Max Weber's antinomies of the Fall : paradisiacal ethics and the populist Zeitgeist

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Paradisiacal ethics and the populist *Zeitgeist*

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> "When in the Yahwistic story of paradise the snake advises the woman to eat from the tree of knowledge. It holds out the promise that 'your eyes shall be opened and ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil.' It told no lie, for Yahweh, after cursing man and the snake, added 'man is become as one of us,' hence godlike through knowledge, and he chased man out of the garden, 'lest he put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live forever.'
>
> (Weber, 1952: 219)

Introduction

This article proceeds from the observation that the biblical myth of the Fall is a valuable heuristic tool in Max Weber's work, which has received hardly any systematic attention. Despite the fact that it is explicitly mentioned in e.g. *Ancient Judaism*, *Protestant Ethic*, *Intermediate Reflections*, *Economy and Society* and several of his methodological essays[1], neither *The Cambridge Companion to Weber* (Turner 2000) nor *The Max Weber Dictionary* (Swedberg and Agevall 2016) contains a single reference. Moreover, while an eminent commentator such as Schluchter (1981[1979]) has pointed out that the developmental history of the idea of salvation in the Judeo-Christian tradition is crucial for Weber's theory of ethics, even in his work no attention is given to the various interpretations of the mythical Fall that created distinct needs for salvation. Whereas this omission may be in line with Weber's anti-utopianism[2] (Derman, 2012), Weber's interpretations of the biblical myth of the Fall nevertheless provide valuable insights in his theses on social differentiation, disenchantment, rationalization, and the vocation of politics. Weber's understanding of everyday action, even in

the contemporary world, is closely related to various religious interpretations of what deprivations were suffered by the human race as a consequence of Adam's original infraction and the yearning for salvation and paradisiacal experiences it engenders. In this respect Weber foreshadows literature that recently makes similar claims with respect to the importance of the myth of the Fall for the human condition (Kahn 2006), scientific knowledge (Harrison 2007), and human responsibility (Greenblatt 2017).

We will show that the way Weber interpreted the myth of the Fall himself is important to understand his preference for heroic existentialism whereby individuals give personality to their character by making a decisive choice of certain, ultimate values. Weber's attention for the Fall is doubly 'negative' in the sense that he rejects utopianism as well as the negative appraisal of the Fall of the Judeo-Christian salvation religions. *To hell with paradise*. But as Turner aptly noticed "it is perhaps easier to identify solutions and positions that Weber rejected rather than those he embraced" (2002: 601). Similarly, Tenbruck (1980:345) states that according to Weber man creates his reality "through the counterpart (*Gegenbild*) of his rationalized image of the world". We will indeed show that the myth of the Fall is a valuable heuristic to understand Weber's tragic awareness that the 'common people' will be overwhelmed by the freedom of choice and therefore will be attracted by charismatic leaders that can invoke a return to a paradisiacal community free of choice. *Back to Eden*.

While these kind of tragic antagonisms (Honigsheim 2003), antinomical structures (Mommsen 1989), and dialectical reasoning (Alexander 1987) in Weber's oeuvre have received considerable attention, no one has pointed out that they often are inspired by the specific cultural significance of the biblical myth of the Fall. This is a lacuna because it led to a one-sided attention for the emancipatory 'fortunate Fall' aspect of his rationalization thesis, while the

complementary paradisiacal thesis has remained under the radar. Yet, an interesting exception in this respect is Carl Schmitt, who turns Weber's thesis of the Protestant Ethic on its head by positing a paradisiacal 'Catholic' value rational counterpoint to the fortunate Fall 'Protestant' instrumental rationality of Weber (Schmitt 1996[1923]: 11). According to Schmitt, Weber overlooks the fact that the advancing 'economical instrumental rationality' creates 'political value rationality'. Especially in a world where 'material interests' rule, there is a need for representatives that embody the unitary will of the people and stand for a particular "political form" or a paradisiacal legal order, because "the juridical regulation of human relations existed before evil and sin, and was not its result" (Schmitt 1996[1917][3]: 56).

However, based on Weber's antinomies of the Fall, we can see that Schmitt's apolitical portrayal of Weber is inappropriate (see also Kalyvas, 2008). Weber is perfectly aware that "the inescapable fruit of the tree of knowledge is distasteful to the complacent." (MVF:18) Accordingly, he knows the common people will be susceptible to the temptations of politicians that seek "the salvation of one's soul and that of others" (PV:90). In all his *Sachlichkeit*, Weber realizes that politics "is certainly not made with the head alone" (PV:91). Ultimately, he is therefore convinced that there is nothing wrong with political 'salvation' seekers as long as they show personality and responsibility in their vocation. They should make deliberate value choices and feel responsibility for the consequences of these choices. They should choose to order choices, just as the followers choose to follow their lead.

Weber nevertheless realizes that such genuine "choice directing" charismatic leaders must get the necessary elbow room in order to be able to compete with the "group embodying" charismatics of the "divine external order" (SCA: 250) and of "natural communal experience". After all, these paradisiacal contenders "direct the gaze of the masses towards paradise on earth"

(SCDR:70-71) by only focussing on "the *form* of existence, …, without setting new, tangible, substantial goals" (Marianne Weber 1975: 319). They evoke a return of an unitary context that is free of choice and full of objective meaning. Consequently, their primary task is to protect this precious context against the hostile fallen surroundings by erecting walls against foreign invaders. After all, the word 'paradise' etymologically stems from the old-Persian *paradeisa*, which means *enclosed* garden.

In sum, while the liberal Weber obviously favoured a 'Fortunate Fall' viewpoint, he is aware of the attractions of the paradisiacal counterpoint. His paradisiacal characterization is clearly akin to the contemporary populist *Zeitgeist* (Mudde 2004). However, while current conceptualizations of 'populism' usually stress its Schmittean political form – the political embodiment of the people – (e.g. Abts and Rummens 2007), they often fail to acknowledge its Weberian paradisiacal epistemology: the eagerness of the masses to be liberated from choice stress, subjective meanings, and differentiation. In sum, Weber's counterconcept of 'paradisiacal ethics' can provide valuable insights in the antiliberal regressive revolt we are witnessing today (e.g. Holmes 1996; Critchley 2012).

