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**WHEN ETHNICITY BEATS GENDER: QUOTAS AND
POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN RWANDA AND
BURUNDI**

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF BURUNDI AND RWANDA

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ABSTRACT

This article studies the impact of electoral gender quotas in post-war Burundi and Rwanda on women's political representation. First, it looks at the evolution in descriptive representation by studying the number of female representatives and the prestige of their positions in the legislative and executive branches of government. Results show that, both in Rwanda and Burundi, the number of female political representatives significantly increased with the introduction of gender quotas, with their share in parliament and ministries consistently exceeding 30 per cent. While women disproportionately end up in ministries of relatively lower prestige, the gap with men has been closing over time, as more women have joined the executive branches of power. The study considers whether such an increase has been accompanied by a positive evolution in the way ordinary women perceive their political representation. Despite a general improvement in perceived political representation across the population, the article finds there is not a significant difference between women and men and it explains this finding by analysing the intersectionality of ethnicity and gender.

INTRODUCTION

In 2015, 128 countries worldwide had some form of gender quota for female political representation, and about one in five members of their parliaments were women (International IDEA et al., 2015; United Nations, 2015). Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is on a par with the rest of the world. To date, 27 of the 48 SSA countries have introduced legislated candidate quotas or reserved seats for female politicians in parliament, and seven of the world's top-20 countries with the largest share of female legislators are from this region (International IDEA et al., 2015; Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2017).

One factor that has likely contributed to the region's relatively good performance is the United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1325 on 'women and peace and security', which urged post-conflict member states to 'ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions'.¹ Combined with the fact that war often means political transition, this UN resolution provides an opportunity for previously excluded groups to be included. In many post-war countries, national women's movements became active agents of change, and managed to be included in the process of crafting a new constitution and drafting new laws (Bauer, 2012; Tripp, 2015). Empirically, it has been demonstrated that every additional year of internal war increases female parliamentary participation by 1.2 per cent (Hughes, 2009), a correlation that is to a large extent driven by countries in SSA (Tripp and Hughes, 2015).

The increase in female political representation is largely seen as a necessary — though not sufficient — step towards equal gender rights. The general theoretical argument that descriptive representation affects substantive representation was made as early as 1861 by John Stuart Mill (1861). In recent years, this view has found empirical support in several randomized controlled trials that have measured positive policy outcomes of gender quotas in India (Beaman et al., 2009; Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Ghani et al., 2014; Iyer et al., 2012). But, the findings of other trials in India, (e.g. Ban and Rao, 2008 and Bardhan et al., 2010) have tempered enthusiasm. Furthermore, the conclusions of feminist scholarship on a variety of countries range from cautious to sceptical, overall suggesting mixed outcomes in terms of substantive changes in women's lives (e.g. Bjarnegård and Melander, 2013;

¹ www.un-documents.net/sr1325.htm

Lovenduski and Norris, 2003; Veitch, 2005; Walby, 2005; Wängnerud, 2009). Such scepticism also applies to the impact of gender quotas across African countries and it is based on four key reasons:

First, many of the African regimes in which gender quotas have been introduced are de facto authoritarian (Muriaas et al., 2013). Although featuring the formal institutions associated with democracies, the actual political power in these regimes is highly centralized in the executive, the actions of which are largely unconstrained by other branches of government (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997). As gender quotas typically do not apply to the highest echelons of executive power, they are unlikely to influence policy.

Second, a rights-based approach to women's empowerment may fail to change the underlying social structures that produce women's subordination (Berry, 2015; Brown, 2000). In other words, even if a change in formal political representation results in changes in the formal rules of the game, it may leave the situation largely unaltered for women on the ground.

Third, in a patriarchal society, ethnic politics may crowd out gendered politics. If different ethnic constituencies need to be catered to, high-profile appointments are used 'to build patronage-based alliances with politicians who act as advocates for ethnic constituencies', the so-called 'big men' (Arriola and Johnson, 2014: 1). In Africa's patriarchal societies, these 'big men' are men, not women.

Fourth and finally, ethnic identity can crowd out gender identity. More generally, in countries with important class, racial or ethnic divisions, and because of the associated relations of power and domination, the women elected may still not be representative and not (be perceived to) represent the female constituency. This argument is an application of the concept of 'intersectionality' and was first made by black feminists, who felt that the rights of Afro-American women could not be represented by white, middle-class women (Collins, 2015; Crenshaw, 1991). Similarly, in the ethnically divided societies of Africa, a woman may be and/or feel better represented by a co-ethnic man than by a woman of different ethnicity. More generally, and in the words of Crenshaw (1991: 1242): 'the problem with identity politics is not that it fails to transcend difference, as some critics charge, but rather the opposite — that it frequently conflates or ignores intragroup differences'.

This study contributes to the debate around the impact of gender quotas in ethnically divided SSA by looking at female political representation in Burundi and Rwanda, two countries that introduced gender quotas in the aftermath of large-scale, inter-ethnic violence. It uses the analytic frame of intersectionality in order to study what the linkages between social identities reveal about the nature of power and relations of domination. In doing so, the article considers social categories such as ethnicity or gender and their connections (intersectionality) to be layered perspectives on the world, not things in the world (Brubaker, 2004: 17).

While the data is most suited to explicitly studying intersectionality, thus making it the article's main focus, the other three arguments of the sceptics potentially apply in the case study countries. First, while *de jure* democratic, they have not been perceived as such.² Second, in a not so distant past, women were kept in a subordinate position, both by law and by cultural norms. While laws were changed, the stickiness of attitudes and social norms may continue to hold back the effective empowerment of women (Berry, 2015; Jefremovas, 1991; Uwineza and Pearson, 2009). Finally, while both countries tried to design — each in their own way — policies to appease ethnic rivalry, ethnicity still dominates the hearts and minds of many, and continues to influence politics (Ingelaere 2010a; Lemarchand, 1994; Longman and Rutagengwa, 2004; Mclean-Hilker, 2009).

It is in this context that the article studies the influence of gender quotas on:

- a) *female political representation* in the legislative and executive branches of the government;
- b) *perceived political representation* by both female and male citizens.

In terms of Hanna Pitkin's different concepts of representation, the first part of the article looks at numerical or so-called 'descriptive' representation, that is whether representatives resemble those being represented in terms of politically relevant characteristics, such as region, religion, language, gender and ethnicity (Pitkin, 1967). The study focuses on the latter two dimensions. More specifically, it studies descriptive representation by considering the number of women, as a percentage of the total number of representatives, their ethnic

² See <https://freedomhouse.org>

identity, as well as the relative prestige of their positions compared to the positions taken up by men. The second part of the article looks instead at so-called ‘substantive representation’, that is whether the representative acts in the interest of the represented (Pitkin, 1967). In this case the analysis is based on a set of more than 700 life history interviews, in which individuals, men as well as women, Hutu as well as Tutsi, from Rwanda and Burundi were asked to systematically rank their perceived political representation (*Guhagarirwa*) throughout their adult lives. Especially with respect to the case of Rwanda, the life history approach constituted an indirect approach avoiding direct questions on a sensitive topic such as (ethnic) identity. Respondents did not only share their own stories but, indirectly, the story of changes in ethnic or gendered perceptions over time. Informed by a social constructivist understanding of identity, such a methodology allows us to gauge changing degrees of, and interconnections between, various ‘ways of seeing the world’ (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000; Wimmer, 2008).

