounds the masterframes, which both nourish the organism *and* are the fruits of the system.

While the opposition between the two media types can partly be explained by deliberate (ideological) choices, practical or pragmatic factors also give rise to, facilitate or reinforce some of the differences. The different revenue models, in particular, can explain many of the practices and norms: The mainstream media – privately owned companies – mainly survive on commercial revenues. Competing for consumers and advertisers in the commercial media market, they are forced to primarily produce ‘sellable’ and ‘appealing’ products. Simultaneously, however, their actions and decisions are influenced – or restrained – by cost-cutting and efficiency (in terms of means, time, space, personnel). Put differently, commercial struggles strongly define the daily practices of the mainstream reporters, whether they want it or not. The alternative media, on the other hand, receive government subsidies and depend on gifts from partners or individuals. Accordingly, they feel less pressure to reach as broad an audience as possible. This allows them more freedom to stick to a certain (ideological) programme and to foreground other values than the commercial, economic, and thus, anthropocentric ones. It does not mean, however, that their working is not affected by financial constraints, whatsoever. Clearly, the subsidies and gifts are not limitless (on the contrary) and are increasingly under pressure. In some cases, they also come with requirements in terms of content or quantity (e.g. number of published articles per year). The small newsrooms – which strongly draw on voluntary, external contributors – are not only the result of deliberate choices but also of financial limitations. The small-scale organizations allow for more openness, shared responsibilities and collaboration than the large mainstream newsrooms, but they also require it. The larger mainstream newsrooms, on the other hand, necessitate more strictly organized, hierarchic and/or routine ways of working.

Other explanatory factors are, among others, the periodicity of the outlets: The 24-hour news cycle of daily newspapers defines to a large extent their organization and strategies (e.g. routines, news values like event-centeredness) and comes along with time restraints and strict deadlines. As journalism is primarily approached as ‘news’ (see ‘correspondence’ in Kovach and Rosenstiel (2007)), journalists feel the need (or im/explicit pressure) to daily fill the news hole, even on those days on which only few (newsworthy / socially or politically relevant) events happen. ‘News’ – and thus the extrinsic need to daily fill the news hole, competing with rivalry media for scoops – is not the main concern of the alternative media. Rather, they want to provide broader contextualization and backgrounds, often building those up over the course of time, and thus across articles (see ‘coherence’ in Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2007).⁸⁹ The online context of the alternative media facilitates such open, ‘slow’ types of news production with stories that are not out-dated as soon as the most recent edition of the outlet has been published. It allows to update publications and/or interlink them with ‘webs of other stories’ (see references or hyperlinks), which complement one another and provide a bigger picture. References to

⁸⁹ Note, however, that (broadsheet) newspapers may also use contextualization as a ‘coping’ or ‘contrast strategy’ (Schönbach, 1997, in De Bens & Raeymaeckers, 2010) to show off their surplus value in comparison to (multimedia) competitors (see Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2007).

the original sources which the reporter has consulted, extend this web beyond the boundaries of the medium. Also, the online web space is limitless. Hence, there are less restrictions with regard to the number or length of articles and the number of sources or contributors that can be allowed to access the debate. In short, broader contextualization and complexity is allowed for rather than prevented. Thus, (deliberately) employing the world wide web to support a ‘slower’ type of journalism, alternative newsrooms exploit other possibilities (or advantages) of online media-making than those (mainstream) websites or apps which consider technological developments as a means to further increase immediacy and speed, tightening up deadlines (Atton, 2002, 2003, 2008; Breed, 1966; Bruns, 2003; Davies, 2008; De Keyser, 2012; Downing, 2001, 2003; Drok & Herman, 2016; Franklin, Lewis & Williams, 2010; Gans, 1979; Gess, 2012; Hamilton, 2004; Hanitzsch, 2007, 2011; Harbers, 2016; Harcup, 2003, 2014; Harrabin, 2000; Le Masurier, 2015; Lewis, Williams & Franklin, 2008; McChesney, 2008; Platon & Deuze, 2003; Shoemaker & Reese, 2014; Wasko, 2016; Wiesslitz & Ashuri, 2011; Zelizer, 2007).

As the schematic representations (Figures 8 and 9) suggest, the opposition between mechanical and organic ways of working is not absolute. Rather, we must approach the differences as a continuum, with the ‘machine rationale’ at one extreme and the ‘organism rationale’ at the other. As discussed, the mainstream outlets have ‘produce, grow, compete’ as a starting point, but do embed the idea of pro-environmental engagement to a certain extent. The popular mainstream outlet leans closer to the machine ideal than the broadsheets or the mainstream news agency. The alternative media, then, have social responsibility and engagement (i.e. a role in the larger system) as their starting point, but are also forced to embed the ‘produce, grow, compete’ rationale. However, *MO** is closer to the centre than *DeWereldMorgen*. The alternative press agency even takes a middle position: its horizontal newsroom (motto: ‘giving a voice to the voiceless’) depends on government subsidies, which come with expectations regarding content and economic viability (see Joye, 2009). Accordingly – I will explicate below – it combines biocentric values or practices (e.g. quality, equality, diversity, contributing to the larger system) with a large number of anthropocentric values (e.g. quantity, efficiency, hierarchy, control, detachment). In other words, each outlet incorporates – to a lesser or larger extent – values and practices of the two ideal types. In the following paragraphs I will take a closer look at the various characteristics of both systems, discussing how exactly certain influences seem to contribute to certain kinds of subframes.

6.4.2.1 Personality Traits, Backgrounds and Professional Roles

Personality Traits and Backgrounds. As illustrated by Table 6, many of the interviewed reporters have no or only a general interest in the environment. Their role as climate reporter is often a – rather coincidental – *career development* more than a personal choice. For instance, the science journalist of a mainstream outlet explains:

'Yes, it was a combination of events. (...) [After a colleague had left] there was an open position and since I had (.) familiarized myself [with the climate topic] for this documentary in Kenia, I was asked to further build up expertise.' [3] (Mainstream science journalist)⁹⁰

Others have a stronger *personal interest* in the matter, often reinforced by life experiences, like a trip to the polar regions, supporting membership of an NGO or environment-related studies (e.g. physics). Such backgrounds seem to be related to Anthropocentric journalist and news Masterframes. The second group of reporters have a *strong personal (intrinsic) and more active engagement*: The environmental cause is truly a part of their lives and is often a component of a more general social engagement. They often work for, or have been actively involved in, NGOs or activist movements, participate in grassroots projects, (have) conduct(ed) research or participate in the climate debate as public speakers (see 'participation around journalism' (Ahva, 2017)). For instance, a reporter of an alternative outlet says:

'I have travelled through Europe looking for many different people, ordinary people, who are – in one way or another – building a different kind of economy (...).' [4] (Alternative generalist journalist (freelancer))

This kind of background generally corresponds with Biocentric journalist and news Masterframes.

As expected, the former journalist profile can often be found in the mainstream outlets, the latter in the alternative outlets (e.g. Atton, 2002, 2003, 2008; Downing, 2001, 2003; Harcup, 2003, 2014; Sachsman, Simon & Valenti, 2010). Yet, some exceptions may illustrate that personal backgrounds as such might have some explanatory value. For instance, the reporters who work for the alternative press agency have a 'mainstream profile' and Anthropocentric journalist Subframes. They also mainly (re)produce Anthropocentric news Subframes. The same is true for a generalist reporter of one of the alternative websites. The chief photo editor of the leftist mainstream outlet has a rather biocentric view on climate suffering in the South (i.e. Unequal Attribution) and argues he also tries to convey his perspective when selecting news photographs.

As described above (3 Framing as a Process; 6.2 Frames and Framing), cognitive (journalist) frames are the result of various input, like cultural frames, news frames, interest-group frames, experiences, personal values, ideologies (e.g. Engesser & Brüggemann, 2016; Entman, Matthes & Pellicano, 2009; Scheufele, B., 2006; Vliegthart & van Zoonen, 2011). As Graber (1988) explains, the more limited our personal experiences are, the more impact external input may have (see also Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Accordingly, it seems that those with a 'mainstream profile' are generally more receptive for socialization, in a newsroom or the broader, hegemonic culture, or the frames of dominant (hegemonic) sources (see 6.4.2.3 'Good Journalism') (Brüggemann & Engesser, 2014; Gans, 1979; Lewis & Reese, 2009; Wilson, 2000), while those with an 'alternative profile' more strongly draw

⁹⁰ (.) indicates a pause. (...) signifies unintelligible speech in the recording or statements omitted in the excerpts for the sake of brevity and clarity.

on personal experiences, values or reasoning. Of course, the character of one's experiences and other personality traits (e.g. gender) also play a role. While a scientific degree or a trip to the affected areas does not seem to provide counterbalance for the hegemonic external input to some respondents, a journey through Africa does so to another, at least to some extent (i.e. one cognitive subframe). Accordingly, the anthropocentric views of an alternative generalist reporter may (partly) stem from her strong engagement with 'mainstream' NGOs (Kenis & Mathijs, 2014). Summarizing, then, the nature of the experiences or interests of reporters may, at least partly, give shape to certain (sub)frames. For instance, an NGO staff member with a degree in climate studies and economics has developed a strong cognitive Human Wealth Subframe (see 6.4.2.2 Newsroom Organization).

Once people have adopted particular cognitive (sub)frames, they tend to hold on to them. Besides, our frames are likely to guide our understanding (i.e. selection and organization) of incoming information and largely define our preferences for certain (i.e. consistent) views or ideas. This is especially so in a supportive context: We do not stand alone with a particular view. Others in a beat, a newsroom or the audience share the same or a similar perspective (e.g. Brüggemann, 2014; Entman, Matthes & Pellicano, 2009; Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Graber, 1988; McCluskey, 2008; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Scheufele, D.A., 1999; Scheufele, B., 2006). While this last note may help us to better appreciate the role of individual views in the framing process, it will also constitute an important background in the discussion of the following influences.

Professional Roles. Many of the interviewed reporters, both working in the context of mainstream as well as alternative media, describe themselves as – what I would call – '*educator-supervisors*'. Having access and/or a better insight (in)to 'the facts', they have the responsibility to translate for the audience what is important for them (as citizens) to know. That is, they want to raise awareness, inform, educate and engage the audience for the 'right cause' (Sachsman, Simon & Valenti, 2010). Bro (2008) and Hanitzsch (2007, 2011) refer in this context to the '(detached) watchdog'. These reporters are also critical towards the political elites and industry (and science), and want to prompt action, guiding the elites in the right direction ('what can be done better?'). Simultaneously, however, they are happy to recognize and praise what is going well. Bro (2008) describes this role as the 'hunting dog' (which both wants to inform as well as to prompt action), Hanitzsch (2007, 2011) as the 'critical change agent' (which acts as watchdog of the elites, and wants to advocate change and affect public opinion). Deuze (2005b) summarizes that journalists provide a public service, acting as representative watchdogs "(...) of the status quo in the name of people, who 'vote with their wallets' for their services (...)" (p.447). Entertaining – drawing attention by selecting the most interesting facts or through linguistic choices – is a secondary but equally important goal, which cannot be separated from the first one (see 6.4.2.4 News Values). Both are often juxtaposed by the journalists, with the combination being considered as

an interesting marketing strategy (see Costera Meijer, 2001; Bird, 2009; Gans, 2009; Hanitzsch, 2007, 2011; Schönbach, 1997 (in De Bens & Raeymaeckers, 2010)). For instance:

'Entertaining and educating (...). I think that those two go well together. That is, you try to teach people something, show them the right path. But you should do this in a way that makes people curious, you know.' [5] (Mainstream political journalist)

'We have thought about this: What message do we want to give to our readers? And this was, eventually, the message: Oil is no longer profitable. We really need to make the transition.' [6] (Mainstream foreign affairs journalist)

'What can the government do? What are they doing? What are they claiming? What is the discrepancy between promises and (.) actions? What should they be doing according to (.) the consensus elsewhere? (...) The industry too: What is greenwashing and bla bla and what is real?' [7] (Mainstream science journalist)

As can be seen in the examples, these reporters are convinced that there is only one 'right path' (see the strong modality in verbs like 'we really need' or 'they should'), which is the anthropocentric response to climate change: technological transitions towards green energy, changes initiated by the elites, drawing on the hegemonic 'consensus' (e.g. IPCC, 2014a, 2014b; Mugambiwa & Tirivangasi, 2017; Pizer, 2017; Tabari, Taye, & Willems, 2015; Urban, 2015). This may well be based on their own convictions: the educator-supervisor role is also related with the Anthropocentric journalist (and news) Masterframe, both in the mainstream as well as in the alternative outlets (Engesser & Brüggemann, 2016). That does not preclude, however, that the messages they want to promote – e.g. 'Oil is no longer profitable' (Human Wealth Subframe) – may be (partly) the result of socialization, top-down (media-external) pressures and/or consensus in the newsroom (see below).

While the causal relation between roles and (sub)frame types is not entirely clear, it is not hard to see how they support each other. Both the Anthropocentric Subframes and the educator-supervisor role have a top-down character: Information, guidelines, good practice or help must flow from active leaders to passive followers, from journalists to audiences (as well as misguided decision-makers), from the elites to the people, from West to South, from humans to vulnerable nature (see 4.5.2 Hegemonic Subframes). Both are, accordingly, reminiscent of the strategies of depoliticization (Brulle, 2010; Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Mouffe, 2005; Pepermans, 2015; Pepermans & Maesele, 2014; Swyngedouw, 2010).

Those interviewees who have a biocentric outlook on climate change (reflected in journalist subframes and most news subframes), then, tend to describe themselves as *moral witnesses and/or stewards* (see Atton, 2002, 2003, 2008; Dryzek, 1997; Wiesslitz & Ashuri, 2011). Drawing on their own life experiences (e.g. as researchers or activists) – these are also the reporters who have 'an alternative background' – they want to contribute views or insights to the debate that might be unknown to others as they are often left out in (hegemonic) debates. Similarly, Harbers (2016) refers to 'witness-ambassadors', who 'see' in 'all our names'. As such, they want to empower the audience, giving them

other tools and insights to think and talk about or, perhaps, to act upon. Although these reporters start from a certain (ideological) engagement and believe their views ought to be part of the debate, they consider themselves as just one voice among equals, without lapsing into complete relativism (see 6.4.2.3 ‘Good Journalism’) (Harbers, 2016). In short, they see climate change communication as a dialogue, not as a (top-down) monologue. While they believe in the power of citizens to instigate change, they are, however, very suspicious towards the elites and the mainstream media who reproduce a ‘destructive’ (hegemonic) system. Taking a highly critical and oppositional role, they try to push for fundamental change. Creating the basic preconditions for the audience to participate in the debate as equals is only one of the goals they pursue (Brulle, 2010). We may, among others, recognize characteristics of the ‘rescue dog’, who is focused on change through deliberation, as described by Bro (2008). For example:

‘Yes, people must, obviously, always make their own choices. That is the foundation of a kind of democratic awareness. And the only thing (.) you can do, is providing the alternative (.) views, so that people have the opportunity to think about these and enter into the debate, talk about them in the pub or at the dinner table. But they should at least (.) have the knowledge or the background.’ [8] (Alternative – activist)

‘You don’t correct a [political] course that lies so far from the ideals you stand for. You tear it apart, but you don’t try to correct it. You don’t give suggestions.’ [9] (Alternative generalist journalist)

The role of the activist or moralist journalist who aims to deconstruct the hegemonic (social, political, economic, cultural and media) system and reconstruct alternatives and who is aware of and open towards various (alternative, bottom-up) voices has been amply described before by students of alternative media (e.g. Atton, 2002, 2003, 2008; Baysha, 2014; Fuchs, 2010; Groshek & Han, 2011; Harcup, 2003; 2014; Lewis, 2007; Wiesslitz & Ashuri, 2011). My analysis shows, however, that it is largely ‘up to’ individual journalists to decide whether they accept this role and how they apply it. Of course, other factors (including personal backgrounds) may help to shape this ‘choice’. Anyhow, those who do not identify with this role are less likely to hold or (re)produce Biocentric (journalist / news) Subframes, even within the context of alternative outlets.

Again, the parallels between roles and subframes are clear: Particular stewards – journalists, bottom-up voices, the South, (representatives of) nature – lead the way: Although they are equal to others, they have important or unique insights to offer which others lack or have no access to (see the description by Dryzek (1997) of ‘Green Rationalism’). The ultimate goal is the fundamental transformation of society, both drawing on and facilitating a broad, ‘multiperspectival’ (Gans, 1979) dialogue (see 4.5.3 Counter-Hegemonic Subframes). Summarizing, moral witness-stewards try to apply in their own practices the ideals they strive for. This is probably a more deliberate consideration than the routines and decisions of most ‘detached’ educator-supervisors (see Eliasoph, 1988). Both the counter-hegemonic subframes and journalists role are, then, reminiscent of the strategies and ideals of politicization (Brulle, 2010;

Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Mouffe, 2005; Pepermans, 2015; Pepermans & Maesele, 2014; Swyngedouw, 2010).

According to Brüggemann (2014), those journalists who ascribe to themselves an interventionist role are more likely to set frames rather than to send them (Hanitzsch, 2007, 2011). While educator-supervisors and moral witness-stewards describe their roles in quite different ways, they share, in the end, similar goals: Instigating political, socio-economic and/or cultural change. That is, they want to intervene in and change society – to a larger or lesser extent. As I argued earlier, the large overlap between journalist subframes and news subframes among reporters of both groups seems, at first glance, to confirm that they are indeed predominantly setting frames. In the following paragraphs I will, however, further nuance these preliminary conclusions, introducing and discussing a number of other influences. For example, the role descriptions above – highlighting hierarchical decision-making versus collective decision-making – already suggest that we cannot simply generalize the idea of frame-setting.

Key words:

top-down, control, inequality, hierarchy, unilateralism, detachment

versus

bottom-up + top-down, stewardship, equality, cooperation, multilateralism / multiperspectivalism, involvement

6.4.2.2 Newsroom Organization

Interactions. During formal newsroom meetings or more informal exchanges, there is a great deal of *interaction or discussion* among various mainstream reporters and editors (and thus, beats). Climate change coverage is, for instance, in some mainstream outlets the subject of regular, formal newsroom discussions and decisions (e.g. Boesman & Van Gorp, 2015, 2016). This is especially so in the centrist broadsheet outlet, *De Standaard*. For example:

'In the run-up to the Climate [Summit] in Paris of last year, for instance, we sat together with all departments, one person from each department: Economy, science, chief editors. And then, we actually made some sort of battle plan. Well, battle plan is perhaps exaggerated, but we did say: Okay, we're going to pay a lot of attention to this in the run-up to the summit. We've also introduced our logo then, Oil is no longer profitable.'
[10] (Mainstream foreign affairs journalist)

Nevertheless, most of the daily output is the result of largely *parallel and sequential* (i.e. *gatekeeping*) *workflows*. As discussed (e.g. 3.1.1 Mainstream Media), the mainstream newsroom is indeed quite rigidly structured. It is a hierarchically organized assembly line, with management, editors in chief and chiefs at the top and early career journalists, generalist reporters or external contributors (e.g. opinion-makers like NGO representatives) near the bottom (see Boesman, d'Haenens & Van Gorp, 2015; Davies, 2008; Gans, 1979; Gitin, 1980; McChesney, 2008; Shoemaker & Reese, 2014; Tuchman, 1978). Each participant has his/her own tasks and these tasks are strictly divided into separate beats, individual

specializations or responsibilities. This has some implications for frame-building. In particular, it largely determines who has the power to set frames and who is obliged or encouraged to send them (Brüggemann, 2014).

Several reporters indicate that the (newsroom) view on climate change, as well as the salience of particular (sub)frames or the issue in general, very much depends on the (commercial) interests and decisions of *the editor(s) in chief or those in management positions* (e.g. Cox, 2010). For instance:

'That engagement is very much alive. As I told you, our editors in chief (...) are all quite green in that regard, that is, quite concerned about the climate. Even more than I, perhaps.' (...) *'He [the editor in chief] sometimes steers [our decisions], especially when it comes to climate politics. As I said in the beginning, the consensus in the newsroom is rather broad.'* [11] (Mainstream foreign affairs journalist)

'But imagine I was a climate sceptic. (.) Then, I would have an ambiguous feeling, as I would probably want to publish other things that (.) would contradict the news reports. And (.) if I would do that, I would be put on the spot. And if I wouldn't do that, I would struggle with a moral dilemma, as I would feel like, it's all nonsense what I'm supposed to bring.' [12] (Mainstream photo editor)

'But turning down a suggestion would not receive a positive response, let's say. (...) Also, if you nuance too much things which sound alarmist, that's not always received positively. That's my experience, with the managers of the newspaper.' [13] (Mainstream science journalist)

'They literally say: That's of no interest to us, so we're going to do this less. I feel that, if I propose things (.), I get more often a no. That was very different (.) with the previous team. (.) For the first time in 6 years, they haven't made a supplement about the summit this year. Yet, they want to do that again next year. And I think it's mainly a financial decision. That's always very profitable, thanks to the advertising.' [14] (Mainstream science journalist)

Clearly, certain (non-hegemonic) views are censored while reporters' freedom to build frames is limited by clear (explicit or rather implicit) boundaries, before, during and after the writing (or photo editing) process. Judging on the results of my analyses (e.g. the overall tendencies in the mainstream media, the motto 'Oil is no longer profitable' referred to above, indications in the discourse of the chiefs), the dominant newsroom subframes have a clear anthropocentric colour. Many reporters indicate that they do not have problems to identify with these top-down perspectives. Put differently, the latter seem to be largely compatible with their own cognitive subframes. This does not exclude, however, that their journalist (sub)frames may originally have resulted from socialization (e.g. Lewis & Reese, 2009), that is, the internalization by the reporters of the (sub)frames that are dominant in society and their newsroom, and/or that they are supposed to reproduce (see feedback processes, e.g. Entman, Matthes & Pellicano, 2009). As discussed before (see 3.1.1 Mainstream Media), reporters quickly learn to 'sell' the right stories to their superiors (see e.g. Breed, 1955; Gans, 1979; Gitlin, 1980; Shoemaker & Reese, 2014). Besides, as many mainstream climate reporters cannot draw on extensive personal experiences, they are more likely to accept this external input (see 6.4.2.1 Personality Traits, Backgrounds and

Professional Roles). In any case, holding (or adopting) subframes consonant with the dominant views makes it – on a(n unconscious) psychological and a practical level – easier for reporters to keep functioning in the newsroom and to feel satisfied with their work (see also quote 12 above). Indeed, reproducing views which are considered (by superiors, elites, experts) to be ‘objective’ (i.e. proven) may protect journalists ‘from the risks of their trade’ (Tuchman, 1972). Gans (1979) also refers to internal power considerations and risk aversion in the newsroom (see Breed, 1955). Drawing on Brüggemann (2014), Brüggemann and Engesser (2016) and Bertram Scheufele (2006), I conclude that it is not unlikely that the reporters are only *setting (or sending) those subframes* which they feel to be *consonant with the newsroom subframes* (see Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Graber, 1988; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).

Within the hierarchical system, not only elite roles but also (*beat*) *specialization and seniority* equal autonomy (e.g. Breed, 1955, Gans, 1979). As Table 6 shows, the majority of the mainstream respondents have a particular specialization, while several of them have more than ten years of experience (see *Beats* below). Brüggemann and Engesser (2014, 2016) and Vossen, Van Gorp and Schulpen (2017) argue that this autonomy allows reporters to define more independently the content of their articles (see De Keyser, 2012; Dunwoody, 1980; Sachsman, Simon & Valenti, 2010). That is, it gives more freedom for frame-setting. For instance, a science journalist with more than 30 years of experience says:

‘I choose what I’m going to write about. I propose this and it rarely gets [rejected]. I never get a no. Otherwise, (.), I would have acted foolishly. I wouldn’t have done a proper job.’ [15] (Mainstream science journalist)

As suggested above, however, this freedom is not absolute. That is, the selected subframes must fall within the boundaries of the anthropocentric thinking. Still, it goes beyond the freedom experienced by *generalist and/or early career reporters*, who act more as executive personnel, following up instructions from superiors. These reporters thus seem to be primarily frame-senders, or at least, they are highly restricted when it comes to the subframes they can set (Brüggemann, 2014). A generalist reporter with less than five years of experience at the general news desk puts it, for instance, as follows:

‘If good instructions are provided, the piece is already made for fifty percent, you know.’
[16] (Generalist journalist)

In the mainstream context, generalists (‘jacks of all trades’) are more often found in the newsrooms of popular media (Boesman, d’Haenens & Van Gorp, 2015; Deuze, 2005a; Gans, 1979; Gibson et al., 2016). If they come up with their own proposals, they are – far more than specialist or senior reporters – obliged to sell those to their superiors, and thus to adapt the content (i.e. subframes) to the views and expectations of the latter. While it may be a coincidence, it is quite remarkable that I found three types of cognitive Subframes in the discourse of the quoted generalist journalist (Scala Naturae, Consumer Rights, Unequal Vulnerability), while I only identified Scala Naturae in his news reports. In the

discourse of a news chief of the same outlet who often assigns articles to this particular reporter, I identified *Scala Naturae* and *Consumer Rights* but not *Unequal Vulnerability*. Based on these findings, I argue that generalist reporters feel stronger pressures to avoid certain subframes if they feel they are not supported by their superiors (Brüggemann, 2014; Brüggemann & Engesser, 2016). While having worked for years as *the* climate expert in her newsroom, the science journalist quoted above (see quote 13) states that she experiences comparable top-down pressures in a newsroom that is, even more than in the past, ruled by commercial interests. As I will describe below (see 6.4.2.4 *News Values*; 6.4.2.5 *Pragmatism and Autonomy*), she tries to reconcile her climate engagement and these commercial pressures by providing (minor) *Human Wealth* Subframes. As such, she also adapts her frame-setting practices (*Human Wealth* is one of her journalist subframes), trying to anticipate the interests and expectations of her superiors.

The frame-building practices of another group of (interviewed) ‘climate reporters’ at the bottom of the hierarchy – *opinion-makers, like NGO representatives or activists* – are stronger affected by top-down restraints. At least, various oppositions among cognitive journalist and news frames can be found in this context. For instance, a staff member of an NGO employs a news subframe which does not appear as (a dominant) part of his cognitive subframe set. The general manager of another NGO uses the anthropocentric version of *Environmental Justice* as news subframe (i.e. *Unequal Vulnerability*) while the cognitive *Biocentric* Subframe (i.e. *Unequal Attribution*) is more salient in his discourse. It seems, thus, that while these contributors try to set subframes, they often end up – consciously or unconsciously – sending different types of subframes. This is probably related to the fact that they – as they admit – tend to adapt their argumentations, writing style, rhetorical strategies or the length / level of detail (e.g. clarity / unambiguity and conflict versus nuance and contextualization) to meet the expectations (newsworthiness, pragmatics) of particular outlets (and thus audiences) (see Anderson, 1991; Cox & Schwarze, 2015; Miller & Riechert, 2000; Mormont & Dasnoy, 1995; Ryan & Freeman Brown, 2015; Wozniak, Wessler & Lück, 2017). After all, their main goal is to be heard by the news media, and thus, the audience and politicians, and to get their op-eds ‘sold’ (e.g. Young, 2013). Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993) confirm that movements are often forced to “pay a price of entry”, “at what they regard as serious costs for the message that they wish to convey” (p.117). According to the authors, movements may water down fundamental criticism and/or may provide less contextualization:

‘De Morgen publishes a lot about climate, anyway. Besides, it was their specific request: Can you write about the climate? What is the present state of affairs? What about this climate summit? What about this quick evolution in parliament? That’s all there. But, well, I’ve put less emphasis on emotion there because they were already open to my opinion. I was already allowed to publish. As for De Standaard, I knew: I still have to sell myself. So, I must do this in such a way so that the editors are going to say: Yes, we see the benefits.’ [17] (NGO staff member)

‘Actually, I’m telling my people all the time: No one’s waiting for the views of [name NGO] about emission reduction here (...). There are environmental organizations like

Greenpeace. That's not what's expected from [name NGO]. We must take that specific angle [to be heard].' [18] (NGO general manager)

'This piece is published, then, in the mainstream media, but in MO you can really read what it's actually about. The latter is only read by a limited audience, yet a lot of people who feel sympathy for our organization. You must seek a balance there.'* [19] (NGO general manager)

As suggested in the quotes, the opinion-makers experience less restraints or pressures when collaborating with the alternative media (see below). This is also confirmed by the activist I interviewed, who said she struggled and often failed to get her op-eds published in the mainstream media.

Bissell (2000), Fahmy (2005), Nurmis (2017), Seelig (2005) and de Smaele, Geenen and De Cock (2017) argue that *photo editors* are also particularly influential gatekeepers. Drawing on their own expertise, literacy, evaluations and cognitive (sub)frames or schemata, they add – quite independently – visuals to the verbal output of reporters (e.g. Mendelson, 2005; Wozniak, Wessler & Lück, 2017). Accordingly, Seelig (2005) refers to 'the visual elite'. Some of the respondents I interviewed can also be considered as 'visual elites'. When being asked about the interactions with the authors of texts, the (chief) photo editor of the leftist outlet replies, for instance:

'No, very little, actually. Well, they sometimes make suggestions, but as for the title, layout, photo, there's no (...) or very little discussion.' [20] (Mainstream chief photo editor)

If discussions take place, it is mostly among members of the photo department or with editors or layouters. Besides, discussions are more often concerned with practical constraints (such as space limitations or the repetition of similar visuals) than with content (de Smaele, Geenen & De Cock, 2017). Due to financial (and thus, personnel) limitations, journalists in the mainstream press agency are both expected to write articles and to select accompanying visuals, even though most lack much visual literacy. This may give rise to (unconscious) frame-sending / setting. Yet, as the interviewed news manager points out, the newspapers (i.e. customers) do not necessarily take over the images suggested by the news agency.

As quote 12 above suggests, however, it seems that photo editors have – just like their colleagues – been socialized in a particular way of thinking. That is, if they did not hold compatible subframes before. For instance, the previously quoted (see quote 12) photo editor argues:

'I believe everything we write and I don't have a hard time finding the images which prove it. So, in my quest for images I'm also reassured that we (.) are serious and don't write nonsense. So I don't have to look for absurd images, because in all (.) serious sources I consult, I always find the images I need.' [21] (Mainstream photo editor)⁹¹

⁹¹ Note that this statement also indirectly confirms that visuals are often used as proof, to reinforce the 'objective', trustworthy status of news articles (e.g. Graber, 1996; Grayson, 2013; Kaml, 2005; Newton, 2000; Tirohl, 2000).

Commenting on the images he and his colleagues have selected, the chief photo editor of the leftist outlet also stays well within the anthropocentric thinking. Discussing the extra meanings he wants to convey through a certain visual, he clearly highlights the Consumer Rights Subframe, which focuses on (close-by) human suffering and drama (Bissell, 2000; Nurmis, 2017) (see 4.5.2 Hegemonic Subframes). This is also the subframe used in (the verbal part of) the news article.

'Yes, if you read this article, I think that you should (...) provide an image with it which is really in the face. What if this [flooding] would happen for real? And here you've got a historical example, of course: The Netherlands, about fifty or sixty years ago, I think. So, we really wanted to give this. And I think you really should do so. (...) Because, I think that many people have forgotten about this, how it was (.) back then, how bad it actually was. So you should really say: This is what could happen (.) if we don't do anything. So, I've really chosen this dramatic tone.' [22] (Mainstream chief photo editor)

His argumentation is not so different from the argumentations of (framing) scholars who call for frames which 'nudge' the audience towards engagement or particular ('best') behaviours, for instance by bringing the climate issue home and/or linking it to the interests or values of the audience (e.g. Lakoff, 2010; Leiserowitz, 2006, 2007; Nisbet, 2009; O'Neill et al., 2013; Smith & Joffe, 2009; Whitmarsh, O'Neill & Lorenzoni, 2013). Note that, while this respondent seems to have a (biocentric) Unequal Attribution cognitive Subframe, this is not reflected in the sample. However, he did not illustrate articles concerned with Environmental Justice during the studied period.

Anyhow, as I will discuss below (see 6.4.2.3 'Good Journalism'; 6.4.2.5 Pragmatism and Autonomy), it seems that more than the (conscious) cognitive subframes of the photo editors, pragmatic considerations and more superficial (content) cues in the verbal texts often guide visual decisions making. As I will show, however, these practices and routines often result in (the sending of) subframes which generally reflect an anthropocentric worldview.

The alternative newsroom, on the other hand, is characterized by a more *horizontal, collective and integrated way of working*. There is no clear hierarchy. Some roles and responsibilities are shared. For example, every week another staff member acts as editor in chief / coordinator in one of the alternative outlets. Also, several contributors have multiple responsibilities (e.g. writing and photo editing). While this is partly the result of certain ideals and decisions, the interviewees stress that they simply do not have the means, money or personnel to do it differently, even if they wanted to (e.g. Ahva, 2017; Atton, 2002, 2003, 2008; Hamilton, 2000; Nee, 2014; Waltz, 2005). In any case, the horizontal, collective newsroom organization also has some consequences with regard to frame-building.

Also, the objectivity or 'seriousness' of sources is 'merged' with the objectivity of the (visual) information they provide (see Tuchman, 1972) (see 6.4.2.3 'Good Journalism').

More than in the mainstream outlets, decisions or views have a *collective character*. The general editorial lines are set out in team while all contributors also – more implicitly – share particular views (but not necessarily subframes / masterframes). That is, as the alternative outlets have an outspoken (ideological) profile and engagement, they mainly attract contributors who identify with these views:

'If there's discussion, we try to solve it as a team. In consultation with each other, yes. But there's no one above us who's telling us: Now you're going to write about this or that. No.' [23] (Alternative generalist journalist and coordinator)

'[We trust each other as] we know of each other that we fit into the profile.' [24] (Alternative generalist journalist)

While there is, no doubt, also a certain level of socialization going on, I contend that the *freedom* of all reporters with regard to frame production goes much further in this context. That is due to various factors: Values like collectivity and equality go hand in hand with participatory parity, as a goal and a means for change (e.g. Brulle, 2010). A *broad range of views and voices* within and from outside the newsroom (e.g. sources, external contributors) are welcomed into the debate:

'If we noticed that an article (...) was perhaps a bit controversial or if we saw that even within our own community of bloggers some people had other views, we always gave the opportunity to write a counter-opinion. And it also happened that people would ping-pong with each other across pieces.' [25] (Citizen journalist – blogger)

Accordingly, the activist I interviewed argued that she has more autonomy and freedom when writing for the alternative media as she does not feel the need to sell her articles (Young, 2013):

'A piece for DeWereldMorgen is going to be longer and a little drier. You're just going to (.) make your story without really wanting to sell it. Whereas, for De Morgen (.), you already know what they find interesting. That's also what's read. Yes, it's got to be a little more (.) spicy or so (laughs).' [26] (Alternative – activist)

The other opinion-makers confirmed this. As I demonstrated before, the pressure on contributors within or outside mainstream newsrooms to sell their stories may – but not necessarily will – lead more often to frame-sending or restricted types of frame-setting. That is, reporters are more obliged to anticipate what their superiors (and, accordingly, the audience) want and to provide this, if they want to survive in the competitive newsroom. Hence, I argue that the release of such pressures is more likely to facilitate largely *unrestricted frame-setting*. As discussed before, journalists are also more inclined to set frames if they feel they are working in a context which provides consonant resonance with their views (Brüggemann, 2014; Brüggemann & Engesser, 2016; Scheufele, B., 2006). That is, supposedly, the case for the alternative media. As said, the choice of most reporters to write for these outlets is a motivated one. Besides, many contributors are, in a way, recognized as specialists (see *Beats* below). This may allow them even more freedom to set frames (Brüggemann & Engesser, 2014, 2016). This is confirmed by the generally strong overlap between alternative journalist frames and news frames (see Table 8) and, in particular, by the diversity of subframes across the various contributors. For instance, some of the

alternative climate reporters – those working for the alternative press agency, a generalist reporter (and coordinator) of one of the alternative outlets and one of the NGO representatives – have Anthropocentric cognitive Subframes. I also identified Anthropocentric news Subframes in their articles. Most others, however, abide by Biocentric cognitive and news Subframes. In short, frame-setting is not restricted to the context of the Anthropocentric Masterframe. Rather it facilitates the interaction of various types of – Anthropocentric and Biocentric – Subframes. In other words, where hierarchical, competitive and commercially inspired relations are largely absent, there is room for more symbiotic and equal relations among various contributors *and* their (sub)frames (e.g. Atton, 2002, 2003, 2008; Brulle, 2010; Deuze, 2005b; Downing, 2002, 2003; Harcup, 2003, 2014; Hopke, 2012).

However, there still is *some hierarchy*. Not all (potential) contributors are, in the end, truly equal. Those in the newsroom – that is, a *small core of professional journalists* – have the power to decide who is allowed to enter and who is not. As Bruns (2003) puts it, they are watching the gates (see Platon & Deuze, 2003; Silcock & Schwalbe, 2010). New newsroom employees as well as external contributors, like citizen journalists or opinion-makers (as well as sources, see 6.4.2.3 ‘Good Journalism’), are those requesting entrance. Depending on the newsroom, however, these gates get closed more or less often:

‘If someone new starts, you talk with him (...), but we are also going to keep an eye on [his work] for a while, until we see: Okay, that’s going to be fine, or that’s not going to be fine.’ [27] (Alternative generalist journalist)

‘Well, if we say: That’s not to our standards, or we don’t agree, then it won’t be published on our website. (...) We can refuse things they [a blog the outlet collaborates with – see [30]] can publish. That’s their own responsibility then.’ [28] (Alternative editor in chief)

‘That’s a difficult one: are there really boundaries? Should someone write an article (...) stating that nuclear is the answer to climate change, I think we would publish it. But I would personally write a counter-opinion (laughs).’ [29] (Citizen journalist – blogger)

Apart from accepting or rejecting the (views of) contributors, the core team of newsroom journalists can also decide to give some articles, op-eds or blog posts more or less salience or prominence. For instance, they may put contributions on the home page of their websites or in their newsletters or promote them on social media. Below (see 6.4.2.3 ‘Good Journalism’) I will refer to this in the context of the interpretive account and frame-setting on the part of the alternative (newsroom) journalists. More than the (ideological) content (i.e. (sub)frames) of contributions, however, poor quality or ethical considerations (e.g. racism) are the main reasons to turn down or background an article, op-ed or blog post. Contributions which are accepted are usually not rewritten, but only undergo linguistic (grammar / spelling) control (Bruns, 2003; Platon & Deuze, 2003). As I already pointed out, the online character of the alternative media is an important, contributing factor which makes it easier for the editorial staff to get in touch with a broader group of contributors and allow them access to the debate. There are also

less restrictions in terms of space, which releases the – practical – pressures to ‘censor’ views which (slightly) diverge from those of the core of newsmakers. These practical considerations (i.e. the lack of limitations) interact with, and support, conscious, ideological choices (e.g. Atton, 2002, 2003, 2008; Bruns, 2003; Deuze, 2005b; Downing, 2002, 2003; Fuchs, 2010; Harbers, 2016; Harcup, 2003, 2014; Platon & Deuze, 2003; Silcock & Schwalbe, 2010; Takahashi et al., 2014; Waltz, 2005; Wiesslitz & Ashuri, 2011).

As said earlier, alternative reporters are more likely to *combine various roles and responsibilities*. Writing articles and selecting accompanying images, for instance, is much more of an integrated process, although one of the outlets also has two photo editors. Also, external contributors have no or less input in the photo selection process. The photo editing for their articles is usually done by the editorial staff. I had expected that this would feed into a stronger awareness regarding visual frame messages: Media production and frame-building, in general, are more deliberate processes in alternative media (see 6.4.2.3 ‘Good Journalism’) (e.g. Eliasoph, 1988). Hence, I reckoned that the alternative reporters, many of whom have strong Biocentric cognitive Subframes, would be equally aware of – or sensitive to – the messages they convey through the verbal *and* the visual mode, especially if they can ‘control’ both. These expectations are, however, not confirmed by my findings. Many visuals are – similarly to the mainstream media – selected based on rather superficial cues or pragmatic considerations (see 6.4.2.3 ‘Good Journalism’; 6.4.2.5 Pragmatism and Autonomy). That might be partly due to the fact that most alternative reporters lack a visual background or literacy (see Scoggin McEntee, 2016; Nurmis, 2017; Seelig, 2005). Anyhow, these practices may lead to – rather unconscious – visual frame-sending.

‘(...) I notice that some people are (.) better educated for this, or let’s say, have more talent for it. None of us has been educated, after all. Anyhow, they have a better intuition. Others, however, show images that make you respond: Would you ever find this attractive yourself? Or, does it say anything?’ [30] (Alternative editor in chief)

‘Yes, the editors choose the images. You really don’t have a say. And sometimes that might be quite annoying, when they choose images that really (laughs) [do not fit]. For instance, right here in DeWereldMorgen: They choose an image (.) of a flood, but that’s exactly the image we actually don’t want to bring.’ [31] (Alternative – activist)

‘No, if an article, for instance, is about nuclear power plants, you provide a photo of a power plant.’ [32] (Alternative generalist journalist and coordinator)

In some cases, however, the integrated process of writing and image selection does give rise to *more deliberate visual framing choices*. That is, contributors consciously try to convey their messages (i.e. set their (sub)frames) not only through the article text but also through the visuals. Yet, as I will discuss below (see 6.4.2.3 ‘Good Journalism’; 6.4.2.5 Pragmatism and Autonomy), the visual parameters most reporters draw on are usually rather ‘superficial’, like denotative cues or metaphors (Bissell, 2000; Nurmis, 2017; Seelig, 2005):

'Next to an article discussing the idea of time and luxury, I had put an image of someone who's simply playing the guitar. And, yes, you can make the association yourself as for what it means. But, you could also put there an alarm clock or so (...).' [33] (Citizen journalist – blogger)

Finally, then, it is important to note that the reporters of the *alternative news agency* take in a *special position* (see Joye, 2009). On the continuum between purely hierarchical ('mechanic') and completely horizontal ('organic') newsrooms they can be situated about half way. The local Belgian newsroom, encompassing three reporters, and the broader international structures are characterized by the '*biocentric*' values of equality, collaboration and integration. Their motto is, for instance, 'Give a voice to the voiceless'. They collaborate with a global network of local grassroots, citizen and professional reporters. However, the survival of the Belgian department, in particular, very much depends on government subsidies, and these come with certain *hierarchical pressures and expectations* which limit the room for frame-setting:

'Last year, in our subsidy application, we had to (.) specify how often we would write about Malawi, Mozambique and South Africa. (...) One of my two colleagues said: We can't seriously do that, can we? We aren't the press (.) agency of the Flemish government. I think that remark is justified. But, if you want to go one (laughs) with their money, you've got to try and find compromises. (...) Of course they've asked us: Could you perhaps write something about the projects we're involved with? So, we've done that a couple of times, yes. (...) Well, yes, there are several interesting projects, and my opinion is: Flemish people are perhaps unaware of those, and it is quite interesting to know.' [34] (Alternative generalist reporter – alternative press agency)

I argue that the hegemonic, anthropocentric discourse of the government with regard to developmental aid – focusing, for example, on the need for the wealthy and developed West to provide money, means and knowledge to the underdeveloped South (e.g. Agyeman & Evans, 2004; Bankoff, 2001; Vihersalo, 2008) – may well give rise to, or at least reinforce, the anthropocentric Unequal Vulnerability Subframe in the discourse and news production of this reporter and her colleagues. Perhaps, it may also feed into the Consumer Rights news Subframe (see socialization / the setting of frames which are consonant to those of superiors) (see Brüggemann, 2014; Brüggemann & Engesser, 2016; Scheufele, B., 2006). As the respondent explains, the government also expects the press agency to be part of the commercial media market.

'(...) The government does not just give us money. They want you to be a commercially viable agency. You've got to show that you can work independently, should you no longer get any money. So, they really want us to (.) do the best we can to attract customers, subscription money, or to raise money in other ways. That makes it very important to us to keep and serve the clients we've got.' [35] (Alternative generalist reporter – alternative press agency)

Accordingly, the (Belgian) employees of the alternative press agency do not only feel a strong pressure to sell their articles to their superiors but also to as many customers as possible. The fact that their current clients encompass both alternative media as well as the online news platforms of mainstream outlets

such as *Het Laatste Nieuws* or *De Morgen* undoubtedly helps to explain – to a certain extent, at least – the dominance of Anthropocentric Subframes in their output. That is, in order to keep or attract customers, they are (increasingly) inclined to adapt the content of their articles so as to meet the expectations of all clients and especially the ‘most important’ and best paying ones.⁹² Objectivity is one of the (‘marketing’) strategies (see Boesman & Van Gorp, 2016; Gans, 1979; Tuchman, 1972) for doing so:

‘So (.) [HLN.be] is also a client for us. That’s an important client (...) and the government is also quite (.) happy that we have them as a client.’ [36] (Alternative generalist reporter – alternative press agency)

‘Yes, actually we don’t want to be too coloured as a press agency. You’ve got to serve HLN.be and DeWereldMorgen with the same piece.’ [37] (Alternative generalist reporter – alternative press agency)

As I will discuss below (see 6.4.2.3 ‘Good Journalism’), however, objectivity (as a goal) (Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2007) tends to facilitate the reproduction of Anthropocentric Subframes.

More generally speaking, then, the combination of these factors and influences seems to explain – at least partly – the fact that the alternative press agency (i.e. a crucial source of information to the alternative outlets) tilts closer toward the mainstream media (see also 6.4.2.3 ‘Good Journalism’ and 6.4.2.4 News Values). Of course, other influences are also at play. For instance, the second respondent who works for the alternative press agency is a non-Belgian (international) professional freelancer. As pointed out, he also has Anthropocentric journalist (and news) Subframes. He mentions that the non-profit news agency is one of the few news organizations (in his part of the world) that is interested in his stories. Hence, he sells his articles to them, even though they are not able to pay him much. His precarious financial situation might encourage him to mainly provide stories which are best adapted to the commercial news market, just like his Belgian colleague. On the other hand, he does not feel the direct top-down (socializing) pressures as described by his colleague, who is an employee of the press agency. Accordingly, he presumably has more freedom to develop his own views, to write the stories he finds important or interesting, or to take sides (to some extent, at least). Still, his profile and decisions are comparable to those of mainstream journalists (i.e. engrained with anthropocentric thinking). Similarly, the ‘anthropocentric’ / mainstream personal background or professional role of the Belgian employee, as well as her decisions or practices, definitely cannot exclusively be explained by her professional context.

⁹² As the Flemish press agency reporter points out, it is the policy of the Inter Press Agency to ask higher financial contributions from the bigger (commercial) media than from smaller (alternative) players (see ipsnews.net).

The two alternative media I studied, *DeWereldMorgen* and *MO**, also partly survive on government subsidies as well as on the gifts of partners (mainly NGOs) or the public. However, they stress that this has no influence, whatsoever, on the content which they produce:

'(...) they have no say, whatsoever (...). [The cannot tell us:] we want you to write about this or that. No.' [38] (Alternative generalist reporter and coordinator)

Similarly, the general manager of one of the NGOs, who is a member of the management board of one of the alternative outlets, stresses that the reporters independently decide what to publish as there is a 'concrete wall' between the board and the newsroom. As I point out in various sections (see also 6.4.2.5 Pragmatism and Autonomy), however, their rather precarious and uncertain financial situation has some – indirect – implications for their practices and workings, and thus for their frame-building strategies.

I will now further elaborate on beats, as the beat system has been demonstrated to have a particularly strong influence on the frame-building process (Brüggemann, 2014; Brüggemann & Engesser, 2014; McCluskey, 2008).