Weber's dialectics of the Fall

It is well-known that the self-proclaimed religiously unmusical Weber already at a very young age "was more at home with the bible than many a theologian" (Radkau 2009: 430), and was convinced that we all behave 'involuntarily' in accordance with Christian doctrines (Radkau 2009: 533; Marianne Weber 1975: 337). He referred to them as "switchmen, that determine the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest" (SPWR:280). Interestingly, this famous passage was a later addition to an already existing text (Schluchter,

1981[1979]:25) and inserted just before the following sentence: "'From what' and 'for what' one wished to be redeemed and, let us not forget, 'could be' redeemed, depended upon one's image of the world". Hence, it is no surprise that Weber insisted that "the myth of the Fall of man is basic to our present conception" (AJ:227).

Interestingly, this assertion is symbolized by the fact that the cycle of Klinger's etchings on the Biblical myth of the Fall, titled "Eve and the Future" was prominently displayed in Weber's Freiberg and Heidelberg homes (Chalcraft 1999: 212). While Max and Marianne Weber owned at least 118 of Klinger's etchings, the etching portraying Adam and Eve's expulsion form the walled paradise hung beside their wedding photo (Radkau 2009: 121). Another etching of the same Eve and the Future-cycle hung on the wall opposite Weber's desk. It shows a colossal sphynx-like tiger sitting up straight at the end of a canyon, which according to Klinger symbolizes "life barred by the passions of the flesh" (Baumgarten 1964: 474) and also "the inevitability of death waiting at the end of life's path (Kirk, Varnedoe and Streicher 1977).

Whatsoever, more important is that Weber as a scholar of comparative religion gave extensive attention to the way the biblical myth has been variously interpreted in the Judeo-Christian tradition[4]. While the basic narrative stays the same, each religious epoch adopts a particular perspective on the Biblical myth. By explaining the specific cultural significance of different interpretations of the biblical myth Weber provides insight in three antinomies: 1) the ability to act and control our lives versus the objectifying consequences of action; 2) the objectivity of truth versus the relativism of knowledge, and 3) the commitment to values and beliefs versus the instrumental responsibility to the consequences of one's actions (Whimster and Lash 1987: 5). Moreover, because the different interpretations of the Fall in the Judeo-Christian tradition typically imply a succession of three distinctive phases: a prelapsarian thesis, a postlapsarian-

sinful antithesis and a postlapsarian-redemptive synthesis, we will argue that it is even more appropriate to speak of three dialectics: 1) a dialectic of freedom and domination, 2) a dialectic of objective and subjective meaning and, 3) a dialectic of unity and differentiation.

In the following sections we will systematically elaborate these three dialectics and show how they are related to the various interpretations of the Fall in the Judeo-Christian tradition. Each of these dialectics unfolds in a succession of three pairwise historical comparisons which contrast specific ethical views. Inspired by Schluchter (1981[1979]:49) we can say that Weber's Judeo-Christian "developmental history" is characterised by three successive swings of a pendulum connecting magical ethics and Judaic law ethics, Catholic universal ethics of conviction and Calvinist particular ethics of conviction and finally the last "major swing" connecting secular ethics of conviction and secular ethics of responsibility (see table 1). Yet, while Schluchter (1981[1979]) aptly recognized the growing rationalization of the 'salvation' beliefs as the "carrier" of the historical process, he somehow neglected what Tenbruck (1980) called the counterparts (*Gegenbild*) of this rationalization process. If one takes the alternative interpretations of the Biblical myth of the Fall into account that Weber links with the particular salvation ethics, it is nevertheless possible to discern a subtle sequence of swings with a fortunate Fall character and swings characterized by paradisiacal yearning.

Table 1 about here

The dialectic of domination and freedom

Traditionally, many authors claim that the system of meaning of the myth of the Fall centers around the transition from freedom to domination (Kurtz 1979). According to Weber this interpretation is mainly initiated by the Jewish prophets who stressed that humanity was free of

social and physical constraints in paradise but after Adam and Eve's consumption of the forbidden fruit of the Tree of Knowledge human freedom is constrained by physical toil and compulsory subjection to the authority of God. The magical creation myths of ancient Babylonia and Sumer were hereby disenchanted and transformed in a rational 'paradigm' propagating law abidance (Table 1: columns A-B). The sin of the Jewish people was much more explicitly linked to violations of Israel's peculiar social institutions. "Sturdy chains bind the Jews firmly to their pariah position" (SR:623). Yet, the Fall as conceived in ancient Judaism was only a minuscule infraction compared to the all-pervasive original sin of Augustinian[5] Christianity. Hence, Weber stated that 'throughout the Old Testament the Fall became no soteriological event decisive for Yahweh's attitude to Israel or to man" (AJ:227).

Only in early Christianity did the Fall become so fundamental that the prospect of salvation in afterlife became all important and an alibi for a life dominated by suffering. Although Jesus' message was rather aristocratic in the sense that "few are chosen to pass through the narrow gate, to repent and to believe in Jesus" (SR:632) it did not a priori exclude certain groups. Moreover, in contrast with Israel's salvation, which is located in the unforeseeable future, the Catholic salvation is at hand for those that are baptized. The only condition is an absolute indifference to worldly concerns, and a preference for the innocent creatures that inhabited Eden before the Fall (ES:632). In this respect the Catholic interpretation of the Fall clearly departed from the rational-legalistic interpretation of Judaism (Table 1: columns B-C). Notably, in the writings of Paul we can feel the overpowering joy at having emerged from the hopeless "slave law" [Talmudic law] into freedom, through the blood of the Messiah" (SR:623).

However, it is only in the irreversible Fall of Calvinism and puritan Protantism that Weber sees the traces of individual freedom (Table 1: columns C-D). In this sense, Weber fully agrees with his colleague, the theologian Ernst Troeltsch, who stated that in Protestant theory "the Fall means the removal of Nature that leaves no room for compromise, adaptation, transitional processes, or evolution as in Catholic dogma" (Troeltsch 1960[1911]:475). Paradoxically, the Puritan individual freedom originates from the doctrine of predestination which denies human beings any free will in the individual pursuit of salvation. "Man, by his fall into a state of sin, hath wholly lost all ability of will to any spiritual good accompanying salvation" (Westminster confession cited in PE, 57). Consequently, the only thing Puritans can rely on, is their own self-confidence in finding inner-worldly confirmation for their conviction of salvation (*certitudo salutis*) (SR:620). "The Puritan directing the gaze of the masses not to the paradise beyond performed very credible services on behalf of 'freedom' in this world." (SCDR:70-71). This positive libertarian appraisal of the Puritan interpretation is clearly neo-Kantian. In the 'Conjectural beginning of human history' Kant satirized Herder's romantic idealization of Eden and argued that eating from the Tree of Knowledge was not an infringement of a divine moral voice but an act of reason's liberation of nature (2007[1786]: 165). Weber subscribes to this view because he also sees rationalization as a liberating force instigated by Protestant Calvinism but even more than Kant he realizes that this liberation comes at a price. Weber puts the 'freedom' in this world in quotation marks.

