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Territorialization, Scarcity, and Value Production: A Transcultural Study of China-Myanmar Jadeite Trade

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Summary

Jadeite has evolved from a mysterious curio in far-flung frontier lands into an object of commodity fetishism in contemporary society. Not only do the Chinese regard it as the most expensive and rare jade species, it also has an important impact on Myanmar's political landscape. The question this dissertation wants to address is what kind of power relations and exchange actions are deployed to construct the scarcity of a cultural consumer product that spans history and cross-culture, such as jadeite, so that its price has reached unprecedented levels. I use the concept of "territorialization" as a theoretical paradigm to exam this issue which indicates the process of repeated de-territorialization and re-territorialization of multi-scale and multi-dimensional spaces by different cross-cultural power subjects. The research uses multi-sited linguistic ethnography as a methodology, focusing on translation and language use from a diachronic and social perspective when tracing the flow of jadeite and cross-cultural subjects' perceptions and evaluations.

The study found that the scarcity of jadeite is constantly shaped and constructed, and its dramatic price changes are closely related to changes in national boundaries and the spatial production of power. This process can be divided into two stages. First, with the development of the southwest border area by the imperial court of China, the Han people brought jade culture to this area and discovered jadeite from it, thus forming the jadeite trade exchange among Han, Kachin and Shan in the area. Second, after the boundaries of modern countries, the origin and market of jadeite were cut off, and the two nation-states territorialized the jadeite trade within their respective territories to obtain more benefits. Multiple powers participate cross-culturally, continuously forming more complex and segmented labor aggregations, and becoming dis-embedded from the original order. Therefore, the value of jadeite has accumulated significantly in quantity and continues to expand in nature or content.

In short, jadeite itself is just a kind of stone and has no use value, but Chinese culture endows it with special symbolic meaning, so it assumes value. However, the origin of its raw materials is an border area of "China". There, jadeite has no meaning and symbol, and the territorialization makes it valuable. In addition, due to the inter-ethnic conflict in the place of origin, the national and local competition further increases its scarcity and concurrently also its value.

Dutch Summary

Jadeiet is geëvolueerd van een mysterieus curiosum in verafgelegen grenslanden tot een object van warenfetisjisme in de hedendaagse samenleving. Niet alleen beschouwen de Chinezen het als de duurste en zeldzaamste jadesoort, het heeft ook een belangrijke impact op het politieke landschap van Myanmar. De vraag die dit proefschrift wil beantwoorden is wat voor soort machtsverhoudingen en uitwisselingsacties worden ingezet om de schaarste te construeren van een cultureel consumentenproduct dat de geschiedenis en interculturele aspecten omvat, zoals jadeiet, zodat de prijs ervan een ongekend niveau heeft bereikt. Ik gebruik het concept van 'territorialisering' als een theoretisch paradigma om deze kwestie te onderzoeken, die het proces aangeeft van herhaalde de-territorialisering en re-territorialisering van multi-schaal en multi-dimensionale ruimtes door verschillende interculturele machtssubjecten. Het onderzoek maakt gebruik van taalkundige etnografie op meerdere locaties als methodologie, waarbij de nadruk ligt op vertaling en taalgebruik vanuit een diachroon en sociaal perspectief bij het volgen van de stroom van percepties en evaluaties van jadeiet en interculturele onderwerpen.

Uit de studie bleek dat de schaarste aan jadeiet voortdurend wordt gevormd en geconstrueerd, en dat de dramatische prijsveranderingen nauw verband houden met veranderingen in nationale grenzen en de ruimtelijke productie van macht. Dit proces kan in twee fasen worden verdeeld. Ten eerste, met de ontwikkeling van het zuidwestelijke grensgebied door het keizerlijke hof van China, brachten de Han-mensen de jadecultuur naar dit gebied en ontdekten ze er jadeiet uit, waardoor ze de jadeïethandelsuitwisseling tussen Han, Kachin en Shan in het gebied vormden. Ten tweede werden, na de grenzen van moderne landen, de oorsprong en de markt van jadeiet afgesneden, en de twee natiestaten territorialiseerden de jadeïethandel binnen hun respectieve territoria om meer voordelen te verkrijgen. Meerdere machten nemen intercultureel deel, vormen voortdurend complexere en gesegmenteerde arbeidscombinaties en raken los van de oorspronkelijke orde. Daarom is de waarde van jadeiet in hoeveelheid aanzienlijk toegenomen en blijft deze qua aard of inhoud toenemen.

Kortom, jadeiet zelf is slechts een soort steen en heeft geen gebruikswaarde, maar de Chinese cultuur kent er een speciale symbolische betekenis aan toe, dus het neemt waarde aan. De herkomst van zijn grondstoffen ligt echter in een grensgebied van 'China'. Daar heeft jadeiet geen betekenis of symbool, en de territorialisering maakt het waardevol. Bovendien vergroot de nationale en lokale concurrentie, als gevolg van het interetnische conflict op de plaats van herkomst, de schaarste ervan en daarmee ook de waarde ervan.

Table of contents

Summary	3
Dutch Summary	4
Introduction	1
1 Origin of the Research	1
1.1 The Price of Jade and the Price of Jadeite	3
1.2 Multi-site Fieldwork to Explore the Evaluation Basis of Jadeite Price	4
2 The Research Issue	10
3 Literature Review	13
3.1 Research on the Value Production and Trade of Jadeite	13
3.1.1 Related Literature in China	13
3.1.2 Related Literature Outside China	17
3.1.3 Literature Review about the Research on the Value Production and Trade of Jadeite	22
3.2 Research on the Flow of Things and the Value Production of Commodities	25
4 Theoretical Approach	31
4.1 Methodology of Process Ontology	31
4.2 Theoretical Paradigm of Territorialization	34
4.2.1 Definition of Territorialization	34
4.2.2 Discussion on the Paradigm of Territorialization Theory in Anthropological Research	38
4.3 Research Framework	41
5 Research Method	44
Chapter 1 The Material Properties of Jadeite, Early Flow and Spatial Separation of Production and Consumption Areas	50
1.1 The Natural Material Properties of Jadeite	50
1.1.1 Jadeite in the Cognition of Others	51
1.1.2 Jadeite in The Cognition of Han Chinese	54
1.2 Understanding and Acceptance of Jadeite in Chinese Jade Culture	61
1.2.1 Jade Culture of the Han People	62
1.2.1.1 Prehistorical period	62