Beats. As expected (see Berglez, 2011; Brüggemann & Engesser, 2014, 2016; de Semir, 2000; Gans, 1979; Gibson et al., 2016; Harrabin, 2000; McCluskey, 2008; Sachsman, Simon & Valenti, 2010), the journalists in the mainstream outlets (and the professional freelancer of the alternative press agency) situate themselves in particular '*parallel*' beats (see Table 6), as science / environmental journalists, political journalists, economic journalists or foreign affairs journalists. The journalist from the popular newspaper is the only one in the sample who identifies himself as a generalist (Boesman, d'Haenens & Van Gorp, 2015; Deuze, 2005a; Gans, 1979; Gibson et al., 2016). For example:

'[Name journalist] writes about Europe. That is, really, the first climate man, partly because much (.) gets controlled by Europe. Of course, we have people in all departments who are working on this. Climate is for instance also an issue in the political news coverage. If we have a dossier of the Council of Ministers to deal with, someone of the political beat is going to handle it. Or, if it's an economic topic, it will end up with me, for instance.' [39] (Mainstream economic journalist)

As Eliasoph (1988) contends, news media legitimate particular fields or issues (including the dominant sources representing them) as particularly important (i.e. 'the main gates to (understanding) reality') through their choice for certain (types of) beats. Clearly, 'political', 'economic' or 'scientific' beats reflect the hegemonic (naturalized) organization of reality, with (elite) political, economic and scientific sources as major rational 'truth-speakers'.

Just like their personal backgrounds and professional roles, background reading, contacts with particular sources or other experiences related to their *beats make certain (types of) (sub)frames (more easily) mentally accessible* to these reporters. Yet, I argue, more than the former two, reporter beat can help to explain why some of these cognitive subframes emerge in reporters' climate coverage as news

subframes and others do not (Engesser & Brüggemann, 2016; McCluskey, 2008).⁹³ For example, the science journalist of the leftist mainstream outlet has multiple cognitive subframes. Yet, I could only identify Scala Naturae – as dominant subframe – in her news articles. This is, not so coincidentally, the major frame in scientific reports like the IPCC (2014a, 2014b) (see 4.5.2 Hegemonic Subframes), which she strongly draws on. As indicated before, Brüggemann (2014) argues that journalists are more inclined to set frames if they work in a context that provides consonant resonance with their views (see Brüggemann & Engesser, 2016; Scheufele, B., 2006). A beat can provide such a context. The economic journalist I interviewed refused to answer my direct questions regarding his views on, or ideal coverage of, climate change. Analysing his discourse, however, I was able to identify Scala Naturae and Human Rights as (more) salient Subframes (than Human Wealth). Yet, the salient Human Wealth Subframes in his news articles clearly reflect his beat. The fact that he distances himself – as a detached and neutral reporter (i.e. ‘a sender’ (see 6.4.2.3 ‘Good Journalism’)) – from the views of his economic (beat) sources, might also confirm that there is indeed a gap among his cognitive subframes and news subframes:

‘Those [articles] do, actually, not really draw on what I found important, but they simply (...) provide issues which the readers, or many readers at least, probably don’t know. Yet, they are happening, or there are people who are dealing with them. And you simply have to bring that. (...) I have my personal opinion, but if you’re a journalist, you’ve got to avoid that your personal agenda determines what is covered in the newspaper.’ [40] (Mainstream economic journalist)

Environmental Justice makes for an awkward fit in the hegemonic beat system (see Harrabin, 2000). While several journalists have, apparently, internalized it as a cognitive subframe, it is absent or at most a minor subframe in the news coverage. One explanation is that the subframe is often initiated by NGOs or bottom-up sources (e.g. Benford & Snow, 2000; Čapek, 1993; Hopke, 2012; Shiva, 1988, 1993; Taylor, 2000). Those are – contrary to scientists, politicians (all beats) or economic sources (economic beat) – not the primary sources in either of the identified beats (see De Keyser, Raeymaeckers & Paulussen, 2011; Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993). Besides, the journalists argue that they prefer NGOs – as sources or agenda-setters – who provide (scientific) studies and numbers (e.g. Greenpeace) (see Van Leuven, Deprez & Raeymaeckers, 2015; Van Leuven, Joye, Flamey, 2015; Wozniak, Wessler & Lück, 2017). However, not all (bottom-up) movements have the means to substantiate their claims with scientific material, or they speak a ‘language’ that deviates from the ‘western scientific language’ (e.g. Shiva, 1988, 1993). During the selected period, only one of the NGO representatives – who works in an ‘environmental justice beat’ – provides some counterweight as opinion-maker and source.

⁹³ Presumably, beats constitute important contexts in which journalists are socialized. That is, beat frames are likely to affect journalist frames. Yet, the data show that many reporters also hold other cognitive frames, which go beyond their beat frames. Also, several of the frames can be found among various journalists. Accordingly, the current data do not allow to describe clear interactions between beat frames and journalist frames.

The responses of the interviewees also provide suggestions as for the extent to which their beats influence their reporting:

'I don't really have that problem (.), as I report about the scientific side of things. I don't need to bother about which views parties promote or how we could optimize policies as much as possible. Those are debates which are covered by other people here, you know (.). That's the political beat, the environmental beat, more specifically (.). So, I can just stick to the pure, more scientific facts.' [41] (Mainstream science journalist)

Put differently, this reporter – and most of his colleagues with him – believes that science can be separated from economy, politics, ideology and thus the broader societal context. This confirms the findings of Engesser and Brüggemann (2016) who demonstrate that science beat reporters stick more to the 'neutral scientific facts', while more politicized beat reporters are more inclined to promote different types of (sub)frames, which provide (particular) broader argumentations (e.g. as regards for economics, politics or human safety) (see Eide, 2012). As Berglez (2011) argues, the beat system indeed seems to largely *decontextualize the multi-level and highly complex climate issue* (see de Semir, 2000; Harrabin, 2000). This prevents both reporters as well as their audiences from seeing large-scale interactions or patterns (see pigeonholing (Larson, 2011)).⁹⁴ Of course, other influences are also at play, for instance restraints in terms of time or space (e.g. to – conduct the research to – provide lengthy discussions regarding the interaction of fields or issues) (e.g. Darley, 2000; Harrabin, 2000). Decontextualization (e.g. Hart, 2011; Iyengar, 1990; van Dijk, 1998) is also a defining characteristic of the Anthropocentric Masterframe, which is – as said – dominant in the Flemish mainstream newspapers under focus (see 4.5.2 Hegemonic Subframes).

That does not take away, however, that beat journalists do get the opportunity to develop *expertise* in a certain area, which allows them to make more informed (routine) decisions, to weigh up external input (e.g. the relevance of a source (frame)) against their own well-developed cognitive (sub)frames and schemata or to provide 'translation' or context that may advance public understanding (see frame-setting, interpretive account). This is less so for generalist reporters (in popular media) or less experienced beat journalists, who – lacking time and, accordingly, background knowledge or experience – tend to draw much stronger on the information and interpretations provided by (secondary) sources, colleagues or other media (Boesman, d'Haenens & Van Gorp, 2015; Brüggemann & Engesser, 2014; De Keyser, 2012; Dunwoody, 1980; Gans, 1979; Gibson et al., 2016; McCluskey, 2008; Sachsman, Simon & Valenti, 2010; Shoemaker & Reese, 2014; Wilson, 2000). For instance:

'But it is not as if I'm following up the latest climate studies, no. You rather draw on your network of people who are dealing with these all the time. Bond Beter Leefmilieu,

⁹⁴ Note, however, that one of the mainstream broadsheets regularly works with 'correspondents', journalists who write about topics like, among others, 'climate change' from beyond the confines of the beat system. Nevertheless, these do not provide / define the regular, 'everyday' coverage. For instance, I did not find any examples in the (October-December) 2016 corpus of climate change news articles.

for instance. They have this scientific background and can brief you: Look, this is new. So, you actually get it as second-hand information.' [42] (Mainstream political journalist – less than 5 years of experience)

The news manager of the mainstream press agency, which does not have an internal climate specialist due to time and financial constraints, confirms the dependence on external input and 'facts' rather than contextualization of the non-specialists newsroom reporters (under deadline stress) who are expected to write climate articles (see 6.4.2.3 'Good Journalism'):

'You've got to ask: Please send me a press release (.). That makes you vulnerable, because you're completely dependent on what they want to give you. But (.), for now, that's the reality of the media we live in. That's not gonna change either, because no one wants to pay for news and we are at the end of the chain. So, we don't have (...) any money left, whatsoever.' [43] (Mainstream news manager – mainstream press agency)

In this context, a statement insisted upon by an experienced climate reporter is also telling. Comparing the beginning of his own career with the situation of young reporters today, he explicitly puts emphasis on the increasing time, financial and organizational constraints. These prevent (early career) beat journalists to develop themselves as experts by attending academic conferences, reading academic publications or building a network of (academic) experts. Lacking sufficient data, it is hard to draw definite conclusions. Yet, I argue that non-specialists may be more inclined to send frames, or to set only those frames which they have (previously) internalized based on the input of (among others) a highly limited number of sources (see 6.4.2.1 Personality Traits, Backgrounds and Professional Roles).

Due to a combination of certain views as for how journalism ought to be practiced as well as various limitations (e.g. money, personnel) (see Atton, 2002, 2003, 2008; Bruns, 2003; Downing, 2001, 2003; Groshek & Han, 2011; Hamilton, 2000; Harcup, 2003, 2014; Nee, 2014; Waltz, 2005), many roles, tasks or topics in the alternative outlets are *shared responsibilities* of several reporters or even the whole team. Besides, due to the focus on debate and interaction in alternative newsrooms, issues or topics are usually approached from various, interacting perspectives even before (and/or after / during) individual journalists write up their articles. Yet, as the following quote demonstrates, their experiences, interests or networks (see 6.4.2.1 Personality Traits, Backgrounds and Professional Roles) can make some reporters specialists in certain areas (see Harbers, 2016):

'So, we report, more or less, about everything, but each of us does have a certain specialization. I cover more foreign affairs and much less internal affairs (...). Dossiers which I followed up in the past [working as politician and consultant for international organizations]and which I'm interested in. So, I don't follow, for instance, what the Flemish Ministry of Environment does, but I do follow, for example, the climate summits. Those are the kinds of issues I cover. I also follow the Free Trade Agreement.' [44] (Alternative generalist reporter)

These ‘beats’ are much broader, less restrictive and organized along different lines – e.g. ecology, globalization, Africa, migration – than the quite rigid compartmentalizations in the mainstream newsrooms, which are based on hegemonic views of ‘how the world works and/or should be understood’ (e.g. politics, economy, science) (see DeWereldMorgen.be; mo.be). As Harbers (2016) points out, allowing reporters to delve into broad topics that relate to their interests, expertise or fascination facilitates ‘in-depth issue-based journalism’: it encourages journalists to thoroughly investigate themes, shed light on issues from different angles (cutting across rigid compartments like ‘politics’ or ‘science’) and gain in-depth insights. In other words, rather than organizational structures which mainly help to fill the ‘news hole’ as efficiently as possible (‘beats-as-goals’) (with journalists often feeling inclined to adopt beat frames, due to influences such as socialization or time restraints (see above)), the alternative ‘beats’ are spaces which grant reporters the time, space and means to contribute to the debate (about particular themes) ‘in the best possible ways’, drawing on their own assessments (‘beats-as-means’) (see Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2007).

In the small alternative newsrooms there are usually one or two reporters who are most often concerned with climate change. I call them generalists with a special interest for or focus on, among other things, environment and climate. As such, rather than a topic that is divided into various small subcategories (i.e. (hegemonic) beat specialisms), *climate change* is much more of a *beat in itself*. This is also confirmed by some of the interviewees, who would like to further develop the climate beat. Clearly, this (ideological) decision, or goal, legitimates climate change as a highly important subject in its own right, vis-à-vis politics, economy or science in the mainstream media (see Eliasoph, 1988):⁹⁵

‘We would love to report much more often and in other ways about the climate theme, but we just have a very small team. (...) It is a theme in itself which you should actually assign to a reporter whose only task it would be to cover the climate.’ [45] (Alternative generalist reporter and coordinator)

For the moment, however, most of the climate articles are provided by a *large group of contributors outside the alternative newsrooms*: freelancers, citizen journalists, bloggers, representatives of NGOs or social movements and, for the larger part, the alternative news agency. Again, this is both the result of ideological as well as practical considerations. Most of those contributors, except for the NGO and social movement representatives as well as the freelance environmental / science journalist of the alternative press agency (see Table 6), cannot be clearly situated in one, specific (let alone, narrow) beat.

Summarizing, then, most alternative climate reporters – within or outside the alternative newsrooms – are liberated from the rigid structures of the hegemonic beat system. As Berglez (2011) argues, this allows them to take a *more comprehensive outlook on climate change*, integrating various aspects and

⁹⁵ A few months after the interviews, one of the alternative outlets appointed a newsroom journalist responsible for ‘climate and socio-ecological transition’ (mo.be).

levels of the issue (see Harbers, 2016). Providing more in-depth discussions, critical analyses and contextualization is, indeed, a major, deliberate goal of alternative media (e.g. Atton, 2002, 2003, 2008; Brulle, 2010; Gunster, 2012; Hamilton, 2000; Harcup, 2014) and may help to sustain the Biocentric Masterframe (see 4.5.3 Counter-Hegemonic Subframes). The preoccupation with broader political, economic, social and/or cultural causes, problems and solutions is also apparent in the discourse of the alternative reporters. It is, in particular, remarkable that many of them, when being asked about their views on climate change, provide a very broad definition of the Biocentric Masterframe and not of specific (sub)frames (yet, some more specific references are also present). Personal experiences and backgrounds (see 6.4.2.1 Personality Traits, Backgrounds and Professional Roles) may, nevertheless, guide the reporters to particular types of Biocentric Subframes. Also, practical considerations – particularly the need to provide each article with a clear focus (i.e. to keep it readable) – may limit the context provided in individual contributions.

'You just can't present people with the bigger picture all the time. I think that the major challenge of climate reporting is the following (...): Of course you must permanently have the bigger picture at the back of your mind. But you can't (.) cover the overall picture in every article. It is the challenge, really, to make clear through (.) different stories: Well, yes, that is also related to climate change.' [46] (Alternative generalist reporter – freelancer)

Key words:

top-down, control, inequality, hierarchy, exclusiveness, individualism, separation, unilateralism

versus

bottom-up + top-down, stewardship, equality, inclusiveness, cooperation, collectivism, integration, diversity, multilateralism / multiperspectivalism

6.4.2.3 'Good Journalism'

Objectivity & Frame-sponsors. A major part of the input for news articles is provided by external sources, like *frame-sponsors* (e.g. Carragee & Roefs, 2004). However, as *gatekeepers* reporters have the power to decide which sources they give or deny access, who they legitimate or delegitimate, and thus, which (sub)frames they accept, reject or adapt (e.g. Durham, 2001; Entman, 1993; Gitlin, 1980; Van Gorp, 2006; Vossen, Van Gorp & Schulpen, 2017). Accordingly, the large overlap among journalist (sub)frames and news (sub)frames (see Tables 7 and 8) in the mainstream outlets and the alternative press agency suggests that a large group of the climate journalists are mainly involved in processes of *frame-setting* (Brüggemann, 2014): they look for and mainly quote those sources which reflect their own cognitive (socialized) (sub)frames. This is in line with their professional role perceptions: as educators or supervisors they want to intervene and envision socio-political or economic change (see Brüggemann, 2014; Hanitzsch, 2007, 2011). The deductive framing analysis of the news articles shows,

among others, that scientists and international (public) organizations, like the United Nations, tend to provide Scala Naturae and Consumer Rights Subframes. Human Wealth can be associated with economic researchers or organizations, as well as industry. NGOs and international organizations (e.g. the World Development Bank) are the main sources in Unequal Vulnerability articles. Politicians can be related to all types of (sub)frames. I argue that this, again, illustrates the pivotal role of the journalist (sub)frames in the news framing process (see Dunwoody, 1992; Engesser & Brüggemann, 2016; Scheufele, B., 2006), which seems to be larger than the influences found by Vossen, Van Gorp and Schulpen (2017). The authors argue that rather than directly influencing news frames, journalist views and knowledge mainly affect reporters' choices for particular sources and topics. Surely, the choice for certain sources is pivotal here. Yet, it seems that the selection of a source is not (or cannot be) separated from the selection of a particular (sub)frame.

Balance is in most cases used to weigh views that reflect the same or reconcilable (sub)frames, like Scala Naturae (primary subframe) and Human Wealth (secondary subframe). Given the character of the subframes (i.e. they call for reform), this appears to be a strategy for reporters to express a pro-environmental engagement without explicitly saying so (Broersma, 2010; Fahy, 2017; Gess, 2012; Hiles and Hinnant, 2014; Sachsman, Simon & Valenti, 2010). *Quoting* is also an important 'strategic ritual' (Tuchman, 1972) that provides a veil of objectivity to the journalist as 'messenger of news facts', especially if the quoted sources are elites whose expertise or societal role can give more weight to statements. The following reporters admit, for instance, that they 'outsource' particular views (see Boesman et al., 2017):

'2016 was warmer than 2015, which was already the warmest year. And I believe, if I remember well, that all records have been broken (.) in the twenty-first century. Well, yes, I don't think that's a coincidence anymore, you know. And if you can quote someone, then, who says: Yes, that is no coincidence, anymore, you know. Well, (...) you can write lots of things, but you must have it framed by someone, as much as possible. A smart person, we call that.' [47] (Mainstream generalist journalist)

'The other alternative is, of course, that you (.) quote people, you know. That you involve others who give a comment (.) which contains a particular view, or a certain judgement or claim (...).' [48] (Mainstream science journalist)

Depending on the beat (and thus, the 'beat frames' described in 6.4.2.2 Newsroom Organization) of reporters (as well as other factors), the journalist (sub)frames may appear as salient (sub)frames or rather as minor (sub)frames in the news articles. For instance, the quoted science reporter [48] has a strong Human Wealth cognitive Subframe. I also detected minor Human Wealth Subframes among her news (sub)frames. Yet, Scala Naturae – both one of her cognitive subframes as well as her (science) beat subframe – is the dominant subframe in her news articles.

As argued before, objectivity strategies help journalists to deal with the risks of their trade, including the daily deadline stress and the expectations (e.g. quality, quantity, efficiency in terms of time-space)

of their superiors. Also, objectivity is considered as a marketing strategy, which allows to reach sufficiently broad audiences. The latter consideration is, in particular, crucial for the press agencies (e.g. Carpentier, 2008; Carpentier & Trioen, 2010; Gans, 1979, 2004; Hanitzsch, 2007; Lewis, Williams & Franklin, 2008; Schudson, 2001; Shoemaker & Reese, 2014; Tuchman, 1972). However, Kovach and Rosenstiel (2007) contend that, when used as a *goal* (or ‘value’ (Carpentier & Trioen, 2010)), *objectivity* – narrowed down to impartiality (Carpentier, 2008) – obscures the actual subjectivity of the frame-building process (see Harbers, 2016). This includes the choices of journalists for sources which are part of their ‘interpretive communities’ (Berkowitz & TerKeurst, 1999; Dunwoody, 1980; Zelizer, 1993). In other words, they are not open about the fact that they – deliberately or not – set frames (Brüggemann & Engesser, 2014; Vossen, Van Gorp & Schulpen, 2017). As Deuze (2005b) argues, objectivity makes them immune for criticism or accusations of subjectivity and prevents democratic dialogue from the outset. The sources that are part of the interpretive communities are mainly scientists, politicians and industrial and economic interest-groups but also large NGOs (Greenpeace, in particular) who can provide the journalists with scientific facts and numbers (see Anderson, 1991; Cox & Schwarze, 2015; Miller & Riechert, 2000; Mormont & Dasnoy, 1995; Ryan & Freeman Brown, 2015). Other (elite, international) media, like *The Guardian* or *The (Financial) Times*, and press agencies are also mentioned quite often (see hierarchy of access (e.g. De Keyser, Raeymaeckers & Paulussen, 2011; Gans, 1979, 2004; Molotch & Lester, 1974; Tuchman, 1978)). As argued before, press releases and press agency input may help journalists to work more quickly and efficiently and, thus, to deal with the top-down commercial pressures, deadlines and resource restraints (e.g. De Keyser, 2012; Franklin, Lewis & Williams, 2010; Lewis, Williams & Franklin, 2008). However, I found only a few articles in the corpus which can be fully / directly attributed to press agencies. Also, few direct references (e.g. quotes) are made to NGOs. Hence, it seems that these sources mainly act as agenda-setters, who draw the attention of the media to interesting events, scientific findings or reports (see Gitlin, 1980; Harrabin, 2000; Van Leuven, Deprez & Raeymaeckers, 2015; Van Leuven, Joye & Flamey, 2015). At the bottom of the hierarchy are sceptics, ‘overly engaged’ social or ecological movements and citizens (e.g. Cottle, 2000; Trumbo, 1996). These are largely situated outside the interpretive communities of the reporters. Of course, this may differ depending on journalists’ beats. De Keyser, Raeymaeckers and Paulussen (2011) confirm this, pointing out that political and economic journalists, in particular, prefer elite – respectively governmental or political, and business – sources to citizen sources or NGOs. Based on my study, I add a preference of science journalists for academic sources and researchers (see 6.4.2.2 Newsroom Organization). According to the authors, local journalists value citizens – but not NGOs, who often have a more global / international work field – higher as sources. However, as local journalists only play a minor role in the mainstream reporting of climate change, they were not included as interviewees.

The reasons why the reporters are less eager to give a stage to *sceptics and social or ecological movements* differ, however. Most journalists confirm that they personally accept the scientific facts (i.e.

consensus) about climate change (see IPCC, 2014a, 2014b). They want to have these facts right and, as such, correctly inform their audience (see ‘correspondence’). Subsequently, the reporters seek to make sense of these facts, in interaction with others (see ‘coherence’) (see Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2007). The Reform Anthropocentric (journalist / news) Subframes, such as Scala Naturae, Human Wealth or Consumer Rights, allow for this (see above). Clearly, however, the Status-quo Anthropocentric Subframes of sceptics (Rights of the Free Market or Inscrutable are the Ways of Nature) jeopardize this endeavour as they are not rooted in the scientific consensus to start with (see 4.5.2 Hegemonic Subframes). That is, ‘they do not have the facts right’ (see ‘*correspondence*’). What is more, based on this ‘skewed’ or ‘biased’ reality, critical voices draw conclusions (e.g. ‘climate action is not required’) which go counter to the interpretations (see ‘coherence’) supported by the reporters (Jacques, Dunlap & Freeman, 2008). As Brüggemann (2014) points out, journalists are inclined to reject (sub)frames which contradict their views (see Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Graber, 1988; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). The subframes promoted by the social or ecological movements, on the contrary, usually take climate facts as a starting point. However, the ways in which they interpret these ‘facts’ and draw conclusions strongly differ from the views of the reporters: The subframes of these movements are more likely to have a biocentric colour. Also, they tend to focus on socio-political or economic interpretations – causes or consequences – which the journalists (in the context of their beat and / or newsroom) attach less or no importance to or which they do not find relevant (see 4.5.3 Counter-Hegemonic Subframes; Chapter 5). Put differently, the objection of the reporters against the input of such groups is mainly situated on the level of ‘*coherence*’ (see the preference for movements which can provide numbers and facts). For instance, the foreign affairs journalist argues that the views of a particular NGO regarding Environmental Justice are overly ideological and ought to be approached with caution. That is, the mainstream reporters consider their own interpretations as legitimate and neutral and, accordingly, are wary towards views which (strongly) depart from this ‘uncontested reality’. Providing the latter could suggest they are biased (e.g. Bennett, Lawrence & Livingston, 2006; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Gitlin, 1980; Lewis & Reese, 2009). Thus, while balance remains an important strategy to provide a sense of objectivity (Tuchman, 1972), most mainstream reporters adapt this routine when dealing with interest-group frames which diverge from their journalist, beat or newsroom (sub)frames: if non-hegemonic frame-sponsors provide well-argued views or turn out to be(come) important actors in the debate, they may be part of an ‘informed type of balance’. That is, the *interpretive account* is used in these cases: While various parties get a voice, the journalists use particular strategies – salience (e.g. placement, repetition, space / time allowance), word choice (e.g. more or less neutral terminology, quoting verbs), rhetorics (e.g. focus on (irrational) conflict versus (rational) numbers, scientific research) – to delegitimize external (sub)frames, while legitimizing the (journalist) (sub)frames they support. In short, suggesting inequalities among views they defend a priori truths. This is in many cases even a newsroom policy (Fahy, 2017; Hiles & Hinnant, 2014; Sachsman, Simon & Valenti, 2010). While the first and last quotes (quotes 49 and 51) below mainly address the relevance of voices in broader sense-making and interpretation of facts (see

‘coherence’), the science journalist [50] is mostly (but not exclusively) concerned with the level of facts (see ‘correspondence’) (see below).

‘That does not mean that you judge the discourse of climate deniers, so to speak, based on the same standards. Of course, you try to apply a journalistic test. (...) Surely, our (...) marketing is (...) to be the salmon swimming against the current. That does not imply, however, that we will give climate deniers a platform because that’s a bit juicy.’ [49] (Mainstream chief)

‘I will never contact them myself. Absolutely not. But the stuff we get, comes from various sources (...). Yet, I will always add: Look, this is not a half-half debate. This is the view of a minority.’ [50] (Mainstream science journalist)

‘However, if you see that those climate sceptics are really getting important, for instance in America right now, you must pay attention to it. After all, they threaten to influence policies (...). But [you’re] not [going to just present them] like: Here’s another one shouting. No, I don’t believe so.’ [51] (Mainstream foreign affairs journalist)

The reporters in the last two quotes above (quotes 50 and 51) refer (indirectly) to strategies to contextualize (and diminish the salience of) non-hegemonic voices. Among the analysed articles, for instance, many quote president Trump, briefly introducing as such the Rights of the Free Market and Natural Machine Subframes. Yet, those are balanced with far more salient subframes such as Cycles of Nature or Human Wealth in heading, introduction or pull quotes.

Reporters’ views vis-à-vis balance and objectivity differ, however, *depending on the topics and sources* they are mostly concerned with, and thus (partly) their beats (Brüggemann & Engesser, 2016). Exceptions are the reporters who work in the newsrooms of the press agencies: Their preoccupation with objectivity encourages them to hold on to the balance ideal in almost all situations (i.e. dealing with all kinds of topics or issues). Anyhow, most science journalists (including the freelancer of the alternative press agency) are most concerned with ‘objective climate facts’. That is, they focus on getting the facts right and, thus, on ‘*correspondence*’ (Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2007). The Scala Naturae Subframe, which they usually employ does not, or to a lesser extent, allow for uncertainty and debate, especially with regard to the causes and problems they tend to highlight. In other words, their a priori views on ‘the facts of climate change’ define the amount of time and space that they want to devote to certain sources. Those who are more concerned with political, economic or societal debates – especially those who work in the political, economic or foreign affairs beats – are less inclined to denounce balance. This is no coincidence. Various researchers have pointed out that the climate issue is no longer a subject of scientific debate, but has evolved into a topic of political (and societal) discussions (e.g. Anderson, 2008; Hiles & Hinnant, 2014; McComas & Shanahan, 1999; Tillinghast & McCan, 2013; Trumbo, 1996). Kovach and Rosenstiel (2007) emphasize that sense-making and drawing conclusions regarding the (socio-economic or political) implications of, in this case, climate change is a process that requires a conversation among various perspectives in society (see ‘*coherence*’). According to Brüggemann and

Engesser (2014), less experienced journalists, who only occasionally deal with the climate, are also more likely to hold on to the ideal of balance (see Gans, 1979) (see 6.4.2.2. Newsroom Organization). As already discussed, however, the range of voices which are included or legitimated is usually much narrower than envisioned by the authors (see ‘absolutist balance’ (Carpentier, 2008)). The economic journalist, in particular, stresses his role as a detached messenger who has the responsibility to give a voice to ‘all perspectives that may be relevant in the debate’. He claims to be mainly *sending* the frames of his sources, while refraining from adding his own views (see Lewis & Reese, 2009). As pointed out above, however, frame-sending can never be entirely free from frame-setting (i.e. the (socialized) values, schemata and frames of the communicator) (see Brüggemann, 2014):

‘This is my take on this: I make stories about this topic and (.) if someone has something to say and provides arguments, in particular if he does so with conviction, he will be given the chance to bring his story. I’ll ask some questions and those are brought into that story afterwards. (...) Yes, thus, I try to refrain from introducing an own view into the story. For such purposes, we’ve got the opinion pages.’ [52] (Mainstream economic journalist)

The last sentence, in particular, clearly highlights his belief in objective news reporting: that is, facts can be separated from personal opinions (e.g. Carpentier, 2008; Carpentier & Trioen, 2010; Schudson, 2001; Tuchman, 1972). As indicated before (see Table 8), there is indeed no or little overlap among the journalist subframes of this reporter and the news subframes in his articles. Another argument for this openness towards various views is, according to the journalist, novelty (see 6.4.2.4 News Values): other, surprising perspectives keep climate reporting interesting and newsworthy (see Boesman et al., 2017).

Summarizing, the mainstream and alternative press agency reporters strongly defend *objectivity-as-a-value* (or goal) (Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2007). Simultaneously, however, most do – implicitly (e.g. describing their search for sources which may voice their own (sub)frames or other strategies to make subjective choices appear ‘neutral’) or explicitly – admit that this ideal remains unachievable in practice (*objectivity-as-a-practice*) (see Broersma, 2010; Carpentier & Trioen, 2010). To deal with this gap, they draw on a number of devices and strategies which must support their objectivity claims. I have discussed a few of those above, and add linguistic and visual selection and choice making here. The responses of the interviewees when being asked about these choices confirm more directly their quest for objectivity, accuracy, factuality and neutrality (Carpentier & Trioen, 2010; Gans, 1979; Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2007; Schudson, 2001; Schudson & Anderson, 2009; Tuchman, 1972). Language must, primarily, be *accurate, right, scientific and neutral*. Accordingly, numbers and percentages are key in climate (science) reports (see Chapters 4 and 5). As argued before, statistics and scientific findings are generally accepted to be more neutral and trustworthy (see Carpentier & Trioen, 2010; Fowler, 1996; van Dijk, 1988). The following quotes illustrate that the journalists indeed seem to believe that language can support their objectivity claims, or even that it may actually function as a quite transparent window on the world:

'Yes, but I think that, mostly, our language is (.) fairly neutral. I don't know. It's not as if we write in a subjective way about climate (.) Yes, in most cases our reports are about: This has happened, or this has been discovered.' [53] (Mainstream science journalist)

'Language is our trade. Making words jump through rings. That's what we're doing all the time (.) You only have to make sure to use a colourful language, a little playful at times. Language that attracts people and that is loose around the corner. However, there's a difference between 'colourful language' and 'coloured language' (.) You must beware of going too far and (.) taking a particular point of view through word (.) choices.' [54] (Mainstream science journalist)

Clearly, fluent language which, preferably, heightens the newsworthiness of a story, is a secondary goal (see 6.4.2.4 News Values).

In a similar way, visuals are supposed to reflect the essence of the verbal story, showing what (e.g. topic, tone, participant, event) is described in the narrative ('an illustration') or, in some cases, providing objective proof of (scientific) findings described in the article (de Smaele, Geenen & De Cock, 2017; Nurmis, 2017). Anyhow, the *visual* needs to support and *reinforce the truth claims of the verbal text* (e.g. Graber, 1996; Grayson, 2013; Kaml, 2005; Newton, 2000; Tirohl, 2000). As argued before, the reporters still largely hold on to the ideal of (photographic) 'mechanical objectivity' (Daston & Galison, 2007):

'That [the article] is about concentrations of CO₂ in the air. Well, you can represent that with a graph. But if you don't have a graph and you've got to use an image, than you often end up with smoke coming from smokestacks or the like, or heavy traffic. It's always a quest. But, well, you often find a reference in the article to a particular place where the problem is the most pressing. For instance, one of these articles deals with the coal mines in (...) Australia. Well, then you look for an image from Australia (...).' [55] (Mainstream chief photo editor)

'You can place a picture from 10 or 20 years ago next to a recent picture and then you have proof that this glacier is really getting smaller. (...) As for droughts and floods (.) you can, at least, show what's going on right now, on the moment the picture was taken. But even then (...) a climate sceptic could say: Well, there have always been droughts and floods. That's no conclusive evidence. We won't claim that either, that a picture is conclusive evidence. But it does say: This has (...) happened now, at least. And (.) research shows that it's not just an accident de parcours anymore.' [56] (Mainstream photo editor)

Note that the interviewees refer to a number of visual strategies or image types which have indeed been described in the literature as recurrent climate visualizations in the media (e.g. Brönnimann, 2002; Doyle, 2007, 2009; León & Erviti, 2015; Manzo, 2010a; O'Neill, 2013). Clearly, pictures are in most cases selected based on their denotative content (who, what, where, when, how) rather than on their potential connotations or associations (i.e. interpretation) (i.e. 'correspondence' rather than 'coherence'). The link with the 'facts' in the text is further facilitated by the caption. However, some photo editors do (implicitly) show that they are – at least in a theoretical sense – aware of the intrinsically

subjective character of photographs (including photo editing) or the fact that connotative meanings might play a role in the interpretations of the audience. In the second quote above (55), for instance, the interviewee clearly identifies a gap between *objectivity-as-a-value* (or goal) and *objectivity-as-a-practice* (Broersma, 2010; Carpentier & Trioen, 2010; Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2007), by pointing out that the photographic reality presented is always partial and selective (see ‘trained judgement’ (Daston & Galison, 2007)). Yet, none of the reporters does, or can, act upon this awareness in daily practice (e.g. by suggesting or even openly communicating about this gap to the audience), at least when it comes to the visualization of climate change (Bissell, 2000; Grayson, 2013; Hall, 1973; Liu, 2013; Mendelson, 2005; Messaris & Abraham, 2001; Newton, 2000; Nurmis, 2017). As such, the photo editors may unconsciously *send certain (sub)frames*, rather than deliberately set them. This may contradict the message of the verbal part of the (sub)frame, at least on a certain level (see ‘dissonance’) or rather make certain argumentations more salient (see Chapter 2). At the very least, the largely unconscious visual choices affect the overall (multimodal) argumentations conveyed by the visual-verbal (sub)frames (DiFrancesco & Young, 2011; Wozniak, Lück & Wessler, 2015).

Given the often rather international scope of climate change news, the main sources of visual material are international press agencies. These tend to produce rather *generic, decontextualized images*, which can easily be inserted in all kinds of (textual) contexts (Bissell, 2000; de Smaele, Geenen & De Cock, 2017; Fahmy, Kelly & Kim, 2007; Nurmis, 2017; Nilsson & Wadbring, 2015). Other images – often graphs – are taken over directly from the scientific publications articles draw on. As discussed before (see 4.5.2 Hegemonic Subframes; Chapter 5), such images (e.g. smoke stacks, polar bears, the suffering child, graphs, satellite images or globes) generally seem to reinforce and reproduce the anthropocentric worldview (Hansen & Machin, 2008; Aiello & Woodhouse, 2016). Scientific graphs, for instance, may reduce, or simplify, climate change to the essential truth of disproportionate human-induced GHG emissions. This purely scientific reality may also draw our attention to causes, problems and solutions which can be defined in these clear, scientific terms (Nocke, 2014). In a more general sense, I argue that the repetitive and stereotypical images which are often distributed by photo agencies usually provide little or new information to viewers, who already expect these types of visuals. Rather than conveying a message or argumentation (i.e. subframe), then, they are likely to function as a clichés or fillers, mainly signalling the topic of the verbal text (see Graber, 1988, 1996; Hahn, Eide & Ali, 2012; Manzo, 2010b; Mendelson & Creech, 2016; Nurmis, 2017). However, Lester (1995) argues that visual stereotypes may appear so naturalized and familiar that we fail to recognize them when coming across them. Yet, every appearance may confirm a particular (unconscious) view (see Rose, 2001). While the material of own (freelance) photo journalists is often used to illustrate other topics or themes, this is less so for climate articles (de Smaele, Geenen & De Cock, 2017). Rather than a choice, however, the respondents emphasize that cost and time efficiency as well as the abstract and global character of climate change motivate these habits (see Fahmy, 2005; Franklin, Lewis & Williams, 2010; León & Erviti, 2015; Lewis,

Williams & Franklin, 2008; McChesney, 2008; Nurmis, 2017). The belief in the truthfulness and objectivity of scientific numbers and graphs can also explain the preference for graphs.

In conclusion, defining the boundaries of the climate debate, the mainstream reporters, and those working for the alternative press agency, stifle true discussions. That is, preventing (almost all) non-hegemonic (Biocentric) Subframes to enter into the debate, they contribute to *depoliticization* (Brulle, 2010; De Lucia, 2009; Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Mouffe, 2005; Pepermans, 2015; Pepermans & Maesele, 2014; Swyngedouw, 2005).

Good journalism has, however, a rather different meaning for journalists of the alternative media, except for the respondents who work for the alternative news agency. Rather than a goal, *objectivity* (mainly in the sense of balance / quoting) *is a means or method* to them, which must allow them to report as accurately as possible and to determine the ‘most constructive truth’ (rather than ‘the objective truth’) (Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2007). Their goal, then, is to convey a particular view on, or engagement for, the climate. That is, they recognize that no one can communicate without taking an (ideological) standpoint, that each communicative act is subjective. Accordingly, it is only fair and more constructive to be open towards the public about their subjectivity, their motives, interpretations and methods, rather than to hide them behind a veil of objectivity (i.e. objectivity as a goal / objectivity-as-a-value) (see Carpentier, 2008; Carpentier & Trioen, 2010; Deuze, 2005b; Fahy, 2017; Gess, 2012; Hanitzsch, 2007; Harbers, 2016; Hiles & Hinnant, 2014; Wiesslitz & Ashuri, 2011). While those are conscious, deliberate considerations, the working conditions in alternative media also allow the reporters to bring these ideals into practice: An online, less commercial context that is not reigned by a 24-hour news cycle creates less restrictions or pressures in terms of time (e.g. to consult various sources) and space (e.g. to include the various voices) to produce articles. The unlimited and ‘fluid’ character of the internet also allows for hyperlinking. Besides, objectivity is no longer a marketing strategy, as the alternative media do not necessarily need to sell as much news as possible to survive (e.g. Atton, 2002, 2003, 2008; Bruns, 2003; Downing, 2001, 2003; Groshek & Han, 2012; Harbers, 2016; Harcup, 2003, 2014; Platon & Deuze, 2003; Silcock & Schwalbe, 2010; Takahashi et al., 2014; Wiesslitz & Ashuri, 2011). For instance:

‘Yes, people can also find that [the ideological standpoint of the alternative outlet] if they check us: who are we, what do we stand for, what is our profile, and so on. And, for someone who often comes to visit us, it is also clear that we look at things from a particular perspective. (...) We believe in the objectivity of facts but not in the neutrality of news coverage. That is a myth according to us. News coverage is never neutral. And what we definitely denounce, is the myth propagated by the big media, of them being neutral. That is not the case. I don’t claim that De Standaard or De Morgen are not entitled to their own views, but they just need to be open about them.’ [57] (Alternative generalist journalist)

As demonstrated by this quote, the alternative journalists still believe in the objectivity of facts or, at least, they make the deliberate choice to consider certain facts as most constructive and relevant. The

scientific facts concerning climate change, as presented by the IPCC (2014a, 2014b), are for instance taken as a background for all climate articles. In that regard, their view is similar to that of the mainstream journalists. However, the alternative journalists are also more inclined to substantiate facts with scientific studies which go beyond the scope of hegemonic climate science as such, for instance the detrimental rebound effects of certain types of (hegemonic) ‘climate solutions’ (e.g. Grunwald, 2016; Lohmann, 2008). Anyhow, both groups strive for ‘*correspondence*’ – through fact-checking – when it comes to *scientific findings* (see Carpentier, 2008; Harbers, 2016; Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2007). Yet, the alternative journalists are overall more open about their deliberate choices and take their ‘pro-environmental engagement’ a step further by openly denying climate sceptics all access to the debate. That is, they choose to *openly set frames* rather than to use a more careful interpretive account, which must suggest a sense of objectivity (Brüggemann, 2014):

‘I do not longer waste energy on this. I mean, I can no longer find the energy to invest in this because that debate has actually been closed, especially after Paris. (...) I think that [letting both parties have their say] is out of question in the future. It’s like the debate whether the internet was a hype or not, which still existed in early 2000 or the late nineties. Yes, I think we agree now that it is not, you know. It is a fact that is there to stay. And I think the same is true for climate change. We’re in the same phase now. Yes, it is here. Now is the time for looking at solutions.’ [58] (Citizen journalist – blogger)

Note that the respondent directly refers to the (historical) evolution from a scientific debate about climate causes (and problems) to *socio-political debates concerning solutions for climate change*, which I introduced above (see Anderson, 2008; McComas & Shanahan, 1999; Trumbo, 1996). While, as I pointed out, mainstream journalists also tend to approach the latter through objectivity strategies like balance, most alternative journalists do not refrain from taking a clear side in the ongoing debates about solutions, either. That is, their strategies with regard to ‘coherence’ are similar to their approach of ‘*correspondence*’ (Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2007): They take the side of what they consider the most constructive or ‘best’ point of view, based on their assessments of the available information (Harbers, 2016). In short, *they openly set frames*.

However, this *frame-setting* is usually *the result of (underlying) interpretive accounts* (Brüggemann, 2014). This becomes clear if we look beyond the scope of individual articles, at the interactions among various contributions in the alternative outlets or the more implicit (long-term) debates, which – according to most alternative journalists – are the background or antecedent of most articles (Groshek & Han, 2011). The latter may be reflected in individual contributions, for instance through the hyperlinks at the bottom of the website page redirecting the reader to the consulted sources. Clearly, the online character of the selected alternative outlets allows more easily for such openness about methods (i.e. sourcing). This is practically unachievable for the printed mainstream outlets in the corpus (Ahva, 2017; Bruns, 2003; Harbers, 2016; Harcup, 2014; Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2007; Wiesslitz & Ashuri, 2011). The *inclusive debate* welcomes a wide variety of views – both hegemonic, like science, politics or

mainstream NGOs, as well as non-hegemonic, like bottom-up (grassroots) movements, activists, alternative thinkers (see Atton, 2002, 2003, 2008; Deuze, 2005b; Fahy, 2017; Fuchs, 2010; Gess, 2012; Gunster, 2012; Hanitzsch, 2007; Harcup, 2003, 2014; Hiles & Hinant, 2014; Hopke, 2012). Put differently, the alternative reporters consult sources that are part of their interpretive communities but also sources that may have (strongly) diverging views (Berkowitz & TerKeurst, 1999; Brüggemann & Engesser, 2014; Dunwoody, 1980; Zelizer, 1993). This reflects the ideal of ‘pluralist objectivity’ described by Carpentier (2008) or ‘multiperspectivalism’ of Gans (1979). The inclusion of various viewpoints allows the audience to evaluate the appropriateness of certain sources and to take sides based on a well-informed choice. Yet, the (newsroom) journalists are more than passive bystanders. Through acts of gatewatching, giving more salience to certain contributions (e.g. by putting them on the homepages of their websites or in their newsletters) or argumentations or through frame-setting in their own articles, they clearly highlight particular (sub)frames (Bruns, 2003; Groshek & Han, 2012; Platon & Deuze, 2003; Silcock & Schwalbe, 2010). Also, the explicit choice of the outlets to foreground some topics as important – for instance, activism, North-South relations or injustice – already sets the scene for certain dominant (sub)frames. Summarizing, the alternative reporters do no longer sustain the (deceptive) belief in one ‘God-like’ truth. However, they do not lapse into complete relativism or solipsism, either, presenting all views as equal. Rather, they support and enact an aggregative or interactive type of truth(-seeking), with an overt moral grounding (Harbers, 2016). One of the respondents summarizes this as follows:

‘So, I think that I always try to do two things. That is, on the one hand (.), showing that there is a debate. Well, laying bare the debate or conflict and saying: What is being presented here is just one view. There are also others. Secondly, I take a clear standpoint in that debate, of course. I also feel very strongly (.) about my own point of view.’ [59] (Activist)

As I argued before, then, rather than a strategy to defend ‘a priori truths’, these informed debates are a means – for the audience and the journalists – to evaluate the value and appropriateness of various (sub)frames, and accordingly, to take the side of those which they find to be most relevant (see *objectivity as a means* (Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2007)). At least, that is the claim of the alternative journalists. Accordingly, they argue that they are also willing to question and even denounce their own convictions if necessary:

‘The first task of the journalist is to be suspicious. (...) You must always assume that certain interests are at stake, to do or to impede things and so on. You look for those, in the first place with those in power, and in the second place in your own intentions or position.’ [60] (Alternative editor in chief)

This ‘suspiciousness’ towards their own convictions may both take place at the level of ‘correspondence’ (i.e. ‘scientific facts’) as well as ‘coherence’ (i.e. interpretations regarding problems, causes, solutions). Some of the reporters argue, for instance, that they would listen to sceptics should the latter provide

good arguments and relevant interpretations which put their previously held (sub)frames in another light (see Brüggemann & Engesser, 2014).

The overall goal of this group of journalists, then, is to provide a broader *contextualization* (see Hart, 2011; Iyengar, 1990), presenting various (interacting) sources, views, problems, solutions and – as such – more fundamental structures and patterns, within and/or across articles (see e.g. Grunwald, 2016; Harcup, 2014; Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Swyngedouw, 2010):

'Climate change is about everything. It is no environmental question, but it's a global (.) question, about inequality, an economic system, our colonial past, about everything, actually. So, everything comes therein together.' [61] (Alternative generalist journalist – freelancer)

As indicated by the reporters (see quote 46), however, it is impossible to provide this broader context in each individual article, as articles need a clear focus (hence the use of hyperlinks, which redirect interested readers to other articles or sources within or outside the context of the medium (Bruns, 2003; Harcup, 2014; Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2007)). This may, at least partly, help to understand why I found Anthropocentric Subframes in articles published by reporters with cognitive Biocentric Subframes. As said, the alternative reporters generally accept scientific findings (e.g. IPCC, 2014a, 2014b) as most constructive facts ('correspondence' (Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2007)) and the background for their more critical and contextualized (biocentric) framings and analyses (see 'coherence' (Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2007)) (Harbers, 2016). Accordingly, they argue that the (scientific) *'factual' articles* – often (based on) articles of the alternative news agency – contribute to the overall (biocentric) narrative. Yet, as discussed by authors like Larson (2011), Shiva (1988, 1993) or Stibbe (2015), the (western) hegemonic scientific discourse (including the IPCC reports) largely reflects an *anthropocentric outlook* onto the (natural) world, through a focus on competition, individualism, human control or hierarchy. The word choices in the individual 'factual' articles do not denounce but rather reinforce this thinking. Accordingly, the most critical activist I interviewed said the following:

'I also think that an implicit discourse about the fundamental cause and the solution is always present, also in the reports of the IPCC. And if you don't explicitly speak out about this, (.) you may easily confirm (.) the hegemonic discourse.' [62] (Alternative – activist)

I accept that those (reporters, audiences) who have a strong cognitive Biocentric Masterframe may, indeed, be inclined to incorporate these views into their biocentric thinking, especially if they are aware of the broader contextualization provided by the 'web of articles'.⁹⁶ I argue, however, that this may not be the case for (occasional) readers who have strong cognitive Anthropocentric Subframes, living in a time-space that supports the latter rather than the former interpretations (e.g. Brüggemann, 2014; Fiske

⁹⁶ I found that the Biocentric Subframes, as realized in my corpus, contain a mixture of variables, some of which are reminiscent of the anthropocentric thinking (see Chapter 4.5.2 Hegemonic Subframes).

& Taylor, 1991; Graber, 1988; Kim, 2011; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Scheufele, B., 2006; Scheufele, D.A., 1999). That is especially so if they cherry-pick and read only one or a few (isolated) articles. As such, the ‘factual articles’ might weaken the overall message the alternative reporters try to convey. Nevertheless, audience reception research will need to further clarify this.

