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The Worldmaker's *Umwelt*: The Cognitive Space between a Writer's Library and the Publishing House¹

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In his essay “Re-Minding Modernism” (2011) David Herman suggests that we regard “storyworlds” as a staging ground for “procedures of *Umwelt* construction” and modernist writers as “*Umwelt* researchers in [Jakob] von Uexküll’s sense – explorers of the lived, phenomenal worlds that emerge from, or are enacted through, the interplay between intelligent agents and their cultural as well as material circumstances.”² The biologist Jakob von Uexküll, a contemporary of Joyce’s, coined the term “*Umwelt*”³ to denote an organism’s model of the world, consisting of all the meaningful aspects of the world for that particular organism. Since each organism has a unique history, each organism has a different *Umwelt*, which constantly changes as the organism interacts with the world. This interaction is a feedback loop or what Uexküll called a “functional circle,” implying that every organism *enacts* the world in which it exists.⁴ In cognitive philosophy, an enactive approach to the mind focuses on “how the manipulation of environmental vehicles constitutes cognitive processes.”⁵

This essay proposes to add a genetic dimension to the narratological suggestion to consider modernist authors as *Umwelt* researchers and their inquiries into the human mind (by means of e.g. stream-of-consciousness techniques) as inquiries into the so-called “extended” or “extensive” mind (see below for a discussion of these concepts). Whereas a narrative analysis tends to focus on the synchronic structure of a literary text and its reception, genetic criticism focuses on its

¹ The research for this article was made possible with the support of the European Research Council (under the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) / ERC grant agreement n° 313609) and the University of Antwerp (TOP BOF project ‘Literature and the Extended Mind: A Reassessment of Modernism’).

² David Herman, “Re-Minding Modernism,” in David Herman (ed.) *The Emergence of Mind: Representations of Consciousness in Narrative Discourse in English*, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2011, pp. 243-271; esp. 266.

³ Jakob von Uexküll applied the term *Umwelt* to such organisms as the tick, which is his first example in *Streifzüge durch die Umwelten von Tieren und Menschen: Ein Bilderbuch unsichtbarer Welten*, Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1956, p. 3.

⁴ John Stewart, “Foundational Issues in Enaction as a Paradigm for Cognitive Science,” in John Stewart, Olivier Gapenne and Ezequiel A. Di Paolo (eds), *Enaction: Toward a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011, pp. 1-32; esp. 3.

⁵ Richard Menary, “Introduction,” in Menary Richard, *The Extended Mind*, Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press, 2010, pp. 1-25; esp. 21.

diachronic structure,⁶ including the complete “genetic dossier”⁷ of notes and multiple drafts. If storyworlds are a staging ground for procedures of *Umwelt* construction, as David Herman suggests, these storyworlds are, in their turn, constructions, made according to specific composition methods or “ways of worldmaking,” as they were called by Nelson Goodman.⁸ Daniel Ferrer refers to this process of “worldmaking” from a genetic perspective, notably to Goodman’s keen observation that de-composition is just as crucial as composition in creative processes.⁹ The dialectic of composition and de-composition can be found in every genetic dossier that consists of multiple drafts. Combining this literary “worldmaking” with Uexküll’s notion of *Umwelt*, it is evident that modernist writers can only be *Umwelt* researchers (in Herman’s sense) because they have an *Umwelt* themselves. And to some degree, aspects of this historical *Umwelt* can be reconstructed by means of genetic research. The enactive cognition that characterizes creative processes is not just the result of the interaction between an intelligent agent (Joyce) and the materiality of the page (the manuscript). It is also the result of the interaction with other elements in his environment, such as newspapers and books, his personal library, as well as publishing houses and critics.¹⁰ To analyse this enactive genesis, the essay’s first case study is Joyce’s use of Wyndham Lewis’s criticism of behaviorism and of ‘telling from the inside’ in *The Art of Being Ruled*.

The well-known controversy between Lewis (interested in the notion of space) and Joyce (who, according to Lewis, was too preoccupied with the notion of time) is reflected in the so-called “dime-cash” problem (*FW* 149.11-150.14), considered from the point of view of a “spatialist.” In the first draft, the “dime” was originally spelled “time”: “my disposals of the same ~~time~~^{dime}-cash problem elsewhere, *naturalistically*, of course, from the blinkpoint of a spatialist”.¹¹ In *The Art of Being Ruled* (1926), the “spatialist” Wyndham Lewis had criticized the “considerable degree of *naturalism*

⁶ Pierre-Marc de Biasi, “Toward a Science of Literature: Manuscript Analysis and the Genesis of the Work,” in Jed Deppman, Daniel Ferrer, Michael Groden (eds), *Genetic Criticism: Texts and Avant-textes*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004, pp. 36-68; esp. 41.

