An EU minimum wage target for adequate in-work incomes?

Reference:
Full text (Publisher's DOI): https://doi.org/10.1177/1388262720968118
To cite this reference: https://hdl.handle.net/10067/1748140151162165141
An EU minimum wage target for adequate in-work incomes?

Sarah Marchal


1. Introduction

Over the past years, various proposals have been voiced for an EU initiative on minimum wages, fed by concerns about fair and adequate wages, wage inequality and competition between Member States and social dumping (cf. infra). Increases in (in-work) poverty have led policy makers to critically reflect on the role of low wages and precarious work conditions. Recently, the European Commission has launched a consultation procedure among the social partners regarding the possible directions of an EU initiative in the field of minimum wages. Earlier proposals, by the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), the European Parliament, leading scholars in the field and EU level social policy makers usually envisioned such an initiative as a wage floor defined by the EU as a percentage of a national reference wage.

In this paper, we ask to what extent such a minimum wage target could contribute to the stated goal of adequacy. To this end, we assess current minimum wages and minimum wage targets in gross and in net terms. Previous research has indeed shown that at the lower wage levels, the impact of the tax benefit system on guaranteeing adequate living standards for working families cannot be ignored.\footnote{Cantillon, Marchal and Luigjes (2019).} An important question is hence to what extent minimum wage families will effectively be better off, given the workings of the tax benefit system, under an initiative that envisages to increase gross minimum wages. We build on the EUROMOD simulation model and its hypothetical household (HHoT) tool\footnote{Hufkens, Goedemé, Gasior, Leventi, Manios, Rastrigina, Recchia, Sutherland, Van Mechelen and Verbist (2019)} to gauge the combined impact of increased wages, taxes and (means-tested) benefits on net disposable incomes.

The outline of this paper is as follows. In the next section, we outline the main reasons for considering the introduction of an EU minimum wage framework. Section 2 then summarizes the current state of EU level proposals, including the Commission’ consultation document. Then, we highlight two issues that warrant attention from an adequacy perspective: the impact of the exact definition of the reference wage, and the interaction with the tax benefit system in guaranteeing adequate net in-work incomes. Finally, we conclude.

2. The case for an EU initiative on minimum wages

\footnotetext[1]{Cantillon, Marchal and Luigjes (2019).} \footnotetext[2]{Hufkens, Goedemé, Gasior, Leventi, Manios, Rastrigina, Recchia, Sutherland, Van Mechelen and Verbist (2019)}
Many influential voices have called for more coordinated EU action in the field of minimum wages, both from an academic as from an EU policy making perspective, raising normative, functional as well as more political arguments.

Normative arguments for an EU level minimum wage initiative are akin to the normative arguments for national minimum wages. They centre on the inherent value of adequate minimum wages, in providing fair remuneration\(^3\) and decent incomes\(^4\) for workers. Normative arguments for an initiative at EU level build on the EU’s raison-d’être as heralded in its treaties, that refer to upward social convergence and improvement of the living standards of its citizens.\(^5\) Whereas there are clearly also functional arguments for reducing large disparities between Member States (cf. infra), one could also deem these disparities in se unjustified.\(^6\) It is hence not surprising that the 6\(^{th}\) principle on fair wages of the European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR) stresses the need for an adequate wage that satisfies the needs of workers and their families.\(^7\)

Functionalist arguments generally focus on the necessity to develop a veritable social union to facilitate the monetary union,\(^8\) as well as to counter some of the externalities caused by a single market characterised by different productivity levels and welfare systems. A monetary union presupposes a degree of risk sharing and stability, that can be achieved through more broadly shared social policies.\(^9\) Also minimum wages have a role in improving the functioning of the single market, as in a context of mobile labour, transparent and predictable minimum wage regimes are key\(^10\) (see also the contribution by Bartłomiej Bednarowicz in this issue on the new directive on transparent and predictable working conditions rolled out of the EPSR). Watt for instance sees wage developments as having clear (negative) cross-border spill overs, in the single market, and especially in the monetary union\(^11\): unit labour costs may drive employer’s location decisions in a single market without exchange rates. Large wage differentials may facilitate social dumping, and cause substantial emigration and population decline in some Member States (see in this regard the contribution by Catherine Jacqueson on the tensions between free movement of services and the protection of workers). These imbalances have further detrimental effects, including lower aggregate internal demand.\(^12\) Given the relation with the EU’s single market, scholars see a role for

---

\(^3\) International Labour Organization (2008).