BACKGROUND

Burundi and Rwanda are two small neighbouring countries in Africa’s Great Lakes Region. The Ruanda-Urundi territory was ruled by Belgium from 1916 until 1962. Belgium implemented indirect rule, favouring the Tutsi ethnic minority (14 per cent) over the Hutu majority (85 per cent) as rulers (Lemarchand, 1994; Prunier, 1998). This approach, along with the issuing of ethnic identity cards, institutionalized and rigidified ethnic identities. The 1962 independence gave way to the nations of Rwanda and Burundi. In Burundi, a Tutsi-led military dictatorship took control. In Rwanda, independence went hand in hand with the instalment of a Hutu-dominated republic. In both countries, the decades following independence were marked by discrimination of the ethnic group deprived of power and by waves of ethnic violence. The last decade of the century, the 1990s, would turn out to be the most dramatic for both countries.

In Burundi, after years of demands for power-sharing, the Tutsi-led government opened the way for a multi-party system with a new constitution in 1992. The first democratic elections, held in 1993, were won by Melchior Ndadaye, who became the first Hutu head of state. But, just a few months into his term, he was assassinated by Tutsi soldiers. The assassination

triggered massive killings of Tutsi civilians and years of violence between Hutu rebels and the Tutsi-dominated army. Three presidents, a coup d'état, several years of peace talks, and three years of transitional government later, a ceasefire was signed in 2003 between the Tutsi-controlled Burundian government and the largest Hutu rebel group (Uvin, 2008).

In Rwanda, the Hutu power monopoly gave rise to the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), founded mainly by Rwandan Tutsis living in exile in Uganda. In October 1990, the RPF attacked Rwanda and demanded a share in power. Around the same time, multi-party politics were introduced in the context of an international call for democratization. Both war and multi-party politics constituted a threat to the privileges of Rwanda's Hutu political elite. To safeguard their power monopoly, the elite played the ethnic card. By early 1994 intensive media and government propaganda had identified every single Tutsi citizen living in Rwanda as the enemy. Once the violence was set in motion following the shooting down of President Habyarimana's plane on 6 April 1994, the call to ethnic violence harvested massive popular support (Prunier, 1998; Straus, 2006). In a timespan of barely 100 days, the genocide against the Tutsis resulted in an estimated 500,000 to 800,000 deaths, while several hundreds of thousands of Hutus lost their lives in other forms of violence and while fleeing the country (Verpoorten, 2005; 2012).

In Burundi, two years after the signing of the 2003 ceasefire, voters backed a new constitution in which quotas assured ethnic power-sharing at different levels (De Roeck et al., 2016; Vandeginste, 2014). Ministerial positions were to be divided among Hutus (60 per cent) and Tutsis (40 per cent) (Article 129), and the same 60/40 division was to apply to the National Assembly (Article 164).³ The same constitutional articles also introduced a 30 per cent gender quota for Ministerial positions and Members of Parliament, materialized through a 30 per cent party list quota and co-optation of seats should the party list quota not result in 30 per cent elected women. Parliamentary and presidential elections occurred in the same year, and Pierre Nkurunziza, once a leader of a Hutu rebel group, was elected president.

In Rwanda, the RPF put an end to the 1994 genocide against the Tutsis, and defeated the Rwandan government forces who fled to eastern Congo, from where they conducted insurgency operations till the late 1990s. In May 2003, Rwanda adopted a new constitution.

³ <http://www.assemblee.bi/Constitution-de-la-Republique-du>

Three months later, Paul Kagame, commander in chief of the RPF, was elected president. In contrast to Burundi, the Rwandan policy was to remain silent on ethnicity and promote the idea of ‘Rwandanicity’, or the union of all Rwandans (Ingelaere, 2010a; Longman and Rutagengwa, 2004; Mclean-Hilker, 2009). In practice, however, ethnicity does play a role, not least in politics. For instance, in 2016, 13 out of the 21 Rwandan ministers belonged to the Tutsi minority (De Roeck et al., 2016). The Rwandan constitution did introduce gender quotas, which is a guaranteed 30 per cent of posts in *all* decision-making bodies (Article 9).⁴ In the case of the parliament, this materialized through voluntary party quotas, as well as 24 reserved seats in parliament. But, even earlier, at the time of the 2001 local-level elections, reserved seats were created for women at the cell, sector, and district levels, and, as early as 1998, elections of grassroots women’s structures took place (Burnet, 2008; 2011).

In sum, both Burundi and Rwanda experienced an important political transition in their post-war period. The transition was accompanied by gender quotas, but at the same time implied a reversal of ethnic power relations. In Rwanda, the reversal was in favour of the Tutsi minority, which has since held about 60 per cent of ministerial positions in Rwanda. In Burundi, the reversal meant that the Tutsis lost their monopoly on power, and they now hold 40 per cent of cabinet positions and seats in parliament.

The post-war political transitions did not result in ‘democratic’ governance. According to the World Bank governance indicators (World Bank, n.d.)⁵, both states score very low on voice and accountability, and, the independent watchdog organization ‘Freedom House’ currently characterizes both states ‘not free’.⁶ At the time of the 2005 elections, Burundi was rated as ‘partly free’, thanks to the more genuine nature of its multi-party system, whereas in Rwanda the RPF dominated and the handful of other parties were satellite parties of the RPF. Burundi’s freedom status was downgraded in 2015 by Freedom House, mainly because of President Pierre Nkurunziza’s decision to run for a constitutionally dubious third term and the increased repression that went with it. In 2016, Rwanda’s freedom status was also trending

⁴ <http://www.rwandahope.com/constitution.pdf>

⁵ <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home>

⁶ See <https://freedomhouse.org/>

downward due to the approval of a constitutional amendment that would allow President Kagame a third, seven-year term in 2017 and two additional five-year terms.

DATA AND METHODS

We set out to study the impact of the constitutional gender quotas on *female descriptive political representation* in the legislative and executive branches of the Burundian and Rwandan governments, as well as on the *perceived substantive political representation* by ordinary female and male citizens in the two countries. To study the trends in female political representation in the legislative branch, we make use of information from the Inter-Parliamentary Union on the share of women in the parliaments.⁷ For the executive branch we turn to a dataset on the composition of the Rwandan and Burundian cabinets from 1996 to 2016, compiled from the annexes of the *Annuaire des Grands Lacs* (De Roeck et al., 2016). We also rely on these annexes to determine the ethnicity of the female executive power holders and the relative prestige of their portfolios. To determine the prestige of cabinet positions, we start with a common classification scheme (Krook and O'Brien, 2012) that ranks minister posts as being of 'low', 'medium', or 'high' prestige, but we make two adaptations to the scheme: because of the specific context, the Ministries of Justice in both countries and the Ministry of Human Rights in Burundi are re-classified as *high* prestige (De Roeck et al., 2016).

For the second part of the analysis, we turn to a life history dataset. Whereas life history researchers usually collect just a few stories, we have stories from more than 700 individuals — 302 in Burundi and 412 in Rwanda. To collect this atypically large number of stories, the second author on this article trained and supervised a team of 7 local collaborators, was continuously present in the field during the data collection (in total 28 months dedicated to collecting life history data in the period 2007–15), was personally present during one third of the interviews and verified all of the collected material on a daily basis in order to guarantee quality and provide feedback to the local collaborators. Overall, the data-collection strategy was marked by immersion, iteration and reflexivity (Ingelaere 2015), including an

⁷ See www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2265_arc.htm

‘awareness of being situated in knowledge-producing power relations (and power-producing knowledge relations) in the field’ (Ingelaere, 2013: 58).