1.2.1.2 Zhou Dynasty (about 11th century BC - 256 BC)	64
1.2.1.3 Han Dynasty (206 BC - 220 AD)	66
1.2.2 From "Stone" to "Jade": Jadeite Entered the Jade Culture System	67
1.3 The Territorialization of Nation-State Power and Jadeite as a Cultural Consumer Commodity	75
1.3.1 Demarcation of State Boundaries: Territorialized Competition between Chinese and Burmese Nation-States	75
1.3.2 Cultural Consumption and Value Content of Jadeite in Contemporary Society ...	81
Chapter 2 Competition for Jadeite Ores and Territory Scramble in Northern Myanmar	88
2.1 The Distribution of Jadeite Deposits in Myanmar and the Ethnic Composition in the Region	88
2.1.1 Overview of the Distribution Area of Jadeite Deposits	88
2.1.2 Ethnic Composition and Changes of Population Surrounding Jadeite Deposits ...	90
2.2 The Burmese Government and the Ethnic Minorities in Northern Myanmar Competing for Jadeite Mining Rights	95
2.2.1 Myanmar Style Socialism and the Violent Market	96
2.2.2 Market Economic System and Ceasefire for Market	102
2.3 Changes in Inter-ethnic Relations in Jadeite Mining Area	107
2.3.1 The Living Conditions of Ordinary People at the Grassroot level and Inter-ethnic Relations	108
2.3.2 Inter-ethnic Relations of Political and Economic Elites	111
2.3.3 The Value Production of Jadeite in a Violent Market	115
Chapter 3 Changes in Long-Distance Trade Routes	120
3.1 Maritime Trade Routes: Abandon the Near and Seek the Distant	121
3.1.1 Overview of Major Ports on the Jadeite Sea Route	123
3.1.1.1 Yangon Port	124
3.1.1.2 Guangzhou Port	125
3.1.1.3 Hong Kong and Free Trade Port	128
3.1.1.4 Shenzhen Port	131
3.1.2 Public Auction and Distant Shipping Routes	132
3.1.2.1 Ethnic Relations on the Jadeite Sea Route	132
3.1.2.2 Opening of Burma Jadeite Public Auction	134

3.1.2.3 Competition from Public Auctions in Pingzhou	138
3.2 Multidimensional Network of Overland Trade Routes	144
3.2.1 Border Closure and Combined Land and Sea Transport: Another Route Through Thailand	144
3.2.1.1 Jadeite Trade Activities of Yunnan Muslim Caravans	145
3.2.1.2 The Remaining members of the Kuomintang and the Route Through Thailand	147
3.2.2 The Cross-border Transportation Network and Public Auctions at the Border ..	153
3.2.2.1 Reterritorialization Actions of Ethnic Minorities on the China-Myanmar Border	154
3.2.2.2 Reterritorialization Actions in the Border Areas of Yunnan	160
Chapter 4 Spatial Separation: Processing Space and Sales Space of Jadeite	168
4.1 The State of the Art in Jadeite Processing and Sales in China from the Qing Dynasty to the Reform and Opening Up	168
4.1.1 Overview of Jadeite Processing and Sales Market in Qing Dynasty	169
4.1.2 Overview of the Jadeite Market in the Late Qing Dynasty and the Republic of China	173
4.1.3 Overview of the Jadeite Market from the Founding of the People's Republic of China until Reform and Opening Up.	177
4.2 The Processing Space Guangdong and the Reterritorialization of Jadeite Trade	179
4.2.1 The Factory of the World: Guangdong as a Part of International Division of Labor	180
4.2.2 "Comprehensive supporting" Type in the Division of Labor: Reterritorialization and Cooperation among Localities	185
4.2.3 The Flow and Convergence of Labor Force and the Value Reproduction of Jadeite	193
4.3 The Sales Space Guangdong and the Reterritorialization of Jadeite Trade	199
4.3.1 The Recovery of Yunnan Jadeite Industry and the Pre-Consumer Society	200
4.3.2 Yunnan's Consumer Market: Tourism as the Engine	206
4.3.3 Reconstructing the Jadeite Culture: The Territorialization of the Yunnan Jadeite Consumer Market	210
Chapter 5 Digital Technology and Reconstruction of Jadeite Trade Order ..	219
5.1 China's Digital Infrastructure Construction Restructures Jadeite Trade Order	219
5.1.1 Reterritorialization of State Power: China's Digital Infrastructure Construction and Digital Platform	220
5.1.2 Platformization: Territorialization and Order Reconstruction of Jadeite Trade in Virtual Space	228

5.2 Live Streaming: Jadeite Trade Relations, Consumer Culture and Value Production in Virtual Space	238
5.2.1 Panoramic Presence: Inter-ethnic Relations and Value Production among Jadeite Live Streamers	238
5.2.2 Relational Labor: The Social Relationship and Value Production Between Jadeite Live Streamers and Fans	243
Conclusion	248
Bibliography	253
List of tables	282
List of images	283
List of charts	284

Introduction

1 Origin of the Research

A travel experience I had in Dali, Yunnan, about 15 years ago was a culture shock. Starting from the ancient city of Dali, about 20 kilometers north along the Dali-Lijiang Provincial Highway, there was a large jewelry tourist shopping mall named Tai'an between Zuoyi Village and the famous scenic spot Butterfly Spring. When I was driving on the Dali-Lijiang Highway during the "Golden Week (Huangjinzhou, 黄金周)" of November, I encountered a long traffic jam, and the tourist buses in front of me formed a long queue that could not be seen at the end. The traffic policeman who maintained order told me that the cause of the congestion ahead was the Tai'an jewelry tourist shopping mall. Because it was the time of "rush groups (Chongtuan, 冲团)" in Tai'an, the queue of tourist buses waiting to enter was two to three kilometers long, which made it impossible to clear the Dali Highway, which has only two-way four-lane traffic and mixed traffic of motor vehicles and bicycles. Out of curiosity I went to Tai'an the following day. Then, I witnessed the grand occasion of rushing groups - more than 500 tourist buses with 50 seats were stationed in the large parking lot outside Tai'an, and the shopping mall with a business area of about 10,000 square meters accommodated 6,000 to 7,000 tourists - rushing to buy jadeite at the same time. These tourists from all over the country crowded in front of rows of counters. They couldn't wait for the salesperson to introduce what was carved on a pendant, so they took out cash and rushed to grab it, fearing that they would not be able to buy one even if they had the money. They did not care whether they still like the products they bought after they calmed down. Except for discounted daily necessities in supermarkets and small commodities sold in New Year's markets, I have never seen a luxury product sold and consumed in such a manner. Crazy consumers seem to have forgotten that jadeite is a non-essential item that can neither be eaten nor drunk. Before starting this thesis, I was lucky enough to interview the manager of the Tai'an at that time. He recalled the grand occasion very proudly and said:

The average daily turnover in Tai'an is more than 1 million RMB in low and peak seasons, and it can reach more than 5 million RMB on the most days during the Golden Week. In the three or four years since 2009, the total annual turnover has exceeded 300 million RMB, making it the largest tourist jewelry shopping mall in Yunnan Province and even in the country.Tourist buses preparing to enter the store lined up on Dali Road until the (Dali) state government had to dispatch traffic police

urgently to maintain traffic order, prohibiting tourist buses on the opposite lane from entering the mall.¹

In Dali, besides jadeite, there are silverware, crystals, ornamental stones, batik cloth and other ethnic handicrafts that are popular among tourists, but none of them are as incredible as jadeite. If the "commodity fetishism" discussed by Marx in the first chapter of the first volume of "Das Kapital" is the questioning of the value of commodities beyond the use value, then the crazy fetishism of jadeite is fully displayed in this shopping mall. However, what arouses my research interest is why people are so obsessed with jadeite but not other commodities? In fact, what they desperately snapped up at Tai'an mall at high prices were mediocre and uniform jadeite pendants processed by machines in the shape of Guanyin (观音), Buddha (佛), Pixiu (貔貅), Ruyi (如意), etc. At the same price, they can buy very exquisite gold and silverware, which are also non-necessities of life with little use value.

