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What are the tools available for the job? Coordination instruments at Uganda's central government level and their implications for multisectoral action for health

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**1. Title of Manuscript:** What are the tools available for the job? Coordination Instruments at Uganda's central government level and their implications for Multisectoral Action for Health

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#### **4. Keywords and an abbreviated running title**

*Coordination, instrument mix, Coordination Mechanisms, governance, multisectoral action for health, public sector coordination*

**Running Title: Multisectoral Coordination instruments in Uganda**

#### **5. Key Messages**

- A range of instruments based on three ideal coordination mechanisms (hierarchy, markets and networks) are usually drawn upon by the government. However, these are not systematically examined and classified in health policy and systems research.
- Structural and nonstructural instruments exist in varied combinations, constitute the institutional context and provide the tools for pursuing intragovernmental coordination.
- Probing these instrument mixes and their underlying mechanisms enables a better understanding of the range of possible solutions and appropriate calibrations to bring about effective coordination.
- Cross-fertilization of ideas and insights from disciplines such as organizational sciences and public administration into health policy and systems research and public health practices would significantly enhance the coordination of multisectoral actions for health advancement.

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This study received approval from the Research Ethics Committee at the Institute of Tropical Medicine, Antwerp, Makerere University School of Public Health, Higher Degrees Research Ethics Committee (HDREC) (No:702) and Uganda National Council of Science and Technology (UNCST) (No: SS 5111). All participants interviewed provided written consent. Interviews and quotes were anonymized.

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**11. Authors' contributions:**

AS conceptualized the study with the support of the co-authors as supervisors of the PhD from which this paper derives. AS conducted data collection, performed the analysis, drafted the article and managed subsequent revisions. BC, SVB, FS, KT and SVB provided substantive feedback on several manuscript iterations. All authors read and approved the final manuscript.

**12. Reflexivity Statement**

The author team includes four males and one female with diverse professional backgrounds. Whereas three authors have a medical background, two have a background in political sciences. Four authors have expertise in public health, especially health policy and system research. All the authors have expertise in conducting qualitative research in sub-Saharan Africa. All authors except one have conducted research in Uganda. Three authors have participated directly in national fora in Uganda, where they presented on health policy matters.

# **What are the tools available for the job? Coordination Instruments at Uganda's national government level and their implications for Multisectoral Action for Health**

## **ABSTRACT**

Managing sectoral interdependences requires functional tools that facilitate coordinated multisectoral efforts. The pursuit of multisectoral action (MSA) for health is intrinsically linked to broader efforts in many governments to achieve greater internal coordination. This research explores the nature of coordination instruments for MSA at the national level in Uganda and the complexities of how these tools play out in implementation. Data was collected through 26 purposive in-depth interviews with national-level stakeholders, including government officials and non-state actors, and a review of selected government strategic documents. An adapted framework by Bouckaert and colleagues (2010) was used to establish a typology of coordination instruments (CIs) and break them down into structural and management tools, and infer their underlying coordination mechanisms based on their design and operational features. A multitheoretical framework guided the analysis of the factors influencing the implementation dynamics and functioning of the tools. The study found that the government of Uganda uses a range of structural and management instrument mixes mutually influencing each other and mainly based on hierarchy and network mechanisms. These instruments constitute and generate the resources that structure interorganisational relationships across vertical and horizontal boundaries. The instrument mixes also create hybrid institutional configurations that generate complementary but at times conflicting influences. This study demonstrated that a contextualized examination of specific coordination tools can be enhanced by delineating the underlying institutional forms of ideal type mechanisms. Such an approach can inspire more complex analysis and comparisons of CIs within and across government levels, policy domains or issues over time. Health policy and systems research needs to pay attention to the instrument mixes in government systems and their dynamic interaction across policy issues and over time.

## INTRODUCTION

Public health initiatives such as primary health care and universal health care, and the global development agenda centred around the sustainable development goals coverage are hinged on effectively coordinated multisectoral efforts (Rasanathan *et al.*, 2017; Hussain *et al.*, 2020). Multisectoral action (MSA) for health – i.e. contributions of non-health sectors towards health objectives - has been pursued in low and middle income countries (LMICs) over time but with limited success (Kickbusch, 2008; Glandon *et al.*, 2019). Bennett and colleagues (2018) aptly summarized unique features hampering MSA in LMICs. These include weak public institutions, complexities in bureaucratic structures, high fragmentation within the government apparatus, high donor dependency, limited government legitimacy and extensive corruption. Against this backdrop, there is increasing interest in the approaches and strategies to pursue coordinated MSA for health in these settings (Rasanathan *et al.*, 2017; Kuruvilla *et al.*, 2018).

Coordination arrangements provide practitioners and researchers with resources and means to bring together interdependent actors and actions to achieve collective goals. Public health literature from LMICs reveals a plethora of such approaches. Such tools include multisectoral plans and structural interfaces such as inter-ministerial committees and councils (Freiler *et al.*, 2013; Matthias Wismar *et al.*, 2012). Some coordination strategies have been developed for specific disease conditions such as non-communicable diseases (NCDs), HIV/AIDS and nutrition (Zaidi *et al.*, 2018; Mahlangu, Goudge, and Vearey, 2019) or policy issues such as tobacco control (Mondal *et al.*, 2021). In addition, public health practitioners and researchers have advocated for government-wide strategies including the health-in-all policies (HiAP) approach, healthy cities and one health approaches (De Leeuw, 2017).

According to Glandon (2004), “coordination is an eternal and ubiquitous problem in public administration” and “finding ways for organizations that are organized differently to work together is eternal and ubiquitous not only in public management but also in every part of social life” (pg 131). The pursuit of MSA for health is intrinsically linked to broader efforts in many governments to achieve greater internal coordination. Therefore, knowing how governments systems are coordinated is critical for organizing and coordinating MSA for health (Glandon *et al.*, 2018). Insights from relevant research disciplines such as public administration, policy studies and organization theory offer public health practitioners and researchers essential lessons

from such government-wide efforts (Glandon *et al.*, 2018, 2019; Ssennyonjo *et al.*, 2021). However, these perspectives have not been optimally exploited.

The scholarship above articulates the tools adopted by governments to advance coordination and reduce the adverse effects of fragmentation. Public policy research, for example, offers the notion of policy integration and shows that various tools such as procedural instruments are used to coordinate government entities and actions during policy development (Cejudo and Michel, 2017; Lagreid and Rykkja, 2015). Within public administration literature, notions of joined-up government, networked government, the whole of government have been well articulated to refer to instances of public sector agencies working formally or informally across their portfolio boundaries to achieve shared goals and integrated government response to a particular issue (Pollitt, 2003; Peters, 2005).

This research draws on the insights above to specifically explore the nature of coordination arrangements for intragovernmental efforts at the national level in Uganda. It further examines their implementation dynamics. This study is part of a broader PhD project focusing on coordination within the public sector to harness MSA for health improvements. The government focus is motivated by the limited attention to internal government dynamics in health policy and systems research on multisectoral collaboration (Shankardass *et al.*, 2018; Glandon *et al.*, 2019; Ssennyonjo *et al.*, 2022). The focus on national government coordination is inspired by this government level being the principal custodian of national development efforts. The national level is also uniquely positioned to provide strategic direction and policy development to be implemented by subnational level entities. It also interacts with supranational entities such as regional and international development agencies to effect regional and international obligations (Peters, 1998). A lack of coordination at this upstream level usually undermines coordination at downstream levels (Peters, 2005; Christensen and Lægreid, 2008; Arora *et al.*, 2012). This paper addresses the following research questions (RQ): (1) What tools are employed to coordinate the central government entities in Uganda? (2) How and why do they work or not (in practice) to shape multisectoral coordination?

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The second section provides conceptual linkages between coordination mechanisms and coordination instruments. In the third section, the research approach is elaborated. The analysis and findings are presented in the fourth section,

followed by a discussion of the implications for practice and research into MSA for health in LMICs. Finally, the paper is concluded with some concluding remarks.

## CONCEPTUALIZING PUBLIC SECTOR COORDINATION INSTRUMENTS AND MECHANISMS

Practitioners and researchers have attempted to provide conceptual clarity on coordination approaches used within and across government entities (Alexander, 1995; Peters, 2005; Bouckaert, Peters and Verhoest, 2010b; Molenveld and Verhoest, 2018). Central to that discourse are the closely related concepts of ‘coordination mechanisms’ and ‘coordination instruments’. **Box 1 provides key definitions.** The concepts are elaborated subsequently.

### **Box 1: Coordination mechanisms and instruments: definitions and conceptual linkages**

Coordination approaches are labelled variably- at times called coordination mechanisms (CMs) or coordination strategies or coordination instruments (CIs) (Blouin 2007; Juma et al. 2018; Cristofoli and Markovic 2016; Claggett and Karahanna 2018). In addition, they are sometimes defined in terms of each other. For instance, as the definitions below indicate, CMs are often defined in terms of instruments. According to Lægreid and colleagues, CMs are described as “formal or informal arrangements (activities, structures, instruments, and procedures) used to bring actions of different sectors (ministries, departments, and agencies-MDAs) into harmony and ensure coherence within and between policies and practices” (Per Lægreid, Tiina Randma-Liiv, Lise H. Rykkja, 2013). Parnini & Verhoest (2008;94) similarly define CMs as “the strategies, instruments and structural interfaces involved in managing relations between ministers, parent ministries and other public organisations”.

