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District Magnitude and Home Styles of Representation in European Democracies

AUDREY ANDRÉ and SAM DEPAUW

How political representatives interact with constituents is contingent on the conditions under which they compete for re-election. It has been the assumption that intra-party competition shapes legislators' incentive to cultivate a personal reputation and thereby the incentive to engage in any constituency-oriented action that reputation may be built on. Using data from the PARTIREP cross-national survey among regional and national legislators in 12 European democracies, the assumption is proven to be inaccurate: focusing on more than one action at a time, it becomes clear that district magnitude increases the time representatives spend on some constituency-oriented actions and decreases the time they spend on others (even when the electoral incentive to nurture a personal reputation is strong). The article demonstrates that representatives' choice to engage in four constituency-oriented actions is related to the nature of these home styles and their electoral utility in a given context.

Legislators, almost by definition, spend part of their time in the capital and part in the district that elected them. Seeking re-election, legislators across the globe decide on a home style and engage in a variety of constituency-oriented actions to gain name recognition and visibility 'as a person' among constituents. Legislators redress constituents' grievances, look after the social and economic interests of the area, and/or frequently meet with organised interests that command larger groups of constituents. While building a favourable personal reputation in the district is a continuous process occurring in large part between elections, legislators' home styles cannot be separated from the conditions they compete under for re-election (Fenno 1978). District magnitude, in particular, has a differential effect on the incentive legislators have to nurture a personal reputation among constituents (Carey and Shugart 1995): the relative value of a personal reputation increases with district magnitude in open-list systems, but decreases in closed-list systems as magnitude grows. Because incentives cannot be readily observed research has concentrated on a

large number of personal vote-seeking proxies. More importantly, research has concentrated on one proxy at a time thereby putting forward, as a body of literature, the assumption that district magnitude has the same differential effect on any one of these proxies. But empirical evidence points in the opposite direction: with district magnitude some proxies increase, some decrease and still others are unaffected.

This article aims to contribute to this growing body of research by demonstrating that electoral rules shape legislators' *incentives* to cultivate a personal reputation, but the effect that district magnitude has will depend on the *nature* of the personal reputation they seek to build (Mitchell 2000: 347). Data from the PARTIREP cross-national survey among national and regional legislators in 12 European democracies will be used to show that there are important differences in the home styles that legislators across Europe favour and that these differences are shaped by the conditions under which legislators compete for re-election. The argument will proceed in five steps. The first section presents the theoretical foundations for district magnitude's differential effect on legislators' incentives to nurture a personal reputation. It further shows the apparent contradictory findings in previous studies. The second section argues that magnitude's effect in open-list systems is conditional upon the particular behavioural strategy that reputation is built on and develops a theoretical argument that accounts for these differences. The third section introduces the PARTIREP data and the case selection. The fourth section demonstrates that legislators' incentive to nurture a personal reputation among constituents increases with district magnitude in open-list systems, but decreases in closed-list systems as magnitude grows. The fifth section discusses the effect that district magnitude has on the manner in which this incentive is translated into various constituency-oriented actions, before concluding with some suggestions for further research.

Linking Personal Vote-Seeking Behaviour to District Magnitude

Electoral rules structure the options open to voters and shape the incentives legislators have to act in certain ways (Shugart 2008: 50). That is, the options open to voters on the ballot paper determine the relative value of a legislator's personal record to his re-election, compared to the record of the party whose label he is running under. The public record of the party naturally ties together the re-election probabilities of co-partisan candidates, based on party identifications among the electorate, the state of the economy, or the party's manifesto pledges (Cain *et al.* 1987; Cox and McCubbins 1993). Even so, the option to mark a single candidate's name on the ballot may cause the interests of individual candidates running under the same party label to diverge from the party interest. Provided preference votes can be expected to alter the order in which seats are allocated to candidates, legislators have an incentive to cultivate a personal reputation. In particular, Carey and Shugart (1995) argued that district magnitude has a differential effect on the relative value of a legislator's

personal reputation as compared to the party record: in open-list systems that relative value increases with district magnitude, but decreases in closed-list systems as magnitude grows. In fact, district magnitude shapes the incentive that legislators have to cultivate a personal reputation, it is argued, irrespective, that is, of the manner in which it is built (Carey and Shugart 1995: 419).

The key to understanding the relative value to legislators of a personal reputation is intra-party competition, Carey and Shugart (1995) explained, as it ensues from voters' ability to alter the party-preferred order in which seats are allocated to candidates. Where there is intra-party competition, a legislator has the incentive to nurture a personal reputation that sets him apart from co-partisans running under the same party label. The incentive grows stronger the more co-partisans there are on the ballot for every seat to be won. District magnitude is the key determinant of that ratio, Carey and Shugart (1995: 431) maintained – provided, we would add, there are no penalties for overnomination (see Crisp *et al.* 2007).¹ Where there is no intra-party competition, district magnitude decreases the incentive that legislators have to cultivate personal reputations. When the order in which seats are allocated is fixed, a legislator's probability of re-election is determined by the electoral fortunes of the party alone (given his position on the list). Only in low-magnitude districts can a legislator markedly improve his re-election prospect by his efforts to attract additional votes to the party (Shugart 2008: 46). Because voters cannot reward individual efforts, they will have no incentive to monitor the efforts of one among a multitude of candidates and shirking will ensue among legislators (Bowler and Farrell 1993; Carey and Shugart 1995: 430; Lancaster 1986).

