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The post-war-time trajectory of CNDD-FDD party in Burundi: a facade transformation of rebel movement to political party

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Abstract

Since the Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie-Forces de Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD-FDD's) accession to power following the 2005 elections in Burundi, governance setbacks were of great concern and constantly criticized throughout the post-war-time. This study contributes to the understanding of how legacies of wartime shape post-war trajectory of a former rebel movement by analysing the relationship between main post-2005 features of CNDD-FDD and some key elements of its history. There is substantial evidence showing that the CNDD-FDD leadership, lacking political will for real changes, has continued during the post-war-time its armed movement practices from the *maquis* era, leading to the conclusion of a facade transformation of CNDD-FDD rebel movement-to political party.

INTRODUCTION

Rebel movement transformation into non-violent political parties, in the context of their military victory or negotiated settlement, has attracted a growing attention from researchers as a key component of peacebuilding and democratisation processes (de Zeeuw 2008, Manning 2017). According to de Zeeuw (2008), rebel-to-political party transformation consists materially of a process of structural-organisational and attitudinal changes intended to convert an armed rebel group into an unarmed political party. This author suggested to classify the rebel-to-party transformations into four categories, i.e., successful, partial, facade or failed, depending on the nature of change. It is qualified as successful if it meets criteria such as demilitarisation of organisational structures, development of party organisation, democratisation of decision-making and adaptation of strategies and goals. Otherwise, the transformation is qualified as partial if for instance there are some attitudinal changes but without real structural changes, facade if there is failure of major organisational and no will to change the nature of decision-making or the strategies, and failed if the former rebel group survives only nominally but is not established itself as a viable political party. Publications have already provided very rich information on different aspects of rebel-to-party transformation including factors that enabled or obstructed the transformation (Söderberg Kovacs and Hatz 2016, Koko 2017), the effect of the type of war termination (Toft 2010) and post-war electoral performance (Ishiyama and Widmeier 2013, Alison 2016) and trajectories (Lyons 2016) of former rebel political parties. However, there are many other issues to elucidate. One of the crucial but yet poorly addressed questions is what are factors that shape the former rebel parties' divergent trajectories? For instance, some authors showed that wartime legacies, such as cohesive leadership, discipline, hierarchical organisation and military rule (Lyons 2016), political identity (Berti 2016) and wartime command structures (Sindre 2014) were key factors that influenced the complex dynamics of rebel-to-party transformation and post-war development of former rebel political parties (Ishiyama and Batta 2011). However, the existing literature, for instance, on how the legacy of armed mobilisation at wartime affect the dynamics of political parties that emerged from armed groups and shape their trajectories is still limited (Sindre and Söderström 2016). Extending such analyses on as many case-studies as possible, particularly in cases of negotiated settlements, this option being considered since the 1990s as the preferred means for ending civil wars (Toft 2010, Söderberg Kovacs and Hatz 2016), would provide a much broad set of variables with a view to enhance

understanding of the post-war political environment in the perspective of peacebuilding, stability, democracy and prosperity. It is from this perspective that this study on postwar development of Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie-Forces de Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD-FDD) in Burundi was motivated. It is an interesting case study for three main reasons. First, the CNDD-FDD emerged as ruling party by winning post-war elections which were part of a peace process achieved through a negotiated settlement, that was the Arusha Agreement signed in 2000 (République du Burundi 2000). However, since its rise to power after the 2005 elections, the CNDD-FDD transformed progressively into a dominant authoritarian party (Palmans 2012). The resulting setbacks and political instability that marked the Burundian governance system and the relapse of a violent crisis since 2015 (Cliff 2017) suggest considering the nature of post-war development of CNDD-FDD as the main cause of the failure of peacebuilding programmes. Second, the international community's investment in peace and democracy consolidation turned Burundi (as well as Sierra Leone) into an exemplary test-case for the UN Peacebuilding Commission (United Nations 2006). Moreover, several international organisation-driven programmes were set up for leadership capacity building in political parties, state, defence and security forces (DSF), and civil society organisations. Therefore, if the CNDD-FDD failed to successfully transform itself from rebel movement to political party, it should be blamed on historical factors which would have played a critical role in hindering that transformation. Third, some studies have been conducted on the CNDD-FDD transformation, but most of them were focused on the analysis of the internal and external factors that had enabled this transformation (Nindorera 2012, Burihabwa 2014), on partial criteria such as the integration process of FDD fighters (Wilén 2016) or on short-term observations of the transformation process (Nindorera 2008, El Abdellaoui 2010). As suggested by some authors (Alfieri 2016, Wittig 2016), deeper analyses on specific historical factors and individual involvement during and after the war are necessary in order to better qualify the nature of CNDD-FDD transformation and figure out the link between this latter and governance challenges that Burundi has been facing in the post-war-time. Therefore, this paper seeks to fulfil this gap by establishing a relationship between key post-war features of CNDD-FDD trajectory and some key elements of its history which subsequently allows qualifying the nature of CNDD-FDD rebel movement-to-political party transformation. Thus, it enriches the literature devoted to figure out the post-war dynamics of former rebel movements by analysing how legacies of wartime hinder warlords (both fighters and political leaders) to convert themselves into democrats and how they shape post-war trajectory of former rebel movements. After this introduction, the following sections highlight key features which have most marked the history and the evolution of the CNDD-FDD with a particular focus on how they have influenced the organisation and functioning of the CNDD-FDD after its transformation from rebel movement to political party. The content of this article is based primarily on my own reflections and reports on my knowledge/eyewitness evidence given my role in Burundi during the time of the events discussed. In fact, I occupied responsibility positions within the CNDD-FDD including at the highest level of decision-making body as member of the party's Council of Elders (from 2007 to 2015). Also, I served at high positions within the State as speaker of the Senate between 2005 and 2010 and as vice-president of the Republic between 2010 and 2015. These positions allowed me to be a privileged witness of events that marked the functioning of both the party and the state. Moreover, my reflections were enriched by discussions with some political and military personalities including ex-FDD officers and other data from the literature.