In contrast to the above, some public administration scholars posit that although related, CMs and CIs are distinct analytical concepts (Bouckaert, Peters and Verhoest 2010a, Alexander 1995, Verhoest and Bouckaert 2005). In this paper, we adopt this thinking. The CMs are defined as *abstract and general basic processes that underpin coordination arrangements*, while CIs are *the specific structures and activities that underpin coordination efforts* (Bouckaert, Peters, and Verhoest 2010a).



## Coordination mechanisms: hierarchies, markets, and networks as ideal types

Coordination mechanisms (CMs) are based on ideal institutional logics of hierarchy, markets and networks (Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998; Verhoest *et al.*, 2005). This trilogy provides a typology to analyze the basic processes that underlie coordination efforts in the public sector (Bardach, 2017). According to Tenbensel (2018;3), CMs are “ideal types of institutional designs that can be harnessed by governmental and non-governmental actors to govern policy problems. As ideal types, they provide a way of mapping governance types analogous to the way that compass points of north, west, south and east provide a foundation for mapping geographical space”. Rooted in organizational theories (majorly transaction costs economics (TCE) and principal-agent theory (PAT)), the firm (hierarchy) or the market are extremes of the governance modes for exchange relationships (Ouchi, 1979; Williamson, 1995; Dekker, 2004). In reality, the networks exist between the two extremes of the market and hierarchy (Williamson, 2014).

These coordination mechanisms are distinguished based on their basic characteristics, such as the processes of decision making, nature of interactions among actors and the power sources they primarily draw upon. Table 1 summarises these distinctions.

**Table 1: Characteristics of Coordination mechanisms**

Attribute	Hierarchy	Markets	networks
Base of interaction	Authority and dominance	Exchange and competition	Cooperation and solidarity
Purpose	Consciously designed and controlled goals	Spontaneously created results	Consciously designed purposes or spontaneously created results
Guidance, control and evaluation	Top-down norms and standards, routines, supervision, inspection, intervention	Supply and demand, price mechanism, self-interest, profit and losses as evaluation, courts, invisible hand	Shared values, common problem analyses, consensus, loyalty, reciprocity, trust, informal evaluation-reputation
Role of government	Top-down rule maker and steer, dependent actors are controlled by rules	Creator and guardian of markets, purchaser of goods, actors are independent	Network enabler, network manager and network participant

Source: (Bouckaert, Peters and Verhoest, 2010a)


Hierarchical type mechanisms (HTM) are based on a central authority's imposition and top-down control. Centralized management animates rules, standard operating procedures, and mandatory processes such as collaborative planning (Peters, 1998; Bouckaert, Peters and Verhoest, 2010a). Market type mechanisms (MTM) lead to coordination through exchange and bargaining between “buyers” and “sellers” with various interests but a shared understanding that the exchange will be mutually advantageous (Bouckaert, Peters and Verhoest, 2010a). The “invisible hand” created through the interplay of price mechanisms, incentives, and self-interest coordinates actors' activities. The medium of exchange may be money, but sometimes virtual markets are created (Peters, 1998; Bouckaert, Peters and Verhoest, 2010a). The network type mechanisms (NTMs) include bargaining approaches. Networks are characterized by a mutual dependence, trust and collaborative role assignment. Coordination is achieved through a mutual exchange of financial, human and information resources. The central government or specific public sector entities may be network members or managers and may impose horizontal coordination among government entities (Dewulf et al., 2011; Zaidi et al., 2018).

### **Coordination Instruments: Typologies**

Theoretical and empirical work on coordination presents various CI typologies (Alexander, Dorfhuber and Gant, 1996; Bouckaert, Peters and Verhoest, 2010a). Details on these are elaborated in **supplemental file 1**.

For example, according to Mintzberg, coordination is pursued through either mutual adjustment, direct supervision, or standardization of skills and norms, work processes, and results (Unger, Macq and Bredo, 2000). Alexander (1995) presented several formal structural instruments characterised by being ex-ante or ex-post specific organisational acts and differentiable by hierarchical levels. However, this study adapted the typology proposed by Bouckaert and colleagues (2010; 54) **(see supplemental file 2)** because it distinguishes structural and non-structural instruments and links these tools to the “hierarchy–networks–markets” mechanisms. Figure 1 below provides an overly simplified depiction of adaptations of the interlinkages between CMs and instruments within a central government setting in Uganda. Following Peters (2005), the tools operate at three hierarchical levels of central government: the core executive, inter-ministerial, and (intra)ministerial levels.

**Figure 1: Conceptual linkages between coordination mechanisms, instruments and levels at the central government level**



**Source:** Author elaboration based on (Verhoest and Bouckaert, 2005) and Bouckaert et al. (2010).

Structural tools relate to structural interfaces for driving coordination and include organisation restructuring (e.g. mergers), bodies with coordination functions, regulated markets. There are also structures for solidarity and cooperation (e.g. formal entities for collective decision-making, structures for consultation and negotiation, formation of joint organisations, and systems for information exchange (Peters, 2005; Verhoest *et al.*, 2005). Non-structural tools are procedural and coordination adjustments in administrative processes and management government systems. These include the means for “strategic management, financial management, and cultural and knowledge management” practices (Bouckaert, Peters and Verhoest, 2010a; pg 55).

Annex 2

## METHODS

### The Ugandan Context

Over the past three decades, public sector management reforms in most countries were based on either new public management principles (to make government slimmer to work more efficiently) or democratic values (to make governance more participatory) (Molenveld and

Verhoest, 2018). However, such reforms have created vertical and horizontal fragmentation, increasing coordination challenges and the need to steer collective action in government (Peters.B.Guy, 1998; Peters, 2004; Christensen, 2012). Uganda is one of the countries whose public sector reforms have been shaped by New Public Management (NPM) and democratic reforms (Hizaamu, 2014; OPM, 2016). As a result, fragmentation and duplication are prevalent. As of 2017, the central government's political-administrative architecture was divided into 21 ministries and departments and 41 semiautonomous agencies (Uganda Ministry of Public Service, 2017). These MDAs fall under 15 sectors<sup>i</sup> galvanized around sector working groups (SWGs) (Roberts and Ssejjaaka, 2017). Overcoming the fragmented character of the Ugandan government has been an objective of many government agencies over the years, but progress has often been slow (Hizaamu, 2014; National Planning Authority, 2020). Despite these shortcomings, the Government of Uganda has continued to make efforts to improve its internal coordination. For example, the 1995 constitution, as overarching legal framework, specifies the roles and mandate of various bodies such as the Office of the President and Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) (RoU, 1995). The central government plays strategic roles such as policy making, resource mobilisation and regulation while service delivery is the mandate of the local governments (GoU, 1997). National coordination efforts could be understood historically. Over time, the national strategic vision has been espoused in the Poverty Reduction Strategic Paper (PRSP), the Plan for Modernisation of Agriculture (PMA), and the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) (Government Of Uganda, 2015). Donors have also introduced sector-wide approaches and results-based planning and management approaches (Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 2015). A National Coordination Policy was adopted in 2016. In this study, we investigate these efforts by focusing on the various instruments used to promote intragovernmental coordination.

## **Data collection methods and analysis**

This case study applied a qualitative study methodology and used key informant interviews and documents review. Twenty-six interviews with government officials in and outside the health sector and non-state actors were conducted between December 2019 and March 2020. The study used a semi-structured interview guide developed by the authors based on insights from public

administration, organizational studies and public health literature. The data collection tool explored various aspects of Intragovernmental coordination, but this paper focuses on CIs.

The first author conducted the interviews and documentary review, assisted by graduate-level research assistants and guided by the other co-authors as academic supervisors. Participants were selected purposefully to represent diverse perspectives and experiences from the Ministry of Health (MOH) and other MDAs outside the health sector (**see annex 2**). A total of 26 key informant interviews with 21 government officials (7 from the ministry of health (MOH) and 14 from non-health sectors (MDAs), and five non-state actors (NSA).

The initial participants identified by the research team were supplemented through a snowballing technique. Participants were approached through email and phone calls. Participation was voluntary; no incentives were provided, and written voluntary consent was obtained. Interviews took place at places and times of convenience for the respondent. They lasted 15 to 90 minutes. In addition, 25 interviews were audio-recorded, while extensive notes were taken for one interview. The audios were transcribed verbatim.

The interview data were complemented by a document review. The government's strategic documents such as Vision 2040 (The Republic of Uganda, 2012), the second National Development Plan (Government Of Uganda, 2015), sectoral development plans, National Coordination Policy(OPM, 2016) and a recent report on coordination by the OPM and Sectors working groups (Roberts and Ssejjaaka, 2017) were pragmatically chosen to complement the interviews.

The documents and interview transcripts were uploaded onto Atlas ti software (Atlas. ti, 2021). The lead author reviewed each document and transcript in detail, assigning codes from the analytical framework to relevant data sections. Using the adapted Bouckaert and colleagues (2010) framework, we categorized the CIs into structural and management tools. We inferred the underlying CMs from the resemblance of the design and operational features of the CIs to the distinct attributes of each CMs elaborated in Table 1 above. In line with Harris et al. (2014), data on the operational and functional aspects of the instruments were abductively analysed using constructs from the multitheoretical framework guiding the overall PhD project. This approach was premised on the belief that social science theories could offer plausible explanations for complex implementation dynamics of multisectoral efforts (Ssenyonjo *et al.*,

2021)). Accordingly, the CIs could be conceptualized as embodiments of power and discourse (political economy perspective), principal-agent relations (agency theory), exchange relationships characterized by transaction costs (transaction cost economics theory - TCE), and, finally, resource (inter)dependences (resource dependence theory). These theoretical lenses provided insights into how mechanisms operate to explain the deviations between the ideal and reality (Danermark, Ekström and Karlsson, 2019). An organization's position in the government hierarchy determines its power and authority to control the implementation of centrally decided agendas. Still, coordinated entities may exercise agency and resist vertical control (Hudson and Leftwich, 2014). The author team was guided by the consolidated criteria for reporting qualitative research (COREQ) (Tong, Sainsbury and Craig, 2007), triangulated the emerging findings and facilitated consensus generation, iterative and critical data interpretation. Illustrative quotes are used.

