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**Development policy and the security agenda in Africa: reassessing the relationship**

## Former combatants at the crossing.

How to assess the reintegration of former combatants  
in the security and development nexus?  
Case study: Ruyigi (Burundi) and Kinshasa (DRC)

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## Introduction

More and more, security and development have been considered as inextricably linked, interdependent and mutually reinforcing. First of all, violent conflict has been described as *development in reverse* (World Bank, 2003). Conflict is seen as obstruction to development as it leads to economic decline, human losses and political and social breakdown. Besides, development efforts are a priori most likely to be wasted in a context of continued insecurity and armed violence. The attacks of September 11<sup>th</sup> have added a global dimension to this link between security and development. Rich countries realise that they cannot protect themselves on the security level when most countries are facing poverty and inequality and when a large part of the world population is feeling marginalised. On the other hand, the risk to insecurity will be higher when there is no sustainable development. A lack of development or imbalanced development and inequalities are important causes of conflict.

These recent concerns with security issues have posed new challenges to development policies: should current development assistance budgets be used more for security issues?<sup>1</sup> The underlying assumption is that a restoration of security must be guaranteed before long-term development can start. In his recent policy letter to the House of Representatives, the Dutch Minister of Development Cooperation identified four focus areas for the development cooperation in 2008 (Koenders, 2007). The first area covers security and development in fragile states, where the Dutch government should urge for a strong commitment of the international community and make a bilateral contribution.<sup>2</sup>

In this paper we want to address two topics that are prominent in the Security and Development Nexus, namely Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR). Since the late 1990s, DDR and SSR are considered to be crucial phases in every transition from war to peace and the concepts have become increasingly related to issues like *governance, conflict prevention and peace building*. To start with, we will briefly present these two topics. Thereafter, a presentation will be made of our field research in Ruyigi, Burundi and Kinshasa, DRC. We will consider the research questions, the context and the methodology. After that we will summarize the most important problems and findings. Then we will formulate some policy lessons and recommendations. In the final part, we will try to draw conclusions about how to assess the changing relationship between security and development issues.

## Linking security and development: SSR and DDR

Programmes for security sector reform and demobilization and reintegration provide a bare illustration of the reorientation of development assistance into security-related

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<sup>1</sup> This question was formulated in the announcement for this DPRN conference.

<sup>2</sup> The identified priorities are: an enlargement of the capacities of fragile states, better analysis of underlying causes, political dialogue, assistance to security sector reform, focus on socio- economical development and a more flexible policy (Koenders, 2007: 20-21).

issues. A lot of funding is actually being allocated through these kinds of programmes.<sup>3</sup> On the international level, there is a consensus that a successful security sector reform and demobilization and reintegration of former combatants into society, lead to a consolidation of the peace process and development of the country. This hypothesis underlies all donor policies and a wide range of international organisations and NGO's have become involved with SSR and DDR in post- conflict societies.

The concept of SSR has emerged in the context of the *security first* philosophy that was adopted by many policy makers after the end of the Cold War. This enhances a broader definition of security, which encompasses economic and human security. The Commission on Human Security formulated the following definition:

“Human security in its broadest sense embraces far more than the absence of violent conflict. It encompasses human rights, good governance, access to education and health care, and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfil his or her own potential... Freedom from want, freedom from fear and the freedom of future generations to inherit a healthy natural environment – these are the interrelated building blocks of human, and therefore national security” (CHS, 2003: 4).

The security sector has been defined by DFID (Department for International Development, UK) in broad terms as “all those responsible for protecting the state and communities within it (2002: 7).”<sup>4</sup> Actors include *core security actors* such as the military, the police and paramilitary forces, but also customary and traditional authorities, border guards, civil society organisations, the judiciary, private security companies, etc.

Recently, some discussion has been going on about donor policies and the implementation of SSR. The main critiques enhance the poor local ownership of the process (Andersen, 2006, Nathan, 2007), the lack of political will (GTZ, 2000, Nathan, 2007, Wulf, 2005) and the impatience and perceived sense of superiority of donors (Brzoska, 2003, Karkoszka, 2003, Nathan, 2007). In addition, Cooper and Pugh (2002: 51) argue that a narrow focus on the security sector risks overlooking wider issues, like “the political economy of conflicts and the ways in which the economic and security policies of developed states can perpetuate local war economies.” One should, in other words, take into account the underlying causes of conflict and the role of external donors. The term Security Sector Reform itself has been criticized as well. The broader term of Security Sector Transformation has been suggested to describe the transformative and long-term process that has to take place (Chuter, 2000, Cooper and Pugh, 2002).

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<sup>3</sup> The MDRP programme that provides assistance to nine Central-African countries, budgets 560 million dollar for the execution of the different programmes. In 2007, 496 million dollars had already been allocated (MDRP, 2007a).

<sup>4</sup> In 1999, Clare Short, the UK Secretary of State for International Development, focused on the security sector in a speech at International Alert in London. The UK government thus took the lead in integrating the new concept of Security sector reform in the development discourse. Other countries such as the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Switzerland and the USA would soon be following, as well as the DAC (Development Assistance Committee) and OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development).

That brings us to the discussion about the nature of the links between SSR and development, particularly the reduction of poverty. The links that are mostly identified are recited by Brzoska (2003: 25-26): making more resources available for investment in poverty-reduction activities by reducing expenditure on security-related issues, better protection of individuals (personal safety and safety of property) and society, “improving the contribution of the security sector to conflict prevention and management” and “greater participation in decision-making on security sector forces as well as more access to security and justices.” There is in fact a general agreement that the reduction of military expenditure does make more resources available for the economic and social sectors, thus creating a *peace dividend* (Kingma, 2000: 23). However, in order to make a contribution to poverty alleviation, these resources must be converted in a productive way, which is often not the case. One can conclude that there are no *necessary* or direct links. The extent of contribution to development depends on the policies adopted by the government.

Now we would like to consider DDR, an important step in the *peacekeeping-to-development* continuum in security-related activities (Brzoska, 2003: 11). DDR should be closing the gap between armed conflict and long-term development. This was first acknowledged in the *Brahimi Report* in 2000: “[...] the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants – key to immediate post-conflict stability and reduced likelihood of conflict recurrence – is an area in which peace-building makes a direct contribution to public security and law and order (UN, 2000: 7).” Six years later, in his foreword to the *Integrated DDR Standards*, Kofi Anan emphasized the role of the UN: “[...] in a peacekeeping environment, a successful DDR programme depends highly on the ability of the United Nations system to plan, manage and implement a coherent and effective DDR strategy (UN, 2006a: 1).” As we said, a wide range of NGO’s that initially were reluctant to engage, have become involved with demobilization and reintegration activities since.

The following definitions, formulated by the UN (2006a: 4), are usually applied. Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civil population. Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed groups. Disarmed combatants are assembled in orientation centres, where they are identified, undergo a medical examination and receive information about civilian life. Reinsertion is the assistance offered to ex-combatants prior to the long-term process of reintegration. Basically, it is a form of transitional assistance to cover the basic needs of former combatants and their families. After this transitional phase, which can last up to one year, the reintegration process starts. Reintegration is the process by which former combatants acquire a civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Social and economic reintegration should be considered primarily in the local context. These processes are part of the general development of communities and require long-term assistance.

When evaluating DDR processes, various authors have emphasized the necessity of a holistic and long-term approach. DDR is not a merely technical process, but a political one, embedded in a broader process of reconciliation, peace building and empowerment of civil society. So far, considerable research has been done about disarmament and demobilization. Researchers have formulated very useful “best practices” (Ball and Van De Goor, 2006, Colletta and Pearce 2001: 205-209, Douglas e.a., 2004, GFN-SSR, 2005: 3, UN, 2005: 27) whereas long-term reintegration remains a more unknown field. However, socio- economic reintegration is maybe the most crucial and critical phase, as the consolidation of the peace process might depend on the ability of former combatants to integrate in the post-war economy and to establish new, sustainable livelihoods.

