Review of periodical articles

Social inequality is an important topic in academia today, ever since Thomas Piketty published his book on Capital in the Twentieth Century. The latest issue of *Tijdschrift voor Sociale en Economische Geschiedenis* looks more closely at inequality in the early modern Low Countries. In the introduction, Jutta Bolt and Wouter Ryckbosch synthesize the major studies of Kuznets, Piketty, and Atkinson. (see: 'Introduction: Inequality in the Low Countries'', *Tijdschrift voor sociale en economische geschiedenis*, 14 (2017), 5-9). In 1955 Kuznets introduced his famous *inverted U hypothesis*, whereby inequality first rises and subsequently lowers with growing average (per capita) income. However, Jan-Luiten van Zanden has questioned such a straightforward causal connection, as inequality in pre-industrial Holland was also rising in times of economic boom. Moreover, it has been argued that the Kuznets curve does not hold for the evolution in income and inequality in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century. Therefore, Bolt and Ryckbosch stress the need to gather as much historical data on inequality as possible. Krisiof Dombrecht and Wouter Ryckbosch focuss on the sixteenth-century polder region – north to Bruges – to tease out a link between inequality and economic transformations (see: 'Wealth Inequality in a Time of Transition: Coastal Flanders in the Sixteenth Century", *Tijdschrift voor Sociale en Economische Geschiedenis*, 14 (2017) 63-84.) Farms became much larger and more commercialized. In the long run, social inequality soared, but it was anything but a linear process. Some episodes saw a levelling of the income distribution. The trend can be explained by looking at the changing nature of wealth. From the late fifteenth century onwards, the number of households with real estate fell, while the commons were increasingly subdivided and sold to a small upper-curst of wealthy farmers, noble, clerical or urban landlords.

The causal relationship between economic growth and inequality is also questioned in Guido Alfani's and Francesco Ammanati's latest article ('Long-term trends in economic inequality: the case of the Florentine state, c. 1300–1800', *Economic History Review*, 70 (2017), 1072–1102). In Tuscany, social inequality decreased after the Black Death (1348-'49), but it rose steadily during the early modern period. A long-term analysis is also used in the article of Ulrich Pfister, who looks at *big data* on prices and wages to sketch the evolution of real wages in Germany on the long run. (see: 'The timing and pattern of real wage divergence in pre-industrial Europe: evidence from Germany, c. 1500-1800', *Economic History Review*, 70 (2017) 701-729.). In occurs, that the divergence happened in two stages. In the first stage, around mid-seventeenth century, the mercantile and financial rim of the North Sea moved away from its hinterland, while in the second stage, in the early eighteenth century, Germany took a 'third way' between the booming economy of (southern) England and the stasis of Italian states. However, the evolution of commodity prices and – to a certain extent – real wages ran strikingly parallel in these regions in spite of their limited market integration.

Disasters, vulnerability, and resilience remain important subjects in urban history. Due to the survival of a unique source – the detailed *journal of patients* of the Chester Infirmary – and a masterly combination with John Haygarth's census records, Simon Szreter has been able to produce detailed estimates of the incidence of syphilis in Chester and its rural surroundings in the late eighteenth century. These figures were compared with estimates on venereal diseases from 1911-'12. ('Treatment rates for the pox in early modern England: a comparative estimate of the prevalence of syphilis in the city of Chester and its rural vicinity in the 1770s', *Continuity and Change*, 32 (2017), 183-223). Due to the peculiar symptoms, contemporaries labelled this phase of the disease as the pox. Hence, it was possible to produce age-specific estimates of the extent to which adults of each sex had been treated for the pox, by the age of 35. Apparently, a staggering 8% of the population of Chester had been infected with syphilis before their 35th birthday, against barely 1% for its rural surroundings.

Risk also looms large in Jeroen Puttevils and Marc Deloof's latest article, which analyses the extremely rare account books of an Antwerp marine insurance broker (see 'Marketing and pricing risk in marine insurance in sixteenth-century Antwerp', *The Journal of Economic History*, 77 (2017), 796-

837). In their impressive case-study, they sketch the well-functioning insurance market in (mid-)sixteenth century Antwerp which, both in scale and scope, could easily compete with other insurance hubs such as Venice, Genoa, and Burgos. Key features were the openness of the market and the large mercantile liberties, which enabled, even small-scale traders, to turn to the insurance market, where occasional and more permanent subcontractors were active. The premium rates charged were largely determined by the underlying risk factors, which seems to hint at the fact that insurance takers relied on sensible risk management strategies.