In the Winter of 1997, at the Hong Kong Christie's Auction, the most prestigious auction house in the United Kingdom, a string of jadeite bead necklaces named "Doubly Fortunate" was sold for 72.62 million HKD, or about 9.37 million USD (At that time, the exchange rate of HKD to USD was 7.75:1). It is composed of 27 brightly colored, plump, uniform, and full green beads and this type of quality is called "imperial green" in the jadeite industry. At Christie's Autumn Auction in Hong Kong in 2017, another necklace of 29 jadeite beads of comparable quality was sold for 95.725 million HKD, or about 12.26 million USD (the exchange rate of HKD to USD at that time was 7.81:1), setting a new Christie's auction record for natural jadeite beads. So, why can a kind of natural jewelry sell for sky-high prices in contemporary times?

Baudrillard once pointed out that art auction has playful, ritual, and reciprocal aspects, different from the spirit of traditional economic exchange, it "far beyond economic calculation, from a logical point of view, it involves all the process of value evolution" (Baudrillard, 1981: 121). We can imagine that the price of jadeite at Christie's auction may not only include its components in general market exchange, but also include the "playful, ritual and reciprocal" dimensions, thus causing price accumulation in the monetized representation of value. However, if these staggeringly expensive top-quality jadeite beads are calculated in carats, their prices are already higher than diamonds, let alone gold or any other jewelry. If it is assumed that the spirit of economic exchange referred to by Baudrillard is similar in the same field, then why is the auction price of jadeite higher than that of internationally recognized top jewellery?

¹ Interview time: 04/2018. Interlocutor: YDL. Location: Yunnan Geological Survey Bureau in Kunming.

1.1 The Price of Jade and the Price of Jadeite

When scholars discuss the price of jadeite, they first focus on China's unique jade culture and its symbolic system and believe that it is precisely because of the cultural demand for jade that jadeite has become a consumer product in modern China.

Indeed, although jade culture can be found in many ancient cultures, the Chinese jade culture is the oldest and most complex culture that is not only alive but thriving. For thousands of years, jade has gradually formed a symbolic system inseparable from sacred worship, power hierarchy, personality and morality, spiritual world, wealth, and status in Chinese society. The word "jade (yu, 玉)" is often used as a signifier to refer to people's names and place names in Chinese society by means of metaphor or analogy. Therefore, the signifier contains various attributes of jade, such as beauty, nobility, purity, tenacity and so on. This process of the subject's cognition of the essential attributes of the object, and the application of the cognitive results to the subject itself or other objects, makes jade an intermediate medium, showing the way that the perception of Chinese people is highly influenced by Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism. This way of understanding the world, which is described as "the unity of man and nature", belongs to the ontological method. Therefore, for the Chinese, jade is not just jewelry worn as adornment, but more of an aesthetic object which carries a whole set of symbols and world view. When people buy jade, they buy the decorative function and cultural significance of jade at the same time. This also explains why most of the jade consumption is concentrated in Chinese society, because only the Chinese can achieve a special aesthetic appreciation conditioned and enhanced by cultural prerequisites.

However, there is a wide variety of jade used by the Chinese. Why are the most famous four traditional jades - Hetian jade (和田玉), Xiu jade (岫玉), Dushan jade (独山玉), Lantian jade (蓝田玉) and other jade varieties not as expensive as jadeite? Taking the most expensive Hetian jade as an example, 29 pieces of Hetian jade were sold for a total of 23.46 million HKD at Christie's Spring Auction in 2021, which is about 3.02 million USD (the exchange rate of HKD to USD at the time was 7.77:1). Among them, the most expensive piece is a Hetian green jade (和田碧玉) pen holder made during the Qianlong period of the Qing Dynasty, which was sold for 0.45 million USD. Another well-known British auction house, Sotheby's, sold a Hetian green jade at a price of nearly 12.4 million USD at the 2016 autumn auction. However, this piece of Hetian jade is not a jewelry decoration, but a jade seal used by Emperor Qianlong engraved with "Treasure of the Supreme Emperor", which is the largest Qianlong seal currently available in the market. That is to say, the spiritual connotation of the value of Hetian jade in the auction is not only the jade culture, but also the value component of antiques and works of art. So, it is the accumulation of the spiritual connotation of the value of general jade luxury goods, and it is the sum of various values. Therefore, the jade seals that symbolized the highest power and status and were used by emperors hundreds of years ago are of the highest value. However, the auction price of this Hetian jade, which has such an important

symbolic blessing, is comparable to the jadeite beaded necklace mentioned above in the 2017 Christie's Autumn Auction.

By studying the data of the auction house, it is not difficult to find out whether the existence of the jade cultural system can explain the question of "why jade has a very high cultural value only in the Chinese society, and there is no such value recognition in the cultural system of other people". But this reason alone does not seem to fully explain "why the same jade, jadeite has such a huge difference in price characteristics from other jade species?" In addition, the location of jadeite mine is in the Hpakant region of Kachin State in northern Myanmar today. Although jadeite products entered the imperial court around the 13th century, it may not be until the 18th century that the Qing Dynasty in the Central Plains fully accepted jadeite into the jade culture system and no longer regarded it as just a kind of stone. However, the value of jadeite at that time was not as high as Hetian jade, which was considered as gentle as a gentleman (君子)'s quality. This can be seen from the selection of materials for the emperor's jade seal. All in all, the current supreme status of jadeite price is not formed naturally, so when did jadeite reverse the situation? Why is it reversed?

1.2 Multi-site Fieldwork to Explore the Evaluation Basis of Jadeite Price

To answer the above questions about jadeite prices, I think that the evaluation system of jadeite prices is the basis for discussing its value. Then it is best to go to the processing and distribution centers of jadeite to do fieldwork, because it can be assumed that this link is the link where the commodity is endowed with the most cultural value. So, I first chose Ruili (瑞丽).