### **Problem statement and methodology: field research in Ruyigi and Kinshasa**

The long-term reintegration of former combatants entails a lot of challenges. One purpose of our research was to make a preliminary and partial evaluation of the reintegration programmes in the DRC and Burundi. We want to stress that our ambition is not to present definitive conclusions. The fieldwork has been too limited to do so. On the contrary, we have done a small- scale case study of a limited group of people in two different contexts. Our goal was to discover which conditions have to be fulfilled for a successful reintegration and thus to formulate recommendations for an improvement of the DDR programmes.

The field research was conducted in Ruyigi, a rural province of Burundi, from October till December 2006 and in Kinshasa, in February and March 2007. The two contexts are extremely different. Ruyigi province in Burundi was heavily hit by the civil war. The province suffered from a huge loss in human lives, but equally from a devastated infrastructure, a destroyed economy and a broken social tissue. A lot of people fled to Tanzania during the war. Trucks full of repatriated refugees were still crossing the frontier on a daily basis during the period of our presence. A recent UNHCR-map indicates that over 5000 inhabitants of Gisuru (one of the seven districts in Ruyigi) are still living in refugee camps in Tanzania (UNHCR, 2007).<sup>5</sup> Every other district has 1000 to 5000 of its inhabitants still living in Tanzania (idem). The access to the province is not easy. Ruyigi is a considerable distance away from the capital. Economic activity in the area is restricted to agriculture and cattle breeding, without many other livelihood opportunities. At the end of 2006, heavy rainfall caused crop failures all over the province. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies estimates that 300 households in Ruyigi were left homeless after their houses and about 100ha of crops were destroyed (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 2006).<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Map in annex

<sup>6</sup> Map in annex

In Kinshasa, a city with over seven million inhabitants, most people conduct retail trade, they own small shops, trade their goods on the streets or deliver all kinds of services. In order to survive, many people are obliged to combine two or three jobs and to make small profits in the informal economy. During our field research in March, violent clashes erupted between the forces of Jean Pierre Bemba and the presidential guards of Joseph Kabila. Despite the democratic elections and the installation of a new parliament and government, the tension in the capital remains high.

In Ruyigi, data were mainly collected through individual and focus group talks. In total we interviewed 162 persons, of which 132 men, 20 child soldiers and 10 women.<sup>7</sup> In Kinshasa, the research was much more limited in time and in scope. We decided to do more individual, in-depth interviews here, because organizing focus groups would be very difficult for practical reasons. We interviewed 30 men, of which 7 child soldiers, in various places in the city.<sup>8</sup> Obviously, this research has some important limits. To start with we are dealing with two extremely different contexts, which can be difficult to compare. The two countries have their own history; they have faced very different conflicts and different transition paths. Secondly, as indicated, the way the research was carried out varied as well. In Ruyigi, we have questioned a sample of almost 20% of the former combatants, whereas in Kinshasa, this would be impossible, since there are more than 6000 possible respondents. On the other hand our sample does more or less reflect the real proportions in age, gender, income generating activities and origin. Before considering the actual research, we want to stress once more that this is a research in progress. We do not aim to make a final evaluation, or to draw definitive conclusions about reintegration processes. There are some very interesting topics that we were not able to include in our field research. First of all, the local communities, the people who are living together with the former combatants, were not questioned. This would be a very interesting path for further research. Secondly, we did not imply any questions about the past, or how the conflict was actually affecting these particular communities. These kinds of questions would require more individual and in-depth talks. Hence we were not able to make any conclusions about how the history of the local communities contributes to the reintegration process. Finally, we did not question in depth whether former members of rebel groups or of the national army have different attitudes or reintegration outcomes.

## **Context: conflict and transition in Burundi and the DRC**

Since independence, subsequent cycles of violence have hit Burundian society. The conflicts, although often presented as ethnic struggles between Hutu and Tutsi, were

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<sup>7</sup> Location and date of the interviews: Butaganzwa (23/11/2006) 18 men, Butezi (28/11/2006) 18 men, Bweru (28/11/2006) 7 men, Gisuru (16/11/2006) 15 men, Kinyinya (13/12/2006) 10 men and 2 women, Nyabitsinda (7/12 and 14/12/2006) 45 men, 7 women and 16 child soldiers, Ruyigi (24/11/2006) 17 men and 1 woman, Ruyigi Garage des Anges (5/12 en 18/12/2006) 2 men and 4 child soldiers.

<sup>8</sup> Location and date of the interviews: GTZ Office Limete (26/2/2007) 8 men, CONADER Provincial Office Gombe (3/3/2007) 2 men, CONADER field visit (3/3/2007) 3 men, CAIDECO field visit (5/3/2007) 6 men, ANESOD field visit (17/2/2007) 7 child soldiers, GTZ field visit (6/3/2007) 4 men.

mainly political power struggles. More and more however, ethnicity was being used for the mobilization of large groups of people. In 1993, the first democratically elected Hutu president was killed. Subsequently, a civil war broke out between the national army and various Hutu rebellion groups (primarily CNDD-FDD and FNL- Palipehutu)<sup>9</sup>, which lasted for ten years. Peace negotiations started in Arusha in 1998 and led to the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in 2000. Only in 2003, a Global Ceasefire Agreement was signed between the belligerents, except FNL- Palipehutu. The Global Ceasefire included among others agreements on SSR and DDR. In the new national army, ethnical quota would be maintained. CNDD booked an electoral victory in 2005 and came into power. Finally in September 2006, a ceasefire was signed with FNL, the last active armed group. However the situation remains tensed. FNL has not entered the DDR phase yet.

The conflict in the DRC must be understood in the regional context. In 1996, the presence of Hutu refugees, Interahamwe and ex-FAR<sup>10</sup> in Eastern Congo induced Rwanda to undertake action. Rwanda and Uganda made use of local dynamics and frustrations to set up a coalition: AFDL<sup>11</sup>, under the leadership of Laurent Kabila. After his capture of Kinshasa and inauguration as a president, the presence of foreigners in the country was more and more criticized. When Kabila demanded that Rwanda and Uganda would leave the country in 1998, the two countries reacted by supporting two respective rebellions: RCD<sup>12</sup> and MLC<sup>13</sup>. The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement of 1999 did not put an end to the hostilities. Finally in 2003, the Sun City Peace Agreement heralded the beginning of a transition period. In 2006, Joseph Kabila beat the main opposition candidate Jean Pierre Bemba in the presidential elections. Yet, violence still continues in the East, where militia leader Laurent Nkunda refuses to integrate his troops in the national army

Both countries have set up a national demobilization and reintegration programme for former combatants after the signing of the respective peace treaties. In Burundi, the programme was set up in March 2004. It is executed by SE/CNDRR<sup>14</sup>. In the DRC, CONADER<sup>15</sup>, the responsible commission, was created in 2003 and the programme was launched in 2004. Funding comes from the World Bank and twelve major donors through the *Multi- Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme* (MDRP). MDRP is providing a general framework, coordination and technical and financial support to the various national programmes.<sup>16</sup> Both programmes are executed in two phases. During the first phase, the demobilized receive a transitional allowance; this is a sum of cash money. During the second phase, they receive in-kind assistance that can consist in several goods

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<sup>9</sup> Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie- Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie and Front National de Libération- Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu

<sup>10</sup> Forces Armées Rwandaises, the national army

<sup>11</sup> Alliance des Forces Armées pour la Libération du Congo

<sup>12</sup> Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie

<sup>13</sup> Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo

<sup>14</sup> Secrétariat Exécutif de la Commission National de Démobilisation, Réinsertion et Réintégration

<sup>15</sup> Commission Nationale pour la Démobilisation et la Réinsertion

<sup>16</sup> Besides DDR programmes in the DRC and Burundi, MDRP also covers the programmes in Angola, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda en Zimbabwe.

and services. The subjoined box provides an overview of the two phases of the National DDR Programmes in Burundi and the DRC and of the number of combatants that has been demobilized and reintegrated.