In times of Syrian boat refugees, it comes as no surprise, that historical research is also heavily geared towards migration, integration, and regulation in the past. In *Comment être vénitien. Identification des immigrants et « droits d'habiter » à Venise au XVIe siècle* (Revue d'Histoire Moderne & Contemporaine, 64 (2017) 69-92) Rosa Salzberg and Claire Judde de Larivière examine how Venetian migration policy changed in the sixteenth century, when the economic and political power of the republic waned. First of all, there was a cry for more state control and regulation. For a long time, the city administration had simply relied on the *cadastre oral* – or the lore in neighbourhoods, where details on the place of origin, occupation, family situation, and reputation were meticulously – yet orally – registered – to identify the *forestieri* (foreigners). Inclusion and integration was primarily negotiated at the local level of neighbourhoods, streets, and workshops. In the early sixteenth century, the Venetian state came up with a new set of rules to monitor the influx of migrants more closely. Keepers of *osterie* (inns) and *albergarie* (lodging houses) were forced to keep detailed registers of their customers. These lists had to be handed in at the *Giustizia Nuova*. In 1545 the state tightened its grip even more by introducing the *bolletino*. Upon arrival, every foreigner had to fill in a form, regardless of the length of stay, and to submit it at the proper officials. In the meantime, the concept of *forestieri* was changing radically. Even though city administrations used the term to label anyone from outside Venice, the *popolani* only used it for itinerant and unknown strangers. More settled migrants were tagged with their place of origin. In the sixteenth century, the fault line between Venetians and *forestieri* became clearer, as the government – spurred by religious motivations – forced some minorities to live within the confines of several enclaves such as the *Foncaco dei Tedeshi* (Germans), the *Ghetto* (Jews) and the *Fondaco dei Turchi* (Muslims), where they could be monitored more efficiently.

Less successful were the efforts of the Ottoman rulers to keep the immigration of the *bekâr* – literally bachelors – at bay. In *Invisible City: Istanbul's Migrants and the Politics of Space* (Eighteenth-Century Studies, 50 (2017) 173-193.) Shirine Hamadeh describes how Istanbul was beleaguered by an army of thousands of male migrant workers in the eighteenth century, who swelled the ranks of the casual labourers, odd-jobbers, pedlars, and beggars. Especially housing was a matter of concern, as the *bekâr odalari* (bachelor lodging houses) not only mushroomed around commercial areas and the harbour, where their tenants were typically employed, but also thrived in the *malhalle* (the residential quarters), where they were a thorn in the flesh of more settled citizens. Frequent purges and campaigns, whereby *bekâr odalari* were torn down or set ablaze by the government, were to no avail, as the shacks, hovels, and barracks were eventually rebuilt. Hamadeh claims that the resilience of these migrant communities was highly dependent on their successful integration in local communities. Newcomers turned to their *odabasi* (innkeeper), *hanci* (headmaster) or employer for support, while these locals saw immigrants as a highly lucrative source of income. Connections with *Jannisaries* and other army units were also vital, as they provided all sorts of opportunities for work in construction, transport, coffee houses, and other sectors, that were beyond control of the guilds. On the other hand, the *bekâr* provided the sheer manpower – not to say cannon fodder – when Janissaries unleashed their umpteenth revolt against the sultan. Due to these power-wielding patrons, the policy of the Ottoman

administration to remove the *bekârs* from even the most residential quarters of Istanbul were ultimately doomed.

In his latest article, Peter King questions the widely held assumption that migrants were singled out and treated more harshly by early modern police forces and judges (see 'Immigrant Communities, the Police, and the Courts in Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth-Century London', in: *Crime, Histoire & Sociétés*, 20 (2016) 1-30). In his article, King masterly combines a qualitative *micro-storia* of one Old Bailey homicide case from 1799 with a more serial analysis of 12,000 entries from the *Newgate Calendars*. From the evidence on accusations, verdicts, and punishments, it occurs that migrant communities were rarely if ever discriminated by the judges and jurors of the Old Bailey. Foreign suspects – from Europe and other parts of the worlds, but also from Wales, Scotland, and Ireland – were not necessarily treated more harshly than Londoners born and bred. Even more surprisingly, the same holds true for Jews and black people. However, there was one exception to the rule: Irish migrants had a much larger chance to be indicted for murders, assault and battery, riot, rape, and other violent crimes than other offenders. King argues that these differences hint at some deeply entrenched prejudices against the Irish, which echoed the *communis opinio* that they were more prone to violence. It remains a moot question, whether these discriminatory trials were the result of long-held prejudices or rather the outcome of recent political turmoil and – more especially – the United Irishmen Rebellion of 1798. It is beyond doubt, however, that the criminal justice system and its main officials – police, magistrates, and judges – harboured some hard-nosed prejudices against Irish immigrants, even if discrimination of other ethnic groups was conspicuously absent.