## **Ethical approval**

This article is part of the first author's PhD project approved by the Research Ethics Committee of the author's institute (HDREC-702) and the Uganda National Council for Science and Technology (UNCST).

## **RESULTS**

The study revealed a mix of structural and non-structural instruments used at the central government level in Uganda over the 2015-20 period. This period covers the internal governmental efforts to align with the global sustainable development goals agenda. These included orienting the National Development plan II towards SDGs and adopting the national SDGs coordination framework (OPM, 2018). At the same time, the health sector goals shifted to achieving SDG aspirations toward universal health coverage (MoH, 2015). These coordination instruments co-exist and complement each other in several instances. Our findings reveal that functionality depends on underlying coordination mechanisms and dynamic interactions with other CIs and the broader (internal and external) government context. These instruments and the underlying mechanisms are summarised in table 2 below and elaborated subsequently.

251 **Table 2: Intragovernmental Coordination instruments and mechanisms at central**  
252 **government level in Uganda**

Instrument typology			Findings	
Major category	Sub-type	examples	Specific Instruments	Underlying mechanism
<b>I. Structural instruments</b>	<b>Core executive and central bodies with crosscutting coordination functions.</b>	(a)coordinating units & lead organisation	The Cabinet & office of the president are the topmost decision-making structures in the executive branch. Rely on a constitutional mandate. The office of the prime minister has the legal mandate. Other central agencies coordinate and supervise respective functions such as budgeting, planning and data systems. Central authority undermined by sectoral independence	Predominantly Hierarchical type mechanisms (HTM) but embody some network-type mechanisms (NTM)
	<b>Regulated markets</b>	Internal markets, quasi-markets, external markets	Not used at central government	N/A
	<b>Interministerial structures for solidarity, cooperation, and mutual decision-making</b>	(a) Systems for information exchange	ICT-based systems are considered under the mandate of the National Information Technology Authority-Uganda (NITA-U) & e-government initiatives	NITA-U is Predominantly HTM; e-government initiatives embody NTM elements too.
		(b):‘Non-binding’ consultation or negotiation bodies, e.g., taskforces, advisory bodies	Adhoc taskforces and technical working groups at sectoral levels	Predominantly HTM with elements of NTM
		(c): Entities for Collective decision-making, e.g., permanent structures and joint organisations	Sector working groups with variable functionality Minimal use of joint organisation, e.g. One Health Platform	
		IE(d): joint organisation		
<b>II. Management instruments</b>	<b>IIA: Strategic management tools:</b>	(a)Top-down process usually Common planning instrument	NPA's top-down planning processes guided by the comprehensive national development planning framework, sectoral development plans, issue-specific multisectoral documents, and SDGs. Bottom-up elements in the processes	Predominantly HTM with elements of NTM
		(b)Bottom-up planning process		
	<b>IIB-Human resources &amp; culture management instruments</b>	Training, reshuffling/rotation of staff within civil service, and common training to foster interprofessional collaboration	Transfer of staff in public service and liaison officers. Policy analysts under the Office of the President are distributed to various ministries.	NTM
	<b>IIC-The financial management system.</b>	(a)- hierarchical input based financial systems	Input-based budgeting is being transitioned to program-based budgeting (PBB). Top-down guidelines from MoFPED	Majorly HTM and moving towards more NTM under PBB
		(b): systems are performance-linked, allowing incentives and sanctions for performance		

Instrument typology			Findings	
Major category	Sub-type	examples	Specific Instruments	Underlying mechanism
		(c) result-oriented financial systems emphasising information exchange and cooperation and managing crosscutting issues, e.g., program-based budgeting		
	IID- Procedures for mandatory consultation	Review of proposals and drafts for policies, legislative instruments, and other plans	Procedures are specified for policymaking requiring, for example, a certificate of financial implication and regulator impact assessments. Joint reviews are suboptimal.	HTM because of the compulsory nature of these requirements

## Main Structural instruments

### Core executive and central bodies with crosscutting coordination functions.

The respondents and documents reviewed acknowledged several agencies with specialized mandates to coordinate crosscutting government functions through mainly hierarchical mechanisms. They are elaborated on below.

#### *The Cabinet and Office of the President*

Our study highlighted the Office of the President (OP) and Cabinet as the top executive bodies coordinating government policymaking and implementation in the entire government (The Republic of Uganda, 2009). Most respondents intimated strong hierarchical inclinations within the Cabinet. For example, there are Cabinet ministers who provide political leadership to sectoral MDAs, and less powerful junior (state) ministers and ministers in charge of specific population groups (e.g., elderly, youths) or geographical regions (e.g., Karamoja, Teso, Bunyoro). A few actors noted that ministers were also curtailed by the strong authority of the President and that “so many of these activities done in ministries are also linked in the President’s office. -MDA-10. One development partner further remarked as follows

*The power in the Cabinet is overcentralized. The President is too powerful. That is why we do not have standing cabinet committees. We have a lot of ad-hoc committees, which is not good. When you have standing committees, they allow you to disperse power to constituencies that will take an interest in thematic issues. -NSA-1*



273 To advance this mandate, the OP is led by the Minister of the Presidency and supported by  
274 technical structures, notably the Cabinet Secretariat (for administrative support to Cabinet) and  
275 Manifesto Implementation Unit. These structures, through hierarchical control, gatekeep  
276 policymaking and enforce government policymaking guidelines to ensure coherence (Secretariat,  
277 2013).

278 On the contrary, the Cabinet also exhibits features of network-based mechanisms. It is bound by  
279 a principle of collective responsibility. It serves as a platform where the whole-of-government  
280 priorities and (inter)sectoral policies are negotiated and approved (The Republic of Uganda,  
281 2009). The internal structures also use network-based approaches and ‘soft power’ such as  
282 organising capacity building to build a shared understanding of the policy making processes. One  
283 senior official affirmed:

284 *We also go there to do capacity building. We also move out to train them (MDAs) on practically*  
285 *how they do the coordination of policy formulation and implementation. Like from tomorrow, we*  
286 *are meeting the prisons people. Last week, we met the information, communication, and national*  
287 *guidance ministry. - MDA-2*

#### 288 *The Office of the Prime Minister*

289 The OPM mainly draws on hierarchical control inherent in its constitutional mandate to  
290 coordinate government affairs by deploying power and authority over other entities(OPM, 2016).  
291 All respondents acknowledged the same as the quotes below illustrate:

292 *It's the duty of OPM to call agencies to order. Also, ensure value for money. Although much of*  
293 *the value for money is done by the Ministry of Finance and the Auditor General's office, the*  
294 *OPM does the general oversight- MDA-10.*

295 *OPM is mandated to lead government business in Parliament but majorly, what we do is to*  
296 *coordinate all sectors, agencies, and ministries to ensure that synergies are realized so that we*  
297 *can improve public service delivery-. MDA-8.*

298 The practical expressions of OPM's coordination function were both direct and indirect.  
299 Examples such as nutrition were cited as examples of OPM's direct intervention. One non-state  
300 actor noted that

301 *After the realization that it (nutrition) is a crosscutting issue, that was discussed*  
302 *comprehensively until a consensus was reached that nutrition should be coordinated elsewhere*  
303 *(from the Agriculture ministry) ... The different stakeholders operate around the coordination*  
304 *from the Prime Minister's office. - NSA-4*

305 The OPMs also exercise indirect coordination by delegating some roles to specific MDAs, as is  
 306 the case for epidemics. However, it retains ultimate control. A government official affirmed  
 307 *For Public Health events, we have a structure that comes from up to down. We have the National*  
 308 *Emergency Coordination Center (NECOC) at the OPM. It coordinates all events/ hazards in*  
 309 *terms of disasters. But our National Taskforce for emergencies deals with health emergencies,*  
 310 *and it is delegated by the OPM to deal with emergencies- MOH-5*

311 Some respondents expressed dissatisfaction with the performance of the OPM- reportedly  
 312 constrained by technical and political issues. Technical issues included limited funding and  
 313 stretched capacities due to “misplaced” priorities.

314 *The coordinator of government ..we see on the ground is not the one the spirit of the law*  
 315 *envisaged. The constitution establishes the Office of the Prime Minister to coordinate all*  
 316 *government business...but when you look at the current set-up of the Prime Minister’s Office, its*  
 317 *strength is elsewhere. It is in special programs for Teso, Bunyoro, Karamoja, northern Uganda,*  
 318 *refugees and disasters. So how do you reconcile that?- NSA-1*

319 The political constraint to OPM’s hierarchical power stemmed from the agency of the  
 320 coordinated MDAs and internal political dynamics at OPM due to departmentalization. One non-  
 321 health official noted OPMs often depend on MDA goodwill:

322 *The OPM has been promoting delivering as a government, as one. You find that one ministry will*  
 323 *say no law requires us to work with them, so they will do it out of courtesy. -MDA-1*

324 The fact that OPM is not a homogenous entity- but organised itself into several ministries and  
 325 departments led to internal silos. One respondent observed:

326 *“you know refugees fall under a ministry in OPM, ministry of disaster and refugees, so there are*  
 327 *certain things one cannot do. One cannot go to <name of Minister of disasters> (to brief him)*  
 328 *because they do not work under the ministry of refugees. So, the issue of mandate actually can*  
 329 *also be a bottleneck. - MDA-7*


330 Ongoing efforts to realise the OPM’s mandate included recourse to the higher authority of the  
 331 President, occasional use of coercive forces, creation of new structures and attempts to prioritise  
 332 focal policy issues. A senior official remarked.