HISTORY AND POST-WAR TRAJECTORY OF CNDD-FDD

Birth of the rebel movement

Unlike other political parties in Burundi that emerged from the initiative of individuals who became their founding presidents, the birth of CNDD in 1994 has its origins in a spontaneous

uprising of the people against the military coup CIVIL WARS 223 of October 1993. The assassination of President Melchior Ndadaye (the first democratically elected Hutu president of Burundi) along with some of his close co-workers in October 1993 triggered the longest and most devastating civil war that Burundi has experienced since its independence. Since the announcement of this terrible news, Hutu people, remembering previous bloody events such as the massacres in 1972, were frightened and agitated throughout the country. They erected road barriers or destroyed bridges to block the movement of soldiers in rural areas (Elias 1994). These acts marked the first signs of a spontaneous popular resistance against the coup. It was in this climate of anger, panic and agitation that inter-ethnic massacres were committed. Faced with insecurity and growing threats (including assassinations) that members of the party 'Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU)' constantly suffered, the Political Bureau of this party decided in November 1993 to organise a self-defence force under the leadership of Léonard Nyangoma, the then Minister of Public Service, Labor and Refugees Repatriation (CNDD 1997). In fact, in only the first 3 weeks of the crisis, inter-ethnic massacres led to more than 80,000 deaths (Chrétien and Mukuri 2002), while many surviving high-level FRODEBU parliamentarians and officials, having lost confidence in the protection from the government army (Forces Armées Burundaises referred as FAB) that have killed their president and colleagues, took refuge in different Embassies before they were thereafter gathered in the hotel Club du Lac Tanganyika under protection of French gendarmes allowing them working together to formulate crisis exit plans (Krueger and Krueger 2007). On 24 September 1994, a rebellion was officially established and was structured into political (CNDD) and military wings (FDD – Intagoheka – 'who never sleep').

Ephemeral pre-CNDD-FDD political coalition

During the period preceding the formal establishment of the CNDD, the tentative coordination structure of the popular resistance was a coalition of all (mainly Hutu) political forces opposed to the military coup of 21 October 1993, the most important being FRODEBU, Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (PALIPEHUTU) and National Liberation Front (FROLINA). This initiative resulted in a pluralistic organisation establishing a collective leadership team in which tightly knit and complementary roles were shared between member organisations. PALIPEHUTU and FROLINA with their armed wings were, for instance, expected to play a key role in military operations given their guerilla expertise. Thus, a PALIPEHUTU member, Donatien Misigaro, was the chief of the general staff (CGS) of the tentative collective military organisation, 'FDD-Intagoheka'. But as reported by Denis et al. (2001), collective leadership is fragile. Especially in this case, each party seemed to have its own agenda while seeking to take advantage of the others. For example, on the one hand, FRODEBU which sought to regain the power it had lost in the coup wanted to take advantage of the fighting experience and capacity of PALIPEHUTU and FROLINA for guerrilla operations. On the other hand, for their part, these old armed groups expected to receive from FRODEBU financial resources that would allow them to increase their guerrilla capacity and to establish themselves as new alternative political forces on the Burundian political scene. After about 3 months of collaboration, the removal of Donatien Misigaro (accused of being too old for the physical requirements of guerrilla leadership) from the post of CGS created a break with PALIPEHUTU. But a significant number of PALIPEHUTU combatants and members preferred to remain in the pre-CNDD structure. This was the case with Adolphe Nshimirimana, Radjabu Hussein, Alain Guillaume Bunyoni and others, who became later the most prominent figures of the movement (International Crisis Group 2002) and then of the political party. A misunderstanding on financial issues also led FROLINA to withdraw from the pre-CNDD organisation. While FRODEBU initially supported the pre-CNDD structure through secret networks, the two organisations separated very quickly because it was becoming almost impossible for FRODEBU leaders under surveillance of the Tutsi politico-military apparatus to simultaneously assume official state responsibilities and the leadership of an armed opposition

movement against the same state. Two weeks before the formal establishment of the CNDD, a Government Convention (referred to as Kigobe Agreement) was adopted as a new power-sharing pact between FRODEBU on one side and UPRONA (Union pour le Progrès National) and the Burundian armed forces on the other. This event marked the split of FRODEBU thereby plotting two separate paths for its members, either a path of struggle under the umbrella of the soon-to-be-born CNDD or a path of negotiation following the ‘Kigobe Agreement’. Since then, FRODEBU and CNDD have been rivals. Despite the withdrawal of all main political organisations from the pre-CNDD structure, the CNDD movement emerged as a council capable of welcoming members with different agendas according to various historical and political origins but individually sharing a common objective to resist the creeping coup (Twagiramungu 2014). The fact that the CNDD-FDD developed as a fully independent organisation from pre-war existing political formations during the period of the war might explain its strained relationships with other political parties in the post-war period. The empathy within CNDD-FDD members and hatred for others, inherited from the *maquis* (note 1) era, was a particular obstacle to the consociationalism-based power-sharing formula introduced by the Arusha Agreement and the Constitution of 2005 (Vandeginste 2017).

Leadership discontinuity

Since its creation, the CNDD has been going through turbulent periods caused by strong internal tensions and crises of regionalism and managerial character (see Figure 1). Few politicians and military leaders who participated in its creation managed to remain members of the movement until the end of the war. During the war, three teams succeeded one another by force following two sets of protests against the movement’s leadership: the Nyangoma team, the Ndayikengurukiye team and the Nkurunziza team. During the first period from 1994 to 1998, the CNDD’s political leaders established their base in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), so that they were absent from the battlefield. As a consequence, the FDD combatants gradually developed a sense of independence vis-à-vis the politicians whose leadership was also weakened by internal intrigues. Nyangoma was overthrown in May 1998 by the FDD chief of general staff, Jean Bosco Ndayikengurukiye (CNDD-FDD 1998). On the one hand, members of the management team splintered off together with Nyangoma to form a small wing, the CNDD Nyangoma, and on the other hand, new figures emerged alongside Ndayikengurukiye (general coordinator) to lead the movement, among them, Hussein Radjabu promoted to the position of

Figure 1. Storyline of the CNDD-FDD evolution

general secretary. At the same time, relations between the political and military branches were redefined, resulting in a military pre-eminence over civilians in decision-making in the restructured politico-military organisation, the CNDD-FDD (FDD 1998). Since then, this military supremacy persists and weakens the civilian authority within the CNDD-FDD party and the state, while civilian control over military is considered as a necessary condition for democratic governance (Kuehn 2008). Ndayikengurukiye was then himself ousted from power in October 2001 for the same charges as his predecessor (CNDD-FDD 2001), although according to him, his dismissal was the result of an international conspiracy because he had refused to participate in the ongoing peace negotiation process in Arusha (personal communication with Ndayikengurukiye, 12 July 2016). The CNDD-FDD split up into two factions, Pierre Nkurunziza becoming head of the main faction. His closest collaborators included Radjabu continuing as general secretary and Adolphe Nshimirimana promoted as new chief of military staff. The

dynamic of leadership team construction, deconstruction and reconstruction over time is indicative of how unstable the CNDD-FDD's organisational management was. As a consequence of this leadership discontinuity, valuable experience, know-how and the original reason for the fight which was 'saving Ndadaye's democratic legacy' were not handed down from old teams to the new. This overarching goal for the fight was rather replaced by a non-democratic goal, i.e., to achieve the 'total control of the state'.