[Figure 1 about here]

The respondents were part of a sample that was stratified geographically across communities and ethnic subcategories. Seven communities were chosen in Rwanda and six in Burundi (see Figure 1). The choice was guided by the principle of maximum variation, aiming at a large variance in conflict and post-conflict experiences across locations. Since the use of ethnic markers is strictly policed by the Rwandan regime (contrary to the Burundian situation at the time of fieldwork) the stratification across ethnic subcategories was based on alternative markers that underlie ethnic categories and that are commonly used by Rwandans (The subcategories include ‘genocide survivor’, ‘returnee’ (related to Tutsi) and those ‘not accused in gacaca’⁸, ‘accused in gacaca’, and ‘imprisoned (related to Hutu); (see Ingelaere and Verpoorten, 2016 for more details). Besides, Rwandans do speak about sensitive topics, such as ethnicity or political representation, in private settings and when relationships of trust are cultivated and developed with interlocutors, as several authors with extensive fieldwork experience have stressed (Ingelaere, 2013, 2015; King, 2009; Thomson, 2010; Fujii, 2010). All interviews were conducted in the house of the respondent without onlookers present in order to allow interviewers to speak freely. To select individuals, lists were compiled in each community with the names of all the household heads and their alternative ethnic markers.⁹ Subsequently households were selected through a random sampling scheme, stratified by ethnic subcategories. Then, the household head or, in case he/she was absent, another adult member was interviewed.¹⁰ Table 1 provides an overview of the sample by gender and ethnicity. It shows that the share of Tutsi in our sample is close to 30 per cent, about twice their estimated population share, which is the intended consequence of the stratified sampling. As there was no purposeful stratification by gender, the sample’s gender balance is

⁸ *Gacaca* is Rwanda’s transitional justice system for alleged genocide perpetrators (Ingelaere 2016).

⁹ A similar procedure was adopted in Burundi but using ethnic markers.

¹⁰ All respondents selected were over 25 years old. The average age of the respondents was 49 in Burundi and 50 in Rwanda.

an unintended outcome of the stratification by ethnic subgroup; especially the subgroup of Tutsi survivors in Rwanda counts many female-headed households. The share of female respondents in the Burundian sample amounts to approximately one fifth compared to one third in the Rwandan sample. We constructed weights to come as close as possible to a representative sample. Our baseline results rely on the unweighted regressions, but the weighted regressions give qualitatively the same results.

- Insert Table 1 about here -

To allow for a quantitative analysis, we needed to extract systematic information from the stories. To this end, the stories were structured by a ranking exercise in which the respondents were asked to systematically comment on political presentation and rank it on a scale of -5 to +5 for every year in their life story. Figure 2 shows the ‘ladder of life’ used for the ranking exercise. The enumerators were trained always to use exactly the same phrasings to explain the nature of the ladder and its steps. The respondents, men and women alike, were asked to situate themselves on the ladder, through time, starting with the year of the interview, by answering the question: ‘Currently, on what step [on the ladder] do you situate your experience of political representation’. Subsequently a move back in time was made to the year of marriage or the first year of adult life (if single), repeating the question for that point. The same question was then asked with reference to the past, asking a rating for every year. The findings from the life history narrative were used to help people recall their situation at a certain moment in time. For example, when someone had told us he or she had a firstborn child in 1986, reference would be made to 1986 as ‘the year when your first child was born’.

- Figure 2 about here -

The ranking exercise was developed in a pilot phase that included 50 full life story interviews with 30 Hutu and 20 Tutsi respondents, each lasting between 7 and 14 hours (spread over several sessions). These interviews were conducted through open-ended questions touching on almost every aspect of the interviewee’s life. The subsequent structuring and focus on a limited number of salient themes (among which political representation¹¹) reduced the

¹¹ Ingelaere and Verpoorten (2016) provide an analysis of another salient theme, namely inter- and intra-ethnic trust.

interview time to 1.5–3.5 hours. However, also in their semi-structured form, the interviews gave the respondent room for ‘telling’ his/her life history.

In the pilot phase, the study also explored how best to inquire about ‘political representation’. This inquiry revealed a shared understanding of ‘*guhagarirwa*’ as ‘political representation’.¹² Probing into what is considered as good political representation, it was revealed that *guhagarirwa* is considered good if (1) authorities are aware of the needs of the population and take care of those needs, and (2) if they govern in an impartial way and prevent the suffering of any kind of injustice that remains unpunished. Thus, the shared understanding of *guhagarirwa* aligns with substantive rather than merely descriptive representation.

For the more recent years, since 2000, respondents were asked to explain in their own words what the reasons of change were in case they changed the ranking of political representation from one life history year to the other. In total, this resulted in 553 ‘narratives of change’ related to political representation in Burundi (of which 86 were narrated by women) and 729 in Rwanda (of which 221 were from women). The narratives allowed us to conduct a qualitative analysis of changes in political representation. For the purpose of this article, we distinguish between narratives that make explicit reference to (1) gender and (2) ethnicity. Concrete examples will follow in the ‘Results’ section.

While we are convinced that the combination of the quantitative and qualitative approach will enrich our analysis, there remain three main potential threats to the validity of our data: recall bias, attrition bias and social desirability bias. In order to get a sense of the magnitude of the recall bias, we exploit the fact that respondents were visited twice. The first wave of interviews took place in 2007 in Rwanda, and 2008 in Burundi; the second waves took place in 2011¹³ and 2015, respectively. In the second round of interviews, the respondents were asked to describe their life history starting from 2000, so we have an overlapping period of life history years and ranking of political representation across the two survey rounds, namely the years between 2000 and 2007/8. This allows us to assess recall bias. Appendix 1 shows

¹² This is the Kinyarwanda term used in Rwanda. The equivalent we used in Kirundi (Burundi) is ‘*guserukirwa*’.

¹³ For the second round interviews in Rwanda, 38 respondents were interviewed in 2015 instead of 2011, because they were not available in 2011 (being in prison or in re-education camps or just visiting family).

perceived political representation for these overlapping periods. The figures reveal an average difference of 0.17 in the score reported by the Burundian respondents across the two survey rounds, while for Rwandan respondents the average gap is 0.11. These relatively small discrepancies reduce concerns of large recall bias.¹⁴

To investigate attrition bias, we compare the level of political representation as reported in the first round across the dropouts (16.8 per cent of the Burundian sample and 12.5 per cent of the Rwandan sample) and the traced respondents. Appendix 1 shows that the reported levels of political representation by these two subsamples are not far apart, 0.14 units on average for Burundi for the period 1986–2008, and 0.07 units on average for the period 1989–2007 in the Rwandan case. In our baseline results, we rely on the subsample of the respondents that could be traced over time. Using the full unbalanced sample gives very similar results.

Finally, the last concern is that in the absence of incentives for responding truthfully, other motives may take the upper hand, most importantly social desirability. While we have no way of formally checking for this, we believe the data collection method that we implemented limits the risk of untruthful but socially desirable answers. This is because the reporting is imbedded in the respondent's life history, thus imposing a 'consistency constraint', namely the reported political representation needs to be compatible with other events in the life history and its related narratives of change. While not completely ruling out biases, the use of a calendar approach through which event history data are collected has proven to be more reliable than 'ordinary' survey approaches (Belli et al., 2001), also in the context of data-collection following traumatic events (Barber et al., 2016).