It is remarkable, then, that the overall awareness among alternative journalists regarding the subjectivity of verbal-visual representations does not extend to the representations of fundamental human-nature relations. Probably that is due to the fact that this thinking is strongly encapsulated in western languages, like Dutch or English (e.g. Alexander, 2007; Heuberger, 2007; Larson, 2011; Stibbe, 2015), and in most (western) generic stock or press photographs of environment which we are continually confronted with (see Hansen & Machin, 2008). More generally, however, most alternative journalists deconstruct, in one way or another, the myth of objective, neutral or factual language. For example:

‘(...) the person you call for an interview, the way you write your article, the way you choose (.) your words, all of that is opinion, really. That’s based on your reference frame. Depending on your reference frame you write things in a different way, you interpret reality in a different way. So, we don’t believe either in that idea of detachedness, that people or journalists are blank pages which take a clean object and interview it (...). Everything’s connected. What is important, then, is that you give the facts, like you see them. (.) So, if there’s a GGO potato, you say that it is a GGO potato.’
[63] (Alternative generalist journalist and coordinator)

Note that the quoted journalist points out the various levels of truth, with ‘correspondence’ (see quite generally accepted denotative meanings, like ‘this is a GGO potato’) as the ‘more factual’ background for more strongly debated and ‘subjective’ interpretations (see ‘coherence’) (Harbers, 2016; Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2007). The alternative reporters emphasize that it is crucial to be aware of the colour of your language and the choices you make. This allows you to convey exactly those messages that you want to communicate. In short, *language is never neutral*. Thus, you need to carefully choose the colour that best reflects your viewpoints. Clearly, then, frame-setting and interpretive accounts are – to a certain extent, at least – the result of more conscious processes than in the context of the mainstream media. Probably, their (largely) diverging subframes vis-à-vis the mainstream views as well as their engaged and oppositional role make the alternative journalists more aware of the boundaries of (their) subframes, heightening the need to make deliberate choices which clearly set their cause apart from the hegemonic argumentations (e.g. Druckman, 2004). For instance:

‘I’m very sensitive about language myself, so I like to play with it. Words can sometimes have a completely different meaning for one person than for another. Hence, I find it very important to convey, in one way or another, what I really mean, you know.’ [64] (Citizen journalist)

‘Yes, what I always emphasize, is this socially just transition. Yes, that is actually a word that I very consciously put (.) into my pieces, because I (.) want to see climate separate from an environmental problem.’ [65] (Alternative generalist journalist – freelancer)

A secondary goal, then, is to communicate in clear and fluent ways.

As for the visual communication, this critical awareness is far more limited, at least in daily practices constrained by routines, limitations in terms of time or money or the absence of visually literate personnel (e.g. Nurmis, 2017). Just like in the mainstream outlets, *images* are often chosen without much deliberation, based on their *denotative meanings* (see ‘correspondence’ / ‘mechanical objectivity’ (Daston & Galison, 2007; Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2007)). Their main functions are illustrating the content of the written text and providing visual proof for certain claims (Bissell, 2000; Liu, 2013; Nurmis, 2017; Seelig, 2005). For instance, an article about flooding is accompanied by a visual of a flooded area. This may, however, facilitate the (*unconscious*) *sending of particular (visual) (sub)frames*. As argued before, it is not unlikely that this affects the overall argumentations conveyed by the multimodal (sub)frames (DiFrancesco & Young, 2011; Wozniak, Lück & Wessler, 2015). Some of the interviewees claim, however, that they sometimes try to deliberately convey messages through the visuals (see Drok & Hermans, 2016; Mendelson & Creech, 2016). As such, these reporters are more involved in processes of (*visual*) *frame-setting*, or at least interpretive accounts, trying to make certain (sub)frames more visually salient. The argumentations (i.e. (sub)frame) of written articles are usually the background for visual messages. Obviously, the cognitive (sub)frames of the journalists affect the decisions they make (and the ways in which they ‘read’ or interpret texts in the first place (e.g. Kim, 2011)). Commenting on some of the photographs he selected, the photo editor of an alternative outlet provides, for instance, some argumentations which clearly reflect a rather anthropocentric outlook upon the world. He discusses, for instance, the beauty of pristine, natural scenes and the smallness of humans in such sceneries (see sublimation, human versus nature). Also, he talks about the fummy and polluting emissions of industry and the trucks on the roads and the negative consequences for him and his children (us versus them, individualization, safety / health of the in-group, metaphor / metonym of the smoke(stack)) (see 4.5.2 Hegemonic Subframes). Again, this may affect the audience interpretations of the multimodal (sub)frames, especially if the (journalist-)photo editor introduces pervasive icons of the anthropocentric worldview (see 2.3.2 Conceptualizing Multimodal Framing). As illustrated, the reporters mention denotative content, metaphorical or metonymical associations, contrasts, modality and sublimation as meaning layers they pay attention to (see Nurmis, 2017). An alternative generalist reporter argues, for example:

‘For instance, if some people act violently or (.) commit vandalism or the like during a demonstration for the climate or against GGOs, I wouldn’t focus on that image but rather on the people carrying a message. After all, that is what’s important. If there are people who do such things, well, fine. That’s not important to me.’ [66] (Alternative generalist journalist and coordinator)

Rather than international press agencies or professional western photojournalists, (citizen) photographers (from the South), NGO photographers and creative commons are more often the sources of photo material. Once again, both ideologies or newsroom policies as well as practical restraints inspire

these choices. The alternative media have, for instance, no money to pay for professional visual material. Hence, they have no choice but to depend *on images which are freely accessible or provided by their partners*. These sources may provide a different take on issues as they are more likely to draw on different cognitive (sub)frames, ideologies or life experiences (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Graber, 1988; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Pulido & Peña, 1988; Scheufele, D.A., 1999, Scheufele, B., 2006; Taylor, 2000). Besides, they may also have access to events or locations which are restricted to professional (western) journalists (Grayson, 2013). For instance, the corpus contains a number of pictures of locals in the South during or immediately after disasters. In most cases, professional western photojournalists have not arrived at that point in time (or never will), or are only able to take air photographs from a helicopter (see Borah, 2009; Borah & Bulla, 2006; Hughes, 2012; Tuchman, 1978; Wiesslitz & Ashuri, 2011). On the other hand, however, various of the alternative reporters contend that, only having access to a small pool of free images, their options are seriously limited. That is, they are often already happy if they just find *a* visual that is related to the article text. Yet, they do not have the space to make tough demands with regard to (pervasive) underlying argumentations, aesthetic qualities or (non-)stereotypical images:

'However, we often get (.) stuck in such clichés [the mother and child] and that is due to the photos we receive, not only from Flickr or creative commons but also from (.) large organizations like (.) UNHCR or the Redd Cross and so on. They provide us with photographs. Those are also (.) programmed in a way. Their views are in there. They are not journalistic (.), but we have no other choice.' [67] (Alternative photo editor)

This may force reporters to consciously *set / send (sub)frames which they do not entirely support* and/or which are – on a certain level, at least – dissonant with (some of) the devices or argumentations in the verbal text. However, as alternative reporters are often only concerned with the more denotative meanings of visuals, this frame-sending (or setting) may also happen more unconsciously. In those cases, reporters are more worried about aesthetics or stereotypical images, which may fail to convey meaning and/or make articles less engaging, than with (potential) underlying argumentations (see 6.4.2.5 Pragmatism and Autonomy). Nurmis (2017) argues, accordingly, that non-professional photographers – like citizen journalists participating in a manifestation and both writing articles as well as taking photographs – may lack the skills, experience and time to make qualitative pictures which have the potential to truly engage the audience. She argues that these non-professional photographers more often make photos which merely function as ‘tokens’ or forms of proof that they were there, while failing to convey real messages. My corpus indeed comprises a number of photographs that are clearly provided by citizen journalists. These often show the backs of people, lack faces (of individualized participants) or fail to provide dynamic and/or interesting scenes. In many cases, they just show us (large) groups of people during demonstrations (see Silcock & Schwalbe, 2010) (see Chapter 5.2).

Summarizing, more than their colleagues in mainstream media (and the alternative press agency), the reporters working for the alternative outlets attempt to introduce a broader group of (equal) perspectives

into the debate rather than excluding (or backgrounding) certain views from the outset for being ‘irrational’, ‘unscientific’ or ‘too ideological / emotional’. That is, their aim is to contribute to the *politicization* of the debate (Brulle, 2010; De Lucia, 2009; Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Mouffe, 2005; Pepermans, 2015; Pepermans & Maesele, 2014; Swyngedouw, 2005). As discussed, various constraints may cut across this endeavour in practice. Yet, the attempt as such is already important (see Groshek & Han, 2012).

Key words:

inequality, hierarchy, disrespect, competition, dualism, exclusion, individualism, unilateralism, detachment, control, efficiency, certainty, immutability

versus

equality, interaction, respect, stewardship, harmony, inclusion, mutual dependence, diversity, multilateralism / multiperspectivalism, interaction, engagement, guiding principles, openness, modesty, uncertainty, change

6.4.2.4 News Values

As pointed out before, the mainstream newsrooms are, for a large part, defined by the goal to produce, grow and compete in efficient ways (time, space, means, personnel). This goal also affects to a large extent the workings of the alternative press agency. As I argued in Chapter 3, many of the daily (mainstream) journalist practices are routines which help reporters to deal with these commercial expectations and pressures (see e.g. Davies, 2008; Dunwoody, 1992; Franklin, Lewis & Williams, 2010; Gans, 1979; Gitlin, 1980; Hamilton, 2004; Lewis, Williams & Franklin, 2008; McChesney, 2008; Shoemaker & Reese, 2014; Tuchman, 1972, 1978). News values, in particular, explain many of the decisions journalists make (see Sachsman, Simon & Valenti, 2010). Or, as one of the science journalists stresses in an email prior to the interview: ‘Every choice, by every journalist, in every department starts with *newsworthiness*’ [68] (see Bednarek & Caple, 2012; Galtung & Ruge, 1965, 1973; Gans, 1979; Harcup & O’Neill, 2001, 2017; Joye, 2010; Lang & Lang, 1953).

Indeed, the reporters mostly refer to news values as the first cues which help them to decide whether an event, issue, announcement or visual is interesting enough to get sold – to superiors, audiences or, in the case of opinion-makers, to the editorial staff. What does not reflect one or, preferably, several of these values is not even taken into consideration. Once a story is selected, the reporters highlight the newsworthiness, for instance in the title, the visual or a pull quote. Articles which are considered to be most newsworthy are usually placed in the most prominent places, like the front page or one of the first pages. They also are more often provided with a visual (see Nurmis, 2017). Mainly drawing on Galtung and Ruge (1973) and Harcup and O’Neill (2001, 2017), I identify the following news values as most salient in the discourse of the mainstream contributors and the alternative press agency reporters, including the photo editors: relevance (i.e. items concerned with issues, nations or groups relevant to

the audience), consonance (with socially-shared norms, values, attitudes, the ideological consensus, thus the broader context of the producer (and audience)), power elites (i.e. stories concerned with elite people, countries, organizations), good news or bad news (including conflict, tragedy), unambiguity (i.e. clear, straightforward stories), surprise (i.e. something unexpected), frequency (i.e. event-centeredness, focus on (elite) events which fit within the 24-hour news cycle), composition (i.e. diversity of story types, topics, visuals). Also, the reporters indicate they choose stories or visuals because they, their colleagues and/or superiors find them interesting or relevant, drawing on their expertise or personal interests (i.e. journalist or outlet agenda) (see e.g. Bissell, 2000; Joye, 2010; Nurmis, 2017):

'Like most people, we are aware of the climate problem. But it is of course [difficult to bring it], as long as nothing changes in the field, so to speak. But now, with Trump, a new momentum has developed. (.) Much depends on the current state of affairs, how you can keep a slumbering topic, that has been around for 20-30 years, interesting.' [69] (Mainstream news chief)

'What could be typical about this, is that it's a concrete, (.) fascinating fact, that triggers something, like what are the chances? This was passed on to me by the University of Ghent.' [70] (Mainstream science journalist)

'In my opinion, you need to avoid to show time and again those (.) press conference images, with these men (...) in suits behind a table discussing something. For me, that doesn't tell anything at all. (...). That's boring. But if you can show something (.) like that, a protest from Marrakech (...). There weren't so many people. But, you know, I think this gives much more information to a reader than the boring [images] of the conference.' [71] (Mainstream chief photo editor)

'That's like super evident, you know. If Leonardo [DiCaprio] meets the Pope (.), you get the image from all press agencies. (...) And then (.), in such a case, you just choose to bring that piece, which is rather short, actually, with a picture. It's simply a great, surprising combination.' [72] (Mainstream chief photo editor)

'Well, I follow this domain. So, I reckon: Well, the time has come to write another piece about this. And people in the newspaper organization will say: Okay, let's draw this to the front. It clearly shows that they want to do that as they realize that the higher echelons attach importance to it, that we still find it an important theme.' [73] (Mainstream foreign affairs journalist)

Like Boesman et al. (2017), I argue that the preoccupation of the reporters with these news values has an important impact on their frame-building choices. Concrete links among news values and particular (sub)frames can be found in the discourse of the interviewees. As referred to above, one of the science reporters argues that she tries to highlight the economic consequences of climate change (i.e. Human Wealth Subframe) as it is a new angle (see surprise, composition) and thus makes her stories easier to sell to her superiors and, presumably, the audience. That is, *'the news is in the frame'* (Boesman et al. 2017). However, it is also a way for her to deal with and to respond to the increasingly commercial context she is working in and which her audience is part of (i.e. the news company, society at large) (see relevance, newspaper agenda). Commenting on one of her news articles in which Human Wealth appears (in a pull quote) as minor subframe, she says:

'I think it's a conscious decision because it's really something that is new. It's news (.). It is not well known or it has not often been written before (...) that we are (.) evolving towards an economy that can completely decouple from it [the climate].' [74] (Mainstream science journalist)

One of the NGO representatives, who strongly focuses on Human Wealth (cognitive subframe and news subframe), argues in similar terms:

'(...) I saw this PwC [PricewaterhouseCoopers] report passing by which said: Well, climate policy creates economic growth. So I thought, let's take that as a starting point to draw the attention of those who think a bit more economically. After all, everyone finds this interesting, isn't it? Prosperity and economics are always related.' [75] (NGO staff member)

Besides, both strongly highlight the need to bring *positive news* to engage the audience. As it is generally accepted (i.e. the hegemonic view) that economic growth is desirable, and thus, positive (e.g. Dryzek, 1997; Grunwald, 2016; Hopwood, Mellor & O'Brien, 2005; Shiva, 1988; Stibbe, 2005, 2015), the Human Wealth Subframe satisfies this news value for the reporters and, presumably, their audiences (see positive news, relevance, consonance). Note that, among the Anthropocentric Subframes, the Economic Challenge Subframes have the clearest and strongest positive component: 'If we take action today, we will financially prosper tomorrow' (see 4.5.2 Hegemonic Subframes).

'We're still emitting too much and it [CO₂ level] is still rising, but it starts to decrease a little. That's interesting because that means that the economy (.) can decouple from (.) the emissions. That's positive, isn't it?' [76] (Mainstream science reporter)

While these argumentations are less manifest in the discourse of the political reporter, it is remarkable that Human Wealth is also one of his cognitive subframes and a minor subframe in his news reports. Also, he stresses the need for positive news.

While *relevance* is, by far, the most salient news value in the discourse of all reporters, it is, however, more often linked to *negative news or drama*. The foreign affairs journalist admits, for example, that one of the reasons why he prefers the term 'global warming' over 'climate change' is that the former more strongly evokes a sense of threat or danger than the latter (see Anderson et al., 2014). Further, various mainstream journalists stress different dramatic events or threats which may draw the attention of the audience: the effects on nature which is of direct interest to us (e.g. our direct environment, aesthetic landscapes or animals that appeal to us), the consequences for humans close by (e.g. ourselves, our children) or the effects on our economic interests (e.g. economic loss) (see e.g. Cottle, 2000; Höijer, 2004; Hulme, 2004; Myers et al., 2012; O'Neill et al., 2013; Remillard, 2011; Spence & Pidgeon, 2010; Whitmarsh, O'Neill & Lorenzoni, 2013; Zia & Todd, 2010).

'Well, if the giraffe appears on the red list, that seems interesting to us. It's an animal that appeals to the imagination.' [77] (Mainstream generalist journalist)

'(...) For the last ten years, it has been very strongly promoted that you should replace your combustion boiler with a gas connection. Well, if such a transition [to renewable energy] takes place, it is interesting to make this article, I think. After all, everyone is convinced that gas is being promoted and you should have that. But that's changing. (...) I'm often asked by colleagues (laughs): What should I do with my heating? (.) It lives. Heating is an important (.) part of new-housing or reconstruction projects, in terms of costs. We live in a time of transition. So, the investments you make today (...) should not be outdated in five years.' [78] (Mainstream economic journalist)

'When it's [referring to an article published in the newspaper on the day of the interview] about (.) CO₂ emissions in the city, which involves dangers for joggers due to the fine dust it brings into the city, that's also partly about climate. After all, this fine dust is linked to the climate. At the same time, it's about jogging and that's something that a lot of people do nowadays. There's your relevance.' [79] (Mainstream news chief)

The quoted generalist reporter exclusively frames the climate in terms of *Scala Naturae*, while the economic journalist – as said – highlights Human Wealth in his news reports. In the discourse of the quoted news chief of the popular outlet I found several references to Consumer Rights, while I could also identify this news subframe in the article he talks about. Thus, depending on the nature or character of dramatic events or problems, other frames may arise. Clearly, then, many of the argumentations provided by the reporters are reminiscent of those of scholars who call for frames that bring the climate issue home to the audience, resonating with their existing interests, values or fears (e.g. Lakoff, 2010; Leiserowitz, 2006, 2007; Moser & Dilling, 2007; Nisbet, 2009; Weathers, Maibach & Nisbet, 2017) (see Chapter 1).

Anyhow, based on these interactions, I draw some conclusions. As the same news value – for instance, relevance – or a combination of news values – for instance, relevance and bad news – can give rise to different (sub)frames depending on the frame-builder (i.e. the climate reporter), I contend that *news values, as such, cannot explain the presence of particular (sub)frames*. As De Vreese (2005), Boesman et al. (2017) or Vossen, Van Gorp and Schulpen (2017) argue, however, I believe that they do *pave the way for particular (sub)frames*, yet only to those (sub)frames which are already mentally available to the journalists. As argued in the literature, stories or particular aspects of events are more likely to draw the attention of a journalist if they reflect certain news values. The presence, character or content of particular news values or newsworthy information, however, depends on the journalist (or beat) (sub)frames of the reporter who 'interacts with' the information. Summarizing, what exactly is new, interesting or relevant very much depends on one's cognitive (sub)frames (see Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Graber, 1988; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Hall (1973) argues, accordingly, that the character of 'surprise', 'power elites' or 'a relevant / important event' strongly differs depending on one's worldviews, reconfirming the latter (see also Eliasoph, 1988; Harcup & O'Neill, 2001, 2017; van Dijk, 1988, 1998). Concluding, news values primarily help to reproduce, reconfirm and highlight what one already believes to be true or relevant and – in many cases – what is generally accepted (i.e. hegemonic views) in a particular context (e.g. society, newsroom) (see Lewis & Reese, 2009).

The facilitating role of news values is also clearly demonstrated by the general absence of Unequal Vulnerability in the news production of the mainstream journalists, even though several of these journalists have mental access to this subframe (i.e. it is part of their cognitive frame repertoire). Although a number of other factors (for instance beats (see *Beats* above)) undoubtedly also play a role, the lack of relevance (the subframe is concerned with geographically, culturally and psychologically distant peoples), frequency (it often highlights long-term processes and historical responsibilities), surprise (it usually draws on well-known stereotypes) or elite participants (it is mostly concerned with less dominant southern nations and ordinary citizens) (e.g. Chouliaraki, 2006; Höijer, 2004; Joye, 2009, 2010; Scott, 2014; Swain, 2003) are likely to inhibit the production of this subframe in news reports (see Chapter 5.1).

In a more general sense, I contend that the news values (as filled in by the mainstream and alternative press agency journalists) help to give shape to some of the *main characteristics of the Anthropocentric Masterframe* (and thus, the Anthropocentric Subframes). For example, decontextualization and the focus on individualized events, causes or participants may easily be linked to values like frequency, surprise or unambiguity. The overall salience of negative climate consequences is, most likely, related to the preoccupation with bad news. The focus on elites as agents (versus passive consumers) and nature as a machine or object in service of human is, no doubt, connected to news values like relevance, power elites and consonance (see 4.5.2 Hegemonic Subframes).

As argued above (6.4.2.2 Newsroom Organization), *opinion-makers* trying to get access to mainstream media are likely to adapt their stories to the expectations of (superiors in) the news organizations. Newsworthiness is certainly a selling point. The general manager of a NGO argues, for instance:

'We had even more interesting, new facts. But those would have made it heavier. So, we left those out. And there were some more nuances about the contribution of Belgium. (...) [What we write for the alternative media] is slightly less accessible than what we make for the mainstream, but it's still truly interesting for our followers and MO readers.'* [80] (NGO general manager)

The need for unambiguity, consonance or relevance may partly help to explain why I found that this respondent employed an anthropocentric outlook when promoting Environmental Justice in the mainstream media rather than the biocentric view, which is much closer to his own thinking.

With regard to *visuals*, in particular, the mainstream reporters stress the importance of values like consonance (in this case with the direct context (i.e. topic, issue, idea of the verbal text)), unambiguity (i.e. a clear visual focus) or composition (i.e. variation within/across outlets), as well as aesthetics, ethical considerations or (professional) quality (e.g. Bissell, 2000; de Smaele, Geenen & De Cock, 2017; Fahmy, 2005; Grayson, 2013; Hanusch, 2013; Léon & Erviti, 2015; Mendelson, 2005; Nilsson & Wadbring, 2015; Nurmis, 2017; Scoggin McEntee, 2016; Seelig, 2005; Smith & Joffe, 2009). Although

these values seem less directly linked to frame-building, they can in some cases *facilitate* the choice for or foregrounding of *particular types of (sub)frames over others*. For example, the need to select photographs with a professional quality may prevent the visuals of non-professional citizen photojournalists to enter the news, while those are able to reflect, or at least reinforce, a different way of looking at the world (see Fahmy, 2005; Grayson, 2013; Nilsson & Wadbring, 2015; Nurmis, 2017). Some of the reporters point out that pictures are only provided with verbal articles which are considered as important. That is, photo editors or lay-outers (can) (consciously) heighten the salience of certain types of argumentation (see Bissell, 2000; Nurmis, 2017).

Summarizing, then, while most mainstream journalists have some room to set (sub)frames, this freedom is considerably limited by the need to weigh off each decision to the news values. Again, the less autonomy one has – that is, the more one is compelled to sell his/her articles – the more the need for newsworthiness is likely to *restrict* this *freedom* (see 6.4.2.2 Newsroom Organization).

Most alternative reporters are not, or to a much lesser extent, concerned with news values. Alternative journalists who produce Biocentric Subframes tend to be *more preoccupied with sharing important messages than with newsworthiness*. One of the alternative generalist reporters and the alternative photo editor do, however, emphasize the need for newsworthiness. Both hold on to Anthropocentric Subframes. As argued above (see 3.1.2 Alternative Media), the critical assessment, renegotiation and/or rejection of news values is usually part of the policy of (progressive) alternative media (Deuze, 2005b; Eliasoph, 1988). The contexts in which the alternative reporters work also allow for, or even facilitate, such deliberate choices. The non-commercial character (i.e. a revenue model largely based on subsidies or donations) and more horizontal organization of the alternative outlets largely lifts the need for reporters to sell their stories to audiences or other gatekeepers and to work in highly efficient, routine ways. Also, the unlimited character of the online space and the periodicity (i.e. no 24-hour news cycles, less deadline stress) allow for more freedom and conscious deliberations (e.g. Atton, 2002, 2003, 2008; Bruns, 2003; Downing, 2001, 2003; Gunster, 2012; Hanitzsch, 2007; Harbers, 2016; Harcup, 2003, 2014; Platon & Deuze, 2003; Silcock & Schwalbe, 2010; Wiesslitz & Ashuri, 2011). Alternative reporters want to get across messages that they find important and make sure they are heard. Hence, they do try to make them sufficiently *evocative*. However, this makes newsworthiness a means rather than a major goal as such (e.g. Deuze, 2005b; Eliasoph, 1988; Hanitzsch, 2007). Put differently, it is mainly a (secondary) ‘accentuation strategy’ (discursively constructed element) (Bednarek & Caple, 2012; Galtung & Ruge, 1965, 1973).

‘Yes, I do try to make it more interesting, but (sighs) I don’t hunt for click baits or so. No, no, no. I mean (.), I certainly will write in a challenging way, but it won’t happen that people go to the article and at the end [think: Was it only this, then]? I’ll write in a challenging way for people who read it, not for people to read it.’ [81] (Citizen journalist – blogger)

'Yes, I mean, you always write for the readers. That's my argument. Those alternative media which deny that, lie or are doing a bad job because you don't write for yourself. You don't write because your small inner circle finds it important. You write to get information across to a wide audience. So, you also have to engage those people. That doesn't mean that you don't make the stuff which you think about: Now, well, no one's going to read that. Well, sometimes you just know it's going to be a vain attempt in terms of reach and impact. But as a medium you must keep making that choice to bring it. Obviously, you always try to bring it in such a way so that it may reach people, so that you don't get stuck in your own intentions.' [82] (Alternative editor in chief)

Of course, the need to engage the audience is more pressing for some journalists than for others, depending on the contexts in which they work. For instance, the alternative newsrooms are expected to meet certain targets in terms of production and reach in order to get funding (see Atton, 2002, 2003, 2005; Hamilton, 2000; Nee, 2014; Waltz, 2005). Hence, the core group of newsroom journalists are generally more concerned with newsworthiness than, for instance, citizen journalists who work outside, or at the margin, of the alternative newsrooms.

A number of (verbal-visual) news values are identified by the alternative reporters: Relevance, unambiguity, composition, surprise, frequency. These seem to be highly similar to the values highlighted by the mainstream reporters. However, the journalists approach and *operationalize them in different ways*, at least to a certain extent. Much depends on the cognitive frames of each individual journalist. Contrary to the mainstream reporters, most alternative journalists do not connect 'relevance' and 'good news' to Human Wealth. Rather, these values are related to the positive, constructive messages people really need and, accordingly, to a Biocentric Subframe like Citizen Rights, which highlights the 'good life' awaiting us if we take action:

'I strongly agree with the things that Rob Hopkins of the transition movement writes about this: He has very strongly experienced that it's no use to show the thirteenth apocalyptic film. I mean: That's concrete and very factual and that's what is about. But it fails to engage people. (...) Thus, it is really this: We must make a story of hope and renewal. That's what Rob Hopkins has made clear: Alright, it is bad, but we can all act together (...).' [83] (Alternative generalist journalist – freelancer)

Composition and surprise must, just like in the mainstream media, keep the topic 'fresh' and engaging for the audience. Yet, diversity is taken a few steps further here, to enclose not only the views the audience wants or expects but also the (biocentric) insights which are hardly ever discussed but which the alternative reporters deem highly important. The interviewed activist exemplifies this, for instance, commenting on an article that highlights the mutual interactions between terrorism and climate change (Civil Rights Subframe):

'Well, should the title, resistance against climate summit is needed now more than (.) ever, would have been combined with (.) another image, of a Syrian terrorist (.), you would think: Well, have you ever, that might be interesting. The contrast, already, with what you initially (.) would think. You read climate, you see an image you can't immediately connect with it and you think: Well, I want to read that.' [84] (Activist)

Frequency means, also in this context, taking clearly demarcated events as starting points. Apart from hegemonic events, however, the alternative reporters often focus on non-hegemonic, bottom-up events. Discussing an article in which I detected a salient Unequal Attribution Subframe, an alternative generalist journalist argues, for instance:

'I just wanted to show another side that is indeed (.) present there. There's an alternative COP going on at the same moment (.) and that remained out of the picture. So, that's my message: Showing that it's not as if everyone is gathered unanimously around the table. There really is a very important discussion, as for (.) whose interests are at stake here.' [85] (Alternative generalist journalist – freelancer)

The need for *clarity and unambiguity* is no reason to dismiss multi-layered stories from the start or to turn a blind eye on the complexity of reality. Rather, it is a guiding principle in the production process that reminds reporters to keep individual messages readable and, thus, sufficiently engaging. For instance:

'There's a lot to say and I've simply picked this out (.) so that it remains compact and not (.) so extensive that it would prevent you from seeing the wood for the trees.' [86] (Citizen journalist)

As argued above, however, most alternative reporters stress that they try, at least, to refer to the broader context in each article (e.g. through short references, hyperlinks). Mutually interacting, the various articles on the alternative news platforms may also provide (a glimpse of) the bigger picture.

Clearly, then, underlying (the operationalization of) each of these news values is the same, primary goal: providing *contextualization* and other views than the ones mainstream media continuously present the audience with. In the process, the latter are (implicitly) questioned and deconstructed (e.g. Atton, 2002, 2003, 2008; Brulle, 2010; Fuchs, 2010; Gess, 2012; Gunster, 2012; Hamilton, 2000; Harcup, 2003, 2014; Le Masurier, 2015; Wiesslitz & Ashuri, 2011). I argue, accordingly, that 'contextualization' could be identified as a supplementary, overarching news value in alternative media. As I discussed earlier, contextualization is one of the defining characteristics of the Biocentric Masterframe (see 4.5.3 Counter-Hegemonic Subframes). Nevertheless, that does not mean that there is a direct link among this news value and biocentric framing. That is, contextualization may, as shown, facilitate counter-hegemonic news subframes, but does not necessarily do so. After all, how one defines 'a broader context', depends on his/her cognitive (sub)frames. For instance, the freelance science / environmental journalist of the alternative press agency strongly emphasizes the need to provide contextualization. However, holding Anthropocentric cognitive Subframes, he also reproduces Anthropocentric news Subframes. Of course, other factors may also intervene:

'I always talk about connecting dots. (.) Everything is kind of interconnected. So, it's kind of like looking at the interconnections, of figuring out how things are all connected up. And sometimes, you know, it works out to be really good. You know, those connections (.) seem to be fine, are not causing any problems. But other times (.) (...) a

*good concept to reduce pollution levels may be causing all kinds of other problems.*⁹⁷
(Alternative science / environmental journalist – alternative press agency)

That it is, indeed, the *message* (and thus, (sub)frame) that primarily guides particular salience enhancing strategies and not the other way around, is also illustrated by more general references alternative reporters make to the rhetorical verbal-visual strategies they use (as means) to make their argumentations (the goal) more evocative or salient:

'Anyway, I try to (.) tell a narrative so that (.) people might see something as an inspiration or a (.) new thought about the topic, they haven't had before. And also, to make sure it remains (.) nice to (.) read and (.) interesting. (...) I'm very sensitive to language myself, so I quite like to play around with it a little.' [87] (Citizen journalist)

'(...) [A] photo is, in the end, an argument (.) in the story (.), which is substantial. And that, content, is what we attach so much importance to. The visual becomes part of the argument. (.) An exercise we often have to make here is engaging people for a topic no one is interested in. (...) People are no longer willing to make an effort to think about things differently (...). So, I consider the photo as one of the means to (.) unsettle them, or at least, perhaps, to encourage them to take a moment to (.) look at this reality in a different way, from a visual starting point.' [88] (Alternative photo editor)

The alternative journalists also highlight a number of other characteristics which *visuals*, in particular, should reflect: news values like consonance, unambiguity and composition, aesthetics, ethical considerations or (professional) quality (Bissell, 2000; de Smaele, Geenen & De Cock, 2017; Nurmis, 2017; Scoggin McEntee, 2016; Seelig, 2005). These are also referred to in comparable terms by the mainstream reporters and, thus, seem to be quite *typical for photo editing* in general (see above). However, as in the mainstream context, these values are here also likely to open the gates for certain types of visuals – and thus argumentations – while closing them for others, depending on particular views, cognitive (sub)frames and contexts.

Summarizing, *newsworthiness* plays a *secondary role* in the practices of alternative journalists. Even so, I illustrated that their operationalizations confirm that the same news values can have very different implications or meanings depending on the cognitive subframes of communicators (see Eliasoph, 1988; Hall, 1973; Harcup & O'Neill, 2001, 2017). While I concluded above that news values (as goals) and the Anthropocentric Masterframe are mutually constitutive in the mainstream context, I summarize here that the 'alternative' approach of news values (as means) tend to coincide with Biocentric journalist and news Subframes (see above). Surely, it is no surprise that contextualization, (surprising) alternative perspectives or 'positive' constructive approaches are pivotal news values for alternative journalists and defining characteristics of the Biocentric Masterframe they tend to reproduce. The lack of 'newsworthiness pressures', in particular, allows for different kinds of framings. As I argued before, being freed from (top-down) pressures to comply to certain (commercial) interests and expectations,

⁹⁷ No translation is provided below as this quote was originally in English.

contributors – including the opinion-makers who try to get their messages in the media – have more freedom of movement in the process of frame-production (i.e. frame-setting).

Key words:

competition, efficiency, consumerism, gain, audience appeal, decontextualization, quantity

versus

information, contribution, public understanding, responsibility, engagement, contextualization, quality

6.4.2.5 Pragmatism and Autonomy

Pragmatism is an important ‘routine’ that guides many of the decisions and practices of journalists, allowing them to deal with limitations in terms of time, space, (re)sources, staff or autonomy and, thus, requirements in terms of quantity and efficiency (e.g. Gans, 1979; Joye, 2010; Shoemaker & Reese, 2014; Vossen, Van Gorp & Schulpen, 2017). Both *mainstream as well as alternative* communicators struggle – to some extent – with these pressures (see Atton, 2002; De Keyser, 2012; Franklin, Lewis & Williams, 2010; Hamilton, 2000, 2004; Lewis, Williams & Franklin, 2008; McChesney, 2008; Nee, 2014; Waltz, 2005). Hence, pragmatism has been a recurring (underlying) explanation that I have brought up throughout the previous sections. I have, for instance, elaborated on ‘visual pragmatism’: *Mainstream and alternative photo editing* is – more than a deliberate (framing) process – often a pragmatic undertaking, a search for accessible, affordable (or even free), diverse and – preferably – aesthetic and concrete climate visualizations, which also fit in the overall rhythm of the outlet (e.g. Bissell, 2000; de Smaele, Geenen & De Cock, 2017; León & Erviti, 2015; Nurmis, 2017; Scoggin McEntee, 2016; Seelig, 2005). For example:

‘I just try to provide an added value in some parts of the newspaper, or at least (...) the highest possible quality. But, well, if I don’t watch out when dealing with climate, I would have spent 1.500 euros at the end of the month (...), and, well, I simply just can’t afford that.’ [89] (Mainstream chief photo editor)

‘Yes, you know, we’ve got certain limitations as for photo materials. We’re a (...) journalistic (.) medium (.) which discusses current affairs and so, and brings news. But we don’t have large budgets when it comes to the purchase of photos (.) that are newsworthy. (.) So, that means we need to develop strategies to work around that.’ [90] (Alternative photo editor)

In the remainder of this section I will discuss a more general issue which journalists, working in a partly or largely commercial context, need to deal with: a *breach of journalistic (i.e. newsroom) autonomy due to commercial interests and/or relations of the news organization* (see ‘nomos’ versus ‘heteronomy’ (Bourdieu, 2005; Marchetti, 2005)). According to De Keyser (2012), a relatively large group of Flemish journalists working in print media are concerned about the infringement of their autonomy by external commercial interest-groups and, in particular, by the commercial departments. I asked the mainstream

journalists in my study specifically about their views regarding the (non- or counter-environmental) commercial messages (i.e. advertisements) that appear side-by-side with their climate articles (see Eide, 2012). After all, the interests of the management and commercial department (and commercial partners, accordingly) are often not consistent with, or even oppose, the interests of the editorial staff, which does – as pointed out above (6.4.2.1 Personality Traits, Backgrounds and Professional Roles) – attach importance to climate change awareness and action (see Breed, 1955; Cox, 2010; Gans, 1979; Hamilton, 2004; McChesney, 2008; Nissani, 1999; Sachsman, Simon & Valenti, 2010; Shoemaker & Reese, 2014). The interviewees stress, however, that they do not feel as if their autonomy is infringed: There is ‘a thick wall’ between the newsroom and the commercial department. Autonomy is taken as a matter of course. Several reporters emphasize that they are not informed beforehand about the advertisements which will be printed next to or near their articles. Hence, they argue, there is *no direct influence*, whatsoever, from commercial partners or non-journalist departments to (not) publish certain views, except, perhaps for the general requirement to produce – as efficiently and quickly as possible – newsworthy articles (e.g. De Keyser, 2012; Deuze, 2005b; Franklin, Lewis & Williams, 2010; Gans, 1979; Hamilton, 2004; Hanitzsch, 2007, 2011; McChesney, 2008; Shoemaker & Reese, 2014). Even so, the responses of the interviewees do also implicitly confirm the influence of more (indirect) processes like *socialization and hegemony* (e.g. Gramsci, 1980; Breed, 1955). Some journalists contend, for instance, that they are not even aware of (i.e. they skip) the ads when reading their own newspaper, suggesting that the audience would not be either. This may remind us of a statement by Lester (1995) who argues that we may fail to recognize often repeated visual stereotypes as they become so naturalized and familiar (see de Smaele, Geenen & De Cock, 2017). Yet, every appearance may confirm a particular (unconscious) view (see Rose, 2001). In any case, the (sub)frames underlying the commercial messages partly (and implicitly) provide the immediate context in which the audience (including the journalists) interpret the climate change news (sub)frames, and in which most (early-career) journalists are socialized (see 6.4.2.1 Personality Traits, Backgrounds and Professional Roles; 6.4.2.2 Newsroom Organization). It is not unlikely that the commercial and editorial messages (intertextually) interact and influence the overall messages which are taken away (see Giles & Shaw, 2009; Mendelson, 2005; Richardson, 2007; Van Gorp, 2006; Verschueren, 2011; Zelizer, 2004). It is interesting, then, that more than one reporter insists that advertisements which encourage the audience to drive luxury cars or to make airplane trips to distant exotic locations (i.e. to be an active customer in the commercial system) are not contradicting the views in the climate articles. The quotes below suggest, at least, that this worldview is common sense (i.e. hegemonic), and does not require (or ‘tolerate’) questioning (see Lewis & Reese, 2009):

‘If Volvo or Mercedes buys a whole page, well, yes, that’s car advertising. (...) We would not even question that. (...) When it comes to that, we shouldn’t act silly.’ [91]
(Mainstream foreign affairs journalist)

‘Well, if it’s cars (...). No, no, no, I don’t think [they would contradict the messages in my articles].’ [92] (Mainstream political journalist)

Yet, briefly before, the first reporter argues that advertising for nuclear power (i.e. the idea of unlimited (economic) growth and human control) would be rejected by the newsroom:

'(...) [W]ell, the forum that promotes nuclear power in Belgium had bought a page (...). And that was very similar to editorial content. Well, quite some questions have been raised then: is this really acceptable? (...) But, you know, if it really would go too far, I think we would be able to say: No, we can't do this. This doesn't fit. Even if it would raise 5.000 euros (...). If it's too similar to editorial content, we would object.' [93]
(Mainstream foreign affairs journalist)

However, as stressed in the last sentence of quote (93), objections are often partly or fully practical in nature. That is, layout or placement of ads in the outlet are questioned, rather than their content (see de Smaele, Geenen & De Cock, 2017). For instance, certain ads are considered as acceptable as long as they are not published directly next to climate articles (e.g. on the same or the opposite page). Anyhow, the quotes above also seem to confirm what I have argued earlier. The mainstream reporters accept and do not even consider it appropriate to question that they are part of media organizations that reproduce advertisements that promote non-ecological lifestyles. That is, as long as the underlying (sub)frames are *reconcilable with their (socialized) journalist (sub)frames* (and, by extension, the newsroom (sub)frames and hegemonic (sub)frames in society) they do not feel as if their autonomy is under threat. Consumerism, as such, is not denounced in the context of the Reform Anthropocentric Masterframe, as long as it happens in more sustainable, efficient and green ways (see 4.5.3 Counter-Hegemonic Subframes). In other words, if journalists criticize the idea of (unlimited) consumerism they do so from within the framework of consumerism and capitalism itself (i.e. anthropocentrism), reconfirming the latter. One could argue, then, that the sustainability messages of their news (sub)frames may partly help to nuance and contextualize the (purely) commercial argumentations, making both 'compatible'. However, the mainstream interviewees have deep reservations about views which *contradict their own (socialized) thinking* (and thus the hegemonic view). Apparently, they do experience those as a threat for their professional autonomy. In this case, the interviewee refers to Rights of the Free Market or Inscrutable are the Ways of Nature (Status Quo Anthropocentric Masterframe), but, as shown before (6.4.2.3 'Good Journalism'), also Biocentric Subframes are rejected. As said, the former are primarily denounced for not accepting the 'facts of climate change' (correspondence), while the latter mainly provide interpretations and contextualizations (coherence) (Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2007) that diverge from the hegemonic perspective (and, accordingly, the perspective of the mainstream journalists). Thus, the journalists only seem to feel a need to protect their autonomy against the interest-group (sub)frames of commercial partners if the latter are not generally accepted (anymore) in the capitalist-liberalist society. Deuze (2005b) argues, accordingly, that a preoccupation with the autonomy ideal mostly exempts reporters from the obligation to interact with interest-groups which may introduce non-hegemonic perspectives into the debate: "[a] valued detachment of society (...) may result in disconnections with certain publics and oversimplified representations of social complexity" (p.454).

Clearly, the journalists take autonomy ('as-an-ideal' or 'goal') for granted as a fundament of their journalistic identity (Deuze, 2005b). The pragmatism they show in their daily practice ('autonomy-as-a-practice') – rationalizing the actual infringement of their full autonomy away – seems to be a largely unconscious strategy (see the discussion of Carpentier and Trioen (2010) regarding objectivity). That is not surprising. After all, socialization and hegemony are also unconscious and subtle processes. The anthropocentric colour of hegemonic (sub)frames, commercial interest-group (sub)frames, newsroom (sub)frames, journalist (sub)frames and news (sub)frames is considered as common sense. Besides, more general (indirect) commercial pressures – like time or financial restraints – do not allow journalists much time to deliberately assess the ideological colour of their source materials in the first place. As pointed out before, reporters often rely on external input to deal with these constraints (De Keyser, 2012; Franklin, Lewis & Williams, 2010; Hamilton, 2004; Hanitzsch, 2007, 2011; McChesney, 2008). However, if external input contradicts this common sense (i.e. what the journalists believe to be true and rational) (see Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Graber, 1988; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), journalists do become more aware about the infringements of their autonomy, it seems. Accordingly, their response – defence, pragmatic acceptance or coping – is, most likely, also more conscious. The following quote illustrates that the journalists – in their daily practice – may also accept (i.e. not always stand up against) contradictions between their editorial content and the commercial content, even if they are well aware of them:

'It doesn't bother me really. (.). It's not as if we have really extreme commercials, either (.). And well, if that's the case, then so be it (.).' [94] (Mainstream science journalist)

Only one of the interviewees admits that she often feels more direct pressures from the management to not publish climate articles which are of no interest to them. She points out that her superiors are only truly supportive (or are even a requesting party) of climate reporting if it is commercially interesting (see 6.4.2.2 Newsroom Organization; 6.4.2.4 News Values). Apparently, her pragmatic response to these direct commercial influences is also a rather conscious coping strategy. That is, she considers the contradiction that she feels among her commercial working conditions and the pro-environmental messages which she produces as a *source of inspiration*. More specifically, she tends to produce Human Wealth as a minor news subframe:

'I mean, we're constantly dealing with this contradiction. But I believe, honestly, that the reader (.). can see through it: Well, yes, everyone, all of us, this journalist, this newspaper, we too, all of us really, constantly have this contradiction. And that's interesting. I think, you could ignore it or wash it away, but, in the end, that's reality. And it's interesting to see that and to try, once in a while, to pose the question: Is this really still a contradiction? Maybe it's no longer the case? I think that's more interesting to invest in than (.). the constant fear like, no, no, no, that can't be there. We aren't Greenpeace, you know.' [95] (Mainstream science journalist)

That is, it seems that this reporter adapts – at least partly – her framing strategies to the context which she works in, incorporating the rationale of the latter in her thinking (see Zehr, 2009). As such, this last

example, in particular, demonstrates most clearly that there certainly is no impenetrable ‘wall’ between commercial interests and editorial work. Summarizing, then, mainstream reporters do not (have the room to) question the commercial, capitalist ‘reality’ but they – consciously or, often, unconsciously – deal with it. As said, they hold on to ‘autonomy-as-an-ideal’. However, as this is unachievable in practice, they use a number of – unconscious or conscious – (pragmatic) strategies, attempting to close the gap between the real and the ideal (‘autonomy-as-a-practice’) (Carpentier & Trioen, 2010; Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2007). They do their utmost to preserve this ideal, even if they are aware that they never will be fully autonomous. Rephrasing this based on Bourdieu (2005) and Marchetti (2005), one could state that they ‘mentally deflate’ the relatively high level of heteronomy (i.e. commercial interests reign) by holding on to the ideal of professional autonomy (i.e. journalistic symbolic capital dominates over commercial interests). In the process, however, they (unconsciously / implicitly) help to reconfirm the (commercial) hegemonic worldview, towards the audience and themselves. Deuze (2005b) summarizes, accordingly, that autonomy is one of the ideological norms which journalism uses to protect itself against criticism (see Tuchman, 1972).

The alternative reporters, however, strongly oppose and deconstruct this kind of pragmatism and rationalization (see Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2007), and thus the acceptance of journalists of a rather passive role for themselves and their audiences. Put differently, working and thinking ‘within the commercial box’, mainstream journalists are said to fail to sufficiently acknowledge that they are, in the end, not fully independent or autonomous in their thinking or acting:

‘It makes initiatives like De Correspondent or Media Par or Apache (.) so interesting. You move into (.) extra-commercial areas, journalism that is situated outside commercial spaces. I think that’s important. And I think that we, as people, underestimate what the impact is of being permanently in commercial spaces. After all, everything is commercial. You know, I think that we really underestimate the impact on us (.), on our being, on our thinking (...). Journalism is a product and it shouldn’t be a product.’ [96] (Alternative generalist journalist – freelancer)

Note that this argumentation is, in particular, reminiscent of the ideas underlying the Biocentric Civil Rights Subframe (see 4.5.3 Counter-Hegemonic Subframes), which claims that people have been blinded by capitalist-liberalist top-down pressures. Clearly, (mainstream) journalists are not different from any other (wo)man in the street. However, it is argued, being aware of ‘the narrowing and blinding character of the all-encompassing commercial space’, alternative (citizen) journalists try to free themselves, and the audience with them. Interacting with the latter, they attempt to construct non-commercial public spheres (Baysha, 2014; Fuchs, 2010; Habermas & Burger, 1989; Lewis, 2007). That is, journalism is no longer a product but a shared common; journalists are no controlled producers in a hierarchical system but autonomous citizens who think for themselves. As Deuze (2005b) puts it, autonomy can only exist in collaboration; individual autonomy is problematic. This freedom allows all contributors to consider and (re)produce, in interaction, different kinds of (sub)frames that no longer

represent the audience as passive consumers or exclusively look for climate answers within the field of production and consumption. In other words, *autonomy* is not just an ideal, or a pragmatic strategy to uphold this ideal (goal), but a *means*, a precondition for truly and actively taking part in society (Atton, 2002, 2003, 2008; Deuze, 2005b; Downing, 2001, 2003; Fuchs, 2010; Harbers, 2016; Harcup, 2003, 2014; Le Masurier, 2015; Lewis, 2007). That is, professional autonomy ('nomos'; what professionals feel to be the best possible strategies to conduct journalism) must prevail over heteronomy (Bourdieu, 2005; Marchetti, 2005). One of the recurring arguments among various of the alternative reporters is, for instance, that they have, or do take, the time and space to make deliberately structured, well-researched and broadly informed articles. This allows them, for instance, to read more deeply into the literature, explore views which they are unfamiliar with or get in touch with a variety of sources. That is, they use time and space in function of the messages they want to convey (Harbers, 2016; Le Masurier, 2015) rather than to allow their articles to be shaped by the limited time or space they are granted (e.g. De Keyser, 2012; Franklin, Lewis & Williams, 2010). The fact that the alternative media mainly survive thanks to funding or subsidies from government, partners and individuals – rather than commercial revenues – is definitely an important factor. As argued above (see 3.1.2 Alternative Media), however, these (like-minded) partners – rather than commercial or political players – also have an important influence on the (sub)frames that are produced. The alternative reporters are engaged and want to contribute to society from a certain background. Yet, one may argue, that is not problematic as long as they are *open and transparent about – inevitable – influences* of and interactions with particular movements and allow the audience to critically assess them (see Deuze, 2005b; Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2007; Harbers, 2016) (see 6.4.2.3 'Good Journalism'). In the end, autonomy is always relative. Accordingly, I argue, the fact that mainstream media also think and write within the boundaries of a particular societal consensus must not necessarily be a problem either, as long as they are more open about it. However, some of the alternative reporters also contend that the methods they use for independent truth verification prevent their engagement or biases from undermining their accurate and reliable reporting (see 6.4.2.3 'Good Journalism') (Harbers, 2016). The editor in chief of one of the alternative outlets, which openly positions itself in the 'green-left' side of the spectrum, argues for instance:

'We often end up in the green-leftist side of the spectrum if we draw conclusions or in the overall tendency of the articles. But that is not because we, so to speak, want this but because we end up there (.) based on the research. Of course, the position you take does play a role. And I find that you must not deny this, but that it's your damn duty to question yourself.' [97] (Alternative editor in chief)

Apart from the revenue model, I have also mentioned the unlimited and fluid character of online media, their periodicity or the more open and horizontal organization of the small newsrooms as important factors which allow the (progressive) alternative media more freedom to add nuance and contextualization to the climate debate, and to produce various types of (sub)frames (e.g. Atton, 2002,

2003, 2008; Baysha, 2014; Downing, 2001, 2003; Fuchs, 2010; Gunster, 2012; Hamilton, 2000; Harbers, 2016; Harcup, 2003, 2014; Lewis, 2007; Takahashi et al., 2014; Wiesslitz & Ashuri, 2011).