Political origin-based identity and exclusion politics

Under Nyangoma (and to a lesser extent at the time of Ndayikengurukiye) leaderships, ex-FRODEBU members dominated the CNDD-FDD political leadership while fighters who had deserted the FAB, especially students of the Higher Institute of Military Cadres (ISCAM), dominated the FDD command ranks. These ex-FAB fighters were highly regarded because they were more disciplined and better organisers. They were also more advanced in training on conventional warfare techniques. Those from PALIPEHUTU felt frustrated, as they considered themselves to be the most experienced guerrilla fighters. Since 1996, they consolidated themselves surreptitiously by preferential recruitment of PALIPEHUTU members, taking advantage of the position occupied by Hussein Radjabu as commissioner for Mobilisation and Propaganda. It was also in this wave that Pierre Nkurunziza (also a member of PALIPEHUTU) was recruited in September 1996 by Hussein Radjabu and presented to Ndayikengurukiye (chief of general staff) to be accepted as a CNDD member. On the other side, political leaders and other cadres who were former members of FRODEBU were forced to resign following the abuse (including the marginalisation and physical elimination) they suffered as members of FRODEBU and as intellectuals (see subsections below). This was the beginning of the split between ex-FRODEBU members and ex-PALIPEHUTU members. This trend of ex-PALIPEHUTU member's gradual dominance of the movement's leadership was consolidated with the overthrow of Ndayikengurukiye in 2001. Since that moment, ex-PALIPEHUTU members have monopolised both the political and military leadership of the CNDD-FDD (see for instance Sentamba (2008) for the description of PALIPEHUTU as an ethnocentric ideology mobilising movement). One of the consequences of this political origin-based identity politics was the CNDD-FDD's isolationism and exclusion practices against those who were different. It resulted in high levels of patronage and politicisation of the civil service under the CNDD-FDD regime (Palmans 2012). This seemed to be the main reason that led to the 2005 post-electoral marginalisation of FRODEBU members by the ruling party. For instance, its officials were almost systematically sacked from managerial positions in state institutions and parastatal companies (Nindorera 2008) and only three ministerial posts were attributed to FRODEBU out of the five it was legally entitled to. This violation of the constitution triggered political tensions. (2)

Marginalisation of intellectuals

The CNDD-FDD movement was gradually cleansed of intellectuals as a result of regionalism (Bururi province against the rest) and uneasy cohabitation between members according to their political origin (FRODEBU versus PALIPEHUTU) but also between university-educated and non-university graduate members, the latter suffering from an inferiority complex. The majority of intellectuals deserted because of political and regional-based solidarity when Nyangoma and Ndayikengurukiye (both from Bururi province) were dismissed in 1998 and in 2001, respectively. They were mainly natives of Bururi or former FRODEBU members. Others were killed by their comrades in arms (see next section) while yet another group were forced to leave the CNDD-FDD, because they felt there was little sense in continuing if rational arguments were no longer welcome, as long as it was repeated that it was useless 'to reason' in the CNDD-FDD. The competition for positions of responsibility during the time of the rebellion and in the prospects for post-conflict period opportunities also became a 'war of degrees', leading non-university

graduate members to mistreat, expel and even kill university-educated members. Such was for instance the fate of fighters who had attended the Higher Institute of Military Cadres. And yet, education is an important factor for the development of personality traits as it may lead a person to adapt, to revise his beliefs and to acquire a new set of norms and worldview (Ohlsson 2011). At the end of the maquis, the CNDD-FDD was devoid of officers with technical marketing skills and experience in public administration. Although it accelerated the recruitment of graduate and experienced members (mainly drawn from FRODEBU for Hutu and UPRONA for Tutsi) long party membership counted for more than skills and merit when assigning responsibility for both technical and political positions. I argue, like Carayol (2016), that in short, intellectuals were no longer accepted in the CNDD-FDD, but that they were rather tolerated according to need (as a human resources reserve, to empty opposition parties of their members, to use officials to mobilise members in their native villages) and provided they did not interfere with the private interests of members of longer standing. And the language used, such as ‘Burundians claiming to be the most intellectuals’ or ‘the so-called intellectuals reflecting in place of the people’ in CNDD-FDD’s official communications to describe the participants in the Arusha negotiations (CNDD-FDD 2016) confirms my apprehension.

Exercise of power by violence

During the rebellion period, when leaders gave orders, no one was allowed to ask questions like ‘why’ to qualify or challenge the leader’s thinking behind those orders. The only questions permitted were requests for clarification such as ‘where’ and ‘when’. There were also some order principles predisposing and legitimating practices of collective violence within the CNDD-FDD movement. These included the principles ‘first, execute the order and ask later’ or ‘an unqualified leader may impose his authority on qualified members by using the whip, while he can physically eliminate those who refuse to submit’ (personal communication with Richard Nimbasha, one of the founding team of CNDD-FDD movement, 20 April 2016). Violent practices were also related to the degree of individual wickedness of fighters. Many fighters were thus summarily killed by their comrades. For example, in 1997, while Martin (an FDD officer) was being carried by a militant combatant on his back to cross the Mpanda river in the western region of Burundi – this practice was a common privilege to civilian and military leaders to avoid having to remove shoes or to have clothes wet when crossing rivers without bridges – this militant combatant fell into the water together with his passenger after slipping on a stone. Another militant combatant took over and put Martin on his back. He also slipped slightly, and Martin’s feet dipped into the water. Martin was furious with the two ‘militant carriers’ who failed to get him through without being wet and he eventually decided to punish them. After crossing, the first militant combatant was immediately shot dead by Martin, while for the second, he ordered the other militant combatants in his team to bury him alive upright. Such upright partial burial alive was commonly adopted to prolong the punishment, some of those sentenced to death being buried in holes which were then filled up to the neck, and the victim left in agony for days before his death. Fortunately for this combatant, he was later rescued by the commander of the northwest region, Cdt Léonidas Hatungimana (personal communication with L. Hatungimana, 2 June 2016). Torture and other inhumane treatments were also meted out to punish the guilty fighters. They were often sequestered in a kind of ‘gunners’ dugouts’, locally known as ‘ihandagi’, inadequately ventilated and often humid. The prisoners were subjected to a regime of up to 50 lashes three times a day for weeks or months. Worse, many combatants suffered and died from cruel torture particularly in cases of upright partial burial alive as described above (personal communication with some ex-FDD officers, between May and July 2016). I can deduce that in wartime, the concept of ‘the enemy’ is very subjective. Indeed, for the CNDD-FDD, several sources claim that internal conflicts caused more FDD officers’ deaths compared to those who were killed by the opposing camp. Over time, fighters were conditioned to violence. The most zealous inherited nicknames such as Ndakugarika (I kill you) for Gervais Ndirakobuca (currently chief of police staff at the