RESULTS

Level and Nature of Female Political Representation

¹⁴ Furthermore, when dropping the observations prior to 2000, which may be most prone to recall bias, our regression results remain qualitatively the same.

Table 2 shows the share of women MPs in the Rwandan and Burundian parliaments. For both Burundi and Rwanda, it is clear that the timing of their new constitution coincided with a surge in women MPs. In 2005 the share of women in the Burundian parliament reached 30.5 per cent, compared with only 9.9 per cent in 1993, the last election year without a gender quota. While in 2005 12 women had to be co-opted to fulfil the quota rule, in the subsequent years the share of elected women consistently scored above 30 per cent, attaining 32.1 per cent in 2010 and 36.4 per cent in 2015 and no co-optation was required.¹⁵ In Rwanda, the share of female MPs jumped to 48.8 per cent in 2003 from 17.1 per cent in 1988. The fact that Rwanda reached well above 30 per cent is because, besides party list quotas of 30 per cent, Rwanda also had 24 reserved seats for women (out of a total of 80). Women thus got a minimum of 30 per cent through the reserved seats and could add further seats by competing via party lists (Powley, 2007). In the 2008 and 2013 election years, women MPs in Rwanda further increased to 56.2 per cent and 63.8 per cent of the seats, respectively, breaking records worldwide. Table 3 provides the number and share of women in cabinet positions, taking into consideration ministers and secretaries of state. It shows that, on average, prior to the introduction of quotas, this share stood at 10.2 per cent in Burundi (1996–2004) and at 10.0 per cent in Rwanda (1996–2002). After the introduction of quotas, it reached an average of 34.3 per cent in Burundi (2006–16) and 31.2 per cent in Rwanda (2004–16).

- Insert Table 2 about here –
- Insert Table 3 about here –

We now turn to the ‘nature’ of female representation in the executive. Table 4 gives the number of cabinet positions by prestige, across gender and across the years 1996–2016. On average, the probability of being allocated to low-prestige ministries that deal for instance with youth, culture, sports, tourism and women’s affairs, is significantly higher for women than for men. Before the introduction of quotas, this probability was 65.2 per cent for women against 8.3 per cent for men in Burundi; while it was 52.4 per cent against 5.9 per cent in Rwanda. The introduction of gender quotas and the associated increase in the number of women in cabinet positions has significantly narrowed the gap, which shrank to 10 percentage points in Burundi (20.9 per cent vs 10.6 per cent), and 12 percentage points in

¹⁵ <http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp>

Rwanda (28.2 per cent vs 16.7 per cent). The inverse pattern can be observed when considering the relative share of men and women occupying high prestige positions.

- Insert Table 4 about here -

Gender is just one aspect of social identity. Given the historically polarizing role of ethnicity in Burundi and Rwanda, any investigation of descriptive representation should also take ethnicity into account. Hence, we verify to what extent the ethnic make-up of the ministers and secretaries of state has evolved over time and to what extent it reflects the ethnic make-up of the population. Until the early 1990s, the Burundian government was largely Tutsi while the Rwandan government was largely Hutu; ‘largely’ can in both cases be interpreted as holding about 85 per cent of positions (Lemarchand, 1994). For Burundi, we find that Tutsis no longer dominate in the period 1996–2016, but reach a share of about 40 per cent, as specified in the constitution. This share is well above the 15 per cent population share of Tutsis, but constitutes a loss compared to the pre-war Tutsi power monopoly. The situation is very similar when considering only women: 41 per cent are Tutsi from the second half of the 1990s onwards. In Rwanda, the Tutsi minority considerably increased its influence over the government after the military victory of the RPF. According to the 1996–2016 database, Tutsis account for 50 per cent of governmental positions on average in this period, thus largely surpassing their 15 per cent population share, and also signifying a complete turnaround with respect to the pre-war period when Tutsis were politically marginalized. Also in this case the trends for women’s ethnic identity are similar: on average, in the years 1996 to 2016, 48 per cent of the female ministers and secretaries of state were Tutsis.

Overall, if gender identity of the representatives plays a role in how people assess their representation, we expect women to report a stronger increase in political representation over time than men. If, in addition, the ethnic content of descriptive representation plays a role, we expect the largest increase in political representation to be reported by Hutu women in Burundi and by Tutsi women in Rwanda. In contrast, due to the historical changes in relations of domination shaping intersections of identity, Tutsi women in Burundi and Hutu women in Rwanda may not perceive an increase in political representation. This would indicate that ethnic ‘ways of seeing the world’ continue to dominate over gendered interpretations of political representation. To investigate the trend in perceived political

representation, we turn to the life histories of our 302 Burundian and 412 Rwandan respondents.

Gender Identity and Change in Perceived Political Representation

Figure 3A shows the perception of political representation as reported by our Burundian respondents throughout their life history years. We focus on the years 1986–2015, set out on the horizontal axis. The year 1986 is a natural starting point in Burundi, as it is the last relatively peaceful year before the turbulent 1990s. The solid line represents the perception of women, the dashed line the one of men. For both women and men, there is a dip of political representation in 1988, a year in which ethnic violence engulfed two northern communes and fear spread throughout the country. This dip was followed by a rather rapid recovery until political representation took a dive in 1993, when the country's first Hutu President, Melchior Ndadaye, was killed by Tutsi elements in the army. After the 1993 low, political representation starts a gradual recovery process.

Figure 3B demonstrates the perception of political representation as reported throughout the life history years of Rwandan women (solid line) and men (dashed line) in our dataset. The natural starting point is 1989, the year before the start of the RPF invasion. This invasion in 1990 marks the beginning of a civil war between the RPF and the Rwandan government, and triggers a decline in political representation. The Arusha peace accords of 1993 bring some stabilization in perceived political representation, but also this move to a multi-party system fails and, after the shooting down of the plane that carried both the Rwandan and Burundian presidents in April 1994, Rwanda plunges into chaos. In July 1994 the RPF puts an end to the genocide against Tutsis, and political representation starts its recovery in 1995.

- Insert Figure 3 (both A and B) about here -

Thus, the perceived political representation of our Burundian respondents reaches a low in 1993, and then starts a recovery process, and political representation in Rwanda recovers after an all-time low in 1994. In both countries the recovery trajectory of political representation is characterized by a striking non-linearity, which suggests the importance of macro-level events and policies. The non-linearity is even more clearly born out in Figures

4A and 4B, where we focus on the recovery period and put changes in political representation instead of levels on the vertical axis. The grey bars give the average movements for women and the black lines depict those for men. Apart from the recovery of political representation in the years immediately following its absolute low point, the figures indicate clear peaks in 2000 and 2005 for Burundi, and 2000 and 2003 for Rwanda. In Burundi, 2000 is the year of the signing of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement. In Rwanda, 2000 marks the end of the insurgency war in the northwest and the start of a reconciliation and unity narrative in public discourse (Ingelaere and Verpoorten, 2016). The peaks in 2005 and 2003 coincide with the years in which a new constitution was launched and the first national-level elections with gender quotas were held.