Even where legislators share similar electoral incentives to cultivate a personal reputation among constituents, however, there are marked differences between the constituency-oriented actions they engage in. Some legislators are popular 'native sons' born and raised in the district, some are diligent caseworkers, and still others take positions on local issues that run counter the party. Even though studies acknowledge that one personal vote-seeking strategy may replace another (Mitchell 2000: 347) – a *caveat* that Carey and Shugart (1995: 430 and 432) did not fail to point out – taken together this body of literature that grew out of Carey and Shugart's (1995) article put forward the assumption that a common goal similarly ties all constituency-oriented actions together: to gain name recognition and approval among constituents. As a result, district magnitude is assumed to have a differential effect on any single strategy of personal vote-seeking. The assumption is inaccurate, however.

This body of literature, as Table 1 illustrates, has further yielded mixed evidence. Surprisingly few comparative studies have addressed the intra-party dimension of electoral rules due to the cost of data collection (Shugart 2008: 45). More often studies have turned to cases that combine a number of electoral rules in one institutional context: in the European Parliament, in mixed-member systems, or after electoral reform. Though the distinction between open-list and closed-list systems is not always made, what evidence there is from this brief review of the existing literature suggests that

TABLE 1
DISTRICT MAGNITUDE'S DIFFERENTIAL EFFECT IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Author	Focus	Data	Results
a. Comparative research:			
Crisp <i>et al.</i> (2004)	Particularised bills	Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Honduras, and Venezuela	DM: positive effect in open-list and negative effect in closed-list (n.s.) Greater in SMDs than in MMDs
Heitshusen <i>et al.</i> (2005)	Constituency attention	Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, and the UK	
Shugart <i>et al.</i> (2005)	(1) Born in the district (2) Local office	Finland, Luxembourg, Norway, Spain, Portugal, and Switzerland	DM: positive effect in open-list and negative effect in closed-list
Sieberer (2006)	Dissent	large-N	DM: no effect
Weßels (1999)	Constituency representation	EU member states	DM: negative effect (no distinction between open-list and closed-list)
b. Single-case studies:			
Bowler and Farrell (1993)	Time spent on constituents' demands	European Parliament	DM (ordinal): positive effect (no distinction between open-list and closed-list) District members more than list members
Bradbury and Mitchell (2007)	Surgeries	Wales and Scotland	
Farrell and Scully (2007)	(1) Importance of representing individual constituents (2) Consult individual constituents	European Parliament	DM: positive effect in open-list (n.s.) and negative effect in closed-list (n.s.)
Ferrara (2004)	Dissent	Italy	No difference between district and list members
Ingall and Crisp (2001)	Trips to the district	Colombia	DM: positive effect in open-list
Kerevel (2010)	Dissent	Mexico	No difference between district and list members
Lundberg (2007)	Contact with constituents	Germany and UK	District members more than list members
Lutz and Selb (2010)	Personal campaign	Switzerland	DM: negative effect (open-list)
Stratmann and Baur (2002)	Committee assignments	Germany	District members more in pork committees than list members

magnitude's effect is invariably negative in closed-list systems, but can be either positive or negative in open-list systems. Where voters cannot directly sanction candidates and the order of intra-party seat allocation is fixed, legislators' incentive to shirk constituent demands grows stronger as party lists grow longer. Where legislators have an incentive to set themselves apart from co-partisan competitors in constituents' minds, on the other hand, they face an effort–efficiency trade-off in determining which of the myriad of personal vote-seeking actions best serve their re-election goal.

Solving the Puzzle in Open-List Systems: The Nature of Home Styles

There is frequently a tension between the collective accountability of political parties and the accountability of the individual representative in systems with effective preferential voting (Carey 2009). Disciplined parties enact into law the policies promised in the course of the campaign. The individual representative on his part is accountable to his constituents and the anticipation of not being re-elected will make legislators act in a manner that they believe will yield personal votes in the next election (Mansbridge 2003). Fenno's (1978: 33) notion of 'home style' best captures the sum of legislators' constituency-oriented actions. As such, the concept can easily be transposed to the context of multi-member districts. A legislator's home style constitutes a series of individual and deliberate choices as to the allocation of his time, actively engaging in some constituency-oriented actions but not in others. Legislators have considerable discretion in deciding how to keep in touch with constituents. That is, the full choice set of legislators by the very 'aesthetic' nature of political representation continues to elude us; entrepreneurial representatives always find new issues and new behaviours to connect to constituents (see e.g. Manin 1997; Saward 2010). But their appeals tend to be cast more narrowly under conditions of intra-party competition, focusing on territorial sub-constituencies or social groups and identities (Ames 1995; Crisp and Desposato 2004; Myerson 1993).

In open-list systems, we argue, the effort–efficiency trade-off a legislator faces in choosing which constituency-oriented actions to engage in critically depends on the marginal cost of reaching an additional constituent. Interactions with a single person at a time require a greater effort on the part of a legislator per person reached than communications that are heard or seen by a large audience at once. With district magnitude grows both the number of people living in the district and the number of candidates running. Therefore legislators will come to favour one-to-many communications over one-to-one interactions for reasons of time and cost efficiency (Fenno 1978). Voters, on their part, typically are not willing to spend the time and effort needed to keep track of a multitude of candidates and will stop paying attention to the most demanding information cues first (Shugart *et al.* 2005). As a result, the effectiveness of a particular constituency-oriented action is assumed to decrease the greater the effort involved on the part of the legislator and the more demanding the action is on the part of constituents.