\(^4\) Bray (2013).

\(^5\) Corti, Sabato and Van Hercke (2019) and Vandenbroucke (2019).

\(^6\) Watt (2019).

\(^7\) European Commission (2017).

\(^8\) One should note here that the EU has already assumed competences in the social field in order to stabilize the EMU (see for instance the Country Specific Recommendations on minimum wages voiced in the framework of the European Semester), but without making the social objective equally important (Corti, Sabato and Van Hercke (2019)). Clear targets, for instance in the field of minimum wages, might ensure that social policies are not merely seen as an ‘adjustment variable’ (Costamagna (2019)).

\(^9\) Vandenbroucke (2019).

\(^10\) European Commission (2017) and Vandenbroucke (2019).


\(^12\) Andor (2019, Andor (2020).
the EU, from strengthening collective bargaining,\textsuperscript{13} to outright promoting wage floors at 60\% of the median wage.\textsuperscript{14}

A recent study by Cantillon and colleagues highlights a functional argument in favour of sufficiently high minimum wages that stands slightly apart from the abovementioned focus on fixing externalities and smoothing the EMU. As the key determinant of the income that can be minimally gained from work, minimum wages co-determine the scope for increasing out-of-work benefits, as policy makers may want to safeguard financial incentives to access the labour market for the unemployed.\textsuperscript{15} Their study shows empirically that increases in out-of-work income protection predominantly took place in countries where in-work protection increased, either through raising the minimum wage or through increasing in-work benefits. With low wages under pressure, an EU initiative could then provide momentum to ensure sufficiently high minimum wages in order to shift the entire floor of the welfare state.

Third, political arguments reflect the existential need for the EU to increase its legitimacy\textsuperscript{16} which was put even more into question after the harsh austerity measures issued in the wake of the 2008 crisis, even including cuts to nominal minimum wages in some countries.\textsuperscript{17} As Vandenbroucke puts it: “a political authority cannot survive without the diffuse support of the people belonging to its jurisdiction”.\textsuperscript{18} Therefore, such policies should not only be effective, but they should also be perceived as fair. In this sense, adequate minimum wages, linking back to the normative arguments summarized above, may very well be of prime importance. This highly visible policy instrument is generally perceived to guarantee that workers get their “fair share”.

3. Earlier proposals and the Commission’s consultation document

The EPSR calls for fair and adequate wages. Earlier proposals have mainly centred on defining a minimum floor for national minimum wages. Over the years, the EU debate on fair (minimum) wages has often proposed to operationalize this concept as a percentage of an indicator of national wages. In the 1970s the European Council defined an “equitable wage” as 68\% of the national average gross wage. This later changed to 60\% of the national average net wage. The 2007 and 2008 positions of the European Parliament asked the Council to agree an EU target for minimum wages to provide for remuneration of at least 60 per cent of the relevant average gross wage, and to agree a timetable for achieving that target in all Member States.\textsuperscript{19} In its 2016 report on social dumping, the European Parliament again called for a target wage floor at 60\% of the respective national average gross wage.\textsuperscript{20} In its recent pay rise campaign also the ETUC advocated for more coordinated minimum wages, to achieve a common strategy on low and minimum wages that

\textsuperscript{13} Watt (2019).
\textsuperscript{14} Andor (2019, Andor (2020).
\textsuperscript{15} Cantillon, Parolin and Collado (forthcoming).
\textsuperscript{16} Ferrera (2019) and Garben (2019).
\textsuperscript{17} Corti, Sabato and Van Hercke (2019).
\textsuperscript{18} Vandenbroucke (2019).
\textsuperscript{19} Schulten, Müller and Eldring (2015).
\textsuperscript{20} European Parliament (2016).
mandates all statutory minimum wages to be living wages of no less than 60% of the national median or average gross wage – whichever is more favourable to the workers.\(^{21}\)

Most recently, EU Commissioner for Jobs and Social Rights Nicolas Schmit committed to proposing a legislative EU initiative in the field of minimum wages. This process has officially started in January 2020 with a first stage consultation of the social partners.\(^{22}\) The Commission waits the difficult task of designing a legislative initiative that takes account of the very different situations in MSs and diverging demands of social partners, in an area where the EU’s legal competences are relatively uncertain.\(^{23}\)