In the history of jadeite trade, Tengchong located in the western of Yunnan, known as the "first city on the extreme edge (极边第一城)", is the core processing and distribution center, and the first stop for jadeite from Hpakant to enter the administrative management system of Central China. The earliest people engaged in the development of jadeite resources were also people from Tengyue (腾越, Tengyue was the old name of Tengchong). However, with the blockade of the China-Myanmar border from the 1950s to the end of the 1980s, Ruili was designated as a national port, and the Jiegao-Muse Port became the largest land port between China and Myanmar, the largest jadeite center market between China and Myanmar was transferred to Ruili. The Tengchong market gradually declined and became a sales market dominated by tourism consumption. Ruili has many jadeite wholesale markets such as Jiegao Jade City, Delong, Jinxin, and Old Jewelry Street. The types of goods traded in each market are different. Jiegao Jade City mainly wholesales finished products such as flakes, ring noodles, beads, pendants, and bracelets and semi-finished products. Delong and Jinxin markets mainly focus on trade ores (毛料, mao liao) or stone gambling (赌石, du shi), while Old Jewelry Street attracts many merchants with top-notch goods, including finished products and ores. After a

jadeite ore is mined, it is usually covered with a layer of weathered shell, and the quality inside cannot be seen. Stone gambling refers to judging the value of the rough stone without cutting the ore or only grinding a small window. Very experienced buyers can judge the quality of the inside by the texture of the shell and the origin mine of the ore, but these references are sparse and vague. Therefore, after cutting the ore, the quality of the inside stone might be diverged from the original judgment. The idiom in the industry is called "one cut to get poor, one cut to get rich (一刀穷, 一刀富)". My observations in the various markets in Ruili inform me that the trading rules for different goods are not the same, and the participants come from different ethnic groups, including Han Chinese, Burmese Chinese, Burmese, Dai, Jingpo (Kachin) people, Rohingya, Burmese Muslims, etc. These participants will also navigate between several markets according to time and product differences. These markets are surrounded by a large number of small factories, including engraving and marquetry, with a labor force also drawn from the various groups mentioned above.

When I tried to understand the specific price of jadeite, I discovered that the quality of a piece of jadeite is generally judged by an indigenous knowledge system based on a combination of indicators such as delicacy (种, zhong), transparency /water (水, shui), color (色, se), background (底, di), light (光, guang), and carving (工, gong). Each index can be divided into many categories, coupled with the rich variety of finished products, the results of the combination of multiple factors are almost ever-changing, which has an effect on the price-setting. In addition, the valuation and transaction price of the same piece in the hands of different sellers are different. This price may also be related to the fact that the piece has passed through the hands of several sellers. Furthermore, the price assessment of jadeite ore has a considerable degree of gambling. Even if it is not a gambling stone with a complete shell, the cut ore will still have a new quality status in the process of continuous further cutting or carving, thereby changing its price, and thus may change the price of the finished product after subsequent processing. And this does not include price changes caused by fluctuations in ore input. These complex factors prevented me from obtaining continuous data on the price changes of the same product within a certain time span from any seller, because although the products can be classified, each one is different. As long as it is not a low-grade product produced by machine reproduction, almost a commodity corresponds to only one price in a certain period of time. After being hindered in collecting data on the specific price of jadeite, I turned to the Jewelry Testing Station of the Ruili Quality Supervision Bureau, hoping to find authoritative price evaluation standards from government functional departments as data guidance. However, the staff told me:

The government issued jadeite quality rating standards more than ten years ago. This standard combines traditional evaluation systems and has corresponding price ranges to guide market transaction prices. However, the promotion has not been accepted by the market until now,

and no one implements it according to this standard in practice.The government can only prevent fake or B+C goods (artificially pickled or dyed jadeite) from entering the market and cannot control the price at all.²

My fieldwork found that the price of jadeite in practice is full of uncertainty, and actors need to rely on relevant knowledge and sensory experience accumulated in the market for a long time to roughly grasp the price of one certain category. So far, the entry path of using specific price change data to demonstrate the construction process of jadeite value had basically failed. One of the reasons is that the coordinates cannot be anchored, and the other is that there are many participating ethnic groups, many categories and great differences. I am afraid that it is difficult to explain the complex production relationship behind the value production of jadeite only by analyzing the price fluctuation of a single category of jadeite.

Then I tried to use the analytical perspective of the relationship between commodity exchange and value suggested by the anthropologist Appadurai in "The Social Life History of Things" - that is, to explore the situation of an economic object circulating in different time and space value systems (Appadurai, 2013) - to study the value production and exchange relationship of jadeite in the commodity stage. For Appadurai, the value including the price is reflected in the commodities being exchanged, so paying attention to the conditions of jadeite circulation in a specific time and space value system can better understand the phenomenon of drastic fluctuations in the price of jadeite. Therefore, I expanded the scope of the field sites to almost all the important nodes of the commodity chain of the cross-border jadeite trade, except for the Hpakant Mine, which is located in the crossfire zone and controlled by different armed forces. After my fieldwork spanning nearly three years, these are the main findings:

First of all, the vigorous development of the jadeite cross-border trade industry has involved the employment and livelihood of millions of people. The participants on the Myanmar side are mainly Burmese, Kachin, Burmese Chinese, Wa, Shan, and Burmese Muslims. Some of them dispose of armed forces, others have economic or political capital, and still others make money through social networks formed by kinship ties. Many opportunists and deprived people mined jadeite ore regardless of the extremely high death rate in order to earn a living, and even used violence to win in the competition of interests. Participants on the Chinese side are no longer mainly inhabitants from Yunnan and Guangdong, but people from central and eastern provinces and cities such as Henan, Jiangxi, Hunan, Hubei, Shanghai, and northeastern provinces have actively participated in jadeite trade activities. They left their hometowns and moved to various major markets to engage in processing, or wholesale, or retail. At the same time, due to the the continuing

² Interview time: 08/2018. Interlocutor: LZZ. Location: Ruili Quality Supervision Bureau Jiegao Jewelry Quality Inspection Station.

opening of ports, a large number of Burmese laborers have crossed the border into China, especially in Ruili City and Dehong Prefecture on the China-Myanmar border. They also come from different ethnic groups in Myanmar and participate in the value production and distribution of jadeite as individuals or groups in order to seek a better life. Chinese participants have also ventured into the jadeite markets in Mandalay, Yangon and other places in Myanmar, becoming a new powerful group of Chinese jadeite practitioners in Myanmar. The cross-border flow of labor force leads to frequent interactions and intense collisions among multi-ethnic groups, which constantly brings about many inter-ethnic interaction problems and complicates the value production relationship of jadeite.