In seeking to optimise effectiveness, legislators competing for re-election in open-list systems can be expected to shift their scarce resources away from constituency-oriented actions that target individual constituents to actions centred on collective appeals as districts grow in magnitude. Casework and project work in particular epitomise individual versus collective strategies in constituency service (Cain *et al.* 1987). Casework on the one hand involves informing and assisting individual constituents in their private dealings with public authorities (Eulau and Karps 1977); project work on the other hand looks after the district's collective social and economic interests. 'Local promoters' claim credit for helping local businesses in securing contracts or loans, saving an army base from closure, attracting public funds for roadworks or the improvement of schools and hospitals in the district and so on (Cain *et al.* 1987; Norton and Wood 1993; Searing 1985). Alternatively, high-magnitude districts, being more proportional, enable legislators to mobilise the support of groups of constituents who share a particular social identity but who are spread more thinly across the district (Bawn and Thies 2003). Legislators may do so by maintaining close ties with their organisations: central to the notion of social identities is the assumption that constituents care, and learn, more about issues that are related to their (multiple) identities (Bishin 2009).

In open-list systems, therefore, an increase in district magnitude can be expected to decrease a legislator's probability of providing casework, but increase his probability of engaging in project work and social group representation. In order to isolate the effect of district magnitude, a number of elements need to be controlled for. First, the geographical location of the district constrains the amount of time the legislator is able to spend there, given his responsibilities in the capital. These constraints are most keenly felt on actions that require the legislator's physical presence and cannot be easily delegated. Second, a legislator's responsibilities and ambitions in the capital commonly shift over time (Fenno 1978). In the early, expansionist, years of his career, a legislator will spend more time in the constituency compared to the later, protectionist, stages of his career. Third, due to differences in life experiences, female legislators can be expected to be more committed to constituency service than their male colleagues (Richardson and Freeman 1995; Thomas 1992). Fourth, party ideologies may differently affect constituency-oriented actions, in particular when tied to specific target audiences. In addition, co-partisans may tend to represent similar constituencies in terms of the urban or rural internal make-up. Previous studies have been inconclusive, however, as to whether left- or right-wing parties, whether urban or rural parties adopt a more service-oriented home style in particular (Jewell 1983). Alternatively, parties may matter because they differ in size. It is only when a critical mass of legislators is reached that policy making and parliamentary responsibilities can be shared and time is freed up to spend among constituents. Small parliamentary party groups thus lack the capacity to implement a 'division of labour' (Patzelt 2007). Finally, the level of government must be accounted for.

TABLE 2
CONSTITUENCY REPRESENTATION IN 12 EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

		Response rate		Ballot Open-list	District magnitude		
		Responses	Proportion		Min.	Max.	Mean
Austria	National	55	0.3	0–1	1	36	7.5
	Regional (9)	172	0.38	0–1	1	26	6.6
Belgium	National	70	0.47	1	4	24	13.6
	Regional (4)	93	0.3	1	2	72	35.1
Germany	National	134	0.22	0	1	65	2
	Regional (4)	145	0.34	0	1	65	1.9
Hungary		99	0.26	0	1	64	1.9
Ireland		34	0.22	1	3	5	3.9
Israel		39	0.33	0	120	120	120
Italy	National	45	0.07	0	1	44	24.2
	Regional (6)	83	0.23	0–1	1	42	8.9
Netherlands		65	0.43	0	150	150	150
Poland		55	0.12	1	7	19	11.2
Portugal	National	76	0.33	0	2	47	10.5
	Regional (2)	42	0.4	0	2	47	26.4
Switzerland	National	49	0.25	1	1	34	7.7
	Regional (25)	555	0.22	1	1	100	19.6
United Kingdom	National	62	0.1	0	1	1	1
	Regional (2)	45	0.24	0	1	7	1.5

Note: The table displays the response rates calculated as the ratio between the number of respondents and the size of the population. The number of regional parliaments in the selection is indicated in parentheses. The table further indicates the coding of ballot structure and the mean, minimum, and maximum value of district magnitude by country and level of government.

Regional legislators are often elected in smaller districts and are expected to have more contact with constituents (Patzelt 2007).

The PARTIREP Cross-national MP Survey

Contrary to previous studies, the PARTIREP study includes a range of constituency-oriented actions thereby highlighting the differential effect that district magnitude has on behaviour that is commonly identified as personal vote-seeking. The PARTIREP cross-national study hosted by the Vrije Universiteit Brussel surveyed national and regional legislators in 12 European democracies. Included are national and regional legislatures in Austria, Belgium, Germany (Brandenburg, Lower Saxony, Rhineland-Palatinate, and Thuringia), Italy (Calabria, Campania, Lazio, Lombardy, Toscana, and Valle d’Aosta), Portugal (Madeira and the Azores), Switzerland (25 cantons, excl. Appenzell-Innerrhoden²), and the United Kingdom (Scotland and Wales). Added are the national parliaments in five unitary states: Hungary, Ireland, Israel, the Netherlands, and Poland. Between March 2009 and January 2012, all members of the selected legislatures were contacted at least three times, employing a variety of methods: legislators typically received an introduction

letter and e-mail inviting them to participate by web-based survey. They further received at least two online reminders (excluding 'hard' refusals) and they were offered the option to fill out a print questionnaire or to be interviewed. A final invitation was by telephone in many countries. Table 2 reports the number of respondents in each parliament. The overall response is about one in four: lower or higher response rates are not concentrated in either open-list or closed-list electoral systems. While the numbers of national legislators responding are comparable across countries, there are marked differences between the numbers of regional legislators responding reflecting the constitutional structure of the countries, as well as the choice to focus on a limited number of regions in Germany and Italy. Weights therefore correct for the over-representation of the Swiss cantons in the selection and, in addition, for minor differences in response between parliamentary parties.