⁷ Almuth Grésillon, *Éléments de critique génétique: Lire les manuscrits modernes*, Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1994, p. 107.

⁸ Nelson Goodman, *Ways of Worldmaking*, Hassocks, UK: The Harvester Press, 1978.

⁹ Daniel Ferrer, *Logiques du brouillon: Modèles pour un critique génétique*, Paris: Seuil, 2011, p. 180.

¹⁰ A famous case of the interaction between an intelligent agent and the criticism in his environment is the publication history of Darwin’s *On the Origin of Species*. During Darwin’s lifetime six editions came out and each of them is quite different because Darwin adjusted the text in response to all the criticism, resulting in a complex epigenesis (a genesis that continues after the first publication).

¹¹ James Joyce, *A First-Draft Version of ‘Finnegans Wake’*, edited by David Hayman, Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1963, p. 99; emphasis added.

aimed at” in *Ulysses*, suggesting a correspondence between Leopold Bloom’s stream of consciousness and the conversation of Mr. Jingle in Charles Dickens’s *The Pickwick Papers*. His conclusion was that Joyce made extensive use of “a fashionable naturalist device – that usually described as ‘presenting the character from the inside’.”¹²

This description corresponds with what Erich von Kahler has famously called “the inward turn of narrative” in Modernism.¹³ According to the enactivist paradigm, such an inside-versus-outside image is an inexact metaphor, building on an obsolete Cartesian body/mind split, which to some extent is also recognizable in Raymonde Debray Genette’s distinction between endogenesis and exogenesis.¹⁴ “Endogenesis” is everything that belongs to the so-called inside of the creative process, whereas “exogenesis” stands for the external source texts he or she makes use of during the writing process. Genetic criticism has always recognized that the border between endo- and exogenesis is blurred; it is impossible to determine exactly where the one ends and where the other begins. But that recalls the opening question of Andy Clark and David J. Chalmers’s essay “The Extended Mind”: “Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin?”¹⁵ – suggesting that the inside/outside, endo/exo metaphor may still be a remnant of our age-old model of the mind, based on Descartes. Daniel C. Dennett has called this model the “Cartesian theater,” in which a tiny homunculus observes and interprets all the incoming sensory data (as if they were projected onto a screen), makes decisions and sends out commands to the limbs. The problem with the model is that the homunculus would also need a consciousness to perform these actions, and this consciousness would have to contain yet another homunculus, creating an infinite Chinese-boxes effect. Dennett’s alternative, his so-called “Multiple Drafts Model” of consciousness, roughly corresponds with the multiple versions that typically characterize the category of endogenesis. It may therefore be useful to examine this category from a post-Cartesian perspective.

¹² Wyndham Lewis, *The Art of Being Ruled*, edited by Reed Way Dasenbrock, Santa Rosa: Black Sparrow Press, 1989 [1926], p. 346.

¹³ Erich von Kahler, *The Inward Turn of Narrative*, translated by Richard and Clara Winston, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973. Cf. Erich von Kahler, “Die Verinnerlichung des Erzählens,” *Die Neue Rundschau* 68: 501-546; 70: 1-54, 177-220 (1957-59).

¹⁴ Raymonde Debray Genette, “Généétique et poétique: le cas Flaubert,” in *Essais de critique génétique*, Paris: Flammarion, 1979, 21-67.

¹⁵ Andy Clark and David J. Chalmers, “The Extended Mind,” *Analysis* 58 (1998): 10-23.