Second, the division of labor within the jadeite industry, which can accommodate so many participants, is extremely detailed, with rich and diverse business formats, while the rules of each value production link are different. These rules are mainly based on traditionally formed rules, including public auctions, stone gambling, middleman commissions, and so on. They are combined with the respective laws and regulations of the two countries to form the reconstruction of the rules. At the same time, parallel informal rules are formed by the social networks of the various participating groups. With the development of digital technology, new trade orders have also been generated in some emerging business forms, such as live streaming e-commerce that realizes transactions across physical distances, etc., all of which are adaptive variants based on the original rules. The combination of these specific value production methods and trade order rules, along with the sharp rise in the price of jadeite and changes in jadeite consumption culture, is continuously determining the roles and mutual relationships of actors, forming an updated and iterative phenomenon of jadeite value production.

Thirdly, China's jadeite market has experienced both a period of healthy development and a period of bubble formation. There is a part of sunshine consumption that belongs to the endurance of Chinese traditional culture, and another important part is the corruption process in which power and money are exchanged in the name of gifts. Jadeite is a special material symbol that can accommodate social, economic and cultural capital. Coupled with the non-standardization of its evaluation system, the uncertainty of prices, and the untraceability of production and sales, it has become the most hidden and implicit gift, flowing in the realm of power and money transactions among different classes. Exchanging jadeite as a gift to achieve reciprocity has largely created more consumer demand and changed the nature of the reproduced value of the jadeite within the current jadeite consumption culture, which is reflected in the price.

Fourth, during the civil war in Myanmar that lasted for more than half a century, the proceeds from selling jadeite ore, together with the proceeds from opium and timber, became an important source of military expenditure for both sides of the war. Among them, the military conflict, political game and interest competition between the Kachin ethnic armed forces in northern Myanmar and the Myanmar military government are

even called "jade politics (玉石政治, yushi zhengzhi)". According to a survey report from a British NGO organization, in 2014, the output value of Myanmar's jadeite was 308,590 million US dollars, accounting for 48% of Myanmar's GDP, more than 8 times the value of natural gas output, and 46 times the medical expenditure of the Myanmar government (Global Witness, 2015). This statistic does not include cross-border smuggling, and several key interlocutors told me that smuggling may account for more than 80% of total jadeite exports. Obviously, the jadeite value production mechanism has added a part of the nature of the violent market, and power competition has gone beyond the scope of normal free market exchange, which is very rare in the value production of most luxury goods, works of art, or commodities hyped by capital.

The fieldwork data reflect that the political and economic activities, ethnic relations, and social problems related to the value production of jadeite are too complex. The method of Appadurai (2013) helps to understand the broad concept of "jadeite as a commodity", that is to say, when jadeite is an economic object, it can be included in the scope of analysis. The concept of "economy" here is not only monetized economic activities, but also includes all economic forms with "exchange spirit". As a gift, jadeite carries the exchange of power or capital, or the exchange of interpersonal relationships, emotions, and bless, resulting in exclusive and sacrificial values, which may affect the value of jadeite in the currency exchange stage. This seems to be a feasible approach, however, I found problems in both practical operability and theoretical interpretation.

From the perspective of uncontrollable operation, the risk is too high. Among the dangers that prevented me from reaching the mines to do fieldwork were the jadeite mines being off-limits to foreigners, being in a fire zone, and the access roads being controlled by different armed forces. Second, the flow time span of objects is beyond the controllable range. The waiting time for the whole process - the excavation of jadeite ore from the mining area, the trade in public auctions, the cross-border trade, the processing, the retail, and eventually the final transaction - may be half a year or many years. There is a proverb in the industry: *It is a long shot as well as a big one* (三年不开张, 开张吃三年, *san nian bu kai zhang, kai zhang chi san nian*). It means that a piece of jadeite may not be sold for three years, but once it is sold, the profit is enough to support the seller for three years. Therefore, the time of the sales process alone may be as long as many years, and adding up the time of the previous phases, I will not be able to complete my research plan. Third, the flow direction of objects cannot be predicted. As a commodity, jadeite can be in the form of completely uncut gambling stones, or cut pieces, undercuts, beads, bracelets, pendants, carved pieces, inlaid pieces, etc. The value production method of each category is very different, and the price itself changes accordingly, and the direction of which finished product category a piece of ore will end up depends entirely on the situation of the jadeite itself after it is cut. Therefore, tracing the flow of jadeite according to the category of finished products can only show the circulation status of this category in this value system, and cannot explain the overall characteristics from the small to the big.

Fourth, it is extremely secretive. When tracing jadeite as an intermediary of power or capital exchange, it often involves extra-legal activities such as shady scenes and black markets, and it is difficult to obtain field data. One of my interlocutors at Sihui in Guangdong Province is a jadeite carving master from Henan. His jadeite carving works are all ornaments (摆件, bai jian), displayed in shops like a small museum, and the prices can easily reach tens of millions of RMB. He told me that these were all award-winning works in the store, and they were only used as "fronts" to show his skills. In fact, all the jadeite ornaments traded are privately customized, and they were absolutely kept confidential for customers. He promised to take me to his studio to see the latest jadeite sculpture worth more than 10 million RMB, but I must promise not to take pictures or describe the characteristics of the work in detail in the paper. On the appointed day, our mutual friend drove us to his studio. When we arrived at the door, he said he would go upstairs to make arrangements, but there was no news after an hour. We probably understood his intentions, so we had to return without success. Therefore, it is difficult to obtain field data on the use and trajectory of jadeite during the gift stage, and most of them come from the recitations of other participants and comparisons with literature data, while the records of my participation in the observation are very limited.

The above-mentioned obstacles make the snowball method commonly used in tracking the social life of objects extremely prone to bias, because each node will lead to a door full of uncertainty, and the relationship between each door is more different than homogeneous, the combination of the possibility of multiple nodes will extend more complex patterns, and the flow line often has multiple directions and different degrees of back-flow. Therefore, a single and random flow route of jadeite is not representative, and it is difficult to provide a strong explanation for the overall observation of jadeite trade as a "typical case". Then, there may be another way to change the perspective of operation, which is to control the external conditions, that is, to find a group that can span the entire jadeite value chain to ensure the continuity and integrity of the value production process. It can be an enterprise, an industry organization, an organized ethnic group, or a family, like De Beers in the diamond industry. Otherwise, when there are too many uncertain variables in the middle, it will easily lead to interruption of tracking. However, in my fieldwork, I have not found any single individual, group or organization whose experience spans the entire jadeite value chain.

In addition, from the perspective of the explanatory power of theoretical tools: Appadurai (2013) pointed out the broad concept of commodity, the exchange production value, the connotation of demand, and the close relationship between politics and value and exchange and other analytical dimensions and elements. However, the multiple cases shown in *The Social Life History of Objects* are not as complicated as the case of jadeite. For example, there are great differences in the circulation of different types of jadeite commodities, and there are also great differences in the way of value production; 2) The objects in these cases are almost all within the space of the same country or

homogeneous region, and there is no value production force involving the wider power between different spaces, which is one of the outstanding characteristics of the jadeite case; 3) Jadeite's cross-cultural exchange relationship exists in almost every key link, and the participating ethnic groups or groups in each link are different, while the discussion of ethnic relations in the case of Appadurai (2013) is relatively simple, and so on. Of course, jadeite, like the things in these cases, such as Mauss's "gift" (2002), has the stage of "social life", "exchange spirit", and cultural commodity exchange, and thus becomes a thing that "has" value. However, as mentioned above, if we want to explain the value production and price of jadeite, it is not enough to stay only on the jade culture of the Han people. It should be said that jade culture is only the basic context to produce jadeite value. In addition to the power advantages brought about by the cultural and intellectual possession of jade, there are many power relations that play a vital role in the price changes of jadeite.