The selection of parliaments displays a wide diversity on the independent variable of main interest, the electoral rules, allowing for the cross-national comparison of behavioural consequences of institutional contexts. Included are a combination of 'open-list systems' where preferential voting significantly affects the allocation of seats to candidates (Belgium, Ireland, Poland, and Switzerland) and 'closed-list systems' where preferential voting does not (Israel, the Netherlands, and Portugal).³ Electoral systems are not always uniform within a single country, moreover. The UK House of Commons uses single-seat plurality to elect its members, while the Welsh Assembly and the Scottish Parliament use mixed-member systems. Nor are rules uniform across regions in Italy.⁴ Mixed-member systems by definition combine a nominal and proportional tier (Germany and Hungary): according to Carey and Shugart's (1995) instructions both tiers are coded as closed-list, albeit of different magnitude.⁵ Parliaments in Austria, finally, adopted PR systems with complex districting, using varying electoral formulae and ballot types in the different tiers.⁶ Respondents are elected in districts of various magnitudes, ranging from single-seat districts to at-large nationwide constituencies. In addition to the ballot structure, Table 2 summarises for each country and level of government the mean, minimum and maximum values of district magnitude.

The PARTIREP cross-national survey asked legislators about the strategic allocation of their scarcest and most precious resource: their time (Fenno 1978). The time a legislator typically spends in the district (TIME) is arguably not an action – but rather reveals a more general attentiveness to the constituency. On average a legislator spends about 90 hours per month in the district, but some spend almost all of their time among constituents. The survey further includes four 'constituency-oriented actions' that time can be spent on. The four actions do not exhaustively constitute the choice set of legislators in terms of personal vote-seeking. But they are four of the most common personal vote-seeking strategies and they differ in the marginal cost to legislators of reaching an additional constituent: the first two constitute alternative operationalisations of legislators' service responsiveness to individual constituents. An 'aggressive casework strategy' identifying constituency members is characterised according

TABLE 3
LEGISLATORS' CONSTITUENCY-ORIENTED ACTIONS IN THE PARTIREP
CROSS-NATIONAL MP SURVEY

	Personal vote incentive	Constituency-oriented actions			
		Individual		Collective	
		CASEWORK	SOLICIT	PROJECT	ORGANISATION
	TIME Number of hours per month	More than 5 hours per week	Actually do it	Most important task	Contact on a weekly basis
Austria	135.4	43.1	70.6	41.4	48.5
Belgium	120.0	39.3	31.6	14.9	18.9
Germany	111.5	28.1	63.9	37.7	37.7
Hungary	69.8	34.8	98.3	31.5	39.9
Ireland	113.3	91.5	85.0	27.6	27.5
Israel	8.2	52.7	51.6	7.6	39.5
Italy	61.5	57.4	51.8	47.1	35.1
Netherlands	49.2	31.1	10.4	2.3	42.4
Poland	95.0	50.4	82.7	24.4	25.7
Portugal	74.5	34.5	64.7	26.4	32.9
Switzerland	51.2	7.8	39.3	25.3	21.0
UK	74.6	81.5	89.2	32.7	32.9
Mean	91.6	40.6	61.0	30.4	34.5

Note: The table displays the average number of hours legislators spend in their district and the percentage of legislators that frequently engages in each of the actions.

to Searing (1994) by the time spent doing casework; while Cain *et al.* (1987) emphasise members actively soliciting casework. The other two concern their responsiveness to territorially and functionally defined groups of constituents. Table 3 displays the percentage of legislators engaging in each of these constituency-oriented actions. The exact question wording and operationalisation of the dependent variables can be found in the Appendix.

About 40 per cent of all legislators report spending more than half a day per week handling requests from individual constituents for help in dealing with public authorities (CASEWORK). Holding surgeries or clinics is a common way to collect cases: they have office hours in the city hall or in the local party headquarters where constituents turn up with their grievances – not unlike at a medical practice. Three in five legislators also make the extra effort and actively solicit additional cases by putting advertisements in the local newspaper or by visiting neighbourhoods (SOLICIT). Legislators, moreover, try to win public acclaim for attracting businesses to and obtaining grants for the district. One in three considers looking after the collective social and economic needs of the local area the single most important task they fulfil as elected representatives (PROJECT). A comparable number has weekly contacts with interest organisations that command a greater number of people (ORGANISATION).

Table 3 not only underlines the importance of home connections in PR-list systems. It further reveals substantial cross-national variation in the selection. With the exception of Switzerland, no country displays percentages that are

consistently below or above the mean across all constituency-oriented actions: legislators choose to nurture one personal reputation but not the other. Despite the scope of intra-party competition, Swiss legislators consistently engage with lower frequency in constituency-focused activities. They are part-time politicians and therefore have less time to spend on politics overall (Hughes 1985).

The empirical analysis and discussion of the results will proceed in two steps. District magnitude's hypothesised differential effect in open- and closed-list systems on a legislator's *incentive* to nurture a personal reputation among constituents will first be addressed by looking at the time spent in the district. Then we turn to the impact district magnitude has on the likelihood that legislators build that personal reputation in a particular manner. The assumption is put to the test that – unlike in closed-list systems – a legislator's choice of home style in open-list systems reflects an optimal balance between the effort involved on his part and the anticipated effectiveness in reaching a sufficient number of constituents.

District Magnitude's Effect on Electoral Incentives

The incentives that legislators have to cultivate a personal reputation are not directly observable (Shugart 2008: 46). Because the number of hours spent in the constituency is not linked to any single action, however, it is rather an indication of a more general attitude of constituency attentiveness. As such, the time per month a legislator typically spends in the constituency is assumed to approximate a legislator's electoral incentives: it is expected to increase with district magnitude in open-list systems and decrease in closed-list systems as district magnitude grows. The number of hours a legislator spends in his constituency is a count variable – i.e. all values are non-negative integers. It is best analysed by the negative binomial regression model: there is strong evidence that the distribution of TIME is over-dispersed (Long and Freese 2006).⁷ With an average of 91.6 and a standard deviation of 76.7, the distribution of the time spent in the district is strongly skewed to the right.