1. Endogenesis

Dennett compares the workings of the conscious mind to a process of editorial revision: “These editorial processes occur over large fractions of a second, during which time various additions, incorporations, emendations, and overwritings of content can occur, in various orders.”¹⁶ Observations or feature discriminations are spatially and temporally distributed over various specialized parts of the brain and combine into narrative sequences that are subject to continuous editing. The result is that “at any point in time there are multiple ‘drafts’ of narrative fragments at various stages of editing in various places in the brain” and there is “no single narrative that counts as the canonical version” (113). As Tim Conley notes, Dennett designates his Multiple Drafts Model as a “Joycean machine in our brains,”¹⁷ which is not only predicated on Joyce’s stream-of-consciousness technique, but is also akin to “textual-genetic methods of re-reading Joyce” and especially reading *Finnegans Wake*:

Trying “to isolate i from my multiple Mes” (*FW* 410.12) turns out to be just the problem the *Wake* presents it as: Subjectivity is an effort of separation of sensations and meanings. That is, consciousness is not so much a quality as a process, not a given but a work in progress.¹⁸

While I fully agree with this analysis, I suggest two nuances might be added to Dennett’s Multiple Drafts Model in connection with genetic Joyce studies:

First, this model is not new. In November 1929, Benjamin Crémieux¹⁹ wrote a review of “Work in Progress,” arguing that Joyce’s purpose of distorting words was to escape from the abstract symbols they represented and to bring them closer to cognition. Joyce allowed the words “to reproduce the hesitations, the errors, *the drafts*

¹⁶ Daniel C. Dennett, *Consciousness Explained*, London: Penguin, 1991, p. 112.

¹⁷ Daniel C. Dennett, *Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness*, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006, p. 171-2.

¹⁸ Tim Conley, “‘Cog it out’: Joyce on the Brain,” *Joyce Studies Annual* 2014, pp. 25-41; esp. 34-5; 32.

¹⁹ “Une revue anglo-américaine, mais qui paraît à Paris, *Transition*, vient de proclamer la liberté totale et absolue du vocabulaire. [...] Comment juger l’initiative des collaborateurs de *Transition*? Faut-il se mettre en colère, éclater de rire ou prendre ces déclarations au sérieux, les discuter? [...] cet emploi de mots déformés ou inventés oblige à reprendre pleine conscience que la littérature est faite avec des mots, qu’elle est une matière verbale et que les mots ont une existence, ne sont pas une simple vitre incolore à travers laquelle on peut voir la pensée” (UBC 33: 1018; University at Buffalo, James Joyce Collection (Poetry Collection), uncatalogued newspaper clippings, preserved in brown envelopes; the abbreviation UBC is followed by the number of the envelope and the handwritten number in red crayon on the clipping).

of cognition” (“de leur permettre de reproduire les hésitations, les erreurs, *les ébauches de la pensée*”; emphasis added).²⁰ Apart from echoing Beckett’s famous observation that the words in “Work in Progress” enacted what they were about (see below), Crémieux also presaged Dennett’s metaphor of the Multiple Drafts Model of cognition.

Secondly, Dennett uses this metaphor to explain consciousness, but in our profession, this is not just a metaphor: these multiple drafts are the real stuff. This material reality externalizes Dennett’s model, or rather: opens it up, for the inside/outside metaphor – which is still somehow predicated on the Cartesian dualism – is quite persistent in literature on cognitive philosophy and the workings of the mind. When Dennett compares his model of the mind to a “Joycean machine *in our brains*,” he confines the “Joycean machine” to the inside of the skull. If his Multiple Drafts Model can be compared to the research object of genetic criticism, it is important to realize that the manuscripts are not just a *record* of, but *part* of, the author’s cognitive process. This awareness brings the model closer to the enactivist paradigm in cognitive sciences, which has affinities with the extended mind theory. According to this theory, the mind is not limited to the brain, inside the skull; the mind is an interaction between an intelligent agent and his or her physical and cultural environment. Radical enactivists argue that the notion of the “extended mind” is still too much inspired by the Cartesian inside/outside split; it still implies an “inside” that is extended only if necessary. Instead, enactivism suggests the term “*extensive* mind” to argue that the mind is constituted in an even-handed way by both the brain and the environment; the brain’s contributions are not prioritized over those of the environment.²¹

To examine the affinities between the metaphorical Multiple Drafts Model and the multiple drafts of Joyce’s “Work in Progress,” the opening lines of *Anna Livia Plurabelle* may serve as a suitable starting point. In his book on the making of *Anna Livia Plurabelle*, Fred Higginson described what is enjoyable about *Finnegans Wake*

²⁰ “Ce que recherche l’auteur d’*Ulysses*, en créant ou en déformant les mots, c’est d’échapper au symbole abstrait qu’ils représentent, c’est de les rapprocher de la pensée, de leur permettre de reproduire les hésitations, les erreurs, les ébauches de la pensée, de reproduire le courant ininterrompu de la pensée” (UBC 33: 1018).