president's office), Gafuni (worn hoe serving as cudgel) for Dismas Sindaye (currently commander of Muzinda military camp) and Vurumayi (disorder) for Godefroid Bizimana (currently deputy director general of police). What is worrying today is that some former combatants admit that it is difficult to give up the habits acquired during the rebellion. Then, the risk that CNDD-FDD warlords continue to act as instigator of insecurity remains very high. Military experiences may have a long-lasting influence on individual-level characteristics (Jackson et al. 2012) and on interaction between citizens and the state (Dorman 2016). Other studies have shown that military experience makes warlords prone to use force and aggressive when facing the pressures inherent in post-war transitions (Sechser 2004). The warlords' mindset seems to be such that, for instance, physical abuse of opponents appears acceptable and even legitimate (Themnér 2017). It is, therefore, not surprising that the names of some ex-FDD fighters promoted to key positions in the National Intelligence Service (as Adolphe Nshimirimana – before his death – Gervais Ndirakobuca and Etienne Ntakarutimana) and the Police (as Alain Guillaume Bunyoni and Godefroid Bizimana) are systematically cited in reports of scandals, particularly as vicious instigators and supervisors of serious human rights violations committed to tracking down opponents. The recurrence of the violent behaviour which was still pending in the post-war period in both demobilised and former fighters integrated into the DSF was exacerbated during the violence that marked the 2015 crisis (Human Rights Watch 2015).

CHANGING THE STATUS, BUT NOT THE GOAL

From 2002, negotiations mediated by Nelson Mandela between the CNDD-FDD and the government of Burundi were accelerated resulting in the signing of a global ceasefire agreement in 2003 (République du Burundi 2003a) followed a few months later by the CNDD-FDD's transformation from a rebel movement into a political party. This section examines some internal and external factors which simultaneously contributed to this transformation.

Unfavourable geopolitical situation and pressure from the international community

The international community exercised pressure on the CNDD-FDD leaders to force them to accept the path of negotiations (Nantulya 2015). Otherwise, the CNDD-FDD would risk being treated as a negative force. Indeed, the mediation threatened to influence neighbouring countries (particularly DRC) to cut off its rear bases and, whenever necessary, to arrest CNDD-FDD leaders if they refused to adhere to the Arusha agreement. The presence of the FDD on the territory of the DRC also became uncertain in the context of the DRC peace process dynamic which resulted in the 2002 Pretoria Agreement. Tanzania, for its part, had taken measures (including the imprisonment of FDD fighters) to force the CNDD-FDD to join the Arusha peace process, while Kenya threatened CNDD-FDD members transiting through its territory (International Crisis Group 2002).

Conflict ripeness, mutually harmful stalemate

According to Zartman (2000), conflicting parties commit to an acceptable negotiated agreement when they feel that they are in an uncomfortable, costly and risky predicament to continue the unilateral alternative to achieving the goal of their struggle by a military victory. On the ground, the CNDD-FDD leaders were increasingly convinced of the near impossibility of winning militarily the war. The armed struggle had exhausted everybody, including in the ranks of the fighters. Shortly before signing the Global Ceasefire Agreement in November 2003, in some localities, the belligerents had agreed to end attacks, a kind of local ceasefire (International Crisis Group 2004). The population was increasingly annoyed by the FDD's presence, first, because it was abused by repeated money and food collections, sometimes by force in the form of looting (International Crisis Group 2002), and second, because the presence of the FDD fighters in a given locality was felt by local people as a threat to their security by the fact that FDD attacks to

military positions were followed by repression/vengeance on the local people (Amnesty International UK 2002). The resulting consequence was a gradual reduction of the population's sympathy towards the CNDD-FDD movement. On the other hand, the CNDD-FDD had exercised enough pressure on the government's forces to the point that they had also understood that they could not wipe out the rebels and militarily win the war. This equilibrium of military force between the belligerents was thus a common factor in favour of negotiations between the CNDD-FDD and the incumbent government. The CNDD-FDD was also confident in the ability of its parallel administration to mobilise people all over the country and to position itself as the principal Burundian political actor with its eye on winning the elections that would mark the end of the war. This political force on the ground was for the CNDD-FDD the only guarantee, that without a military victory, it could take control of the state by means of the ballot box. On the other hand, the Tutsi-dominated government power and forces had a good reason to negotiate with the CNDD-FDD in order to conclude a ceasefire agreement that would allow the implementation of the Arusha Agreement. This agreement provided for power-sharing arrangements that guaranteed the interests of the Tutsi minority. The balance of power achieved predisposed the parties to (temporarily) tolerate abusive behaviour in the past, most importantly crimes committed by both sides, and therefore to commit to peace.

Advantage of a structured organisation

After having passed through the various crises described above, the CNDD-FDD was a clearly structured movement with a strong internal organisational discipline. Thus, it shared with former or existing structured resistance or liberation movements key intra-group features influencing their dynamics, including the fluency of horizontal and vertical communication within the group. Therefore, orders and instructions were easily transmitted downward and enforced decisively by the whole group. This feature was a great asset in enforcing the peace process, which follows the classical transition scheme whose milestones are: negotiations, signing of peace agreement, demobilisation, disarmament and democratic institutionalisation. A structured organisation enabled the collective ownership of all these steps in emerging from violent conflict to a peaceful transition, as it was reported for many armed movements around the world (Dudouet 2012).

Did the CNDD-FDD adhere to the letter and spirit of the Arusha Agreement?

The signing of the Global Ceasefire Agreement on 16 November 2003, marked the end of negotiations between the transitional government and the CNDD-FDD movement, and the end of hostilities between the two parties. Article 2 stated that 'the Global Ceasefire Agreement is an integral part of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi'. Formally, this meant that the CNDD-FDD agreed at the same time to adhere to the Arusha Agreement, although it strongly criticised its content. The CNDD-FDD was particularly opposed to the institutionalised ethnicization of political life in Burundi because this agreement established ethnic quotas between Hutu and Tutsi as the fundamental basis of power-sharing (CNDD-FDD 2000). In particular, the Arusha agreement stated that each ethnic group should have a 50 per cent representation in the national defence forces (FDN) and in the national police (PNB), frustrating the CNDD-FDD members who considered these quotas as an overrepresentation of the ethnic minority at the expense of the majority ethnic group. They would have preferred a representation percentage based on that of ethnic proportions of the Burundi population, i.e., 85 per cent for Hutu, 14 per cent for Tutsi and 1 per cent for Twa. Most recently, the CNDD-FDD, through a statement, strongly criticised the Arusha Agreement, which it considered to have originated from arrangements between intellectuals to share leadership positions in the government, without the mandate of the people (CNDD-FDD 2016). Based on the above, it is obvious that the CNDD-FDD's leaders adhered to the 'letter' of the Arusha agreement as a matter of form as a result of heavy internal and external pressure. However, they did not follow the 'spirit' of the Arusha

agreement – i.e., political compromises, power-sharing, ethnic tolerance and national reconciliation – in the CNDD-FDD’s ideology and politics. Inspired by the success of other armed movements that managed to take power by force in the African Great Lakes region, namely NRM/NRA in Uganda in 1986, RPF in Rwanda in 1994 and AFDL in DRC in 1997, the CNDD-FDD has not given up its main objective of the total control of power. Then, the strategy was to adhere to the Arusha Agreement for the record and in the hope of changing it progressively once in power so as to achieve the objectives of the struggle it had not been able to attain by force of arms. But this was the most difficult: the Arusha Agreement, with its principles of ‘consociationalism’ that the CNDD-FDD was forced to comply with while it had not participated in their negotiation, was finally the great hindrance to achieving this goal of total control of power. That is why it bypassed and eventually ignored it (although it refers to the agreement whenever it serves its interests).