333 *The (OPM’s) delivery unit is pursuing a presidential directive of realizing twenty million bags of*  
 334 *coffee by 2020. People embraced it because it was a directive, and it received a lot of support....*  
 335 *but I do not know. But you cannot have a hundred directives. - MDA-7.*

336 Interviews revealed that the OPM had also undertaken internal structural reorganization, such as  
 337 creating the prime Minister’s delivery unit to effect this mandate. In addition, the Institutional  
 338 Framework for Coordination of Policy and Program Implementation in Government (IFCPPI)

was adopted under the OPM in 2003 as the overall national coordination structure (OPM, 2016). The above coordination framework provided hierarchical decision-making structures for policy development and implementation monitoring, as elaborated in figure 2 below and Box 2 below.

**Figure 2: The Institutional Framework for national coordination in Uganda**



*Source: Office of the Prime Minister*

**BOX 2: Coordination structures under the Institutional Framework for Coordination of Policy and Program Implementation in Government (IFCPPI).**

- The Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) is a Cabinet committee chaired by the Prime Minister and responsible for policy coordination and monitoring progress on the implementation of government programs.
- The Implementation Coordination Steering Committee (ICSC), which consists of Permanent Secretaries and is chaired by Head of Public Service and Secretary to Cabinet, directs implementation of activities.
- The multi-sectoral Technical Implementation Coordination Committee (TICC), chaired by the Permanent Secretary (Office of the Prime Minister), coordinates and monitors program implementation across ministries and sectors.
- The IFCPPI is supported by 16 joint Sector Working Groups responsible for implementation of the National Development Plan and service delivery at sector level. In addition to that, there are several thematic and ad hoc coordination groups

Source: National Coordination Policy 2016(OPM, 2016)

The OPM spearheaded the national coordination policy development adopted in 2016 (OPM, 2016). Some of the policy objectives include a) strengthening synergies across MDAs, b) standardizing reporting, and c) strengthening secretariats at the Sector Working Groups (SWGs).

The document and interviewees revealed that the operationalization of the IFCPPI was suboptimal. Some structures, such as the Technical Implementation Coordination Committee (TICC), never met for over five years. One government official intimated concerns about membership and corrective efforts to streamline participation.

*“...apparently this committee (TICC) was too big at that time. Its membership is very big. So, they were trying to see how they do not call anyone and then have nothing to talk about that affects them- MDA-8*

*The National Planning Authority.*

Other central level agencies with coordinating authority also draw on their legal mandates to develop policies and guidelines for the other MDAs. These coordination entities expect compliance of other MDAs in return. The National Planning Authority (NPA), established through the NPA Act, controls strategic planning in the country. The NPA spearheaded the development of the Comprehensive National Development Planning Framework (CNDPF) as the overall instrument for this purpose (The Republic of Uganda, 2012). The National Vision 2040 and 5-year plans constitute instruments for pursuing multisectoral coherence over time. The NPA

365 has also produced the sector planning guidelines (National Planning Authority, 2015) and  
366 regulations (National Planning Authority, 2018). In addition, the NPA has led the development  
367 of multisectoral plans such as the Uganda Nutrition Action Plan (NPA, 2015). The NPA also  
368 issues compliance certificates indicating alignments of sectoral and local government plans and  
369 budgets to the national development plans.

370 Respondents reported that the NPA occasionally draws on their power and authority to facilitate  
371 other government agencies effectively performing respective coordination roles. For example,  
372 using its convening power, the NPA steered an interministerial committee to a) define universal  
373 health coverage (UHC) as a multisectoral goal focusing on social determinants of health, b)  
374 articulate actor roles and performance indicators, and c) determine the costs of these  
375 interventions. One NPA official affirmed that “*we undertook as the NPA to lead the*  
376 *multisectoral policy coordination for universal health coverage*” (MDA-3), culminating in the  
377 UHC policy paper and national roadmap.

378 Activation of fora for deliberative decision making considered essential aspect for coordinated  
379 actions.

380 *But also, the national Planning Authority is supposed to generate policy options for government*  
381 *because we are the secretariat of PEC, which is the Presidential Economic Council. So, we are*  
382 *supposed to generate business for PEC, evaluate policy effectiveness, look at affordable policy*  
383 *that will improve performance of government, and as well consult stake holders on policy*  
384 *effectiveness through the National Development Planning Forum- MDA-1*

385

386 Factors facilitating NPA coordination function were reportedly facilitated by its higher position  
387 in government bureaucracy favoring a focus on broader government issues, inclination towards  
388 consensus building, and regular monitoring and evaluation activities as a basis for demand  
389 accountability from government MDAs. Government officials said as follows.

390 *.. the mandates are described by law or policy, and they work like that. But as NPA, because we*  
391 *sit at the apex, we have seen that we need to break these silos because we are not seeing the*  
392 *desired results- MDA-3*

393 *Now, there are also other legal provisions that allow NPA to compel other institutions to provide*  
394 *particular information, but NPA has not usually invoked such provisions because harmonious*  
395 *working is always more preferred to pulling the last stroke. - MDA-14.*

### *Other central agencies with coordination mandates*

Documentary evidence recognized the Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development (MoFPED and the Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS) to coordinate the budgeting process and national statistics systems, respectively (Roberts and Ssejjaaka, 2017). UBOS reportedly “*in collaboration with MoFPED (finance ministry), NPA and OPM*” spearheaded the development of the National Standard Indicator Framework in 2016 “*aimed to align the performance monitoring requirements at the outcome level between the NDPII, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and Sector Working Groups (SWGs)*” (Roberts and Ssejjaaka, 2017; 6). Interviews further acknowledged UBOS’ efforts to harmonize (inter)sectoral data systems but noted that this was still less developed. One senior government official remarked

“(The process of developing national data systems) involved engaging the respective sectors and sector heads like the permanent secretaries to think about statistics in a more organized manner”. MDA-13

Other hierarchical type agencies included the Uganda AIDS Commission (UAC) and National Population Council that coordinate specific issues, namely national multisectoral HIV/AIDS response, and population management, respectively.

### *General observations regarding central agencies*

The study documented inconsistent guidance from the central coordinating agencies. For example, Roberts and Ssejjaaka (2017, pg vi) found that “*MoFPED, OPM and NPA provide separate guidance to sectors*”. In addition, the limited ability to sanction non-compliance was a significant constraint to hierarchy-based structural instruments. One respondent observed that despite legal mandates, there was limited control over other MDAs because of gaps in legal-institutional frameworks.

“The planning act provides that the Minister has the power to compel and penalize institutions that don’t provide relevant information for planning if requested by the NPA...So, I think those legal provisions compel participation in planning processes and alignment of budgeting processes to planning processes. However, there is a grey area on enforcement mechanisms and penalties” MDA-14.

## **Interministerial structures for solidarity, cooperation, and mutual decision-making.**

The structures discussed below predominantly had features consistent with network-type mechanisms (NTM), albeit underlaid with hierarchical elements.

### *E-government Systems for information exchange*

The Government of Uganda (GoU) has attempted to adopt Information Computer Technology (ICT)-based systems in its operations by “*automating work functions and reducing paperwork for greater internal operational efficiencies*”(The Republic of Uganda, 2012; 59). Under the framework of e-government, the study revealed ongoing efforts to leverage ICT as “*a tool and enabler of other sectors’ performance*”, and a means to “*create efficiency in coordination*” (MoICT, 2015, pg 15). The National Information Technology Authority-Uganda (NITA-U) was created and mandated to coordinate information technology services in Uganda to achieve this objective. As an autonomous statutory body established under the NITA-U Act 2009, NITA-U has the attributes of a hierarchy-based central coordination agency. The fourth objective for NITA-U is to “*promote cooperation, coordination and rationalization among users and providers of information technology at the national and local level to avoid duplication of efforts and ensure optimal utilization of scarce resources*” (NITA-U, 2022). NITA-U was driving several innovations to foster easy data sharing and collaboration across MDAs and Local governments. These included the NITA Service Desk, National Cloud Data Center, Unified Messaging and Collaboration Systems ( UMCS), E-payment portal, Deepening national connectivity and UGhub Systems Integration Platform (NITA-U, 2022). These innovations seemed aligned with adjustments in the government reporting systems under the program-based planning approach. One non-health government official emphasized that

*“when you look at the programs, the reporting format in the ministry has to change to the extent that the outputs that are being reported on are for the program...those are the things that force people to work together. You are supposed to report together. MDA-14*

However, a few respondents observed that government IT systems were disjointed. The coordination of information generation, exchange and use within government was reportedly undermined by capacity gaps, incoherent stakeholder interests and disincentives in donor support. One government official intimated

454 *“I talked about funding too. The other one is capacity gaps. Some people lack capacity in terms*  
455 *of reporting and even data collection. It’s a weak system – MDA-5.*

456 *‘Non-binding’ Consultation or negotiation bodies*

457 Other examples of network-based instruments in Uganda include interministerial committees and  
458 advisory bodies without formal decision-making powers. All interviewees reported the existence  
459 of several inter-ministerial committees and taskforces to coordinate responses for specific policy  
460 issues such as nutrition, UHC and early childhood development. Other informal structures such  
461 as the Forum for the Permanent Secretaries and Commissioners were reported. The sectors’  
462 technical working groups (TWGs) were considered formal structures to harness multisectoral  
463 contributions.