Paradoxically the individual freedom of Puritanism leads to an universalization of the quest for self-fulfillment in their professional calling which in turn creates a cosmos of capitalist and bureaucratic institutions (PE:123). In the end, this iron cage will prove to be more persistent than its religious underpinnings but nevertheless the idea of duty in one's calling which is imposed upon us by the Fall 'prowls about in our lives like the ghost of dead religious beliefs'

(PE:124, 233). Hence, in Weber's case it is more appropriate to speak of a dialectic of domination and individuation because in modern disenchanted times the Fall is perceived as a fortunate flaw (*felix culpa*) that makes real individual freedom possible but at the same time tragically produces a new force of dominion: bureaucratic impersonal rules (Alexander [1987]2006). Weber not coincidently speaks in this context of a "shell as hard as steel" (*stahlhartes Gehäuse*). Contrary to the walls of paradise which protect the Edenites from the inhospitable outside world, the iron walls of the rational cage control them from within. In this respect, it is understandable that the "masses" are again longing for the protective paradisiacal walls of social closure against outsiders (ES: 43-47) and some leaders are eager to satisfy this need and protect the paradisiacal essences.

Yet, in a purely Puritan way, Weber's personal resistance to this refractory domination presupposes the self-confidence to face the bureaucratic tiger (Table 1: columns D-F). Postparadisiacal humans are individually accountable for the consequences of their deeds. Without Adam and Eve, the snake would have been powerless. I must choose my own values, and this is not a rational choice, but a matter of mature conviction. Such a courage of despair is also typical for the existentialist revolt and in this sense Jaspers aptly identified Weber as the "existential philosopher incarnate" (op cit. in Löwith 2003(1993): 47). Also for Weber the Fall once and for all closes off a pre-historical mythological cosmos from a modern rational cosmology[6]. In this respect he agrees with Elias who stresses the illusionary character of a zero-point in the civilizing process or a knowledge-less Eden (Elias 1987: 230).

The dialectic of objective and subjective meaning

Weber also presents a second system of meaning, a modern epistemological interpretation of the myth of the Fall, namely the transition from objective meaning to subjective meaning, with common knowledge as important go-between. In order to clarify this, we start off from a passage in *The objectivity of knowledge*:

"The fate of a cultural epoch that has eaten from the tree of knowledge is that it must realize that we cannot read off the *meaning* of events in this world from the results, – however complete they may be – of our scrutiny of those events, but that we ourselves must be able to create that meaning." (OK:104).

Hence, according to Taylor, Weber constructs a "subtraction theory," which explains modernity "by human beings having lost, or sloughed off, or liberated themselves from certain earlier, confining horizons, or illusions, or *limitations of knowledge* (2007:22; italics ours). Conversely this means the prelapsarian Adam and Eve can perfectly read off the meaning of events because they experience the true essence or the "objectivity" of Edenite existence. In Eden, they are symbolically "made of the same flesh" (Genesis 2:23). There is no individuality and no individual character (OK:119). Hence, when speaking, they legitimately use the *majestatis pluralis*. "We know, because we are. We are, because we know." If social scientific knowledge is defined as insight into the reasons why people differ on a given variable, those in paradise know nothing, as there are no distinct subjects, there are no distinct value spheres, there is no history, there is no future, and thus no variation. It is unlikely that subjective meaning – "adequacy on the level of meaning" – in order to live in a self-conscious manner (*sinnhafte Adäquanz*) (ES:17) will be found in paradise. In Paradise, meaning is collective and uncontested, such that there is actually only *kausale Adäquanz*. The first truly self-conscious meaningful social action (*Handeln*) taken by Adam and Eve is to cover their genitals because

in doing that they are purposively oriented towards each other's action. Although there was obviously behavior before the Fall, even speech, they involved only relating to someone else (*Verhalten*).

This fortunate Fall-interpretation Weber again links up with the Puritan tradition (Table 1: columns D-F). In *The Protestant Ethic*, Weber includes two passages from Milton's *Paradise Lost*, a work that he describes as "A Divine Comedy of Puritanism" (cited in PE:46). It is no coincidence that he chooses the passage in which the angel Gabriel impresses upon Adam that, after the Fall, he must above all else obey God, but that he must also attend to the well-being of his fellow humans. "*Only add. Deeds to thy knowledge answerable*; add faith; add virtue, patience, temperance; add love, by name to come called Charity, the soul. Of all the rest: *then wilt thou not be loath to leave this Paradise, but shall possess a Paradise within thee, happier far*" (PE:47; italics ours). It is thus possible to individualize and transcend the original experience of paradise by explicitly basing one's actions on subjective self-conscious knowledge. In contrast with the objective meaning of the suffering for the pariah-people in Judaism and for the faithful baptized Catholics[7], Puritans explicitly have to rely on subjective meaning (PE:113). Instead of the "very human Catholic cycle of sin, repentance, atonement, release, followed by renewed sin" (PE:71), in the Puritan world of predestination the faithful have but two elements to which they can cling: self-confidence and untiring ascetic labor (PE:67). The message is thus that one should not doubt one's own subjective knowledge regarding the divine election, as doubt concerning whether one is amongst the elect is in itself a warning sign. In order to live an authentic life one should embrace one's own death. One should work, not because professional success is a means of being worthy of election, but purely because it allays the fear of the contrary (PE:69). Interestingly, the Puritan quest for subjective meaning only makes sense if they are aware that all their fellow believers also lack objective

meaning. All Puritans are naked before an invisible but nevertheless almighty God and they know they all know this. In sum, Puritan subjective meaning is embedded in common knowledge. "I know that you know, that I know … that only some of us "are predestinated unto everlasting life" (PE:57). Hence, it is not a coincidence that Weber's interpretative social science focuses on social behavior that is meaningfully oriented to the actions of others involved with each other (ES:23).

"The transcendental precondition of every social science is […] that we are cultural beings endowed with the capacity and the will to […] to bestow meaning upon the world, […] which will become the basis on which we are, in our life, led to judge certain phenomena of human existence in *common* and to adopt a position with respect to them because we regard them as significant (OK:119 italics ours).