The primary independent variables are district magnitude and open-list, a dichotomous indicator coded '1' for effective preferential systems and '0' for closed-list systems. By taking the decimal logarithm of district magnitude, we account for the intuition that an increase in magnitude in the low range will affect legislators' personal vote-seeking incentives more than an increase in the high range. To assess the expected conditional effect of district magnitude, both variables enter the model as a multiplicative interaction. Confidence in the results is increased by adding country-specific fixed effects to the model that control for the impact of alternative system-level determinants. The analysis further accounts for the effect of seniority, sex, the party's ideological position on a left–right scale, the size of the parliamentary party group, the district's distance from the capital, and the level of government.⁸ Table 4 reports the summary statistics of the independent variables.

TABLE 4
SUMMARY STATISTICS (MEAN, STANDARD DEVIATION AND RANGE) OF THE
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

	Mean	s.d.	Min.	Max.
District magnitude (log)	11.7	3.9	1	150
Seniority in years	5.1	6.3	0	54
Left-right position	5.0	1.9	0	10
Party size (log)	38.9	3.2	1	309
Distance in km (log)	37.2	7.4	0	1691

The estimated negative binomial regression coefficients, robust standard errors, and parameters of model fit are presented in Table 5. In non-linear models, the coefficient of an interaction term lacks a straightforward understanding, however: it is conditional upon the values of all other explanatory variables. To ease interpretation, model simulations are run using CLARIFY in STATA (King *et al.* 2000). That is, the number of hours a legislator is expected to spend among constituents in open-list and closed-list systems was computed across a range of district magnitude while keeping all other variables constant. To test whether the slope of the effect of district magnitude is statistically significant in both list types, a significance test of the difference in expected counts between the minimum and maximum simulated values was performed. Figure 1 presents the results graphically. The solid and broken lines depict the expected counts in systems with closed lists and effective preferential voting respectively. Bold lines indicate that on the basis of the 90 per cent confidence interval the null hypothesis that district magnitude has no effect can be rejected.

In addition to cross-national differences, constituency attention is a product of expectations in both the party and the district. It is more important to leftist parties that legislators are in close contact with the district than to parties further to the right. The number of representatives there are in a parliamentary party, on the other hand, does not explain the amount of time that legislators typically spend in the district. But a legislator's physical presence in the district increases with the district's distance from the seat of parliament – though distance effects tail off when travelling time constraints cross a particular threshold. The district's distance from the capital, it seems, is also related to the development of distinct local identities and resentment of being ruled from the capital (Searing 1985). Contrary to our expectations, national legislators, men, and long-time veterans in parliament do not spend markedly less time in the district that elected them.

Even after controlling for differences between countries, parties, and districts, district magnitude is found to shape legislators' incentive to be attentive to the constituency.⁹ District magnitude has a differential effect in open- and closed-list systems. In open-list systems the coefficient of magnitude is positive ($b_1 + b_2$). Figure 1 demonstrates that intra-party competition increases the

TABLE 5
DISTRICT MAGNITUDE, TIME IN THE CONSTITUENCY AND CONSTITUENCY-ORIENTED ACTIONS

	TIME		CASEWORK		SOLICIT		PROJECT		ORGANISATION	
	b.	s.e.	b.	s.e.	b.	s.e.	b.	s.e.	b.	s.e.
District magnitude (b1)	-0.262	(0.046)***	-0.319	(0.151)**	-0.494	(0.155)***	-0.670	(0.150)***	-0.087	(0.138)
Open-list * magnitude (b2)	0.669	(0.115)***	-0.497	(0.404)	-0.068	(0.329)	1.647	(0.350)***	0.831	(0.377)**
Open-list (b3)	-0.218	(0.146)	0.992	(0.478)**	0.459	(0.440)	-0.811	(0.453)*	-0.063	(0.446)
Seniority	-0.003	(0.004)	-0.002	(0.011)	-0.009	(0.011)	-0.027	(0.013)**	-0.034	(0.012)***
Female	-0.010	(0.053)	-0.100	(0.154)	-0.291	(0.148)**	-0.027	(0.154)	0.225	(0.140)
Left-right	-0.030	(0.013)**	-0.019	(0.036)	-0.025	(0.034)	-0.041	(0.038)	-0.081	(0.035)**
Party size	-0.097	(0.071)	-0.394	(0.191)**	0.025	(0.180)	0.394	(0.209)*	0.023	(0.181)
Distance	0.075	(0.037)**	0.099	(0.098)	0.103	(0.096)	0.323	(0.109)**	0.139	(0.092)
Regional parliament	0.087	(0.066)	0.022	(0.195)	0.004	(0.182)	0.906	(0.202)***	-0.224	(0.186)
Austria	0.324	(0.136)**	-0.191	(0.326)	-0.036	(0.315)	0.042	(0.361)	0.364	(0.325)
Belgium	-0.129	(0.154)	-0.291	(0.411)	-1.701	(0.405)***	-1.915	(0.459)***	-1.672	(0.436)***
Germany	0.299	(0.114)***	-0.400	(0.275)	-0.291	(0.265)	-0.134	(0.294)	0.082	(0.271)
Ireland	0.160	(0.202)	2.080	(0.702)***	0.338	(0.616)	-0.027	(0.640)	-0.714	(0.575)
Israel	-1.959	(0.267)***	0.862	(0.457)*	-0.065	(0.458)	-0.170	(0.627)	0.570	(0.461)
Italy	-0.555	(0.138)***	0.812	(0.331)***	-0.722	(0.327)**	0.209	(0.351)	-0.393	(0.338)
Hungary	-0.146	(0.143)	-0.029	(0.326)	3.125	(0.751)***	0.009	(0.376)	0.256	(0.324)
Netherlands	-0.100	(0.181)	0.078	(0.410)	-2.297	(0.492)***	-1.732	(1.047)	0.252	(0.385)
Poland	-0.172	(0.183)	0.321	(0.489)	0.380	(0.555)	-1.170	(0.609)*	-1.350	(0.512)***
Portugal	Omitted		Omitted		Omitted		Omitted		Omitted	
Switzerland	-0.851	(0.164)***	-2.385	(0.453)***	-1.401	(0.377)***	-1.221	(0.399)***	-1.369	(0.396)***
United Kingdom	-0.226	(0.130)*	1.895	(0.388)**	0.936	(0.416)**	-0.623	(0.361)*	-0.088	(0.353)
Constant	4.747	(0.186)***	0.358	(0.490)	1.235	(0.458)***	-1.407	(0.535)***	-0.298	(0.470)
N	1672		1641		1772		1715		1740	
Log pseudo-likelihood	-6793.47		-740.19		-731.23		-692.35		-807.65	
LRI(df)	435.30	(20)***	227.21	(20)***	322.23	(20)***	178.91	(20)***	87.79	(20)***
Nagelkerke r^2	22.9		20.0		26.2		16.6		7.9	