This may explain the importance addressed in the consultation document to listing what the Commission does not aim to do in its new initiative, such as harmonizing minimum wage levels, installing uniform minimum wage setting mechanisms, or directly establishing levels of pay. The Commission also explicitly states that it does not seek to impose on countries with high coverage of collective bargaining and that it will respect national traditions. Rather, it identifies four fields for action: wage adequacy, coverage, institutionalized involvement of social partners in statutory minimum wage setting and regular and transparent national frameworks for minimum wage uprating. In the consultation document, wage adequacy is defined according to different parameters. Minimum wages are considered adequate if they are fair vis-à-vis the national wage distribution and if they provide a decent standard of living, in line with the economic and social conditions. Both an analysis of minimum wages relative to the median and the average gross wage, and of net incomes relative to the median equivalent household income is included.

This consultation document ultimately does not list concrete proposals, in line with its exploratory aim.\(^{24}\) The measures that the Commission identifies as potential candidates for the legal initiative refer to broader principles, such as supporting the Member States in making sure that minimum wages are adequate or that social partners are involved in minimum wage adjustment, all with the aim of tackling in-work poverty, creating a more level playing field for companies and taking account of national contexts. The added value of the EU initiative lies, according to the document, in renewing the political momentum for national initiatives, as an EU-wide initiative may limit concerns regarding external cost competitiveness.

In their reactions, the social partners have stressed that the identified aims may be better served by strengthening collective bargaining rather than through a minimum wage initiative.\(^{25}\) From the employer’s side, the preferred route is mainly to install mechanisms that allow for a timely and appropriate consultation of social partners, and to further strengthen the single market. The ETUC is in favour of strengthening collective bargaining at the sectoral level and sees a role for the

\(^{21}\) European Trade Union Confederation (2017).
\(^{22}\) European Commission (2020).
\(^{23}\) In this contribution, we will not focus on this issue. Suffice it to say that article 153(5) of the TFEU specifically excludes pay from EU competences. Scholars have highlighted alternative legal bases for an EU minimum wage initiative (see e.g. Aranguiz and Garben (2019)). However, in the current consultation document, the European Commission indicates it is considering an instrument devised under article 153 TFEU, taking account of case law that has previously reaffirmed the limited competences regarding pay under this legislative basis.
\(^{24}\) Müller and Schulten (2020).
\(^{25}\) BusinessEurope (2020) and ETUC (2020).
instrument of government procurement biddings, in making these only accessible to companies that recognize unions and participate in collective agreements. Overall, ETUC appears to be more in favour of EU level action, although they do request more information on the specific legal form the initiative would take, and the precise measures considered.

As these were at the time of writing not yet available, in this contribution we follow the earlier proposals that operationalize fair minimum wages as a percentage of a national reference wage. In addition, we follow the consultation document’s approach of defining adequate wages in terms of net incomes relative to the at-risk-of-poverty-threshold.

4. The non-trivial choice of a reference wage

The Commission’s consultation document highlights various aspects of minimum wage policy, that differ between countries. A minimum wage initiative striving for effective minimum wage protection “in line with the national habits and possibilities” will have to find ways to make progress on different fronts in order to become meaningful. In the remainder of this paper, we will focus on the issue of adequate minimum wage levels.

Most proposals (see section 2) consider it a step forward to define a (minimal or a target, depending on the proposal) minimum wage level as a percentage of the national median or average wage. This should lead to fairer wage differences, and provide more adequate income protection to workers. An important point is that setting a standard as a percentage of median wages requires “agreement on a common method for estimating median wages in each Member State”. This is no empty remark, and generally not addressed in recent proposals. In the posting of workers directive, national (host) Member States get to decide which wage components are included in the wage definition (such as holiday payments, remunerations for working abroad etc.). Whether or not such freedom will also be awarded in the definition of the reference wage will have an impact on the bite EU initiatives in the field of minimum wages can have.