While Schütz (1967:234) was right that Weber often does not specify whether the subjective meaning (*gemeinter Sinn*) is attributed by the acting individual(s) or by the sociological observer, he is nevertheless very clear that the interpretative method presupposes an extensive overlap between the perspective of the actor and the observer in terms of a context of common knowledge of "average habits of thought and feeling". However, due to processes of rationalization, specialization and (subjective) social differentiation, subjective meaning is increasingly detached from such a context of common knowledge. We can potentially know everything (SV:12), but we no longer have much knowledge of what the other knows and feels, because of the lack of common cultural value ideas with which we approach reality (OK:118). Consequently, "it becomes less likely that 'culture' can have any inner-worldly meaning for the individual" (RR:356). In the absence of a common cultural context one can only cling to an

important constant in modern life: instrumental-rationality. However, this is only a glimmer of hope:

"The rationalization of community action will most certainly not result in a universalization of the knowledge about its conditionalities and interrelations, but mostly in the exact opposite. The "savage" knows infinitely more about the economic and social conditions of his own existence than "civilized man" (IS:301).

Modern individual knowledge is bounded by the inability to assimilate the exponential growth of collective knowledge. "Thus the growing process of intellectualization and rationalization does *not* imply a growing understanding of the conditions under which we live. It means something quite different. It is the knowledge or the conviction that if *only we wished* to understand them we *could* do so at any time" (SV:12). Interestingly, in the foregoing quotation Weber is referring to both a decrease in self-conscious subjective knowledge and an increase in collective knowledge ('we as a collective'). Paradoxically, this means modern individuals are increasingly confronted with a gap between all-pervasive collective knowledge and futile individual knowledge. When speaking we again use the paradisiacal *majestatis pluralis*, but this time we are painfully aware of this. What I know is that "we can", but this knowledge is often completely detached from one's own individual experience. Weber realizes that objective scientific truth is only that which claims validity for those who seek it, like himself, but for the masses it is just generally accepted correctness. In this respect, it is comforting for them when political leaders affirmatively say: "Yes, we can". It is the fate of the modern individual that after the Fall one has the capacity to create subjective meaning but giving the meaninglessness of the world it is a challenge to live up to this capacity. In this sense, Weber explicitly takes

into account that modern subjective meaning might be a tough nut to crack for many of his contemporaries.

The dialectic of unity and differentiation

Whereas in Paradise, Adam and Eve had been "free to eat from every tree of the garden, except the tree of the knowledge of good and evil" (Genesis 2:15-17), out of Eden they have to provide for their own needs. Hence, already in Judaism "Adam's and Eve's fall is an etiological myth for … the toil of labor" (AJ:227). The necessity of labor gives rise to a chasm in the holistic cosmos. Adam and Eve experience that there is not one world outside paradise, but multiple worlds, different spheres governed by specific values and ethics (e.g., the world of labor and brotherly love and the world of erotic attraction). The historical roots of social differentiation (*Eigengesetzlichkeit*) of the spheres of values thus can be located in very early interpretations of the Fall.

"For the rationalization and the conscious sublimation of man's relations to the various spheres of values, external and internal, as well as religious and secular, have then pressed towards making conscious the internal and lawful autonomy of the individual spheres; thereby letting them drift into those tensions which remain hidden to the originally naive relation with the external world." (RR:328).

All evidence seems to indicate that, with the "originally naive relation with the external world," Weber is referring to the magical myths in which the Fall is only a fait divers that underscores the supremacy of the Gods. Borrowing from Nietzsche, Weber uses the chemical term 'sublimation' to refer to the rationalization as well as the fragmentation of the various

orientations and spheres of values. This sublimation is conscious to the extent that individuals become subjects through individual choice, understanding the world differently and pursuing different goals and 'surrogate religions' depending upon the value spheres in which they are located (SV:30). Conscious sublimation is actually specialization, and this specialization is unavoidable and even desirable (OK:108). According to Weber, those who do not see this are naively unconscious (SV:7).

This conscious sublimation manifests itself already in Puritan asceticism, because there "primal, naturalist, and *un*sublimated sexuality," is integrated in the sphere of marriage, whereby "all elements of passion are considered as residues of the Fall" (RR:349). It is no coincidence that, after the Fall, Adam and Eve cover their genitals with fig leaves. After all, these body parts embody the differences between them and that make them different and attractive to one another. The act of covering them with fig leafs makes the man and the woman. Adam knows that Eve, like himself, knows that they are not alike. An implicit meaning of Christian interpretations of the Fall is that individuals feel guilty about their own state of difference and about their concupiscence, as it is equivalent to betrayal with regard to the magical paradisiacal wholeness. I see that you are different from me, but I also know that you see this as well. Hence, for Max Weber "sexual polarity" is an archetypical form of social differentiation (Radkau 2009:53). Yet, at the same time he is perfectly aware of the human urge to overcome such polarities. When one speaks of the Fall in the Judeo-Christian tradition, Weber antinomically realizes, one is referring to disobedience to the Divine, as well as to betrayal to the fundamental paradisiacal unity of the godly community of the walled Eden (SR:558). God created humans "in our own image, after our *likeness*" (Genesis 1:26; italics ours).

According to Weber this disobedience and betrayal are inevitable nevertheless. This is the tragedy of human existence. Humans do not rise up until after the Fall. It is no coincidence that, according to Aristophanes in Plato's *Symposium*, the first humans were spherical, with four arms, four legs and two sets of genitals (Hunter 2004:62-63). It was not until the panic-stricken Zeus split them in two that humans as we now know them emerged: erect, split beings desperately searching for a suitable other half. In this respect inner-worldly Weber's heroic existentialism rejects outer-worldly orgiastic experiences which envision "the possibility of a communion which is felt as complete unification, as a fading of the *thou*" (RR:347; Weber's italics)[8]. Yet, Weber realizes that living in a rational differentiated world is far from easy. For one, it puts 'brotherliness' under stress. As a result that which distinguishes us from each other is covered or concealed. It is no coincidence that, in the Christian faith, sexual attraction is increasingly suppressed, with celibacy and even castration being a virtuoso ideal. After all, by renouncing the concupiscence of carnal desire Christians can position themselves somewhat above the original sin (ES:606). In the creation narrative, the Fall thus also constitutes a legitimation for the systematic spiritualization of the Christian religions (RR:349).[9] Interestingly, the poet Stefan George, one of Weber's contemporaries, blames Weber of the same kind of spiritual heroism: "You want to keep turning everything into spirit and thereby you destroy the body" (quoted in Marianne Weber, 1975: 463).