Note: For TIME, negative binomial regression coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses) are displayed. For the four constituency-oriented actions, the table displays the parameter estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) of logit models. * $p \leq 0.10$; ** $p \leq 0.05$; *** $p \leq 0.01$, using two-tailed t-values.

FIGURE 1
SIMULATED EFFECT OF DISTRICT MAGNITUDE ON TIME SPENT IN THE DISTRICT

Note: The lines indicate the simulated expected counts of spending time in the district in districts of varying magnitude. Shaded areas are the 90 per cent confidence intervals and bold lines are statistically significant.

incentive for legislators to be physically present in the district more frequently. Changing district magnitude from its minimum to its maximum observed value markedly increases the number of hours spent in the district by 95 – give or take 49 hours.¹⁰ On the other hand, the negative coefficient of district magnitude in closed-list systems (b_1) indicates that legislators spend considerably less time among constituents as district magnitude grows. The predicted count decreases from 95 to 56 hours per month in the district when comparing legislators elected in single-seat districts to those elected in a large nationwide constituency – a change significant at the 0.05 level.¹¹ Only in single-seat districts did legislators elected on the basis of closed lists spend more time in the district than legislators elected on open lists: at a district magnitude of two both lines intersect in Figure 1. Closed- and open-list systems can however clearly be distinguished at magnitudes greater than about 8 – that is, the 90 per cent confidence intervals for both list types diverge when the number of seats to be allocated in a district exceeds eight.

District Magnitude's Effect on Constituency-Oriented Actions

Even where legislators have strong incentives to cultivate a personal reputation, they may be found not to engage in constituency-oriented actions that are nonetheless typically called personal vote-seeking. That is, legislators may engage in one type of constituency-oriented behaviour but not in another. They

FIGURE 2
SIMULATED EFFECT OF DISTRICT MAGNITUDE ON CONSTITUENCY-ORIENTED
ACTIONS

Note: The lines indicate the simulated predicted probabilities of engaging in a particular constituency-oriented action in districts of varying magnitude. Shaded areas are the 90 per cent confidence intervals and bold lines are statistically significant.

make their choice on the basis of the individual or collective nature of the behaviour, given the district magnitude. While one-to-one interactions may still be electorally rewarding in low-magnitude districts, legislators in high-magnitude districts are expected to turn to one-to-many communications. That variance is captured by the four constituency-oriented actions presented in Table 3. A logistic regression model is the appropriate estimation technique for these dichotomous dependent variables. The estimated logit coefficients, robust standard errors, and measures of model fit are added to Table 5. Figure 2 further depicts a legislator's predicted probability of engaging in a particular constituency-oriented action in open-list and closed-list systems across a range of district magnitudes.¹² Analogous to the previous analysis, all models include the control variables and country dummies. As none of the control variables is consistently found to have an effect across the different models, the discussion of the findings will concentrate on the conditions legislators compete under for re-election.

In line with the hypotheses formulated above, district magnitude has a negative impact on the perceived effectiveness of assisting constituents in their private dealings with public authorities in open-list and closed-list systems alike. Elected representatives provide information and act as a mediator,

confidant, prop and stay to constituents. They believe that the reputation of being accessible will spread beyond those constituents they assisted (Fenno 1978). But the personal reputation that might ensue is rapidly outdistanced by the effort required to reach large numbers of constituents in this manner. Changing district magnitude from a single-seat district to an at-large constituency decreases legislators' predicted probability of spending more than five hours per week handling constituent casework requests by 39 per cent in open-list systems and by 15 per cent in closed-list systems (CASEWORK). Their probability of actively soliciting additional cases by putting advertisements in the local newspaper or by visiting neighbourhoods similarly falls by more than 20 per cent in both list types (SOLICIT). Figure 2 moreover provides some tentative evidence that representatives respond strategically to the incentives generated by their re-election context: at any given district magnitude legislators competing in systems with effective preferential voting put more effort into dealing with casework on behalf of individual constituents than their colleagues in closed-list systems. Caution is warranted, however, in overstating this conclusion because the difference between both ballot types does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance.