TANGIBLE EVIDENCE OF FACADE CNDD-FDD REBEL MOVEMENT-TO-PARTY TRANSFORMATION

Registration of CNDD-FDD as a political party while its political and military wings maintained close relations

The cantonment of combatants that followed the Global Ceasefire Agreement a few weeks later marked the ‘formal’ separation between the armed wing (FDD) and the political wing of the CNDD-FDD, although in reality, both wings maintained quiet close relations. The decision to transform the CNDD-FDD movement into a political party was adopted during the third Congress of the CNDD-FDD movement held on 7–8 August 2004 in Gitega (CNDD-FDD 2004). Two important texts were adopted on that occasion: a political programme and the statutes of the party. According to Article 10 of the statutes of the party, ‘the founding members are all activists of the CNDD-FDD Movement until the eighth day of August 2004, when the movement became a political party’. This provision has an important significance and a camouflaged logic for the CNDD-FDD. Officially, it aimed to allow an automatic return to the party for integrated FDD fighters after their jobs in the DSF, as Major General Evariste Ndayishimiye did after resigning from the army to become secretary general of the party in August 2016. However, it also implicitly allowed all ex-combatants (demobilised or integrated in the new DSF) to be ex officio members of the party – for instance, some Generals were members of the high-level decision-making body of the party, the Council of Elders – thus violating the 2003 law on political parties which provided in article 25 that ‘members of the defense and security bodies are not allowed to be member of a political party’ (République du Burundi 2003b) and later article 82 of the 2005 Constitution.

Deficient intra-party democracy

Political parties are known to play a crucial role in modern representative democracy (Catón 2007). They represent citizens and their opinion in a democracy. However, it is essential that internal party organisation and functioning are based on basic democratic principles. According to the National Democracy Institute (2003), a party that practices internal democracy is characterised in particular by the free expression of opinion by its members, the equitable participation of members, a tolerance for different ideas and respect for rules and procedures established to facilitate decision-making processes. Officially, the participation of CNDD-FDD members in deliberation and decision-making is provided through meetings of party bodies, including regular and special congresses. During the first years of the CNDD-FDD as a political party, some democratic practices were recorded. These were, for instance, open competition among members for certain internal responsibility positions and a secret ballot for major decisions. Thus, for example, Manassé Nzobonimpa was elected secretary general of the party through secret ballot, beating two other candidates during the extraordinary congress of February

2006 (VOA 2006). However, these practices did not last long. Thereafter, votes in the party were done by show of hand or by simple acclamation to avoid the risk that party members might vote against decisions made by leaders. Democracy within the CNDD-FDD was compromised by a strong centralization of decision-making, authoritarian practices and a lack of tolerance of differing opinions. Decision-making bodies such as congress served as one-way transmission channels of messages and orders from leaders to members without debate. Meetings of party bodies were nothing more than simple occasions to endorse decisions made by a small circle of individuals operating in the shadows and parallel structures dominated by some ex-FDD generals. The race of President Nkurunziza for a controversial third term in 2015, while almost all (civilian) members of the CNDD-FDD's Council of Elders had taken a firm stand against at the Council meeting held on 14 March 2015, is an illustrative case. (note 3) The weakness of democracy within the CNDD-FDD can also be illustrated by the absence of space for open debates. For instance, in March 2015, more than a hundred members signed a petition to express their concerns about the increasing political tension around the likely candidacy of President Nkurunziza for a third presidential term (Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2015). With this act, some members were suspended from party activities while others were expelled. Many of them were also removed from office. (note 4) This arbitrary exercise of authority, ignoring all advice, leaking contradictory debates and persisting in actions contrary to the interests of the society, was referred to as one of the 'pathologies of leadership' (Kets de Vries 2009). And yet, a multitude of workshops intended to cure these pathologies were organised by donor-funded international organisations (see Introduction). Despite several sessions, at which CNDD-FDD leaders and FDD-origin members of the DSF attended, on various topics including the process of consensus and participatory decision-making, intra-party democracy and DSF professionalisation, ex-FDD generals continued to dominate the CNDD-FDD and state decision-making structures. I can attest that the real power both within the CNDD-FDD party and the state is held by a group of ex-FDD generals around President Nkurunziza. Moreover, authoritarian practices increasingly developed within the party. The effectiveness of action undertaken by these international organisations was, therefore, challenged and should be assessed.

Continuation of politico-military command structures

While the 2003 law on political parties and the 2005 Constitution prohibited members of the DSF from joining a political party and political parties from developing military or paramilitary organisations, the CNDD-FDD party blatantly ignored these prohibitions. For instance, since 2007, there were five ex-FDD generals, together with six civilians (including myself), in the Council of Elders of the party at the national level. But this combined civilian-military structure did not last long, since the generals eventually refused to sit with civilians. Although they justified this withdrawal as a strategy to participate in the organisation and activities of the party while remaining in the shadows, it was likely that they were rather uncomfortable sharing this decision-making space with civilians. They often struggled to impose their views when faced with our (civilian) arguments. For example, when the Council had to decide on options to manage political tensions, the generals prioritised the use of force when we (civilians) suggested the way of dialogue and compromise. (note 5) Such tendency to opt for military solutions over other alternative responses seems to be a common behaviour of military leaders as a result of military training and powerful incentives (Sechser 2004). They thus constituted a parallel Council of Elders, certainly informal but more powerful than its civilian counterpart which became a fig leaf to create an illusion of democracy within the party. The military leadership successfully managed to dominate the civilian leadership in the decision-making arena, as it was during the maquis era. Among the many bad consequences, they took advantage of this privileged position to interfere in the day-to-day working of institutions until they became non-independent. This military supremacy over civilians has severely hampered the implementation of major good governance reforms including those aimed to fight against corruption (Rufyikiri 2016). (note 6) As observed