Therefore, I think it is best to get rid of the thinking perspective of the cultural and social exchange of objects and the ontology and objectivity of value, and to focus on the power that produce value or cause price fluctuations and how they operate. This is the key to unlock the lock explaining the production order of jadeite value.

2 The Research Issue

The ethnic groups participating in the cross-border trade of China-Myanmar jadeite for profit are very diverse and participate in various ways. The relations of production and power formed between them have led to a series of social problems, mainly focusing on but not limited to the following three aspects:

Firstly, is China's consumption of jadeite the only or most important cause of some of Myanmar's social problems? As a cultural commodity unique to Chinese culture, most jadeites are sold from Myanmar to China. In the face of the war in northern Myanmar that has lasted for nearly 70 years, the political situation in Myanmar is turbulent, drugs are rampant in the Hpakant jadeite mining area, AIDS is ubiquitous, residents are displaced, ecological damage is serious, natural disasters and mining accidents are frequent, international public opinion has criticized China's jadeite consumption. So, is this really the cause of these social problems? Who is the biggest beneficiary in the jadeite value chain? Or who are they?

Secondly, the cross-border trade of jadeite has prompted tens of thousands of Burmese people to come to the cities on the China-Myanmar border, and they form inter-ethnic or intra-ethnic relations such as competition, conflict, cooperation, and mutual assistance with Chinese businessmen or consumers, which poses challenges to border security and political governance. For example, the number of cases of smuggling, illegal immigration, and economic disputes is numerous, while the laws and regulations of the two

governments are hardly effective. For another example, the emergence of new formats such as live streaming e-commerce has brought about a more complex and subdivided innovation in the division of labor, but market regulation and management regulations from the government appear to be lagging behind and useless. In addition, the jadeite market in China is significant, but taxation has never been implemented scientifically and rationally.

Third, the enthusiasm for consumption of jadeite in the Chinese market has been at a high level, and the price of jadeite has been fluctuating all the time. The depletion of resources, the hoarding of goods by the wealthy, the outbreak of war, and the anti-corruption campaign are all narratives that frequently appear among trade participants. These words may be the rhetoric of creating scarcity anxiety in the jadeite market, or they may be the real concerns of the participants. Can jadeite preserve or increase in value? How to distinguish true and false when buying jadeite? How to judge whether the value is reasonable? If the jadeite in Hpakant is exhausted, what will happen to the jadeite industry? Where do practitioners go from here? These problems concerning the development of the jadeite market are not only related to local economic development and consumer interests, but also to personal survival.

The above-mentioned problems recurrently surface in my field work, which has been puzzling me for a long time. It is difficult for both officials and individuals to find a starting point and provide a more sustainable solution. Market research reports and relevant government policies are often either scratching the surface or are easily questioned or overturned. This is actually because there is a lack of overall grasp of the ins and outs of the jadeite trade and the process of jadeite value production, and an overall understanding has not yet been formed. The consideration that the field of vision is limited to a part of the whole is like a blind man feeling an elephant, which is inevitably biased. I think that before proposing coping strategies or predictions, we must first conduct a comprehensive analysis and explanation of the research object and answer the questions of "what" and "why" before we can talk about "how".

However, based on the experience and thinking gained through field work, it is found that none of the existing anthropological theories discussing international traded commodity and value analysis can be directly applied to the explanation of "what is" the value production order in jadeite trade.

But it is precisely because I realize that the non-standard and multi-dimensional nature of jadeite value, as well as the diversity of ethnic groups involved in the value production and the complexity of value production forms have brought me key inspirations - when observing the order of such a special economic action system, if the existing functionalism and universalism theories cannot explain the situation - we should return to and respect its original appearance.

So, returning back to the original question of why the price of jadeite is so extremely high, I am actually asking: **"What kind of power relations and exchange actions are behind a cultural commodity that spans tradition and modernity like jadeite, making its price so exorbitant?"**

It should be noted that although the value of jadeite will be expressed in the form of currency value at a certain stage of its flow, it does not mean that the value content here only includes monetized commodity economic exchange, but also socialized commodity economic exchange. In addition, the two different types of economic exchange are not presented in a chronological sequence on the time axis, but the movements are overlapping, mixed, contaminated, parallel, and inseparable, but are generally expressed in the form of prices. Therefore, the "value" referred to in the dissertation does not make any distinction, it is the value concept in the broad sense following the example of Appadurai (2013), and the exchange activities are also in the broad sense including currency exchange, social relationship exchange, spiritual exchange, etc. in the exchange action. When discussing value production on this basis, we can find that power is omnipresent. However, I do not intend to just list and lay out which powers lead to the price changes of jadeite. I hope to uncover, disentangle and understand the general operation rules of both large and small powers.

In order to address this question, it is necessary to use a political and economic perspective to grasp the commodity value production order of the entire industrial chain of the China-Myanmar jadeite trade as a whole. My hypothesis is that the extreme high esteem for jadeite, when its price surpassed that of Hetian jade that traditionally was regarded as the "jade of kings" resulting into a jadeite fever in the market at present, has gone through a human-made, complicated, and long-term process. Powers have continuously reproduced the value of jadeite through a series of competitions. Based on the characteristics reflected in the fieldwork data, I will use the theoretical framework consisting of the three analytical concepts of territorialization, deterritorialization, and reterritorialization to understand the operation process and characteristics of power in the production of jadeite value. I still take the flow of jadeite in specific time and space as the main line, and specifically examine how various powers in each stage lead to drastic changes in the price setting of jadeite through territorial competition in space.

To sum up, my research is dedicated to mapping the overall landscape of China-Myanmar jadeite trade and understanding the internal different processes and practices. In the end, it does not directly put forward strategic suggestions or specific solutions to problems, but it can be used as a general framework for scholars in various related fields at home and abroad to further conduct research on specific issues and topics regarding jadeite culture in different disciplines.