Ever since Keith Luria launched his famous hypothesis, the way in which various confessional groups, more or less, peacefully coexisted in early modern cities has been vehemently debated. In *Religious conflict and civic identity: battles over the sacred landscape of Montpellier* (in: *Past & Present*, 237 (2017) 53-91) Barbara Diefendorf shatters the rosy picture of Catholics and Huguenots living together in perfect harmony in Montpellier. Frequent outbursts of religious violence evidence that the oecumenical coexistence was but a thin veneer, while, underneath, the religious tensions festered on. Taking a spatial turn, Diefendorf maps the recurring conflicts, whereby space was symbolically marked as sacred by the consecration of churches, processions, and other powerful rituals, but also fiercely contested through bouts of iconoclasm. Sacred space – both for Catholics and Protestants – served as a constant and bitter reminder of old enmities, which, even in times of peaceful coexistence, sparked off mutual antagonism. Militant Huguenots razed the catholic churches and monasteries when they came to power after the Edict of Nantes (1598), turned them in to protestant temples, sabotaged – or even banned – processions and removed the *Magestat antiqua* (Black Madonna) from the city seal. When royal power was restored after 1622, Catholics reclaimed their sacred space by organizing processions, building new churches, erecting crosses and – ultimately – by pulling down the protestant *Grand Temple* in 1682.

Religious coexistence – or rather the sheer lack of it – is also an issue in the latest article of Max Deardorff (see 'The Ties that Bind: Intermarriage between Moriscos and Old Christians in Early Modern Spain, 1526-1614", in: *Journal of Family History*, 42 (2017) 250-270.), who analyses marriages between so-called Old and New Christians. The latter – also tagged as *conversos, Moriscos* or *nuevos convertidos de moros* in legal terms – were former Muslims, who had been converted to Catholicism in the slipstream of the conquest of the Nasrid Kingdom of Granada in 1492. In the sixteenth century, the Spanish state still looked askance at these *conversos*, as they stuck to their old traditions, spoke Arabic, wore 'Moorish' styles of clothing, honoured culinary taboos, or remained faithful to their – ostensibly Islamic rituals. These crypto-Muslims were expelled in recurrent purges and pogroms, leading to the final ethnical cleansing in 1609-'14, when hundreds of thousands of *Moricos* were

banished from Spain. Marriage with an Old Christian was, as Deardorff proposes, a crucial argument to avert expulsion, as the Spanish government saw mixed weddings as an important tool to integrate former Muslim minorities. Hence, petitions of *conversos*, who stood in fear of expulsion, focussed on their Christian lifestyle, on their active role in fighting the Muslim rebellion of the *Alpujarres* (1568-1570), and, above all, on their marriage with faithful Old Christians. In most cases, the last argument proved decisive to avert banishment. Deardorff also points at some fascinating gender differences. Whereas female *conversos*, who were married to an Old Christian husband, did not need extra arguments, *Moriscos*, wedded to an Old Christian wife, had to provide additional proof of their Christian life. These differences echo deeply entrenched ideas about patriarchal hierarchy.

Emily Michelson looks more closely at the coexistence between Catholics and Jews in early modern Rome through the lens of conversionary preaching. (see 'Conversionary preaching and the Jews in Early Modern Rome', in: *Past & Present*, 235 (2017) 68-104). Every Saturday, Roman Jews were processed from the ghetto to the *Santissima Trinità dei Pellegrini* (Confraternity of the Most Holy Trinity), where they were treated to an endless sermon. Through a nitpicking analysis of the Scripture, Talmud, Kaballah, and other canonical texts, the prelate tried to convince his audience that the Jewish interpretation was false and faulty. Michelson argues, however, that Jews were not the only – nor the most important – audience, as these sermons always attracted a crowd of Christian listeners. Therefore, conversion of the lost Hebrew sheep was not the principal aim; it was much more important to convince one's own flock of the regained vigour and dynamism of the Counter Reformation Church. In this way, conversionary preaching was part of a much wider programme of sermons, processions, pilgrimages, and other devotions, which had to demonstrate the unmistakable health and glory of the Baroque church. As they were the oldest opponents, Jews were a rhetorically more rewarding target than Muslims, Protestants, and other foes.