in some post-war situations, like in Ethiopia (Berhe 2017), the development of non-partisan culture among former rebels appears to be a challenging task because of the historical politico-military hybrid of the rebel leadership to which they are accustomed. If some ex-FDD fighters were propelled into leadership positions during the war thanks to their skills in organising and carrying out the armed struggle, it did not necessarily mean that they were equally suitable for leading the organisation when it entered the arena of peaceful politics. For instance, the greater a fighter's propensity for violence and brutality against the enemy, the greater his perceived strength and likelihood of promotion. In times of peace, however, these same characters are considered as deficiencies. It is an issue of political leadership, the capacity to take over the role of leader in times of peace, which has been reported to be the main challenge for significant policy changes during the transformation from rebel movement to political party and during the post-conflict political party development (Khadiagala and Lyons 2006). The other example concerns the militarization of the Imbonerakure (CNDD-FDD youths) creating a pro-Government militia – in violation of the 2003 law on political parties which provided in article 34 that 'no political party can develop any military or paramilitary organization' (République du Burundi 2003b) – for the political intimidation of members of opposition parties and civil society organisations (Human Rights Watch 2009). The creation of this militia has been decided by a secret team of some ex-FDD generals led by the late Adolphe Nshimirimana outside official decision-making spaces of the CNDD-FDD party such as the Council of Elders or of the state such as the National Security Council, to which I was a member. These examples indicate that the movement's politico-military networks have been informally transferred to the current party structures. The development of ethnized militarism in Burundi during the post-war period (Vandeginste 2017) is part of the consequences of the continuation of politico-military command structures.

Difficult companionship and socialisation between ex-FDD and ex-FAB

Several studies have reported that the integrated security bodies (DSF and Police) were – until the 2015 electoral crisis – the symbol of Arusha compromises for power-sharing between ethnicities in Burundi and reconciliation (Samii 2013, Wilén 2016). However, a thorough analysis shows that, contrary to these conclusions, the cohesion between the two main groups that merged, i.e., CNDD-FDD fighters and FAB, remained weak and that ex-FDD were partisan (see the subsection above). Then, the newly integrated security bodies appeared homogenous by their uniforms whereas, in fact, they remained rather heterogeneous through some behaviour of ex-FDD fighters which constituted a latent threat to the reconciliation process and to a real power-sharing, as it was sadly proven by the 2015 crisis (International Crisis Group 2017). For instance, ex-FDD fighters rarely used the common entertainment places such as officers' mess, non-commissioned officers' mess and canteens for troops, for two main reasons. First, before joining the institutions after the signing of the Global Ceasefire Agreement, a moral standards session was organised during which the combatants were advised to maintain their vigilance vis-à-vis their adversary. The message was released as follows: 'you go out of the maquis to live with people that you were fighting. Beware, they could kill you by poisoning, or weaken your consciousness and conquer you by offering their pretty girls as decoys' (personal communication with an ex-FDD officer, 10 May 2016). Second, most ex-FDD officers were embarrassed by their low training levels resulting in an inferiority complex while they were entrusted with positions of responsibility. Then, fearing a shortage of arguments in discussions, they preferred to limit conversations with their ex-FAB colleagues only to office colleagues. As a result, the ex-FDD fighters organised their own socialisation and mentoring frameworks. Refreshment places (such as '144' in Kinindo, 'Iwabo w'abantu' and 'Iwabo w'abasisigaye' in Kamenge, 'Bel-Air' in Carama and 'Mpirindi' in Kamenge) and sports associations (such as 'Alleluia FC' and 'Amicale pour la Promotion du Sport (Amipros-Nonoka)' were created for this purpose as meeting places and entertainment. These civil war-inherited differences and partisan affiliations were bearers of the virus of division. They resulted in the development of parallel chains of command within the

DSF and Police. As also reported by Vircoulon (2015), these divisions were prominent during the 2015 crisis management leading to a shift of power balance within military and police hierarchies with the supremacy of ex-FDD over ex-FAB. Examples are the predominance ex-FDD in the special Brigade of protection of institutions, poor equipment of ex-FAB compared to their ex-FDD colleagues and the fact ex-FABs occupy command posts while the real command power is in the hands of their ex-FDD deputies. Given that the ex-FDD and ex-FAB are mainly composed of Hutu and Tutsi, respectively, their rivalries have direct repercussions on ethnic reconciliation. The 2015 crisis indicated that the ancient politico-ethnic hatred which was ultimately only dormant had been reignited by former CNDD-FDD warlords – one can refer to the hate speech of the president of the Senate, Révérien Ndikuriyo, of 29 October 2015 (Rainfroy 2015). Although its magnitude was smaller compared to previous crises, the ethnic dimension of the 2015 crisis fuelled a fear of another genocide in the African Great Lake Region (Cliff 2017).

Violence and confrontational approach

From the beginning of the CNDD-FDD's rule, a winner-takes-all wartime mindset was noted as one of basic political challenges (Wolpe and McDonald 2006). The policy of categorising Burundian society into two camps (a friendly camp including all Burundians who supported the CNDD-FDD's activities and hostile camp for the rest) that characterised the movement on the battlefield has continued even during the post-conflict period. Opposition or rival political parties were identified as 'abakeba', referring to rivalries between co-wives in polygamous families. The refusal to share power with such political adversaries has characterised the CNDD-FDD regimes, in contravention of the law. It was in this spirit that the first Nkurunziza government was unconstitutional as he narrowed the rights of FRODEBU and UPRONA parties (International Crisis Group 2006). The ultimate goal was to weaken rival political parties. This same principle resulted in maintaining strained relations between the CNDD-FDD and PALIPEHUTU-FNL. Indeed, the CNDD-FDD dominated government dragged to commit to negotiating with the PALIPEHUTU-FNL with which it had been in fierce struggle and has continued to repress PALIPEHUTU-FNL members during the post-wartime (Van Acker 2016). The physical abuses of political opponents involved systematically ex-FDD either members of the army or police or national intelligence service or les Imbonerakure (Human Rights Watch 2008, 2016). Curtis (2012) criticised the contribution of activities of international peacebuilders to an order in Burundi where violence, coercion and militarism remain central. Finally, the restriction of the opposition political space together with the overwhelming victory of CNDD-FDD in the 2010 elections led this party to become de facto quasi single-party and further to have a total control over the entire State. The CNDD-FDD decision makers have proven to be politically immature in managing the whole country in all its diversities. There have been few occasions where institutions have taken the initiative to involve Burundian citizens in dialogue as partners. To ease political tensions, face-to-face dialogue workshops involving political actors were finally organised under pressure and under the patronage of development partners. As the CNDD-FDD participated rather as a formality than as a real commitment to dialogue and compromise, these workshops have often ended with declarations of high principles which were rarely followed by concrete actions. This was the case, for example, with the roadmap on the 2015 electoral process adopted at the workshop organised in March 2013 for political actors under the auspices of the UN Office in Burundi (Atelier sur le processus électoral au Burundi 2013). The points concerning the creation of a conducive environment for peaceful and inclusive elections received less attention in the follow-up. Another example was the workshop organised by the Parliament in December 2013 on the draft amendment for certain provisions of the Constitution. Even though it was closed with many points of divergence (Nahimana 2013), the government attempted to force the amendments through.⁷ This revision whose main objective was to enable President Nkurunziza to seek a third presidential term in the 2015 elections was rejected at the meeting of 21 March 2014 in the National Assembly. Rather than learning from this failure, President