The main Eurostat instrument for calculating median and average wages is the Structure of Earnings Survey (SES). This survey is conducted once every four years and provides, inter alia, information on the level of monthly and annual remuneration, annual paid leave and working hours for employees working in enterprises consisting of 10 employees or more. Annual earnings cover non-standard payments, such as holiday bonuses, annual in-kind payments or company bonuses. Monthly earnings are the cash earnings received in the reference month, before tax deductions and social security contributions payable by wage earners. In Figure 1 below, we present for each country its national statutory minimum wage for an adult full-time worker with no prior experience relative to different measures for median and average gross wages. The data refer to 2014, as this

26 Due to space limitations, we do not reiterate all these differences, that include the variation in nominal levels and related unit labour costs, variation in purchasing power, the statutory wage setting method, the minimum wage coverage and potential employment and productivity effects. See Eurofound (2019), Schulten, Müller and Eldring (2015), Marchal and Siöland (2019), Eurostat (2020), Dube (2019) and OECD (2015) for more information on these features.
27 Brischoux, Jaubertie, Gouardo, Lissot, Lellouch and Sode (2014).
is the most recent SES wave for which results are available. Figure 1 distinguishes between median and average wages, annual and monthly wages, and wages calculated on full-time workers only, or on all workers using full-time equivalent wages. It is clear that each one of these distinctions has an impact on the ratio of the statutory minimum wage with the reference wage. As full-time employees are usually paid more than part-time employees, median or average wages calculated on full-time equivalent wages are usually lower than when they only take account of wages earned by employees that work full-time. Including bonuses, holiday allowances and in-kind benefits in the reference wage concept – which may be warranted from an adequacy perspective - further decreases the ratio in most countries. The median wage is in general lower than the average wage: the ratio of the minimum wage to the full-time equivalent monthly median wage is usually the highest. In four countries, the minimum wage already reached 60% of this reference wage, at least in 2014: France, Portugal, Slovenia and the Netherlands, and the three former countries maintain this position when we turn to a monthly reference wage concept that is solely based on full-time employment. The countries with the least generous minimum wages in 2014 (Estonia, the Czech Republic, Spain and the United Kingdom) had a minimum to median wage ratio in the 40 – 45% range. As soon as we take account of annual wages in the denominator, not a single country succeeds in reaching the 60% threshold, and this is the case even though the minimum wage concept used also includes annual payments for countries where these are mandatory.

Average wages are generally substantially higher than median wages: even in the least generous reference wage concept (monthly fulltime equivalent), the most generous minimum wage in 2014 only reached 52% of the reference average wage. The least generous countries even fall back to the 30 – 35% range.
In sum, the exact operationalisation of a reference wage has a substantial impact on the precise minimum wage target, the size of which differs between countries. There may be good reasons to select one approach over another, or to leave the choice with the Member States or social partners, but these clearly should be made explicit.

5. **EU minimum wage coordination and net incomes of minimum wage families**

Tax benefit systems differ substantially between countries. Minimum wages will therefore not directly translate into adequate net disposable incomes. Tax wedges due to taxes and social insurance contributions at the minimum wage level range from 4.25% to 39.5% in the EU. Still, not only taxes and contributions have an impact on the minimum wage adequacy. In recent decades, governments have shifted towards supporting families relying on a single minimum wage, through lowering taxes and social insurance contributions, but also through increasing (in-work) benefits.

---

30 Eurofound (2019).
Additional support targeted at minimum wage levels in EU Member States has reached high levels, although, once again, variation is substantial.\textsuperscript{32}

Figure 2 shows the net disposable income and the various income components of two hypothetical families relying on a minimum wage: a 35 year old single person and a 35 year old lone parent with two children, aged 7 and 14. Both adults are assumed to work full-time, all year round, at the minimum wage, including mandatory annual holiday payments and bonuses if applicable. For these fictional families, we calculate the net disposable income in line with the applicable tax benefit rules. Calculations are based on the EUROMOD hypothetical household add-on HHoT.\textsuperscript{33} In order to gauge the adequacy of the net disposable income at minimum wage for these typical families, we compare the net income to the at-risk-of-poverty threshold, which is equal to 60 per cent of the national median equivalent disposable household income.

Generally, minimum wages at their 2014 level appear to suffice to protect a single person against poverty in most EU Member States, even when taking account of taxes and social insurance contributions, although this is in some countries (for instance the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Poland and France) thanks to specific additional means-tested benefits. It is worth noting that the situation in Figure 2 represents a best case scenario, in which the hypothetical household knows of these benefits, takes all the steps necessary to acquire those, and will effectively receive them. Both administrative and academic research into the issue of non-take-up has abundantly shown that this is not self-evident.\textsuperscript{34} In eight countries, net disposable income of a single minimum wage earner is below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold. With the exception of Estonia, gross minimum wages are usually above the poverty threshold, but taxes and social insurance contributions (in the absence of additional benefits) bring the net disposable income below the threshold.