464 *But the Technical working groups are mandated to make sure that other sectors of relevance,*  
465 *including academia, are invited. They are part of the process and part of the decision-making*  
466 *process.- MOH-7*

467 The TWGs reportedly offered opportunities for consultations, but respondents felt they could  
468 more do. Interviewees noted that these structures were further constrained by the suboptimal  
469 participation of actors outside the hosting sector(s) and a lack of binding authority.

470 *Actually, some technical working groups require that we co-opt these other sector people. Some*  
471 *of them work more easily, for example, for adolescent health. But others don’t work. I said by*  
472 *design, they are programmed differently. Different activities are going on.-MOH-7*

473 Informal and voluntary committees are challenged to sustain stakeholders’ interest in  
474 collaboration. This was underpinned by concerns about mandates and limited shared vision. For  
475 example, one MOH official intimated an experience regarding non-communicable diseases  
476 (NCDs):

477 *First, we formed a multisectoral committee for the prevention and control of NCDs, and we met*  
478 *for some time. Of course, it involved all the key sectors, i.e. Gender, Agriculture, Trade, Works,*  
479 *OPM, Finance, Presidents’ office. It was inaugurated in 2018. But the challenge is that it is*  
480 *inactive now because the other sectors don’t find the motivation... They don’t see it as their own*  
481 *mandate talking about health.-MOH-6*



Accordingly, these structures often played advisory roles, and their decisions usually need ratification by a hierarchically higher body.

#### *Entities for collective decision making and joint organizations*

Sector working groups (SWGs) were also presented as major formal collective decision-making at the sectoral level. The national Coordination Policy articulates that “*the government will promote the Sector Wide Approach (SWAP), which entails coordination within and among the Sector Working groups*”(OPM, 2016, pg 11). Documentary evidence (e.g. National Planning Authority, 2015; Roberts and Ssejjaaka, 2017) and interviews indicated disparities between the ideal and actual functionality of the SWGs. One non-state actor remarked

*“Sectors have been constituted into sector working groups, but these sectors are not all working. For example, some do not have functioning secretariats, others do not have budgets, others do not have active steering mechanisms, and others do not have regular engagements- NSA-1.*

The study noted the constraining factors were similar to those affecting the TWGs. For example, several government officials highlighted the challenges of not designating budgets for multisectoral initiatives.

*....if an activity is due, then there (should be) an arrangement that ensures that it is financed because most of the multisectoral arrangements depend on courtesy, on pleadings- MDA-1*

*...(regarding sanitation), you find the Ministry of Water has dedicated for several years two billion on that, (but) the Ministry of Health nothing- MDA-4*

Formally, requesting sectors to designate membership to intersectoral structures was presented as an attempt to boost their functionality.

*...they will always invite based on that (technical working) group, ... they will say members of this committee technical working group are ABCD. They will always write to the permanent secretary- MOH-2*

Relatedly, the use of joint organizations – “new common organizations with shared control powers among ‘parent’ organizations that created it” was another, albeit an uncommon coordination instrument. The One Health (OH) approach was mentioned as a typical example of

512 a joint structure where the overall leadership rotates quarterly among the key ministries. One  
513 MOH official affirmed:

514 *“In the areas, for example, animal industry, they are interested in what we do because they have*  
515 *been very supportive of One Health Initiative. They have come on board, and we have developed*  
516 *a one health strategy with a number of these sectors”- MOH-1.*

## 517 **Non-structural instruments**

518 In line with Bouckaert, Peters and Verhoest (2010a), structural instruments were complemented  
519 by strategic management tools, financial management tools, instruments for knowledge and  
520 culture management and mandatory procedures for policy making.

## 521 **Strategic management tools**

522 As evident in the section on hierarchical structures above, strategic planning in Uganda is a  
523 predominantly hierarchical top-down planning process spearheaded by the NPA (National  
524 Planning Authority, 2015, 2018). Strategic documents such as Vision 2040, steered by the NPA,  
525 espouse national consensus on general overarching goals, objectives, and targets expected to get  
526 cascaded and customized at sectoral and local government levels. The national strategic planning  
527 process also embodies features consistent with network-based mechanisms. For example,  
528 developing the national and sectoral development plans involves bottom-up aspects with sectors  
529 developing their *issue papers* (primers for sector development plans) that get consolidated into  
530 the National Development Plan (National Planning Authority, 2015). The centre (NPA) specifies  
531 and reviews sectoral priorities in these sectoral papers. The final documents emerge from a  
532 consultative and negotiated process involving various sectors and actors within and outside  
533 government. The quote below illustrates the example of the Vision 2040.

534 *“The National Planning Authority in consultation with other government institutions and other*  
535 *stakeholders has thus developed a Uganda Vision 2040 to operationalise this Vision statement”*  
536 *(The Republic of Uganda, 2012; pg iii)*

537 Respondents noted a long history of national (multisectoral and strategic) plans drawing their  
538 legitimacy and national appeal from internationally agreed goals. Regarding maternal health, one

539 development partner recollected the impact of the International Conference on Population and  
540 Development (ICPD):

541 *It was actually 1994 when we had the ICPD conference in Cairo. So the ICPD became a*  
542 *platform for us to explain the entire (women) health and its relation to many other sectors. -*  
543 *NSA-5*

544 Regarding national statistics strategy, one government official referenced the Marrakesh Plan for  
545 Statistics (The World Bank, 2022), compelling countries to develop national strategies for  
546 development statistics (NSDS).

547

548 *They call them ‘NSDS, National Strategy for the Development of Statistics’. At the centre of it*  
549 *again is coordination because you are coming up with a strategy that brings (together) the key*  
550 *actors in the country. The Uganda Bureau of Statistics had to bring on (board) other institutions*  
551 *in the Strategy for Statistics. So, it involved engaging the respective sectors, sector heads like the*  
552 *permanent secretaries to think statistics in a more organized manner- MDA-13*

553

554 Respondents and documents revealed that the SDG’s agenda served as a significant impetus for  
555 driving national coordination efforts in Uganda. The country established a national SDG  
556 Coordination Framework that articulated mandates for planning, implementation, resource  
557 mobilization, use, and other decision-making processes for various government entities  
558 (Muhwezi, 2016). The SDG coordination functions were anchored within national coordination  
559 structures (described in the preceding section) and inherited their underlying mechanisms  
560 (Roberts and Ssejjaaka, 2017). The National SDG Roadmap elaborated as follows

561

562 *The SDG coordination institutional framework in Uganda has two core level players: The*  
563 *political core team that comprises the Cabinet and Parliament and works through the National*  
564 *Policy Coordination Committee, and the technical team that comprises the national technical*  
565 *coordination team, the TWGs, Programme Working Groups (PWGs), MDAs and HLGs as*  
566 *implementing entities of public programmes ((OPM, 2021, pg 5).*

567

568 There were indications that SDG coordination structures were relatively functional due to the  
569 ‘good’ alignment between SDGs and existing sectoral mandates. One government official  
570 commented.

571 “... the SDGs have their own fitting into this (coordination systems).. we have what we call a  
572 national SDG task force. And this one happens every quarter. That one takes place”. The SDGs..  
573 entirely fit into our mandates... we have a call for all sectors to be contributing to that (SDG  
574 agenda). When you call upon them concerning SDGs, they come. They always come and provide  
575 guidance- MDA-8

576 SDGs also framed health broadly, providing an entry point to mobilise multisectoral action for  
577 health. One non-state actor affirmed:

578 *So, our ministry of health, the mandate I talked about, to a large extent, is about healthcare. But,*  
579 *if we are talking in the context of SDGs, we are talking in the context of health. Then the effort*  
580 *has to be beyond healthcare to bring other players that contribute immensely as well to the*  
581 *health outcomes - NSA-2*

582 On a related note, developing multisectoral plans to coordinate specific policy issues such as  
583 disaster, early childhood development and nutrition was reported to be a critical feature of  
584 Uganda’s strategic planning culture. However, such tools were limited by their narrow focus on  
585 sectoral priorities, limiting their appeal across the board.