Surely, however, the alternative reporters cannot fully escape commercial pressures or interests as they are, in the end, also acting in a global market place. For instance, I have already (see mainly 6.4.2.2 Newsroom Organization) referred to the stronger (top-down) pressures felt by the contributors who work for the alternative press agency. Also, the newsrooms of the selected alternative media receive government subsidies, which may come with certain expectations regarding reach and production (i.e. quantity, efficiency). Accordingly, they may also use *some pragmatic strategies* to deal with these pressures. For instance, in order to meet their quotas, the newsroom reporters, in particular, are forced to budget the time they can spend to conduct research, consult sources, write articles and/or provide them with visuals. The contributors who have most freedom to move around in a ‘non-commercial (mental) haven’ (or alternative public sphere) (Baysha, 2014; Fuchs, 2010; Habermas & Burger, 1989; Lewis, 2007) then, are the citizen journalists, activists or other opinion-makers, who provide a considerable share of the articles produced in the alternative context. However, those are also the contributors who generally have only limited resources (e.g. they are not paid for their work).

Key words:

efficiency, quantity, acceptance, rationalization, dependence, passivity

versus

commitment, quality, engagement, criticism, suspicion, independence, openness about dependence, activity

6.5 Conclusions

This study is one of the first to analyse journalist (sub)frames and link them directly to the news (sub)frames in the articles of the reporters, and the first to do this in the context of climate change coverage. As such, it has built on existing research regarding frame-building and has extended it. My multi-method approach allowed me to show parallels among cognitive journalist (sub)frames and news (sub)frames. However, I have also demonstrated the influence in the frame-building process, across outlets, of various other factors which have previously been identified in the literature: the backgrounds and roles of individual journalists, newsroom organization, interactions and beats, extra-media influences and frame-sponsors, news values and pragmatic considerations. These may directly (mutually) interact with the cognitive (sub)frames of the journalists and/or may intervene in the frame-building process.

My findings largely confirm the results of previous studies, but nuance the conclusions of Vossen, Van Gorp and Schulpen (2017). As pointed out before, the authors found that journalist frames have only limited predictive value for the usage of news frames. They argued, however, that sources and news

values are important influences. Colleagues are not. Based on the comparison of mainstream and alternative media, however, I argue that journalist (sub)frames do have an important impact in frame-building processes (see Dunwoody, 1992; Engesser and Brüggemann, 2016; Scheufele, B., 2006). I found that the mainstream and alternative reporters employ similar methods (Deuze, 2005b): If they do not set frames, they often use interpretive accounts (Brüggemann, 2014). Both groups adopt interventionist journalist roles (Hanitzsch, 2007, 2011) and refer to similar news values. Also, I found experts among both groups of reporters. Nevertheless, their resulting news subframes often differ. The journalist (sub)frames can, at least partly, explain these differences. That is, even if journalist (sub)frames may have no direct impact on the news (sub)frames, they definitely affect the nature or outcome of other influences. Furthermore, I found that beats – and thus, small interpretive communities of journalists and sources (Berkowitz & TerKeurst, 1999; Brüggemann & Engesser, 2014; Dunwoody, 1980; Voakes, 1998; Zelizer, 1993) – and superior gatekeepers have a major impact, particularly in the mainstream context. While my study differs from the research of Vossen, Van Gorp and Schulpen (2017) in research design and the operationalization of frames, I contend that the difference among the selected news topics – global poverty versus climate change – may largely explain the differing findings. Contrary to global poverty – which was described by the respondents in the study of Vossen, Van Gorp and Schulpen (2017) as a vague, diffuse and abstract concept – I found that climate change has evolved into a more concrete topic in newsrooms, which is subject of lively debates and strategies. Poverty generally lacks such conscious newsroom debates. Also, many newsrooms have a few climate specialists, who have gained extensive experience and have, for instance, attended climate summits or conferences. As Brüggemann and Engesser (2014, 2016) point out, this autonomy allows climate journalists to strongly affect the frame-building process (see De Keyser, 2012; Sachsman, Simon & Valenti, 2010). While some reporters in the newsroom may be occasionally or frequently concerned with ‘poverty topics’, poverty is less of a (clearly delineated) specialism. Summarizing, frame-building may well have a different – for instance, more or less conscious – character depending on the topic which is covered. Accordingly, I argue that future frame-building studies should attend to other types of issues as this may shed more light on the generalizability of previous conclusions (like those provided in this study), which are often drawn in the context of climate change framing.

This study also adds some interesting insights with regard to frame-building in alternative media and the contrast among mainstream and alternative contexts. The studied mainstream newsrooms produce exclusively Anthropocentric journalist and news Subframes and accordingly monocultural newsroom (sub)frames. The reporters use various strategies to survive within the mainstream news machine. Yet, the latter also restrict their freedom. The mainstream journalists tend to reproduce (set / send) (sub)frames which, they feel, are consonant with – a rather narrow set of – newsroom (sub)frames (i.e. strongly defined by superiors), beats and/or the broader capitalist-liberalist system they work in. Besides, their journalist (sub)frames are likely to be the result of socialization in the first place. They reproduce

and reconfirm the hierarchy in society (i.e. the values underlying anthropocentrism), positioning themselves as educators and supervisors which must bestow their audience with ‘the most rational views and guidelines’. Mainstream news values (as goals) and journalist (sub)frames are mutually constitutive and also tend to reinforce the dominant (anthropocentric) perspectives. Lacking mental access to alternative (sub)frames and feeling the pressure to appear neutral (‘objectivity as a goal’), the journalists approach their (socialized) cognitive (sub)frames as factual, balancing counter-views against them. Even so, they insist on the ideal of journalistic autonomy (as a goal), which helps them to rationalize their role of ‘a little gear, a sprocket-wheel, in the machinery’. Summarizing, both the framing strategies of mainstream journalists as well as their approach towards (i.e. rationalization of) their practices are likely to contribute to the depoliticization of debates regarding climate change in general and (climate) reporting in particular (Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Mouffe, 2005; Pepermans, 2015; Pepermans & Maesele, 2014; Swyngedouw, 2010).

The (progressive) alternative newsrooms are characterized by a diversity of newsroom (sub)frames, and thus journalist and news (sub)frames. In the ‘controlled organism’ news strategies are means rather than goals. In the absence of one, hierarchically defined newsroom (master)frame (or beat (sub)frames), each journalist feels free to stick to his/her journalist (sub)frames, even if these are not consonant with those of their co-workers. They draw more often on personal experiences in NGOs or grassroots projects, values and reasoning, rather than socialization. This may (partly) explain the largely biocentric colour of their (sub)frames. Having access to a broader range of (sub)frames (e.g. by allowing various voices – (citizen) journalists, opinion-makers, sources – to enter the debate), they do not refrain from questioning their own perspectives: the results of these interactions are foregrounded as most constructive facts (interpretive account). Similarly, acting as moral witnesses or stewards towards the audience, they consciously adopt values of modesty, equality and mutual dependence. Their role enactment is also reflected in the news (sub)frames they provide. News values and journalist (sub)frames mutually reinforce each other. Yet, newsworthiness as a means allows more freedom to include other perspectives. Concluding, their (relative) autonomy (‘as a means’) towards the capitalist system liberates them from many of the pressures and constraints that facilitate the (unconscious) reproduction of one (hegemonic) worldview (e.g. Brulle, 2010; Cirino, 1973; Deuze 2005b; Dunwoody, 1980; Eliasoph 1988; Gans, 1979, 2004; Gess 2012; Hackett, 1984; Hanitzsch 2007; Harbers, 2016; Kovach & Rosenstiel 2007; Le Masurier, 2015; Molotch & Lester, 1974; Scheufele, B., 2006). I conclude, then, that both the framing strategies of the interviewed alternative journalists as well as their (critical) approach towards journalism practice are more likely to contribute to the politicization of the debate, regarding climate change in general and (climate) reporting in particular (Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Mouffe, 2005; Pepermans, 2015; Pepermans & Maesele, 2014; Swyngedouw, 2010).

I believe that this research may provide some relevant insights for journalists and other communicators. As said, the alternative media have fruitfully adopted certain strategies and methods used by (mainstream) media (in general), adapting – or partly deconstructing – them with an eye on their own purposes and ideals (see Deuze, 2005b; Eliasoph, 1988). In a similar vein, mainstream media might fruitfully adopt some insights from their alternative counterparts: providing broader contexts (e.g. by partly dismantling the beat system or introducing a climate / environmental beat); allowing larger and more diverse groups of voices to be part of the debate; being more open about one's / an outlet's own convictions, methods, source selection, (sub)frames, (commercial / ideological) dependence (i.e. frame-setting) (see Drok & Hermans, 2016; Gess, 2012; Harbers, 2016; Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2007; Le Masurier, 2015; Mendelson & Creech, 2016). Admittedly, some contextual factors – the dominant capitalist-liberalist societal model, the 24-hour news cycle of printed newspapers or their limited scope (i.e. space), among others – may prevent or limit the adoption of certain strategies. However, I contend that even within this context the mainstream media may move closer towards a more 'organic' way of working. This may pave the way for more inclusive and open newsrooms, which are, as shown, more likely to provide a broader set of interacting (sub)frames (Groshek & Han, 2012). As such, they may help to politicize the climate debate, a crucial precondition for more effective actions on *the* global threat of the twenty-first century (Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Mouffe, 2005; Pepermans, 2015; Pepermans & Maesele, 2014; Swyngedouw, 2010). Does this mean that I consider the (progressive) alternative media as *the* only model? Certainly not. As I have pointed out earlier, I support the idea (from the (re)politicization literature) that one hegemonic ideal always impoverishes human thinking and acting and impedes fundamental development (beyond a very narrow interpretation). Therefore, I interpret the above argument as a call to all media workers – both in the mainstream as well as the alternative media – to be open towards and interact with other views, to never stop questioning their own routines and values, to borrow what they consider as constructive practices and offer others an insight into their own approach. Again, key words are openness, diversity, mutual dependence, criticism, equality.

I hope that the concepts and patterns I have identified will be further tested, employed and/or developed by other researchers, in other contexts. Clearly, this study has also some shortcomings which require further research. As discussed, framing is a process encompassing frame-building, a textual frame (message) and frame interpretations by the audience. Hence, it would be highly valuable to also include this last stage in analyses. This may foster an even more thorough understanding of the meanings and implications of the process, in general, and multimodal textual frames in particular. For example, it may clarify the status and audience interpretations of the 'factual news articles' (correspondence) (Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2007). As discussed in section 6.4.2.3 ('Good Journalism'), alternative reporters use those as news (sub)frames even though they hold Biocentric cognitive (Sub)frames. That is, they feel that these 'facts' support their broader biocentric messages. I concluded, however, that it is unclear which (anthropocentric or biocentric) views (various) audiences would take away from such articles. As

pointed out, follow-up studies also need to delve deeper into the visual part of frame-building, which has been largely overlooked in the literature (Dan, 2017; Nurmis, 2017). I was able to draw some first conclusions with regard to photo editing that largely confirmed my general findings as well as the conclusions of other researchers (e.g. Bissell, 2000; Dan, 2017; de Smaele, Geenen & De Cock, 2017; Nurmis, 2017; Scoggin McEntee, 2016; Seelig, 2005). With regard to visual frame-building, in particular, I argued that pragmatic decisions and restraints often lead to rather unconscious frame-sending (Brüggemann, 2014). However, as I was not able to identify cognitive (sub)frames for all interviewed photo editors,⁹⁸ the current data do not allow to draw further, more informed conclusions. Such limitations could be tackled by adding an ethnographic layer in future studies, which would allow for the actual observations of workflows and the triangulation of the results (see Boesman et al., 2017; Boesman, d'Haenens & Van Gorp, 2016).

Original Dutch Quotes

[1] 'Ik ben één radertje, één tandwielletje, in dat raderwerk.'

[2] 'Dus dat is organisch en (.) natuurlijk gegroeid.'

[3] 'Ja, dat is een samenloop van omstandigheden. (...) Er is eigenlijk een gat gevallen en omdat ik toen mij (.) had ingewerkt in het thema voor die reportage in Kenia (.) is mij gevraagd om mij daar verder [in te verdiepen].'

[4] 'Ik heb eigenlijk een reis gemaakt door Europa en dan ben ik op zoek gegaan naar heel veel verschillende mensen, gewone mensen die (.) op één of andere manier aan een andere economie aan het bouwen zijn (...).'

[5] 'Entertainend-didactisch (...). Ik denk dat die twee goed samengaan, zijnde dat je mensen iets probeert bij te leren, een beetje op het goede pad te zetten. Maar je moet dat dan ook op een manier doen zodat mensen nieuwsgierig kunnen gemaakt worden, he.'

[6] 'Wij hebben daar wel over nagedacht: Welke boodschap willen wij nu brengen aan onze lezers? En dat was de boodschap, uiteindelijk: olie loont op termijn niet meer. We moeten echt die overschakeling maken.'

⁹⁸ As explicated above, multiple of the interviews were too limited in scope or duration for me to be able to detect (sub)frames. This was due to time restraints on the part of the interviewees and/or their unwillingness to go into their 'personal views'. Furthermore, the newsrooms (chiefs) did not always allow me to interview several photo editors. Often, those were chiefs rather than the actual photo editors who go over the daily decisions.

[7] ‘Wat kan de overheid? Wat doet ze? Wat claimt ze? Wat is de kloof tussen wat ze zegt te doen en (.) wat ze doet? Wat zou ze eigenlijk moeten doen, volgens (.) de consensus elders? (...) Bedrijven ook: Wat is greenwashing en bla bla en wat is echt?’

[8] ‘Ja, mensen moeten uiteraard altijd hun eigen keuzes maken. Dat is de basis van een soort democratisch bewustzijn. En het enige (.) wat je kunt doen, of het belangrijkste wat je kunt doen, is de alternatieve (.) visies aanreiken, zodat er ook de mogelijkheid is (.) voor mensen om daarover na te denken en het debat over aan te gaan, of er op café over te praten of ‘s avonds aan tafel thuis. Maar ze moeten op z’n minst (.) de kennis of de achtergrond hebben.’

[9] ‘Een koers die zover aflight van waar wij voor staan, die corrigeer je niet. Die kraak je af. Maar die probeer je niet te corrigeren. Daar geef je geen suggesties aan.’

[10] ‘In de aanloop naar de klimaattop in Parijs vorig jaar, hebben wij echt wel samengezeten met alle afdelingen, met iemand van elke afdeling: Economie, wetenschap, hoofdredactie. En dan hebben we eigenlijk een soort van strijdplan [opgesteld]. Alle, strijdplan is misschien overdreven. Maar we hebben wel gezegd: Oké, we gaan daar in de aanloop naar de top veel aandacht aan besteden. We hebben toen ook dat logo, Olie Loont Niet Meer, geïntroduceerd.’

[11] ‘Dat engagement leeft toch. Ik zeg het, onze hoofdredactie (...) is (...) redelijk groen op dat vlak, alle, eigenlijk echt wel redelijk klimaatbewust, misschien nog meer dan ik.’

‘Hij [de hoofdredacteur] stuurt wel af en toe. Zeker in klimaatbeleid. Dan kom ik terug op wat ik in het begin zei: de consensus op de redactie is wel redelijk groot.’

[12] ‘Maar stel je voor dat ik een klimaatscepticus zou zijn geweest, (.) dan zou het wringen, want dan zou ik waarschijnlijk allemaal dingen willen plaatsen die de berichtgeving tegenspreken. En als ik dat zou doen, dan zou ik op ‘t matje geroepen worden, wat plaats je daar nu bij? En als ik dat niet zou doen, zou ik met een gewetensconflict zitten, want ik zou dan zeggen van, het is allemaal onzin wat ik hier allemaal moet brengen.’

[13] ‘Maar, de suggestie afwijzen, dat zou niet zo in goeie aarde vallen, laten we zeggen. (...) Ook als je dingen die alarmistisch klinken te veel nuanceert, valt niet altijd in goeie aarde. Dat is mijn ervaring, bij de leidinggeevenden van de krant.’

[14] ‘Ze zeggen letterlijk: Mij interesseert dat niet, dus we gaan dat minder doen. Ik voel dat, als ik dingen voorstel, het veel vaker niets wordt. Dat was bij de vorige ploeg (.) wel anders. (...) Ze hebben dit jaar voor het eerst in zes jaar geen bijlage gemaakt rond de top, en ze willen het nu volgend jaar toch weer opnieuw doen. Ik denk dat dat eerder financieel is. Ze winnen daar altijd wel veel geld aan, dankzij advertenties.’

[15] ‘Ik kies zelf waar ik over schrijf. Ik bied dat aan en dat wordt zeer zelden afgewezen. Nee krijg ik nooit, of (.) dan moet ik al heel dom bezig zijn. Dan heb ik mijn job niet goed gedaan.’

[16] ‘Als een opdracht goed gegeven wordt, is ‘t stuk al voor vijftig procent gemaakt, he.’

[17] ‘*De Morgen* rapporteert al heel veel over klimaat en de vraag kwam specifiek van hun: Het moet over klimaat gaan. Wat is de stand van zaken bij het proces? Hoe staat het met de klimaattop? Wat is dat bij het parlement met die stroomversnelling? Dus dat zit daar ook allemaal in. Maar goed, daar heb ik niet echt gevoelsmatig gewerkt omdat ik daar al open kaart had. Daar mocht ik al publiceren. Bij *De Standaard* was het meer, ja, hier moet ik mij nog verkopen. Dus ik moet dat op een manier doen dat de eindredactie ook gaat zeggen: Ja, hier zien wij wel brood in.’

[18] ‘Eigenlijk zeg ik heel de tijd tegen de mensen: Niemand zit te wachten op wat [naam NGO] zegt over de reductie die hier moet gebeuren. (...) Er zijn milieuorganisaties, Greenpeace en zo voort. Dat is niet echt wat men verwacht van [naam NGO]. We moeten die specifieke invalshoek kiezen.’

[19] ‘Dat komt dan in de mainstream media, zo’n stuk, en dan kan je in *MO** eigenlijk eens goed lezen waar het eigenlijk over gaat. Maar dat is sowieso voor een beperkter publiek, maar wel voor veel mensen die wel sympathie hebben voor onze organisatie. Dan kan je wat evenwicht zoeken.’

[20] ‘Nee, eigenlijk weinig. Alle, die doen soms wel suggesties, maar zo over titel, lay-out, foto, daar is niet (...) of heel weinig [discussie over].’

[21] ‘Ik geloof zelf alles wat wij schrijven. En ik vind daar ook heel gemakkelijk de beelden bij die dat ook bewijzen. Dus ik word in mijn zoektocht naar beelden ook bevestigd dat wij (.) serieus zijn en dat we geen onzin schrijven. En ik hoef dus ook geen onzinnige beelden te zoeken, want in alle (.) serieuze bronnen waar ik zoek, vind ik altijd wel het beeld dat ik nodig heb.’

[22] ‘Ja, als je dat artikel dan leest (.), dan vind ik wel dat je daar (...) wel zo’n beeld mag geven, *in the face*. Wat als ’t echt zo zou gebeuren? En dan heb je hier een historisch voorbeeld natuurlijk: Nederland, ik denk vijftig-zestig jaar geleden. Dus dat wouden we echt geven, en dan vind ik wel dat je dat echt moet doen. (...) Want ik denk dat heel veel mensen dat zijn vergeten, hoe dat dat toen (.) was, hoe erg dat dat eigenlijk wel was. Dus je mag echt wel eens zeggen: Dit kan er gebeuren als we (.) er niets aan doen. Dus ik heb echt wel een dramatische toon gekozen.’

[23] ‘Als er discussie is, proberen we ’t wel in team op te lossen. In overleg, ja. Maar er is niemand die van bovenaf zegt: nu gaan jullie dat of dat schrijven. Nee. (...) Maar soms zijn er thema’s, bijvoorbeeld, waar ik meer in geïnteresseerd ben en (.) bijvoorbeeld meer bronnen voor heb of mensen die mij daarrond contacteren. Dan kan ik er wel (.) autonoom iets over schrijven.’

[24] ‘(...) we weten wel van elkaar dat we passen in het profiel.’

[25] ‘Als we merkten dat er een stuk werd geschreven dat misschien een beetje controversieel was of als we zagen dat zelfs binnen onze eigen community van bloggers andere mensen andere gedachten hadden, dan lieten wij altijd wel de kans om een tegenopinie te schrijven. En het gebeurde ook wel soms echt dat mensen twee-drie keer met elkaar pingpongden in een ander stuk.’

[26] ‘Een stuk voor *DeWereldMorgen* gaat al snel langer zijn en wat seccer. Dan ga je gewoon (.) uw verhaal maken zonder het de hele tijd te willen verkopen. Terwijl, bij *De Morgen* (.) weet je al wat zij interessant vinden. Dat is ook wat er gelezen wordt. Ja, dan moet er een beetje meer (.) fleur in zitten of zo [lacht].’

[27] ‘Mocht er nu iemand nieuw beginnen (...) dan heb je daar een gesprek mee. Maar dan gaan we dat toch nog wel even in het oog houden, tot we zien: oké, dat komt in orde, of dat komt niet in orde.’

[28] ‘Dus als wij zeggen, dit is niet *to our standards* of dat denken wij niet, dan verschijnt het niet bij ons. (...) [W]ij kunnen dingen weigeren die zij [een blog waarmee ze samenwerken] wel kunnen publiceren. Dat is hun eigen verantwoordelijkheid dan.’

[29] ‘Dat is een moeilijke, zijn er nu echt grenzen? Als er nu iemand zou (...) komen en die schrijft een volledig stuk dat nucleair het antwoord is op de klimaatverandering. Ik denk wel dat we het zouden publiceren, maar ik zou persoonlijk een tegenopinie schrijven dan.’

[30] ‘Ik merk wel dat sommige mensen daar (.) beter in gevormd zijn of laat ons zeggen, beter talent voor hebben, want vorming hebben we daar allemaal niet voor. Maar ze voelen dat beter aan. Terwijl anderen met beelden komen waarvan je zegt: Komaan, zou je dat nu zelf ooit aantrekkelijk vinden, of zegt het iets?.’

[31] ‘Ja, de redactie kiest die beelden. Je hebt daar echt niks over te zeggen. En soms is dat echt vervelend, want soms kiezen die echt beelden [lacht] [die helemaal niet passen]. Zoals hier met *DeWereldMorgen*, bijvoorbeeld. Dus dan kiezen ze een beeld (.) van iets dat onder water loopt, maar dat is nu net echt het beeld dat we juist niet willen brengen.’

[32] ‘Nee, als het bijvoorbeeld over kerncentrales gaat, dan zet je een foto van een kerncentrale.’

[33] ‘Bijvoorbeeld, bij een artikel rond dat idee van tijd en luxe had ik toen een foto gestoken van iemand die gewoon gitaar aan het spelen is. En, ja, je kan zelf de associatie maken wat dat dan is. Maar, je kan daar evengoed een wekker zetten of zo (...).’

[34] Vorig jaar in onze subsidieaanvraag hebben we moeten (.) specificeren hoe vaak we het zullen hebben over Malawi, Mozambique en Zuid-Afrika. (...) Eén van mijn twee collega's zei: Ja, dat kunnen ze eigenlijk toch niet maken? We zijn toch niet het pers(.)bureau van de Vlaamse overheid? Wat ik zeker een terechte opmerking vond. Maar ja, als je wil verder gaan [lacht] met hun centen, moet je toch wel een compromis proberen te vinden. (...) Ze hebben natuurlijk wel gevraagd: Zouden jullie iets kunnen schrijven over de projecten waar wij (.) op werken (...). Dus dat hebben we dan, ja, een paar keer gedaan. (...) Dus ja, er zijn wel een aantal interessante projecten, dus op zich heb ik ook zoiets: Vlamingen weten dat misschien niet en op zich is dat wel eens interessant om te weten.'

[35] '(...) de overheid geeft ook niet gewoon geld. Die willen ook echt dat je commercieel een bureau bent dat leefbaar is. Dat je eventueel laat zien dat je nog wel op eigen pot kan blijven bestaan, mocht het geld wegvallen. Dus daarnaast willen ze ook echt wel dat we (.) ons best doen om klanten, om abonnementsgeld binnen te halen, of op andere manieren geld te werven. En dat maakt natuurlijk dat het voor ons ook wel belangrijk is om de klanten die we hebben, te houden en te bedienen.'

[36] 'Dus (.) dat is ook een klant voor ons. Dat is een belangrijke klant en (...) de overheid is ook wel (.) blij dat we die hebben als klant.'

[37] 'Ja, eigenlijk willen we natuurlijk als persagentschap niet te gekleurd zijn. Je moet een *HLN.be* en een *DeWereldMorgen* bedienen met hetzelfde stuk.'

[38] 'Maar ze hebben geen inbreng (...). [Ze kunnen ons niet zeggen:] we willen dat jullie nu daarover schrijven of daarover of daarover. Nee. (.) Dus binnen die vier jaar zijn we eigenlijk zeker dat we subsidies krijgen.'

[39] '[Name journalist] schrijft rond Europa. Dat is eigenlijk de eerste man van klimaat, ook omdat veel (.) door Europa wordt gedreven. We hebben natuurlijk op de verschillende afdelingen mensen die daarmee bezig zijn. Klimaat is bijvoorbeeld ook een issue in de politieke berichtgeving. Er zijn dossiers van de ministerraad die op tafel komen. Ja, dan is er iemand van de politieke redactie die daarmee bezig is. Of, als het over economische onderwerpen gaat, komt dat bij mij terecht, bijvoorbeeld.'

[40] 'Eigenlijk zijn die niet zozeer ingegeven door wat ik zelf belangrijk heb gevonden, maar dat zijn gewoon (...) zaken die de lezers, of toch heel veel lezers, waarschijnlijk niet weten. Ze zijn wel aan het gebeuren of er zijn mensen die daar werk van aan het maken zijn. En dan moet je dat gewoon brengen. (...) Wel, ik heb mijn eigen gedacht. Ik heb mijn persoonlijke opinie daarover. Maar als je journalist bent, moet je eigenlijk vermijden dat je persoonlijk gedacht gaat bepalen welke agenda je in de krant brengt.'

[41] ‘Zelf zit ik minder met dat probleem (.), omdat ik over de wetenschappelijke kant van de zaak bericht. Ik moet mij niet bezighouden met welke partij welk standpunt inneemt of (.) hoe we een beleid zo efficiënt mogelijk kunnen doen draaien. Dat zijn debatten die door andere mensen hier gecoverd worden, he. (.) Dat is de politieke redactie, de milieuredactie (.). Dus ik kan het op de pure, meer wetenschappelijke feiten houden.’

[42] ‘Maar om nu te zeggen dat ik de nieuwste klimaatstudies en zo volg, nee. Daarvoor reken je ook meer op je netwerk van mensen die daar wel mee bezig zijn. Bond Beter Leefmilieu, bijvoorbeeld. Die hebben wel die wetenschappelijke achtergrond en kunnen je dan informeren van, kijk, er is hier iets nieuws. Dat krijg je dan eigenlijk uit de tweede hand.’

[43] ‘Je moet vragen: Ja, stuur mij alstublieft een communiqué (.). Dat maakt je kwetsbaar, want je bent volledig afhankelijk van wat ze je willen geven. Maar (.) voor het moment is dat de realiteit van de media waarin we leven. Dat gaat ook niet veranderen want niemand wil nog betalen voor nieuws en wij zitten aan het einde van de ketting, dus wij hebben (...) helemaal geen geld meer.’

[44] ‘Dus wij volgen, min of meer, zo’n beetje alles, maar we hebben elk toch ook een zekere specialisatie. Ik doe veel meer buitenland en veel minder binnenland. (...) Dossiers die ik vroeger ook al volgde en die mij ook interesseren (...). En in die context, op internationaal niveau, volg ik ook leefmilieu. Dus ik volg niet, bijvoorbeeld, wat het Vlaams ministerie van leefmilieu doet, maar ik volg bijvoorbeeld wel de klimaatconferenties op. Dat soort zaken volg ik op. Ik volg ook het Vrijhandelsakkoord.’

[45] ‘We zouden heel graag veel meer en op aan andere manier willen rapporteren over het thema klimaat, maar we zitten gewoon met een beperkt team. (...) Het is een thema op zich waarvoor je eigenlijk een redacteur moet vrijmaken die alleen schrijft over klimaat.’

[46] ‘Je kunt ook mensen niet permanent het grotere geheel voorstellen. Ik denk dat dat de uitdaging is in klimaatberichtgeving (...): Natuurlijk moet je dat grotere geheel permanent in je achterhoofd (.) hebben. Maar je kunt niet in ieder stuk het grotere geheel gaan (.) behandelen. Het is eigenlijk net de uitdaging om eigenlijk via (.) verschillende verhalen duidelijk te maken: Ja, maar, ook dit gaat over klimaatverandering.’

[47] ‘2016 was warmer dan 2015, dat al het warmste jaar was. En ik geloof, als ik het mij goed herinner, dat alle records zijn verbroken (.) telkens in de eenentwintigste eeuw. Wel ja, ik vind dat al geen toeval meer, he. En als je dan iemand aan het woord kan laten, die zegt: Ja, dat is geen toeval meer, he. Dus, (...) je kunt veel schrijven, maar je moet het zoveel mogelijk proberen te omkaderen door iemand. Een slimme mens, noemen wij dat.’

[48] ‘Het andere alternatief is natuurlijk dat je mensen quote, he. Dat je er anderen bijhaalt die (.) een commentaar geven (.) waarin dan een bepaalde waardering schuilt, of een inschatting of bewering (...).’

[49] ‘Dat wil daarom niet zeggen dat je het discours van klimaatontkenners, om het zo te zeggen, op dezelfde schaal plaatst. Dus je probeert daar natuurlijk wel een journalistieke toets op te doen. (...) Onze (.) marketing is natuurlijk (...) de zalm, tegen de stroom in. Dat betekent nu niet dat we klimaatontkenners aandacht gaan geven omdat dat nu een beetje lekker is.’

[50] ‘Ik zal ze nooit zelf contacteren. Dat niet. Maar de dingen die tot bij ons komen, komen van alle kanten tot bij ons (.) Maar ik zal daar altijd wel bij zeggen van: Kijk, dit is niet een half-halfdebat. Dit is een mening van een franje.’

[51] ‘Maar, als je nu ziet dat die klimaatsceptici echt belang gaan krijgen, nu in Amerika bijvoorbeeld, dan moet je daar wel aandacht aan besteden, omdat zij dreigen het beleid te beïnvloeden. Maar niet zo van: Hier nog eens iemand die nog eens roept. Nee, dat vind ik niet.’

[52] ‘Ik sta op de lijn: Ik maak verhalen over dat thema en (.) als iemand iets te zeggen heeft en daarvoor argumenteert, zeker als die dat met een bepaalde overtuiging brengt, dan (.) krijgt hij de kans om zijn verhaal te doen. Dan stel ik daar vragen over en dat wordt dat nadien verwerkt in dat verhaal. (...) Ja, dus, ik probeer mij er wat van te onthouden om een eigen visie in dat verhaal te brengen. Daarvoor bestaan er bij ons de opiniëpagina’s.’

[53] ‘Ja, maar ik vind wel dat ons taalgebruik meestal (.) redelijk neutraal is. Het is niet alsof we subjectief schrijven over klimaat (.) Ja, meestal is het berichtgeving over: Dat is er gebeurd, of dat is ontdekt.’

[54] ‘Taal is ons vak. Woorden door ringetjes doen springen, daar zijn we continu mee bezig (.) Alleen moet je zorgen dat je wel (.) een kleurige taal hebt, af en toe een beetje speels. Taal die mensen meelokt en die soepel door de bochten gaat. Maar er is een verschil tussen kleurige taal en gekleurde taal (.) En daar moet je uitkijken dat je niet te ver gaat en dat je (.) niet al in je woordkeuze standpunten in(.)neemt.’

[55] ‘Dat gaat over concentraties van CO₂ in de lucht. Ah ja, dat kan je met een grafiek doen. Maar als je geen grafiek hebt en je moet dat met een beeld doen, ja, dan zit je heel snel bij (.) rook die uit schoorstenen komt en wat weet ik allemaal, of bij druk verkeer. ’t Is altijd een beetje zoeken. Maar ja, meestal in dat stuk vind je ergens een vermelding van een concrete plek waar het probleem het grootst is. Een van die stukken ging dan over steenkoolmijnen in (...) Australië. Ja, dan ga je op zoek naar een beeld uit Australië (...).’

[56] ‘Je kan een foto van tien jaar geleden of twintig jaar geleden in relatie van nu zetten en dan heb je echt een bewijsstuk: Die gletsjer is aan het verkleinen. (...) Bij droogtes en overstromingen (.) kun je in

elk geval laten zien wat er nu (.) bezig is, op het moment van de foto. Dus dan nog zou (...) een klimaatscepticus kunnen zeggen: Ja, er zijn altijd wel droogtes en overstromingen geweest, dus dat is geen sluitend bewijs. Dat gaan wij ook niet (.) poneren, dat een foto een sluitend bewijs is. Ze is wel (.) iets dat zegt (:): Dit is (...) in elk geval nu gebeurd. En (.) het onderzoek wijst erop dat dat toch wel niet meer zo eventjes een (.) *accident de parcours* is.’

[57] ‘Ja, dat kunnen de mensen ook vinden als zij ons nazien: wie zijn wij, waar staan wij voor, wat is ons profiel, en dergelijke meer. En, voor iemand die regelmatig komt is het ook wel duidelijk dat wij de dingen bekijken vanuit een bepaald perspectief. (...) Wij geloven in objectiviteit van de feiten, maar wij geloven niet in neutraliteit van berichtgeving. Dat is volgens ons een mythe. Berichtgeving is altijd gekleurd. En wat we zeker afkeuren, is de mythe die door de grote media wordt gepropageerd, dat zij neutraal zouden zijn. Dat is niet het geval. Ik zeg niet dat *De Standaard* of *De Morgen* geen recht hebben op hun eigen visie, maar ze moeten daar vooruit komen.’

[58] ‘Ik verspil er geen tijd meer aan. Ik bedoel, dit is energie die ik niet meer kan opbrengen om te investeren omdat, toch zeker na Parijs, dat debat eigenlijk afgesloten is. (...) Dus ik denk dat [beide partijen aan het woord laten] in de toekomst absoluut geen piste meer is. Het is zoals je begin 2000 of eind jaren negentig nog het debat had of het internet een hype was of niet. Ja, ik denk dat we erover zijn dat dat niet is, he. Dat het een feit is dat dat er is en dat dat zal blijven. En ik denk dat dat met klimaatverandering hetzelfde is. We zitten in dezelfde fase. Ja, dus, het is er. Het is tijd om nu gewoon naar oplossingen te kijken.’

[59] ‘Dus, ik denk dat ik altijd twee dingen probeer te doen. Enerzijds (.) tonen dat er debat is. Alle, het debat of het conflict blootleggen en zeggen van, oké, wat er hier gepresenteerd wordt is maar één visie en er zijn ook andere visies. En ten tweede neem ik in dat debat uiteraard ook een standpunt in. Ik ben ook [lacht] zeer overtuigd (.) van mijn eigen standpunt.’

[60] ‘De eerste opdracht van de journalist is achterdochtig zijn. (...) Je moet altijd achterdochtig zijn en ervan uitgaan dat er belangen mee gemoeid zijn om dingen te doen of tegen te houden, enzovoort. En daar ga je naar op zoek, in de eerste plaats bij de macht en in de tweede plaats ten opzichte van je eigen intenties, je eigen positie.’

[61] ‘Klimaatverandering gaat eigenlijk over alles. Het is geen milieuvraagstuk. Het is een mondiaal (.) vraagstuk dat gaat over ongelijkheid, over een economisch systeem, over ons koloniaal verleden, over alles eigenlijk. Dus alles komt daarin samen.’

[62] ‘Ik denk ook dat er altijd impliciet een discours aanwezig is over wat de grondoorzaak is en de oplossing, ook in de rapporten van de IPCC. Als je je daar niet expliciet over uitsprekt, dan (.) dreig je het hegemonische discours (.) te bevestigen.’

[63] ‘(...) de persoon die je belt om te interviewen, de manier waarop je je artikel schrijft, de manier waarop dat je de woorden (.) kiest om te schrijven, dat is allemaal opinie eigenlijk. Dat is gebaseerd op je referentiekader. Naargelang je referentiekader schrijf je de dingen anders, interpreteer je de realiteit op een andere manier. Dus, wij geloven ook niet in dat *secce* (.), dat mensen of journalisten een wit blad zijn en dan een *clean object* nemen en het dan interviewen (...). Alles is geconnecteerd, he. Wat dan wel belangrijk is, is dat je de feiten geeft, zoals je die ziet. (.) Dus als er een ggo-aardappel is, dan zeg je dat dat een ggo-aardappel is.’

[64] ‘Ik ben zelf heel gevoelig voor taal, dus ik vind het wel fijn om daar wat mee te spelen. Woorden kunnen soms een heel andere betekenis hebben voor de éne dan voor de andere. Daarom vind ik het heel belangrijk om over te brengen, op een bepaalde manier, wat ik echt bedoel, he.’

[65] ‘Ja, waar ik altijd de nadruk op leg, is die sociaalrechtvaardige transitie. Ja, dat is eigenlijk een woord dat ik echt heel bewust in mijn stukken (.) stop, omdat ik (.) klimaat los wil zien van een milieuprobleem.’

[66] ‘Als er bijvoorbeeld op een betoging (.) rond klimaat of tegen ggo’s een aantal mensen gewelddadige dingen doen, vandalisme of dergelijke, zou ik niet focussen op dat beeld maar eerder op de mensen die een boodschap dragen, omdat juist dat belangrijk is. Als er een aantal mensen zijn die dat doen, ja, dan doen ze dat, he. Dat is voor mij niet belangrijk.’

[67] ‘Maar we zitten wel (.) vaak in zo’n clichés en dat heeft te maken met foto’s die we ontvangen, niet alleen van Flickr ook van creative commons, maar ook van (.) grote organisaties zoals (.) UNHCR of het Rode Kruis, enzovoort. Die stellen ook foto’s ter beschikking. Die zijn ook (.) ergens geprogrammeerd. Hun (.) doelstellingen zitten vervat in die foto’s. Die zijn niet journalistiek (.) maar wij kunnen niet anders.’

[68] ‘Elke keuze, bij elke journalist en op elke afdeling, begint bij nieuwswaarde.’

[69] ‘We zijn net zoals de meeste mensen ook bewust van het klimaatprobleem. Maar het is natuurlijk [moeilijk], zolang er niet iets verandert op het terrein, om het zo te zeggen. Maar nu met Trump, bijvoorbeeld, heb je weer een heel nieuwe dynamiek die is ontstaan. (.) Alles hangt een beetje af van de actualiteit, hoe je een sluimerend thema dat al twintig-dertig jaar meespeelt, interessant blijft maken.’

[70] ‘Wat daar typisch aan zou kunnen zijn, is dat dat een concreet, (.) fascinerend feit is dat een beetje triggert zo van, tiens. Dat is mij door de unief van Gent doorgespeeld.’

[71] ‘Alle, wat mij betreft is dat toch wel te vermijden dat je weer die (.) persconferentiebeelden geeft, met die (...) mannen in pak achter een tafel die iets aan het bespreken zijn. Dat zegt voor mij eigenlijk niks. (...) Alle, dat is saai. Als je dan zoiets, (.), een protest, kunt laten zien van in Marrakesh (...). Daar

was ook niet keiveel volk. Maar alle, ik vind dat je dan wel sowieso meer informatie geeft aan de lezer dan met het saaie [beeld] (...) van het congres.’

[72] ‘Ja, dat is superevident, he. Als Leonardo naar de paus gaat (.), dan krijg je dat beeld binnen van alle agentschappen. (...) In dat geval kies je er ook voor om dat stukje dat eigenlijk best wel kort is met foto te geven, want dat is gewoon een toffe, verrassende combinatie.’

[73] ‘Ja, ik volg dat domein een beetje. Dus ik zie dan: Oké, ik vind het moment gekomen om daar nog eens een stuk over te schrijven. En dan zijn het mensen in de krantstructuren die dan zeggen van: Oké, ik trek het naar voren. Het geeft ook wel weer aan dat ze dat naar voren willen trekken vanuit het besef dat daar wel aandacht voor is binnen de hogere kringen, dat we dat wel een belangrijk thema blijven vinden.’

[74] ‘Ik denk wel dat het een bewuste keuze omdat het over iets gaat wat nieuw is, he. Het is nieuws. (.) Er is niet zo veel bekend of er is niet zo heel vaak geschreven (...) dat we wel (.) in de richting gaan van een economie die zich kan loskoppelen daarvan [klimaat].’

[75] ‘We stoten nog altijd te veel uit en het [CO₂-concentraties] stijgt eigenlijk nog altijd, maar het is een beetje aan ’t minderen. Dat is interessant want dat wil zeggen dat de economie (.) zich kan ontkoppelen van (.) de uitstoot. Dat is toch positief.’

[76] ‘(...) daar zag ik een rapport voorbijkomen van PwC [PricewaterhouseCoopers] dat zei: Ja, maar, klimaatbeleid zorgt voor economische groei. Ik dacht van: Kijk, laten we daarmee beginnen om de aandacht te grijpen van de ietwat economisch denkenden. Want, uiteindelijk, iedereen vindt dat interessant, he. Welvaart en economie is altijd wat aan elkaar gelieerd.’

[77] ‘Als de giraf op de rode lijst plots komt, ja dan lijkt ons dat wel interessant. Het is een dier dat tot de verbeelding spreekt.’

[78] ‘(...) [D]e voorbije tien jaar is in feite bijzonder zwaar gepromoot dat je best je stookketel vervangt door een aardgasaansluiting. Ja, als er dan zo’n verandering plaatsvindt, dan is het, denk ik wel, interessant om dat artikel te maken, want iedereen leeft in de overtuiging dat aardgas gepromoot wordt en dat je dat moet hebben. Maar dat is aan het veranderen. (...) [I]k krijg meer dan eens een collega [lacht] bij mij die zegt: Ja, wat moet ik eigenlijk doen met mijn verwarming? Dus dat leeft. Verwarming is een belangrijk (.) onderdeel bij een nieuwbouw of een verbouwing, wat de kostprijs betreft. En we leven eigenlijk in een tijd van transitie. Ja, die investering die je nu doet, dat is een investering die na vijf jaar niet achterhaald mag zijn.’

[79] ‘Als dat (verwijst naar een stuk dat die dag in de krant staat) gaat over CO₂-uitstoot in de stad en dat het voor joggers gevaarlijker is door het fijn stof dat dat in ’t stad brengt, dan is dat ook een stukje

klimaat. Want ja, dat fijn stof is klimaatgebonden. Tegelijk gaat dat over joggen en dat is iets wat tegenwoordig heel veel mensen doen. Dus daar heb je dan relevantie.'

[80] 'We hadden nog veel meer interessante nieuwe gegevens. Maar dat maakte het ook gewoon zwaarder. Dus dat is eruit gegaan. En er waren zeker ook nog een paar nuances over de bijdrage van België. (...) [Wat we schrijven voor alternatieve media] is ietsje minder toegankelijk dan wat we voor de mainstream maken. Maar het is wel echt nog interessant voor onze achterban en voor de *MO**-lezer.'

[81] 'Ja, interessanter probeer ik het wel te maken, maar [zucht] ik ga niet voor de *click baits* of zo. Nee, nee, nee. Ik bedoel (.), ik zal wel uitdagend schrijven, maar het zal niet zo zijn dat mensen naar het artikel toegaan en aan het einde van het artikel [denken: Was dit het dan?] / Ik zal uitdagend schrijven voor de mensen die het lezen, niet om mensen aan het lezen te krijgen.'

[82] 'Ja, ik bedoel, je schrijft altijd voor je lezers. Dat is mijn stelling. Dus de alternatieve media die dat ontkennen, liegen, ofwel zijn ze slecht bezig, want je schrijft niet voor jezelf. Je schrijft niet omdat je kleine kring dat belangrijk vindt. Je schrijft om informatie bij een ruim publiek te brengen. En dus moet je die ook engageren. Dat betekent niet dat je de dingen niet maakt waarvan je denkt: Pff, dit gaat niemand lezen. Alle, soms weet je vooraf dat het een maat van niets zal zijn, in termen van bereik en impact. Maar als medium moet je wel die keuze blijven maken om het te brengen. Maar je probeert het natuurlijk toch altijd zo te brengen dat het aankomt. Dat je niet blijft steken in je eigen intentie.'

[83] 'Ik volg daarin heel erg wat Rob Hopkins van de transitiebeweging daarover schrijft. Hij heeft heel sterk ervaren dat het geen zin heeft dat je de dertiende apocalyptische film laat zien. Ja, ik bedoel: Dat is heel concreet en heel feitelijk en daar gaat het effectief over. Maar dat ketst af op mensen. (...) Ja, we moeten daar eigenlijk een verhaal over hoop en vernieuwing (.) van maken. Dat is eigenlijk wat Rob Hopkins heel duidelijk gemaakt heeft: Oké, het is erg, maar we kunnen daar met z'n allen iets aan doen (...).'

[84] 'Mocht de titel, Verzet tijdens de klimaattop is nu meer dan ooit (.) nodig, gecombineerd zijn met (.) een heel ander beeld, van een Syrische terrorist (.), dan denk je (.): Ja, tiens, dat is misschien wel interessant. Alleen al het contrast tussen wat je initieel (.) zou denken: Je leest klimaat, je ziet een beeld dat je daar niet direct mee linkt en je denkt misschien, dat wil ik lezen.'

[85] 'Ik wilde gewoon een andere kant laten zien die daar effectief (.) aanwezig is. Er wordt op dat moment ook een alternatieve COP georganiseerd (.) en die bleef echt wel buiten beeld. Mijn boodschap is gewoon om te tonen: Het is niet dat iedereen hier eensgezind aan tafel zit. Er is echt nog wel een heel belangrijke discussie, namelijk over wiens belangen gaat het hier eigenlijk?'

[86] ‘Er valt heel veel over te zeggen en ik heb er nu iets uitgehaald zodat (.) het compact bleef en niet (.) uitgebreid werd waardoor je het bos door de bomen niet meer zou zien.’

[87] ‘Ik probeer het alleszins te doen op een (.) verhalende manier waardoor (.) mensen al dan niet iets kunnen zien als inspiratie of een (.) nieuwe gedachte over het onderwerp die ze eerder nog niet hadden gehad. En ik zorg er ook gewoon voor dat het (.) fijn blijft om erover te (.) lezen en dat het (.) interessant blijft. (...) Ik ben zelf heel gevoelig voor taal, dus ik vind dat wel fijn om daar wel wat mee te spelen.’