Panel B of Figure 2 shows the net disposable income and the income components for a fictional lone parent with two children. The at-risk-of-poverty threshold for this family type is higher, since the needs for three persons are higher than for a single-person household. The additional benefits that this household receives (most importantly child benefits, but also housing allowances, social assistance top-ups and other income, such as income tax credits, lone parent supplements or in-work benefits) do not sufficiently compensate for the fact that one minimum wage now needs to cover these higher needs. In only five countries is the net disposable income of a lone parent household with 2 children above the at-risk-of-poverty threshold.

\textsuperscript{32} Cantillon, Marchal and Luigjes (2019)
\textsuperscript{33} Information on other assumptions made when defining the hypothetical families can be found in Marchal, Siöland and Goedemé (2018).
\textsuperscript{34} Bargain, Immervoll and Viitamäki (2012), Eurofound (2015)
Figure 2. Net disposable income at minimum wage relative to at-risk-of-poverty threshold, single and lone parent with 2 children, 2014

Panel A. Single

Panel B. Lone parent with 2 children

Note: Minimum wages are the national statutory minimum wage for a full-time white-collar adult worker with no prior experience, including mandatory bonuses.

Source: MIPI-HHoT (see Marchal et al., 2018).
A crucial issue is whether a minimum wage increase will actually bring the net disposable income of minimum wage families above the at-risk-of-poverty threshold. As illustrated by Figure 2, this increase would operate in a very crowded field of (means-tested) benefits and preferential tax treatments. The OECD has calculated the impact of a limited 5% increase in the minimum wage on the net disposable income of a lone parent family. In around a third of OECD countries, less than half of such an increase would trickle down to the net disposable income. In one country, the net disposable income would even decrease.35

In Figure 3, we present a similar exercise. For the same families included in Figure 2, we calculate the net disposable income at the 2014 minimum wage, at 60% of the 2014 fulltime equivalent monthly median wage (as a ‘least generous scenario’, see the previous section) and at 60% of the fulltime annual average wage (as a ‘most generous scenario’). These increases36 are for most countries far more substantial than the 5% increase that the OECD assumed for its exercise. An increase to an EU-wide minimum wage target of 60% of the national monthly median fulltime equivalent wage, would lift net disposable income for a single minimum wage earner over the at-risk-of-poverty threshold in 5 of the 8 countries where the minimum wage previously did not suffice. An increase to 60% of the average annual fulltime wage would lift the net disposable income of a single person above the poverty threshold in all EU Member States, although it would entail quite significant minimum wage increases.

Panel B of Figure 3 shows the results of the same exercise for a lone parent with 2 children. The EPSR states that the minimum wage target should contribute to adequate incomes for minimum wage workers and their families. It is clear from Figure 3 that accompanying measures will remain necessary. Even an increase to 60% of the average wage in the most generous scenario would in many countries not suffice to lift net disposable incomes above the poverty threshold, without supportive changes to the tax benefit system. As many of the current supportive measures are concentrated around very low incomes, an increase in the minimum wage under current tax benefit regulations often means an increase in the relative tax burden, and a decrease in benefits, that sometimes only barely compensates for envisaged increases in gross minimum wages.

---

35 OECD (2015)
36 As was already shown in Figure 1, four countries had in 2014 a statutory national minimum wage at or above 60% of the median full-time equivalent gross wage. For these countries (France, the Netherlands, Portugal and Slovenia), the second scenario included in Figure 3 shows the effect of a minor decrease in the minimum wage on net disposable income.
Figure 3. Net disposable income at current minimum wage, 60% of full time equivalent monthly median wage and 60% of annual average full time wage, as a percentage of the 60% at risk of poverty threshold, 2014

Panel A. Single person household
Panel B. Lone parent with 2 children
Note: mw: situation at current minimum wage, 60med: situation when minimum wage changes to 60% of full time equivalent monthly median wage; 60aw: situation when minimum wage increases to 60% of annual average full time wage

Source: author’s calculations based on EUROMOD – HHoT, methodology described in Marchal et al. (2018)

6. Discussion

In this paper, we assessed the potential impact on the adequacy of workers’ incomes of an EU minimum wage target of 60% of national median or average wages using hypothetical household simulations. We took these values as an illustrative case in order to highlight some caveats in EU initiatives on adequate minimum wages.