The unitary holistic relation with the external world not only comes to an end 'spatially' but also 'temporarily'. Self-consciousness ensures that we become conscious of inner and outer differentiation, but also of our own mortality (AJ:227). In this regard, Weber adds to the quote in cites Yahweh's indictment against the sinful human:

> [F]or Yahweh, after cursing man and the snake, added 'man is become as one of us,' hence godlike through knowledge, and he chased man out of the garden, 'lest he put

forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live forever.' Hence, one becomes a god by possessing two things: immortality and knowledge." (AJ:219).

Here Weber refers to the Divine connection between mortality and moral knowledge. In contrast to the primary paradisiacal group that continues to exist as long as there are members of that group, the earthly existence of unique, self-conscious individuals ends upon their death. In the religions of salvation, the terrifying idea of the irrevocable end of earthly existence is mitigated by the salvation of the hereafter. For example, in the Christian tradition, death is not a dreadful end point – quite the contrary, as it brings an end to suffering. Paradise is literally projected into the future for those that have faith. Yet, this projection is beyond human control in predestinated Puritanism. Even more explicitly than Yahweh, the Puritan God is distant and intangible. Whereas, in the Garden of Eden, Yahweh personally went in search of Adam and Eve, who had hidden themselves after they had eaten of the fruit (AJ:211), the Calvinist God is an invisible and distant Creator, who does not condescend to come to humans. The individual believer is therefore disembedded and thrown back on himself. Me, myself and a omniscient God. Whereas in a mythical world, the individual is surrounded by collective rituals, in a disenchanted world, the human is naked before an invisible but nevertheless almighty God. The Puritan lives within a divine panopticon. Because humans are ever conscious of their nakedness, all fig leaves aside, the chasm between them and the Paradise of Eden is never deeper and the disenchantment is never more pressing than it is in Puritanism. Within a context in which only one end counts, divine election, instrumental rational action (*zweckrationales Handeln*) becomes a self-evident mode of action. Given that the righteously ascetic are certainly not allowed to enjoy the fruits of their own work, each action is merely a means and never an end. Unlike Catholics counting their rosary beads, Calvinists have recourse only to themselves. In sum, a righteous Puritan should act as if death is only a *fait divers*, while it is vitally important.

Also in the modern world, mortality tend to become a vitally important *fait divers* for fallen humans. "Because death is meaningless, civilized life as such is meaningless; by its very 'progressiveness' it gives death the imprint of meaningless" (SV: 13). In the Western world, mortality is paradoxically the most tangible characteristic that self-conscious individuals share with each other. "People are 'equal' before death" (SDG:105). The primary concern here is a fear of spiritual mortality and, only in the second order, a fear of the end of corporality. Hence, procreation is often considered the most appropriate survival strategy. Procreation alone is nonetheless insufficient. After all, it is one of the most important assignments in Paradise (dispensation of innocence). In post-paradisiacal existence, one should fight against the Tolstoian meaninglessness of life (SV:13). Even though the struggle against earthly mortality is lost in advance, Weber expects individuals to engage all resources in the struggle. To the extent that one regularly employs rational means in order to reach earthly ends, one will eventually wonder about the utility of allowing oneself to be led by heavenly ends, particularly as the ritual ties existing between heaven and earth continue to decrease. "[W]e need no longer have recourse to magic in order to control the spirits or pray to them. Instead, technology and calculation achieve our ends." (SV: 13)

With the differentiation of the value spheres also comes a new proliferation of meaninglessness. One can no longer be satiated by life because there is an infinite number of "cultural values one can amass and there is no guarantee that this selection has reached an end that would be meaningful to him precisely at the 'accidental' time of his death. (RR: 356). However, just as universal monotheism brought meaning in life because action could be oriented toward God willed salvation, individual value choice makes 'sense'. If "one finds the demon who holds the fibers of life" (SV:156), one creates unity in diversity. By creating this conscious dichotomy

between the chosen and the not-chosen one can somehow transcend the differentiation of the polytomous rationalized world. One dialectically brings back the abysmal gulf between the paradisiacal garden and its harsh surroundings. In this sense it is no wonder that Weber frames this individual choice in religious terms. "The individual has to decide which one is the devil and which the God *for him* (SV:23). If one decides to follow the political demon Weber points out that the most important economy of worth will be power. This means you will have to "resist evil, otherwise you will bear some of the responsibility for its victory" and cannot abide by the religious dictum "resist not him that is evil" (SV:23). As such there is a "mutual strangeness of religion and politics (RR: 335). However, in this particular case the strangeness also takes the form of a competition around a similar economy of worth: the meaning of death and suffering. Both in the religious and in the political warlike sphere "the individual can believe that he knows he is dying 'for' something" (RR: 335). But also in a more mundane sense the political sphere is for Weber the arena where the demons are to be found and value struggles are being fought (MVF: 333; Kalyvas, 2008). In this respect it is the best location to see his struggle between Fortunate Fall ethics and Paradisiacal Ethics and the interconnections (*Sinnzusammenhang*) of the three aforementioned dialectics, as we will demonstrate in the next section.

The modern political struggle between Paradisiacal and Fortunate Fall ethics

We start off from an interesting quotation, because here Weber sets the stage for the politics of the Fall:

"'Correct' Social Democracy is drilling the masses in intellectual parade-marching, directing their gaze, not to the paradise beyond, but towards paradise on earth, and turning this into a

kind of vaccination against those with vested interests in the prevailing order. (…) It accustoms its followers, in other words, to a 'hysterical enjoyment of emotion' which displaces, and replaces, economic and political thought and action. (…) Yet time presses, and we 'must work while it is still day'. An 'inalienable' sphere of freedom and personality must be won now for the individual who belongs to the great masses and who is thrown entirely on his own resources." (SCDR:70-71).

This quotation nicely illustrates 1) Weber's personal aversion of the aestheticization of politics that accompanies paradisiacal 'romantic experientialism' because it leads to "intellectual stultification" 2) the fact that some leaders will nevertheless be prepared to drag the masses in this direction and 3) the need for charismatic personalities that can counter this trend by heroically facing the contingent modern world by linking the inevitable instrumental rationality to a passionate and decisive value choice.