[88] ‘[U]iteindelijk is een foto een argument (.) in het verhaal (.), dat inhoudelijk is. En dat, het inhoudelijke, is waar wij (.) zo veel belang aan hechten. Beeldmateriaal wordt mee een argument (.). Een oefening die we hier heel vaak moeten doen is mensen interesseren voor een topic waarin niemand geïnteresseerd is. (...) Mensen willen geen inspanning meer doen om nog eens eventjes anders over iets na te denken. (...) En dus de foto zie ik als een van de middelen om (.) ze toch eventjes te doen twijfelen, eventueel, of ze een moment te doen nemen om (.) die realiteit vanuit een visueel (.) vertrekpunt anders te gaan bekijken.’

[89] ‘Ik probeer gewoon op een paar plekken in de krant wat een eigen accent te leggen, of toch ook (...) voor de hoogste kwaliteit te gaan. Maar, als ik niet oppas met klimaat, dan ben ik op het einde van de maand (...) 1.500 euro kwijt (...), en euh, dat kan ik mij gewoon niet permitteren.’

[90] ‘Ja, weet je, we hebben een bepaalde beperking bij ons fotomateriaal. Dus, we zijn een (...) journalistiek (.) medium (.) dat actualiteit bespreekt enzovoort (.), en nieuws brengt. Maar we hebben geen (.) grote budgetten als het gaat om de aankoop van foto's (.) op hun nieuws waarde. (.) Dus dat betekent dat we sowieso strategieën moeten ontwikkelen om daar eigenlijk rond te werken.’

[91] ‘Als Volvo of Mercedes hier een volledige pagina zou kopen. Ja, dat is autoreclame. Daar worden zelfs geen vragen bij gesteld. (...) Op dat vlak moeten we ook niet onnozel doen.’

[92] ‘Bwa, bij auto's (...). Nee, nee, nee, ik denk het niet [dat ze vloeken met mijn artikels].’

[93] ‘[H]et forum dat kernenergie promoot in België had eigenlijk een soort van pagina gekocht. En dat leek erg redactioneel, eigenlijk (...). En daar zijn dan toch wel vragen bij gesteld: Kan dat nu nog wel? (...) Maar alle, als het echt te ver zou gaan, zouden we, denk ik, op een bepaald moment wel kunnen zeggen: Nee, we gaan dit niet publiceren. Dit past toch niet. Zelfs al brengt dat ons 5.000 euro op. Als het te veel lijkt op redactionele inhoud, dan zouden we daar bezwaar tegen hebben.’

[94] ‘Mij stoort het niet (.). Echt extreme reclame hebben wij ook niet echt (.). En ja, als het zo is, dan is het zo (.).’

[95] ‘Ja, ik bedoel, wij zitten constant met die tegenstelling. Maar ik denk, echt waar, dat de lezer (.) daardoor ook kan zien: Tiens, ja, iedereen, wij allemaal, die journalist, die krant, maar wij ook, wij allemaal, zitten constant met die tegenstelling. En dat is interessant. Ik vind, je kunt dat wegmoffelen of uitzuiveren, maar ja, dat is nu eenmaal de realiteit. Het is interessant om die te zien en om ook af en toe te proberen om daar iets mee te doen, door de vraag te stellen: Is dat nu nog altijd een tegenstelling? Zou dat eigenlijk ondertussen niet meer zo zijn? Ja, dat vind ik interessanter om mijn energie in te stoppen dan (.) de voortdurende schrik: Oei, oei, oei, dat mag daar niet staan. Alle, wij zijn Greenpeace niet, he.’

[96] ‘Dat maakt ook initiatieven zoals *De Correspondent* of *Media Par* of *Apache* (.) zo interessant. Je gaat naar (.) buiten-commerciële ruimtes, journalistiek die zich buiten commerciële ruimtes bevindt. Ik denk dat dat belangrijk is. En ik denk ook dat wij als mens (.) onderschatten wat de impact is, om permanent in commerciële ruimtes te zijn. Want dus, ja, alle, alles is commercieel. Alle, ik denk dat wij dat echt onderschatten, de impact daarvan op ons (.), op ons zijn, op ons denken (.) (...) Ik bedoel, journalistiek is een product en dat zou eigenlijk geen product mogen zijn.’

[97] ‘Wij komen vaak in dat groen-linkse spectrum uit, als we conclusies trekken of wat de tendens van de stukken betreft. Maar dat is niet omdat we dat, bij wijze van spreken, willen, maar omdat we daar (.) door de research toch uiteindelijk uitkomen. Daar speelt uiteraard de positie die je hebt in mee. En ik vind dat je dat niet moet ontkennen, maar dat je wel de verdomde plicht hebt om jezelf te bevragen.’

7 Conclusions: The Organism and Politicization as Mutually Constitutive Concepts

The introduction of this study was similar to the starting point of numerous other studies. Climate change is, arguably, *the* global threat of the twenty-first century. It jeopardizes the future of the natural system, including humans. Some groups, in particular, will experience the consequences of the changes earlier and more severely (IPCC, 2014a, 2014b). Therefore, humanity is called to action. All action starts with perception, cognition, emotion, communication. In short, it starts with framing (e.g. Bilandzic, Kalch & Soetgen, 2017; Davis, 1995; Hart, 2011; Powell et al., 2015). However, depending on the frame, other causes and problems are foregrounded, other ethical considerations come to the fore, other actions become likely, feasible or even indispensable (Entman, 1993, 2004). As subsequent surveys (e.g. Brechin, 2003; Eurobarometer, 2014; Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006; Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2003) have shown that people's engagement and willingness to act are at a low ebb, numerous researchers have called for more effective types of frames that are better able to encourage the public to think and act in 'favourable ways' (e.g. Lakoff, 2010; Leiserowitz, 2006, 2007; Myers et al., 2012; Nisbet, 2000; Zia & Todd, 2010). It has, for instance, been argued that *effective climate change frames* should counter-balance alarmism with more positive alternatives (e.g. O'Neill, 2017; O'Neill et al., 2013; O'Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 2009) and contextualize, over even avoid, conflict and uncertainty (e.g. Butler & Pidgeon, 2009; Corbett & Durfee, 2004). They must depict climate action as a collective endeavour, with an eye on peer support (e.g. Hart, 2011; Iyengar, 1990), connect it to the time-space of the audience (e.g. Hulme, 2004; O'Neill, 2017; O'Neill et al., 2013) and introduce values which resonate with those of the public (e.g. Myers et al., 2012; Weathers, Maibach & Nisbet, 2017; Whitmarsh, O'Neill & Lorenzoni, 2013). In summary, contextualization may help to engage the audience and encourage feelings of self-efficacy.

While I pointed out that such empirical findings and strategies are definitely valuable in some ways, I also made clear that I do not support the underlying rationale in most of these studies. That is, I connected these views to *depoliticization* (Brulle, 2010; De Lucia, 2009; Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Mouffe, 2005; Pepermans, 2005; Pepermans & Maesele, 2014; Swyngedouw, 2010). Drawing on Brulle (2010) and Gamson and Ryan (2005), I argued that they approach the audience as passive consumers, or clients, which must and can be 'steered' in a certain direction, the so-called 'rational consensus'. However, this view mainly supports and reproduces the interests of small groups of elites. Put differently, it fails to fundamentally criticize the development thinking of the capitalist-liberalist project. A literature review of the existing research on climate change framing demonstrated that this 'anthropocentric' (i.e. 'mechanic') worldview (e.g. Adamson, 2014; Alexander, 2007; Shepard, 2015; Stibbe, 2015; Verhagen, 2008) underlies many of the 'frames' which are currently in circulation. However, only few researchers explicitly recognize the ideological colour of their frames (e.g. Brand & Brunnengräber, 2012;

Maesele, 2010). This may, at least partly, be due to the ways in which framing and frames are often conceptualized and operationalized. I have argued that both the climate and the academic (framing) debate need *politicization* in order to go beyond the (hegemonic) consensus view. Citizens (i.e. people from all kinds of backgrounds) must be allowed to interact and actively participate in climate discussions. They may collectively help to instigate fundamental change, questioning the hegemonic perspectives and providing alternatives in the interest of the whole natural system and, accordingly, all humans. I connected this type of framing to biocentrism, which has the ‘organism’ or ‘natural web’ as a pivotal metaphor (e.g. Adamson, 2014; Alexander, 2007; Shepard, 2015; Stibbe, 2015; Verhagen, 2008). A literature review did, however, only yield some general and scattered insights regarding the presence and status of this type of framing in the media. I argued that the lack of counter-hegemonic ‘frames’ in the academic literature may, at least partly, be due to the fact that many researchers do not allow (their) hegemonic views to (thoroughly) interact with (i.e. to be questioned by) alternative perspectives (see Entman, 1991; Hertog & McLeod, 2001, p.150). The latter are more likely to appear in the context of, among others, (progressive) alternative and/or non-western publications, which are largely under-researched (e.g. Gunster, 2011, 2012; Hopke, 2012). However, those researchers who do concern themselves with these alternative contexts, may still be hampered by their conceptualizations and/or operationalizations of framing.

Accordingly, I formulated the following overarching research question: How do hegemonic anthropocentric and counter-hegemonic biocentric perspectives give shape to various visual-verbal climate change frames (i.e. subframes) in mainstream and (progressive) alternative media? Responding to this question, this study has made *three major contributions* to the field of framing studies, in general, and climate change framing, in particular. Firstly, in an attempt to approach framing in a more comprehensive, thorough and nuanced way, I have developed a multi-level and multimodal framing analysis toolkit. This allowed me, secondly, to come up with a set of climate change masterframes, frames and subframes, integrating and operationalizing framing and hegemony research (Carragee & Roefs, 2004). Finally, I have contributed to the further development of (multimodal) frame-building research in (and beyond) newsrooms, directly connecting journalist frames, the influences that affect the decision-making and the frames in news texts. This is important, as insights into the origin of frames may help us to better grasp the (ideological / hegemonic) implications and potential meanings of frames.

In the process, I have transferred the *metaphorical machine-organism dualism* from the context of environmental and climate change communication to the fields of academic (i.e. framing) research (practice), on the one hand, and journalism practice, on the other. This was broadly inspired by traditions of *ecolinguistics and ecocriticism* (e.g. Alexander, 2011; Alexander & Stibbe, 2014; Fill & Penz, 2007; Garrard, 2014; Hiltner, 2015; Milstein, 2009; Stibbe, 2015). Roughly speaking, both traditions are largely concerned with the effects of human communication on natural (life-supporting) systems. As

pointed out before, the machine and organism (or natural web) metaphors characterize, respectively, more anthropocentric and rather biocentric worldviews. Accordingly, they are usually employed to analyse how environmental discourses (directly) give shape to the relations among living beings (e.g. Heuberger, 2007; Larson, 2011; Shepard, 2015; Stibbe, 2015; Verhagen, 2008). As such, they are also central concepts in my framing analyses, in Chapters 4 and 5, of Anthropocentric and Biocentric Masterframes and Subframes. Naturally, my views or ‘ecosophy’ (Stibbe, 2015) (see Chapter 1) have also (unconsciously) informed my approach in the more conceptual and methodological chapters (Chapters 2 and 3), and the practice-based (i.e. frame-building) chapter (Chapter 6). Both academic research practices as well as journalism practice are part of human communication processes which, par excellence, help to make the world graspable and manageable for large groups of people. That is, they are both types of frame-building; they give shape to the (character of) academic and journalist frames through which we approach reality (Beck, 2000; Dahinden, 2005; Entman, Matthes & Pellicano, 2009; Scheufele, D.A., 1999, Scheufele, B., 2006; Van Gorp, 2006). Especially in those cases where processes are, in the end, aimed at understanding environmental communication, I believe that it may be valuable – if not necessary – to be also attentive to the realization of the machine and organism metaphors in the early stages of these processes. As such, one may quite easily trace recurrent patterns (e.g. depoliticization – politicization) throughout the stages of and across various types of communication processes.

7.1 Organic Ways of Conducting (Framing) Research

Throughout my discussions of the framing concept and method in Chapters 2 and 3, I have (implicitly) suggested that many of the existing framing approaches do not sufficiently exploit the potential of the concept and method as they are too partial, decontextualized, unilateral, ‘individualistic’, hierarchical, unresponsive / non-interactive and/or ‘neutral’. Rephrasing this, one could argue that they are *too ‘mechanical’*. That is especially so for deductive-quantitative approaches which argue that frames are measurable based on a limited number of quantifiable variables, void from much (subjective) interpretation and contextualization (e.g. Hertog & McLeod, 2001; Matthes & Kohring, 2008; Touri & Koteyko, 2015). Overall, researchers rarely elaborate on their positionalities or ecosophies (Stibbe, 2015), although these are likely to influence their views or interpretations (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Danelzik, 2016). As Alexander and Stibbe (2014) contend, each type of communication – including the frames or discourses employed to study communication – is characterized by omission and simplification. After all, selection and organization are preconditions for human (abstract) thinking (e.g. Bateson, 1972; Fillmore & Baker, 2009; Goffman, 1986; Graber, 1988). However, it is problematic if (over)simplifications prevent us from sufficiently grasping or understanding our communication, and thus potential implications for human relations with the rest of the world. In that light, it is clear why we ought to be critical towards (or, at least, approach with caution) *conceptual / methodological*

oversimplifications in the context of framing studies, such as the separation of frames from their underlying argumentations and, particularly, hegemonic struggles. Also, the separation of the visual and verbal modes or of denotative and other meaning levels may, as argued, be problematic. Each of those cannot exist without the others and, hence, loses a large part of its meaning when being approached in isolation (e.g. Coleman, 2010; Geise & Baden, 2015; Jewitt, 2009; Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006; Machin & Mayr, 2012; Martinec & Salway, 2005; Unsworth & Cléirigh, 2009). Further, research and knowledge development are not – and should not be – exclusively the terrain of (‘individualist’) *experts*. However, authors sticking to idiosyncratic frame sets (for each research topic) and/or refraining from openly discussing the (methodological) frameworks that they use to analyse (climate change) frames or the (framing / reasoning) devices that constitute their frames, largely prevent thorough interactions with, critical evaluations by or contributions from others, and thus concept / theory building (e.g. Hertog & McLeod, 2001; Reese, 2007; Tankard, 2001). In short, the debate is, to a large extent, exclusive and unresponsive (Groshek & Han, 2011). Nevertheless, I definitely do not argue that these contributions have no value, whatsoever. On the contrary, as I have shown, the existing insights have constituted a starting point for my own research and have – to a certain extent – informed and buttressed my concepts, methods and findings – even though it was often challenging to assess if and how different approaches or frameworks could interact. However, this does not alter the fact that some researchers, in my opinion, (unconsciously) contribute to the ‘*depoliticization*’ of the *academic debate* regarding (climate change) framing (Brulle, 2010; De Lucia, 2009; Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Mouffe, 2005; Pepermans, 2015; Pepermans & Maesele, 2014; Swyngedouw, 2010).

Therefore, I have argued that more constructive framing research is characterized by debate, openness, interaction, inclusiveness, equality, complexity, contextualization, (recognition of) subjectivity. We could, arguably, call this a more ‘*organic way of working*’. I have tried to contribute to the further development of the framing field by attending to, interacting with and building upon insights from a *variety of backgrounds and research fields*, going beyond the boundaries of (current) framing studies. I believe that this multi-faceted approach allowed me to grasp more of the complexity of framing, as a multimodal, multi-level concept and method, which always has an ideological background. To allow my contribution to be the subject of further assessment of, debate with or development by other researchers over time, I have tried to *communicate as openly as possible* about my methodological toolkit or which devices constitute the frames which I identify and why I believe this to be so (e.g. Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Glaser & Strauss, 1968; Lewis & Ritchie, 2003; Ritchie & Spencer, 1994). After all, not one study or perspective can grasp ‘the objective truth’ (as far as this exists, or ever can be grasped). However, amidst the interaction of many voices we can, perhaps, find ‘the (most comprehensible and) best possible truth’ (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Danelzik, 2016). Accordingly, I have also tried to be sufficiently open about my own assumptions, biases or beliefs (see positionality (Pulido & Peña, 1998; Taylor, 2000)), for instance by explicating my ‘*ecosophy*’ (Stibbe, 2015) from

the outset (see Chapter 1). After all, the researcher is not a machine, not a neutral ‘we’. This subjectivity cannot be overcome, but at least transparency and openness can prevent bias from undermining accuracy – allowing the audience to critically assess the findings and argumentations. In short, rather than approaching objectivity and neutrality as feasible goals, or facts, I have attempted to use them as valuable *means* to contribute to a fuller understanding of climate change framing (e.g. Carpentier, 2008; Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2007). One may argue that this might help to make the academic debate (regarding (climate change) framing) more inclusive and responsive (Groshek & Han, 2011), and thus, to ‘politicize’ it (Brulle, 2010; De Lucia, 2009; Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Mouffe, 2005; Pepermans, 2015; Pepermans & Maesele, 2014; Swyngedouw, 2010).⁹⁹

7.2 Organic Climate Change (Sub)frames

In Chapters 4 and 5, then, I have applied my framing approach for the analysis of a number of climate change frames. Approaching frames as multi-levelled concepts and allowing my own mental frames to interact with, and to be informed and questioned by a variety of views in a number of mainstream *and* alternative media outlets, I introduced two overarching ideologically coloured masterframes and, accordingly, two groups of subframes. As pointed out above, the *machine-organism opposition* (i.e. anthropocentrism versus biocentrism) is most directly present in these chapters. More specifically, I identified, on the one hand, a group of subframes which argue that climate change is a ‘simple’, manageable and (largely human-external) scientific problem that manifests itself particularly in some (separated) areas. A small group of individual(s) (elites) carries the main responsibility for causes and solutions. Those in control may pass on their knowledge and means to recipients, consumers or clients. (‘External’) development – toward a ‘higher’ western(ized) economic, technological, social, cultural and/or political ideal – is the ‘best’ and most rational answer. The biocentric group of subframes, on the other hand, highlight that the complexity and multi-levelled character of the problems – largely internal to western(ized) human society – requires multi-levelled solutions, and thus fundamental (‘internal’) change. This can only be realized if various groups of equals (i.e. citizens) (are allowed to) interact in inclusive, democratic debates. In Chapter 5, I have discussed in more detail the (multi-levelled) *injustices and inequalities* which are (re)produced by subframes that are exclusively informed by the ‘machine outlook’. Throughout these chapters, I have argued that subframes (and masterframes) based on the organism or natural web idea are generally more constructive (and effective) – at least in the current globalized world, facing particular interconnected problems – as they provide us with more complex, contextualized, multi-faceted, inclusive, interactive and open representations. As suggested before, I argue that they have largely adopted the guidelines for *more engaging communication*, which

⁹⁹ Note that Langacker (1993) argues in comparable ways, pointing out that ‘natural’ linguistic analyses attend as much as possible to the richness, subtlety and complexity of language while ‘unnatural’ descriptions violate the intrinsic organization by isolating particular elements or singling out one dimension, at the expense of other, interacting dimensions.

I summarized in the introduction (Chapter 1), and have taken them to a higher level. I have pointed out before that ‘contextualization’ is the common denominator underlying these various strategies.

Deconstruction-Reconstruction. The Biocentric Subframes respond to the call to counter-balance alarmism with more positive alternatives (e.g. Foust & O’Shannon Murphy, 2009; Hendry, 2010; O’Neill, 2017; O’Neill et al., 2013; O’Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 2009). As Brulle (2010) puts it, they provide ‘*deconstruction-reconstruction*’ subframes. Fear, unease or division may awaken citizens’ consciousness and make them more aware (again) of the complex world around them, large parts of which are often covered up or muffled behind a top layer of ‘rational consensus’. For instance, the Biocentric Subframes, which often foreground the hegemonic socio-economic system as destructive responsible agent, reveal and denounce the familiar and generally trusted ideals of ‘sustainable development’, ‘green economy / growth’, ‘emission trading’ or ‘development aid’ as semantic reversals. This is often done through contextualization (e.g. foregrounding rather than deleting of agents or circumstances, the usage of nominalizations and personifications) (see Hart, 2011; Iyengar, 1990) or powerful and (potentially) engaging rhetorical devices, such as metaphors or metonyms. The constructive strategies, then, (are supposed to) promote a *sense of self-efficacy* (Kellstedt, Zahran & Vedlitz, 2008) and agency among the audience (e.g. Curry, Stroud & McGregor, 2016; Leiserowitz, 2006, 2007; McIntyre, 2015; Painter, 2013; von Engelhardt & Jansz, 2014). That is, they suggest that people *are* able to take their own future in their hands and contribute to change. ‘We’, as sovereign agents (Chouliaraki, 2006), are usually associated with (material, economic, political, cultural, social) actions of positive and constructive fundamental change, including a foreshadowed better or ‘good life’. However, several authors (e.g. Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002; Norgaard, 2006; Sandvik, 2008; Spence & Pidgeon, 2010; Spence, Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2012) have justifiably pointed out that people are likely to (emotionally, psychologically and/or economically) protect themselves against unfamiliar, threatening and/or uncomfortable truths by distancing, delegating or denying them, or responding in apathic ways (see Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Graber, 1988; Höijer, 2004; Kim, 2011; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Indeed, people may, among others, deny their own responsibility, disregard the all-encompassing character of the climatic problems or only accept those arguments (e.g. solutions) which do not threaten their interests or values. Refusing to acknowledge (the full breadth and depth of) the problems or lacking motivation, people will fail to (fundamentally) change their thinking or behaviour, especially if actions require personal sacrifices. That is, indeed, a conceivable problem in the context of the Biocentric Subframes. Hence, I argue that it is crucial to assess this strategy in the light of *its embeddedness in the context of broader communicative choices*, which may – but not necessarily do – help to mitigate or even nullify such counter-productive effects. This study, with its well-developed (sub)frames and frame matrices, is one of the first to provide a tangible basis to do so. I will focus, in particular, on the often debated engaging strategies and discuss how exactly these are employed, adapted and operationalized

in the context of the identified counter-hegemonic subframes. Obviously, further empirical reception research is needed to inform us about the actual effects among various audiences.

Global Awareness. Firstly, people are inclined and/or encouraged to consider *climate change as a distant problem* for which they carry little responsibility and/or which will not affect their own lives in the near future (e.g. Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002; Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006; Norgaard, 2006; Sandvik, 2008; Spence and Pidgeon, 2010). Strategies that may help to *domesticate* the problems (e.g. Barron et al., 2012; Doyle, 2007, 2009; Joye, 2015; Nicholson-Cole, 2005; O'Neill et al., 2013; Sheppard, 2012) or contribute to a sense of '*ecological citizenship*' (Beck, 2000; Lester & Cottle, 2009) have been foregrounded as alternatives which may help to close the gap between the time-space of the audience and the global climate problem. Many strategies that are employed in the hegemonic subframes are, indeed, reminiscent of these strategies. As pointed out before, however, there is no agreement as for the audience effects of many of these choices. That is, various authors attribute contradictory effects to sublimations or air views (i.e. they may both highlight the importance and salience of the changes as well as distance the audience and make them feel as if their contributions are irrelevant) (e.g. Chouliaraki, 2006; Doyle, 2007, 2009; Grittmann, 2014; Hahn, Eide & Ali, 2012; Hughes, 2012; Manzo, 2010a, 2010b; Nicholson-Cole, 2005; O'Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 2009; O'Neill, 2017; O'Neill et al., 2013). For example, the focus often lies on one or a few singled out vulnerable places or groups, which are, for instance, pinpointed on a (world) map (through colour symbolism). These can often be described as culturally resonant or valued places, objects or traditions, or sublime species or natural systems. That is, they are relevant or important to (some groups in) the audience (e.g. Grittmann, 2014; Hansen & Machin, 2008; Hulme, 2004). The symbol of the globe (Doyle, 2007, 2009; Hughes, 2012; Lester & Cottle, 2009; Mahony & Hulme, 2014; Manzo, 2010a, 2010b) as well as a number of other recurrent metaphors or metonyms – the polar bear, the suffering child, spectacular views of destructed or flooded landscapes, melting glaciers... (e.g. Doyle, 2007, 2009; León & Erviti, 2015; Manzo, 2010a, 2010b; Smith & Joffe, 2009) – are prevalent. According to Lester and Cottle (2009), the reappearance of such 'stock images' may evoke the idea that the changes are omnipresent and repetitive, and thus due to a more fundamental, underlying (climate) problem. Consumer Rights or Human Wealth, in particular, attempt to connect the problems more directly to the time-space of the (western) audience. The focus often lies on (familiar) places in the West, and the interests of the people living there, affected by climate consequences. Although this backgrounds and abstracts other regions or (non-human) groups, domesticated scenes are often (implicitly) connected to the (abstract) global threat of climate change.

Howard-Williams (2012) points out, however, that the global public sphere envisioned by Beck (2000) and, accordingly, Lester and Cottle (2009), is *unlike the 'public sphere' imagined by Habermas* (see Habermas & Burger, 1989). That is, it does not allow participants or cultures to directly interact with each other as equals. Thus, while 'ecological citizenship' entails an increased awareness of a more

salient ‘other’ and, potentially, feelings of empathy or engagement, the other remains a social construction. According to Beck (2000), those who are responsible are held to account – ‘out in the open, global public (media) sphere’ rather than behind closed doors – and that may create room for action and change. After all, the ‘old’ responses are not sufficient or workable anymore in the global ‘risk society’, in which concepts like ‘economy’, ‘politics’ or ‘a safe environment’ ‘need to be renegotiated and redefined.’¹⁰⁰ Nossek and Kunelius (2012) argue that if national media do not domesticate foreign news, they tend to adopt a ‘hegemonic global view’, which strongly draws on the perspective of the elite voices in the ‘centre’ (i.e. most dominant regions and groups). Those are supposedly voicing a ‘common (sense)’ view.¹⁰¹ I second the argumentations of Howard-Williams (2012) and Nossek and Kunelius (2012). More specifically, I argue that the singling out of individualized vulnerable regions or groups mainly contributes to ‘pigeonholing’ (Larson, 2011). The one-sided character of these depictions of vulnerability is exacerbated through the unilateral preoccupation with objects, participants or places which are relevant for (western(ized)) humans (see Euro-American anthropocentrism). While we are aware of ‘some (vulnerable) others’, there is no sense of true interconnection or mutual dependence. The only suggested relation is a rather abstract, unilateral one, with (generic) western(ized) elites as producers of problems and solutions and non-westernized, non-elite and/or non-human groups as (passive) recipients. Both the victims outside of the time-space of the western audience as well as those situated within (i.e. domestication) are, besides, usually depicted as generic, passive and, thus, distant ‘others’, with whom we cannot, or only remotely, relate (Chouliaraki, 2006). The globe symbolism – which is particularly salient in *Scala Naturae* – may, on the other hand, also overgeneralize the responsibilities *and* the vulnerability of generic human or abstract ‘we’ (Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Manzo, 2010a, 2010b; Swyngedouw, 2010), with whom we cannot easily relate either. Summarizing, the (Reform) Anthropocentric Subframes overall suggest that there is a ‘*hierarchy of suffering*’ (Bankoff, 2001; Beck, 2000; von Engelhardt & Jansz, 2014). Yet, even if a more holistic outlook is adopted, a lack of intimacy (see Swim & Bloodhart, 2015) prevents us from truly imagining ourselves as part of the larger problem (i.e. as responsible agents or victim) (Nixon, 2015). What is more, even though the globe symbolism or repeated ‘stock images’ may encourage us to imagine the individual changes as part of an (external) underlying global climate problem, we – as individuals – are not encouraged to consider the problems and solutions as internal to the more fundamental structures of our society (constituted by collectives of citizens). As such, lacking contextualization, the hegemonic subframes are most likely to feed into *ad-hoc, short-term, individualized actions*, backgrounding structural problems or responsibilities (Hart, 2011; Iyengar, 1990), such as the reproduction of fundamental injustices and inequalities (e.g. De Lucia, 2009).

¹⁰⁰ Beck (2000) refers in that context to ‘(involuntary) politicization’, defining the term, as shown, in quite different ways as I do in this study, drawing on authors like Mouffe (2005) or Swyngedouw (2010).

¹⁰¹ See also ‘emergency news’ as described by Chouliaraki (2006).

The Biocentric Subframes, however, are more likely to give rise to – or at least provide a glance of – the ‘global public sphere’ as imagined by Habermas (see Habermas & Burger, 1989) and accordingly, I argue, to a ‘*natural web*’ of *interconnected, equal but diverse participants* (Shepard, 2015; Verhagen, 2008). They mainly do so through contextualization, in multi-perspective stories: Causes, problems and solutions are situated in (various) larger societal (socio-political, economic) and/or environmental systems (Hart, 2011; Iyengar, 1990). As we collectively constitute or ‘make’ these systems, we can no longer simply ignore or downplay our roles as heroes, villains *and* victims. For instance, the visual-verbal humanization and/or activation of ‘them’ or the reversal of ‘us-them’ roles (i.e. alignments) (see Chouliaraki, 2006; Huggan & Tiffin, 2015; Manzo, 2010b; van Dijk, 1998) may make the audience aware of their place in the larger natural web (Shepard, 2015; Verhagen, 2008). As Shepard (2015), Norton (2014) or Adamson (2014) point out, recognizing our place in the natural web is a precondition for really respecting ourselves and others and interacting with them on a par. The global (hierarchical) economic society is replaced by a global civil society of (at least) human equals, which are (largely) situated in time-spaces which are meaningful to the audience or which the latter can clearly connect to their own time-spaces. That is, these subframes suggest *intimacy* (see Swim & Bloodhart, 2015) next to – or even more than – *holism* (Nixon, 2015). We interact and are interconnected with other living beings: We are all both victims as well as sovereign agents (Chouliaraki, 2006). We can all help others, but also need help. Our actions affect others while their actions affect us. In short, we are (structurally) interdependent. Even so, ‘us’ is used in nuanced ways, foregrounding that – despite our equality and connectivity – we are not all (treated) the same (in the current society), drawing on other views or experiences, struggling with problems or issues which are not entirely identical, carrying different responsibilities. In any case, feeling connected with others, we are more inclined to contemplate and act systematically upon the why of the suffering (‘reflexive identification’) (Chouliaraki, 2006), addressing more fundamental problems, injustices and inequalities (see Eide & Kunelius, 2012).

Collective Responsibility. This can directly be connected to a second problem, which is often pointed out: people are inclined to delegate the responsibility to act to the elites. Moreover, they may feel or believe it is pointless for them to take action as long as they do not get the impression that others are acting either, that is, if they lack a sense of peer support. Small-scale, individual contributions seem pointless in the light of the major threats which the world is facing (Dilling & Moser, 2007; Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Graber, 1988; Hart, 2011; Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Frames are considered as disengaging if they support or reinforce this thinking. The Anthropocentric Subframes in my study indeed demonstrate a preoccupation with *individual(ized groups of) responsible agents*, primarily elites like politicians or experts. Individual consumers are secondary agents. The idea of collective action – let alone system-thinking – is largely absent. Most actions lie in the sphere of (small-scale, ‘external’) consumption and/or production. The Biocentric Subframes, on the other hand, are far more likely to give rise to the much needed sense of peer support. After all, they foreground *collective*

groups of active citizens – often represented by ‘real’ (functionalized) individuals like us – who are welcomed to contribute to discussions about and/or to collectively act for change (Corner, Webster & Teriete, 2015; O’Neill, 2017). As I have argued above, contextualization (e.g. Hart, 2011; Iyengar, 1990) is of great importance here. Being situated in the context of broader societal structures (i.e. ideologies, beliefs), (problems and) solutions are (and can) no longer (be) ‘owned’ by individual consumers but rather by collective groups of citizens. Rather than overgeneralizing ‘(collective) we’ as equally responsible for (causes and) solutions (Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Swyngedouw, 2010), however, ‘we’ is usually employed as a strongly nuanced pronoun. For instance, ‘us-them’ contrasts or hyperboles may highlight the primarily bottom-up character of the collective action. Simultaneously, ‘we’ may belong to one or multiple interacting groups, depending on the (sub)frame (and its interaction with the mental frames and schemata of the audience): citizens, bottom-up groups in the South, responsible (elite) agents, western(ized) humans, the whole natural system.

Contextualized Conflict. Thirdly, McIntyre (2015) points out that people also get disengaged if final solutions are already provided. After all, their contributions are not required anymore or even get (implicitly / explicitly) delegitimized. Avoiding fundamental debate and discussion, or relying on (predefined) balance or dichotomies, the Anthropocentric Subframes which I identified may, indeed, weaken a sense of self-efficacy among the audience (Kellstedt, Zahran & Vedlitz, 2008). For instance, the consensus view regarding green growth or sustainable development may be reproduced as the most rational or common sense perspective by presenting it at both sides of the ‘discussion’. Put differently, many ‘*frame struggles*’ take place *within the contours of the (Reform) Anthropocentric Masterframe*. The boundaries of this masterframe define the boundaries of the legitimate debate. If non-hegemonic views (e.g. Rights of the Free Market) are explicitly placed vis-à-vis the consensus view, those are delegitimized through salience enhancing strategies (like repetition, placement, presupposition, modality, rhetorics). As such, the Anthropocentric Subframes respond – one may argue – to the call of authors like Corbett and Durfee (2004) or Leiserowitz (2007) to contextualize uncertainty and debate in order to highlight the extent of the (scientific) consensus upon which can and must be acted. Transformation Subframes, however, also foreground ‘contextualized debates’. Yet, being open towards alternative perspectives and discussions beyond the boundaries of the hegemonic worldview, they may help to depict climate action as a *continuously developing process* in which every contribution might still have its value. That is, there is not one single, let alone a final, solution (e.g. Stibbe, 2015). Thus, ‘contextualization’ must in this context primarily be understood as the inclusion of a broader group of (non-hegemonic) perspectives (Groshek & Han, 2012). Still, I will discuss below, our attention is often (implicitly) guided towards a preferred (i.e. ‘the most constructive’ or ‘best possible’) solution. Summarizing, the Biocentric Subframes tend to employ broader (*contextualized*) *conflict as a means* to engage a larger number of voices and perspectives, to make sense of issues, question ‘realities’ or

suggest solutions, rather than as a goal to present a certain (consensus) view in a neutral way, to engage people for a ‘preferred way of acting’ (e.g. Carpentier, 2008; Gans, 1989; Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2007).

Resonant Values and Interests. A fourth problem that is often addressed is that people tend to reject frames which are contradictory to, or threaten, their *values or interests* (e.g. Dilling & Moser, 2007; Sandvik, 2008; Stoll-Kleemann, O’Riordan & Jaeger, 2001; Whitmarsh, O’Neill & Lorenzoni, 2013). Lakoff (2010) also contends that many frames activate destructive (i.e. conservative) views (e.g. nature for human use, market fundamentalism, no government regulations). The two Status-Quo Anthropocentric Subframes in my corpus – Rights of the Free Market and Natural Machine – openly reflect such values. Nevertheless, it is, clearly, quite generally accepted now that frames must be tailored to the (constructive part of the) values or belief systems of (specific groups of) people, in order to engage them for ‘the right cause’ (e.g. Darnton & Kirk, 2011; Lakoff, 2010; Leiserowitz, 2006, 2007; Nisbet, 2009; Myers et al., 2012; Shen, 2004b; Shen & Edwards, 2005; Slocum, 2004; Weathers & Kendall, 2015; Weathers, Maibach & Nisbet, 2017; Whitmarsh, O’Neill & Lorenzoni, 2013). McIntyre (2015) argues, for instance, that constructive journalism must make sure to manipulate individuals into feeling positive emotions (i.e. to emotionally engage). Each of the identified Anthropocentric Subframes foregrounds a number of ‘*universally shared*’ values (see Beck, 2000; Crompton & Smith, 2015; Grouzet et al., 2005; Schwartz, 1994). However, those which can be recognized in the context of Consumer Rights and Human Wealth are ranked highest in surveys such as the Eurobarometer (2014). That is, they can be expected to (strongly) resonate with large groups of people. Individual, family, national health and security are central in Consumer Rights. Wealth, intelligence or self-indulgence characterize Human Wealth. Less resonant values like protecting the environment or justice are only secondary. These are, however, pivotal in the context of Scala Naturae and Unequal Vulnerability. Scala Naturae further foregrounds values like helpfulness, being part of nature, a beautiful world or moderation but also pleasure, self-indulgence or influence. Equality, helpfulness or a world at peace can be connected with Unequal Vulnerability, as well as security, social order, social recognition or wealth.

While it is quite generally accepted that the values or interests need to ‘package’ a rather ‘neutral’ (scientific) environmental message, and make it more appealing, my analyses disprove this argumentation, at least when it comes to the subframes.¹⁰² As I have demonstrated, underlying all hegemonic subframes are the same anthropocentric (‘mechanic’) values. Being merely concerned with financial success, authority, influence and order (e.g. Dryzek, 1997; Hopwood, Mellor & O’Brien, 2005; Larson, 2011; Prelli & Winters, 2009; Stibbe, 2005, 2015; Verhagen, 2008), they can be considered as *largely ‘extrinsic’ values and/or values related to the physical self* (see Grouzet et al., 2005). According to authors like Crompton and Smith (2015) or Lakoff (2010), these need to be avoided in communication

¹⁰² Note that, as I argued earlier, my (ideologically coloured) subframes can be situated on the same level as many of the (‘neutral’) ‘frames’ identified in the literature. The frames which I have identified and described can, arguably, be considered as more generic, global, ‘neutral’.

about climate change as they fail to engage the audience and encourage them to act. Drawing on Stibbe (2015, p.202), I consider as extrinsic those values which are concerned with “(...) self-serving goals which, *in themselves*, make no contribution to the common good. In other words, the goals are not an ethical end in themselves” (italic in original). Rather than being avoided, however, I have shown that they are made to fit into (superficially) pro-environmental (sub)frames. Once activated, they are likely to draw the attention away from other (intrinsic, self-transcendent) groups of values (e.g. Crompton & Smith, 2015). That is, they help to shape discussions that are largely exclusive and unresponsive (Groshek & Han, 2011). Accordingly, the values associated with those subframes (Consumer Rights and Human Wealth) which are ‘designed’ to resonate most directly with the (assumed) values and interests of the audience (living in a capitalist society in which we are socialized as individualist consumers), are for the larger part situated in the corner of extrinsic values (e.g. financial success) and/or values related to the physical self (e.g. physical health, safety, hedonism) (Crompton & Smith, 2015; Grouzet et al., 2005). Many of the central values (e.g. equality, social justice, protecting environment, helpfulness) of Circle of Life and Environmental Justice, which are also minor values in the two other subframes, appear to be ‘intrinsic’ (see Crompton & Smith, 2015; Schwartz, 1994). That is, they seem to be “(...) aimed at altruistic goals which, *in themselves*, contribute to the common good. In other words, the goals are an ethical end in themselves” (Stibbe, 2015, p.203; italics in original). Nevertheless, I have shown that they can be filled out in entirely different – more anthropocentric or rather biocentric; self-serving or altruistic – ways depending on the context or the positionality (Pulido & Peña, 1998; Taylor, 2000) of participants (i.e. both communicators as well as recipients). For instance, ‘Universal (i.e. western(ized)) Justice’ has other implications and meanings than locally defined justices (e.g. Beck, 2000; De Lucia, 2009; Sen, 1999, 2009; Shiva, 1988, 1993). Protecting the environment may happen out of recognition of the intrinsic value of all (non-)living beings, but may also mainly be concerned with (extrinsic) interests in terms of human needs, wealth or luxury (e.g. Dryzek, 1997; Endres, 2012; Meister, 1997; Naess, 1973; Remillard, 2011; Stibbe, 2015). As discussed, the (Euro-American) anthropocentric interpretations which are dominant in the hegemonic subframes only contribute to the common good in superficial ways. In the end, however, they are mainly deployed with an eye on profit, status, control, competition (i.e. the confirmation and reproduction of the hegemonic world(view)). After all, once people start to focus for extrinsic values, they automatically lose attention for intrinsic values, and vice versa (Crompton & Smith, 2015). Summarizing, *resonant values are mainly used as goals per se* and not as means to a higher (ethical / extrinsic) goal: sets of values are (strategically) selected in order to convince the audience to accept and support a whole package of seemingly intrinsic *and* (underlying) extrinsic values. Being juxtaposed and integrated in the context of comprehensive (sub)frames, it is suggested that these views are not contradictory whatsoever: the frame, foregrounding certain views and suppressing others, makes us understand one set of (intrinsic, pro-environmental) values in terms of another (extrinsic, anthropocentric) set of values (see Hansen & Machin, 2008; Meister, 1997; Stibbe, 2015). As such, these subframes contribute to the depoliticization of the debate

(Brulle, 2010; De Lucia, 2009; Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Mouffe, 2005; Pepermans, 2015; Pepermans & Maesele, 2014; Swyngedouw, 2010).

The values in the Biocentric Subframes, then, predominantly have an *intrinsic and/or self-transcendent character* (Grouzet et al., 2005). Natural Web, Unequal Attribution and Civil Rights are mainly concerned with values such as being part of nature, protecting the environment, equality, social justice, (inner) harmony, a world at peace, broadmindedness, humility, maintaining tradition or responsibility. Obviously, some of those are more central to some of the subframes than are others. These ‘universal’ human values now get *biocentric (‘organic’) and altruistic interpretations*, being concerned with community, affiliation, respect. That is, being aimed at altruistic goals, these values are not only superficially intrinsic, but may actually contribute to the common good (see Stibbe, 2015). For instance, being part of nature does not mean controlling the environment as a machine or taking advantage of the natural resources but interacting with fellow beings in harmony (natural web) (e.g. Adamson, 2014; Alexander, 2007; Dryzek, 1997; Larson, 2011; Naess, 1973; Shepard, 2015; Shiva, 1988, 1993; Stibbe, 2005, 2015; Verhagen, 2008). Goals and means – respect, interaction, collectivity, broadmindedness, humility – are largely parallel, and mutually constitutive (e.g. Brulle, 2010). Drawing on an extensive literature review, Crompton and Smith (2015) conclude that people who consider intrinsic values to be particularly important, are more likely to be concerned about environmental issues and motivated to engage (see Lakoff, 2010). One may argue that the Biocentric Subframes still draw the audience into accepting a particular (‘most constructive’) reality. Indeed, some (biocentric) perspectives are foregrounded as more constructive and effective, in the current space-time, dealing with a specific problem. Anyhow, (a person’s) attention for intrinsic (and self-transcendent) values automatically entails a loss of attention for other types of values, and vice versa (Crompton & Smith, 2015). Nevertheless, exactly the focus on the fundamental equality and interaction in the natural web (e.g. Adamson, 2014; Norton, 2014; Shepard, 2015; Verhagen, 2008) does allow – explicitly or, at least implicitly – other worldviews and values a (certain) place in the debate. After all, one perspective or positionality never allows us to fully grasp a particular problem or ‘reality’. That is, the answer to climate change does not lie in one small set of ‘superior’ or ‘rational’ values but rather in the interaction of different views (see politicization) (e.g. Brulle, 2010; De Lucia, 2009; Mouffe, 2005; Pepermans, 2015; Pepermans & Maesele, 2014; Sen, 1999, 2009; Shiva, 1988, 1993). Hence, *debates must be inclusive and responsive* (Groshek & Han, 2011) (see ‘contextualized conflict’ above). As shown, for instance, the counter-hegemonic subframes also embrace – to a certain extent, at least – extrinsic values like authority, wealth, power or capability, or values that are more concerned with the physical self, like enjoying life, freedom or self-respect. The latter, in particular, may (also) be filled out – or, more correctly perhaps, interpreted – in more biocentric ways (i.e. not as goals in their own right but as means to higher, ethical goals) in the context of the counter-hegemonic subframes, though. For instance, ‘the good life’ is considered *as a means* for humans (and non-humans) to live equitable, fair, fulfilling and

moderate lives. In any case, Biocentric Subframes are – supposedly – able to engage larger groups of people.

Nevertheless, the realization of the counter-hegemonic subframes in my corpus illustrates that their potential to engage may be more limited in practice (see also Kenis & Mathijs, 2014). Firstly, I have shown that the *solutions* provided by the Biocentric Subframes, particularly Natural Web and Civil Rights, are often *rather limited and quite abstract* (i.e. underdeveloped). Hence, one may wonder whether they are salient enough to counter-balance the substantial system critique (Brulle, 2010; Foust & O’Shannon Murphy, 2009; O’Neill, 2017; O’Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 2009; O’Neill et al., 2013). As said, the lack of a feasible alternative may encourage people to distance, deny or delegate uncomfortable and/or unfamiliar truths, or to respond in apathic ways (Fiske and Taylor, 1991; Graber, 1988; Höijer, 2004; Kim, 2011; Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002; Norgaard, 2006; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Sandvik, 2008; Spence & Pidgeon, 2010; Spence, Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2012). Inviting the audience to provide their own solutions, the subframes may – theoretically – mitigate these effects. In practice, however, the subframes only present, and (seem to) encourage, *limited responsiveness and inclusiveness* (Groshek & Han, 2011). That is, they tend to essentialize us-them (e.g. hero-victim or hero-villain) antagonisms (see van Dijk, 1988, p.33), which may prevent mutual understanding, cooperation or debate (Fraser, 2000; Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Ritchie & Thomas, 2015). Piotrowski (2013) contends, for example, that oversimplified dualisms may disengage the ‘villains’ (or ‘victims’) as they are delegitimized and reduced to listeners, who are told they cannot understand the situation unless it is explained to them by the ‘heroes’. Especially if the emphasis lies on the hero role of ‘exclusive us’ or ‘them’ (e.g. grassroots groups in the South, (far-leftist) environmental movements) others may feel disengaged (see Kenis & Mathijs, 2014). Accordingly, the subframes may be *skewed towards one set of values or worldviews*. However, the co-presence of Anthropocentric and Biocentric Subframes across outlets and within the scope of single alternative, *and* mainstream, outlets may partly facilitate ideological diversity and inclusiveness, even though the direct interaction (responsiveness) among the various viewpoints remains limited (Groshek & Han, 2011). Likewise, most (realized) alternative subframes only suggest *partial interconnections among the audience and the rest of the natural web*. Human-nature equality is not fully restored. This may prevent us from taking up responsibility vis-à-vis nature, contemplating and acting systematically upon the why of suffering (‘reflexive identification’) (Chouliaraki, 2006). Besides, as long as we fail to fully recognize our equality with nature, we also keep doing (some level of) injustice to all humans – including ourselves – who are part of the natural web (Larson, 2011; Norton, 2014; Roos & Hunt, 2010; Shepard, 2015). In short, the Biocentric Subframes do not yet fully exploit their potential to mobilize (all) people to actively contribute to the debate and collectively enact (fundamental) change. Put differently, they are not (yet) able to truly contribute to the politicization of the debate (Brulle, 2010; De Lucia, 2009; Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Mouffe, 2005; Pepermans, 2015; Pepermans & Maesele, 2014; Swyngedouw, 2010).

7.3 Organic Ways of Journalistic Frame-Building

Finally, I have enacted and illustrated a more comprehensive or organic approach to framing by connecting my frame set to the practices of *journalistic frame-building*, in Chapter 6. As argued before, in order to gain a fuller understanding of the potential implications or meanings of frames, textual frames may not be separated from the contexts in which they originate (e.g. Dahinden, 2005; Entman, Matthes & Pellicano, 2009; Scheufele, D.A., 1999, Scheufele, B., 2006; Van Gorp, 2006). In order to make these highly complex and multi-faceted contexts graspable, I have tried to capture them in two schematic representations.

I have argued that mainstream newsrooms (at least, those under research) often function as *machines*: (small groups of) individuals work along hierarchically organized assembly lines. They have (access to) knowledge and ‘truths’ which they must share with (passive) recipients, in order to inform the latter and engage them for the ‘right cause’. In other words, the journalists are largely disconnected from their audiences; interactions are limited and one-sided. (Being compelled to) considering quantity (e.g. audience share, revenue, articles, advertisers) and efficiency (time-space, money, employees) as major values or motives, they use a number of strategies (e.g. objectivity, news values, autonomy) as goals in their own right (i.e. to attract and convince audiences) rather than as means (to facilitate debate, the distribution of (various) important views). As such, the ‘machine’ produces predominantly Anthropocentric news (and journalist) Subframes which are separated from other (ideologically coloured) perspectives (i.e. exclusiveness, unresponsiveness (Groshek & Han, 2011)). Trying to survive in this machine, the journalists (are forced to) mainly reproduce their socialized mental frames as ‘objective facts’. Yet, failing to openly discuss their biases, assumptions or methods, they may deceive the audience or, at least, prevent reciprocity or fundamental debate. In short, a small group takes ‘big’ decisions. This may seriously hinder the further development of climate change communication (see Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2007). Put differently, it may give rise to *depoliticization* (Brulle, 2010; De Lucia, 2009; Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Mouffe, 2005; Pepermans, 2015; Pepermans & Maesele, 2014; Swyngedouw, 2010).