586 According to one non-state actor intimated.

587 *“If you look for multisectoral plans, they are very few. I remember the nutrition action plan is a*  
588 *very good example of a multisectoral plan. I would have expected this country to have a*  
589 *multisectoral plan on urbanization, the industry, and, in fact, health because most of the (health)*  
590 *problems are in the education and water sectors. But how do education, health and water*  
591 *interact strategically? Do they have a reference point? NSA-1.*

592

593 Strategic plans such as the NDP and multisectoral policies were considered tools to induce  
594 multisectoral coordination by serving as a ‘common reference point’ for mutual accountability.  
595 *...and that is why we are currently drafting the third National Development Plan. The theory of*  
596 *change is that we move to a program-based approach, and it is all intended to strengthen the*  
597 *multisectoral collaboration- MDA-3*

598

599 *....so we came up with .... common policy and common strategy so that at least people, to the*  
600 *extent possible, it is not always 100%, but at least there is a reference point. - MDA-4*

601

However, political considerations played a role to ensure buy-in across sectoral boundaries. For example, the policy documents had to be titled and framed strategically and usually through negotiated processes. One non-health government official gave an example:

*For example, the environmental health policy, we wanted (to call it) a sanitation health policy, but it was difficult....so we called it environmental health policy to encompass what the environmental health division (at MOH) was doing by then- MDA-4*

The multisectoral plans empowered bodies with cross-government coordination functions to perform legitimate roles and stimulated ‘coordination among the coordinators’. One non-health government official aptly summarised

*What the national development plan was saying (is that) ‘we want to see how you are going to plan for how you are going to deliver this (result). OPM says, ‘we want to see how you will deliver on this. We want to monitor’. UBOS was like, ‘we want to see the statistics’. (NPA was like) ‘where is the plan?’ (the ministry of) finance is like ‘we want to see your budget’. So, a combination of the four (central agencies) working together made them get up on their feet. So, we needed that coordination mechanism between the oversight functions- MDA-14*

Another strategy was to tag coordination to senior civil servants’ job descriptions and performance contracts.

*....(coordination) is a major function of the chief executive. One had not realized it was a core role until there was a need to develop a contract, a service agreement. Then, coordination of the national statistical system was one of those (performance indicators for the ED) that would be checked to see the bureau’s efficiency in terms of coordinating- MDA-13.*

The country was reportedly adopting a program-based planning approach as a tool for horizontal coordination under the third national development plan III (2020-25)(National Planning Authority, 2020). The quote below from one senior government planner illustrates optimism with the new planning approach.

*If you read this NDP (III), it’s no longer a sector plan. It’s now a program-based plan... If we are talking about human capital development, we are not only looking at education as a silo*

634 *because you can provide a very good education, but kids go without feeding, which means that*  
635 *you have not addressed certain aspects of nutrition. So, the programmatic arrangement was*  
636 *coming to deliver that approach. MDA-14*

637 There were expressions of caution on the effectiveness of strategic planning tools because the  
638 strategic plans were often not effectively translated into operational plans. One MoH Official  
639 noted as follows

640 *Every year people plan for what they are supposed to do (but) with very little focus on the*  
641 *multisectoral component-where you know I am going to do this but not necessarily for my sake*  
642 *but because this (other) sector requires it so much- MOH-2*

643 Indeed, despite attempted harmonisation, duplicated policies were still prevalent. According to  
644 one non-state actor

645 *So, in government, it is possible to find five policies trying to achieve the same thing but being*  
646 *driven by different institutions. So, you have a type of business in government where there is*  
647 *some kind of competition, ministries are struggling to do the same things and ending up*  
648 *producing laws and policies that are duplicating each other. -NSA-1*

649 Moreso, whereas strategic planning and policy development seemed better coordinated,  
650 implementation, monitoring, and evaluation were often disjointed processes. So, the existence of  
651 the tools was reported not to guarantee successful implementation as the practice often deviated  
652 from the expectations. According to a senior government official:

653 *Frameworks are in place...there are guidelines and institutions that have been put in place like*  
654 *these meetings have to take place, and so and so is supposed to do this., but most often, they are*  
655 *on paper when it comes to practice. They (MDAs) do their own things- MDA-2*

656 The discrepancy above was attributed to that plans not being linked to the budgets, asynchronous  
657 sectoral priorities and fights over mandates. One non-state actor illustrates.

658 *... (The) Ministry of health will say we need a health facility here. The community needs it. But*  
659 *the people responsible for water will say we don't have a plan for taking water in that direction.*  
660 *Then the ministry of health might say in our budget, we are going to put a budget for water, but*  
661 *the other ministry will say that is not your mandate- NSA-2*

## 662 **Human resources management instruments.**

663 Several instruments focused on managing interorganizational culture and shared visions, norms,  
664 values, and understanding between public organizations. Reshuffling staff within the public

service and using liaison officers are prominent examples of these instruments. For instance, issue-specific focal persons, commonly called “desk officers”, such as nutrition desk officers, served as liaison officers across MDAs. In addition, policy analysts under the Directorate of Policy Coordination at the Cabinet Secretariat were distributed in all sectors to support the coordination of policy development. One senior government official confirmed:

*“...we have what we call the policy analysts cadre, and each ministry has a policy analyst unit or department or division, so we have quarterly coordination meetings”-MDA-2*

Policy champions galvanized MSA around specific policy issues. For example, regarding adolescent health, one respondent reiterated that *“working with partners, (they) managed to attract the First Lady to be the champion”*- MOH-7. Such policy champions draw on their structural and agential power to influence multisectoral programming and policy developments.

#### **The financial management system.**

All respondents agreed that the government budgeting system was mainly input-based and exhibited hierarchical traits based on the following features. First, the Public Finance Management Act (2015)(GoU, 2015) as the primary legal instrument dictated the operations of Uganda’s public finance management system. Second, the MoFPED has strong authority over other MDAs’ budgets, use and accounting for their resources. Third, the budgetary plans followed the budgeting cycle and entailed instruments such as guidelines (i.e., budget circulars and budget framework papers) produced by the Finance Ministry.

Further scrutiny, however, noted elements consistent with network-based approaches. For example, there are opportunities for negotiations and conflict resolution processes through budget conferences and ministerial policy statements presented to Parliament for harmonization. In addition, the transition to program-based budgeting (PBB) made the budget more network-based. The PPB was envisaged to strengthen network-based structures such as the sector working groups.

*“The current budget process does not provide a strong incentive to engage in joint sector planning and budgeting. The transition to Programmed Based Budgeting is an opportunity to*

*review the role of SWGs in prioritizing and monitoring sector investments.” (Roberts and Ssejjaaka, 2017, vi).*

## **Procedures for mandatory consultation and review of proposals and drafts for policies, legislative instruments, and other plans.**

The discussion under structural tools highlighted that the government of Uganda has processes for consultations during planning, policymaking and program design closely linked to the coordination structures and other procedural instruments. These coordination processes exhibit both hierarchical and network features. For example, the Cabinet procedures and guidelines provide for a negotiated process that accords ministers (on behalf of their respective MDAs and sectors) opportunities to review and consider the (likely) impacts of policy proposals on their sectors (The Republic of Uganda, 2009). Conversely, the Public Finance Management Act 2015(GoU, 2015) mandates a certificate of financial implications from the Ministry of Finance for every new law and policy underscoring hierarchical control. Similarly, every new law and policy is subjected to a regulatory impact assessment (RIA) to determine its alignment and harmonization with existing national and international laws and legal-institutional instruments (The Republic of Uganda, 2009). This also embodies top-down control typical for hierarchical mechanisms. Other mandatory processes include joint monitoring and reviews embedded in the policy management cycle corresponded to network mechanisms. However, evidence indicated that participation in these collaborative processes was minimal, unstructured and less active. The underlying reasons were similar to those undermining other coordination instruments discussed in the preceding sections. For example, one development partner emphasised that “*we (Uganda) do(es) not consciously audit our policies, review them and keep removing inconsistencies, contradictions and stuff like that*”- NSA-1

## **DISCUSSION**

This paper contributes to the ongoing debate on how to structure and organize coordinated MSA for health, taking a government perspective and drawing on insights from public administration, policy studies and a multi-theoretical framework. We highlighted the nature of CIs based on their underlying coordination mechanisms and the factors that influence their functioning. Below, we



discuss the main observations and reflect on their implications for coordinated government action toward health and other development objectives.

## **Emerging insights and implications for multisectoral action for health**

The study unraveled the rich and broad set of tools available to the government of Uganda to coordinate internally in pursuit of development goals. Consistent with public administration literature (Peters, 1998, 2005; Institute on Governance, 2014), this study found a hybrid body of structural and non-structural instruments to coordinate Uganda's intragovernmental efforts at the central level. This CI mix forms the repertoire of tools available to pursue coordinated MSA for health within the national government context.

Our findings hinted at disparities between coordination instruments' ideal and actual functionality. Central-level agencies such as the OPM and NPA were constrained, despite clear mandates, by limited technical capacity and non-material resources such as legitimacy. This is consistent with other assessments (Secretariat, 2013; A *et al.*, 2016; Roberts and Ssejjaaka, 2017; Ssenyonjo *et al.*, 2022) and with literature from LMICs emphasising the importance of relational and technical factors (Hongoro, Akim J and Kembo, 2012; Zaidi *et al.*, 2018; Mahlangu, Goudge and Vearey, 2019).

This study adapted Bouckaert and colleagues' (2010) framework to support identification of central government CIs, infer their underlying CMs, and analyse how these influence their functioning. This framework provided a more sophisticated and comprehensive analysis beyond a mere description of instruments. Our study revealed that the CIs at the national government level in Uganda are underpinned by hierarchy and network mechanisms. Many instruments integrate both mechanisms. For example, the negotiation and consultative bodies such as inter-ministerial committees, although primarily based on a network logic, also possessed hierarchical attributes to draw on the associated structural power. Indeed, the recourse to central coordination agencies personified by the Ministry of Finance (wielding power over line ministries through budget approvals) and the PM's office (wielding coordination power relying on its hierarchical power) epitomise coordination through structural power derived from legal mandates (Peters, 1998; Bouckaert, Peters and Verhoest, 2010a). The rationale and implications of the co-existence of two CMs co-existing within a single or set of related CIs are worth further scrutiny. According

to Tenbenschel (2018), each mechanism has inherent strengths, weaknesses and resources it draws on. Two CMs in one instrument could provide complementary or contradictory features that could support or constrain CI functionality, respectively.