Burundi National Programme: (figures May 2007) 23 185 demobilized 8 499 received reintegration assistance	DRC National Programme: (figures May 2007) 116 675 demobilized 46 259 received reintegration assistance
Transitional allowance: 9 months of salary (transportation and installation)+ 9 months during 9 months	Transitional allowance: \$110 (transportation and installation)+ monthly \$25 during one year
Reintegration assistance options: - Training + material kit (Local executive partners) - Education - Professional training	Reintegration assistance options: - Professional training + material kit (Local executive partners) - Small business - Agriculture or cattle breeding - Other

## Waiting for assistance and dealing with jealousy: DDR in Ruyigi

### The national programme

In May 2007, 23.185 former combatants had been demobilized in Burundi, whereas only 8.499 of them had received reintegration support (MDRP, 2007b). Consequently, two thirds of the demobilized are still waiting for their reintegration support. As it is, this should not be a major problem, provided that all demobilized receive their support within a reasonable term. After all, reintegration takes some time and practical conditions make it often difficult to reach the former combatants. Field research however, showed that many of them had been waiting for more than a year, and reintegration support was not likely to be provided within the next months. Therefore, most of them lost their patience and their faith in the responsible actors.

To start with we will describe the nature of this reintegration support in more detail. When they are leaving the demobilization centre, former combatants receive a sum of money, equal to nine months of salary. After three months, they receive another three months, and again after six and after nine months. This amount should cover the transportation and installation costs and the first basic needs. Nine months after the demobilization, the reintegration support, which consists in goods and services, not in cash money, should be available. One option is to go back to school or to receive a professional training in for example computer science or accountancy. The most popular option however is to be assisted by local executive partners (NGO's) to set up an income generating activity. Concretely, in each province a local partner is chosen who receives funding from the World Bank through the National Commission. The partner is



responsible for providing a certain amount of demobilized with a short training and a material kit, consisting in carpenter, mechanic, tailor... tools. The aim is to supply the former combatants with some capabilities, skills and a material starter's kit in order to build sustainable livelihoods.

Initially, the World Bank prohibited the National Commission to collaborate with local organisations as partners, referring to their suspected low capacities. Yet, international NGO's were not interested in executing these kinds of projects. As we have said, NGO's have long time been reluctant to get involved in demobilization and reintegration activities, because development agencies were not supposed to participate in security-related activities. After demonstrations of impatient demobilized in Bujumbura in 2005, the World Bank eventually decided to allow partnerships with local organisations. According to a CNDRR official, a lot of these small organisations encountered major difficulties in the beginning, due to complicated procedures at the Bank.<sup>17</sup> In Ruyigi, a contract was signed between the National Commission and SOPRAD, a local NGO with a lot of experience in the region. Reintegration activities started in September 2005 and evolved slowly during one year, but all the actors involved were satisfied with the results. The satisfactory results were ascribed to the field knowledge and reintegration experience and to the good reputation of SOPRAD in the local communities.<sup>18</sup> Despite these results, new contracts were signed at national level with one national and two international NGO's, causing a lot of delays in the execution of the programme. We will come back to this later.

I interviewed former combatants in the seven districts of Ruyigi province. In every community a small group of former combatants was assembled for a focus group talk. The number of participants varied heavily from community to community and occasionally people came and left during the interviews. The semi-structured interviews were based on a list of open questions about the background, the actual livelihoods and the social and economic reintegration of the former combatants. We became quickly aware of our difficult position as a researcher, as almost all the respondents expected to receive some assistance from us. In addition to having clarified our own position to the respondents, we have also tried to verify and rectify as much as possible the bias or possible exaggerations resulting from their assumptions.

### **Economic reintegration**

During the focus group talks, the same complaints came up everywhere. The most important complaint was about the delays in payments. Some respondents in Gisuru, a border town at the Tanzanian frontier, warned us that “[...] la violence peut éclater si l’enveloppe ne vient pas vite.<sup>19</sup>” According to one former combatant in Butezi, the DDR

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<sup>17</sup> Interview with Pierre Claver Sinzinkayo, Director of Reintegration at CNDRR, 07/11/2006, Bujumbura.

<sup>18</sup> Personal communication with SOPRAD officials, CNDRR officials and the local population in different districts of Ruyigi. Since 2003 SOPRAD has also been involved in a special programme initiated by UNICEF to reintegrate former child soldiers into their communities.

<sup>19</sup> Focus group talk in Gisuru, 16/11/2006. “[...] violence could break out if assistance is not given to us soon.”

programme has already failed: “L’ objectif a déjà échoué, parce que ça avance si lentement.”<sup>20</sup>” We will be dealing with some causes for these delays later.

A lot of people were also displeased with the amount of assistance. Almost all respondents agreed that the reinsertion assistance (in total 18 months of salary) is sufficient to cover basic needs, basically to buy food for the family and to pay school fees for the children. However, the reinsertion allowance leaves nothing for additional investments and does not create a safety net. Once the demobilized and their families were facing additional costs or unexpected setbacks such as crop failure, they were in trouble.<sup>21</sup> Additional costs can enhance health care for family members, hospital bills, wedding costs, building material,... A lot of people lost their ground and/or their house during the war. Consequently, they had to invest a major part of their allowance in the rehabilitation of their house. This made it impossible to engage in any profitable investments. Peter Uvin interviewed 63 ex-combatants in two rural provinces (Ngozi in the North and Makamba in the South) and in the capital Bujumbura in September 2006 (Uvin, 2007). In Ngozi, he found that the large majority of the demobilized invested their reinsertion money in off-farm income generation.

“Most of them had distinctly more resources –bikes, radios, animals, a boutique that allowed them to invest in off-agriculture opportunities, and plow part of the profit back into the farm which was taken care of by their wives. Many of these people seemed distinctly at ease with their lives, talking about the dreams they had, investments they intended to make, etc. It seems we can describe the demobilized soldiers in Ngozi as a new entrepreneurial middle class” (Uvin, 2007: 13).

However, Uvin notes that these results are not to be expected throughout the whole Burundian territory. He thinks the results will be more positive in rural areas, among former combatants who returned to homes that were still in existence and among people who returned to the North and the Centre of the country (Uvin, 2007: 14). Indeed, in Nyanza-Lac, in the Southern province of Makamba, he faced quite different situations. The hills of Nyanza-Lac had been almost totally empty of people during the last years of the war. “[...] almost all the demobilized –especially the older ones- we spoke to in Nyanza-Lac had to invest most of their money in the basic establishment of their household” (Uvin, 2007: 15). Respondents in Nyanza-Lac also complained much more bitterly than in Ngozi about the delays in payments. Comparing his findings with ours, we can conclude that the context in Ruyigi is similar to Nyanza-Lac. In both areas, livelihood opportunities are very much restricted to agriculture and cattle breeding. Most investments were made in farming. Moreover, both areas were severely hit by the civil war. People had to invest their allowance in non income generating activities. A lot of

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<sup>20</sup> Focus group talk in Butezi, 28/11/2006. “The programme has already failed because of the excessive delays.”

<sup>21</sup> In Butanganzwa (focus group talk on 23/11/2006), people told us about a drought period and crop failure earlier this year. This made them spend all the money of the reinsertion allowance to buy food. In Bweru (focus group talk on 28/11/2006), there were stories about floods that devastated a part of the harvest. As a matter of fact, floods were destroying a part of the harvest at the end of 2006 (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 2006)

people fled and crossed the Tanzanian frontier (UNHCR, 2007). Refugees and IDP's were still returning to these areas on a daily basis. In Kinyinya, the district that is really at the frontier with Tanzania, nine in twelve respondents answered that they used a large part of their allowance to "help their families return from Tanzania."<sup>22</sup>

The arrival of all these refugees and IDP's is provoking some additional challenges. All those people have to *reintegrate* and they are all facing the same problems: land problems, housing, generating an income,... Still, according to the former combatants, the other groups are better off because they are considered as real victims, whereas demobilized in a way remain the aggressors. In the district of Kinyinya for example, distributions of roofing were organized by the local administration together with some NGO's. Nevertheless, the respondents complained that the material was not given to them. They accused the NGO's of deliberately forgetting the demobilized, "[...] parce qu'ils croient que comme démobilisés, nous avons déjà trop d'avantages."<sup>23</sup> The same kinds of complaints were heard at several occasions. In Ruyigi and Kinyinya, two men told us about two respective international NGO's who explicitly told them that they were not willing to help demobilized combatants.<sup>24</sup> A local CNDRR official tried to put the situation into perspective, but admitted that this kind of unequal treatment exists: "C'est possible que le chef de colline décide de donner d'abord aux autres, parce qu'il sait que les démobilisés vont recevoir leur appui bientôt."<sup>25</sup> While the interviewees in Butezi proposed to create an NGO especially for the demobilized,<sup>26</sup> the policy of the national commission is aimed at separating the different groups as less as possible. They do not want the demobilized to be treated separately to avoid new frictions in the society. This also seems to be the reason why certain provincial offices are reluctant to organize sensitization activities. They seem to be afraid of stigmatizing the group of former combatants by drawing attention to their problems. However, the focus group talks made clear that there is a huge need for more information and sensitization.