- Insert Figure 4 (A and B) about here -

We documented earlier that these gender quotas resulted in a surge of female MPs and ministers in both countries. Looking at our life history data, we note a concurrent increase of political representation as reported by female respondents. However, for men there was also an increase in reported political representation in these years. In Burundi, men reported an average increase of 0.79 in 2005 versus 0.51 for women. In Rwanda, the increases were very close to each other: 0.60 for men and 0.62 for women. Thus, at first sight and in comparison to men, there is no effect of descriptive female representation on political representation as perceived and reported by ordinary women.

To check this more formally, we estimate the following equation:

$$PPR_{it} = \alpha_1 year_t + \alpha_2 (year_t * female_i) + \alpha_3 (year_t * Tutsi_i) + \eta_i + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (\text{Eq. 1})$$

where i indicates an individual respondent, t indicates a year in the period 1989–2011, PPR stands for perceived political representation, η_i are individual fixed effects¹⁶, and ε_{it} is the error term. We cluster the standard errors at the individual level to take into account that observations coming from the same subject are likely to be correlated. We control for the entire set of year dummies, and interact the year dummies with an indicator variable for female and an indicator variable for belonging to the Tutsi ethnic group. The variable

¹⁶ While the dependent variable in the econometric model is the *level* of political representation, the model effectively analyses ‘within-individual’ *changes* over time, due to the inclusion of individual fixed effects.

‘Female’ takes the value one if the respondent is female, and zero otherwise. The variable ‘Tutsi’ takes the value one if the ethnicity of the respondent is Tutsi, and zero otherwise. The variable ‘PPR’ takes values within the range [-5,5] as derived from the ranking exercise during the life story telling. The variable ‘year’ is a vector of dummy variables for each year comprised in our analysis, thus a series of 23 dummy variables for the years 1989 to 2011.

We estimate this equation separately for the Burundian and Rwandan respondents, for their life story years within the period 1989–2011, yielding an analytical sample of 6753 and 9373 observations, respectively. Columns 1 and 3 in Table 5 show the results. The estimates for α_2 are often negative, and whenever they are positive they are small and not statistically significant. In other words, there is not a single year in which women experienced a significantly higher surge in political representation than men.

- Insert Table 5 about here -

This ‘zero-result’ begs the question of whether women’s perceived political representation was not at all influenced by descriptive representation, or whether it was, but men’s perceived political representation rose as well, for other reasons, thereby cancelling out the difference between women’s and men’s perceived political representation. This is the tricky issue of the counterfactual: What would have happened in the absence of gender quotas? Would women’s perceived political representation have risen by significantly less than men’s? Since we cannot observe the counterfactual, our quantitative analysis does not yield conclusive evidence. We therefore turn to a more qualitative analysis of the content of the narratives of change: Did women, in their narratives, refer to the gender quota, or to the increased female descriptive representation following from it? Answering this question sheds light on the ways political representation is interpreted in women’s popular perception over time.

For Burundian women, we have a total of 89 narratives of change, of which 18 are in the election year 2005. For Rwanda, the respective numbers are 221 and 25. Of the 18 Burundian women who gave a narrative of change to explain their change in political representation in the election year 2005, only the following two mentioned the representation of women: ‘The president gave women the right to speak’,¹⁷ and ‘We had a lot of competent authorities to

¹⁷ Interview, Burundian Hutu woman, aged 51, 2015.

represent us because even the women who used to fear our husbands were represented'.¹⁸

Looking at the entire 2001–15 period, we find just one more such narrative out of a total of 89 narratives by women: 'We the women received the right to be represented'.¹⁹

In Rwanda, none of the 25 Rwandan women providing a narrative of change in the 2003 election year mentioned female descriptive representation. Studying all their 221 narratives for the 2001–11 period, we find only the following narrative that explicitly refers to the representation of women: 'After the elections of authorities at the level of the *Umudugudu*, there is no longer corruption and we women are well represented'.²⁰ However, six narratives of women explain their political representation increase as a result of their own nomination. Here is one example: 'I was well represented because I myself was *cheftaine* [leader] of the village'.²¹

In sum, very few narratives of change make direct reference to a greater descriptive representation by women: one out of 221 for Rwanda (or seven when including those referring to own nominations), and three out of 89 for Burundi. This result seem surprising, so we now turn to discuss potential explanations. A first possibility is that, in line with a social constructivist understanding of identity, that there other aspects of one's identity dominate the 'way of seeing the world' and thus the nature of political representation in our current analysis. As a next step we therefore check whether, in contrast to gender, the data reveal a significant role of ethnic identity in influencing perceived political representation. We will then briefly discuss other potential explanations.

Ethnicity and Change in Perceived Political Representation

In contrast to the gender identity of representatives, ethnic identity is mentioned rather frequently in the narratives of change. Focusing on women, we find that Rwandan women

¹⁸ Interview, Burundian Hutu woman, aged 61, 2015.

¹⁹ Interview, Burundian Hutu woman, aged 61, 2015.

²⁰ Interview, Rwandan Hutu woman, aged 48, 2011.

²¹ Interview, Rwandan Hutu woman, aged 54, 2011.

explicitly mentioned ethnicity in 17 out of the 221 narratives, and Burundian women did so in six out of the 89 narratives. For instance: ‘With the new election the authorities have not yet changed. Maybe they will change later on. Those well represented are the *rescapés* [Tutsi genocide survivors]’.²² The implicit mentioning of ethnicity was also rather common. For instance: ‘We started to be excluded by our current regime’.²³

To better appreciate the intersections of ethnicized and gendered ways of interpreting political representation we plot the evolution of perceived political representation across gender (men and women) as well as ethnicity (Hutu and Tutsi). Figure 5 shows that, both for Rwanda and Burundi, the within-ethnicity correlation of political representation movements is higher than its within-gender correlation, indicating that perceived political representation is driven by ethnic interpretations, not gendered ones.

- Insert Figure 5 about here -

Furthermore, looking back at the estimation results of equation (1) in Table 5, we find that most of the estimated coefficients (α_3) on the interaction terms $year_t * Tutsi_i$, are highly significant for both Burundi and Rwanda, sharply contrasting with the estimated coefficients on the interaction terms $year_t * female_i$ (see columns 1 and 3 of Table 5). Thus, ethnicity appears more salient than gender in matters of political representation, suggesting that a Hutu woman feels more represented by a Hutu man than by a Tutsi woman.

But the dominance of ethnic perspectives does not necessarily imply that gender becomes entirely irrelevant. While ethnicity may nullify gender for the ‘other’ ethnic group, there may still be a preference for same-gender representatives from one’s own ethnicity. To verify this scenario in the data, we restrict the estimation of equation (1) to respondents belonging to the ethnicity category that gained power in the post-war transition, namely Hutu in Burundi and Tutsi in Rwanda. Our result remains: we do not find that Hutu women in Burundi (and? Tutsi women in Rwanda) reported a stronger increase in political representation than Hutu men in Burundi (Tutsi men in Rwanda) at a time when their descriptive representation increased (columns 2 and 4 of Table 5). These results for women of the politically dominant ethnic category suggest that gendered interpretations are overpowered by ethnic ways of seeing the

²² Interview, Rwandan Hutu woman, aged 60, 2011.

²³ Interview, Burundian Tutsi woman, aged 61, 2015.

world, most probably because of the long-standing, asymmetric and heavily loaded power relations structuring the meaning and interrelations of ethnicities. However, such a role of ethnicity does not exclude a role played by other factors. We therefore turn to a discussion of a set of alternative explanations for the lack of a gender effect.

ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

In what follows, we briefly discuss four alternative explanations for the lack of a relatively larger increase in perceived political representation in the life history data of women, relative to men, in response to the increased descriptive female political representation: (1) the intersectionality of class and language, (2) the authoritarian nature of the state, (3) sticky gender norms and (4) sociotropy. This discussion is however tentative as our data does not allow us to distinguish among the four alternative explanations and to draw firm conclusions.

Intersectionality of Class and Language

Ethnicity and gender are not the only categorizations of social identities (and thus perspectives on the world) in Rwanda and Burundi. So are region of origin, class, language and religion, as well as one's (alleged) role as a perpetrator or a victim in the decade of violence. The nature of these connections may further clarify the operation of power and relations of dominance, and therefore different connotations with gender that drive perceived political representation. Indeed, the vast majority of Tutsi women who are part of the current Rwandan political elite (for instance 75 per cent of female Tutsi ministers or secretaries of state since 1996) are so-called 'returnees', that is Tutsi who returned from exile to Rwanda after the genocide, which for the majority means they grew up in Uganda and are Anglophone. Debusscher and Ansoms (2013) argue that, combined with the fact that the elite is urban based, this translates into a gap between the objectives and perspectives of the elite and those of the majority of the Rwandan population.

Authoritarian Nature of the State

In both our case study countries, elections do take place, but — especially in Rwanda — they are ‘staged events with predetermined outcomes’ (Burnet, 2011: 315). Since the show is run by a small elite in the executive, there is little or no accountability from the ‘elected’ towards the citizens (Debusscher and Ansoms, 2013; Ingelaere and Verpoorten, 2014). When citizens cannot exercise pressure on representatives, the gender identity of the latter may not matter for perceived political representation. On the other hand, Figure 4 shows a surge in perceived political representation in the election years — 2003 in Rwanda and 2005 in Burundi, indicating that despite the authoritarian character of the regime and the staged nature of elections, citizens do associate elections with increased representation.

Sticky Gender Norms

When asked about their understanding of ‘guhagarirwa’ (Rwanda) or ‘guserukirwa’ (Burundi), our respondents pointed towards substantive rather than descriptive representation. Therefore, one possible reason for our zero-result is that women did not experience substantive changes in their day-to-day lives for the better, compared to men. This could in part be explained by gender norms that only change slowly over time. They are thus sticky. Certainly in patriarchal societies that stress the subordination of women, such norms may stand in the way of top-down reforms by formal law or policy (Brown, 2000). Indeed, while we find that the narratives of change of political representation abound with references to various policies, none of the mentioned policies have an explicit gender dimension, neither were policies interpreted in gendered ways. This aligns with studies by Berry (2015) and Sommers (2012) who find that, despite the various landmark laws concerning for instance inheritance and gender-based violence, traditional gender norms and masculinity perceptions are slow to change in Rwanda.

Sociotropy

A fourth, possible alternative explanation for our results is sociotropy — the idea that citizens, both men and women, care about the best representation for the well-being of the nation rather than their own (Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler, 2005). This is supported by the fact that men and women’s political representation appears to be responsive to the same policies, for instance in the areas of health, education and reconciliation. One man even mentions the equality between women and men as being among the reasons for his increase in political representation. This 71-year-old Hutu man explains: ‘The president of the republic has taken the lead to establish development programs such as girinka [one cow per poor family], and the equality between women and men’.²⁴ Thus, many policies that are women-friendly are also men- or family-friendly, and men respond equally positively in terms of perceived political representation to these policies. In this sense, gender is not as potentially divisive as ethnicity and can be interpreted in terms of sociotropy, an idea that has also been put forward in the broader literature on female political representation, to explain why men and women respond to the representation of women in a very similar way (Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler, 2005).

CONCLUSION

Rwanda holds the world record in terms of its share of female MPs, the number reaching 64 per cent in 2013. Burundi is also a good performer in women’s descriptive political representation, with over 30 per cent female MPs. The share of female ministers is also consistently above 30 per cent and, while female ministers still disproportionately occupy lower-prestige cabinets, the gap with male ministers is closing. What does this surge in female descriptive representation mean for political representation as perceived by ordinary female citizens? When comparing the evolution of perceived political representation across men and women, we do not find any statistically significant difference. This quantitative result is corroborated by the qualitative data analysis, which reveals an absolute sparseness of the mentioning of gender identity of representatives or gendered interpretations of policies by the life story respondents when inquired about their perceived political representation.

²⁴ Interview, Rwandan Hutu man, aged 71, 2011.

In sharp contrast, ethnic perspectives matter quite a bit, both in the quantitative and qualitative analysis. Hence, it seems that ethnic ways of seeing the world are crowding out gendered ones. An intersectional interpretation of these findings sheds light on the underlying relations of power and domination. Namely, even when only focusing on the people belonging to the ethnic category with an increased share in power, the gender quota does not seem to be a factor influencing perceived political representation. So, even Tutsi women in Rwanda and Hutu women in Burundi do not report a stronger increase in perceived political representation than their male counterparts. This suggests that power relations are still perceived along ethnic rather than gender lines. It is the intricate relationship between power and ethnicity that clarifies the consistent and continuous political salience of ethnicity and the fact that gender identities are instead not politically salient.

There are other explanations, such as the intersectionality of class and gender, the authoritarian nature of the state, sticky gender norms, or sociotropy, that could also account for this finding and deserve further study. To date, little research has been done on Burundi, while the opinions are divided on Rwanda. As such, Burnet (2011) argues that gender quotas are changing the norms and attitudes towards women through role modelling (so-called ‘symbolic representation’²⁵), which could plant the seed for a slow but more fundamental societal transformation in the longer run. Other Rwanda scholars (Berry, 2015; Debusscher and Ansoms, 2013; Sommers, 2012) are much more sceptical, perceiving the record number of female representatives in Rwanda largely as a cosmetic change without actual impact. Time, and future research, will tell.

In particular, future studies should try to shed light on the drivers of perceived political representation. We still know little of how these perceptions relate to dimensions such as security, trust and economic well-being, and how these are affected by elected representatives, and their ethnic, gender or class identity. Such study of the drivers of perceived political representation, paired with a richer dataset, could help disentangling the drivers behind the patterns described in our analysis. Besides, our result of the surge in perceived political representation in response to ‘staged elections’ begs the question what

²⁵ Pitkin explains symbolic representation as ‘the symbol’s power to evoke feelings or attitudes’ (Pitkin 1967: 97).

exactly it is about these elections that brings about this surge. Finally, similar research in other post-war countries could reveal to what extent our results are generalizable. According to Tripp (2015), as many as 15 post-war SSA countries have seen a surge in female descriptive representation. Not all of these share the outspoken ethnic divide and authoritarian style of government with our two case study countries. Hence, it is worthwhile to further examine the external validity of our results.

In addition, the study results presented here mainly focus on ‘ways of seeing the world’. Inspired by innovative research on ethnicity, we call for a further study on the intersections of identity the combine such a perspective with research on ways of acting in the world (Wimmer, 2008). This warrants a methodology that, on the one hand, combines the study of changing degrees in the sense of belonging to a distinctive bounded group (the ‘ways of seeing the world’ analysed in this article) with an understanding of the scripts of action reflected in everyday routines and popular practices (‘ways of acting in the world’). So far, very few studies have managed to combine both perspectives in a systematic way.