Thanks to the *Bodily Turn*, urban historians have increasingly turned their attention to the more physical dimensions of everyday life in early modern Europe. In *'Facing identity' in a 'Faceless' Society: Physiognomy, Facial Appearances, and Identity Perception in Eighteenth-Century London* (in: Cultural and Social History, 14 (2017) 137-153) Kathryn Woods details the ups-and-downs of physiognomic theory and practice in early modern London. Even though the idea, that facial expressions and features – a big nose, bright eyes, heavy eyebrows – were a telltale for one's character, was widespread in the seventeenth century, it was challenged by the new ideal of *politeness*, which urged people to look beyond outward appearances and looks. Yet, in the late eighteenth century, physiognomy was back again, as a flood of treatise and observations evidence. Woods explains this evolution by referring to some sweeping societal changes. Urbanization – London's population had by 1750 risen to a staggering 750,000 – created the uneasy feeling on an anonymous and "faceless' mob; an anxiety which was also fuelled by fading social boundaries. In this climate, physiognomy gave something to grasp hold on. The *Bodily Turn* is also tangible in Matthew McCormack's newest article on *Boots, material culture and Georgian Masculinities* (in: *Social History*, 42 (2017) 461-479). Literally, as McCormack fingered several specimen to say something about the changing experience and feel of wearing boots in early modern Britain. With this *material culture* approach, he questions the idea that men's footwear was – in stark contrast with women's decorative, flimsy, and impractical shoes – predominantly plain, sturdy, and functional. In reality, boots evolved from the stiff, bulky and chafing jackboots, which were popular in the early eighteenth century, to the much more supple, soft and elegant Wellington in the early nineteenth century. McCormack's claim that boots were much more than functional gear is also endorsed by eighteenth-century owner's obsession for polishing, with a clear preference for shiny, black shoe-polish. Boots also emphasized masculinity by their military association, but also by their physical effect on the body, which drew the eye to the shape of the man's leg and his crutch.

Bodily features also loom large in the *Commentationes* of Johannes Rütiner, a well-heeled citizen, who recorded all sorts of obscene humour in sixteenth-century Switzerland. Carla Roth draws on this unique manuscript to provide fresh perspective in the ongoing debate about laughter in early modern Europe. (see: "Obscene Humour, Gender, and Sociability in Sixteenth-Century St. Gallen", in: *Past & Present*, 234 (2017) First of all, it becomes clear that sexual and scatological jokes were all but a guilty pleasure, which had to be read in secret and recited in hush voices. Rütiner frequently heard these obscene quips in inns and taverns, but was also keen to repeat them to pepper the conversation with his intellectual, humanist friends. Sexual and scatological jests, whereby sperm, faeces, and urine were standard ingredients, even served as a sort of "admission ticket" to these upper-crust circles. Moreover, the *Commentationes* reveal how malleable and adaptable early modern humour actually was. *Facetiae* and other printed collections may have served as an inspiration for humour, but witted *homo ioci plenus* rarely if ever stuck to this material, but masterly tailored their jokes to their audience and the circumstances. Last but not least, Roth challenges the widely held idea that most jokes had a misogynous baseline. In fact, most obscene humour focussed on men who were unable to control their own bodily functions, leading to unforeseen eruptions of sperm, excrements, and other fluids. By way of inversion, these jokes substantiated masculinity.

Time awareness in early modern cities has witnessed a revived interest lately. In her latest article, Anne Murphy takes a closer look at the business archives of the Bank of England – and, more particularly, at the reports of the *Committee of Inspection* – to assess the importance of the clock in the everyday operational management of the bank. ("Clock-Watching: Work and Working Time at the Late Eighteenth-Century Bank of England", in: *Past & Present* (2017) It occurs, that clocks were extremely important, as virtually every aspect of the bank's corporate culture was imbued by a strong horological awareness. Clerks were kept in line by strict working hours and fines for lateness. They worked from nine till five, six days in a week. Public holidays were scarce, while Saint-Monday [Monday was, by tradition, part of the weekend] was never observed. Moreover, the clerk's answers to the committee suggest, that they frequently worked against the clock and were familiar with time pressure. Most of them also had a side-job. After five, they worked as brokers, speculators or merchants to maximize their income, which seems to hint at de Vries' *industrious revolution*. Murphy not only challenges Thompson's black-and-white opposition between pre-industrial and industrial time awareness with her analysis of the Bank's inspection reports, but also uncovers some interesting social differences. Whereas the clerks worked their guts out, the more senior staff was more laidback. They slipped away shortly after three, which seems to suggest that they did prefer more leisure time above a larger pay-check.