²¹ Daniel D. Hutto and Erik Myin, *Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without Content*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2013, p. 137.

as “the pleasure of watching the mind at work.”²² Higginson was one of the first to analyse the *Wake* as a “Work in Progress,” taking its subsequent versions into account, watching the mind at work and choosing *Anna Livia Plurabelle* as his subject. Evidently, the metaphor of the stream of consciousness imposes itself. The text of *Anna Livia Plurabelle* can be seen in terms of enactment, according to Samuel Beckett’s principle that “form *is* content, content *is* form” in Joyce’s work and that “His writing is not *about* something, *it is that something itself*”²³: Whereas the evocations of the mind in *Ulysses* were descriptions of a character’s thought process with techniques such as interior monologue and stream of consciousness, “Work in Progress” *is* that process itself. It performs imagination, it enacts the workings of the mind. This performative rendition of the notion of “stream of consciousness” adds a cognitive dimension to what A. Walton Litz called Joyce’s “*rendering* [rather than description] of the river.”²⁴

This metaphor of the river also recurs in Daniel C. Dennett’s view on consciousness. He sees the “self” in terms of “narrative selfhood,” consisting of what he calls “streams of narrative”:

These streams of narrative issue forth *as if* from a single source – not just in the obvious physical sense of flowing from just one mouth, or one pencil or pen, but in a more subtle sense: their effect on any audience is to encourage them to (try to) posit a unified agent whose words they are, about whom they are: in short, to posit a *center of narrative gravity*. (418; original emphasis)

This passage could serve as a fairly accurate description of what happens in the opening of *Anna Livia Plurabelle*, “O tell me all”: the positing of a center of narrative gravity; the presentation of streams of narrative issuing forth as if from a single source.

Dennett, however, mixes this river metaphor with another powerful metaphor: that of the web. He suggests that “our fundamental tactic of self-protection, self-

²² Fred H. Higginson, *Anna Livia Plurabelle: The Making of a Chapter*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1960, p. 14.

²³ Samuel Beckett, “Dante...Bruno.Vico..Joyce,” in *Our Exagmination Round His Factification for Incamination of Work in Progress*. Norfolk, Connecticut: New Directions, 1972 [1929], p. 14 (original emphasis).

²⁴ A. Walton Litz, *The Art of James Joyce: Method and Design in Ulysses and Finnegans Wake*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964, p. 113.

control, and self-definition is not spinning webs or building dams, but telling stories, and more particularly concocting and controlling the story we tell others – and ourselves – about who we are. [...] Our tales are spun, but for the most part we don't spin them; they spin us. Our human consciousness, and our narrative selfhood, is their product, not their source.” (418) But Dennett also adds that “Unlike a spider, an individual human doesn't just *exude* its web; more like a beaver, it works hard to gather the materials out of which it builds its protective fortress” (416). Dennett's metaphors of the spider and the beaver have a literary precursor in the fable of the spider and the bee in Swift's *Battle of the Books*: the bee is the one that draws the spider's attention to the fact that it is an illusion to think that you spin your web out of your own entrails. The spider may have wanted to build its own web “with [its] own hands, and the materials extracted altogether out of [its] own person,” as Swift puts it,²⁵ but the Ancients point out that the spider also feeds on insects and the “vermin of its age,” otherwise it would not be able to make its web. In this way, “The spider's web appears as a proper part of [what Richard Dawkins called] the spider's extended phenotype,” which Andy Clark compares to the extended mind.²⁶ So, whereas the river metaphor corresponds rather well with the endogenetic process described by Higginson, the web metaphor accords with the category of exogenetics.

2. Exogenesis

Applying Swift's fable to Joyce, it seems fair to say that he worked according to the manner of the bee, and of the Ancients. Wyndham Lewis accused him of lacking any special viewpoint of his own. Lewis would probably have seen himself as a spider, on the side of the Moderns. Joyce, however, showed him that he was also feeding on the vermin of his age, to use Swift's terms.

A good example is Wyndham Lewis's criticism of behaviorism in his book *The Art of Being Ruled*, where he starts railing at “Professor Watson,” whom he calls “the greatest exponent of behaviorism, and the king of testers.”²⁷ Joyce took down the

²⁵ Jonathan Swift, *A Tale of a Tub and Other Works*, edited with an Introduction by Angus Ross and David Woolley. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 112.

²⁶ Andy Clark, “Embodied, Embedded, and Extended Cognition,” in *The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science*, edited by Keith Frankish and William M. Ramsey. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, pp. 275-91; esp. 287.