3 Literature Review

3.1 Research on the Value Production and Trade of Jadeite

3.1.1 *Related Literature in China*

Although the main consumer market of jadeite is in China, the research on the value production, price and trade of jadeite in China is relatively fragmented and has not yet formed a coherent system. Among them, the discussion on the value production and price of jadeite mainly focuses on the following two issues: One is how to evaluate jadeite and what are the criteria for judging the price of jadeite? This type of research generally incorporates the cognition of jadeite into the cognition methods of natural science of modern gemology and geology, including first using chemical and physical properties to judge the authenticity of jadeite, and then supplemented by the evaluation knowledge system formed in the industry to discuss the factors of jadeite grading standards. Examples are *Jadeite Valuation* (Mo, 1993), *Commercial Grade Evaluation of Jadeite Finished Products* (Mo, 1998), and *Jadeite Grade Standard Sample Collection* (Mo, 2009) by Mo Tai, and *Practical Jadeite Science* (Ouyang, 2005) by Ouyang Qiumei, etc. These two jadeite experts are representatives of the first generation of Chinese scholars who introduced scientific knowledge to study jadeite gemology, mineralogy, and geology. Their research laid the groundwork for the Chinese government to develop official jadeite identification and grading standards (GB), including *Names of Jade and Gemstones* (2003) and *Grading of Jadeite* (2009). In addition, they also influenced the further research and discussion of natural science scholars, such as *Applied Jadeite Gemology* (Yuan, 2009). Another set of literature looks at the cultural factors that affect the price of jadeite, or what is the jadeite cultural connotation? To name a few: *Exploring Jadeite* (Zhang, 2005), *Understanding Jadeite within a Book* (Yang, 2014) and *Chinese Ancient Jade and Jade Culture* (Yang and Yang, 2017), *Exploration and Explanation of the Formation of Jadeite Culture in Qing Dynasty* (Qiu, etc., 2017), *Jadeite Culture and Market Exploration* (Xu and Li, 2010), *The Jadeite Culture and the Directivity of Industry Cultural Characteristics to Jadeite Classification* (Zhou and Gao, 2012), *Analysis of the Connotation of Tengchong Jadeite Culture* (Sun, 2014) and so on. Among them, Guo Yan's *Research on the Relationship between Factors Affecting the Value of Jadeite Bracelets and Prices* (Guo, 2016) used the price analysis method of economics to make a regression model of the relationship between the price and value influencing factors of jadeite bracelets. However, in addition to the process, the selection of influencing factors relates solely to physical properties such as delicacy, transparency, and color, while cultural and other factors have been ignored.

These studies reflect that the natural sciences and social sciences are trying to use their own set of methodologies to understand the value composition of jadeite and suggest how people should judge the price of jadeite more clearly and accurately. However, it should be noted that when faced with economic practice, the non-empirical knowledge of natural science seems to only judge effectively whether jadeite is "natural", chemically

treated, or completely "fake". Of course, the judgment of its price serves as a guide for specific price grading and has no immediate practical value. Discussions about the cultural value of jadeite present similar problems. Scholars have realized that the cultural value is an important part of the production of jadeite value, but what exactly does cultural value signify? In addition to the aesthetic value in the context of jade culture, is there any other value content? In other words, does the cultural value of jadeite overlap with that of other jade species? Considering it further, does the value of jadeite and other jade species go through the same value production process? If not, where is the difference? Existing studies seem to focus only on a pragmatic standpoint and have not touched on the deeper issue of value production. Bao Deqing found that in the 2014 jadeite Public Auctions, a large number of jadeite ores owners asked "deputies to block bids (枪手拦标, qiangshou lanbiao)", which led to an inflated overall price of ores (Bao, 2014). The owners deliberately set a high price in hidden bids to scare off other candidate buyers, while at the same time they hire 'deputies' or impostors to make a bid slightly higher than the estimated price of the Myanmar Ministry of Mines. In so doing they manipulate the auction to their own advantage. Dai Zhuming talked about the stone gambling skills and the contradiction between these trading rules and the official jadeite market management rules (Dai, 2019). Their research actually reflects a part that cannot be ignored in the production of jadeite value, that is, the traditional trading rules. It is a pity that they did not clearly identify whether these rules are part of the jadeite culture, so the conclusions and opinions given still belong to applied research rather than basic theoretical research.

Domestic research on the jadeite market appears to be more simplistic, most of which focus on the field of economics, and are research on the development and countermeasures of China's jadeite industry. For example, *SWOT (Advantages, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats) Analysis and Countermeasure Research on the Development of Jewelry and Jade Industry in Yunnan Province* (Yang and Zhang, 2011), *A Preliminary Study on the Formation and Development Mechanism of Three Jade Industry Clusters in Guangdong* (Wang, etc., 2011), *Research on the Interactive Development of Yunnan Stone Industry and Tourism* (Guo, 2012), *China's Jadeite Culture Industry Development and International Market Expansion* (Fang, 2012), *Discussion on the Sustainable Development of the Jewelry and Jade Industry in Yunnan Province* (Li, etc., 2016), *Analysis of the Sustainable Development of the Yunnan Jadeite Industry: Based on the perspective of comparison between Yunnan and Guangdong* (Wang and Yang, 2016). A comparable amount is the research on the overall situation of various types of jadeite markets and related countermeasures. Such as *Analysis of Jadeite Marketing Strategies from the Study of Luxury* (Liu, 2012), *Looking at the Development of Jadeite Market in Myanmar's Jadeite Market in Recent Years* (Feng, 2014), *Current Situation and Countermeasures of Jadeite Wholesale Market* (Hu, 2019), *Market Analysis of Jadeite Industry Under Multi-Status Indeterminate Economic Factors* (Guo, etc., 2019), *Analysis of Jadeite Market Prospects in Pingzhou Jade Street* (Lei and Zu, 2020). In addition, there are a few research on jadeite enterprises, consumers, and brands. For example, *Research on the Development Strategy of China's Jade Retail Enterprises* (2003), *Research on the*

Marketing Strategy of Yunnan Jade and Jade Retail Enterprises (Zhu, 2015), *Research on the Behavior of Tourists in Jadeite Origins* (Zhou, 2013), and *The Feasibility of Building an International Brand of Jade Jewelry Research* (Zhang, 2014). The common feature of these studies is the use of conventional theories in economics, and the quantitative method of questionnaire survey is rarely used in research methods. Although some studies have constructed analytical models, most of them are integrated with existing data and literature materials, which reduces the rigor of the research conclusions.

There are few studies investigating the overall spectrum of transnational trade in jadeite, which can be roughly divided into three categories. The first category is the perspective of economics. Chen Weilai (2016) used the resource endowment theory and comparative advantage theory to summarize the status quo, advantages and opportunities, disadvantages and challenges of jadeite export development from the perspective of Myanmar, a jade-producing country, and put forward corresponding countermeasures and suggestions. However, the research data sources rely almost all on Chinese materials. There is no fieldwork to serve as empirical data, so the conclusions are highly subjective showing a clear gap with the actual situation. Wu Zhenzhu (2016) also used economic theory to discuss the aforementioned issues. Since she was originally a student from Myanmar studying in China, the research data on Myanmar is more abundant. She found that the problems existing in China-Myanmar jadeite trade include shrinking public offerings, high tariffs, Myanmar's export to domestic sales, drugs, and AIDS. One of the reasons is that jadeite is classified as luxury goods in both China and Myanmar. Second, the military government and drug lords control the jadeite trade and cause a series of problems. Although her research method is mainly a critical study of the existing literature, the focus and interpretation of her work diverge significantly from her Chinese counterparts.