In recent years, early modern apprenticeship and learning on the job has drawn a revived interest. In his latest article, Ruben Schalk looks at 400 orphan apprentices from Dutch cities. Despite their high degree of mobility, these orphans were seen as a cheap labour force by the guilds ('From orphan to artisan: apprenticeship careers and contract enforcement in The Netherlands before and after the guild abolition', *Economic History Review*, 70 (2017), 730–757'). Masters ceaselessly recruited new apprentices, while the need to stipulate the employment in a contract weakened. In Leiden, most of these orphans ended up in the textile industry, where guild-regulation was low or non-existent. They were mainly recruited for low-skilled labour and slipped away as soon as an apprenticeship in a guild-controlled craft opened up. Flexibility in apprenticeship in other parts of Europe is also stressed in the latest contribution of Ruben Schalk, Patrick Wallis, Clare Crowston, and Claire Lemercier ('Failure or flexibility? Apprenticeship training in premodern Europe', *Journal of Interdisciplinary history*, 48 (2017) 131-158). They emphasize the volatility of work: youths – including apprentices and journeymen – came and went, roved from one place to another, moved from master to master, and – most likely – frequently switched occupations. Schalk *et alii* draw a compelling analysis of the individual carreers of

these youths from their initial apprenticeship to the final settlement as a master in Amsterdam, Leiden, Lyon or Shrewsbury by a meticulous comparison between the initial articles of apprenticeship and the final mastership. Instability was the buzzword. Although cities witnessed an enormous efflux of apprentices, none of the guilds attempted to enforce the completion of the contracts, which hints at the fact, that masters and apprentices were well aware of the fact that their labour contract could come to an untimely end.

Labour is also an issue in *Gender, life cycle, and family 'strategies' among the poor: the Barcelona workhouse, 1762-1805* (in: Economic History Review, 70 (2017) 810-836) of Montserrat Carbonell-Esteller and Julie Marfany, who question the link between poor relief and family strategies. Traditionally, historians separate North-Western Europe, where nuclear families thrived, from Mediterranean and Eastern Europe, where extended families prevailed. It is often assumed, that family ties were much stronger in the latter. Marfany and Carbonell use the records of the Barcelona workhouse to provide chapter-and-verse on the origins, ages, gender, and marital status of the inmates. Furthermore, their analysis looks closely at the family ties of these paupers. Apparently, the workhouse was overwhelmingly populated by young, male singles from outside Barcelona. Yet, the institution was also used as a sort of (urban) substitute for (rural) kin by migrant families, who dealt with short-term crises. Marfany and Carbonell also stress the importance of training on the job offered in the workhouse, which enabled youths to enter the urban labour market.

Ever since Oscar Gelderblom published his book *Cities of Commerce*, the discussion on the importance of institutions to facilitate international trade rages through economic history. In the introduction of the special issue on the topic in *Continuity & Change*, Alain Wijffels introduces the new concept of *conflict management* – as opposed to *conflict resolution* – as an analytical tool to study commercial clashes of interest through the lens of legal institutions. ('Introduction: Commercial quarrels – and how (not) to handle them', *Continuity and Change*, 32 (2017), 1-9). New research suggest, that the legal power of urban governments to create the necessary conditions for international trade were rather limited. Focusing on Portuguese merchants in England, Normandy and Flanders, Flávio Miranda examines potential differences in laws, rules and institutions in these different regions. (see 'Conflict management in western Europe: the case of the Portuguese merchants in England, Flanders and Normandy, 1250–1500', *Continuity and Change*, 32 (2017), 11-36). Drawing on hundreds of records – ranging from safe-conducts and petitions to prosecutions – Miranda's research rather emphasizes the role of diplomacy in conflict management and the lasting importance of privileges.

Equally influenced by the *New Institutional Economics*, Justyna Wubs-Mrozewicz claims that the medieval and early modern Hanseatic Ligue was much more than an organizational structure; it developed all sorts of procedures for mediation and arbitration between disputing parties. (see 'The late medieval and early modern Hanse as an institution of conflict management', *Continuity and Change*, 32 (2017), 59-84). The Hanse created added value to the membership of individual traders and cities by serving as an effective institution for conflict management, which transcended the patchwork of political and judicial backgrounds. Mika Kallioinen also provides an interesting case-study on conflict management and legal institutions by examining the correspondence between Finish and foreign city councils in the Late Middle Ages and early modern period. ('Inter-communal institutions in medieval trade', *Economic History Review*, 70 (2017), 1131–1152). Its focus on a region outside the well-studied core of Western-Europe provides fresh perspective. Kallioinen takes a closer look on an institution which prevailed in the Baltic area and could best be described as an interurban tool for conciliations. When a dispute arose, mediation rather took place between the city councils than between individual merchants.