Weber is fully aware that the *inner* and *outer dissolution* of unity in the postlapsarian situation makes "everyday life hard and lonely". Moreover, he is also sceptical about experiences of happiness in the post-paradisiacal state: "It is the stigma of our human dignity that the peace of our souls cannot be as great as the peace of one who dreams of such a paradise" (Weber op cit. in Roth and Schluchter 1981:XXIII). Hence, although Weber does not have much respect for those who are unable to look the "fate of the age full in the face" (SV:24), he takes into account that "the world is filled with those who have not the self-discipline to hold upon themselves the world in all its chaos" (introduction of Owen and Strong in Weber 2004: lxii). This is certainly true for Weimar politics that suffer from bureaucratic overregulation, ambiguity, and fractionalization. Weber therefore acknowledges the temptation to aestheticize politics, for instance by idealizing history. Yet, this is a precarious undertaking because "it accustoms the

masses to a 'hysterical enjoyment of emotion' which displaces, and replaces, economic and political thought and action" (SCDR: 70). In other words, it diverts the attention from real life political issues and tends to negate them (PGG: 215).

Certainly near the end of his life he nevertheless realizes that his own preferred heroic existentialism might be too demanding for the masses. What the weak really need are shining examples, charismatic individuals and their aristocratic apostles, that show personality in a calling and are not afraid to challenge the authorities. Yet, there is some sense of urgency. "An 'inalienable' sphere of freedom and personality *must be won now for the individual who belongs to the great masses.*" (SCDR:70-71). It is hard not to see the analogy with the biblical prophet that fights for the salvation and the spiritual control of the masses.

Although modern man will be strongly driven by material interests concerning happiness, there is no reason that "the need for salvation" which is closely linked to a search for meaning will disappear. In *Politics as a Vocation* Weber explicitly takes into account that some politicians will seek "the salvation of one's soul and that of others" (PV:90). Yet, he is convinced that such an ethic of conviction (*Gesinnungsethik*), whereby one's actions are primarily led by a decisive subjective value choice and thus moral intentions, will often do more damage "because conviction politicians take no responsibility for the consequences of their actions" (PV:91). Because they embody the value they represent, they cannot be without value. Weber is therefore fully aware that political 'representatives' of such convictional ethics are often striving for power as "an object purely of self-intoxication instead of something that enters exclusively into the service of a "cause" (PV:77)". Often they are just "windbags who do not genuinely feel what they are taking on themselves but who are making themselves drunk on romantic sensations" (PV:92). Accordingly, Weber prefers politicians conforming to an ethic of

responsibility (*Verantwortungsethik*) and hereby strive for inner-worldly solutions to compensate for the "ethical irrationality of the world" (PV:85).

In a way, it is tempting to see Weber's assessment of paradisiacal ethics of conviction as a backlash of the losers of rationalization, who are "unable to endure the fate of the age like a man" (SV:30). However, in reality Weber realized that "ethics of conviction and ethics of responsibility are mutually complementary (PV: 92). He was for example aware of the authentic appeal of those representing the democratic ethos of brotherliness, as a unique countervailing force "against the unavoidable 'status' character of bureaucracy" (SCA: 242). After all, democracy will also rationalize to the extent that it will be dominated by parties that primarily want to advance their own material interests (ES:983). Accordingly, there will always be a tension between the democratic demos of the rule by the common people anchored in 'equality before the law" and the redemptive democratic ethos of brotherliness that stresses a common mission (ES:979-980). In this respect, he seems to realize that his own preferred matter-of-factness (*Sachlichkeit*) needs a passionate embedding. While democratic laws change individuals "from without", charismatic leaders embodying the democratic ethos can potentially change individuals "from within" (ES:1116). In this respect charismatic politicians are priceworthy.

Mommsen (1989: 141) and Schluchter (1981[1979]: 37) have therefore rightly pointed out that in Weber's later work charisma is no longer an ideal-typical scheme for the legitimation of authority extraordinary contexts; instead it becomes a universal category. Indeed, each of the interpretations of the Fall highlighted by Weber, even the modern ones, can be linked to influential leader(s) or prophet(s). Yet, Weber distinguishes two forms of charisma. In the first case the personal gift of group leadership is important. Because the charismatic leader embodies

the group all those that want to belong to the group have the "duty to recognize its genuineness and act accordingly" (ES:223). In three ethical traditions (columns A, C, and E in table 1) the followers are more pervasively imbued by this type of 'group embodying' charisma which tends to be anti-rational, anti-intellectualist and organic. This is true for Zoroasterism and Catholicism but also for the modern artistic circle around the poet Stefan George. George's charisma is characteristically described as "directed at the *form* of existence, …, without setting new, tangible, substantial goals" (Marianne Weber 1975: 319). In the second case the value choices of the leader are crucial. "Here I stand, I can do no other" (PV:92). Yet, even more important is the fact that those choices are recognized by the followers. "The mere fact of recognizing the personal mission of a charismatic master establishes his power" (ES:1115). In three ethical traditions (columns B, D, and F in table 1) the followers are more pervasively imbued by this type of 'choice directing' charisma which tends to be more rational and doctrinarian in nature. This is true in ancient Judaism, Puritanism and Weber's own heroic existentialism. In all these traditions there is not much respect for the powers-that-be. Illustrative in this respect is that for puritans "the conduct of an office appeared as a business like all others, the ruler and his officials as sinners like everyone else" (ES:1140). It is clear that this 'choice directing' charisma is the type Weber preferred because it represents "the root of the idea of a calling in its highest expression" (PV:34-35). Genuine charismatic democratic leaders should help the masses, by exemplifying responsible decision making. Hence, this type of charisma is a "choice in itself" (Smith, 1998:34). Genuine charismatic leaders choose to order choices to the extent that their followers choose to follow their lead. Moreover, this type of charisma creates common knowledge, in the sense that all its followers know from each other that they endorse and construct the same authoritative value choice (Joosse, 2014). Yet, such a charismatic 'community of choice' will always be more vulnerable because it is based on public recognition that can easily be reclaimed. If a "choice directing" leader claims 'Wir schaffen das' it is fairly

easy to verify whether this is really the case. In this respect, 'group embodying charisma' is generally more robust. If a 'group embodying' charismatic leader says 'We will make our nation great again' it is much more difficult to verify this.

After all, he/she can always revert to blaming the out-group. According to Weber the universalization of solidarity that accompanied the conviction ethics of salvation religions would "succumb in the end to the world dominion of unbrotherliness" (RR:357). As a matter of fact Weber realizes that "the corruption of the world through original sin should have made it relatively simple to integrate violence into ethics as a way of punishing sin and the heretics who placed human souls in jeopardy" (PV:88). In this respect he predicted that modern ethics of conviction will either fall back on the dualism of in-group and out-group morality or on the reciprocity of in-group morality (RR:329).