Similar to public administration and policy scholars (Alexander, 1995; Capano and Howlett, 2020), our study noted that these CIs co-exist interdependently, sometimes in harmony and occasionally not. Functionality then becomes dependent on these interactions as (a set of) CIs shape(s) and are shaped by other CIs. CIs can be considered as inputs and outcomes of each other's functioning. For example, structural tools such as Cabinet and Interministerial committees serve as drivers, spaces and contexts for adopting and implementing non-structural tools. The former also serve as arenas through which coordination problems are revealed, and discussed in search of solutions (Bouckaert, Peters and Verhoest, 2010a). Similarly, the procedural instruments correspond to the processes through which coordination structures are established and operationalized. When pursuing coordinated MSA for health, unearthing and considering these interdependences, inherent interactions, compatibility, complementarity or contradictions among the different instruments and their underlying mechanisms is vital (Bryson, Crosby and Stone, 2015).

The co-existence of several CIs within government systems implies that the choice, implementation and modification of CIs is both a political and technical process (Candel and Biesbroek, 2016; Capano and Lippi, 2017). Procedures for mandatory consultation, negotiation and review of drafted policies and legislative instruments illustrate application of hierarchical power as part of the coordination culture in government. Actors have to judiciously navigate existing institutional and power arenas comprised of other CIs. Whereas sometimes institutional arrangements have constraining effects (Hudson and Leftwich, 2014), international experiences (e.g. Wismar *et al.*, 2013) indicate that these contextual realities could be entry points to further collaborative MSAs. Similarly, the requirement for new policies in Uganda to align with the national strategic vision and development plans smoothen the need to contest over ideas, resources and interests for enhanced intragovernmental coordination (National Planning Authority, 2015).

Our study reveals a strong tendency towards central coordination instruments. However, consistent with political economy perspectives, the functioning of hierarchical bodies is not

straightforward. The coordinated MDAs were noted to strategically respond to top-down control, at times resisting it overtly. These findings are not surprising when situated in the ‘structure-agency’ debates that dominate social sciences scholarship and the critical realist paradigm underpinning the broader PhD study (Craib and Archer, 1997; Danermark, Ekström and Karlsson, 2019). Structure and action are considered analytically different, but related concepts. Understanding complex social phenomena such as coordination requires deliberately examining their interactions (Craib and Archer, 1997; Lamsal, 2012; Danermark, Ekström and Karlsson, 2019). Structures shape what agents (individual or collective) can or cannot do, but they don’t determine their actions. Similarly, the structure depends on agents to reinforce, perpetuate or undermine them (Hudson and Leftwich, 2014). These power dynamics invite caution against indiscriminately using hierarchical tools. Efforts to situate coordination of health goals such as UHC at central coordinating agencies in Uganda (Ministry of Health, 2020) is reasonable but should consider the agency of the coordinated MDAs. More so, over-centralizing can lead to inefficiencies to resurface (Peters, 2005).

Relatedly, coordination bodies are in themselves agents that seek to optimise organisational or collective goals. They undertake deliberate action to facilitate their coordination function. In Uganda, the OPM internally reorganised and also develop relevant policy tools (e.g National Coordination Policy). Granular examination of coordination bodies indicates that they are not homogenous but rather layered entities with multiple identities increasing complexities. For example, First Lady chosen to champion adolescent health also heads the Ministry of Education with prominent roles in adolescent health (George *et al.*, 2021). The OPM is divided into special ministries and several departments (Roberts and Ssejjaaka, 2017) and our findings emphasise that such compartmentalisation infuses power differences and entrenches internal silos undermining the functioning of the coordination bodies.

Our study revealed that market-based tools were generally absent at the central government level, despite recent global trends such as the pursuit of result-based management approaches in Africa underpinned by neoliberal market logic (African Development Bank 2017, Oxman and Fretheim 2009). The Ugandan context (like other LMIC) is characterized by challenges in performance measurement, risk-averse principals, weak capacity to monitor, high transaction costs, strong interdependence, high complexity and uncertainty (Roberts and Ssejjaaka, 2017;

Uganda Ministry of Public Service, 2017; Mukuru *et al.*, 2021; Ssennyonjo *et al.*, 2022). These features favour dominance of tools based on hierarchical and network-based mechanisms as per the TCE and PAT theories ((Rossignoli and Ricciardi, 2015) Additionally, lack of market based tools can be explained by notions of the path-dependence in institutional change (Thelen, 1999). New CIs and mechanisms are historically contingent (Hall and Taylor, 1996). As demonstrated by the SDGs, leveraging and capacitating existing systems might offers benefits such as reduced resistance, higher legitimacy and lowering transaction costs (OPM, 2021). This partly explains the delegation of coordination powers (e.g from OPM to MoH for epidemics) to reduce coordination costs.

The empirical and theoretical insights above are instructive for Uganda and other countries attempting to coordinate new goals such as UHC. Coordinating specific health agendas such as UHC need to be positioned within existing government structures and processes to minimise ‘institutional inertia’(Lawrence, 2008). The path-dependence of the selection, adaptation and performance of CIs further underscores the value of contextualizing CIs and mechanisms for MSA for health within broader public sector reforms. The adoption of hierarchical tools actualises the primary goal of post-NPM reforms to gradually move public-sector organizations to greater integration and coordination (Christensen and Lægreid 2007a). Fragmentation following NPM increased pressure for more government integration and coordination (Verhoest and Bouckaert, 2005). This partly explains the creation of central agencies with coordination mandates typifying efforts to return to the centre (Peters, 2005).

Some approaches, such as Health in All Policies (HiAP) advocated by health sector players, presuppose a purposive focus on policy development within the broader government beyond the health sector (Freiler *et al.*, 2013). To succeed, such approaches require a deeper immersion in the government’s policy development processes and other sectors’ legislative or policy agendas. Therefore, health sector players should strive to be active within government-wide and intersectoral coordination structures and processes.

## **Future research agenda**

We identify four issues for further research. First, change in CIs mix depends on contextual conditions. It is constrained by the prevailing mixes, which structurally limit the emergence of a fundamentally new instrument set, thereby depriving alterations in the underlying CMs (Howlett, Mukherjee and Woo 2015; Capano and Mukherjee 2020). Thus, there is a need to interrogate further the factors that allow actors to adopt only specific instruments (mixes) and how these factors favour or disfavour the choice of particular tools. Second, how these instruments embody and persuade power relationships and interests, such as including or excluding some actors, is unclear. Further inquiry should focus on how the political economy reality favours or constrains change or stability. Third, this empirical study explored the toolbox of instruments available to the national government to actualize coordination among its entities. However, it has only provided a general picture of the CIs. Therefore, in-depth inquiry, for example, through case studies focusing on policy issues such as HIV/AIDS and nutrition, would illuminate how and why instrument mixes are adopted, sustained or changed. Fourth, it is perhaps “easier” to engage in multisectoral coordination for some health problems (like HIV/AIDS) than for others because of differential donor interest and funding. This is an exciting hypothesis to investigate in the future. Such an inquiry would enable examining the day-to-day implementation of coordination arrangements. It would unravel the do’s and don’ts and the facilitating factors and obstacles.

## **Limitations**

This paper’s main strength is its detailed elaboration on the various structures and processes to get MSA done at the central government level. It attempted to explore how these tools are “operationalized” in practice and characterized by their underlying CMs. However, we identify four limitations. First, this research sheds light on the dense landscape at the central government level but does not address how all this intense activity taking place at the central level is “lived” at the meso level (the district) in Uganda’s decentralized system. Second, it also doesn’t capture the coordination arrangements between the government and the private and non-state actors. Third, the study design did not permit examining the dynamic and complex interactions among the CMs and CIs over time and policy domains. Modifying study designs into longitudinal and historical designs can enable inquiry into the evolution of coordination tools and the explanations

for the observed trajectories over time (Bouckaert, Peters and Verhoest, 2010a). Lastly, the paper focuses on the formal arrangements. It is not explicit about informal arrangements that are often equally influential in driving IGC arrangements (Tenbensen, 2018).

## **CONCLUSION**

This paper illuminated that intragovernmental coordination at the central level in Uganda is pursued through various structural and non-structural CIs underpinned by hierarchical and networks logics. Hierarchies, markets and networks have been presented as useful reference points for a general description of institutional arrangements for coordination. This study demonstrated that specific coordination tools can be analyzed deeper by delineating the underlying institutional forms of these ideal type mechanisms. Such an approach can inspire more complex analysis and comparisons of CIs within and across government levels, policy domains or issues over time. Understanding the CMs might explain the resources and social processes that underlie the preference, functionality and change of the instruments or lack thereof. Contextualizing coordination of MSA for health within government systems guides decision-makers on the broader government problems and possible options. Public health research needs to pay attention to the public sector instrument mixes, the dynamic change processes and the factors that enhance or threaten the instruments' effectiveness.

## **ABBREVIATIONS.**

MSA=Multisectoral action; CM= Coordination Mechanisms; CIs= Coordination Instruments; OPM= Office of the Prime Minister; MOFPED=Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development; MDAs= Ministries, Departments and Agencies; IFCPPI=Institutional Framework for Coordination of Policy and Program Implementation; IGC= Intragovernmental coordination; NPM= New Public Management; NPA= National Planning Authority, SWG= Sector Working Group.