²⁷ Wyndham Lewis, *The Art of Being Ruled*, edited by Reed Way Dasenbrock, Santa Rosa: Black Sparrow Press 1989 [1926], p. 339.

word “tester” in his notebook VI.B.20 and a few other notes from Lewis’s rant against behaviorism. Lewis ridicules Watson’s way of explain everything in terms of stimulus and response; he also ridicules Watson’s argument that “introspectist” psychology threw away the notion of the “soul” only to replace it by the notion of a “mind” that “was to remain always hidden and difficult of access” (339).

Against this “instrospectist” or inward turn, some cognitive philosophers such as Louise Barrett only recently suggested that there is something to say for Watson’s behaviorist approach and that “a stimulus-response mechanism is a legitimate ‘cognitive’ process.”²⁸ Against this cognitive background, Joyce’s reaction to Lewis is intriguing: After reading Lewis’s rant against behaviorism, Joyce responded “behavioristically” (*transision* 6, 98),²⁹ employing this adverb in the journal publication of chapter 6, in which “Professor Levis-Brueller” (99) tries to explain the “dime-cash problem” and starts with the question “*Why am I not born like a Gentilman*” (99), alluding to Lewis’s discussion of Bloom’s “gentleman-complex – the Is he or isn’t he a gentleman? – the phantom index-finger of the old shabby-genteel”.³⁰ But soon enough the Professor notices that his message is not getting across: “As my explanations here are probably above your understandings I shall revert to a more expletive method which I frequently use when I have to sermo with muddleclass pupils” (*transition* 6, 100). To illustrate his point he tells the fable of “The Mookse and the Gripes” (101).

In *transition* 6, the fable was followed by the story of Burrus and Caseous. Joyce was extremely late with his lengthy addition for which the editors of *transition* even had to take apart the first four hundred copies of the review, which had already been stitched. The page numbering also had to be adapted. The fable of the Mookse and the Gripes ends at the bottom of page 105 (“*I no canna stay!*”). Page 106 opens with the Professor’s smug recapitulation (“As I have now successfully explained to you ...”); on the next page (106 *a*) he reminds his audience:

²⁸ Louise Barrett, *Beyond the Brain: How Body and Environment Shape Animal and Human Minds*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton Univerity Press, 2011, p. 10.

²⁹ James Joyce, “Continuation of a Work in Progress,” *transition* 6 (September 1927), 87–106 f. [*FW* 126–68].

³⁰ Wyndham Lewis, *Time and Western Man*, edited by Paul Edwards. Santa Rosa, Black Sparrow Press, 1993 [1927], p. 105.

My heeders will recoil with a great leisure how at the outbreak before
trespassing on the space question [...] I proved to mindself as to your
sotisfiction how his abject all through [...] is nothing so much more than a
mere cashdime however *genteel* he may want ours (106 *a*, emphasis added)

– another allusion to what Lewis called the “gentleman-complex” of the “shabby-genteel.”³¹ This is immediately followed by the Professor’s second illustration, the Burrus and Caseous episode: “Burrus, let us like to imagine, is a genuine prime, the real choice, full of natural greace [...] whereat Caseous is oversely the revise of him” (106 *a*).

In the chapter “Hatred of Language and the Behaviorist ‘Word-Habit’” in *The Art of Being Ruled*, just before discussing Watson’s behaviorism, Lewis had argued that “without the control of the intellect, words have tended to go over into music.”³² Joyce alludes to this theme on page 106 *d* when he introduces “Margareen”: “We now romp through a period of pure lyricism of shamebred music evidenced by such words in distress as *I cream for thee, Sweet Margareen*” (106 *d*). Her intermediary position (“Margareena she’s very fond of Burrus but, alick and alack! She velly fond of chee”; 106 *e*) is appropriately presented as an intermezzo in the “art of being rude” (106 *e-f*).