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
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
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Appendix 1: Assessing average recall and attrition bias in self-reported political representation

A. Self-reported perceived political representation in Burundi, 1986–2015



B. Self-reported perceived political representation in Rwanda, 1989–2011




Notes: The figures give the average levels of political representation as reported by respondents for each year in their life story. In the case of Burundi, the traced subsample includes 302 respondents; the sample of drop-outs includes 61 respondents. In the case of Rwanda, the traced subsample includes 412 respondents; the sample of drop-outs includes 59 respondents.


Source: Authors' compilation based on the life history dataset described in this article.

Figure 1: The location of research sites

A. Burundi




B. Rwanda



Note: The locations correspond to small administrative sectors.

Source: Authors' compilation.


Figure 2: Ladder of life, on which respondents indicate their level of perceived political representation




Source: Authors' interview guide.

Figure 3: Perceived political representation as reported in life stories, by gender

A. Burundi, 1986–2015



B. Rwanda, 1989–2011




Notes: Based on the life story rankings of 302 traced Burundian respondents (235 men and 67 women) and 412 traced Rwandan respondents (260 men and 152 women).


Source: Authors' compilation based on the life history dataset described in this article.

Figure 4: Change in perceived political representation, for women and men

A. Burundi, 1994–2015



B. Rwanda, 1995–2011




Notes: Based on the life story rankings of 302 traced Burundian respondents (235 men and 67 women) and 412 traced Rwandan respondents (260 men and 152 women).


Source: Authors' compilation based on the life history dataset described in this article.

Figure 5: Perceived political representation as reported in life stories, by gender and ethnicity

A. Burundi, 1994–2015



A. Rwanda, 1995–2011



Source: Authors' compilation based on the life history dataset described in this article.

Table 1: Sample observations by gender and ethnic subcategory, and across interview rounds

<u>Burundi</u>							
	Round 1 (2008)			Round 2 (2015)			Attrition (%)
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	
Hutu	222	41	263	189	37	226	14,1%
Tutsi	63	37	100	46	30	76	24,0%
All respondents	285	78	363	235	67	302	16,8%
<u>Rwanda</u>							
	Round 1 (2007)			Round 2 (2011/14)			Attrition (%)
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	
Hutu	240	77	317	201	73	274	13,6%
Tutsi	66	88	154	59	79	138	10,4%
All respondents	306	165	471	260	152	412	12,5%

Notes: Most of round two Rwanda interviews took place in 2011. Only 38 were conducted in 2015, with respondents who could not be interviewed in 2011.

Source: Authors' compilation based on the life history dataset described in this article.

Table 2: Women MPs in Burundi and Rwanda

Year	Men	Women	Total	% Women
Burundi				
1993	73	8	81	.099
2005	82	36	118	.305
2010	72	34	106	.321
2015	77	44	121	.364
Rwanda				
1981	60	4	64	.063
1983	61	9	70	.129
1988	58	12	70	.171
2003	41	39	80	.488
2008	35	45	80	.562
2013	29	51	80	.638

Note: The years listed in the table are the election years for which PARLINE provides information on the Parliament's gender composition. The years in bold are when a new constitution with gender quotas was introduced.

Source: PARLINE database on national parliaments (Inter-Parliamentary Union n.d.b).

Female Political Representation in Burundi and Rwanda

Table 3: Number and share of women in cabinet positions (ministers and secretaries of state)

Year	Burundi					Rwanda				
	Minister	Secretary of State	Total	Female	Female (% total)	Minister	Secretary of State	Total	Female	Female (% total)
1996	24	2	26	5	19,2%	20	0	20	1	5,0%
1997	24	2	26	3	11,5%	18	4	22	2	9,1%
1998	22	0	22	1	4,5%	17	5	22	2	9,1%
1999	22	0	22	1	4,5%	20	5	25	2	8,0%
2000	22	0	22	1	4,5%	17	4	21	3	14,3%
2001	22	0	22	1	4,5%	17	3	20	2	10,0%
2002	26	0	26	4	15,4%	17	4	21	3	14,3%
2003	25	0	25	4	16,0%	17	8	25	4	16,0%
2004	26	0	26	3	11,5%	18	10	28	8	28,6%
2005	27	0	27	3	11,1%	18	9	27	9	33,3%
2006	20	0	20	7	35,0%	19	0	19	4	21,1%
2007	20	0	20	8	40,0%	19	0	19	3	15,8%
2008	18	7	25	8	32,0%	22	6	28	9	32,1%
2009	25	0	25	7	28,0%	23	4	27	9	33,3%
2010	26	0	26	8	30,8%	23	3	26	8	30,8%
2011	21	0	21	8	38,1%	21	4	25	8	32,0%
2013	21	0	21	8	38,1%	21	8	29	9	31,0%
2014	21	0	21	8	38,1%	21	8	29	11	37,9%
2015	21	0	21	7	33,3%	21	10	31	12	38,7%
2016	20	0	20	6	30,0%	21	9	30	12	40,0%
Average	22,7	0,6	23,2	5,1	22,3%	19,5	5,2	24,7	6,1	23,0%
- pre-quota	23,7	0,4	24,1	2,6	10,2%	18,0	3,6	21,6	2,1	10,0%
- post-quota	21,3	0,7	22,0	7,5	34,3%	20,6	5,9	26,5	8,5	31,2%

Note: As in Arriola and Johnson (2014), we consider not only ministers but also secretaries of state. The drop in the share of female cabinet positions in Rwanda in 2006 and 2007 is due to the fact that for those years information on secretaries of state is missing.

Source: Own compilation of dataset provided by De Roeck et al. (2016).