Nkurunziza decided to continue his race by forcing an illegal third term, against the Constitution and the Arusha Agreement (Reyntjens 2015) and despite domestic protests and international criticisms. Changes of constitutions or their circumvention and the exploitation of legal loopholes by leaders willing to extend presidential terms seem to be rather a trend than an isolated case (Corrales and Penfold 2014) and are a worrying phenomenon that undermines the democracy, impedes peaceful alternations of leaders on power, and causes insecurity in many African countries (Etyang and Nhlengethwa 2017). Although leaders of many African countries emerged from non-state armed movements (for instance in Uganda, DR Congo, Rwanda and Burundi) which fought against incumbent governments accused to be authoritarian and which argued that their goal was to establish, *inter alia*, democratic regimes, no significant changes have been observed in their governance systems. In his book 'What is Africa's problem' published in 1986 (the year he took power by a military victory, Museveni (president of Uganda) wrote: 'The problem of Africa in general and Uganda in particular is not the people but leaders who want to overstay in power' (Museveni 1986).

Sovereignty-based arguments used to dodge donors-driven reforms

The facade CNDD-FDD transformation, which led to an unsuccessful democratic transition, seemed to have been encouraged by the lack of strong, stable and sustainable accompaniment mechanisms for the implementation of the Arusha Agreement. For instance, the UN representative-chaired Implementation Monitoring Committee and the UN mission in Burundi (ONUB) have successfully assisted the transitional government in the DSF's integration, demobilisation, CNDD-FDD involvement in state institutions and the organisation of the first post-conflict general elections. However, their mandates ended prematurely at the insistence of the Government of Burundi using arguments of sovereignty. It was certain that the government was hostile to partners' criticisms on governance setbacks and foreigners working in the structures monitoring the implementation of the Agreement were embarrassing witnesses of the abuse of power. The CNDD-FDD was also reluctant to implement a number of donor-driven reforms, most of them negotiated or imposed in the form of aid conditionality that it considered as interference. By refusing to be accompanied by its partners, the CNDD-FDD leaders overestimated their capacity to lead the peace and state-building process, considering that it would be easier to run state affairs alone in peacetime compared to the many challenges they faced during 10 years of wartime without any assistance from the international community. Thus, the mandates of these guarantee and monitoring mechanisms were prematurely curtailed leaving behind a vast programme of unfinished and/or not yet initiated (political and economic) reforms even though concerns about the likely sliding of Burundi towards authoritarianism had been expressed early on.⁸ Other support mechanisms designed by the international community such as the Burundi Configuration of the UN Peace Building Commission have also been ineffective, given the scaling-up of political tensions culminating in the 2015 election-related crisis. And Burundi was not the first case to experience the recurrence of violence during what is known as post-wartime. Toft (2010) argued that negotiated settlements are associated with higher authoritarianism over time and are more apt to lead to the recurrence of war than ending wars by victories.

FACADE TRANSFORMATION AND FAILURE OF POLITICAL TRANSITION TOWARDS DEMOCRACY

This article touches on the question raised by Themnér (2017) on 'whether an individual can simultaneously be a warlord and democrat'. Since the 2005 elections, the Burundian political leadership was dominated by CNDD-FDD's former warlords which raised huge expectations but also worries from peacemakers and Burundians in their conversion into promoters of peace and democrats, and in post-war peace, stability, respect of human rights and of rule of law,

democratisation (effective multiparty system, fair elections and peaceful alternation of leaders on power), integrity and development (Lemarchand 2006). To succeed such mission, these former warlords would have been guided by peace-striving virtues including looking beyond past circumstances, adopting an innovative spirit, mobilising citizens around alternative ideas, and generating aspirations and hopes to citizens. These are features of a transformational leadership style (for definition, see for example: Aga et al. 2016) for instance recognised for Nelson Mandela, former president of South Africa, in the aftermath of the Apartheid (Kets de Vries et al. 2016). While transformational leadership was required in post-wartime to reconcile the divided society in Burundi, the former CNDD-FDD warlords lacked the will to convert themselves into democrats, but instead, they were vengeful gravitating to the negative extreme referred in the literature to as destructive leadership (Padilla et al. 2007). Themnér (2017) argued that militant background may push or entice former fighters to resort to violence making them instigators of insecurity. Analysing the post-war trajectory of CNDD-FDD party in Burundi, this study provides evidence that the militant background of warlords and the global historic route of a rebel movement were key parameters that negatively influenced the CNDD-FDD leadership in post-wartime and hindered efforts to implement legal and institutional reforms in Burundi. In spite of external driven peacebuilding and state-building initiatives, big-man rules, military supremacy over civilians, predation, intolerance, clientelism, exercise of power by force, human rights violations, non-respect of the rule of law and of fundamental democratic principles and informal structures in the continuation of old politico-military command bodies were features of the post-war CNDD-FDD leadership which were similar to those of the wartime, highlighting the inertia of the CNDD-FDD warlords to changes. Like numerous African ruling parties (Kura 2008), the CNDD-FDD consolidated itself progressively as a dominant authoritarian party subjecting Burundian society to a totalitarian regime (International Crisis Group 2006, Palmans 2012). Some analysts considered undemocratic practices as the result of the *maquis* reflexes within the current leadership in the management of state affairs (Sentamba 2008) or of the incomplete transformation of the CNDD-FDD rebel movement-to-political party (Nindorera 2008). Internationally, Burundi's postwar transition was referred to as a success story (El Abdellaoui 2010). It is worth noting that these conclusions on successful transition or incomplete CNDD-FDD transformation were supported by arguments based either on partial criteria (Wilén 2016) or on short-term observations (Nindorera 2008, El Abdellaoui 2010) of the process of rebel-to-party transformation. The culmination of intermittent political tensions in the crisis which overshadowed the 2015 electoral process led Wittig (2016) to consider that what was referred to as '*maquis* reflexes' was, in reality, the continuity of *maquis* practices. This article, covering an overall view and different facets of the CNDD-FDD transformation for a relatively long period, more than 10 years, provides substantial evidence showing that the CNDD-FDD leadership, lacking political will for real changes, has continued during the post-wartime its armed movement practices from the *maquis* era, leading to the conclusion that the CNDD-FDD rebel movement-to-political party was a facade transformation. The post-war trajectory of CNDD-FDD as an authoritarian party was strongly shaped by legacies of wartime organisation, governance and individual or collective leadership behaviour as it was also reported for political parties that transformed from militarily victorious rebel movements (Lyons 2016). This indicates that whatever the type of war termination that allows former rebel movements to become post-war dominant political parties, the legacies of wartime can lead to similar development of post-war parties transformed from former rebel movements, at least for long term. During the 10 years of power, the CNDD-FDD has used its position to obtain the 'total victory' it failed to acquire by the armed struggle. Its political space has been infinitely extended to the detriment of good governance and democracy. As a consequence of this facade transformation of CNDD-FDD while it was entrusted with huge responsibilities as the ruling party since 2005, the democratic transition in Burundi was unsuccessful. Bad governance practices already described above and intermittent political tensions that persisted and the resurgence of political violence since the 2015