As we have said, economic opportunities in Ruyigi are very much restricted to agriculture and cattle breeding. A lot of demobilized are struggling to find a job.<sup>27</sup> The nature of some training facilities is even fuelling this. For example, too many demobilized in Ruyigi have been trained as a car mechanic, whereas very few cars can be found in the region. A reintegration programme has to take into consideration the local economic reality. However, we acknowledge that any economic reintegration is extremely difficult in a context with few livelihood possibilities. Therefore, reintegration programmes should

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<sup>22</sup> Focus group talk in Kinyinya, 13/12/2006.

<sup>23</sup> Focus group talk in Kinyinya, 13/12/2006. "[...] because they think that we, demobilized combatants, are already receiving too many advantages." See also focus group talks in Gisuru, 16/11/2006, Butaganzwa, 23/11/2006, Ruyigi, 24/11/2006.

<sup>24</sup> Focus group talk in Ruyigi, 24/11/2006. and in Kinyinya, 13/12/2006.

<sup>25</sup> Interview with CNDRR provincial official, 19/12/2006, Ruyigi. "It is possible that the *chef de colline* gives priority to the other groups, because he knows that the latter will receive their reintegration assistance soon."

<sup>26</sup> Focus group talk in Butezi, 28/11/2006.

<sup>27</sup> In Bweru (focus group talk on 28/11/2006), the example of demining activities was given. Former combatants expected to be involved in demining. They claimed to be most suited for the job, because they put the mines themselves. However, these jobs were not presented to them.

ideally be linked to wider economic development programmes. In summary, DDR is to be linked to a wider economic development strategy in post-conflict societies.

### **Social reintegration**

The social reinsertion of ex-combatants is generally quite good, although some particular problems came up during several focus group interviews. Initially, cohabitation with the neighbours was not causing any problems. Almost all respondents (95,8%) returned to the place where they lived before and joined their families. This seems to have had a positive impact on the reinsertion, since they were familiar with the place and the people living there. Thus the research showed that there has not been a massive move to the towns.<sup>28</sup> However, problems are coming up gradually. A man in Gisuru gave the example of money loans.<sup>29</sup> Some former combatants decided to lend money from their neighbours in order to make small investments. They would pay it back as soon as they would receive the rest of the reinsertion assistance or the reintegration support. After more than one year, they are still not able to reimburse due to the delays. Those kinds of situations create misunderstanding and distrust amongst the different groups in society. Local people are beginning to consider the demobilized as an unreliable group. Demobilized in return are more and more distinguishing themselves and closing themselves off as a group, whereby former divisions among rebels and soldiers of the national army totally disappear. As a matter of fact there is a lot of solidarity among former combatants. They are often hanging out together. When we asked them who they would turn to in case of problems, they answered they would ask for the help of other veterans. Besides, many of them organised themselves in cooperatives or associations in Ruyigi. This solidarity has clearly some positive consequences, but it can have serious drawbacks as well. Outsiders might start to consider them as a distinct group, and might begin to fear and distrust them. Of course, fear can be related with the behaviour of combatants during the war. So far, we have not been able to question this issue in more detail. One should consider the specific local conflict history; what kind of violence was used in the different places, who were the actors, were they locals or outsiders, etc.

Apparently there has been a lack of preparation in the local communities. The neighbours have not been well informed about the programme. As one of the respondents said: "La communauté locale n'a pas été bien préparée, pour ça il n'y a pas de compréhension."<sup>30</sup> This seems to be a source of many frustrations: "Ils sont jaloux. Ils croient que nous sommes déjà riches. Mais ce n'est pas le cas!"<sup>31</sup> Thus, the research showed that upcoming problems are not directly caused by the violent behaviour of the former combatants during the war, but rather by side-effects of the reintegration programme. Ironically, a programme that was conceived to facilitate the cohabitation of demobilized and the local population has in many ways the reverse effect.

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<sup>28</sup> In Ruyigi, the provincial capital, only 4 of the 14 respondents were born in another district or province.

<sup>29</sup> Focus group talk in Gisuru, 16/11/2006. See also focus group talk in Ruyigi, 24/11/2006.

<sup>30</sup> Focus group talk in Bweru, 28/11/2006. "The local community has not been prepared properly. Therefore, there is a lack of understanding."

<sup>31</sup> Focus group talk in Gisuru, 16/11/2006. "They are jealous. They think that we are already rich. But this is not the case!"

According to the interviewees the local population is jealous. They are not really aware of the content of the reintegration programme, so they think former combatants are receiving big amounts of cash money and material support. Unfortunately our field research did not last long enough to question the local population about their opinions. This was beyond the scope of this study, but it will be a crucial issue for further research. Various authors and programme managers agree that generally there are problems of jealousy.<sup>32</sup> The population feels as if violence is being rewarded. A provincial CNDRR official admitted that most people are not aware of the exact content of the DDR programme and are drawing false conclusions.<sup>33</sup> According to Uvin however, there is no problem of jealousy:

“Of the rural ex-combatants, only two – a child soldiers and an adult – told us about jealousy towards them in the community; the others did not bring this up. In our hundreds of conversations with non-combatants, the demobilized were never once brought up as an economic problem” (Uvin, 2007: 21).

Uvin’s research showed that the major problem is the presence of groups of unemployed young men who are hanging out together. Their neighbours often distrust and fear them. The image of young unemployed men as dangerous, criminal and drunk is prevailing. Uvin states that people also fear demobilized because “[...] it is widely believed that many of them are informants and part-time employees for dirty jobs for the Intelligence Services and other parallel networks of power” (Uvin, 2007: 22).

As we already said we have come to opposite conclusions regarding the issue of jealousy. Jealousy was explicitly mentioned as a problem in *every* focus group talk. This could mean several things. First of all, jealousy might indeed be present in the local communities in Ruyigi province. On the other hand, it could be a mere impression from the combatants. In this case, impressions are probably reinforcing each other during a group interview. In fact, the latter could be as dangerous as the former. Even if their allegations are false, they are creating many frustrations and as we have said, possibly new divisions in the local communities. The solution to this problem seems to be rather obvious: organize information and sensitization sessions and make sure that everyone knows the exact content of the DDR programme. Respondents in Ruyigi also explicitly proposed this solution.<sup>34</sup> The national commission emphasizes the importance of sensitization as well, but this seems to remain a theoretical commitment. Sensitization activities are until now very poorly implemented.<sup>35</sup> More efforts have to be done in order to inform the population and if necessary to reassure the ex-combatants. The responsible actors have to make sure frustrations are not creating a group of former combatants who are vulnerable to re-recruitment.

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<sup>32</sup> Patricia Lewis, Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (Lewis, 2003: 20), also points to this problem.

<sup>33</sup> Interview with CNDRR provincial official, 19/12/2006, Ruyigi.

<sup>34</sup> Focus group talk in Ruyigi, 24/11/2006.

<sup>35</sup> Interview with Pierre Claver Sinzinkayo, Director of Reintegration at CNDRR, 07/11/2006, Bujumbura and personal communication with responsables in various districts.