District magnitude, on the other hand, has a clear differential effect in open-list and closed-list systems on legislators' probability of engaging in personal vote-seeking actions that reach a multitude of constituents at once. The target audience may then be defined in terms of territorial interests or social group identities. Legislators elected off fixed party lists become increasingly unlikely to identify looking after the collective social and economic needs of the local area as their single most important task when districts grow in magnitude. Where voters can alter the order in which candidates are elected, by contrast, project work gains attractiveness with district magnitude (PROJECT). The significance test of both slopes further increases confidence in our findings: legislators' likelihood of pursuing constituency projects significantly decreases with 23 per cent in closed-list systems as districts grow in magnitude from 1 to 100, but increases with 44 per cent in open-list systems. That project work in low-magnitude districts seems to be somewhat more common among legislators in closed-list systems than in open-list systems is largely the product of single-seat districts moreover: the slopes of both list types, Figure 1 indicates, intersect when district magnitude equals 3. Where a legislator is the sole representative of a distinct geographical area, credit claiming for 'bringing home the bacon' is indivisible and free-riding is not an issue (Bowler and Farrell 1993; Buck and Cain 1990). In districts with a magnitude of more than 13 seats, however, a legislator's predicted probability of doing project work is systematically higher in open-list systems than in closed-list systems.

Having frequent contact with economic, social, and cultural organisations serves a similar purpose: it signals to those constituents identifying with the group in question the legislator's knowledge of the group's problems, needs, and wants, as well as his dedication to solve and defend these (ORGANISATION). The likelihood of cultivating a personal reputation for advocating the

interests of a particular group markedly increases from 34 to 69 per cent in systems with effective preferential voting, a change significant at the 0.05 level. The finding that close contact with organised interests may in fact yield a personal vote disproves Bawn and Thies' assumption that parties face a trade-off regarding organised interests: their presence on the ballot will net campaign contributions, but cost votes (Bawn and Thies 2003). Candidates who are responsive to organised interests need not be 'hidden' on the party list in open-list systems. Disseminating one's name among the members of a particular group is less favoured in closed-list systems. Even though we can tell both list types apart as district magnitude exceeds 16, we cannot be certain at any level of statistical significance that maintaining contact with organisations will decrease with magnitude in closed-list systems. That many political parties have natural allies among organised interests may plausibly account for the absence of a more pronounced negative effect.

The results reported here are based on four separate logistic models but the findings are robust to using multivariate regression techniques that account for the non-independence of the four discrete outcome variables. The exact same conclusions are drawn when estimating a multivariate probit regression model – using the `myprob` command in `stata` (Cappellari and Jenkins 2003).¹³ Chi square tests of the interaction term coefficients across the different constituency-oriented actions, further, support our findings: the combined effect of ballot structure and district magnitude on handling constituents' casework requests does not differ significantly from the combined effect on soliciting additional cases. But the null hypothesis that there is no difference in the rules' effect can clearly be rejected when conducting pairwise comparisons of the two one-to-one strategies with the two one-to-many strategies. In sum, in the presence of intra-party competition, magnitude's effect is conditioned by the nature of that behaviour: actions that target individual constituents become less common with district magnitude, whereas collective appeals become more attractive. In closed-list systems, by contrast, constituency-oriented behaviour invariably decreases as district magnitude grows.

Conclusion

Legislators spend part of their time in the capital and part in the district that elected them. The frequent contacts they have with constituents are critical to the latter's ability to separate good from bad representatives. There are a myriad of constituency-oriented actions that legislators may choose from in order to connect to constituents. Some are vigorous caseworkers, others pursue projects for the district, and still others maintain close contact with organised interests. It is argued that a legislator's choice where to invest his scarce time is shaped by the conditions under which he competes for re-election.

The 'personal vote' literature inspired by Carey and Shugart's (1995) article, however, has assumed that because district magnitude has a differential effect in open-list and closed-list systems on legislators' incentive to cultivate a

personal reputation, it therefore also has a differential effect on any behavioural strategy that reputation can be built on. Taking stock of the modest volume of empirical research addressing the impact electoral rules have on legislators' personal vote-seeking behaviour, however, revealed that, depending on the proxy used, district magnitude's effect is positive, negative, or non-existent.

Using the new PARTIREP cross-national MP survey, district magnitude was found to have a differential effect on a legislator's 'constituency attentiveness': as magnitude grows, a legislator spends less time in the district in closed-list systems and more time in the district in open-list systems. The electoral rules, however, do not dictate which constituency activities that time is most effectively allocated to. Legislators facing strong incentives to develop a favourable reputation may still decide against engaging in any one personal vote-seeking action. The key to this puzzle, we argued, is to be found in the specific nature of different constituency-oriented activities. Actions that are aimed at a larger subset of constituents and that offer them low-demand information cues become more effective as districts grow in magnitude: both the number of voters living in the district and the number of candidates competing for election tend to increase with district magnitude. As a result, legislators' likelihood of devoting more than half a day per week to handling casework and of actively soliciting additional requests was found to decrease as districts grow in magnitude. District magnitude, on the other hand, was found to increase their likelihood of promoting the collective needs of a territorial or social sub-constituency.

These findings have important implications for future research that seeks to link legislators' behaviour to the rules under which they compete for re-election. Research on the intra-party dimension of electoral rules would benefit greatly from theorising more carefully on the nature of the proxies used. Furthermore, little is known about the 'repertoire' of home styles legislators may choose from across a wide range of institutional and cultural contexts. Context-rich studies of the ways in which legislators 'connect' to constituents have largely been limited to the realm of single-seat districts and the United States in particular. More research, in particular in the context of multi-member PR, is called for.