electoral process are indicators of this unsuccessful political transition towards democracy. This means that, although negotiated settlements transcribed in the Arusha Agreement helped Burundi to avoid so far returning to tragedies of mass inter-ethnic violence, it failed to lead Burundi to lasting peace. The recurrence of violent crisis in 2015 in Burundi is a remarkable illustration of previous studies that reported that peace and democratisation achieved through negotiated settlements tend to be short-lived (Toft 2010). This observation was confirmed later by the UN advisory group of experts who mentioned in their report that peacebuilding processes are prone to failure and estimated that, in 2015, over half of the conflict-related items within the UN Security Council agenda were cases of conflict relapse (United Nations AGE 2015). This study shows that, while the Arusha Agreement was conceived as a basic reference for ending the cyclical nature of political and ethnic conflicts (Vandeginste 2015), hardliners of CNDD-FDD continued to question its value and provisions (CNDD-FDD 2016). The fact they eventually succeeded to torpedo its enforcement suggests to consider that the mechanisms designed to guarantee its implementation were weak and inefficient. Therefore, scholars and peacemakers should learn lessons from this peacebuilding failure in Burundi in order to imagine about robust mechanisms to sustain peace in cases of negotiated settlements to end civil wars. The persistent political violence, the progressive consolidation of centralised and militarised regime, the instrumentalization of the ruling party's youth league and state institutions and corruption scandals (Hirschy and Lafont 2015, Rufyikiri 2016) indicate a continuity of certain practices from the previous dictatorial regimes that the CNDD-FDD had fought during the war. The development of a pro-government militia from the CNDD-FDD's Imbonerakure youth league which was comparable to the UPRONA's JRR youth League in their policing and controlling role in the countryside, the CNDD-FDD behaviour as a single-party reminding the former single-party UPRONA before the establishment of multiparty system in 1990s, the development of neo-patrimonial power structure in the same way than traditional patronage systems are some indicators of replication of the pre-war order (Van Acker 2016, Vandeginste 2017). The leadership discontinuity and the political origin-based identity and exclusion politics have resulted in 'pirate'-like CNDD-FDD leaders devoid of benchmarks relative to the starting points and finishing line of the struggle. These benchmarks should have included (i) the objectives of the fight if they had participated in their definition at the time of the creation of the movement, (note 2) the text and spirit of the Arusha Agreement if they had participated in the negotiations that gave birth to it and (3) the respect of international standards of democratic state governance while they continued to refer to practices developed during the 10 years spent in a closed system of *maquis* with very limited contact with the international community. Instead, the ethno-political paradigm was the keystone of political governance.

Notes

1. The term *maquis* refers to a form of resistance that uses guerilla techniques to fight the occupier. In its common sense, it refers to a group of armed people establishing their initial or temporary accommodation in wooded massifs or in any other place that can guarantee their safety vis-à-vis the occupier they are fighting with.

2. At that time, I was President of Senate. It was necessary that, considering the competence of the Senate to advise the President on any matter including legislation (art. 187, paragraph 6 of the Constitution), I engage in March 2007 the Senate to debate on the constitutional legality of the governmental team. As conclusion, senators decided to suggest the President to take advantage in compliance with the constitution (Sénat du Burundi 2007) and a constitutional government was subsequently appointed in November 2007, appeasing the political climate in relation to that issue (VOA 2007).

3. In opposing this third term, we have been exposed to threats of every kind. Having been informed from a reliable source of the imminence of my imprisonment, I had to flee Burundi to take refuge in Belgium since June 2015. In a letter I sent to President Nkurunziza a week after my escape, I also recalled him the need to withdraw his candidacy in the interest of the Burundian people (see *Jeune Afrique* of 25 June 2015).

4. On 24 April 2015, the President's Office sent me for countersign a decree proposal intended to fire eleven advisers serving at the second vice-presidency. Four days later, I got an appointment with the President and argued that the punishment was disproportionate for citizens who expressed their opinion. My refusal to countersign this decree worsened my already severely strained relations with President Nkurunziza since I had disagreed with him, together with many other members of the Council of Elders, on his third term.

5. The management of the crisis of confidence between the UPRONA party and the government in 2007 is an illustrative case. UPRONA was frustrated particularly by the violation of the power-sharing principles and eventually demanded the dismissal of the vice-president Martin Nduwimana (member of UPRONA) whom it accused of cautioning the CNDD-FDD governance system while he failed to uphold the party's interests in the government. While UPRONA decided to armwrestle government over its rights and interests, positions advocated by former FDD generals and civilians within the Council of Elders to deal with the crisis were totally divergent. At the end, our option of dialogue prevailed over that of the generals which consisted in the use of force to silence UPRONA.

6. For instance, as vice-president coordinating economic affairs during the period 2010–15, I struggled to prevent or fight against corruption which in many cases involved the most influential ex-FDD generals. I've managed to prevent certain cases, but I acknowledge that I failed for others or to sanction any cases in which they were directly or indirectly involved. 7. The Council of Ministers of 9 and 10 October 2013 which analysed the draft text for the revision of the Constitution was intended solely to endorse the amendments and legitimise the revision proposal. Given that the draft text had not been distributed to the Ministers contrary to practice, they had immediately realised that President Nkurunziza, who was leading the meeting, did not need any comment on the proposed amendments or their enrichment. 8. At the Conference of Partners for Development of Burundi, which I headed in Geneva in October 2012, the various representatives of the partner countries and organisations, while recognising important progresses made by Burundi during the post-transition period, they were also very concerned about the fragility of Burundi caused by risks mainly of insecurity. Situating Burundi at the crossroads, they reiterated the commitment of their headquarters to financially and technically support Burundi to help it to choose the right path (*République du Burundi* 2012).

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