It is no coincidence that the demarcation of friends and foes as well as the "group embodying" forms of representation became quintessential principles of politics for Carl Schmitt, whose work received a lot of attention in recent years, both form the left (e.g. Mouffe 1999) and the right (e.g. de Benoist 2013). Hennis (1988: 194) was certainly right to state that in the absence of Weber's 'Politics as a vocation' Schmitt's political ideas would be barely thinkable. One can even say that Schmitt found the prototype of his authoritarian antitype in Weber's writings (Ulmen op cit. in Schmitt 1996: xx). Reminiscent of Weber, Schmitt claims that "All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts" (1985[1922]: 37). Yet, while Schmitt was not opposed to Weber's diagnosis of the elective affinity between capitalism and protestant ethic, he nevertheless thought that the elective affinity between political form and catholic ethic would ultimately be more crucial. According to Schmitt, eventually, secularized protestants would "return in Romantic flight to the Catholic Church

seeking salvation from the soullessness of a rationalistic and mechanistic age" (Schmitt 1996[1923]: 11). Especially in a capitalist world where 'material interests' rule, there is a need for representatives that embody the unitary will of the people and give it "political form". This observation was somehow visionary because it foreshadows some contemporary descriptions of the populist *Zeitgeist* (Mudde 2004). Interestingly, Schmitt also embeds his populist political form in the biblical myth of the Fall:

"Whoever recognizes how deep is the sin of man is compelled by the incarnation of God to believe that man and the world are "by nature good," because God can will no evil. Whoever has an eye for identities sees that the doctrine of paradise, of the original goodness of man "by nature" -transformed into the philosophy of nature- is the doctrine of the priority of life over death. (…) The lawfulness of the visible world in the Christian conception is thus by nature good. The juridical regulation of human relations existed before evil and sin, and was not its result." (Schmitt, 1996[1923]: 56)

With the paradisiacal identities Schmitt refers to the classical Augustinian insight that just as Adam and Even were in their paradisiacal innocence married to each other, a mystical union exists between the Church and Christ and between the people and the ruler. This idealization of the paradisiacal roots of a genuine political form is also in line with Schmitt's conviction that after the Fall human nature is essentially defective and needs to be corrected by church or state authorities (Schmitt 1985[1922]:57-58). In a legitimate political order, politicians should therefore show the way back to an Edenite *Schicksalgemeinschaft* and this is what many populists do.

Schmitt would undeniably agree that his aphorism "Everyone is as great as what he negates" also applies to Weber (Schmitt, 1996[1923]: 54). Yet, while Weber certainly would have rejected paradisiacal politics, notably in its Schmittean populist political form, Weber's antinomies of the Fall are interesting in themselves for contemporary populism research. While 'populist research' typically stresses the Schmittean political form in the sense that the will of the pure people is pitted against self-interested and corrupt elitist outsiders (Mudde, 2004), inspired by Weber, we can additionally see an interesting electoral affinity between paradisiacal ethic and populist form. The paradisiacal ethic responds to the redemptive yearning of the people and promises that they will again get in touch with long lost paradisiacal essences: secured freedom, truth and unity. The *essentialization* is realized both by the explicit linkage with the myth of the Fall and by negatively aestheticizing freedom restrictions, fake truths and the cosmopolitanism of the liberal enemies. While it goes beyond the scope of this contribution to systematically look for empirical proof in contemporary populist rhetoric, it is illustrative that all three paradisiacal essences can be found in Arlie Hochschild's ethnographic descriptions of the appeal of Donald Trump:

Like other leaders promising rescue, Trump evokes a moral consciousness. But what he gives participants, emotionally speaking, is an ecstatic high. (…) One way of reinforcing this "high" of a *united brother- and sisterhood* of believers is to revile and expel members of out groups. (…) He was throwing off not only a set of "politically correct" attitudes, but a set of feeling rules—that is, a set of ideas about the right way to feel (…) First, they felt the *deep story was true*. Second, they felt that liberals were saying it was not true, and that they themselves were not feeling the right feelings. (…) So it was with joyous relief that many heard a Donald Trump who seemed to be wildly, omnipotently, *magically free* of all PC [political correctness] constraint. (Hochschild, 2016:226-227); italics ours)

The Weberian perspective on populism therefore is both aetiological and political. By making proposals to return to a paradisiacal situation a 'populist leader' can 'outflank' the traditionalist elites for whom the *essentialization* will be dangerously purist or utopian (Joosse 2018). Moreover, the opposition between the paradisiacal and fortunate Fall ethics can function as an axes along which new political value conflicts are fought. Especially in post-COVID-19 times we can expect intense struggle between paradisiacal 'welfare chauvinists' according to whom social and healthcare protection should be reserved exclusively for those who belong to the objective in-group and fortunate Fall 'cosmopolitans' who oppose the strengthening of group-based welfare fortresses but instead advocate empathy with different others across borders (e.g. Thijssen 2012; Thijssen and Verheyen 2020; Lesch 2019).

Yet, Weber's reasoning is not only characterized by oppositions but also by historicized antinomies and dialectics. While Weber stated that modern individuals should decide "which one is the Devil, and which one God" (SV:23) he is not blind for the difficulties that this entails in everyday life. After all, even Weber himself, a high priest of a rational anti-utopian tradition, felt a strange attraction to the charismatic George and his circle (Radkau 2009). "Pursuing the idea of 'disenchantment' through the progressive formal rationalization of all spheres of social interaction, he came close to rediscovering myth as a source of individual lifestyles at variance with everyday life" (Mommsen 1989: ix). Yet, he personally remained committed to his Fortunate Fall heroic existentialism that keeps a distance with dogmatic belief in paradisiacal essences but also with the vain self (Turner, 1992). The political actor with a vocation for politics embraces passion, a sense of responsibility, and a sense of proportion (PV:76).

Afterword

In the beginning of this article we already mentioned that several etches of Klinger's "Eve and the Future"-cycle were prominently displayed in the home of the Webers. While as far as we know there are no reliable reports on Weber's own interpretation of the etchings it is tempting to speculate about them, based on the foregoing analysis of the way he treated the Biblical myth of the Fall in his work.