Female Political Representation in Burundi and Rwanda

Table 4: Cabinet positions by prestige, across time and gender

Year	Sex	Burundi						Rwanda					
		Nr			%			Nr			%		
		low	medium	high	low	medium	high	low	medium	high	low	medium	high
1996	male	2	12	7	9,5%	57,1%	33,3%	2	11	6	10,5%	57,9%	31,6%
	female	1	3	1	20,0%	60,0%	20,0%	1	0	0	100,0%	0,0%	0,0%
1997	male	3	13	7	13,0%	56,5%	30,4%	1	12	7	5,0%	60,0%	35,0%
	female	0	2	1	0,0%	66,7%	33,3%	1	0	1	50,0%	0,0%	50,0%
1998	male	2	14	5	9,5%	66,7%	23,8%	1	11	8	5,0%	55,0%	40,0%
	female	1	0	0	100,0%	0,0%	0,0%	1	0	1	50,0%	0,0%	50,0%
1999	male	2	14	5	9,5%	66,7%	23,8%	1	12	10	4,3%	52,2%	43,5%
	female	1	0	0	100,0%	0,0%	0,0%	1	1	0	50,0%	50,0%	0,0%
2000	male	2	14	5	9,5%	66,7%	23,8%	1	9	8	5,6%	50,0%	44,4%
	female	1	0	0	100,0%	0,0%	0,0%	1	2	0	33,3%	66,7%	0,0%
2001	male	2	14	5	9,5%	66,7%	23,8%	1	9	8	5,6%	50,0%	44,4%
	female	1	0	0	100,0%	0,0%	0,0%	1	1	0	50,0%	50,0%	0,0%
2002	male	1	16	5	4,5%	72,7%	22,7%	1	9	8	5,6%	50,0%	44,4%
	female	2	2	0	50,0%	50,0%	0,0%	1	2	0	33,3%	66,7%	0,0%
2003	male	1	15	5	4,8%	71,4%	23,8%	1	12	8	4,8%	57,1%	38,1%
	female	2	2	0	50,0%	50,0%	0,0%	1	1	2	25,0%	25,0%	50,0%
2004	male	1	16	6	4,3%	69,6%	26,1%	2	10	8	10,0%	50,0%	40,0%
	female	2	1	0	66,7%	33,3%	0,0%	1	3	4	12,5%	37,5%	50,0%
2005	male	1	17	6	4,2%	70,8%	25,0%	2	9	7	11,1%	50,0%	38,9%
	female	2	1	0	66,7%	33,3%	0,0%	1	4	4	11,1%	44,4%	44,4%
2006	male	1	9	3	7,7%	69,2%	23,1%	3	6	6	20,0%	40,0%	40,0%
	female	2	3	2	28,6%	42,9%	28,6%	1	1	2	25,0%	25,0%	50,0%
2007	male	1	9	2	8,3%	75,0%	16,7%	3	6	7	18,8%	37,5%	43,8%
	female	2	3	3	25,0%	37,5%	37,5%	1	1	1	33,3%	33,3%	33,3%
2008	male	4	10	3	23,5%	58,8%	17,6%	4	8	7	21,1%	42,1%	36,8%
	female	1	5	2	12,5%	62,5%	25,0%	3	4	2	33,3%	44,4%	22,2%
2009	male	2	11	5	11,1%	61,1%	27,8%	4	7	7	22,2%	38,9%	38,9%
	female	2	4	1	28,6%	57,1%	14,3%	3	4	2	33,3%	44,4%	22,2%
2010	male	2	11	5	11,1%	61,1%	27,8%	5	7	6	27,8%	38,9%	33,3%
	female	2	5	1	25,0%	62,5%	12,5%	2	3	3	25,0%	37,5%	37,5%
2011	male	1	8	4	7,7%	61,5%	30,8%	4	7	6	23,5%	41,2%	35,3%
	female	2	4	2	25,0%	50,0%	25,0%	2	3	3	25,0%	37,5%	37,5%
2013	male	1	6	6	7,7%	46,2%	46,2%	4	9	7	20,0%	45,0%	35,0%
	female	2	6	0	25,0%	75,0%	0,0%	2	4	3	22,2%	44,4%	33,3%
2014	male	1	6	6	7,7%	46,2%	46,2%	2	9	7	11,1%	50,0%	38,9%
	female	2	6	0	25,0%	75,0%	0,0%	4	4	3	36,4%	36,4%	27,3%
2015	male	2	6	6	14,3%	42,9%	42,9%	1	10	8	5,3%	52,6%	42,1%
	female	1	6	0	14,3%	85,7%	0,0%	5	4	3	41,7%	33,3%	25,0%
2016	male	1	8	5	7,1%	57,1%	35,7%	1	4	6	9,1%	36,4%	54,5%
	female	0	5	1	0,0%	83,3%	16,7%	4	3	3	40,0%	30,0%	30,0%
Average	male	1,7	11,5	5,1	9,2%	62,2%	28,6%	2,2	8,9	7,3	12,3%	47,7%	40,0%
	female	1,5	2,9	0,7	43,1%	46,2%	10,6%	1,9	2,3	1,9	36,5%	35,3%	28,1%
-pre-quota	male	1,8	14,2	5,6	8,3%	66,0%	25,7%	1,1	10,4	7,9	5,9%	53,6%	40,5%
	female	1,2	1,1	0,2	65,2%	28,9%	5,9%	1,0	0,9	0,3	52,4%	33,3%	14,3%
-post-quota	male	1,6	8,4	4,5	10,6%	57,9%	31,5%	2,9	7,7	6,8	16,7%	43,5%	39,8%
	female	1,6	4,7	1,2	20,9%	63,2%	16,0%	2,4	3,2	2,8	28,2%	37,4%	34,4%

Notes: To define prestige, we relied on the classification scheme by De Roeck et al. (2016). The cells highlighted in grey indicate for which positions (low, medium, or high) the row percentage for women exceeds that for men—in other words, where the relative share of a certain level is higher for women than for men.

Source: Own compilation of dataset provided by De Roeck et al. (2016).

Table 5: Fixed-effects estimation of the determinants of perceived political representation

	Dependent variable: perceived political representation			
	Burundi		Rwanda	
	Total sample	Only Hutu	Total sample	Only Tutsi
female*year1990	-0.094	-0.127	-0.083	-0.526
female*year1991	-0.129	-0.171	0.200	-0.304
female*year1992	-0.026	-0.160	0.117	-0.396
female*year1993	0.578	1.094	0.209	-0.221
female*year1994	0.606	1.203*	-1.194***	-2.100***
female*year1995	0.521	1.143*	-1.166***	-2.341***
female*year1996	0.426	0.804	-0.802**	-1.710**
female*year1997	0.133	0.610	-0.541	-1.543**
female*year1998	-0.072	0.252	-0.704*	-1.688**
female*year1999	-0.126	0.207	-0.578	-1.636**
female*year2000	-0.091	0.016	0.460	-1.718***
female*year2001	-0.084	0.009	0.477	-1.748***
female*year2002	-0.059	-0.012	0.380	-1.604**
female*year2003	0.145	0.402	0.505	-1.483**
female*year2004	-0.056	0.017	0.229	-1.644***
female*year2005	-0.087	-0.276	-0.122	-1.674***
female*year2006	-0.217	-0.576	-0.402	-1.683***
female*year2007	-0.221	-0.636	-0.594	-1.750***
female*year2008	-0.598	-1.147*	-0.575	-1.449**
female*year2009	-0.558	-1.090	-0.585	-1.445**
female*year2010	-0.734	-1.173*	-0.608	-1.183*
female*year2011	-0.708	-1.154*	-0.607*	-1.382**
Tutsi*year1990	-0.497***		-0.626***	
Tutsi*year1991	-0.515***		-1.406***	
Tutsi*year1992	-1.094***		-2.070***	
Tutsi*year1993	-2.203***		-2.198***	
Tutsi*year1994	-0.998*		0.005	
Tutsi*year1995	-0.662		3.668***	
Tutsi*year1996	0.050		4.100***	
Tutsi*year1997	0.259		4.173***	
Tutsi*year1998	-0.064		4.334***	
Tutsi*year1999	-0.044		4.299***	
Tutsi*year2000	-2.450***		3.501***	
Tutsi*year2001	-2.623***		3.397***	
Tutsi*year2002	-2.675***		3.368***	
Tutsi*year2003	-2.769***		3.006***	
Tutsi*year2004	-2.896***		2.980***	
Tutsi*year2005	-3.821***		3.156***	
Tutsi*year2006	-4.174***		3.187***	
Tutsi*year2007	-4.334***		2.791***	
Tutsi*year2008	-4.092***		2.504***	
Tutsi*year2009	-4.026***		2.430***	
Tutsi*year2010	-4.219***		2.200***	
Tutsi*year2011	-4.347***		1.959***	
Constant	1.606***	1.040***	3.791***	2.779***
Individual fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	6753	5145	9373	3146
R-squared	0.363	0.398	0.383	0.388
Number of individuals	302	231	412	138

Standard errors, clustered at level of individual, omitted for reasons of presentation; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; time period restricted to 1989-2011; the year 1989 is the basecategory

Source: Authors' analysis of the life history dataset described in this article.