The selected (progressive) alternative outlets, on the contrary, resemble *organisms*. A variety of equal voices are welcomed to the debate, as sources or ‘reporters’. The professional (newsroom) journalists, who do not (necessarily) have superior knowledge, only constitute one group among them. Like other contributors, they mainly want to stir the debate by introducing views which others may not be familiar with. After all, only interaction allows to come to ‘the best possible truths’. Journalism is a collective endeavour. Quality, rather than quantity, is the main motive of these media, which want to contribute to the larger system they are part of. Hence, news strategies like objectivity, newsworthiness or autonomy are used as means to achieve, or at least pursue, this goal. The organic way of working is, as shown, more likely to facilitate ideologically diverse newsroom (and journalist) subframes. That is, there is

room for inclusiveness and responsiveness (Groshek & Han, 2011). Indeed, the organic way of working grants contributors more freedom to reproduce their journalist (sub)frames, or at least what they consider – based on personal experience, research, reasoning – as the most constructive (sub)frames. The latter can never be fixed, but always remain open to questioning and assessment by the journalists themselves or by others. Accordingly, transparency regarding assumptions, biases and/or methods, and thus the subjective / ‘temporal’ character of each argumentation, invites assessment by and/or discussions among large (or at least broader) groups of people (see Carpentier, 2008; Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2007). In short, the (progressive) alternative media are more likely to contribute to the *politicization* of the debate (Brulle, 2010; De Lucia, 2009; Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Mouffe, 2005; Pepermans, 2015; Pepermans & Maesele, 2014; Swyngedouw, 2010).

While these findings are largely based on the qualitative interviews which I have conducted, they were further informed by the insights of other authors, like Atton (2002, 2003), Boesman et al. (2017), Brüggemann and Engesser (2014, 2016), Deuze (2005b), Eliasoph (1988), Gans (1979, 2004), Gess (2012), Hanitzsch (2007, 2011), Harcup (2003, 2014), Mendelson and Creech (2016), Bertram Scheufele (2006), Shoemaker and Reese (2014) or Tuchman (1972, 1978).

7.4 Where to Go from Here? Organic Thinking and Future Communication Practice

We – as individuals but even as groups – will always be unable to fully grasp ‘reality’: the complexity of the world, the natural system, human communication, actions or mental processes. Selection and structuring are *the* main strategies of framing, which allows us to handle this complexity. Yet, choosing the best possible or most constructive ways to deal with this unsurmountable ‘fact’, we still have a few options at our disposal. As I have shown, so-called ‘*mechanic*’ and ‘*organic*’ approaches are in use today. Based on the cumulative findings in this study, I contend that the former (hegemonic) one largely inspires oversimplification through the deleting, ignoring, disregarding or disconnecting of important parts of ‘the system’. Put differently, humans try to enforce a machine structure upon fundamentally organic systems (see Adamson, 2014; Alexander, 2007; Larson, 2011; Norton, 2014; Shepard, 2015; Stibbe, 2015; Verhagen, 2008). Apparently, that has not worked out very well for academic (framing) research, journalism, society, environment, the climate. I conclude, therefore, that *acknowledging and respecting the organic structure of things* is more likely to give us access to ‘*less skewed truths*’. Recognizing and embracing complexity *and* our limitations to ever grasp it, is a first step to understanding, not the end-point. Accordingly, we need to cherish and enable interactions with others, who are well-positioned to show us what we cannot see based on their differing positionalities (Pulido & Peña, 1998; Taylor, 2000). Drawing on the insights which I have gathered, I argue for more organically inspired approaches in academics, in journalism practice, in society at large.

Clearly, the findings which I have provided throughout this study are based on the insights of one researcher, in interaction with a small group of direct and indirect colleagues or peers (e.g. the literature), holding particular worldviews, interests, values and experiences (a positionality / ecosophy) and working in a particular academic field (media and communication studies; (applied) linguistics), a particular part of the world (a western European country) and a particular time period (the first part of the twenty-first century). Accordingly, this study can only contribute to a fuller understanding of the issues which it has dealt with – the methods and concept of framing, climate change framing, the journey of frames along the framing process – through the interaction with other views. Hence, I hope that the insights which I have provided will inspire *follow-up research* by academic and non-academic colleagues from different backgrounds, working in different time-spaces, in different disciplines or research traditions or on different topics. They may assess, develop or build upon my findings.

As pointed out in Chapter 3, the *multi-level, multimodal framing analysis toolkit* requires further testing and development: Currently, its extensive character makes it hard to apply in practice. Its application in other contexts may, however, help to sift out the decisive framing devices. Researchers from different backgrounds may be better placed to critically point out redundancies and shortcomings. For instance, a shortcoming that I was not able to address is the applicability of the model in audiovisual contexts. Another is the failure of the current toolkit to provide definite answers as for the handling of visual-verbal dependencies *and* contrasts. In Chapters 4 and 5 I emphasized that the frames, subframes and masterframes which I introduced, constitute only one step towards a more comprehensive *frame set*. Being based on a relatively limited corpus collected in one western European country, they can, no doubt, only provide us with a partial image. Hence, diachronic and synchronic follow-up studies will need to further develop, adapt, extend, redress or contextualize my preliminary findings. For example, depending on the context, other (culturally available) frames may be in circulation (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). It may also help to make the Gaia Subframe more (empirically) solid or to fill out other (apparent) gaps in my frame set. For instance, are there biocentric realizations of the Economic Challenge Frame in circulation and how exactly can we summarize their underlying argumentations? Chapter 6 made clear that there is still a long way to go with regard to *frame-building*. While the machine-organism dualism may be a valuable tool that can easily be transferred to other studies which try to grasp the working of newsrooms, it definitely needs further development and nuancing. Researchers who take other groups of mainstream and/or alternative outlets into account may, for instance, help to fill out and explicate the positioning of various journalism traditions on the continuum. Possibly, the inclusion of other types of media – for instance far-rightist alternative media (e.g. Atton, 2006) – will demand reworkings of the model to make it more inclusive. Besides, follow-up studies also need to delve deeper into visual frame-building. Lacking data regarding the journalist frames of the photo editors, I could only draw general conclusions. Such limitations could be tackled by adding an ethnographic layer in future research. Finally, due to time restraints, this study does not address the last

stage of the framing process: *frame interpretations by the audience*. Hence, I hope that other authors will complement my findings regarding frame-building and textual frames, demonstrating how frames can be traced throughout the whole framing process (i.e. from their origin to their reception). Also, audience reception research may further help to validate, or disprove, the expectations that I have formulated with regard to the effects of the visual and verbal parts of frames (see 2.3.5 Pending Issues; 3.3 Frame Interpretations) in the context of climate communication. Also, it may put to the test my theoretical argumentations as regards to the power of the Biocentric Subframes to engage the audience and politicize the debate (see above) (Brulle, 2010; De Lucia, 2009; Kenis & Mathijs, 2014; Mouffe, 2005; Pepermans, 2015; Pepermans & Maesele, 2014; Swyngedouw, 2010).

I conclude with a direct address to the reader. While everyone will, no doubt, take away other insights from this study, I would like to formulate *six points of advice* which, in my opinion, most clearly emanate from my research. All of these suggestions – which I have tried to apply throughout this study – revolve around the ideal of the organism (see also the discussions of ‘slow journalism by Gess (2012), Le Masurier (2015), Harbers (2016), Mendelson and Creech (2016) or Drok and Hermans (2016), of constructive journalism by McIntyre (2015) or Curry, Stroud and McGregor (2016) or of ‘truth’ and ‘objectivity’ by Kovach and Rosenstiel (2007) or Carpentier (2008)). I believe that they may be helpful for every communicator-researcher, working in academia, journalism, non-profit, politics or society at large (Jacobson, 2016). Of course, fundamental change can only stem from multi-level evolutions within and across each of these fields. However, as we collectively make (are) the system, every step may contribute to this transformation.

- 1. Modesty:** No one possesses *the* truth. Rather, every individual (or group) has only direct access to a small piece of the puzzle. As a witness or steward, everyone may share important information which others are not aware of or have no access to. Yet, no one should purport to be *the* educator who is able to put others on *the* right track. In short, every communicator should take modesty and self-scepticism as a rule of thumb.
- 2. Transparency:** It is alright – and even perfectly normal – for communicators to have their own opinions, biases, motives, assumptions. Yet, they should be open about them and clearly position themselves rather than try and cover up their subjectivity. Also, they should openly discuss the methods which they use. This allows the audience to evaluate the reliability, soundness or transferability of their arguments and draw their own conclusions. Put differently, rather than a goal as such, objectivity should be a means to prevent bias from jeopardizing accuracy. Being transparent is showing respect to the audience and treating them as equals.
- 3. Inclusiveness and interaction:** As all views are equal, each piece of communication should be open towards a wide variety of voices (e.g. professionals and non-professionals, western and non-western, male and female, young and old, higher or lower educated, with leftist, centrist or

rightist political leanings or from various academic backgrounds or journalist beats). They should be included in the debate and allowed to interact within the context of one ‘text’ or across various ‘texts’. At the very least, their viewpoints ought to be taken into consideration, assessed, balanced off against other views in the development process of texts, and not disapproved off from the outset. After all, we depend on each other to get a fuller (the best possible) idea of the complex ‘reality’.

4. **Contextualization (i.e. ‘thematic framing’):** Everything and everyone is part of a larger system, an organism or (natural) web. While it is impossible to let this system emerge in any single piece of communication, every communicator should at least explicate how his/her arguments are connected to the system. Interacting, then, many texts can ‘collectively’ allow the broader context to emerge. Contextualization should clarify, among others, that groups or systems rather than individualized agents are, in the end, responsible for fundamental causes or solutions, that the time-space of the audience is interconnected to the time-space of the agents and patients in the text, or that communication always encompasses various layers (e.g. visual-verbal, denotative-connotative-ideological) which mutually interact and influence each other, and can only be thoroughly understood in that light.
5. **Deconstruction-reconstruction:** Communicating is being critical about (structural) problems and explicating why exactly – in the opinion of the communicator or a particular group of people – they are not sufficient or deconstructive. Yet, communicating is also proposing and explicating positive alternatives which may allow to overcome these problems, enabling and inviting the audience to participate in this reconstruction work. Criticism and ‘fear’ should always be balanced with positive solutions.
6. **Quality over quantity:** The first aim of (public) communication should not be to attract as many people as possible. Embellishment, audience appeal, entertainment or simplification are certainly valuable means to make ‘important messages’ more readable and accessible, but should not become the final goal of communication as such. That is, they should not divert the attention away from scientists, journalists, politicians, NGO spokespeople or others addressing a (larger) public to contribute to a just, equitable, harmonious and respectful system.

Observing, adopting and contributing to a more organic approach to the world, the media and human communication, we can start to imagine a different, equitable, collective and ‘good’ future, inspired by climate change frames which stimulate us to look beyond the here and now, which encourage us to appreciate again the essence of living (together), cherishing what each of us is and may contribute, which impel us to never stop reinventing ourselves and our world for the better.

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Appendix 1: Case Study Article (Chapter 2)

Australia must put a price on carbon, say institutional investors

The Guardian (7/03/2017)

Move needed to drive orderly transition to low-emissions power sources, Investor Group on Climate Change says



The Investor Group on Climate Change has urged the government to take concredited steps to unlock new investment. Photograph: Hamish Blair/Getty Images

The Turnbull government needs to put a price on carbon to unlock new investment in the electricity sector and drive an orderly transition to low-emissions power sources, according to the Investor Group on Climate Change.

The group, which represents major institutional investors in Australia and New Zealand, has used its submission to the Finkel review to argue that the government’s oft-repeated concerns about network reliability, energy affordability and emissions reductions will be addressed if concrete steps are taken to unlock new investment.

The investor group has joined a host of other organisations in arguing that the government needs to put a price on carbon and adopt a technology-neutral approach in planning new energy infrastructure to ensure the grid is up to the task of supplying reliable base load power and producing emissions reductions consistent with Australia’s Paris commitments.

It warns that policy and regulatory uncertainty is now the key barrier to investment in Australia’s electricity sector “across all energy sources and technology types”.

The advocacy comes as the Climate Council will on Wednesday release a new report arguing that the heat Australia experienced this past summer demonstrated the energy grid was unable to cope with escalating extreme weather.

“Climate change is worsening the impacts from heatwaves and hot weather and is putting a strain on critical infrastructure,” the new report says.

“This summer alone has shown the vulnerability of the electricity grid to heatwaves, with power outages during peak times in South Australia during a severe February heatwave, while New South Wales narrowly avoided widespread outages several days later.”

The report notes that in just 90 days, more than 205 records were broken around Australia this summer, with the state-wide mean temperature the hottest for NSW since records began, with temperatures 2.57C above average, and Brisbane and Canberra recording their hottest summers on record.

The report argues that the only viable approach to slowing and eventually halting the increasing trend of heat-related extreme weather is to “rapidly increase the uptake of renewable energy and to phase out all forms of coal-fired power plants, as well as phasing out other fossil fuels”.

On Tuesday the National Farmers’ Federation reversed its once vociferous opposition to carbon pricing, using its submission to the Finkel review to call for a market-based mechanism to secure clean and affordable energy.

The NFF’s stance mirrors calls for consideration of a market mechanism from Energy Networks Australia, the retailer EnergyAustralia, the electricity provider AGL, the Climate Change Authority, the Business Council of Australia and the CSIRO.

The renewed activism around carbon pricing or a market mechanism to reduce pollution and drive efficient investment decisions in the national electricity market stands at odds with the Turnbull government’s decision to rule out such measures last December.

The energy and environment minister, Josh Frydenberg, initially signalled the government would look at the desirability of an emissions intensity trading scheme for the electricity sector as part of its scheduled review of its Direct Action climate policy – but he reversed his position after key government conservatives voiced their objections.

The man conducting the energy review, the chief scientist, Alan Finkel, gave implicit support for an emissions intensity scheme in his preliminary report, saying it would integrate best “with the electricity market’s pricing and risk management framework” and “had the lowest economic costs and the lowest impact on electricity prices”.

The Clean Energy Finance Corporation has also used its submission to the Finkel review to argue Australia needs “a stable bankable policy framework ... to promote investor confidence and capital availability and reduce risk”.

The CEFC has floated a range of potential policy options to drive the decarbonisation of the electricity sector, “including pricing mechanisms such as carbon pricing or an emissions intensity target;

‘technology-pull’ policies such as a renewable energy target, a low-emissions target, or reverse auctions with contracts for difference; or regulatory interventions such as regulated closures or absolute baselines”.

It has also repeated previous arguments that new investment in coal-fired capacity would be unlikely to be financed by Australian or international capital markets because of the risk of stranded assets.

“Further, there is arguably no longer a social licence for new coal-fired power stations in Australia,” the submission says.

The CEFC notes there are now several proposals in the market for new gas-fired generators in Australia but it says proponents are finding it “challenging” to find long-term domestic gas supply agreements to support new investment.

Senior executives from AGL Energy told a Senate committee on Tuesday the main issue causing problems with reliable energy supply in South Australia was “dysfunction” in the gas market – not too many windfarms making the grid unreliable.

Richard Wrightson, AGL’s general manager of wholesale markets, told Tuesday’s hearing the problem was so dire the company was contemplating building its own LNG hub in Queensland to help secure reliable supply downstream.

Katharine Murphy

Energy

Australia must put a price on carbon, say institutional investors

Move needed to drive orderly transition to low-emissions power sources, Investor Group on Climate Change says



The Investor Group on Climate Change has urged the government to take concrete steps to unlock new investment. Photograph: Harish Iyer/Getty Images

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The investor group has joined a host of other organisations in arguing that the government needs to put a price on carbon and adopt a technology-neutral approach in planning new energy infrastructure to ensure the grid is up to the task of supplying reliable base load power and producing emissions reductions consistent with Australia's Paris commitments.

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Katharine Murphy Political editor
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Appendix 2: Frame Matrices (Chapters 4 and 5)

Problem definition	Causal responsibility	Solution	Moral basis	Framing devices	Examples
Cycles of Nature Frame					
The natural system as we know it, is seriously affected in – potentially – dangerous ways. Interacting with nature, (ordinary) human is also a – secondary – victim.	The current climate change is not natural but caused by humans (mainly but not exclusively (top-down) elites). As such, human shows contempt for – the characteristics and workings of – nature.	Human will need to rethink and change the ways in which he acts and interacts with other (non)living beings and systems. This will also benefit human. While all of us must act, we must be led by those who are best equipped (with knowledge, insights, means...).	-The current human acting is immoral and indefensible (i.e. overly selfish) towards the larger natural system -Recognition of certain values of the natural system (vis-à-vis contempt) which are meaningful to human	<p>Participant and process depiction:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Human, '(inclusive / collective) we', especially particular groups, climate change: responsible agents for causes and solutions -Cause (goal): human development, wrong (i.e. 'misguided') priorities and beliefs (e.g. short-term economic prosperity, contempt for nature), man-made climate disasters – maldistribution, misrecognition -Object of help (goal): green economy, sustainable development, altered human acting and interacting with the rest of the (natural) world + redefining of priorities with an eye on the survival and well-being of the natural system (and thus, human) – redistribution, recognition -The natural system, human (secondary): patient -Unwanted object: maldistribution (vulnerability, loss of resilience), misrecognition (of certain ways of living) -Context: generic ('the world'), often focused on human environments (general) <p>Rhetorical devices:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Contrast / juxtaposition: human versus nature -Juxtaposition human society and nature / climate change -Pigeonholing: deletion / concealing of (full) natural web -Repetition of terms like 'nature', 'the world'; references to human-nature interaction 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -“Every year we dig up more from the Earth, emit more GHG and consume more energy.” (DS, 04/25/2013, p.10) -“We cannot link climate change to one particular weather phenomenon, but we clearly see the fingerprint.” (DWM, 01/16/2014) -“(…) all energy is produced by wind turbines, hydraulic pumps and solar panels. (HLN, 10/27/2012, p.85)

Problem definition	Causal responsibility	Solution	Moral basis	Framing devices	Examples
Human Rights Frame					
<p>The human rights, freedom, well-being and ways of living of all humans on Earth are under threat. Bottom-up groups (i.e. ordinary people) – who (currently) cannot act for themselves – are among the ones who are affected most severely.</p>	<p>Climate change is a threat. Yet, humans – particularly, but not exclusively, the elites – endanger their own kind, by holding on to wrong (misguided, egocentric) priorities and beliefs.</p>	<p>All actions that humans undertake must be inspired by the fundamental responsibility to defend their own rights and protect their well-being. While all of us must act, we must be led by those who are best equipped (with knowledge, insights, means...).</p>	<p>-Moral acting is acting that – first and foremost – takes into account, and respects, the greater (long-term) interests of humanity (i.e. human rights) -We must have faith in the human capacity to lead ourselves to salvation</p>	<p><u>Participant and process depiction:</u> -Human, “(inclusive / collective) we”, especially particular groups, climate change: responsible agent for causes and solutions -Cause (goal): human development, wrong (i.e. ‘misguided’) priorities and beliefs (e.g. short-term economic prosperity, overlooking human rights), man-made climate disasters – maldistribution, misrecognition -Object of help (goal): green economy, sustainable development + redefining of priorities and beliefs with an eye on (long-term) human well-being – redistribution, recognition -Human (“inclusive / collective we”), particularly certain (bottom-up) groups: patient -Unwanted object: maldistribution (human suffering, lack of well-being, freedom), misrecognition (of certain ways of living, organizing one’s life) -Context: human environments</p> <p><u>Rhetorical devices:</u> -Metaphor: nature is a machine -Contrast / juxtaposition: human versus nature, top-down versus bottom-up -Pigeonholing; deletion / concealing of full natural web -Repetition of terms like ‘human’, ‘society’, ‘human rights’ -Key events / intertextual references: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights</p>	<p>“For years now, scientific and legal research has shown that climate change is caused by human, that it is life-threatening and that it will cause violations of human rights.” (DM, 11/09/2013, p.72)</p>

Problem definition	Causal responsibility	Solution	Moral basis	Framing devices	Examples
Environmental Justice Frame					
Whereas some – socio-economic, ethnic, cultural gender... – groups (mainly, but not exclusively (in) the South) are less responsible for climate change, they (will) pay the bill: They are more sensitive to changes and/or lack coping abilities.	The most powerful and dominant groups (mainly, but not exclusively (in) the West / westernized) carry a large responsibility, for the loss of lives, livelihoods, cultures... beyond their time-spaces.	A combination of mitigation (GHG reduction) and (local) adaptation can solve the problems.	-The current acting of the ('western(ized)') elites is immoral and indefensible (i.e. overly selfish) towards other groups in society, who live beyond the (cultural) time-space of the former -Recognition (vis-à-vis contempt) of other lives, livelihoods, cultures	<u>Participant and process depiction:</u> -The elites (mainly, but not exclusively (in) the West / westernized), climate change: responsible agents (cause) -Cause (goal): elite ('western(ized)') development, wrong (i.e. 'misguided') priorities and beliefs (e.g. egocentric economic prosperity, contempt for 'others'), climate disasters – maldistribution, misrecognition -Particular human(s) (groups) (with certain socio-economic, ethnic, cultural, gender... backgrounds): responsible agents (solution) -Object of help: mitigation + adaptation (with a certain role for green economy / sustainable development) – redistribution, recognition -Particular bottom-up groups (mainly, but not exclusively (in) the South): patients -Unwanted object (goal): maldistribution (vulnerability, e.g. socio-economic loss), misrecognition (e.g. of certain ways of living, organizing one's life and economy...) -Context: continuous time, (mainly) human environments <u>Rhetorical devices:</u> -Metaphors, hyperbole, numerals... emphasizing the extraordinary natural forces hitting certain groups -Contrast / juxtaposition: 'us' versus 'them' -Pigeonholing: deletion / concealing of (full) natural web -Key events / intertextual references: Typhoon Haiyan (2013), Tsunami (2004)	-“We pollute and they pay the price.” (DWM, 20/09/2013) -“As a result of the Kyoto protocol they [the industrialized countries] were obliged to reduce their GHG emissions during the past 15 years. They had taken on that responsibility because they bear a historical heritage for (...) gases which cause a gradual temperature rise on Earth.” (DS, 19/11/2013, p. 14) -“(...) the industrialized countries have the responsibility to support adaptation in the developing countries.” (MO, 12/11/2012)

Problem definition	Causal responsibility	Solution	Moral basis	Framing devices	Examples
Economic Challenge Frame					
<p>Human is, primarily, a(n) economic consumer and / or producer. However, his/her (economic) wealth and accomplishments are under threat.</p>	<p>Climate change sets in motion major changes which have an impact on human (access to) wealth, accomplishments, economic interests. The response of certain elites is, however, economically not beneficial, or even dangerous (especially for particular groups).</p>	<p>Human response to climatic changes at least has to guarantee (status-quo) human (economic) wealth and accomplishments, but – ideally – will amplify these, optimizing economic relations.</p>	<p>-Economic decay and decline – including harmful economic relations – are unacceptable and must be counteracted at all times -We must recognize climate change as ‘a blessing in disguise’ and reap the benefits of this change (as efficiently as possible)</p>	<p><u>Participant and process depiction:</u> -Elites, climate change: responsible agents (cause) -Cause (goal): current (climate) acting, wrong (i.e. ‘misguided’) priorities and beliefs (e.g. overlooking crucial economic interests) – maldistribution -Elites, those suffering (economic) loss: responsible agents (solution) -Object of help (goal): human technology, ingenuity, development – redistribution -Human as economic agent, especially particular groups: patient (problem) -Unwanted object (goal): maldistribution ((economic) loss and decay) -Deletion (decontextualization): non-economic patients, players, objects – particularly strong utilitarian view on nature -Context: the world, especially the West; mostly human environments – (one global) economic society</p> <p><u>Rhetorical devices:</u> -Metaphor: war -Numbers: (economic) loss or gain (often combined with comparative / superlative) -Contrast / juxtaposition: human versus (sublime) nature, human versus human -Pigeonholing; deletion / concealing of full natural web -Juxtaposition economy / technology and climate -Repetition of economic terminology, one-liners -Key events / intertextual references: stock market reports, financial news (pages)</p> <p><u>Narration:</u> -Focus on threatening present / future but balanced with ideal (i.e. promise) of (economic) development</p>	<p>-“The financial crisis has affected the process [of climate action].” (DS, 12/11/2013, p.6) -“(…) Belgium might save 60 to 150 billion euros, because the country would no longer need to import oil from the Middle East or other fossil fuels.” (DM, 19/09/2013, p.16) “ ‘There is a lot of money to be earned’, says Michael Liebrich, ceo of Bloomberg New Energy Finance.” (MO, 16/01/2014)</p>

Problem definition	Causal responsibility	Solution	Moral basis	Framing devices	Examples
Inscrutable are the Ways of Nature					
Developments can be witnessed in the natural system.	The changes are internal to the system. They are – largely – due to specific agents. Humans are not to be blamed or, at least, human action does not make a fundamental difference.	If needed, these flaws are mitigated by the natural system, or the system may adapt. Human’s help is – largely – superfluous.	-Human should acknowledge his limited impact on the natural system -Demonstrating (human) self-knowledge is accepting our (rather) limited understanding of nature	<p><u>Participant and process depiction:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -The natural system: responsible agent (cause and solution), patient (problem) -Cause: GHG -Object of help: system-internal changes -Unwanted object: end of the current state -Nominalizations, personifications, passivizations, (visual) deletion: decontextualization of (causes and) solutions; responsibility of human is largely absent / minimalized -Context: (largely) natural environments; continuous time <p><u>Rhetorical devices:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Contrast / juxtaposition: (sublime) nature versus human -Simile / comparison: similar system changes in the past -Key events / intertextual references: statements like ‘Human-made climate change is a hoax / myth’ or ‘Climate change is a natural phenomenon’; scientific consensus reports are introduced, only to show how they are faulty, misleading, resulting from conspiracy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -‘Human CO₂ emissions only constitute a tiny percentage of the CO₂ emissions.’ -‘CO₂ limits will make little difference.’ -‘Nature will solve the problems.’

Problem definition	Causal responsibility	Solution	Moral basis	Framing devices	Examples
Anthropocentric Masterframe – Status Quo					
<p>Nature caters to human’s needs. However, human’s full access to these services is currently under pressure (maldistribution).</p>	<p>The acting of individual players threatens the services of nature.</p>	<p>Nature – particularly climate change – is generous and forgiving. Humans can enjoy the fruits of nature if they recognize this (redistribution).</p>	<p>-Nature as a perfectly designed machine should be allowed to function in the ways, and for the purpose, it was meant</p>	<p>Participant and process depiction:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Individualized, identified players: responsible agents (cause) / <u>actors</u> -Cause (goal): pressures, changes – <u>maldistribution</u> -Individualized, identified players, climate change: responsible agents (solution) / <u>actors</u>, carriers or identified -Object of help: taking away of pressures, changes – <u>redistribution</u> -(Humans benefitting from) natural services: patients / <u>patients</u> -Unwanted object (goal): <u>maldistribution (vulnerability, loss)</u> -Nominalizations, personifications, passivizations, (visual) deletions, sublimation: <u>decontextualization of broader responsibilities</u> (human-induced climate change + <u>hegemonic system</u>) -<u>Environment: mainly resource, or abstract, (circumstance) background, deleted</u> -Context: (decontextualized) natural environments (for human usage) <p>Rhetorical devices:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Metaphor: nature as Santa Claus, <u>nature is a machine</u> -Use of (stereo)typical climate change symbols (metonyms / metaphors) to associate discussion to idea of (natural) climate change -Prevalence of numbers, percentages -Contrast / juxtaposition: <u>human versus nature</u> (dualism) -Pigeonholing: <u>deletion / concealing of natural web</u> -Human-made climate change is revealed / delegitimized as <u>hyperbole</u> (i.e. ‘alarmist’) -Presupposition: <u>anthropocentric worldview as given</u> – status-quo as the only possibility <p>Narration:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Sources: <u>mainly elites</u> (top-down) (especially scientists, think tanks) 	<p>-“The European market is uncertain as Europe focuses on sustainable energy.” (DS, 27/11/2012, p.15)</p> <p>-“Earthworms are the real culprits behind global warming.” (HLN, 05/02/2013, p.24)</p> <p>-An (abstracted) globe (only) shows two new, more efficient shipping lanes (MO, 05/03/2013)</p> <p>-“(…) over the last 65 million years, the mountain woods have been able to prevent that the temperature would rise to levels which would be catastrophic for living beings.” (DS, 11/02/2014, p.8)</p> <p>-Comparative (before-after) satellite images, which are typically used to show the melting of (polar) ice sheets or glaciers, are used to demonstrate the growing of the ice, instead. (HLN, 10/09/2013, p.24)</p>

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Anthropocentric Masterframe - Reform					
<p>Human is <i>the</i> victim of climate change, as the environment – which caters to his needs – is changing. However, certain groups in society, as well as in nature, have internal characteristics which make them more vulnerable and less able to cope than others (maldistribution, cultural identity misrecognition).</p>	<p>Man-made climate change, its causes (GHG) and (direct) consequences constitute a largely external threat. While all of us humans carry some responsibility for this threat, some – mainly, but not exclusively elite (top-down) groups – are more responsible. They show contempt for others (nature and / or humans) (maldistribution, cultural identity misrecognition).</p>	<p>Due to their responsibility, and / or their accomplishments, particular groups need to act for the sake of nature, and thus human. They need to mitigate their GHG emissions and adapt, by means of green economy / technology or sustainable development. Besides, they need to share their money, means or knowledge with others, and help them (to) protect (themselves) (external solution) (redistribution, cultural identity recognition).</p>	<p>-The elites have the obligation (and potential) to protect the others, or to help them to protect themselves, by sharing their accomplishments (inequality as an accepted fact). -The right to live, to develop, to prosper... as ‘Universal (human) Justice’</p>	<p>Participant and process depiction: -Climate change (consequences), ‘(inclusive / collective) we’, (abstracted, backgrounded) human, certain (top-down) groups (<u>individualization</u>) – mainly as consumers or producers: responsible agents (cause) / <u>actors</u> (often economic processes), carriers or identified -Cause: GHG emissions, development, ignorance / unwillingness (i.e. preoccupation with short-term, egocentric interests), (man-made) climate disasters – <u>maldistribution</u>, cultural identity misrecognition -Certain (top-down) groups, ‘(inclusive / collective) we’, human (generalized, identified) – mainly as consumers or producers: responsible agents (solution) / <u>actors</u> (often economic processes) – often strong modality -Object of help: mitigation and adaptation by means of sustainable development / green economy (production + consumption) (e.g. renewable energy, emission trading, techno-fix) + transfer of money, means, knowledge, ‘development’ – <u>redistribution</u>, cultural identity recognition -Human, particular (bottom-up) groups in human society and nature (generalized, identified): patients (problem) / ‘vulnerable’ – carriers or identifieds, <u>patients</u>, conditional agents – negative / negated processes -Unwanted object: <u>maldistribution (vulnerability, loss)</u>, cultural identity misrecognition (of cultural practices, characteristics, traditions) -Nominalizations, personifications, passivizations, (visual) deletion, sublimation: <u>decontextualization of broader responsibilities (mainly the hegemonic system)</u> -Overlexicalization / visual salience of GHG / nature (as agent), ‘vulnerable’ and comparable terms / ideas as predicate -<u>Environment: circumstance (background), abstract, source, deleted</u> -Context: one global (human) economic society</p> <p>Rhetorical devices: -Metaphors: <u>nature is a machine</u>, war -A limited number of <u>stereotypical metonyms / symbols</u>, like the polar bear, the suffering child, smoke(stacks), melting ice, cracked ground -Prevalence of numbers, percentages -Contrast / juxtaposition: top-down versus bottom-up, <u>human versus nature (dualism)</u> -Synecdoche / ‘collective we’: We (humans) are all responsible; we are all under threat; we all have to act. -<u>Pigeonholing: deletion / concealing of natural web</u> -Visual / verbal corporate speak -Presupposition: <u>anthropocentric worldview as given</u> – status-quo as danger; reform as solution</p> <p>Narration: -<u>Sources: mainly elites</u> (top-down) (science, politics, economics, agriculture, industry...) -Focus on threatening (climate) present / future</p>	<p>-“The US did not ratify the Kyoto protocol out of fear that it would harm its economic interests.” (DS, 12/11/2013, p.6) -“(…) the Arctic is <i>the</i> climate controller – let us say, <i>the</i> air conditioning – of this globe.” (DS, 17/10/2013, p.9) -A drawing of a globe highlights (hyperbole) a number of causes (e.g. a smokestack, a car) and consequences or problems (e.g. a southern woman and child, colour symbolism) (HLN, 21/06/2012, p.6) -“The shortage of water resources does not only have a huge impact on the economy (...) but also the natural system itself.” (DWM, 23/10/2013) -“The citizens will have to move by foot or by bike.” (HLN, 01/14/2014, p.14) -“(…) sharing green technology with the developing countries.” (DM, 06/23/2012, p.1)</p>

Problem definition	Causal responsibility	Solution	Moral basis	Framing devices	Examples
Scala Naturae Subframe					
<p>The effects of climate change (and, secondarily, other human acting) can be witnessed on separate layers and in various parts (i.e. particular species, systems) of the environmental system. They are getting weaker, are undergoing change. Yet, they cannot protect themselves: They lack resilience and coping abilities (largely internal problem). Nature caters to the needs of human, who is at the top of the system. Hence, human will also be affected.</p>	<p>Man-made climate change (consequences / causes) is a serious external threat. Although all of us are guilty of emitting GHG and / or refusing to change habits (i.e. prioritizing our own, (mainly) short-term interests), particular countries, politicians or corporate organizations are more guilty than others. As such, human disregards the (economic, aesthetic...) characteristics or services of the endangered species and systems (mal-distribution, cultural identity misrecognition).</p>	<p>We – i.e. ‘elite managers’, producers, consumers... – need to cut the GHG emissions (mitigation) and help vulnerable nature to adapt, mainly by means of a green economy, sustainable and technological development (pragmatic, largely human-external solutions). By making sure that natural species and systems – and their particular workings and characteristics – are preserved or improved, we also protect our own interests (redistribution, cultural identity recognition).</p>	<p>-Human has been assigned the (paternalistic) role of ruler <i>and</i> protector of nature. Hence, he is expected to live up to this role (human as a good housekeeper). Accordingly: -Those who carry responsibility and have the means to act have the moral obligation to save, protect (and improve) ‘our planet’ and ‘the helpless other’ -Nature caters to human’s needs. Hence, acting for the sake of nature is acting for the sake of human, today and in the future</p>	<p>Participant and process depiction: -Climate change, (abstracted, backgrounded) human, ‘(inclusive / collective) we’, (individualized) (elite) countries, politicians, corporate organizations: responsible agents (cause) / actors (mostly economic processes) or carriers -Cause (goal): GHG emissions, short-term growth, human (economic) interests over long-term natural services – maldistribution, cultural identity misrecognition -Singled out individuals, scientists, human, ‘(inclusive / collective) we’: responsible agents (solution) / actors (mostly economic processes), sensors -Object of help (goal): emission reduction by means of sustainable development / green economy (mitigation) + aid, protection, development / modification (adaptation) – redistribution, cultural identity recognition -Singled out species, parts of the ecosystem, ‘sublime nature’ (generalized): patients (problem) / patients, carriers or identifieds, behaviors, conditional agents -Unwanted object (goal): maldistribution (vulnerability, loss of resilience, decay), ‘cultural identity misrecognition’ (loss of practices in nature, e.g. migration patterns) -Overlexicalization of GHG (as an agent), endangered and comparable ideas -Context: (distant) natural environments, usually linked to human (i.e. services for man)</p> <p>Rhetorical devices: -Metaphors: survival of the fittest, colour symbolism, ice + palm tree, the globe -Symbols / metonyms: the smokestack, the threatened ‘polar bear’ (or other animal), the melting ice / glacier, cracked ground – lack of visualized alternatives (e.g. wind turbine) -Contrast / juxtaposition: individualized villains versus individualized heroes, past versus (threatening) present / future -Synecdoche / ‘collective we’: We (human) are all responsible; we are all under threat; we all have to act. -Visual / verbal corporate speak -Key events / intertextual references: (the decisions / protocols of) climate summits, IPCC, scientific journals like ‘Nature’, (scenes similar to) the painting ‘Wanderer above the sea of fog’ (C.D. Friedrich)</p> <p>Narration: -Prevalence of elite voices (mainly scientists, politicians and NGOs) -Focus on threatening (climate) present / future</p>	<p>-“Climate change threatens eighty percent of the Earth’s ecosystems.” (DWM, 10/10/2013) -“The US are the only western economy which have (...) not conducted a single policy addressing climate change.” (DWM, 28/06/2013) -“Help, the polar bear is drowning.” -A picture of a single polar bear in the distance, walking (with its back turned to us) over melting ice. (MO, 09/12/2012) -“Investments in energy in particular have to move rapidly from unsustainable sources to (...) renewable energy.” (DS, 30/09/2013, p.44) -A drawing of a globe highlights a number of causes (e.g. a smokestack) and consequences (e.g. a southern woman and child, colour symbolism) (HLN, 06/21/2012, p.6) -“The Dutch are going to breed climate resistant great tits.” (HLN, 21/11/2013, p.10)</p>

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Consumer Rights Subframe					
Our collective well-being, mental and / or physical health and safety are vulnerable to the changes in our (human) environment. Some (bottom-up) individuals cannot guarantee their own safety: They are ignorant about the changes and / or lack the means to act (internal weakness).	Man-made climate change (consequences) is an immensely powerful (external) force, threatening human rights. However, particular (mainly political top-down) groups, are also major villains. They do not sufficiently use their insights and means to counteract these pressures or to bolster the resilience of the victims. As such, they run away from their responsibility towards their 'clients' (maldistribution, cultural identity misrecognition).	The elites (politics, public services, science) need to protect human health, safety and well-being, largely by means of (green) economy / technology, (sustainable) development or emergency aid (focus on adaptation). (Bottom-up) individuals are instructed to change their (consumption) habits, mainly with an eye on mitigation (i.e. help them to save themselves) (pragmatic, largely human-external solution).	-The elites have the obligation (and potential) to protect the others, or to help them to protect themselves, by sharing their accomplishments (inequality as an accepted fact). -The right to live (a good and safe life) as 'Universal Justice' -We cannot allow nature (i.e. climate change) to undo again the levels of health, safety, well-being... (development) we have managed to build up, and which separate us from other living beings	Participant and process depiction: -Climate change, (political) elites (generalized, identified), (abstracted, backgrounded) human, '(inclusive / collective) we' (consumers): responsible agents (cause) / actors (economic processes), carriers -Cause (goal): GHG emissions, short-term, egocentric interests over long-term (general) human safety – maldistribution, cultural identity misrecognition -The political, scientific elites, social services, international (aid) organizations (generalized / individualized, often functionalized) / secondary: '(inclusive / collective) we', human (generalized, identified): responsible agents (solution) / actors (in economic processes), sensors -Object of help (goal): emission reduction by means of sustainable development / green economy (mitigation) + emergency aid, charity, transfer (of means, money, knowledge) (adaptation) – redistribution, cultural identity recognition -'(Inclusive / collective) we', mainly ordinary ('consuming') individuals (generalized, identified): patients (problem) / carriers or identifieds, patients, conditional agents -Unwanted object (goal): maldistribution (loss of safe environments, natural resources = loss of human well-being, unsafety, health problems), cultural identity misrecognition (loss of a culture of safe, sedentary living within a certain (familiar) community) -Context: recognizable places in human environments (the world, mainly the West) Rhetorical devices: -Metaphors: climate change is a monster, war -Symbol / metonym: cracked earth / extreme weather + human face or reference to human; people in need / being saved by elite agents -Numbers: lives threatened, lost, saved (often combined with comparative / superlative) -Contrast / juxtaposition: top-down versus bottom-up -Repetition of 'lives', 'dead', 'human', 'save / protect', and the like -Synecdoche / 'collective we': We (human) are all responsible; we are all under threat; we all have to act -Visual / verbal corporate speak -Key events / intertextual references: immigration, social security... crises, (universal) disasters myths, human suffering caused by disasters like Hurricane Katrina (2005) (+ top-down response) Narration: -Sources: mostly elites (top-down) (science, politics, public services, international organizations – exceptionally: (individualized) bottom-up sources solely as victim-witnesses -Focus on threatening (climate) present / future, alarmist style	-“Flash floods as ‘water bombs’ on Sardinia. Cyclone Cleopatra makes water level rise 3 meters: 18 dead.”(DM, 11/20/2013, p.5) -A ‘generic’ western girl, suffering from hay fever (HLN, 18/04/2012, p.22) -World map with highlighted areas, identified as those (countries, groups, numbers of people) which suffer from droughts, water shortages, conflicts (DM, 10/02/2014, p.5) -“The American Geological Survey USGS saw on air views ‘dramatic changes in the coastal areas over hundreds of miles’, and thus not only around New York and New Jersey, the most affected areas.” (DWM, 18/12/2012) -“Cameron promised to do all in his power to take sustainable measures.” (DS, 14/02/2014, p.18) -“The citizens will have to move by foot or by bike.” (HLN, 14/01/2014, p.14) -“(…) the social relations in our neighbourhoods will change as well as the amount of time we allow our children to play outside (...).” (MO, 21/02/2014)

Problem definition	Causal responsibility	Solution	Moral basis	Framing devices	Examples
Unequal Vulnerability Subframe					
<p>Particular ethnic, cultural, socio-economic, gender... (bottom-up) groups in society are characterized by structural (internal) weaknesses: They are economically, socially, culturally, politically, physically and/or psychologically less developed. As such, they are more vulnerable to and less able to cope with climate change consequences.</p>	<p>Man-made climate change (consequences / causes) are a serious (external) threat. Due to their development, the most powerful, leading ('top-down') groups bear a major responsibility for emitting GHG. Besides, many of them refuse to profoundly change habits. As such, they do not (sufficiently) recognize the lives, economies, right to develop, cultural identities... of others (mal-distribution, cultural identity mis-recognition)..</p>	<p>Their responsibility, and / or their power, knowledge and means entitle the ruling (western(ized)) groups as main agents. They need to mitigate their GHG emissions and aid the most vulnerable to adapt, mainly by means of a green economy and (the transfer of) technological development and other accomplishments. They must save and improve – and thus acknowledge – the lives, economies and / or cultural identities of others (redistribution, cultural identity recognition) (external solution).</p>	<p>-The elites have the obligation (and potential) to protect the others, or to help them to protect themselves, by sharing their accomplishments (inequality as an accepted fact). -The right to live, to possess, to develop, to have a cultural identity..., as 'Universal Justice' -Charity</p>	<p>Participant and process depiction: -Climate change, particular (individualized) groups of elites ('the West'), 'exclusive we': responsible agents (cause + solution) / actors (mostly economic processes), carriers or behavers -Cause (goal): GHG emissions, short-term growth, economic interests of a selected group of people over the (social, economic, environmental...) interests of others – maldistribution, cultural identity misrecognition -Object of help (goal): emission reduction by means of sustainable development / green economy (mitigation) + (developmental) aid, charity, transfer (of money, means, knowledge) (adaptation) – redistribution, cultural identity recognition -Particular bottom-up groups ('the South') (generalized, identified ('vulnerable')): patients / carriers or identifieds, behavers, patients, conditional agents -Unwanted object (goal): maldistribution (vulnerability, e.g. socio-economic loss), cultural identity misrecognition (e.g. of traditional practices like hunting) -Overlexicalization / visual salience of GHG / nature (as agent), (un)developed and comparable ideas -Context: continuous time (timelessness of passivity, vulnerability as internal / eternal state) / distant, often vaguely / overly specifically situated human environments</p> <p>Rhetorical devices: -Metaphors: sublime nature, war -Symbol / metonym: the helpless child -Contrast / juxtaposition: 'us' (the elites – 'West') versus 'them' (the others – 'South'), elites: individualized heroes versus individualized villains -Numbers: lives lost (and lives saved), economic loss -Concatenation of verbal / visual images of passivity, helplessness, destruction (visual sublimation of natural destruction) -Key events / intertextual references: Kyoto Protocol (1997), Millennium Development Goals</p> <p>Narration: -Prevalence of ('Western') elite voices (e.g. politicians), NGOs, or elite representatives of bottom-up groups -Alarmist style (e.g. graphic images, narratives of despair)</p>	<p>-“The US did not ratify the Kyoto protocol out of fear that it would harm its economic interests.” (DS, 12/11/2013, p.6) -“(...) the combination of geography, poverty, unsafe constructions, and the extreme population growth.” (DM, 13/11/2013, p.4) -Two starving women, holding their emaciated babies, look at the spectator, their gaze expressing a demand for help. (HLN, 09/08/2012, p.12) -Slogans on banners during a demonstration of locals: “Save us. We are drowning”. (DWM, 12/11/2013) -“(...) sharing green technology with the developing countries.” (DM, 23/06/2012, p.1) -Flooded shacks at a distant; no people present. The caption helps to locate this in an overly specific way: “The slum Jangwani in Dar es Salaam was flooded after heavy rainfall, at the end of last year.” (MO, 12/02/2014)</p>

Problem definition	Causal responsibility	Solution	Moral basis	Framing devices	Examples
Human Wealth Subframe					
In their current state, our (collective) economic, technological and / or cultural wealth are highly vulnerable to climate change. Some (individual) consumers and / or producers, however, (will) suffer a larger part of this loss since they do not have yet the necessary (economic) incentives, nor the insights or means, to sufficiently protect their own possessions (internal weakness).	Man-made climate change (causes / consequences) is a largely external force which hampers human (economic) growth and development. Some agents are aware of the threats and able to react. However, being too preoccupied with short-term gain, they fail to recognize the long-term benefits of climate action. They largely belong to elite (political / economic) top-down groups (maldistribution, cultural identity misrecognition).	The elites (politics, science, industry...), in particular, need to invest in green economy, technology and development (mitigation / adaptation). Besides, the (political) elites have to encourage the others (with financial incentives) to act and / or show them how. These investments are likely to be repaid, by stirring (economic) development (e.g. profit, jobs) (pragmatic, largely human-external solutions) (redistribution, cultural identity recognition).	-The elites have the obligation (and potential) to protect the others, or to help them to protect themselves, by sharing their accomplishments (inequality as an accepted fact). -The right to possess and to develop as 'Universal Justice' -We cannot allow nature (i.e. climate change) to undo again the levels of economic, material and / or cultural development we have managed to build up, and which separate us from other living beings -We need to manage well the costs and benefits of climate change, for the sake of human society	Participant and process depiction: Climate change, political and industrial elites (generalized / individualized, identified), (abstracted, backgrounded) human, '(inclusive / collective) we' (as consumers): responsible agents cause / actors, carriers or behaviors – often in negated / negative processes -Cause (goal): GHG emissions, prioritizing short-term interests / development over long-term gain (and development) – maldistribution, cultural identity misrecognition - Political, industrial, scientific elites (generalized / individualized, identified) / secondary: '(inclusive / collective) we' (mainly as consumers / producers), human (generalized, identified): responsible agents solution / actors (mostly economic processes), sensors -Object of help (goal): (encouraging of) mitigation and adaptation by means of (the transfer of insights of) sustainable development / green economy; economic incentives – redistribution, cultural identity recognition -'(Inclusive / collective) we', certain (ordinary) consumers or producers (mostly generalized, identified): patients / carriers or identifieds, patients, conditional agents, sensors – often negated / negative processes -Unwanted object (goal): maldistribution (environmental loss / loss of natural resources = economic / material loss, decay, decline), cultural identity misrecognition (cultural loss, e.g. of (commercial(ized)) traditions or habits like skiing, drinking beer) -Secondary consequence of solution: (economic) development (efficiency, profit, job creation...) -Overlexicalization of nature (as agent), economically vulnerable and comparable ideas Rhetorical devices: -Metaphors: nature is a machine, war -Symbol / metonym: human technology, natural destruction + human face (or reference) -Numbers: economic / technological / cultural loss or gain (often combined with comparative / superlative) -Contrast / juxtaposition: top-down versus bottom-up -Synecdoche / 'collective we': We (human) are all responsible; we are all under threat; we all have to act. -Key events, intertextual references: Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change (2006), (late-2000's) economic crises Narration: -Sources: mainly elites (top-down) (science, economics, agriculture, industry...) – exceptionally: (individualized) bottom-up sources (as victim-witnesses)	-Destruction caused by coffee rust on a Mexican plantation. / “ (MO, 30/05/2013) -“The shortage of water resources does not only have a huge impact on the economy (...) but also the natural system itself.” (DWM, 23/10/2013) -“(....) this has disastrous consequences for the power of the European economy. We would carry an extra ‘Greek debt’ outside of the Union every year.” (DWM, 25/06/2012) -Focus on a high-tech human invention which might save the ski season. (HLN, 27/10/2012, p.85) -“The Stern report demonstrates that the costs of controlling the climate are about 10 times lower than the economic damage the climate would cause if the warming is left unaddressed.” (DWM, 25/07/2012) -“Prospect of 65.000 green jobs.” (DM, 19/09/2013, p.16) -“(....) you can reduce GHG in a way which is good for the economy.” (MO, 02/12/2013)