In *The Art of Being Ruled*, Lewis had made a link between Joyce’s literary project and the “exploitation of madness, of ticks, *blephorospasms*, and eccentricities of the mechanism of the brain” (347; emphasis added), which Joyce alludes to on page 106 *f* (“a boosted blasted bleating blatant bloaten blasphorus blesporous idiot”). To protect his work against Lewis’s (and others’) poisonous criticism, Joyce used the technique of vaccination, incorporating a bit of the harmful or poisonous matter to strengthen his work’s immune system. To examine how this piecemeal incorporation of inimical material worked – according to a textual-genetic (rather than philosophical-metaphorical) multiple drafts model – the genesis of the fable of the Mookse and the Gripes (as part of the pre-book publication *Tales Told of Shem and Shaun*) is a suitable example. We seldom take the pre-book publications of *Finnegans Wake* into account as separate publications. The last part of this essay argues that these separate publications and all the agents involved in their publication process did

³¹ Lewis, *Time and Western Man*, p. 105.

³² Lewis, *The Art of Being Ruled*, 339.

play a role in the enactive creative process, which may be interesting both for a cognitive approach to “Work in Progress” and for the study of consciousness *as a* work in progress.

3. The Exo-Endo Nexus

The fable of the Mookse and the Gripes was the first of the *Tales Told of Shem and Shaun*, published in 1929 by Harry and Caresse Crosby and their Black Sun Press. They worked with the renowned “Maître-Imprimeur” Roger Lescaret, whose name even appeared prominently on the stationary of the Black Sun Press. Lescaret carefully produced several proofs, which he would personally deliver to Joyce, giving him the opportunity to explain any changes or corrections to the printer in person. Between the second and the fourth set of proofs, the *James Joyce Archive* indicates a gap (*JJA* 47: 193).

With the help of Luca Crispi and Cheryl Herr, I have been able to locate this “missing” third set at Salisbury House in Iowa.³³ The document³⁴ is accompanied by an errata sheet from Joyce (“J.J.”), dated [2] May 1929. The proofs are fairly heavily annotated as the following sample shows. The second set of proofs of the Mookse and the Gripes reads:

My temple is my own. (*JJA* 47: 214; Yale 9.3-5)

A handwritten addition in the left margin indicates that “, loudy bullocker,” should be inserted after “temple” and an extra sentence is added:

My temple^{, loudy bullocker,} is my own. My velocity is too fit in one stockend. (*JJA* 47: 214; Yale 9.3-5)

³³ I wish to thank Luca Crispi and Cheryl Herr for drawing my attention to the presence of the Black Sun Press material at Salisbury House. I also owe a debt of gratitude to Eric Smith at Salisbury House for all his help, without which it would not have been possible to make the textual collation.

³⁴ The proof sheets were purchased in 1930 from Harry F. Marks in New York City by Carl Weeks, who built Salisbury House. They are accompanied by a letter from C. K. Ogden, a penciled note from Harry Crosby and an errata sheet from Joyce. The erratum relates to the Mookse and the Gripes (with a double underlined capital S in Seter: “Hic sor a stone, singularly illud, and on hoc stone Seter satt huc sate.”) and is followed by the line “Herewith ‘O & G’ with final corrections. / J.J. / [2].V.929”.

In the (no longer) missing third set preserved at Salisbury House, the addition is incorporated in the newly set text (“My temple, loudy bullocker, is my own. My velicity is too fit in one stockend.”) The handwritten corrections and marginal additions indicate that “temple” should be replaced with “tumble” and yet another sentence is added:

And my *spetial* inexshellsis the belowing things ab ove. (Salisbury proofs, third set, page 6; emphasis added)

In the fourth set of proofs (*JJA* 47: 230; Texas-6) the additions are incorporated in the text, including the “spetial” reference to Wyndham Lewis’s focus on things “spatial” as opposed to Joyce’s preoccupation with time.

Not only critics such as Wyndham Lewis, but also the agents in the production of *Tales Told of Shem and Shaun* played a role in the creative process, as Caresse Crosby’s anecdote about the master printer Roger Lescaret and the fable of the Ondt and the Gracehoper illustrates:

The pages were on the press and Lescaret in consternation pedaled over to the rue de Lilly to show me, to my horror, that on the final ‘forme’, due to a slight error in his calculations, only two lines would fall *en plaine* [sic] page – this from the typographer’s point of view was a heinous offense to good taste. What could be done at this late date! NOTHING, the other *formes* had all been printed and the type distributed (we only had enough type for four pages at a time). Then Lescaret asked me if I wouldn’t beg Mr. Joyce to add another eight lines to help us out. I laughed scornfully at the little man, what a ludicrous idea, when a great writer has composed each line of his prose as carefully as a sonnet you don’t ask him to inflate a masterpiece to help out the printer! We will just have to let it go, I groaned and Lescaret turned and pedaled sadly away – but the next noon when I arrived at 2 rue Cardinale, joy seemed to ooze from the doorway of the Black Sun Press. Lescaret bounced out and handed me that final page. To my consternation eight lines *had* been added.