If we are distinguishing between veterans from different groups, we may assume that combatants, who contributed to a victory, expect to be rewarded. A respondent in Gisuru made a poignant remark about his former fellow fighters who are now in power that captures the prevailing frustrations: “On nous à oublié là-bas à Buja, ils ont la bonne vie et la bonne nourriture et ils ne pensent plus à nous ici.<sup>36</sup>” The majority of ex-combatants in Ruyigi had been a member of CNDD-FDD (71,3%). The other represented groups are FAB<sup>37</sup> (22,6%), Frolina<sup>38</sup> (2,9%), CNDD-Nyangoma (1,4%), Kaze-FDD (1,2%) and Frolina-Karumba (0,5%). In our sample, CNDD-FDD veterans are slightly overrepresented (91,3%), whereas we questioned few ex-FAB (6,5%). As Uvin (2007: 24) says, “the main difference between ex-combatants everywhere and those who did not fight is a higher degree of politicization among the former”. Demobilized are talking more critically about politics. Besides, the majority expresses a negative opinion, even and maybe especially when they were at the side of the group that is actually in power. Uvin’s findings were confirmed by our own. We heard a considerable amount of criticism on government policies. The CNDD-FDD fighters have the feeling that their former leaders have forgotten them. After all, they have contributed to the *victory* (electoral victory in 2005, the party has been in power since) of CNDD-FDD and they expect to be rewarded for their contribution.

### **Special target groups**

We will be focusing very briefly on some special target groups. There is a special programme for the reintegration of former child soldiers. From 2004 until June 2006 it was implemented by UNICEF<sup>39</sup>, while now the national commission is responsible. We will not go further into this programme, although we have been talking to some former child soldiers. Within the national programme, there are some special facilities for female and disabled former combatants. Women are considered as a vulnerable group on the economic level and the social stigma they bear being former combatants is much heavier. A woman in Nyabitsinda told us her husband left her because “il ne voulait pas vivre ensemble avec une femme de la brousse.<sup>40</sup>” Nevertheless, our limited personal observations told us that women are more often assisted by NGO’s. That means they might receive more opportunities than men.

Disabled former combatants are supposed to receive free treatment in a local hospital. Concretely, they receive a document indicating to which kind of treatment they are entitled. They must present themselves with the document in the allocated hospital within a precise period. Those specifications constitute a lot of problems. Firstly, hospitals are very much dispersed in the rural areas of Burundi. Former combatants often have to travel several hours in order to reach the nearest hospital, there is no public transport and

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<sup>36</sup> Focus group talk in Gisuru, 16/11/2006. “They have forgotten us in Bujumbura, where they live a good life and have good food. They do not think about us anymore.”

<sup>37</sup> Forces Armées Burundaises, national army

<sup>38</sup> Front pour la Libération Nationale

<sup>39</sup> From 2004 till 2006, 3013 children were reintegrated in their families (UN, 2006c).

<sup>40</sup> Interview with a female former combatant in Nyabitsinda, 12/12/2006. “[...] he did not want to live together with a woman from the bushes.”

the roads are not maintained at all. They have to bear the transport cost themselves, which often is a problem as well. It is difficult to reach the hospital during the indicated period and when they arrive after the closure of the period, they are refused health care.<sup>41</sup>

Finally, Uvin draws the attention at a group that is always neglected, the self-demobilized (Uvin, 2007: 17-19). They did not receive any support. “They are as a group feeling more excluded, more depressed, more hopeless [...]” (idem: 17) The first step, he argues, is to recognize the problem. It may be difficult to include them in the national programme, but they should be targeted in broader programs. Although we did only interview one self-demobilized – who had the chance of having followed a professional training and found a job with a local NGO – we fully support Uvin’s plea for more assistance and recognition of self-demobilized.

### **Conditions for a successful reintegration**

As we have announced, the aim of our research was to identify some factors that contribute to the success or failure of a reintegration process. First of all we found that the family of the former combatant has a decisive impact. The research revealed that a close involvement of the family in the reintegration activities is very positive. If the demobilized has the chance to return to his family and his former house, this is a good thing. Of course, the economic and material situation of the family has a big influence. If this situation is good, the demobilized can probably invest a large part of his or her allowance in income generating, productive activities. As we have seen, the situation is very difficult for combatants whose families lived as refugees or IDP’s as well. Some ex-combatants are facing additional constraints. The need for health care for example can be a serious cost, or a bad harvest. A large part of the responsibility lies with the demobilized as well. SOPRAD administrators told us that demobilized who set up a cooperative micro project are generally successful. Success is also likely for combatants who had been thinking seriously about their project and who applied previous skills and capabilities. When the demobilized changes his or her project immediately after the reintegration assistance or when the in-kind assistance is sold immediately, the project is likely to fail.<sup>42</sup> At the level of the reintegration programme, it is our opinion that more attention should be paid to an adaptation of the professional trainings to the local livelihood opportunities. It seems as if in Ruyigi, too many young men have been trained in the same professions. In addition, income diversification should be stimulated.

According to Uvin (2007:26), there are two other variables influencing the impact of DDR. Firstly, reintegration seems to be easier in rural areas than in urban areas. Secondly, age seems to be an influencing factor. He found that older, married men are mostly better off than younger men. They can rely on previously acquired capacities, they have an extended family and their identity is not entirely defined by their membership of an armed group. In Ruyigi, 4% is younger than 20, 40,6% between 20 and 30, 19,4% between 31 and 40, 24% between 41 and 50 and 12% older than 50. Our own sample

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<sup>41</sup> Focus group talk in Gisuru, 16/11/2006, Butaganzwa, 23/11/2006 and Kinyinya, 13/12/2006.

<sup>42</sup> Interview with SOPRAD official, responsible for follow-up, 26/12/2006.

corresponds to this proportion (43,6%, 20,7%, 25,7% and 10%). Almost half of the respondents are between 20 and 30.

### **More delays**

In addition to the delays that were already in place, the World Bank decided in October 2006 that the local NGO SOPRAD, which managed the programme rather well, had to be replaced by the international NGO AFRICARE. AFRICARE is almost entirely financed from the United States. This abrupt change of partners caused even more delays. In November, AFRICARE had not opened an office yet in Ruyigi. Obviously, they did not know the region. Eventually in December 2006, AFRICARE decided they had neither the capacity nor the field knowledge to execute the programme. They suggested that SOPRAD would continue the work in partnership with AFRICARE, which would provide the funding through its contract with the national commission.<sup>43</sup> Due to these manoeuvres, demobilized had to wait in vain for more than three months. One could ask the question why the World Bank chose AFRICARE, that did not know the region, nor had any experience in reintegration activities, as a partner. Although I have no evidence to prove it, a conflict of interest seems a plausible explanation.

As we have mentioned, the National Commission signed contracts with two international NGO's: AFRICARE and PADCO, and one national: Twitizimbere. Apparently, PADCO was facing the same constraints as AFRICARE, as in February its offices in Burundi were occupied by furious former combatants (Association Internationale des Tutsi du Burundi et de la Diaspora, February 22, 2007). The latter denounced the extreme delays in the implementation of the reintegration programme and accused CNDRR officials of investing the programme money in private banks in order to make profit out of it. This is just another illustration of the impatience of the demobilized.

## **Surviving in the city and screaming for assistance: DDR in Kinshasa**

### **The national programme**

After several negotiation attempts, on April 2 2003 the *Sun City* peace agreement to the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo was finally signed. A transition period was to follow in which the main duties of the transitional government would enhance political (constitution and elections) and security (new national army and police force) issues. At the beginning of 2004, the newly established national commission drafted a national programme for demobilization and reintegration.

The national DDR- programme in the DRC is an immense project, financed by the World Bank and executed by CONADER (Commission Nationale pour la Démobilisation et la Réinsertion). At several occasions however, the National Commission has been accused of mismanagement and corruption (Amnesty International, 2006 and UN, 2006b). All

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<sup>43</sup> Personal communication with CNDRR provincial responsible.



over the country frustrated former combatants demonstrated against the slow execution of the national programme. On 13 June 2006, the UN Security Council heavily accused CONADER:

“Disgruntled ex-combatants who have not received their reintegration assistance present a further threat to security and stability in the coming months. Serious shortcomings in the management of CONADER, including the alleged misappropriation of funds, continue to hinder the effective implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme. Thousands of armed men across the country await late payments in orientation centres, where living conditions are very poor (UN, 2006b: 11).”

A strange incident occurred on 9 March this year.<sup>44</sup> At night, a fire devastated CONADER head offices in Kinshasa. Just at this moment the president of the World Bank, Paul Wolfowitz, was visiting the capital to talk, among others, about a restructuring of the DDR-programme. Wolfowitz had said he wanted to do something about the bad management, so certain informants did not believe the fire was a coincidence. Some suspect CONADER personnel of having tried to destroy documents that were not in accordance with the World Bank rules. Others interpreted the incident as a protest action of the demobilized.