Problem definition	Causal responsibility	Solution	Moral basis	Framing devices	Examples
Rights of the Free Market Subframe					
<p>(Some) economic and / or political players are being hampered in the struggle for wealth and (new) resources / opportunities nature (climate change) keeps providing. They are being faced with revenue loss, unfair competition, inefficiency...</p>	<p>Some governments take too far-reaching climate / environmental measures which – directly or indirectly – hamper the workings of the free market. Certain players – not / less restrained by such policies – further endanger the economic interests of others (mal-distribution).</p>	<p>Climate measures stop where the rights of the free market begin. With the political pressures lifted, economic and / or political players can prosper thanks to climate change, drawing on technology and ingenuity. They enjoy, among others, economic profit and efficiency and a stronger economic / political position (redistribution).</p>	<p>-Capitalist-liberalism must be protected, whatever the cost ('the end justifies the means')</p> <p>-Economic development as supreme human goal</p> <p>-Acceptance of 'survival of the fittest' as inescapable 'natural' principle</p> <p>-Nature as a perfectly designed machine should be allowed to function in the ways, and for the purpose, it was meant</p>	<p><u>Participant and process depiction:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Governments, countries (individualized, identified): responsible agents (cause) / actors, sayers -Cause (goal): climate action, policies, unfair competition – maldistribution -Governments, countries, industry (individualized, identified): responsible agents (solution) / actors, sensors, sayers (usually economic acting) -Climate change: generous background agent or cause / carrier or identified – frequent use of nominalizations -Object of help / positive consequence (goal): human ingenuity, technology, development / profit, efficiency, access to resources, strong economic / political position – redistribution -Governments, countries, industry (individualized, identified): patients / patients, carriers or identifieds, actors in negated / negative processes -Unwanted object (goal): maldistribution (economic loss, inefficiency, inaccessibility of resources, weak economic / political position) -Decontextualization: concealing of all values beyond the liberalist-economic -Positionality: them, distanced -Environment: mainly resource, or abstract, (circumstance) background, deleted <p><u>Rhetorical devices:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Metaphor: nature as Santa Claus, nature as a machine -Use of typical climate change symbols (metonyms), particularly melting ice, to associate discussion to climate change debate; accepted fact of melting poles as background -Contrast / juxtaposition: human versus human, country versus country -Numbers: profit, efficiency, resources, (potential) loss -Comparatives, superlatives: highlighting positive evolutions -Key events / intertextual references: 'Arctic strategies' of various countries, American Gold Rush (nineteenth century), Cold War (1945-1991); "The concept of global warming was created by and for the Chinese in order to make U.S. manufacturing non-competitive" (Donald Trump, Twitter, 06/11/2012) <p><u>Narration:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Journalists working for centrist, rightist outlets -Sources: mainly elites (academics specialized in economics, political sciences..., politics) 	<p>-“The European market is uncertain as Europe focuses on sustainable energy.” (DS, 27/11/2012, p.15)</p> <p>-“Up till now, fishing was all they had”, Vestergaard says. “But it is obvious that the exploitation of the resources – and they really have everything – is a way to become an independent country, in time.” (DS, 01/02/2013, p.18)</p> <p>-The lay-out highlights numbers, such as “500.000 barrels of oil” (“the revenue the Arctic can produce”) (DM, 12/09/2012, p.12)</p> <p>-“The struggle for the black gold of Alaska has started.” (DM, 12/09/2012, p.12 (title))</p> <p>-An (abstracted) globe (only) shows two new, more efficient shipping lanes (MO, 05/03/2013)</p> <p>-“(…) a worldwide march of oil companies to the Arctic, partly accommodated by the global warming” (DM, 30/07/2012, p.5)</p>

Problem definition	Causal responsibility	Solution	Moral basis	Framing devices	Examples
Natural Machine Subframe					
Changes can be witnessed in the natural environment of humans (mal-distribution).	The increasing level of GHG – as major cause of climatic changes – is mainly due to individual natural processes, variances and species. Hence, they are (largely) separate from human.	(Other / separate) systems and species may evolve, adapting to their particular (new) environmental circumstances. As such, the perfectly designed natural machine can regulate and mitigate these changes, especially for the sake of ‘higher’ living beings (particularly, human) (redistribution).	-Nature as a perfectly designed machine should be allowed to function in the ways, and for the purpose, it was meant -We must respect the natural state of the environment: sublime, pristine, free of human (intervention)	<p><u>Participant and process depiction:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -GHG, climate change, natural processes or species (individualized): responsible agents (cause) / actors, carriers or identified -Cause (goal): GHG emissions – maldistribution -Natural processes or species (individualized), (human as a mechanic): responsible agents (solution) / actors, carriers or identified -Object of help (goal): mitigation of GHG – redistribution -The various parts / processes of the natural system, with a focus on human environments: patients / patients -Unwanted object (goal): maldistribution (vulnerability, instability) -Context: (decontextualized) natural environments (for human usage) <p><u>Rhetorical devices:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Metaphor: nature is a (almost perfectly designed) machine / nature as Santa Claus, sublime nature -Use of typical climate change symbols (metonyms / metaphors), such as smoke (standing for GHG emissions of human), taken out of the human context -Natural ‘villains’ and ‘heroes’ -Numbers: GHG -Repetition of terms referring to individualized natural agents (e.g. earthworms, sea grass, woods, oceans) and material (mechanical) processes as ‘store’, ‘absorb’, ‘mitigate’ -Key events / intertextual references: climate-sceptical views in the international press, like “100 reasons why climate change is natural” (Daily Express, 20/11/2012), or on social media (e.g. by Republican Americans) <p><u>Narration:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Sources: mainly elites (scientists and (conservative) think tanks), presenting ‘alternative climate facts’, balanced with counter-views (i.e. scientific consensus) -Stories of surprise, the unexpected (regarding nature repairing itself) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -“Earthworms are the real culprits behind global warming.” (HLN, 05/02/2013, p.24) -“Mountain woods are the thermostat of our climate” (title). “(...) over the last 65 million years, the mountain woods have been able to prevent that the temperature would rise to levels which would be catastrophic for living beings.” (DS, 11/02/2014, p.8) -Comparative (before-after) satellite images, which are typically used to show the melting of (polar) ice sheets or glaciers, are used to demonstrate the growing of the ice, instead. (HLN, 10/09/2013, p.24)

Problem definition	Causal responsibility	Solution	Moral basis	Framing devices	Examples
Transformation Masterframe					
Nature, as well as those (bottom-up) human groups who stand close to nature, are being victimized by the hegemonic system. They are – among others – ,deprived of their agency, (access to) alternative (i.e. biocentric) values and / or ways of living, voice... This victimization makes them disproportionately vulnerable to climate change (and other crises) (external pressures).	The hegemonic socio-economic system lies at the roots of multi-level injustices: (direct / indirect) maldistribution, misrecognition and misrepresentation. It is largely sustained by western(ized) humans, particularly – but not exclusively – elite groups (human-internal cause).	The victimized groups – the only ones who are able to look beyond the hegemonic thinking – must become equal partners in the debate. Drawing on (biocentric) alternatives like harmony, mutual dependency or sufficiency, they can instigate (fundamental) change. This will lead to long-term mitigation and adaptation, and a more safe, equal coexistence for all (redistribution, (status) recognition, representation) (human-internal solution).	-The right to self-determination -Biocentric alternatives (like harmony, collaboration or sufficiency) need to be recognized as precondition for safe, satisfying and good living for all -Recognition and redrawing of an unequal world – participatory parity as precondition for a just and equal world	Participant and process depiction: -Elites (mostly generalized), the hegemonic socio-economic system, human-induced climate change: responsible agents (cause) / actors, sensors, carriers or identifieds – often negated / negative processes; visually passivized elites -Cause (goal): the hegemonic system, evident in ‘green economy’, ‘sustainable development’, ‘unlimited consumption ideal’, ‘survival of the fittest’... – maldistribution, misrecognition, misrepresentation -‘(In/exclusive / collective) we’, mainly groups of (bottom-up) citizens: responsible agents (solution) / actors, sensors, sayers -Object of help (goal): sustainable development / green economy + biocentric alternatives – redistribution, (status) recognition, representation -The whole natural ‘web’, particularly bottom-up groups (generalized, identified): patients / carriers, identifieds, behaviors, conditional agents, patients – often negated / negative processes -Unwanted object (goal): maldistribution (multi-levelled vulnerability), misrecognition (of the value of (biocentric) alternatives), misrepresentation (no true democracy) -Contextualization: foregrounding of agents or circumstances, nominalizations, personifications: highlight society-wide responsibilities (causes / solutions) -Reversal of hegemonic ‘us-them’ roles: others close to ‘us’ (humanization) -Environment: ‘sublime’, circumstance (background), source, deleted + complex and harmonious system, responsive subject, example for human (agent), mutual dependency -Context: substitution of the global economic society with civil society/ies Rhetorical devices: -Metaphors: Mother Earth + nature is a machine -Contrast / juxtaposition: ‘us’ (bottom-up) versus ‘them’ (top-down), deconstruction (past / present) versus (reconstruction) future -Hyperbole (usually bottom-up) versus ellipsis / litotes (usually top-down) -The revealing and denouncing of ‘sustainable development’, ‘green economy’, ‘emission trading’... as semantic reversals -Presupposition: hegemonic system as sickening; transformation as healing -Key events / intertextual references: the books, articles, speeches... of alternative thinkers like Harald Welzer, Andrew Simms or Vandana Shiva Narration: -Sources: mostly bottom-up -Threatening present (climate change + system) + inspiring alternatives	-“The society we live in (...) does not recognize limits (...): The economy keeps developing and growing, investments are being done, new products are continually being launched.” (DWM, 23/08/2013) -“(...) a second wave will hit the Philippines soon: the wave of international emergency aid.” (DM, 13/11/2013, p.31) -“The rainforest of the Amazon, also called ‘the lung of the world’ breathes carbon dioxide (CO ₂) in and oxygen out (...).” (DS, 17/02/2014, p.8) -A cartoon (metaphor) of a man standing in a flooded area. The rain is pouring down His head is covered by an umbrella full of dark clouds (MO, 11/03/2013). -“(...) the Cuban delegation did not agree with the tight focus on ‘green economy’ (...).” (DWM, 15/06/2012)

Problem definition	Causal responsibility	Solution	Moral basis	Framing devices	Examples
Natural Web Subframe					
<p>The natural web – all inter-connected living beings and ecological systems – has (to a certain extent) internal resilience, but is largely deprived of it due to external human pressures, of which climate change is only one: Her agency and responsiveness, harmonious workings, exemplary function, ‘voice’... are destructed and / or disregarded. Bottom-up groups can / are willing to speak up for this system, but are largely prevented from taking up this (steward) role.</p>	<p>The (current acting, inspired by the) hegemonic socio-economic system does not help to solve, but mostly reproduces / exacerbates the current situation: It lies at the roots of interacting problems of multi-levelled maldistribution, misrecognition and misrepresentation. Although being mainly sustained by a small group of elite (top-down) stakeholders, it is also a society-wide problem (i.e. ‘(western) human culture’) (human-internal cause).</p>	<p>A universal ecological transformation is necessary (human-internal change). Participatory parity is a means and a goal. (Bottom-up) civil society – as representative of nature – must be an equal partner in the debate. They can urge the other (top-down) groups to approach the problems in different ways. Together they can instigate (funda)mental change towards a more just, inclusive, mutually dependent and modest (biocentric) coexistence. This will serve long-term mitigation and adaptation (redistribution, (status) recognition and representation).</p>	<p>-All living beings are equal. Yet, (ordinary) human – being a conscious creature – has a special duty to fulfil as a steward (natural ‘self-determination’ facilitated by human representatives). -Harmony, collaboration or mutual dependency – biocentric values which characterize nature – must also guide humans to a more ethical way of living -Recognition and redrawing of an unequal world (i.e. culture-nature) – participatory parity as precondition for a just and equal world</p>	<p><u>Participant and process depiction:</u> -Corporate, (international) political elites, the hegemonic system, ‘(inclusive / collective) we’ (mainly individual consumers), climate change: responsible agents (cause) / (conditional) actors, sensors, sayers, carriers or identifieds -Cause (goal): the hegemonic system, evident in ‘green economy’, ‘(sustainable) development’, ‘emission trading’, ‘aid’... – maldistribution, misrecognition, misrepresentation -(Bottom-up) ordinary citizens, ‘(inclusive) we’ (largely generalized): responsible agents (solution) / actors, sensors, sayers -Corporate, (international) political elites (generalized): secondary actors (solutions) / actors, sensors, sayers -Object of help (goal): sustainable development / green economy + biocentric (mainly bottom-up) alternatives, like more traditional ways of living, modesty, circular economy, sharing, biomimicry, long-term thinking... – redistribution, (status) recognition, representation -‘Natural web’ + (bottom-up) ordinary citizens (generalized), ‘(in/exclusive / collective) we’: patients / patients, carriers, identifieds, behavers, conditional agents – often negated / negative processes -Unwanted object (goal): maldistribution (e.g. multi-levelled vulnerability - climate change consequences + detrimental consequences of emission trading, mass consumption etc.), misrecognition (e.g. of bottom-up alternatives, nature as example), misrepresentation (undemocratic processes, e.g. international debates) -Context: natural environments – but often focus on human environments</p> <p><u>Rhetorical devices:</u> -Metaphors: human is a predator / god (denounced) -Symbols / metonyms: bottom-up protest, parts of the ecosystem (for the whole) -Anthropomorphism / personification -Contrast / juxtaposition: human (masses / consumers) versus nature -Key events / intertextual references: ‘Climate Train’ during COPs, ‘Universal Declaration on the Rights of Mother Earth’</p> <p><u>Narration:</u> -Sources: mostly bottom-up (alternative thinkers and think tanks, NGOs, scientists, ordinary people, (visual) first person perspective)</p>	<p>-“Meanwhile, however, human has become a ‘super predator’. Master of the universe.” (DM, 27/06/2012, p.12) -“The society we live in (...) does not recognize limits.” (DWM, 23/08/2013) -“The rainforest of the Amazon, also called ‘the lung of the world’ breathes carbon dioxide (CO₂) in and oxygen out (...)” (DS, 17/02/2014, p.8) -“While the civil society was kept quiet, the fossil fuel industry was able to seize a central seat at the summit.” (DM, 23/11/2013, p.58) -Activists carry a banner saying “Bla Bla Bla – Act Now”. (DWM, 11/21/2012) -“If we just want to meet the EU goal for bio fuels, we’ll need 2 times the surface of Belgium within 5 years. (...) Rainforest is being cut, swamps are being drained.” (MO, 10/10/2013) -“ ‘Lagom’ is the Swedish term for just enough, adequate.” (MO, 10/12/2012)</p>

Problem definition	Causal responsibility	Solution	Moral basis	Framing devices	Examples
Civil Rights Subframe					
All citizens are the victims of the hegemonic system, being reduced to passive / voiceless (individualistic) consumers. As such, preoccupied with our own surviving (or prospering) within (the 'here and now' of) this system, we are not able to consider the more constructive (long-term) alternatives. This makes us disproportionately vulnerable to climate change, and other crises (external pressures).	The current socio-economic system constitutes a threat to civil society in multiple, interacting ways: (direct / indirect) maldistribution, misrecognition and misrepresentation. Sustaining the system, the elites violate the rights of the social (bottom-up) groups they govern / 'control'. Yet, allowing ourselves to be deceived / passivized, all of us contribute to its reproduction (human-internal cause).	Reclaiming our role as citizens, we need to collectively work on (think / talk about) (funda)mental change. Participatory parity is a goal and a means. Drawing on values like sufficiency, sharing, harmony or (e)quality, we may improve our society, safety, well-being, environment and future (in the long run), in ways we consider most appropriate (redistribution, (status) recognition, representation) (human-internal solution).	-The right to self-determination ('a good and safe life', 'freedom', on one's own terms) -Individualism, unlimited growth or consumption as stifling and blinding values, solely serving the interests of a minority (indoctrination) -Harmony, collaboration or sufficiency need to be recognized as preconditions for safe, satisfying and good (i.e. ethical) living -Recognition and redrawing of an unequal society – participatory parity as precondition for a just and equal society	Participant and process depiction: -Political and economic elites (mostly generalized), the hegemonic system, climate change: responsible agents (cause) / actors, sensors, carriers or identifieds -'(Inclusive / collective) we', often as individual consumers: secondary responsible agents (cause) / sensors, carriers or identifieds, actors, conditional agents -Cause (goal): the hegemonic system, prescribing development, consumption, competition, human control... as preconditions for human well-being – maldistribution, misrecognition, misrepresentation -'(In/exclusive / collective) we', (bottom-up) citizens (generalized, identified): responsible agents (solution) / sensors, actors, sayers – often strong modality -Object of help: sustainable development / green economy + 'the good life', working less, returning to nature (e.g. gardening), collective endeavours based on mutual dependency or sharing (e.g. repair cafes), freedom to act well, for the sake of oneself and others – redistribution, (status) recognition, representation -Secondary consequence of solution: better, more satisfying and meaningful lives for humans -'(In/exclusive / collective) we', human, human (civil) society (generalized, identified): patients / patients, carriers or identifieds, sensors, conditional agents – often negated / negative processes / strong modality -Unwanted object: maldistribution (climate change consequences + rebound effect of 'solutions'), misrecognition (of (bottom-up) alternatives like the 'good life', moderation), misrepresentation (no equality, collaboration) -Context: generic (but rather western) human environments Rhetorical devices: -Denounced metaphors: human as a machine, suffocated / blind man -Contrast / juxtaposition: individual consumers versus collective of citizens -Repetition of terms like 'consumers', 'citizens', 'blindness', 'idea', 'system', 'transformation' -Key events / intertextual references: 'I have a dream' (Martin Luther King, 1963), bottom-up initiatives such as city farming, repair cafes, community exchange networks Narration: -Sources: mostly bottom-up (alternative think tanks / thinkers, NGOs, 'people like us')	-“It is clear: neoliberalism is a sickening system.” (DWM, 21/11/2013) -A cartoon of a person standing in a flooded area. The rain is pouring down (metonym for climate change consequences). His head is covered by an umbrella (metonym for current – insufficient – climate change action, within the system) full of dark clouds (metaphor for the hegemonic system which blinds us for the true dangers to which we are exposed / more constructive alternatives) (MO, 11/03/2013). -“(…) we must evolve from passive consumers to active producers who freely choose their destiny. Repairing everything, learning everything anew, doing it ourselves again.” (DWM, 17/09/2012) -“(…) the economy as servant of a better life” (DWM, 02/11/2012)

Problem definition	Causal responsibility	Solution	Moral basis	Framing devices	Examples
Unequal Attribution Subframe					
<p>Some ('bottom-up') groups – mainly those who do not meet the western elite ideal (i.e. 'who are under-developed') – more than others are largely deprived of their livelihoods, cultural traditions, voice..., and thus resilience, due to external pressures. As such, they are (made) disproportionately vulnerable. Climate change is the latest pressure exacerbating this victimized state.</p>	<p>The ('top-down') 'western(ized)' elites – who sustain the hegemonic worldview – appropriate 'common goods' to themselves in a process which they call 'development'. This results in a number of interconnected injustices: (multi-leveled) maldistribution, misrecognition and / or misrepresentation (human-internal cause).</p>	<p>The victimized ('southern') groups need to be respected, and allowed to act, as ('sovereign') equals. Drawing on their (local, internal) experiences or knowledge, they may provide (biocentric) alternatives, with an eye on local / diverse needs and long-term adaptation / mitigation. As such, they can improve their own situation, but also inspire other groups to work (together) on (funda)mental transformation (redistribution, (status) recognition and representation).</p>	<p>-Biocentric values – like harmony and collaboration – as valuable contributions of non-western (nature-) cultures and guiding principles for all humans (i.e. for more ethical ways of living) -Multiple, locally defined justices, which are different but equally valuable as the western ideal (must be recognized and respected) -Right to self-determination -Recognition and redrawing of an unequal society – participatory parity as precondition for a just and equal society</p>	<p>Participant and process depiction: -('Western(ized)') political / corporate elites, NGOs (mostly generalized), the hegemonic system, climate change: responsible agents (cause) / actors, behavers, sensors, carriers or identifieds -Cause (goal): the hegemonic system, evident in 'green economy', 'emission (trading)', 'development', 'aid', 'land grabbing'... – maldistribution, misrecognition, misrepresentation -Particular bottom-up groups ('(in) the South'), '(exclusive) we' / 'I' (generalized / individualized, identified / functionalized): patients + responsible agents (solutions) / carriers, identifieds, behavers, conditional agents, patients (negated / negative) + sovereign agents, sensors or sayers -Particular ('western(ized)') elites (often individualized) / 'inclusive we' (generalized): secondary responsible agents (solution) / actors, sensors or sayers -Unwanted object (goal): maldistribution (multi-layered vulnerability, e.g. climate-induced economic loss + land grabbing), misrecognition (e.g. of climate-clever agriculture), misrepresentation (in local / national / international debates) -Object of help (goal): green economy, technology, knowledge, means, money (mainly top-down) + biocentric (mainly bottom-up) alternatives (e.g. traditional or local knowledge / experiences) – redistribution, (status) recognition, representation -Context: continuous time (timelessness of bottom-up resilience, harmony with nature...) / (clearly situated) human environments, but some recognition of the holistic nature of the world Rhetorical devices: -Metaphor: the elites as predators -Symbols / metonyms: the 'parent' looking after his/her children, the (southern) hero / 'militant' -Contrast / juxtaposition: 'the South' (us) versus 'the West' (them) -Concatenation of verbal / visual images of resilience, harmony, activity -Key events / intertextual references: 'Principles of Environmental Justice' (1991) Narration: -Prevalence of bottom-up voices (locals (e.g. farmers), grassroots movements or officials), as well as ('western') NGOs speaking on their behalf</p>	<p>-“In order to cultivate biofuel, companies and governments rob enormous amounts of land, without compensating the local farmers.” (DWM, 03/10/2013) -“(…) a second wave will hit the Philippines soon: the wave of international emergency aid.” (DM, 13/11/2013, p. 31) -A father and mother running from the devastation caused by typhoon Haiyan, carry / protect their child. (DM, 13/11/2013, p.31) -“The indigenous leaders show an enormous generosity, teaching us a different story.” (DWM, 15/09/2013) -“(…) the Cuban delegation did not agree with the tight focus on 'green economy' (...).” (DWM, 15/06/2012) -“(…) we combine scientific weather forecasts with traditional knowledge.” (MO, 29/06/2012) -A Bangladesh farmer looks us proudly in the eyes, showing the produce of his combined farming project. (DWM, 21/12/2012)</p>

Appendix 3: Exemplary News Articles (Chapter 4)

Klimaattop maakt milieu niet beter (Scala Naturae Subframe)

Het Laatste Nieuws (21/06/2012, p.6)

Nog tot morgen stomen 50.000 activisten, zakenlui en politici uit 130 landen op de milieutop Rio+20 een akkoord klaar om de planeet te redden. Twintig jaar geleden maakten regeringsleiders daar al afspraken. Maar zonder veel succes. Van de 500 doelstellingen uit 1992 werd er maar voor 4 grote vooruitgang geboekt. "We zijn een pak minder duurzaam dan toen", meent milieuprof Hans Bruyninckx zelfs.

De voorbije 24 uur zijn 150 planten- of diersoorten uitgestorven, zijn 6 miljoen liter vervuilende stoffen in onze rivieren gesijpeld, is 200 vierkante kilometer bos gekapt en zijn 8 miljoen stukken afval in zee gegooid. In die tijdspanne hebben ook 50.000 activisten, zakenlui en politici van over de hele wereld in Rio zitten discussiëren hoe we de planeet kunnen redden. In de vorm van een akkoord waar de staatsleiders van 130 landen hun handtekening onder zetten. Nog maar eens.

Want twintig jaar geleden werden in de Braziliaanse feeststad al eens afspraken gemaakt over maatregelen voor het milieu. Maar veel effect hebben die niet gehad. Dat geven de Verenigde Naties - die beide toppen organiseerden - in een recent rapport zelf toe. Wereldwijd is pas voor 4 van de 500 engagementen uit 1992 serieuze vooruitgang geboekt. Zo is het aantal ozonafbrekende stoffen met 93 procent gedaald. Daarnaast wordt benzine loodvrij gemaakt, verbetert de toegang tot goede waterbronnen en vordert het onderzoek naar vervuiling op zee.

"Maar in te veel gebieden blijven de wijzerplaten wat betreft het milieu in het rood duiken", waarschuwt VN-topman Achim Steiner. "Als de huidige trends doorzetten dan krijgen regeringen te maken met ongekende schade en aftakeling." Zo wordt er volgens de VN nu bijna 1,5 keer zoveel plastic geproduceerd als twintig jaar geleden. Driehonderd miljoen hectare bos is verdwenen, een gebied groter dan heel Argentinië. Elke minuut gaat het equivalent van 36 voetbalvelden verloren.

"Twintig jaar na Rio staan we dus niet veel verder en dat smaakt erg bitter", vindt Hans Bruyninckx, professor Internationaal Milieubeleid aan de KU Leuven. "De strijd tegen klimaatverandering was geen succes, als je weet dat er sinds 1990 veertig procent meer uitstoot is. Momenteel verbruiken we elk jaar de helft meer natuurlijke rijkdommen dan de aarde in die tijd kan produceren. We nemen niet alleen rente op, maar happen ook in ons kapitaal."

Rampzalig

Maar beginnen we dat ook te voelen? "Natuurlijke rijkdommen dunnen uit of verminderen in kwaliteit - soms voor we er ons bewust van worden - en sommige metalen lijken plots zeldzaam te worden", merkt Steiner op. Want gsm's, iPads en andere technologische snufjes waar we maar niet genoeg van

krijgen zitten vol steeds schaarsere aardmetalen die uit de aarde worden opgedolven. En intussen warmt de planeet ook nog verder op. De gemiddelde wereldtemperatuur is op twintig jaar 0,4 graden gestegen en klom het voorbije decennium 3 procent per jaar. Ondanks de investeringen in groene stroom, leveren fossiele brandstoffen zoals olie en gas nog altijd 87 procent van de energie die wereldwijd verbruikt wordt. En dan is er nog de toegenomen CO₂-uitstoot, waarvan 80 procent aan amper 19 landen te wijten is.

In snel ontwikkelende economieën als China, India en Brazilië zwol de CO₂-uitstoot zelfs 64 procent aan. En daar gelden nog altijd niet de strikte milieuregels die Europa hanteert. "De EU is de enige groep landen met bindende afspraken en duidelijke doelstelling op de lange termijn. Zo is de industriële pollutie verminderd en de waterkwaliteit erop vooruitgegaan", zegt Bruyninckx. "Maar in andere landen, zoals de VS, is het met het milieubeleid rampzalig gesteld."

Al is er ook bij ons nog ruimte voor verbetering. We slagen immers maar op de helft van 25 onderzochte indicatoren die in 1992 voorop werden gesteld. Op 13 milieudoelstellingen doen we het zelfs slechter. Zo is het effect van de klimaatverandering al duidelijk merkbaar. De temperatuur in België ligt 2,3 graden hoger dan voor de industriële periode en er valt meer neerslag. De winters worden natter met meer neerslagdagen. De zomers kennen dan weer minder, maar intensere neerslagperiodes.

En het ziet er niet naar uit dat het nieuwe akkoord in Rio daaraan wat zal veranderen. Nog voor het einde van de top, ligt nu al een ontwerp voor de slotverklaring die meer honderd staatsleiders zullen tekenen. De tekst roept wel op tot "dringende actie", maar geeft geen details over hoe de doelstellingen bereikt moeten worden. Voor Vlaanderen hebben minister-president Kris Peeters en milieuminister Joke Schauvliege trouwens hun kat gestuurd. Federaal minister van Ontwikkelingssamenwerking Paul Maignette (PS) is wel present.

Katrien Stragier

130 landen in Rio bijeen om planeet te redden: zinvol of niet?



Nog tot morgen stomen 50.000 activisten, zakenlieden en politici uit 130 landen op de milieutop Rio+20 een akkoord klaar om de planeet te redden. Twintig jaar geleden maakten regeringsleiders daar al afspraken. Maar zonder veel succes.

Van de 500 doelstellingen uit 1992 werd er maar voor 4 grote vooruitgang geboekt. «We zijn een pak minder duurzaam dan toen», meent milieuprof Hans Bruyninckx ze fys.

KATRIEN STRAEGIER



De voorbije 24 uur zijn 150 planten- of diersoorten uitgestorven, zijn 6 miljoen liter vervuilde stoffen in onze rivieren gesijpeld, is 200 vierkante kilometer bos gekapt en zijn 8 miljoen stukken afval in zee gegooid. In die tijdgenere hebben ook 50.000 activisten, zakenlieden en politici van over de hele wereld in Rio zinnen discussiëren hoe we de planeet kunnen redden. In de vorm van een akkoord waar de staatsleiders van 130 landen hun handtekening onder zetten. Nog maar eens.

Want twintig jaar geleden werden in de Braziliaanse kuststad al eens afspraken gemaakt over maatregelen voor het milieu. Maar veel effect hebben die niet gehad. Dat gaven de Verenigde Naties – die beide toppen organiseerden – in een recent rapport zelf toe. Wereldwijd is pas voor 4 van de 500 engagementen uit 1992 serieus vooruitgang geboekt. Zo is het aantal armoedevrije mensen met 93 procent gedaald. Daarnaast wordt bezette landbouw gemaakt, verbeterd de toegang tot goede waterbronnen en verdert het onderzoek naar vervuiling opzou.

Maar in de veel gebieden blijven de wijproblemen wat betreft het

Klimaatop maakt milieu niet beter

milieu in het noordelijk vasteland VN-toppen Achter Steiner. Als de huidige trends doerzetten dan krijgen regeringen te maken met opkomende schade en afvalbergz. Zo wordt er volgens de VN nu bijna 1,5 keer zoveel plastic geproduceerd als twintig jaar geleden. Driehonderd miljoen hectare bos in verdueren, een gebied groter dan heel Argentinië. Elke minuut gaat het equivalent van 36 voetbalvelden verloren.

Twintig jaar na Rio staan we dus niet veel verder en dat smaakt erg bitter, vindt Hans Bruyninckx, professor Internationaal Milieubeleid aan de KU Leuven. «De strijd tegen klimaatverandering was geen succes, als je weet dat er sinds 1990 veertig procent meer uitstoot is. Minstens vierhonderd miljoen ton CO₂ meer per jaar die heeft meer natuurlijke rijkdommen dan de aarde in die tijd kan produceren. We nemen niet alleen rente op, maar happen ook in om kapitaal».

Rampzalig
Maar bezinnen we dat ook te veel? «Natuurlijke rijkdommen dalen uit of overmaten in kwantiteit – soms voor we er ons bewust van worden – en sommige metalen lijken plots zeldzaam te worden, merkt Steiner op. Want geen 3, 4de en andere technologische snijden waar we maar niet genoeg van krijgen zitten we steeds schaarser aan metalen die uit de aarde

20 JAAR GELEDEN WERDEN OOK AL AFSPRAKEN GEMAAKT IN RIO, MAAR VAN DE 500 DOELSTELLINGEN UIT 1992 WERD ER MAAR VOOR VIER ECHT GROTE VOORUITGANG GEBOEKT

worden opgedolven. En intussen wordt de planeet ook nog verder op. De gemiddelde wereldtemperatuur is op twintig jaar 0,4 graden gestegen en klein het voorbije decennium 3 procent per jaar. Ondanks die investeringen in groene stroom, leverensociale handstaftezo als olie en gas nog altijd 87 procent van de energie die wereldwijd verbruikt wordt. In dat is er nog de toegenomen CO₂-uitstoot, waarvan 80 procent aan amper 33 landen te wijpen is. In snel ontwikkelende economieën als China, India en Brazilië zwol de CO₂-uitstoot zelfs 64 procent aan. En daar gelden nog altijd niet de strikte milieuregels die Europa hanteert. «De EU is de

enige groep landen met bindende afspraken en duidelijke doelstelling op de lange termijn. Zo is de industriële pollutië verminderd en de weerbaarheid niet erop voortgegaan», zegt Bruyninckx. «Maar in andere landen, zoals de VS, is het met het milieubeleid teruggaand gebleven. Al is er ook bij ons nog ruimte voor verbetering. We slagen immers maar op de helft van 25 endemische indicatoren die in 2002 voorop werden gesteld. Op 13 milieudoelstellingen doen we het zelfs slechter. Zo is het effect van de klimaatverandering al duidelijk merkbaar. De temperatuur in België ligt 2,3 graden hoger dan voor de industriële periode en er valt meer neerslag.

De winsten worden netter met meer vooruitgang. De zonnepanelen dan weer minder, maar interessere vooruitgang. En het ziet er niet meer uit dat het nieuwe akkoord in Rio daaraan wat zal veranderen. Nog voor het einde van de top, ligt nu al een ontwerp voor de slotverklaring die meer honderd staatsleiders zullen tekenen. De tekst moet wel op het volgende actieplan, maar geeft geen details over hoe de doelstellingen bereikt moeten worden. Voor Vlaanderen hebben minister-president Kris Peeters en milieuminister Joke Schauvliege trouwens hun kat gestruwd. Tweemaal minister van Ontwikkelingscoördinatie Paul Magnette (PS) was present.



Vloedgolven als waterbommen' op Sardinië (Consumer Rights Subframe)

De Morgen (20/11/2013, p.5)

Bij noodweer op het Italiaanse eiland Sardinië zijn maandagnacht en gisterenochtend minstens 18 doden gevallen, onder wie vier kinderen, zo melden plaatselijke media. Verschillende afgelegen plaatsen zijn voorlopig nog onbereikbaar, wat doet vrezen dat het dodental nog zal stijgen. Toen cycloon Cleopatra op het eiland inramde, viel in twaalf uur tijd evenveel neerslag als normaal in een half jaar. Tal van wegen zijn ondergelopen en rivieren traden buiten hun oevers. Op bepaalde plaatsen steeg het waterpeil tot drie meter hoogte en liepen huizen onder, bruggen stortten in door de kracht van het water en auto's werden weggeblazen door de wind. Honderden mensen zijn geëvacueerd. Op veel plaatsen viel de stroom uit. Het vlieg- en treinverkeer was urenlang verstoord.

Na een spoedzitting van het Italiaanse kabinet, kondigde premier Enrico Letta aan dat dit 'een nationale tragedie' vormt, wat Rome in staat stelt om meteen extra geld en middelen vrij te maken voor hulpverlening. Een van de zwaarst getroffen plaatsen is Olbia. De burgemeester had het over 'een ware apocalyps' en omschreef de vloedgolven als het inslaan van "waterbommen". Cleopatra is de ergste storm in minstens een decennium tijd. Sommigen speculeren dat het natuurgeweld verband houdt met de opwarming van de aarde maar daarover bestaat onder wetenschappers geen eensgezindheid. Wel hopen milieu-activisten dat de rampspoed de modale Italiaanse burger doet inzien dat er dringend maatregelen nodig zijn in de hele wereld.

Catherine Vuylsteke

voor elk kind



...rijen dat...
...niet me...
...van de...
...voet een...
...kind in het...
...daar ook al...
...dingen wet...
...niet. Voor...
...niet. Het...
...niet, en zo...
...errekken...
...derwijs.

Groen stelt voor om het basiseding voor het eerste kind in de huidige regering als algemene onderverzekering voor ieder kind te behouden. Een kind uit een rijk gezin waarvan het inkomen bij de twee procent laagste inkomsten ligt krijgt het basiseding, voor een kind uit een andere gezin wordt het basiseding aangevuld met een degrootere inkomensafhankelijke uitkering.

WIE WINT?

Dit is het meest 'hervormende' voorstel van alle kinderen uit benodigde gezinnen zullen wat minder krijgen, kinderen uit minder welgestelde gezinnen krijgen meer.

Open Vld: 'Geen 7de staatsvorming op korte termijn'

BRUSSEL - Open Vld-Kamerlid Bart Somers ontkent in alle toonaarden dat de partij een bereidheid heeft van de maatschappelijke discussies te verschuiven. Daarvoor roept hij op politoloog Nicolas Roubaux (Ugent), die dat de allereerste partij is van hun voorstel om de alarmprocedure en het tussentijd in de federale regering af te schaffen.

'Wij willen bescherming voor de Franstaligen niet weg'

BAAR SOMERS
OPEN VLD

Open Vld houdt dit weekend haar interdebatte congres, waar de partij naar eigen zeggen resoluut haar pleidooi om federale Belgie zal behouden. Tegelijk wil de partij ook af van enkele 'grote, onhaalbare' procedures, die moeten veranderen dat het taalregime. Vrijwilligen of Franstaligen, een wet er eenzijdig zou doorbreken.

nen door een volgende en grondige staatsvorming. Dit maakt de liberalen dan ook, zo roept de Groen politoloog verder, tot een houding van 'Nik. Een pijnlijke conclusie voor de liberalen, want ze doen er niet alles aan om zich van de Vlaamse nationalisten te distancieren. Tegelijk brengt Open Vld dat een zeer sterke Vlaamse boodschap verstuikt als een soort 'nutteloos federalisme', vat Roubaux samen.


Niet wij, maar Roubaux maakt een deskloof, reguleert Somers. Zijn partij wil niet over zes maanden, na de verkiezingen in de lente, de partij en de alarmprocedure opheffen via uitputtende onderhandelingen, maar in een verre toekomst. 'Wij focussen ons dus wel degelijk op het economisch herstel en willen op korte termijn geen zevende staatsvorming', benadrukt de Mechelse burgemeester. Aan het huidige federalisme zit en echter haken en ogen, zoals deze gezin, en daar moeten we op langere termijn over nadenken.

De Franstaligen hebben volgens hem alle te vrezen. 'Wij willen niet elke bescherming voor de Franstaligen weg, wij willen het federalisme', rijnt.



• Twee olievuikers in de woeste zee van de Golf van Cagliari op Sardinië worden gegeseld door stormwinden. © MAX SOLINAS / AP

'Vloedgolven als waterbommen' op Sardinië



• Een bus en een vrachtwagen volgeladen met splinterkraker auto's zijn gestrand in een ondergelopen tunnel nabij Olbia, een zwaar getroffen stad in het noorden van het eiland. © MARIO LUCIO / AP

Cycloon Cleopatra laat waterpeil tot 3 meter stijgen; 18 doden

BRUSSEL - Bij aankomst op het Italiaanse eiland Sardinie zijn inwoners in de geroerde zee van de kust van de provincie Cagliari, onder andere in Olbia, getroffen door de kracht van de zwaarste storm in maanden. Honderden mensen zijn gebuureerd. Op veel plaatsen viel de stroom uit. Het vlieg- en treinverkeer was urenlang verstoord.

Na een opvoeding van het Italiaanse kabinet, kondigde premier Enrico Letta aan dat dit 'een nationale tragedie' vormt, wat Rome in staat stelt om meteen extra geld en middelen vrij te maken voor hulpverlening. Een van de zwaarst getroffen plaatsen is Olbia. De burgemeester had het over 'een ware apocalypse' en omschreef de vloedgolven als het insaan van 'waterbommen'. Cleopatra is de ergste storm in meer dan een decennium tijd. Sommigen speculeren dat het natuurgeweld verband houdt met de opwarming van de aarde maar daarvoor bestaat onder wetenschappers geen eensgezindheid. Wel heeft milieuschrijver dat de rampspoed de lokale Italiaanse burger doet inzien dat er dringend maatregelen nodig zijn in de hele wereld. © V



• Een man wandelt in een overstroomde straat in het dorpje Silqua (b.). Brandweerlui reddden burgers in het stadje Terralba (o.), afgebeeld in het binnenland van Sardinië. © ANDRÉ COCCA / AP

'Dit moet doen nadenken over klimaatverandering' (Unequal Vulnerability Subframe)

De Standaard (12/11/2013, p.6)

De natuurramp op de Filipijnen weegt op de klimaattop in Warschau, die gisteren begon. Maar of ze een impact zal hebben op de uitkomst ervan, is twijfelachtig. De tegengestelde belangen van diverse hoofdrolspelers wegen wellicht zwaarder door.

BRUSSEL 'De tyfoon Haiyan is een realiteit die ons moet doen nadenken over de klimaatverandering.' Christiana Figueres, klimaatverantwoordelijke van de Verenigde Naties, legde gisteren bij de opening van de klimaattop in Warschau onmiddellijk een verband met de natuurramp op de Filipijnen. Het hoofd van de Filipijnse delegatie in de Poolse hoofdstad, Naderev Sano, was meer cassant: 'Ik daag iedereen uit die blijft ontkennen dat de klimaatverandering een realiteit is, om op dit eigenste moment de Filipijnen te bezoeken.'

De bijeenkomst in Warschau, waar meer dan 190 landen aanwezig zijn en die tot 22 november duurt, is een voorbereidende conferentie op de klimaattop in Parijs in 2015. Het blijft de bedoeling om daar afspraken te maken zodat de opwarming van de aarde beperkt wordt tot 2°C in vergelijking met het pre-industriële tijdperk. Dat kan alleen als de industrielanden over twee jaar in de Franse hoofdstad een ambitieus en bindend akkoord sluiten om de uitstoot van broeikasgassen vanaf 2020 terug te dringen. Tot dan loopt het Kyoto-protocol dat in 1997 afgesloten werd en pas in 2005 in werking trad.

Extra geld vrijmaken

De hulporganisatie Oxfam merkte al direct op dat 'de druk op de rijke landen nu stijgt om extra geld vrij te maken en de impact van de klimaatverandering aan te pakken. Er is dringend meer geld nodig om arme gemeenschappen en ontwikkelingslanden te helpen met acties om hun kwetsbaarheid voor de klimaatverandering te verminderen.' Tijdens de klimaattop in Kopenhagen in 2009 spraken de ontwikkelde landen af dat ze tegen 2020 jaarlijks 100 miljard dollar in een fonds zouden stoppen. Maar door de financiële en economische crisis zit de klad in dat proces.

'De tyfoon op de Filipijnen zal zeker een impact hebben op de speeches in Warschau', zegt de Belg Wendel Trio, directeur van Climate Action Network Europe, dat 120 ngo's in 25 Europese landen overkoepelt. 'Het is altijd moeilijk om één specifieke gebeurtenis te linken aan de klimaatverandering. Maar in zijn jongste rapport stelt het klimaatpanel van de VN dat door de opwarming dit soort natuurrampen nog zal toenemen. In die zin zal de tyfoon zeker gebruikt worden. Maar ik betwijfel of het een impact zal hebben op de uitkomst van de top in Warschau.'

Grootse beslissingen vallen er niet te verwachten in de Poolse hoofdstad. 'De deelnemers zouden een tijdlijn moeten kunnen afspreken over wat er tussen nu en de conferentie in Parijs moet gebeuren', zegt Trio. 'Zo zouden er afspraken moeten komen over de verschillende stappen die gezet

Reservelampje voor wereldeconomie brandt (Human Wealth Subframe)

DeWereldMorgen (25/06/2012)

RIO DE JANEIRO - De 'aardetop' in Rio heeft haar ei gelegd. Meer dan 180 soevereine staten hebben – gevangen in een 'prisonnersdilemma' – hun laagste gemene deler gevonden in een slotakkoord dat weinig harde en concrete maatregelen bevat voor het creëren en verdelen van welvaart binnen de grenzen van het natuurlijk systeem. Het proces gaat voort, maar dat is dan ook de enige verdienste.

In deze tijden van financiële en economische crisis wordt daar nogal schouderophalend op gereageerd. De mensen en beleidsmakers hebben wel andere zorgen. *It's the economy stupid!* De schulden crisis die Europa in haar greep houdt, laat geen ruimte voor overheden om duurzame investeringen aan te zwingelen. De economische motor moet eerst opnieuw aanslaan vooraleer de wagen een andere richting kan worden opgestuurd. Zoiets.

Meer van hetzelfde is geen optie meer

Die houding is nefast. Meer van hetzelfde is geen optie meer. Een doorstart van onze olie- en grondstofverslaafde economie zal nooit van lange duur zijn. De druk op de natuurlijke rijkdommen is van die aard dat de natuur begint terug te slaan. Vorig jaar al liep de factuur voor de netto-import van aardolie en aardgas in de Europese Unie op tot meer dan 600 miljard dollar, meer dan de totale buitenlandse schuld van Griekenland!

Als de aardolieprijzen het volgende decennium opnieuw verdubbelen zoals in het vorige, dan heeft dit desastreuze gevolgen voor de Europese handelsbalans en voor de vitaliteit van de Europese economie. Dan dragen we elk jaar opnieuw een extra 'Griekse schuld' naar buiten de Unie. En de prijzen van fossiele brandstoffen, grondstoffen en voedsel zouden wel eens veel sterker kunnen stijgen.

Tegen 2030 krijgen we een verdubbeling van de wereldwijde autovloot tot 1,7 miljard wagens en betreden 3 miljard extra middenklasse consumenten de wereldmarkt. Volgens het gezaghebbende Stern-rapport zal het verder opwarmen van ons klimaat ons zo'n 5 tot 20 procent van het wereldwijde BBP kosten, meer dan de Grote Depressie uit de jaren dertig van vorige eeuw.

Ook het verlies aan ecosysteemdiensten kost onze economie handenvol geld. Het TEEB-rapport over *The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity* onder leiding van voormalig Deutsche Bank-econoom Pavan Sukhdev maakte duidelijk dat zelfs in het economisch crisisjaar 2008, de economische waarde van wat dat jaar aan natuur (vaak letterlijk) voor de bijl ging, hoger opliep dan het verlies aan beurswaarde.

Commerciële visbestanden zijn tot 90 procent afgenomen. Tegen het huidige tempo zullen er tegen 2050 geen economisch winbare visbestanden in onze zeeën overblijven. Natuurlijk kapitaal dat

tijdens miljoenen jaren natuurlijke evolutie werd opgebouwd, gaat op enkele decennia voor de bijl en verhindert de regeneratie van onze economische welvaart.

Het steeds vroeger vallen van de *Overshoot day* (de dag in het jaar waarop de mensheid evenveel grond- en hulpstoffen heeft geconsumeerd als dat jaar door de natuur wordt voortgebracht), maakt duidelijk dat we niet leven van de 'rente' waarmee onze natuurlijke stocks jaarlijks aangroeien, maar interen op het kapitaal ervan. We overschrijden de mondiale ecologische draagkracht met ongeveer 50 procent. We zagen zo de tak af waar we op zitten.

Alternatieve financiering is nodig

Als we nu niet investeren in de transitie naar een koolstofarme kringlooeconomie en in het behoud of de (her)ontwikkeling van ecosystemen, zullen morgen de kosten helemaal niet meer te overzien zijn. Het Stern-rapport toont aan dat de kost om de opwarming binnen de perken te houden zo'n 10 keer lager ligt dan de economische schade die het klimaat zou aanrichten als we de opwarming laten betijen.