A first etching hanging on the wall opposite his desk could reveal that the enclosed canyon-like walk of life of modern individuals is necessarily lonely and separate because it is determined by distinctive value choices. These value choices are perfectly symbolized by the sphynx-like tiger looking them full in the face at the end of the canyon. This is a terrifying image because according to Weber there is no meaningful way back. One must move forward as is symbolized by that other Klinger etching hanging next to Weber's wedding picture in which a Herculus-like Adam is leaving Eden carrying Eve in his arms.

These two etchings of Klinger's 'Eve and the Future'-cycle nicely illustrate Weber's heroic existentialism because he is perfectly aware of the fact that only a small number of heroic Adam's can bear the gaze of the sphynx-like tiger. As a consequence flights from the world taking the form of re-divinization of the world and a commitment to paradisiacal experientialism will be very common. In line with Nietzsche, Weber does not have much sympathy for those people who cannot face being alone in a socially differentiated polytheistic world. Obviously, they can easily "return to the welcoming and merciful embrace of the old churches" (SV:30) or follow political leaders that direct their gaze towards paradise on earth (SCDR:70). But Weber really hopes that they will be enchanted by charismatic leaders that heroically give personality to one's character by a constant and intrinsic choice for certain ultimate values and meanings.

Acknowledgements

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Table 1. Weber's developmental history of the Biblical myth of the Fall

	COMPARISON 1		COMPARISON 2		COMPARISON 3	
	Magical traditions	Judaic tradition	Christianity		Disenchanted modernity	
	A.Zoroasterism	B.Jahewist	C.Catholicism	D.Puritanism	E.'Populist' experientialism	F.Heroic existentialism
	Paradisiacal Magic ethic	Fortunate Fall Legal ethic	Paradisiacal Conviction ethic	Fortunate Fall Conviction ethic	Paradisiacal Conviction ethic	Fortunate Fall Responsibility ethic
PRELAPSARIAN EXISTENCE	Individuals are impure and wise (AJ:228)	Individuals are innocent pure fools (AJ:228)	Individuals are innocent perfect (PE:46)	Individuals whose state of infinite nonbeing is suboptimal (PE: 47)	Individuals are part of an esthetic whole	Individuals live a boring inactive existence (PE:32)
POSTLAPSARIAN SINFUL EXISTENCE	Impure, wise but no longer immortal	Foolish by nature Obedient to an almighty God eschatological hopes for the chosen pariah people (PE:59,109)	Guilt-stricken, suffering from the burden of the fall of men, passively accepting the dependence on God's grace	Inner lonely, ascetic worker who focuses on rational and specialized labor in a calling (PE:107)	Would-be hermaphrodites longing for orgiastic experiences (Letter to Jellinek)	Modern individual that has eaten from the tree of rational knowledge is a meaning creating perspectivist (OK:104)
POSTLAPSARIAN REDEMPTIVE EXISTENCE	Rudimentary idea of compensation in the hereafter in Zoroasterism (AJ:145)	A special promise of salvation of Israel was connected to obedience in the here and now	Redemption is within the reach of the baptized who can again become an innocent child (ES:632)	Salvation hinges on predestination; the elected work for confirmation in the here and now	Quasi-religious redemption in the sense of a sectarian union with a charismatic leader	There is no salvation, one should heroically embrace one's tragic fate (SV:24)
DIALECTIC 1 Domination/freedom	Liberated from the dominance of certain gods	Free as legal but mortal subject	Liberated from sin by Jesus Christ and the church	Free to work for the confirmation of one's own	Liberated from individual 'choice stress'	Free to seize the "wheel of history"
DIALECTIC 2 Objective/subjective meaning	Experience oriented meaning through magical rites	Subjective quest for objective meaning of the suffering "pariah-people"	Objective meaning of individual suffering – vessel of God's grace	Subjective creating meaning – tool of God's will	Collective experiencing of the truth	Subjective meaning detached from common knowledge
DIALECTIC 3 Unity/differentiation	From numerous abstractions, a purely constructed figure assumes the role of saviour	The one God and the law unites the different tribes of the 'chosen people'	Promise of divine salvation unites all believers	The individual conviction of salvation connects all the Calvinist's undertakings	A 'choice embodying' leader personifies group unity in a polytheistic world	Individual responsible value choice brings unity in the polytheistic world

Notes

[1] We use the following abbreviations for references to English translations of Weber's work: AJ = Ancient Judaism (1958); ES = Economy and Society (1949); PE = *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (2001). For references to SR = *Sociology of Religion;* RR: *Religious Rejections of the World and Their Directions (Intermediate Reflections/Zwischenbetrachtung)*, MVF = *The Meaning of Value Freedom in the Sociological and the Economic Sciences*, and SCA = *Sociology of Charismatic Authority* we use the classic collection of *Essays in Sociology* by Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (1946). For the methodological paper OK = *The Objectivity of Knowledge in the Social Sciences and Social Policy* and IS = *On some categories of interpretive sociology* (Logos essay) we use the recent collection by Hans Bruun and Sam Whimster (2012). For references to SCDR = *On the Situation of Constitutional Democracy in Russia* and PGG= *Parliament and Government in Germany under a New Political Order* we use the collection by Peter Lassman and Ronald Speirs (1994). Finally, for the *Vocation Lectures (SV= Science as a Vocation* and PV= *Politics as a Vocation), we* use the collection by Owen and Strong (2004).

[2] Derman distinguished cold, temperate, and hot interpretations of Weber's anti-utopianism. Yet, in the end he clearly favored the latter which describe Weber's personal vision of life as an active heroic commitment to the possibilities of the modern rationalized world, rather than a passive enduring its shortcomings (2012: 137).

[3] We refer here to the essay 'The Visibility of the Church: A Scholastic Consideration' which was published in appendix to 'Roman Catholicism and Political Form' (Schmitt 1996).

[4] Weber also gave some attention to analogous myths in Islam but clearly the meaning of sin, especially original sin, is far less important here. On the implications hereof see Turner (1992).

[5] The importance of the Augustinian interpretation of the myth of the Fall is somewhat underexposed in Weber's work.

[6] But obviously on other points there were fundamental differences between Weber and Troeltsch (see Radkau 2009: 201-203).

[7] Also when Weber refers to the traditionalistic tendencies in Lutheranism (PE:45) he implies that they were still automatically and unthinkingly reacting (ES:25).

[8] It is exactly on this point that Weber sees a fundamental difference between Lutheranism and Calvinism. The former still contains outer-worldly tendencies which are completely absent in the latter.

[9] Like the sword of Zeus and the bitten fruit of the Tree of Knowledge, the severed umbilical cord simultaneously symbolizes the unfolding self-consciousness and the disintegration of the organic whole.