‘Where did you get these?’ I accused him.

‘Madame, I hope will forgive me,’ he beamed. ‘I went to see Mr. Joyce personally to tell him our troubles. He was very nice – he gave me the text right away – he told me he had been wanting to add more, but was too frightened of you, Madame, to do so.’³⁵

Since some sets of proofs are missing or incomplete, it is difficult to reconstruct the sequence of events in the manuscripts, but to the third set of proofs for *Tales Told* (JJA 57: 370-1) Joyce added a few sentences in the running text and six lines to the Gracehoper’s song,³⁶ which suggests there is at least some historical truth to the anecdote. The addition of a few lines is more than just a quantitative matter. It goes to the heart of Joyce’s accretive creative process, and since the impulse for this particular accretion was given by the printer, it also shows how Joyce’s creative mind functioned in constant interaction with his environment.

By calling the volume *Tales Told of Shem and Shaun*, Joyce drew attention to the act of tale-telling. The point Joyce made implicitly, by means of literary enactment, several decades before Daniel Dennett made it explicit with the Multiple Drafts Model, was that the telling of tales is constitutive of the human mind. And perhaps he pushed it even further than Dennett’s theory of narrative selfhood by suggesting that this is not an exclusively internal affair, but that it involves the environment.³⁷ This *Umwelt* can consist of comments by critics, printers, publishers and other agents in the process of production and reception, but also writings by other authors. In the past, genetic research into Joyce’s notebooks has been derogatively called “source hunting” or “philological spadework.” But Joyce’s “notesnatching” was an integral part of an enactive cognitive process and perhaps the derogatory attitude toward “source hunting” was a remnant of a view on Modernism as an “inward turn”, which saw the mind in terms of an inside/outside metaphor, the equivalent of what Hutten and Myin call the “Senior Partner Principle” (in the context of cognitive philosophy):

³⁵ Caresse Crosby, *The Passionate Years: An Autobiography*, New York: The Dial Press, 1953, p. 187.

³⁶ Dirk Van Hulle, *Textual Awareness: A Genetic Approach to the Late Works of James Joyce, Marcel Proust, and Thomas Mann*, PhD Dissertation, University of Antwerp, 1999, p. 485.

³⁷ In *Intuition Pumps and Other Tools for Thinking* (London: Penguin, 2014), Dennett does take the environment into account when he revisits his concept of “narrative selfhood” as a “centre of narrative gravity” and argues that this centre of gravity is “tightly coupled to the physical world” (334). Nonetheless, the aspect of the “physical world” Dennett concentrates on is the brain: “It is not so much that *we*, using our brains, spin our yarns, as that our brains, using yarns, spin *us*.” (339)

To suppose that what is constitutive of mentality must reside in organisms or their brains alone is to endorse a Senior Partner Principle holding that, although a partnership with environmental factors may be causally necessary for cognition, the organism's or system's brain "wears the trousers" in the relationship; only brains bring mentality to the party. In the place of this, we promote the more even-handed Equal Partner Principle as the right way to understand basic mental activity. Accordingly, contributions of the brain are not prioritized over those of the environment.³⁸

If one sees consciousness in terms of the extensive mind, which is "constitutively [...] world-involving" (137), then it does not come as a surprise that Joyce made use of so many source texts, notably texts that – in their turn – were grafted on Joyce's previously published works or pre-book publications of *Finnegans Wake*. Thus, for instance, James Douglas wrote in his review in the *Sunday Express* (28 May 1922): "if Ireland were to accept the paternity of Joyce and his Dublin Joyceries, which out-rosse the rosseries of the Parisian stews, Ireland would indeed [...] degenerate into a latrine and a sewer."³⁹ When Joyce read the review, he took a reading note in one of his notebooks (VI.B.06, page 117), and he used it for the description of Shem the Penman. The "Joyceries" from the review thus became the "shemerics" (*FW* 187.35-6) in *Finnegans Wake*. The number of reviews and short announcements mentioning Joyce in the newspapers that appeared during the seventeen years of his work in progress amounts to several hundreds of reactions.