Maar ook hier geldt dat de kost voor de baat uitgaat. Om de transitie naar een koolstofarme samenleving te financieren, is een alternatieve financiering nodig, via bijvoorbeeld een financiële transactietaks of een taks op de brandstoffen van het internationaal vlieg- of scheepvaartverkeer.

De wereld heeft noord aan een internationaal duurzaamheidscontract waarin samen werk gemaakt wordt van de noodzakelijke technologische, maatschappelijke, financiële en institutionele innovaties. Een derde industriële revolutie die ons de 'bevrijdingstechnologie' levert die we nodig hebben om los te komen van onze verslaving aan eindige grondstoffen en hulpbronnen.

Een sociale innovatie die leidt tot het beter verdelen van de welvaart en de ontwikkeling van sociaal kapitaal. Een institutionele innovatie die werk maakt van een gezamenlijk beheer van *global commons* in plaats van de nationale grondstoffen-soevereiniteit die een duurzaam beheer vandaag in de weg staat.

We hebben nood aan bio(sfeer)politiek in plaats van geopolitiek, een *sustainability-sixpack* waarbij ook afspraken komen voor het beheersen van de tekorten op onze natuurbalans, het afbouwen van ecologische schulden en het rechtvaardig verdelen van de beschikbare milieugebruiksruimte en van de welvaart die daarmee wordt voortgebracht.

Bart Martens

Bart Martens is Vlaams volksvertegenwoordiger voor de SP.A. Hij schreef deze bijdrage vanuit Rio

Het hoge noorden is hot (Rights of the Free Market Subframe)

De Standaard (10/03/2012, p.38)

De hele week reisde Catherine Ashton door het hoge noorden van Europa met de boodschap dat de Europese Unie meer aandacht moet en zal schenken aan die strategisch belangrijke regio. Maar wat heeft Europa daar eigenlijk te zoeken?

Langzaam zet de helikopter voet aan grond in Ny Alesund, 's werelds meest noordelijk gelegen bewoonde plek op aarde. In de winter verblijven hier 35 mensen, in de zomer loopt dat aantal op tot 150, vooral onderzoekers van smeltend ijs. Dit is Spitsbergen, het grootste eiland van de Svalbard-archipel, een Noorse eilandengroep midden in de Arctische Oceaan. Tot de noordpool - nog 1.300 kilometer hoger - is er alleen water en ijs.

Uit de helikopter stappen Jonas Gahr Store, de Noorse minister van Buitenlandse Zaken en Catherine Ashton. Tussen de kale, besneeuwde bergen blaast een ijsskoude wind, maar die lijkt Europa's hoge vertegenwoordiger voor Buitenlandse Zaken en Veiligheid niet te deren. Ze is dan ook al een hele week op stap in het hoge noorden van Europa. Spitsbergen is Ashtons derde stop na Fins Lapland en Zweden.

Minimumrecord

Haar boodschap, die ze herhaalt als een mantra, is duidelijk: de ontwikkelingen in de Arctische regio worden almaar belangrijker voor de Europese Unie, zowel op strategisch als op economisch en milieugebied. Daarom moet Europa er vanaf nu meer aandacht aan besteden.

Tegen die boodschap is weinig in te brengen. Het Noordpoolgebied zal de komende jaren almaar belangrijker worden en dat heeft alles te maken met de klimaatverandering en het snel smeltende ijs. Dat het poolijs almaar dunner en kwetsbaarder, is voor alle wetenschappers in de regio zonneklaar. Ook deze winter werd hier net geen nieuw 'minimumrecord' gebroken. En de gevolgen daarvan zijn gigantisch.

In de eerste plaats komen enorme olie- en gasreserves binnen ontginningsbereik. Volgens het Amerikaanse Instituut voor Geologie liggen 30 procent van 's werelds gasvoorraden en 13 procent van de olievoorraden onder dat noordpoolijs. De verwachte voorraad wordt bovendien stelselmatig naar boven bijgesteld: waar eerst werd gedacht aan 90 miljard vaten, houden oliemaatschappijen nu rekening met mogelijk 160 miljard vaten.

Daarnaast ontstaan veel kortere vaarroutes voor grote zeeschepen. Concreet: een schip dat van Noorwegen naar China moet, hoeft in de toekomst steeds minder langs het Suezkanaal, maar kan de noordoostelijke passage nemen, langs de kust van Rusland en vervolgens door de Beringstraat varen.

Een tocht die normaal 40 dagen duurt, kan dan in 22 dagen gedaan worden, goed voor een besparing van 580 ton aan brandstof.

Koude Oorlog

'Deze regio is inderdaad bijzonder snel aan het veranderen', zegt minister Store, terwijl hij plaats neemt in het salon van het Amundsen-huis, genoemd naar Noorwegens beroemdste poolreiziger Roald Amundsen die hier een tijdje verbleef. 'Daarom heeft de Noorse regering van het Hoge Noorden een prioriteit gemaakt. En we zijn heel blij dat de Europese Unie meer aandacht aan de regio wil besteden. Dat is immers in ons gezamenlijk belang.' En, voegt hij eraan toe: 'Er dreigen hier geen conflicten. We moeten niet in termen van Koude Oorlog denken. Die tijd is immers voorbij.'

Maar spreekt uit de woorden van Store ook niet een klein beetje ongerustheid over wat de plannen zijn van Noorwegens grote buur Rusland, de machtigste speler in de regio. Nauwelijks vijf jaar geleden plantte Rusland immers zijn vlag op de bodem van de Noordelijke IJszee, waarmee het een duidelijke claim legde op mogelijke rijkdommen.

'Toch zijn de relaties tussen Noorwegen en Rusland nooit beter geweest dan nu', zegt Gunnar Ole Austvik, politiek econoom aan de universiteit van Lillehammer. 'Er was inderdaad die vlag, maar in 2010 hebben Rusland en Noorwegen ook een 40 jaar lang aanslepend conflict bijgelegd over een vis- en olierijk gebied in de Barentszee, waardoor dat opnieuw ontgonnen kan worden.'

Maar, voegt hij er snel aan toe: 'Rusland blijft onvoorspelbaar en het heeft nog een hele weg af te leggen op gebied van corruptie, democratie en milieubewustzijn. Onze politici weten dat ook en daarom willen ze zo graag steun van de Europese Unie.'

Bondgenoot

'Klopt', zegt Kristine Offerdal, onderzoekster aan het Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies en gespecialiseerd in het noordpoolgebied. 'Van alle spelers met belangen in de regio is Noorwegen veruit de kleinste en Rusland de grootste. In zo'n geval is het altijd veilig een sterke bondgenoot te zoeken. Want hoewel er op dit moment zeker een vertrouwensband is met Rusland, weet je nooit hoe zaken evolueren.'

En de Koude Oorlog speelt, volgens Offerdal, in de hoofden van de Noorse politici inderdaad nog altijd een rol, maar dan op een andere manier. 'Tijdens de Koude Oorlog was het Hoge Noorden ook bijzonder belangrijk, waardoor Noorwegen, als Navo-lid, erg veel aandacht kreeg van zijn bondgenoten. Dat hielp Noorse politici in hun relaties met de Russen. Het gaf hen meer invloed, want ze hadden die sterke bondgenoten achter zich. Maar met het einde van de Koude Oorlog veranderde dat. De rugdekking viel weg, waardoor ze zich ongemakkelijk begonnen te voelen. En zeker nu de regio om die andere redenen flink aan belang wint, willen ze graag dat de Europese Unie hen opnieuw meer aandacht geeft.'

Maar heeft de Europese Unie eigenlijk iets te zoeken in Hoge Noorden en heeft het er invloed? Offerdal: 'Europa heeft op dit moment zeker belangrijkere zaken aan het hoofd - om de eurocrisis maar even niet bij naam te noemen - maar het is in elk geval verstandig dat het de ontwikkelingen hier op de voet volgt. Met Finland en Zweden heeft het bovendien twee leden die direct betrokken partij zijn. Maar tegelijk voel je ook dat Europa niet goed weet wat het hier moet doen.'

In het Amundsen-salon blijft Ashton inderdaad bijzonder vaag. 'We moeten de regio op de meest efficiënte manier steunen', klinkt het. En voorts gaat het over een evenwicht zoeken tussen kansen en uitdagingen, en over milieubescherming en onderzoek waar de Unie een steentje kan bijdragen. 'Het zou bovendien fantastisch zijn als we permanent waarnemer kunnen worden van Arctic Council.'

De Arctische Raad is een samenwerkingsverband van acht landen die grenzen aan de regio: VS, Rusland, Canada, Finland, Noorwegen, Zweden, Denemarken en IJsland. Maar Rusland en Canada zien dat EU-engagement eigenlijk niet zitten en stemden vorig jaar dan ook tegen dat permanent waarnemerschap. Volgend jaar krijgt Europa een nieuwe kans.

Offerdal: 'Symbolisch is zo'n permanent waarnemerschap misschien belangrijk, maar in de praktijk maakt het weinig verschil. Ik denk echt niet dat Europa's invloed erdoor groter wordt. Ik zie ook niet goed in hoe de EU meer invloed kan krijgen in het hoge noorden. Het best lijkt het me dat Europa financiële steun geeft voor wetenschappelijk onderzoek.'

Ballon

Dat lijkt Ashton ook te beseffen. Als ze door een onderzoeker wordt uitgenodigd een boodschap te schrijven op een ballon die wordt opgelaten voor ozononderzoek, schrijft ze iets over wetenschap en onderzoek.

'Maar wat Europa zeker ook kan doen, is zo weinig mogelijk afval in het water en de lucht achterlaten', zegt Kim Holmen, internationaal directeur van het Noorse Poolinstituut. 'Want uiteindelijk komt al die vuiligheid bij ons terecht: van radioactieve deeltjes van de Britse kerncentrale van Sellafield tot smog van bosbranden in Tsjechië.'

Dominique Minten

REPORTAGE | WELKE AMBITIES HEEFT EUROPA IN HET NOORDPOOLGEBIED?

Het hoge noorden is hot



Op Arvid, 1 weekje naar het noordelijk poolgebied, zijn de eerste winters in de zomer, zo'n 150 vriesgraden Celsius en een bodem die 10 meter diep is.

De hele week reisde Catherine Ashton door het hoge noorden van Europa met de boodschap dat de Europese Unie meer aandacht moet en zal schenken aan die strategisch belangrijke regio. Maar wat heeft Europa daar eigenlijk te zoeken?

VAN DE WERELD

De Europese Unie heeft een belangrijke rol te spelen in het hoge noorden van Europa. Dit is niet alleen een gebied van strategische waarde, maar ook een gebied van enorme natuurlijke rijkdommen. De Europese Unie moet ervoor zorgen dat deze rijkdommen op een duurzame manier worden gebruikt.

DE ARCTIS

De Arctis is een gebied van enorme strategische waarde. Het is een gebied van enorme natuurlijke rijkdommen, waaronder olie, gas en andere mineralen. De Europese Unie moet ervoor zorgen dat deze rijkdommen op een duurzame manier worden gebruikt.

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De Antartis is een gebied van enorme strategische waarde. Het is een gebied van enorme natuurlijke rijkdommen, waaronder olie, gas en andere mineralen. De Europese Unie moet ervoor zorgen dat deze rijkdommen op een duurzame manier worden gebruikt.

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

Naag de planeet op Spitzbergen met Johan de Groot, de Noorse minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, en Catherine Ashton, de hoge vertegenwoordiger van de Europese Unie.

Het poolijs wordt almaar dunner en kwetsbaarder. Daardoor komen enorme olie- en gasreserves binnen bereik

Maar, voegt hij er aan toe, het is niet alleen de olie en het gas die de aandacht trekken. Het is ook de strategische waarde van het gebied. Het is een gebied van enorme natuurlijke rijkdommen, waaronder olie, gas en andere mineralen. De Europese Unie moet ervoor zorgen dat deze rijkdommen op een duurzame manier worden gebruikt.

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"Regenwormen zorgen voor opwarming van de aarde" (Natural Machine Subframe)

Het Laatste Nieuws (05/02/2013, p.24)

Regenwormen zijn de échte boosdoeners voor de opwarming van de aarde. Dat beweren onderzoeksteams van vier internationale universiteiten, in een lijvig rapport dat ze gisteren voorlegden. De wetenschappers stellen dat regenwormen de uitstoot van koolzuurgas vanuit de bodem met gemiddeld 33 procent vermeerderden, en die van lachgas zelfs met 42 procent. Hoofdoorzaak, zo zeggen ze, is het gewoel van de beestjes, waardoor de gassen gemakkelijker kunnen ontsnappen naar de atmosfeer.

"De meest verrassende conclusie van deze studie is het bewijs dat regenwormen de natuurlijke cyclus van gasproductie versnellen", zegt Guido van der Werf, wetenschapper bij de Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam. "Wat de exacte gevolgen zijn, kan ik niet goed inschatten." Nu de onderzoekers van Wageningen dit belangrijk mechanisme in opwarming van de aarde op het spoor zijn, willen ze ook aan een 'oplossing' werken om de gasproductie te verminderen.

Maar niet iedereen reageert even enthousiast. Biologen en natuurverenigingen sprongen gisteren in de verdediging voor regenwormen. "Er werd niet gekeken naar het nut van de beestjes, maar alleen naar de nadelen. Dit is een veel te eenzijdige studie", zegt de bekende Nederlandse bioloog Meindert Nieuweboer. "Het klopt dat wormen een grote rol spelen bij de omzetting van plantenresten en mest tot gassen. Maar dat ze de opwarming van de aarde dermate kunnen beïnvloeden dat ze plots een probleem vormen, is larie. Er zijn nog veel meer studies nodig om tot realistische vaststellingen te komen."

PV

MIJDELEN 4°
NW 3-4
KUST 5-13
ARDENNEN 0-1-2
Aantal uren zon 1
Kans op neerslag 85%
Hoofsheid neerslag 3 liter/m²

DOENDERDAG 4°
NW 3-4
KUST 5-13
ARDENNEN 0-1-2
Aantal uren zon 1
Kans op neerslag 85%
Hoofsheid neerslag 3 liter/m²

VRIJDAG 4°
NW 3-4
KUST 5-13
ARDENNEN 0-1-2
Aantal uren zon 3
Kans op neerslag 40%
Hoofsheid neerslag 3 liter/m²

ZATERDAG 2°
N 2-3
KUST 5-13
ARDENNEN 0-1-2
Aantal uren zon 2
Kans op neerslag 40%
Hoofsheid neerslag <1 liter/m²

ZONDAG 2°
Z 3
KUST 5-13
ARDENNEN 0-1-2
Aantal uren zon 3
Kans op neerslag 15%
Hoofsheid neerslag 0 liter/m²

MAANDAG 2°
NO 2-3
KUST 5-13
ARDENNEN 0-1-2
Aantal uren zon 6
Kans op neerslag 15%
Hoofsheid neerslag 1 liter/m²

DINSDAG 2°
ZW 2-3
KUST 5-13
ARDENNEN 0-1-2
Aantal uren zon 3
Kans op neerslag 15%
Hoofsheid neerslag 0 liter/m²

DAGRECORD
14,7° (2004) -13,3° (1912)
normaal 8,0° normaal 0,3°

Aantal uren zon 3
Kans op neerslag 75%
Hoofsheid neerslag 3 liter/m²



JILL PEETERS
Zon: op 08.12u, onder 17.42u
Maan: op 03.49u, onder 12.58u

Winterse buien



HET WEER OP 113.425 PLAATSEN WERELDWIJD > SURF NAAR WWW.HLN.BE

TORNADO VOOR KUST CORSICA

Een toeriste heeft een indrukwekkende foto kunnen maken van een tornado boven de Middellandse Zee. De fotografie bevond zich op een bootje voor de kust van Corsica toen ze het natuurfenomeen plots zag verschijnen. Na amper 30 minuten was de tornado alweer verdwenen. Journalist



REGENWORMEN ZORGEN VOOR OPWARMING VAN DE AARDE

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De wetenschappers stellen dat regenwormen de uitstoot van koolstofdioxide vanuit de bodem met gemiddeld 33% verminderden, en die van lachgas zelfs met 42%. Hoofdoorzaak, zo zeggen ze, is het gewoel van de beestjes, waardoor de gassen gemakkelijker kunnen ontsnappen naar de atmosfeer.

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HET MEER MORGEN

Gurga	12°
Antalya	14°
Athene	17°
Barronville	14°
Berlijn	10°
Bern	11°
Dublin	8°
Faro	10°
Helsinki	10°
Madrid	14°
Kopenhagen	10°
Lissabon	12°
Ljubljana	10°
Londen	7°
Moskou	11°
Moskou	11°
Osaka	8°
Prague	10°
Rome	12°
Sofia	10°
Stockholm	10°
Toronto	10°
Wenen	7°
Zagreb	8°
Chicago	2°
Los Angeles	15°
Miami	27°
New York	4°
Seattle	5°
Mexico	25°
Havana	25°
Santo Domingo	25°
Bogota	13°
Buenos Aires	23°
Rio de Janeiro	25°
Atika	15°
Cairo	18°
Kinshasa	22°
Nairobi	25°
Duane	25°
Adelaide	32°
Sydney	25°
Azi	25°
Bangkok	32°
Hong Kong	24°
Singapore	30°
Tokio	4°
Dubai	23°

op de hoogteste

Zwitserland	410
Armenie	190
Duitsland	190
Kosten	190
Verenigd Koninkrijk	190
St. Maarten	240
Zwitserland	290
Frankrijk	290
Chamorro	290
La Plagne	290
Tignes	290
Murcia	290
Vai d'Isère	290
Nebelhorn	290
Dubai	290
Dubai	290
Suben	290
Albania	190
Alpbach	190
Lermoos	190
Ischgl	190
Lech	190
Kitzbühel	190
Alta Badia	190
Groden	190

Habib Maalouf: 'Religie en ontwikkelingsdogma zijn catastrofaal voor milieu' (Natural Web Subframe)

MO* Magazine (14/11/2013)



MO* sprak met Habib Maalouf, een Libanese schrijver, journalist en professor die twee boeken publiceerde over milieufilosofie. Hij is hoofd van de Libanese Vereniging voor Milieu en Ontwikkeling en mede-oprichter van het Euromed Civil Forum (MEDEA). Hij ziet de klimaatonderhandelingen in Warschau zeer zwartgallig in. De hele menselijke cultuur treft schuld, aldus Maalouf.

Maalouf bezoekt Brussel met een delegatie van Arabische ngo's die deel uitmaken van de Arab NGO Network for Development (NDA). De delegatie is hier om de relatie tussen Europa en de Arabische landen te bespreken. Ze leveren felle kritiek op de economische akkoorden tussen de EU en de Arabische landen.

Habib Maalouf is echter voornamelijk geïnteresseerd in het milieu, hét belangrijkste probleem van het moment, volgens hem. Ook hierin heeft de EU een belangrijke rol te spelen, onder andere in het opvangen van de klimaatveranderingmigranten, meent Maalouf. Maar de oplossing van de milieuproblematiek gaat veel verder dan Europa alleen. 'Een universele ecologische revolutie is nodig', zegt de Libanese professor.

Wat zijn uw verwachtingen voor de onderhandelingen in Warschau?

Habib Maalouf: Er gaat niets vooruit sinds 1992. We zijn nog steeds in dezelfde situatie, neen, we zijn er zelfs op achteruitgegaan. De ontwikkelingslanden willen dat de ontwikkelde landen hun uitstoot verlagen, maar ondertussen willen ze zelf een economische revolutie. Simpel gezegd: de arme landen willen rijk worden en hoe word je rijk? Door meer ontwikkeling en daardoor gaat je uitstoot stijgen.

In Warschau gaan ze praten over de volgende onderhandelingen in Parijs in 2015, maar ze zijn nog niet eens begonnen om echte veranderingen door te voeren om de deadline van 2020 te halen. De zaken worden uitgesteld terwijl de globale opwarming zich gewoon voortzet. Neen, ik denk niet dat er iets gaat gebeuren in Warschau.

Waarom verandert er maar niets?

Habib Maalouf: Het type ontwikkeling dat dominant is in de wereld, dat is de echte boosdoener, het fundament van het probleem. Ontwikkeling boven alles is het dominante idee in de wereld. Niemand wil inzien dat het idee catastrofaal is geworden. Catastrofaal voor de planeet en voor de mensen in de toekomst. We belasten de natuur enkel maar meer en meer. Nochtans, in een democratisch systeem heeft de meerderheid het toch voor het zeggen? Wel, de mensen in de toekomst – zij gaan met veel meer zijn dan wij– moeten we dan niet vooral rekening houden met hen?

Ontwikkeling in de natuur is beperkt. Bloemen krijgen vruchtjes, de vruchtjes vallen af en sterven. Zo zit de ontwikkeling nu eenmaal in elkaar, het heeft een eindpunt. Wat de mens nu bezig is, heeft geen eindpunt. Neem nu de nucleaire energie, wat een gevaarlijke energiebron! Om onze manier van leven te onderhouden, vernietigen we ander leven. Het eindpunt zal komen wanneer de natuur zelf er een einde aan maakt. We moeten echt stoppen met de manier waarop we leven. Er is een universele ecologische revolutie nodig.

En dit is het centrale idee in de twee boeken die u publiceerde over milieufilosofie?

Habib Maalouf: Inderdaad, ik heb twee boeken geschreven over milieufilosofie. Ze zijn enkel in het Arabisch beschikbaar. Het zijn trouwens de eerste Arabische boeken over dit onderwerp. De boeken gaan dus over het problematische van de menselijke cultuur. Een humanistische cultuur die gelooft dat de mens het centrum van de wereld is, dat de wereld rond hem draait. We gedragen ons als goden. En dat is de basis van de milieuproblematiek.

De mens heeft alles naar zijn hand gezet zonder rekening te houden met de andere soorten. Neem nu de religies, die zijn ook verantwoordelijk. Het godsbeeld is problematisch. De relatie mens – God moet herdacht worden. De mens is niet superieur, hij is niet de *primus inter pares*. De dominante religies doen de mens geloven dat hij speciaal is. En als hij denkt dat hij speciaal is, dat hij meer waarde heeft dan een ander, is het toegestaan om andere soorten te devalueren.

Ik ben zelf wel een gelovig man, maar ik heb religie voor mezelf geherdefinieerd. Ik geloof in God als de schepper, maar ik geloof ook in gelijkheid en dat de mens in harmonie moet leven met de natuur.

Is Libanon ontvankelijk voor jouw ideeën?

Habib Maalouf: Neen, de Libanese regering is zoals alle andere regeringen: ontwikkeling en vooruitgang gaan voor. Het maatschappelijk middenveld heeft vele kansen in Libanon. Er is een grote diversiteit aan organisaties, maar er worden geen beslissingen genomen. Ze hebben ook een consumenteninstelling in het maatschappelijk middenveld: ze consumeren ideeën alsof het eten is, maar niks verandert. Het enige dat blijft is de consumptiesamenleving in een land dat altijd op het punt van een interne oorlog staat.

Zal klimaatverandering problematisch worden voor de stabiliteit van de regio?

Habib Maalouf: Klimaatverandering zal alleszins problemen verscherpen. Er zijn al heel wat klimaatmigranten, mensen die immigreren omwille van de droogtes die de landbouwgronden aantast. Dat is een nieuwe soort migratie die alleen maar zal toenemen.

Een andere zaak is de waterkwestie. Water zorgt bijvoorbeeld voor heel wat bijkomende spanningen tussen de Arabische landen en Israël. Water biedt zowel een kans voor samenwerking, maar het kan ook een reden tot conflict zijn. En de klimaatverandering zou het tij kunnen doen keren in negatieve zin, dus dat de kans op conflict groter wordt.

Julie Putseys

Iedereen politiek: de toekomst heroveren

DeWereldMorgen (21/11/2013)

Lezing van Dirk Holemans op de trefdag van het Steunpunt sociaal cultureel volwassenenwerk met als thema 'Iedereen politiek'.

'Iedereen politiek', het is een goed gekozen thema voor deze trefdag. Want wat is in feite politiek? Laat me eerst een onderscheid maken tussen *politiek* als partijpolitiek en het beheer van de samenleving, en het *politieke*, wat gaat over richting geven aan de samenleving. En waar zit het politieke? Wel, op veel meer plekken dan je zou denken. Om het met mijn lievelingsfilosofe Hannah Arendt te zeggen: het politieke ontstaat zodra twee mensen aan de keukentafel praten over bijvoorbeeld de verkeersdrukke in hun straat en wat ze eraan kunnen doen. Op dat moment ontstaat er een gemeenschappelijke *inter-esse*, een woord dat verwijst naar de ruimte die ontstaat als mensen samen handelen en spreken. Deze ruimte tussen de burgers wordt zo een gemeenschappelijke wereld. Kortom, met deze kleine filosofische uitweiding is het duidelijk dat het thema van deze trefdag een uitstekende keuze is.

In dit kader wil ik de toekomst van onze samenleving aan de orde stellen aan de hand van drie dragende concepten:

- **transitie**, tegen de illusie dat alles hetzelfde zal blijven (en er geen alternatieven nodig zijn), en voor de keuze van een andere, ecologisch duurzame en sociaal rechtvaardige samenleving;
- **fRICTIE**, tegen de gedachteloze consensus en middelmaat, en voor het terug durven te benoemen van de democratie als het georganiseerde meningsverschil;
- en *last but not least* **positie**: we beslissen nu of we een duurzame toekomst bouwen. En dat laatste is de kern van het politieke. Maar dan moeten we wel positie kiezen. Voor en met diegenen die willen zorgen voor de aarde, haar bewoners en toekomstige generaties. En tegen diegenen die de toekomst vroegtijdig willen afsluiten uit eigenbelang en kortzichtigheid.

Transitie

Transitie is synoniem van systeemverandering. Het feit dat er nu er transitie-initiatieven zijn, duidt op het gegeven dat we een ander maatschappelijk systeem nodig hebben.

Want transitie betekent in mensentaal: we staan voor reusachtige uitdagingen. Zoals de auteur van het rapport van de Club van Rome *Grenzen aan de Groei* van 1972, Dennis Meadows, verleden jaar, en dus veertig jaar later, verklaarde op een Oikos-lezing in Gent: “*we gaan de komende twintig jaar meer verandering meemaken dan de voorbije honderd jaar*”.

Ons maatschappelijk model van de sociale verzorgingsstaat uit de 20^{ste} eeuw kreunt in al haar voegen. Dertig jaar neoliberaal beleid, uitgevoerd volgens de principes van liberalisering, privatisering en deregulering, hebben de publieke sector uitgekleeft en geleid tot een mondiale concurrentiestrijd, een

race to the bottom. De rode draad is dat de markt een grotere rol krijgt ten nadele van de overheid, en geknipt wordt in de sociale rechten. En terwijl de overheid de financiële elites ongemoeid laat, stijgt de disciplinerende van sociaal zwakkere groepen. En in Europa maken we, na de eeuw waar gelijkheid de kern van het maatschappelijk project vormde, nu de crisis mee van de ongelijkheid. Het is jammer genoeg geen cliché: ook in ons land worden de rijken elk jaar rijker, en de armen armer. Ondertussen heeft een zielloos efficiëntiedenken en schaalvergroting de menselijke maat in dienstverlening en organisaties verdreven. De gekende persoon achter de balie is vervangen door een callcenter, wie weet in welk land.

Het is duidelijk: het neoliberalisme is een ziekmakend systeem. Maar een nuchtere analyse leert ook dat als we het neoliberalisme hadden kunnen buiten houden, het systeem van de 20^{ste} eeuw ook op systeemgrenzen was gestoten, met name ecologische grenzen. Onze huidige samenleving steunt op een fossiele brandstoffen gestookte groei-economie, waarbij welvaart materialistisch wordt ingevuld. We leven in een wegwerpeconomie: we vragen meer van de aarde dan ze kan geven en dumpen meer dan ze kan verwerken. Waarbij we vergeten dat de aarde de plaats is waar we onze wereld moeten bouwen. Ik ga hier niet uitweiden over de ecologische problemen die ons economisch model veroorzaakt, zoals het ineensstorten van de biodiversiteit of het vergiftigen van onze oceanen. In deze week, met de klimaatopwarming in Warschau, volstaat het te verwijzen naar de klimaatopwarming en de reactie van de Filipijnse vertegenwoordiger op de top. Hij riep op tot mondiale solidariteit om de klimaatwaan te stoppen. En waanzin gaat dan over het levensbehoud van miljoenen mensen wereldwijd.

Dit maakt duidelijk dat het probleem van de ecologische grenzen het oudere herverdelingsvraagstuk nog complexer maakt. We moeten niet alleen in eigen land, of in Europa herverdelen, maar onze verantwoordelijkheid opnemen binnen de wereldsamenleving die we ondertussen geworden zijn. En aangezien het een crisis is van het mondiale systeem, we geraken we daar niet uit zonder aan de uitgangspunten van dat systeem te raken. Ecologische rechtvaardigheid is dus verbonden met concrete sociale strijd, het durven in vraag stellen van onze eigen productie- én consumptiewijze.

Fricie

Met het thema van de klimaatopwarming kan ik overgaan tot het tweede dragende concept: *frictie*. Het staat voor *wrijving*, en ook voor *onenigheid*. Het is iets dat de meeste politici graag vermijden. Net als trouwens andere machtsinstellingen, zoals onderzoekslabo's of krantenredacties. Daar geldt nu, over de interne zaken, een zwijgplicht. In die zin zitten we met een paradox. Het woord participatie is alom aanwezig in onze samenleving. Alleen gaat het meestal om een romantische invulling ervan, met focus op harmonie en consensus. 'Ze hebben toch hun gedacht kunnen zeggen', is dan het motto, en de hoop dat mensen tevreden zijn met op een onschuldige manier deel te nemen aan besluitvorming.

Dit is uiteraard de uitkomst van een gedepoliteerde samenleving. Een moeilijk woord: *gedepoliteerd* maar eenvoudig uit te leggen: een samenleving zonder het politieke, waar er geen ruimte meer is om een andere en betere samenleving te denken, dromen en te realiseren. En dan blijft alleen het beheer van het bestaande systeem over.

Maar omdat de scheuren in het systeem elke dag groter worden, kunnen we ons deze houding niet meer veroorloven. We moeten dus een andere invulling van participatie vorm geven én opeisen. Ons eraan herinneren dat democratie het georganiseerde meningsverschil is. Dat we de verschillen in de samenleving uitspreken en confronteren. Juist daar begint terug het avontuur van vrijheid: ons inlaten in publieke debatten en maatschappelijke processen en samen echt spreken en handelen. Zo krijgen we een hernieuwde publieke ruimte waar we nieuwe perspectieven leren kennen, terug leren samen denken en werken. Zo komen we uit ons cocon van consumerend individu, en worden we uitgedaagd ons echt te verhouden tot de anderen.

Het benadrukken van frictie als weg naar herpolitiserings mag echter niet begrepen worden als een eenzijdig pleidooi voor de conflictbenadering. Ik kom daar zo dadelijk op terug bij het derde dragende concept van positie.

Een motiverende vorm van frictie vinden we alleszins bij klimaatwetenschappers. Tot voor kort beperkten ze zich tot een accurate weergave van hun wetenschappelijke resultaten. Maar dat is veranderd. Er zijn nu klimaatwetenschappers die toegeven dat ze in tranen uitbarsten als ze de maatschappelijke gevolgen van hun wetenschappelijke voorspellingen beseffen. En in de Verenigde Staten is er de klimaatexpert James Hansen, die de universiteit verliet om strijd te voeren tegen de olie-industrie. En hierbij niet terugschrikt voor acties die kunnen leiden tot gevangenisstraf. Participatie krijgt zo de kracht van een kritisch engagement vanuit een helder besef van wat er op het spel staat.

Zo krijgen we ook zicht, in het licht van de noodzakelijke transitie, van een hedendaagse invulling van actief burgerschap wat we omschrijven als ecologisch burgerschap. Twee elementen zijn hier vernieuwend. Ten eerste de zorg voor medemens én het leefmilieu die tesamen worden gedacht en opgenomen. Daarnaast is er de ‘vertrouwde omgang met het onbekende’. Ecologisch burgerschap staat open voor wat nog niet helemaal vertrouwd is, zij het diversiteit in de stad, of noodzakelijke veranderingen om te komen tot een duurzame samenleving. Ik kom hier op het einde nog op terug.

Positie

Positie kiezen. Dat betekent je niet laten meedrijven met de stroom, integendeel. Zich positioneren is zich duidelijk verhouden tot wat er gebeurt, wat anderen voorstellen en effectief doen. Een positie kies je als individu, in vele kleine en grote beslissingen. Vind je bijvoorbeeld ‘donderdag veggiedag’ een goed initiatief en wil je daartoe behoren. Positioneren doe je ook als organisatie uit het middenveld. Laat me kort een historische evolutie schetsen. Nemen we als beginpositie de periode van mei '68, waarbij radicale maatschappijverandering centraal stond, en bewegingen de kant van de zwakkeren kozen tegen

de overheid in. Nadien werd langzamerhand heel de samenleving pragmatischer, gematigder en gedomineerd door het neoliberale. Ook de meeste organisaties ontsnapten er niet aan. Ze stelden zich minder kritische vragen, voerden zonder al te veel weerstand uit wat een overheid hen oplegde vanuit een managementbenadering. Of ze vermarkten zonder het zelf te beseffen, door vooral aan te bieden wat succesvol was op de markt van de burger als consument. Methodisch goed werken stond centraal, het inhoudelijke werd minder kritisch bevraagd.

De laatste jaren, en de crisis is daar niet vreemd aan, zien we organisaties zich terug de vraag stellen rond hun positie: moeten we wel louter beleidsuitvoerend werken, of integendeel, terug onze autonomie definiëren en opeisen.? Vaak gebeurt dit onder de noemer van *herpolitisering*, met als centrale vraag de verhouding tot de overheid. Dit is een belangwekkende ontwikkeling, maar ik wil de uitdaging van positionering nog vergroten. Het centrale woord is hier toekomst. De voorbije dertig jaar heeft onze samenleving gefunctioneerd alsof er geen toekomst nodig was. We beleefden tenslotte zogezegd het einde van de geschiedenis. Een parlementaire democratie in een vrije markteconomie had ons nu eenmaal in het beste der werelden gebracht. Vandaag beseffen we dat we verblind door het onmiddellijke, *toekomstvergetelheid* hebben geïnstalleerd. De Filipijnen beseffen ondertussen na de tyfoon wat het betekent.

Voor het eerst moeten we ons radicaal positioneren tegenover onze eigen toekomst. En de verzuchting die we overal horen, ‘we leven in een tijd waar onze kinderen het minder goed zullen hebben dan wij’, is de dooddoener van een verslaafde. Want het dominante gedrag is juist het omgekeerde: we trekken ons helemaal niets aan van de toekomst van onze kinderen! Het lijkt er op dat onze fixatie op de onmiddellijke consumptiebevrediging ons vermogen onteigend heeft om ons over de toekomst te bekommeren. 2012 was mondiaal het jaar met de grootste CO₂-uitstoot uit, wij Belgen hebben na dertig jaar milieubewustzijn ongeveer de grootste ecologische voetafdruk en zijn dus, ja consumptieverslaafd. Dat is de hoofdstroom in onze samenleving, de *toekomstvergeters*. Maar het hoopgevende is dat er terug een tegenstroom ontstaat die werkt aan het andere: *toekomstvaardigheid*. De voorbeelden zijn gekend, ik ga ze niet allemaal opnoemen: stadslandbouw, transitiewijken, repair cafes, ruilbeurzen, etc. En het is logisch dat nieuwe initiatieven zich ontwikkelen als hoopvolle eilanden in de zee, en interessante ideeën ontspruiten zonder dat er zicht is op een groot samenhangend geheel. Dat is niet erg als we weten wat de opdracht is. Zoals Harald Welzer zegt, gaat het hier om *de sociale beweging die nog niet weet dat ze bestaat*. We beslissen vandaag of we een toekomst bouwen. En dat laatste is de kern van het politieke. Maar dan moeten we wel terug een toekomst durven denken en dromen. Want zonder een duidelijk kompas is het moeilijk varen als nieuw initiatief, laat staan samen koers houden en een vloot bouwen.

En zo kom ik tot de noodzaak van het introduceren van een vierde dragend concept, bijna een taboe in onze samenleving: de utopie.

Utopie

Nooit wordt ons nog gemeld wat het belang van dromen is, het is alsof onze huidige beschaving en welvaart uit het niets zijn ontstaan, zonder dat iemand er eerst over droomde en deze wenselijke toekomst uitschreef. Zoals Rutger Bregman stelt, is ons geleerd dat maatschappelijke dromen gevaarlijk zijn, ze veranderen steeds in een nachtmerrie. Want de samenleving is niet maakbaar. Intellectuelen die dit verdedigen, nemen meestal niet de moeite om iets in de plaats te stellen. Ironie en cynisme is hun retorisch antwoord zonder inhoud.

Als we vandaag vaststellen dat het enige Grote Verhaal dat overeind is gebleven, dat van de Markt, onze samenleving onderuit haalt, dan is het de hoogste tijd om terug ruimte te maken voor radicale ideeën over een betere wereld. Uiteraard moeten we niet terug naar blauwdrukken waar het collectief belangrijker is dan het individu. Maar ondertussen weten we dat een individueel leven zonder collectief ook niet de gedroomde plek is. Een utopie is geen vaststaande dogma, maar net de lege plaats die ons uitnodigt om ze een invulling te geven als alternatief voor de huidige situatie. Het is dus zowel een aanklacht tegen de werkelijkheid als een mogelijk alternatief. Het gaat om samenhangende visies waarin onze passie en onze intelligentie met elkaar versmelten. Meteen doemt hier het vraagstuk op van de maakbaarheid van de samenleving. En laat ons duidelijk zijn: de maatschappij is veel complexer en gelaagder dan een halve eeuw geleden. Een grote revolutie zit er niet aan te komen, structurele maatschappelijke veranderingen gebeuren niet overnacht. Ze zijn het gevolg van wijzigingen in economie, cultuur, gedrag, technologie en instituties die op elkaar inspelen. Denk aan de ontwikkeling van internet: we hebben de introductie en het toenemend gebruik niet als een plotse gebeurtenis ervaren maar het heeft onze samenleving op twee decennia wel ingrijpend veranderd.

Er zijn dus wel grote maatschappelijke tendensen vast te stellen, en we kunnen hierin nadenken over gewenste fundamentele veranderingen. Kern is wat André Gorz reeds de vorige eeuw omschreef als *revolutionair reformisme* en nu door systeemtheorie bevestigd wordt. Als er in verschillende maatschappelijke domeinen tegelijk maatregelen in de juiste richting worden genomen, kunnen deze elkaar versterken in een welwillende vicieuze cirkel die leidt tot een krachtige maatschappelijke verandering. Maar dat is zeker geen rimpelloos proces. Maatschappelijk verandering doet zich altijd met horten en stoten voor: er is samenwerking maar ook conflict, crisis en succes. Hierbij past wat ik eerder stelde over het voorzichtig zijn om conflict als enig handelingsperspectief naar voor te schuiven, we zullen ook met heel veel actoren moeten leren samenwerken.

En niemand kan voorspellen welke actie nu de grootste bijdrage zal leveren tot de transitie. Het is logisch dat in dit mistig maar hoopvol landschap het in de eerste plaats gaat om eerder kleinere hoopvolle praktijken, die een 'voorspiegeling' zijn van een bredere systeemverandering. En dat is de tijd waarin we nu leven: nieuwe eilanden van een alternatieve praktijken, op zoek naar een goed leven met minder fossiele brandstoffen en broeikasgasuitstoot, meer levenskwaliteit en minder uitsluiting en milieuvernietiging. Belangrijk hierbij is dat het terug om collectieve praktijken gaat. Na decennia focus

op individualisering, herontdekken we dat dingen samen doen niet alleen effectiever is, maar ook zin en betekenis geeft aan ons leven. Dat leidt tot het inzicht dat de nadruk op individuele gedragsverandering structurele veranderingen (lees: transitie) in de weg staat.

Het maakt een groot verschil of je op je eentje bewust keuzes probeert te maken in de supermarkt, of samen met een groep burgers deelneemt aan Voedselteams.

De dingen samenbrengen

Ter afronding wil ik de uitgezette lijnen samenbrengen. We staan de komende jaren voor grote veranderingen. Om hier een antwoord op te bieden is er nood aan een duidelijke visie op transitie. Dat vergt loskomen van vastgeroeste denkpatronen en praktijken en dus het aanvaarden als frictie als een gezond onderdeel van onze democratie. Enkel als we ons terug een andere toekomst kunnen denken, ons positioneren, wordt de samenleving terug maakbaar. Niet als een machine door aan enkele knoppen te draaien, maar door collectief in te zetten op positieve veranderingen die elkaar op gunstige wijze versterken en de tanker van koers doen veranderen. En het is logisch dat dit niet zomaar uit de lucht komt vallen. We hebben het onszelf als het ware afgeleerd om nog te dromen, en dus ook te denken over een andere samenleving.

Cruciaal is onze vrijheid hanteren om werk te maken van een andere toekomst. Zo heroveren wat we verloren zijn. Want alles staat nu in feite op zijn kop. Verandering is nu iets waar veel mensen schrik van hebben, ze onzeker maakt. Behouden wat we hebben is de slagzin van heel wat organisaties. Een begrijpelijke positie maar wel een verliespositie. We moeten verandering terug opeisen als progressief project, waarbij doordachte transitie zicht geeft op de uitkomst dat we werken aan verandering ook zekerheid brengt. De zekerheid van een betere wereld die ook in staat is de schokken die gaan komen zo goed mogelijk op te vangen. Vrijheid en zekerheid komen dan samen als toekomstgericht je leven samen met anderen vorm geven.

Dromen is mooi, zal u ondertussen wel denken, maar waar gaat het over in de praktijk. En dit concreet te maken wil ik tot slot de contouren van mijn maatschappelijke droom meegeven, in vier zinnen.

1/ Ik droom van een samenleving waar we minder consumeren en het uitgespaarde geld investeren in de duurzame infrastructuren van de toekomst: we worden allemaal mede-eigenaar van wind- en watermolens, tramlijnen en collectieve moestuinen.

2/ Ik kijk uit naar een toekomst waarin we minder werken, uit de ratrace stappen en met een dertiguren werkweek tijd heroveren om te zorgen voor onze medemens en onze leefomgeving.

3/ Ik word hoopvol als ik de verschuivingen zie van bezitten naar ruilen, delen en weggeven, een wereld met minder spullen en meer sociale contacten die zin en betekenis geven.

4/ Waar ik warm van word, zijn burgers die niet langer wachten op markt of staat om hun toekomst in handen te nemen, maar niet genoeg krijgen van coöperatieven, nieuwe banken en eigen complementaire munten.

Tot slot: de samenleving is nog nooit fundamenteel verbeterd door managers of efficiëntiemetingen. Enkel de kracht van ideeën zet mensen in beweging. En dat weten schrijvers al langer, daarom eindig ik graag met een citaat van de Saint-Exupéry:

Als je een schip wilt bouwen, roep dan geen mannen bij elkaar om hout te verzamelen, het werk te verdelen en orders te geven. In plaats daarvan, leer ze verlangen naar de enorme eindeloze zee.

Dirk Holemans



Exemplary drawing (by Klaas Verplancke) for the Civil Rights Subframe, provided with the article ‘From global warming to cultural revolution’, published in MO* (11/03/2013).

Opletten dat de ene ramp niet op de andere volgt (Unequal Attribution Subframe)

De Morgen (13/11/2013, p.31)

Hulpcoördinatie dient grotendeels bij de Filippijnse overheid te blijven

Het is een vergelijking die ik vast niet alleen gemaakt heb. De vreselijke beelden uit de Filippijnen doen denken aan die van de tsunami in december 2004. Totale verwoesting, ontredde en beelden van dode mensen in het water. Het is niet de enige mogelijke vergelijking. Ook de internationale reactie en de wereldwijde betrokkenheid is er opnieuw. Mensen willen nu steun verlenen en dat is natuurlijk ook nodig.

Net als de tyfoon over het land raasde komt er nu voor de Filippijnen een 'tweede golf' aan: die van de internationale noodhulp. Het getroffen gebied zal deze en volgende weken overspoeld worden door boten, vliegtuigen en jeeps, gevuld met goederen en hulpverleners.

Ontwrichting

De impact van de komst van massale hulp mag niet onderschat worden. Zeker bij dit soort rampen, waar heel de wereld plots reageert, kan die enorm zijn. Ik heb het dan niet alleen over de gekende fouten, waarbij overlevenden ski-jassen en Viagra of vervallen medicijnen vonden in hun hulppakketten, maar over echte ontwrichting. Enige bescheidenheid zou ons dus sieren.

Indien niet goed beheerd kunnen de enorme geldstromen die nu op gang komen de verhoudingen in het getroffen gebied fundamenteel veranderen. Bovendien mag je ook de mentale impact niet onderschatten. Wat zeggen al die organisaties die bestaande structuren opzij schuiven immers?

Dat ze niet goed genoeg zijn?

Het is daarom van groot belang dat het eigenaarschap van de hulpcoördinatie grotendeels bij de Filippijnse overheid blijft. We weten dat ze gebreken heeft, maar ze heeft ervaring met dit soort rampen. Haiyan is dit jaar al de 25ste tyfoon die het land doorploegt. Eventueel kunnen ze bijgestaan en ondersteund worden door de VN, maar zonder coördinatie zal de chaos aanhouden.

Voortrekkersrol

Niet alleen de Filippijnse overheid moet een voortrekkersrol krijgen, ook de lokaal ingebedde organisaties. Zij zijn nu bezig met het lenigen van de eerste hulp. Dat is niet hun job en ze zullen het operationele werk met plezier overlaten aan professionals, eens die erdoor geraken. Maar hun kennis moet blijvend ingeschakeld worden. Zij weten immers bijzonder goed welke mechanismen spelen op het terrein. Of wie de echte versus de valse behoeftigen zijn.

De verhalen van hulpverleners die hun geld nietsvermoedend aanwenden om verkeerde bestaande machtsverhoudingen te versterken zijn gekend. Daar waar men daadwerkelijk gebruikt maakt van de

aanwezige kennis en de bevolking zo betreft, kan de hulp de situatie zelfs beter maken dan voordien. Een knap voorbeeld hiervan is de toewijzing van huizen na de tsunami, waarbij de plaatselijke organisaties besloten om de eigendomsakte enkel op naam van vrouwen te zetten. Een ingreep die beslissend bleek in de genderverhoudingen van de vissersdorpen. En gelukkig zijn er zo nog voorbeelden.

Sommigen vinden het misschien getuigen van slechte smaak om net nu kritische beschouwingen te maken. Laat me daarom duidelijk zijn, er is hulp nodig en wel onmiddellijk. Maar deze noodhulpsituatie kan enkel omgekeerd worden als men respect heeft voor de lokale capaciteiten en gewoonten. Dat is mijn pleidooi.

Het is te zeggen, voorlopig. Want deze ramp komt niet uit de lucht gevallen. Dit is man-made. Natuurlijk zijn er wetenschappelijke vragen te stellen en moeten we voorzichtig blijven met conclusies, maar laat ons stoppen met doen alsof de impact van de *klimaatverandering* een zaak van later is. Zij het de stijgende zeespiegel of de kracht van tyfoons, ontwikkelingslanden worden nu geraakt. Door iets wat wij veroorzaakt hebben. Laten we eindelijk zo eerlijk zijn daar ook de gevolgen van te dragen. Vandaag besteden de Filipijnen al 2,5 procent van hun BNP aan de impact van de passerende tyfoons. Hier en elders zijn centen nodig om de verdedigingslinies sterker te maken. Maak die vrij en die iets aan de CO₂-uitstoot. Het zal u verwonderen, maar bij elk contact dat we deze dagen met onze Filippijnse partners hebben, vragen ze ook dat.

À propos, als er per grote uitzondering een teveel aan geld gestort wordt, zoals ten tijde van de tsunami, panikeer dan niet. Er is nog heel wat structureel werk in de Filippijnen.

En ben ik te provocerend als ik zeg dat ook Syrië onze hulp blijft verdienen? Ook dat is overigens man-made.

Bogdan Vanden Berghe