At the end of 2006, the first phase of the national programme (with a total budget of \$201 million) was closed. A recent MDRP document states that a disbursement of \$72 million for the second phase of the national programme has been allocated under three express conditions (MDRP, 2007c): the government of the DRC has to reimburse the MDRP for ineligible expenses and mismanagement that occurred under the first phase of the program and amounted to approximately \$6.8 million, CONADER has to be abolished by Presidential Decree and a small and simple project implementation unit has to be formed by the Minister of Defence, with an acceptable organization chart and staff, and the presence of an approved international agency to implement procurement and financial matters. Up till July, the conditions had only been partly fulfilled, the organizational and staffing arrangements for the new implementing entity did not meet the requirements yet.<sup>45</sup> Since then, the process has been totally blocked. Very recently, a new executive organism has been established: Unité d’Exécution du Programme Nationale de Désarmement et Démobilisation (UEPNDDR) (Radio Okapi, October 10, 2007). The results of their work remain to be seen.

Security Sector Reform is evolving slowly as well. Delays are mostly ascribed to a lack of capacity and a lack of political will (ICG, 2006 and 2007). The former leaders of the

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<sup>44</sup> All the information in this paragraph comes from personal communication in Kinshasa, March 2007.

<sup>45</sup> As the MDRP document states: “We are aware of possible negative consequences to beneficiaries and security in the long-term if the PNDDR is not completed. However, lessons from the first phase of the program and the dictates of good governance require that the new implementation unit be fully accountable to stakeholders, with appropriate oversight mechanisms, transparent hiring procedures, and structures that support cost-effective and efficient implementation.” (MDRP, 2007c)

armed groups hesitate to integrate all their troops into the national army.<sup>46</sup> They want to retain control over some forces in order to be able to react quickly to a potential outbreak of violence. Besides, the army in the DRC has a historical reputation of being an insecurity- broker rather than a provider of security to the population. Massive fraud in the army hinders security sector reform as well. Army commanders would be receiving the payment of tens of thousands of *ghost soldiers*. Finally, continued insecurity and performance of militia's like Laurent Nkunda's in the East have a very negative impact on the process. Nkunda has always retained control over his forces. In fact, he has used the *mixage* process to consolidate and even extend his position (Boshoff 2007a and 2007b, Wolters 2007). In August this year, he withdrew his troops from the mixed brigades, claiming that the government was not meeting her commitments. It has been reported at several occasions that Nkunda is recruiting amongst demobilized soldiers in Eastern Congo and in Rwanda and Burundi (COJESKI 2007, UN 2007, Wolters 2007, AFP 2007).<sup>47</sup> Discussion over the security forces recently became apparent in the capital as well. The immediate cause for the March fighting in Kinshasa, was the ultimatum stated by Kabila to integrate Bemba's personal armed forces in the national army. After the refusal of Jean Pierre Bemba, who claimed lacking security guarantees, fighting broke out in the city centre. Many international observers have condemned the premature use of violence.

Our field research in Kinshasa had already showed clearly that demobilized combatants in Congo are vulnerable to re-recruitment. A general feeling of insecurity is one of the factors fuelling this. Other explanations are to be found in the deplorable economic circumstances in the capital and in the mismanagement of the national programme. As we mentioned earlier, the interviews were mainly individual, in-depth interviews. They were based on rather extensive questionnaires that still left some room for additional questions and remarks.

### **Economic reintegration**

In Kinshasa, 6028 former combatants had been reintegrated at the beginning of 2007. After leaving the orientation centre, they receive \$110 for transport, food and drinks and the first basic needs, while transport alone can cost you already more than \$200. Once they are settled in the community of their choice, the demobilized receive \$25 a month during twelve months. For most of them this was highly insufficient. Nevertheless, it is more than the salary of a soldier in the new national army, which is \$10 a month. Who chooses to demobilize, receives \$25 a month during one year plus a professional training and a reinsertion kit. This absurdist situation has of course led to misuse (ICG, 2006). A lot of people chose the demobilization option, received the benefits and rejoined the army

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<sup>46</sup> "Some military leaders hide their combatants at the moment of demobilization." Interview with two students, former combatants, at the UNIKIN university campus, 02/03/2007.

<sup>47</sup> According to a NGO-contact person in the region, rumours about recruitments are widespread. There is however no hard evidence to prove it and some stories may be exaggerated. (Personal communication, 21/08/2007)

afterwards. CONADER officials admit this is a true scenario for many, but cannot give any numbers as to how many actually rejoined the army.<sup>48</sup>

Some figures of GTZ, the executive partner that assists nearly 5000 former combatants in the capital, can give an impression of the scale of the problem. During the post-reintegration follow-up in January and February 2007, GTZ planned to visit respectively 163 and 469 demobilized, to whom they had offered a training and material.<sup>49</sup> In January, only 63 in 163 were properly installed in the community, while 80 in 163 could not be tracked down anymore. In February, 89 in 469 were installed, whereas 230 remained untraceable. This situation seemed to persist the following months.<sup>50</sup> Many of the untraceable former combatants are suspected of having rejoined the army.<sup>51</sup> Others may have moved, or may have given a false address in order to avoid follow-up. A significant part of them leaves the capital in search for more opportunities on the countryside or in small towns. In any case, the reintegration projects are not achieving their goals when half of the beneficiaries disappear after having received the training and the reinsertion kit. In terms of programme management, we can conclude that reintegration has failed in this case. However, this conclusion may not be valid if we are thinking in terms of development. To evaluate this, further research will be necessary.

For now we will give a brief overview of the reintegration paths and the actors involved in Kinshasa. In the capital, contracts were signed with eight different executive partners. Most of them were small local NGO's who were willing to assist about one hundred demobilized, whereas FAO (Food and Agricultural Organization) and GTZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit), two international organisations, signed a contract for respectively one thousand and five thousand former combatants. The latter two organizations contract out the training, so that groups do not count more than a hundred beneficiaries. The first six contracts had already been executed in March 2006. In the evaluation by CONADER, some problems of lack of resources, infrastructure and capacity were highlighted.<sup>52</sup> On the other hand, the two international NGO's have sufficient capacity, but the number of demobilized to be assisted seems to be too high for an appropriate reintegration assistance.<sup>53</sup> Out of several reintegration options, most demobilized in Kinshasa choose to learn a profession (almost 70%). Running a small business is the second popular option (11%). Each of the former combatants should receive training and a material starter's kit, but once more, there are a lot of delays. GTZ coordinator blames CONADER and the World Bank for delays in the payment of the funds.<sup>54</sup> Moreover, the demobilized are often not satisfied with the content of their reinsertion kit. A lot of beneficiaries are selling their kits to obtain cash money. One day we observed about fifteen demobilized receiving their carpenter's kit at the GTZ office in Limete. They kept complaining about the bad quality and missing parts. One angry young

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<sup>48</sup> Interviews with CONADER officials, February and March 2007.

<sup>49</sup> Unpublished document: GTZ Follow-up January- February 2007.

<sup>50</sup> Personal communication with GTZ evaluator, 21/07/2007.

<sup>51</sup> The GTZ evaluator estimates that about 30% of the demobilized they assisted rejoined the army/ armed groups afterwards.

<sup>52</sup> Unpublished documents: CONADER Rapport de Mission. Mission de suivi-évaluation March 2006.

<sup>53</sup> Interview with GTZ national coordinator, 26/02/2007, Limete.

<sup>54</sup> Idem.

man screamed: “Regarde bien, mundele, comment la CONADER nous donne la mauvaise qualité!”<sup>55</sup> Last year, the beneficiaries occupied the GTZ offices and threatened the personnel a few times. GTZ coordinator told us that the programme is too difficult, so they would rather not be involved in the second phase of the national programme.<sup>56</sup> The incidents at their office demonstrate the frustrations of the beneficiaries.