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Notes

1. Where there are penalties for overnomination, under the single non-transferable vote for instance, parties will tend to field as many candidates in the district as there are seats they expect to win. Fielding more candidates risks splitting their vote and winning fewer seats in the face of concentrated opposition (Cox 2008). As such, district magnitude can no longer be assumed to be the key determinant of that ratio.
2. Political parties are absent from the state legislature of Appenzell-Innerrhoden.
3. Dutch voters indicate a preference for a candidate, but the impact of preference votes on the order of intra-party seat allocation is negligible. In the 2003 general elections, Andeweg (2008) observed, no more than two candidates were elected in defiance of the predetermined list order. Leapfrogging past higher ranked co-partisans is much more common in Belgium – in particular since the 2000 reform cutting the number of list ballots to be allotted to the top candidates in half. In recent elections, the number of legislators owing their seat to their personal performance exceeded 10 per cent (André *et al.* 2012).
4. The ballot structure is closed for the Italian *Camera dei Deputati* and for the Tuscan regional council but open for the regional councils in Campania and Valle d'Aosta. The regions of Calabria, Lazio, and Lombardy use a two-tiered PR system. Preference votes alone determine which candidates are elected at the lowest level. The second tier allocates a majority bonus to the coalition or party list of the candidate elected for presidency. Candidates are elected in the order of the regional party list.
5. There is some discussion regarding the correct coding of single-seat districts: it is our opinion that the practice of coding single-seat districts as candidate-centred is inspired more by its observed consequences than by its mechanics: the preference for a candidate cannot be separated from the party preference (Karvonen 2004). Voters are not offered intra-party choice and cannot hold an individual candidate to account without changing party affiliation (Mitchell 2000).
6. The Austrian *Nationalrat* employs a three-tiered system with preferential voting at the lowest levels, but nominal voting is quite uncommon in the second tier and as such is ineffective. The ease of supporting an individual candidate differs markedly at both levels. While candidates are fully listed on the ballot and voters simply tick the box next to the name of their preferred candidate in the first tier, voters have to write in a candidate's name in the second (Müller 2008). Both the second and third tiers are therefore coded as closed lists. Though reduced to two levels, the regional parliaments largely mirror the electoral system used at the national level.
7. The overdispersion parameter, alpha equals 0.58 and a likelihood ratio test indicates that it differs significantly from zero ($G^2 = 50,212$; $p < 0.000$). The likelihood ratio test for alpha is computed as follows: $G^2 = 2(\ln L_{\text{NBRM}} - \ln L_{\text{PRM}}) = 2(-6,794 - (-31,900))$.
8. The district's geographical location is defined by the distance from the seat of parliament to the largest city in the district as the crow flies – using Google maps. In mixed-member systems, the distance was measured to the first tier district the legislator stood in. Only for legislators who stood only on the party list was the distance set to zero. In the Netherlands reference was made to the 19 administrative electoral regions and in Israel to the legislator's place of residence.
9. The controls do not detract from the effect of the electoral rules. Reported findings are robust to excluding the control variables from the regression equations.
10. District magnitude was increased from 1 to 100 (i.e. the maximum in open-list systems) to compute the expected counts and the 90 per cent confidence intervals of the discrete change. Dichotomous variables were set to zero and continuous variables were fixed at their mean values.
11. To ascertain that the negative effect in closed-list systems is not an artefact of the question wording in Israel and the Netherlands, the model was rerun excluding both cases. The direction, significance, and even magnitude of district magnitude's effect remain practically unaltered.

12. Analogous to the previous analysis, district magnitude was increased from 1 to 100. Dichotomous variables were set to zero and continuous variables were fixed at their mean values.
13. Due to word limit constraints, the multivariate probit model and post-estimations are not reported – but they can be obtained upon simple request.

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APPENDIX

OPERATIONALISATION OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES

TIME: 'In a typical month, how many *working hours* (incl. at public events and meetings) would you say you spend in your constituency?'

Constituency was replaced by 'in your area of residence' in Israel and the Netherlands.

CASEWORK: 'How many hours per week would you say you, personally, spend dealing with requests for help from individual citizens in dealing with public authorities?'

Legislators spending more than the median value of 5 hours per week on doing casework are coded as '1'; those spending less than half a day per week on casework are coded as '0'.

SOLICIT: 'Mentioned below are some of the many different things that Members of Parliament do to keep in touch with constituents. For each one, do you actually do it *outside election campaign periods*, might you do it, or would you never? [...] advertising your constituency work services (e.g. in newspaper ads or by visiting neighbourhoods).'

Legislators reporting that they 'actually do it' are coded as '1'; those that 'might do it' or 'would never' are coded as '0'.

PROJECT: 'What do you yourself consider the most important task you fulfil as a Member of Parliament? (1) influencing government policy, (2) providing assistance to individual voters in their dealings with public authorities, (3) looking after the collective social and economic needs of the local area, (4) liaising between members of the parliamentary party and the party leadership and managing Parliament's business.'

Legislators are coded as '1' if they select item 3 and as '0' if they select another item.

ORGANISATION: 'In your role as a Member of Parliament, how often in the last year have you had contact with the following groups, or organisations? (1) youth organisations, (2) organisations for the elderly, (3) workers' organisations and trade unions, (4) employers' organisations, (5) women's organisations, (6) farmers' organisations, (7) organisations of ethnic minorities, (8) churches or religious organisations, (9) environmental organisations.'

Legislators having contact with one of these organisations 'at least once a week' are coded as '1'; the others are coded as '0'.