First, such an EU-wide target requires agreement on the exact benchmark to be used. Seemingly small, technical issues regarding the reference wage concept, may have a large impact on the actual minimum wage level that is pursued. Second, minimum wage hikes on their own will not suffice to provide adequate net disposable incomes for families in which more dependents rely on one minimum wage, as may be the case in lone parent families. For such families, already a broad arsenal of supportive benefits exists in most Member States, that often depend on means-tests. Whereas we can expect that the income thresholds for these benefits will often move along with minimum wage increases, this may not always be the case. The overall, net effect of minimum wage increases should therefore also be taken into account when promoting a higher minimum wage target from an adequacy perspective. In some countries, one may expect more progress from changes to the tax benefit systems in terms of adequate protection, in line with the different needs of specific family types and constellations, rather than across the board increases in the minimum wage level. Third, in a limited number of countries a minimum wage hike up to 60% of the monthly median wage does not suffice to protect a fulltime employed single person without dependents against poverty. This may indicate that not only minimum wages, but large parts of the wage structure are inadequate.

This is not to say that an EU wide initiative is superfluous. Scholars have stressed the desirability of EU action on minimum wages, even if such action would not immediately lead to adequate net disposable incomes for minimum wage earners. Recent research for instance shows that declining minimum wages are associated with declining out-of-work minimum income protection, another policy field the European Commission has included in the EPSR as a non-negligible factor in combating poverty (see also the contribution of Ane Fernandez de Aranguiz in this issue). Increasing minimum wages may therefore well create policy space to improve out-of-work protection. In a context where adequate incomes for low-skilled workers are both determined by the wages they can earn on the labour market, and the treatment of these wages in the tax-benefit system, such a step could minimize the additional financial effort governments have to target at

37 Müller and Schulten (2020) have in this regard argued for strengthening sectoral collective bargaining as a way to lift the entire wage structure, and not just the minimum wage. Alternatively, they see the need for comparing minimum wages to living wage measures, based on a basket of necessary goods and services.
low wage families\textsuperscript{38}. Others have stressed the need for transparent and predictable minimum wages in the context of labour mobility in the single market.\textsuperscript{39} An important political argument refers to the need to enhance the legitimacy of the EU by introducing more visible social advances.\textsuperscript{40} In spite of the practical issues highlighted in this contribution, it is clear from our analysis that an EU minimum wage target, even in a rather minimal form, would represent such an advance in many Member States.

References


—, ‘EU minimum wage: why now?’ The progressive post <https://progressivepost.eu/progressive-page/eu-minimum-wage-why-now>


Brischoux M and others, \textit{Mapping out the options for a European minimum wage standard} (Trésor-Economics, 2014)

BusinessEurope, \textit{Response to first phase social partner consultation on a possible action addressing the challenges related to fair minimum wages} (2020)


Corti F, Sabato S and Van Hercke B, ‘The European (Social) Union is in need of a ‘Social Imbalances Procedure’’ in Ferrera M and Vandenbroucke F (eds), \textit{Towards a European Social Union: The European Pillar of Social Rights and the Roadmap for a fully-fledged Social Union -}

\textsuperscript{38} Cantillon, Parolin and Collado (forthcoming) and Cantillon (2019)
\textsuperscript{39} Andor (2019), Vandenbroucke (2019).
\textsuperscript{40} Ferrera (2019).

Costamagna F, ‘The European Social Union as a “union of national welfare states”: a legal perspective’ in Ferrera M and Vandenbroucke F (eds), European Social Union: a public forum debate (Centro Einaudi 2019)


ETUC, ETUC REPLY to the First Phase Consultation of Social Partners under Article 154 TFEU on a possible action addressing the challenges related to fair minimum wages (ETUC 2020)


—–, Consultation document: First phase consultation of Social Partners under Article 154 TFEU on a possible action addressing the challenges related to fair minimum wages (Brussels 2020)


European Trade Union Confederation, Minimum wages: minimum wages should not be poverty wages (Briefing Note: Pay rise campaign, 2017)


Hufkens T and others, ‘The hypothetical household tool (HHoT) in EUROMOD: a new instrument for comparative research on tax-benefit policies in Europe’ (2019) 12 International journal of microsimulation, 68


Marchal S and Siöland L, A safety net that holds? Tracking minimum income protection adequacy for the elderly, the working and the non-working of active age (CSB Working Paper, 2019)


Müller T and Schulten T, *The European minimum wage on the doorstep* (ETUI policy brief, 2020)