### **Social reintegration**

Many former combatants are angry; they feel abandoned and not rewarded for their efforts. Most of them are proud of having fought during the war. Consequently, they expect to be treated with respect. As a former combatant said:

“Les jeunes qui ont servi dans les forces armées, ont l’esprit militaire, ils ont le goût des armes. Avec une arme, ils se sentent respectés. Alors c’est difficile pour eux d’abandonner tout ça. Non, je crois que c’est très difficile de changer l’esprit militaire.”<sup>57</sup>

Another demobilized combatant complained:

“Nous nous sommes battus pour ce pays et nous n’avons pas reçu de rémunération. Pourquoi avons nous quitté le travail pour entrer dans le chômage?”<sup>58</sup>

A third respondent told us:

“Nous n’avons pas de moyens pour nous prendre en charge, l’état nous a donné très peu. Pour ça, beaucoup de démobilisés sont rentrés dans l’armée. On n’a pas bien réfléchi sur le programme national, on pousse les gens pour rentrer dans l’armée. Aussi, les militaires n’ont pas l’habitude de vivre dans la cité, ça fait longtemps qu’ils vivent dehors de la cité.”<sup>59</sup>

An important objective of reintegration is to convert the *military spirit* of the former combatant. For some Congolese veterans, this seems to be extremely difficult. According to some of our informants and to our observations, belonging to an armed group and

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<sup>55</sup> Personal observation, GTZ offices, 26/02/2007, Limete. “Mundele (white man/ woman), have a look at the bad quality CONADER is offering us!”

<sup>56</sup> Interview with GTZ national coordinator, 26/02/2007, Limete, Kinshasa.

<sup>57</sup> Interview with two students, former combatants, at the UNIKIN university campus, 02/03/2007. “The youngsters who fought in an armed group still have a military spirit; they have a hunger for weapons. With a weapon, they feel respected, so it is difficult for them to abandon this. No, I think it is extremely difficult to change the military spirit.”

<sup>58</sup> Interview with former combatant (a), 06/03/2007, Masina. “We have fought for this country and still, we have received no compensation. Why did we quit our jobs to be confronted with unemployment?”

<sup>59</sup> Interview with former combatant (b), 06/03/2007, Masina. “We have not enough means to make a living, the state has given us too little. That’s why a lot of demobilized rejoined the army. The policy makers did not think properly about the national programme. They are tempting the former combatants to rejoin the army. Moreover, the soldiers have been living outside the city for a long time; they are not used to it anymore.”

carrying a weapon is still considered as an important source of wealth and prestige in the DRC. For many frustrated combatants, who feel insufficiently rewarded and marginalized, the army is the most evident and plausible way out.

Frustrations among ex-combatants in Kinshasa generally target government institutions and NGO's. None of the respondents pointed out serious problems with the neighbours. Moreover, according to our interviewees, the population in the capital is not jealous of the bulk of the demobilized. Several hypotheses could be brought up to explain this. First of all there seems to be a lack of solidarity or community spirit. People just do not care about the special treatment and the assistance for former combatants. Another explanatory factor might be the fact that people in Kinshasa were not directly affected by the war. The immediate impact of violence was mainly felt in the East. Hence the population in the capital might not make an association between the *violence* combatants used and the *remuneration* they receive. Finally, there might be a difference between Kinshasa and Ruyigi in terms of communication. Information and sensitization material is available in both places, but in Ruyigi, people have less access to it. The reasons are to be found both in distribution possibilities and entitlements of the population. Most families in Ruyigi do not possess a radio and most people are illiterate. In addition, they live in distinct places that are very difficult to reach. Thus, it is not really remarkable that misunderstandings seem to occur more frequently in Ruyigi than in Kinshasa. Contrary to our observations in Ruyigi, we found that cooperatives and associations among former combatants are not very popular in Kinshasa. There is not many solidarity among demobilized who fought in different armed groups. There is still a lot of distrust and even hostility among the former warring parties in the DRC. This hostility was even stirred up by the extremely polarised election process and by the continued divisions and clashes between government and opposition.

### **Conditions for a successful reintegration**

In Kinshasa and in Ruyigi, similar factors are contributing to a successful reintegration. Has the demobilized returned to his family, to his house and property? This was the case for only three interviewed former combatants in Kinshasa. The first was a 60 year old man, demobilized from the national army. He was doing well, since he invested everything in his bar/ restaurant.<sup>60</sup> The other two were 30 year old men who owned a small shop. They said business is difficult: sometimes you win, sometimes you loose.<sup>61</sup> Starting up a micro project is indeed not easy. If the combatant can rely on previously acquired capacities or resources, the chances for success will be higher. The examples show that age might be an influencing factor as well. Anyhow, younger persons have generally less capacities and resources to rely on. Of course outcomes also depend on personal ambitions and efforts. Both a programme manager and a respondent argued that combatants who do not think seriously about the economic activity beforehand will probably be facing large difficulties afterwards.<sup>62</sup> According to most observers, the

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<sup>60</sup> Interview with former combatant, 06/03/2007, Masina.

<sup>61</sup> Interview with former combatants, 06/03/2007, Masina.

<sup>62</sup> Interview with CONADER Provincial officer, 26/2/2007, Gombe and Interview with former combatant, 6/3/2007, Masina.

frequent practice of selling the material kit immediately in order to receive cash money is pernicious. We interviewed one man who sold his kit, he was doing rather well at the moment. On the whole, we do not have enough information to confirm or refute this assertion. It is possible that some combatants who sold their kit are doing well in spite of everything. However, it is clear that people with serious projects and ambitions will succeed more easily.

## **Policy lessons and conclusion**

### **Towards better reintegration programmes**

If we look at both sections of our field research, we can conclude that the outcomes of the reintegration programmes are very much shaped by the local contexts.

In Ruyigi, the demobilization and reinsertion process can be considered more or less as a success. The population seems to be fed up with violence and does not tolerate peace spoilers. On the other hand, inequalities between population groups are engendering some tensions. The rural context has both advantages and disadvantages for the socio-economic reintegration. First of all, former combatants return to the hills where they were born, where their family and former neighbours are living. Apparently, this is stimulating a successful reintegration process. None of the demobilized complained about a frosty welcome. Nevertheless, tensions are arising as the reintegration process does not evolve as planned and the local population seems to be ignorant of the programme. While the social reintegration did not create tensions in the first place, a lot of respondents in Ruyigi are complaining about a lack of understanding and about jealousy now.

Our field research did not allow us to draw conclusion about rural-urban differences within Burundi. Uvin on the contrary has interviewed combatants in two rural provinces and in the capital (Uvin, 2007). The latter, he argued, are in the worst situation. Former combatants who come to the city immediately face major costs (idem: 16). Often they have to rent a house, commodities are more expensive in the city and it is more difficult to earn money or obtain a job. In general these people are from poor families, they have less schooling and “they lost the social networks which are so important to progress in the city” (idem: 16). As a result, the tardiness of the reinsertion assistance is very problematic to them.

In Kinshasa, the DDR programme is provoking many tensions. Demobilized are angry and impatient, they feel abandoned by the government. A whole range of false promises and missed deadlines has created anger and frustration among the combatants in Congo. The ex-combatants are assisted by subcontracted NGO's, but more than half of them disappear after having received their training and kit. Of course, it is relatively easy to *disappear* in a metropolis such as Kinshasa and demobilized are very mobile. It seems as if Uvin's conclusions for Bujumbura are valid for Kinshasa as well, in an even more extreme manner. It is true that former combatants have higher installation costs in the city. Most of the respondents were not born in Kinshasa. They ended up in a strange city,

where they had no family, no house, nothing to start from. Besides, life in Kinshasa is relatively expensive. Competition is extremely hard and it is very difficult to obtain a job. Apart from the metropolitan context, several other factors are influencing the reactions towards the reintegration programme. Most of the former combatants we spoke to were demobilized from the national army. As Joseph Kabila gained an important electoral victory, they feel as if they have contributed. As a result, they want to be rewarded. The average age of ex-combatants in Kinshasa is lower than in Ruyigi as well. As a matter of fact, cities are more attractive for younger people, whereas older men and women who had been living outside the city before, often return home. Age is probably an important influencing factor, although our research could provide no figures to prove the *exact* influence. In general the population of the capital expresses a lot of criticism towards the government. The actual political situation and the slow reconstruction of the country definitely have an influence on the reintegration efforts.