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## SUPPLEMENTAL FILE 1

### Coordination Instruments: Typologies

Theoretical and empirical work on interorganisational CIs presents various typologies (E. R. Alexander, Dorfhuber, and Gant 1996; Bouckaert, Peters, and Verhoest 2010a). According to Mintzberg, coordination is pursued through either 1) mutual adjustment or 2) direct supervision or 3) standardization of skills and norms, work processes, and results (Unger, Macq, and Bredo 2000). Alexander (1995) presented several formal structural instruments characterised by being ex-ante or ex-post (provided before or after specific organisational acts respectively) and differentiable by hierarchical levels. The liaison officer (boundary spanner) was considered the least hierarchical. Inter-organisational groups and the coordinator were in the middle, while coordination units and lead organisations were the most hierarchical (Alexander, 1995, p. 117). Peters (2003) typology (see table below) includes structural and process based coordination strategies. The national level structures are subcategorised into the core executive, ministerial levels, interministerial and public organisations with coordination functions. The core executive strategies include expanding staff with the Office of the President or Prime Minister, Cabinet (inclusive of full and junior ministers and ministers without portfolio) and central agencies to coordinate crosscutting functions such as finance and public service. The procedural strategies related to budgeting, policy making, regulatory and performance monitoring functions.

**Table: Common Coordination Instruments at the Central Government level**

Structural coordination instruments	Specific strategies
1) The core executive:	
<b>The core executive is a major coordination structure in all countries. In most governments, the overall coordination centre is in the office of the President, prime minister, or their equivalent. Different strategies are used to facilitate multisectoral collaboration and ensure public</b>	<p>a) <i>Expanding staff in the office of the government's Chief Executive officer (e.g. the President) to look at specific policy issues.</i></p> <p>b) <i>Establishing Central agencies to coordinate budgetary, policy, personnel management organizations such ministries of Finance and Public service that report directly to the chief executive or have designated authority of central coordination of policy and implementation management. Central agencies may be effective coordinators, but the possibility of tensions between these agency staff and line ministries is high. The line staff resent control and accuse the central agencies of limited understanding of the problems and programs being implemented. While the</i></p>

<b>sector coordination at this level (Peters, 2005).</b>	central agency staff accuses the staff of line ministries of having a narrow view of government priorities (Peters, 2005).
	<p>c) <i>The Cabinet is usually the best place to negotiate priorities.</i> However, the Cabinet may be a space for a minister to defend the interests of their ministry, thereby undermining whole-of-government thinking. Cabinet committees could be constituted to work on a policy area or several related issues, or an overarching committee for "joint planning and coordination" could be constituted within the Cabinet to harmonize positions of different ministries. However, the proliferation of these committees may also need coordination leading to "coordination of the coordinator". The committees may also lead to blurred boundaries among policy areas and ministries(Peters, 2005).</p> <p>d) <i>Minister without Portfolio or with additional Portfolio:</i> Substantive ministers may be very busy and conflicted, so a minister without a department home may be selected to undertake special tasks like coordinating government programs. The main problem is that a minister without Portfolio may face limited authority and resources to effectively undertake this task. S/he too may also become overloaded with multiple portfolios.</p> <p>e) <i>Junior ministers</i> may be assigned specific areas to support the substantive minister under a policy domain. However, they usually have limited clout and authority to perform these duties. They may also be perceived as a threat to the minister's authority (Peters, 2005).</p>
<b>2) Coordination within the Ministerial organizations</b> <b>At the ministerial level, the mechanisms attempted to enhance coordination include the creation of super ministries, advisory committees, or governing boards(Peters, 2005; Bouckaert, Peters and Verhoest, 2010a)</b>	<p>a) <i>The creation of super ministries</i> to oversee related areas is one of the strategies to improve coordination. However, merging ministries may create additional coordination problems for the ministers due to the creation of several internal units within the big ministry.</p> <p>b) <i>Advisory Committees</i> are intended to bring together representatives from different line ministries and interest groups. Significant policy endeavors by a ministry must be sent to the Advisory Committee for discussion and allow at least information sharing among ministries. However, the agenda-setting is usually controlled by the hosting ministry.</p> <p>c) <i>Governing Boards:</i> These are usually composed of government and non-state representatives to oversee policy direction for semiautonomous agencies. Boards help draw organizations to broader perspectives than would have been the case otherwise.</p>
<b>3) Agencies with Portfolio relevant for coordination</b>	<p>a) Special ministries could be created to coordinate the provision of services to the demographic and regional populations. However, these usually have limited authority and resources and still need to align with other ministries.</p>
<b>4) Interministerial organizations</b> <b>All governments have interministerial governance mechanisms.</b>	<p>a) Taskforces, working groups and ad-hoc committees are examples used where temporary solutions are needed or where clarification of the problem is needed in a short period(Peters, 2005).</p> <p>b) Special programs created as coordinating organizations</p>

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**Processes-based coordination mechanisms**

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**Coordination may be enhanced through adjustments in processes and procedures such as budgeting, regulatory reviews and evaluation of policies and programs (Peters, 2005; Bouckaert, Peters and Verhoest, 2010a):**

- a) *Budgeting* is essential for ensuring fiscal discipline and policy and program coherence. However, in the reality of competing priorities and reducing funding, the tendency is for people to retreat to their silos and underinvest in coordination.
  - b) *Regulatory review*: In the case of new policies, there is usually a process to review them, their cost to the government and their relationship to existing regulatory frameworks. The main question is the (economic, political or policy) criteria to base these decisions on.
  - c) *Evaluation of Policies and programs* may highlight deficiencies or challenges with program/ intervention coordination. Evaluation of complex programs without due consideration of the constellation of policies and nested contextual environment may reveal the effectiveness of the program and mask deficiencies from a broader systemic perspective.
  - d) *Coordination comments*: This mechanism is employed in some settings like Australia. Before any issue is taken to the Cabinet, it is required that comments are solicited from relevant ministries to avoid surprises in the Cabinet.
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 1142 Perri 6 2004 classifies tools based on the initiating agency into top-down (centrally defined and  
 1143 steered) and bottom-up (driven by local managers mainly targeting service delivery levels). Top-  
 1144 down tools include initiatives driven by budgetary systems, driven by using plans, targets, and  
 1145 performance management tools, driven by central initiative in localities, driven by the creation of  
 1146 centrally appointed brokers or "tsars" and driven by using mandated or incentivized partnerships  
 1147 between centrally defined subnational agencies. Bottom-up tools include a) formally agreed  
 1148 partnership structure and b) informally emergent relationships; no central direction or mandates.

1149 Bouckaert and colleagues (2010a) highlight the following observations in reviewing multiple  
 1150 typologies. First, some typologies (e.g. Perri 6 2004) are rather generic, are more structural-  
 1151 oriented and do not distinguish instruments according to CMs. Second, other typologies consider  
 1152 non-structural tools such as administrative processes (e.g. budgeting and resource management) to  
 1153 complement the structural-based strategies. However, these typologies do not explicitly link the  
 1154 instruments to the CMs (Bouckaert, Peters, and Verhoest 2010a).



## SUPPLEMENTAL FILE 2

The table below elaborates the adopted typology constituting the structural interfaces or processes for coordination (Adler and Borys, 1996; Peters, 1998, 2005; Osborne, Radnor and Nasi, 2013).

**Table: Typology of CIs and linkages to predominant mechanisms**

Instrument			Underlying mechanism
Major category	Type	Variants/examples	
<b>III. Structural instruments</b>	IA Organisation restructuring	Mergers	Hierarchical type mechanism (HTM)
	IB Reorganizing and altering control lines and levels within a hierarchy	Super minister to control related ministries	HTM
	IC: Creation of coordination function or bodies.	Liaison officers, coordinating units & lead organization	HTM
	ID: Regulated markets	Internal markets, quasi-markets, external markets	Market type mechanism (MTM)
	IE: Structure of solidarity and cooperation	IE(a): Systems for information exchange	Network type mechanism (NTM)
		IE(b): Creation of consultation or negotiation bodies, e.g., task forces, advisory bodies	NTM
		IE(c): Entities for Collective decision-making, e.g., Cabinet, permanent structures	NTM
		IE(d): joint organisation	NTM
<b>IV. Management instruments</b>	IIA: Strategic management tools:	IIA(a)Top-down process usually Common planning instrument	HTM
		IIA(b)Bottom- up planning process	NTM
	IIB-Human resources & culture management instruments	Training, reshuffling/rotation of staff within civil service, and common training to foster interprofessional collaboration	NTM
	IIC-The financial management system.	IIC(a)- hierarchical input based financial systems	HTM
		IIC(b): systems are performance-linked, allowing incentives and sanctions for performance	MTM

		III(c) result-oriented financial systems emphasizing information exchange and cooperation and managing crosscutting issues, e.g., program-based budgeting	NTM
	IID- Procedures for mandatory consultation	Review of proposals and drafts for policies, legislative instruments, and other plans	HTM or NTM depending on the degree of compulsory nature

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<sup>i</sup> The SWGs are as follows in alphabetical order: Accountability WG, Agriculture WG, Education WG, Energy and Mineral Development WG, Health WG, Information & Communication Technology WG, Justice, Law & Order WG, Lands Housing & Urban Development WG. Other WGs are Public Administration WG, Public Sector Management WG, Social development WG, Security WG, Tourism Trade & Industry WG, Water & Environment WG, and Works & Transport WG. The 16th WG is the Legislature WG which corresponds to the Parliament. Recently efforts to merge government have been proposed (Roberts and Ssejjaaka, 2017; Uganda Ministry of Public Service, 2017)