To gather these reactions in the press, Joyce's entourage employed various clipping services, such as Durrant's Press Cuttings (London); Romeike & Curtice (London); The Original Henry Romeike Press Clipping Bureau (New York); Le Courrier de la presse (Paris) and several others. Dozens of brown envelopes, held at the James Joyce collection in Buffalo, contain clippings such as this one, from the Minneapolis Journal, discussing "Work in Progress":

It is as difficult to treat these things any more seriously than the ordinary citizen, who pays his taxes and supports the Constitution of the United States,

³⁸ Daniel D. Hutto and Erik Myin, *Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without Content*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2013, p. 137.

³⁹ Dirk Van Hulle, *Manuscript Genetics: Joyce's Know-How, Beckett's Nohow*, Gainesville, Florida University Press, 2008, p. 86.

treats the work of the Modernists in painting with which he has been afflicted of late (31 July 1937; UBC 1: 2162).

The mere fact of being published by a journal like *transition* was in itself enough to be criticized. Marjorie Peters, the reviewer in the *New York World* (14 August 1927) drew attention to the way *transition* announced itself “a little pompously” as being of the *avant-garde*, characterizing the journal’s content as “A New Tongue for Literary Snobs” (UBC 33: 576). In Australia, the *Sydney Daily Telegraph* (7 August 1927) invited its readers to decide “which of the two is the sillier,” Joyce or Gertrude Stein, concluding that it did not matter how much scorn they felt: “the scorn the plain man has for this school is as nothing compared with the scorn this school has for the plain man” (UBC 68: 2161).

These are just a handful of the hundreds of other, usually very negative reviews. Considered separately, most of these short reviews may not be particularly insightful in and of themselves, but as a whole they do give an adequate impression of the way the world at large responded to “Work in Progress,” and it seemed important to chart this immediate reception to reconstruct the cultural environment – the *Umwelt* – in which Joyce tried to give shape to his work.⁴⁰

Conclusion

Since Joyce and many other modernist writers were preoccupied with the workings of the mind, it is only natural that the workings of cognitive processes in their own environment served as a model. According to the paradigm of enactive cognition, any writer who makes use of notes and drafts is an example of the extended or extensive mind at work.⁴¹ Joyce clearly was a writer who thought on paper. He was also sensitive to whatever happened to offer itself as potential material for his work. He was able to incorporate enormous amounts of external material by means of a process that became thematic in *Finnegans Wake*, when he described it as “decomposition”

⁴⁰ I have tried to do this in a book that is not a publishing history of *Finnegans Wake*, but of “Work in Progress,” that is, of the pre-book publications that appeared in the seventeen-year period between *Ulysses* (1922) and *Finnegans Wake* (1939). It investigates how “Work in Progress” develops from *Ulysses* in terms of enactive cognition (Ashgate, forthcoming).

⁴¹ See Richard Menary, “Writing as Thinking,” *Language Sciences* 5 (2007), pp. 621-32; Dirk Van Hulle, *Modern Manuscripts: The Extended Mind and Creative Undoing from Darwin to Beckett and Beyond*, London: Bloomsbury, 2014.

for the purpose of subsequent “recombination” (*FW* 614.34-5). Not unlike Shem the “notesnatcher,” he took words and excerpts from numerous books in his notebooks, thus decomposing others’ texts and recombining them in his drafts. Evidently, these impressions were processed in the writer’s mind, but this mind was not limited to the writer’s physical brain; it included the interaction with his cultural and material environment. And it is almost impossible, certainly with hindsight, to answer the question: “Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin?” – the key question with which Clark and Chalmers opened their foundational article on “The Extended Mind” (see above). Applied to the textual-genetic process, the question is not so much “What is the border” but “Is there a border between endo- and endogenesis?”

If enactive cognition can be defined in terms of the nexus between an intelligent agent and his or her cultural and material circumstances,⁴² Joyce’s immediate environment certainly also included the material and cultural circumstances of his work’s publication history. Joyce’s *Umwelt* – including the support by *avant-garde* journals and fine arts presses, but also the fierce criticism by “anticollaborators” (*FW* 118.25-6) such as Wyndham Lewis and Ezra Pound, and the massive number of negative reviews in newspapers – played a considerable role in the workings of the extensive mind that shaped “Work in Progress.” Publication history is not just a matter of a book’s reception history; it can also be part of its genesis, and in that sense the exchange of ideas between book history and genetic criticism can be mutually beneficial in the study of the exo-endo nexus that characterizes the worldmaker’s *Umwelt*.

⁴² Herman, “Re-Minding Modernism,” p. 266.