1. It is clear that the same national programme can have different effects on people and that ex-combatants within a country can react very differently to the same programme. Several factors are influencing this. Firstly, the context in which the combatants are to reintegrate has a decisive impact. What is the history of this place, the impact of the civil war, the economic opportunities, the relations between different population groups? Next, the immediate surroundings of the combatant are important: his or her family, land, house... Finally the entitlements, capacities and background of the demobilized him or herself are of major importance. The latter (entitlements and capacities) can be affected by a DDR programme, whereas the former (surroundings and context) are not covered by it. Therefore, we are convinced that DDR programmes should be coupled with other aid programmes and with broader development efforts.

2. Another main policy lesson that can be drawn from the field research is that reintegration processes should be tailored to the local context and to the needs of the local population. DDR programmes should take into consideration the local economic context. Besides, the social environment needs to be taken into account. If several groups of possible beneficiaries are present in a small community - like repatriated refugees, demobilized combatants and other people in need - NGO's and other organisations have to acknowledge this. Clear communication about the various aid projects is necessary. As we have noticed in Ruyigi, a lack of communication and information might create mistrust and frustrations. There is a need to conceive reintegration programmes from a bottom-up instead of a top-down perspective.

Nathan argues that the same is true for security sector reform: "SSR initiatives have to be grounded in the circumstances of each country" (Nathan, 2007: 13). External donors often impose their models and programmes on local actors for several reasons, he states (Nathan, 2007: 2). A first reason is the weakness of the state and civil society. Besides, the government might lack legitimacy, or local actors might lack the necessary expertise or might be too divided. Other reasons are the sense of superiority among the donors and a lack of respect for local actors, or an underestimation of the difficulties of state building and transformation. Donors sometimes require unrealistic time frames and finally, they are often pursuing their own political agendas at the expense of local interests.

3. We found that delays in the execution of the programmes seem to create tensions everywhere. It is unclear who is to blame. Are long and complicated procedures at the World Bank level responsible? Are the national commissions guilty of corruption? Do they use allocated funds for their proper needs? It is clear that the different actors are trying to blame each other, which is in any case not in the interest of the former combatants, for whom the programmes are conceived. During the period of our field research in Ruyigi, delays were caused by the switch of executive partners, demanded by the World Bank. In Kinshasa, delays seemed to be caused by bad management of the programme. Those kinds of delays should be avoided.

4. The final point we would like to make concerns the relationship between security and reintegration. First of all, we want to stress that we are not applying the broad definition of human security as formulated in the first section. In the context of this paper, we are interpreting security as a situation where violence is no longer a means to obtain wealth and prestige and where incentives for recruitment to armed groups are low. Security is not the mere absence of violence, but the absence of incentives to use violence.

Such a context of security seems to be really important for a successful reintegration in the long run. This does not mean that reintegration efforts can not start as long as there is some violence, quite the reverse. Reintegration activities must be carried out soon. The ultimate goal of reintegration is however a true reintegration of former armed actors into civil society, so that these actors will not use violence anymore and will not be recruited to fight. In order to achieve this, one must guarantee a context of security. In any case, it is clear that insecurity and violence provide a lot of opportunities for re-recruitment of demobilized combatants.

We can illustrate this by looking at the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo. In the Eastern provinces, demobilized combatants seem to be one of the main target groups for recruitment (COJESKI 2007, UN 2007, Wolters 2007, AFP 2007). Since a few months overt violent conflict has re-emerged in the East. In the capital Kinshasa however the situation is slightly different. There is no full-scale violent conflict. Yet, clashes such as the March 2007 fighting between the troops of Kabila and Bemba demonstrate the vulnerability and the potential for an outbreak of violence. Demobilized combatants have no *direct* incentives to regain an armed group, as they are not in war. Nevertheless, many of them return to the army because they see no other opportunities. Up till now, engagement in an armed group seems to be one of the best guarantees to income, prestige and a secure livelihood. Furthermore, the poor progress of the reform of the security sector has a negative impact. The national army is not collaborating with the demobilization commission to identify the persons who are willing to enter but have been demobilized before.<sup>63</sup> Secondly, the immense corruption persists, so that demobilized can easily bribe an army officer in order to be re-accepted. If we look at the present situation in the East of the DRC, we have to conclude that the SSR and DDR programmes have

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<sup>63</sup> Interview with CONADER provincial official, 26/02/2007, Gombe. CONADER keeps a database that the army could use to look for persons who are trying to enter the army while they have already received reintegration assistance. However there is no collaboration on this issue.



failed to reach their objectives. In the DRC, violence continues to be seen as a means to get access to resources, wealth and prestige. As long as this is the case, recruitment will remain easy for armed groups. Reintegration strategies and security sector reform cannot but fail in this case. First of all, there is no stable environment. Several parties are lacking the political will to integrate their troops into the national army and continue to operate like they did before the peace agreement. Secondly, economic opportunities are lacking. Since the ending of our field research in the capital of the DRC, the situation both in the capital and in the East seems to have worsened. In a recent report, military analyst Henri Boshoff characterizes the DDR process in the DRC as a “never ending story” (2007a).

### **Assessing the link between security and development**

In this final section, we will try to link the previous discussion about security and reintegration to the broader discussion about security and development. How to assess the changing relationship between security and development?

We can say that security is not a necessary, nor a sufficient condition for development. Why is it no necessary condition? It is true that there can be some kind of development or progression in a context of war or insecurity. The extended literature about new orders emerging in context of war and failed states has drawn our attention to the fact that insecurity and failed government institutions do not necessarily lead to a breakdown of society. New orders and particular kinds of governance are often emerging in those contexts. Some population groups have renegotiated their positions and are making large profit or small benefits out of the situation. However, these solutions are not really sustainable, because violence remains the first means to get access to power and wealth. This development will probably not be inclusive or balanced. Therefore we must look further and search for possibilities for long term development. Why is security no sufficient condition? Once a society is facing total security, development will not automatically follow. We have stated before that the *peace dividend* created by the conversion of military budgets into social and economic sectors, is not an automatic outcome. Whether there will be development or not, depends on several factors. To sum up, we can say that a context of security is instrumental for development. Hence security related efforts may and even must become part of development policies.

On the other hand, the promotion of development is also instrumental for the achievement of security, and for the prevention of insecurity. Development is neither a necessary, nor a sufficient condition for security, but an important contributing factor. After all, people need powerful incentives to engage in the peace economy. If these are absent, armed actors or the ones who are associated with armed groups will not disarm or engage in security sector reform. This is not only the case for the leaders of armed groups or those who benefited from the war economy, but also for the ordinary soldiers who need new jobs. Therefore, development must be balanced and inclusive. This is well illustrated by the DDR process. The success of this process depends largely on the ability of former combatants to engage in the post conflict economy. Still, it is this last phase of long term reintegration that is often neglected in DDR programmes.

In conclusion we want to argue that security-related initiatives such as SSR and DDR and development initiatives must be implemented at the same time. Because of their interdependence, the one can not precede the other. Various actors must take into consideration both security and development issues and different efforts must be coordinated.

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
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




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## Burundi: Heavy rains



The maps used do not imply the expression of any opinion on the part of the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies or National Societies concerning the legal status of a territory or of its authorities.



Map data sources  
ESRI  
GIST  
Federation

About 600 households were left homeless after their houses and 180 ha of crops were destroyed following heavy rain fall in Cibitoke and Ruyigi (around 300 households each) in Burundi which represent 2500 people. Districts of Bubanza, Muramvya, Karuzi and Kayanza also have been diversely affected





<p><b>Légende</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Chef Lieu de Province</li> <li>■ Capitale Nationale</li> <li>□ Limite de Territoire</li> <li>□ Limite de District</li> <li>□ Limite de Province</li> <li>□ Limite d'Etat</li> </ul>	<p>OCHA DRC IS SUPPORTED BY:</p> <p>Belgian Cooperation, Canada, Dutch Government, ECHO, France, Germany, Norway, SIDA, Spanish Cooperation, Switzerland, UK Government, USAID/OFDA</p> <p>Geographical Data Source: GIS Working Group</p> <p>Production Date: 13/03/2007          Produced by: OCHA DRC - HIS          Datum: WGS84</p>	<p>1:11 800 000</p>  <p>0 400 800 Kilometers</p>  <p>The boundaries and names and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations</p>
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