The second category is the perspective of history. The earliest record in modern times is Yin Mingde's *Survey Notes on the Northern Boundary of Yunnan* (1933), which mainly records his investigation of the disputed area on the China-Myanmar border by the government authorities from 1929 to 1930, including the mining of jadeite at that time. Zou Huaqiang (2005) used many local records, history books, biographies, surveys and other historical materials to discuss the role played by Tengchong people in jadeite mining and trade, and the development brought by the jadeite trade to Tengchong and northern Myanmar. *The Discovery and Significance of Guangdong Customs "Import Records"* by Gu Xianzi et al. (2007) is a study of the extremely precious microfilm archive *Guangdong Customs Records*. It was found that the "jadestone", recorded by the "foreigners" who was the actual controller of the customs during the emperor Guangxu period, was jadeite. And the data registered in it was cross validated with other documents and materials, which showed that Guangzhou was the most important jadeite trading port in China in the late Qing Dynasty.

The third category is the perspective of anthropology. Zhou Jinglun's *The Destiny of Jade* (1989) used autobiography to describe his journey from a Yunnan refugee who made a living in Upper Burma in the 1970s to a laborer digging jadeite, a manager of a jadeite mine, and finally becoming a jadeite trader. From the first-person perspective, he showed the whole picture of the jadeite trade at that time, and a large number of pages described the scenes of Han people interacting with Shan, Kachin and Burmese people.

Chang Wen-Chin (Chang 2004) discussed the cross-territory network chain established by the migration and assembly of the dispersed Yunnanese through the jadeite trade, that is, the flow chain from Myanmar, Thailand, Taiwan, to Hong Kong, Guangzhou, and Yunnan, emphasizing the flow of human-like commodities, capital, consulting, and knowledge, etc., forming a multi-directional, endlessly circulating network chain that can expand outward at any time. Yunnanese create new opportunities for survival and development for themselves through kinship and geosocial relations combined with the development of the global market. Then, she used Appadurai's "social life history of things" method to illustrate the jadeite trade culture by examining the social life in the transnational flow of jadeite from Myanmar to Thailand during the Burmese socialist regime (Chang, 2006). She believes that the complex intersection of economic, political, and cultural factors related to jadeite trade is embodied in organizational politics, knowledge politics, personal courage, and uncontrollable luck in jadeite trade, and the law of the market intertwined with the intricate socio-political forces in this region is the driving force for the transnational trade of jadeite. After that, she discussed the everyday politics of Yunnanese underground trade in Myanmar from a "civilian" perspective since the socialist era in Myanmar (Chang, 2013). The Burmese military government repressed the economy from 1962 to 1988 by implementing "Burmese-style socialism" that nationalized trade and industry. Severe mismanagement, lack of infrastructure, and policy mistakes soon led to a severe recession and shortage of basic daily necessities, the collapse of the existing socioeconomic, and the rise and dominance of a black-market economy. The Yunnanese who were active in the Myanmar-Thailand border transport sold jadeite and daily necessities in the black market, and at the same time established reciprocal relationships with government agencies in the border areas. These actual conditions prove that the underground economy was embedded in a wide range of political, economic, social and cultural backgrounds. Her last related essay showed the trade network picture of jade merchants in Yunnan by depicting members of the Duan and Peng families active in the jadeite trade in Burma, Guangzhou, Hong Kong, Yunnan, and Taiwan, and the flow of trading goods (jadeite and processing machines), capital, information, and knowledge back and forth along the trade routes (Chang, 2014). She divided three stages and routes, namely the land transportation from Myanmar to Thailand from the 1960s to the mid-1990s, the land transportation from Myanmar to Yunnan starting in the mid-1980s, and the sea transportation from Yangon to Guangzhou since 2000. And she pointed out that the decisive factors for the economic success of jade merchants are coping with external challenges and personal luck.

Li Rui (2019) used ethnographic methods to study the flow and reproduction of jadeite in Tengchong. She believed that the jadeite that flowed into Tengchong from northern Myanmar during the Ming and Qing Dynasties was the key material that led to social changes in modern Tengchong. She divided the flow of jadeite in Tengchong into the stage of symbolizing the power relationship between kingship and vassal states under the tribute system, and the stage of linking up the network of chieftains, jade men, jadeite merchants and consumers under market trade conditions. Coupled with the cultural network centered on jadeite worship, she jointly explores the issues of material flow and ethnic contact in the southwestern border area and provides a valuable case for the ethnography of things.

3.1.2 *Related Literature Outside China*

The cognition of jadeite in publications outside of China shows a clear period distinction. The earliest documents come from brief expedition records written by officers sent by the British colonial authorities, including Hannay (1837), Griffith (1847) Adamson (1889), Scott (1901), Hertz (1912) and Chhibber (1934). The amount of these materials is limited, but it represents the official knowledge of jadeite mines and trade during the century of British colonialism in Burma. After World War II, there were still very few Westerners who entered the jadeite mines for investigation, who nonetheless left behind equally precious documents, including Meen (1962), Martin Ehrman (Smith and Smith, 1994) and Gübelin (1964, 1965, 1978). These studies mainly examine and recognize jadeite from the perspectives of gemology, mineralogy, and geology, while the description of jadeite trade is often omitted.

The above literature is annotated and discussed by American gemologist Richard W. Hughes. In 1996, as the first batch of foreign gemologists who were allowed to visit the Hpakant Mine after the new army group came to power in Myanmar, he and his team visited the Hpakant jadeite mine twice and wrote a series of articles focusing on natural science research and social investigation. He discussed the history, location, and geological conditions of the jadeite mines, especially the mining activities in the Hpakant area at that time, including mining technology, rough processing technology, ore value judgment standards, artificial coloring processing technology and Public Auction, etc., detailed the cutting, grading and trading and handling of jadeite in Myanmar and China, with the aim of dispelling some of the mysteries surrounding the "Most Valuable Gemstone of the Orient" (1996, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2012). These studies were expected to be published as a book in *Jadeite: A Gemologist's Guide* in early 2022. Hughes' research on jadeite knowledge is the most systematic among Western scholars, but he did not further involve in the rules and social relations in specific trade fields.

Adrian Levy and Cathy Scott-Clark (2001) are two British "Sunday Times" staff writers. They collected historical materials in the UK, the United States, the National Archives of India, and the Palace Museum in China, and persuaded the Burmese military government

and Kachin warlords to allow and lead them to conduct field investigations in the Hpakant jadeite mining area. They combined original historical research, travel notes and in-depth investigative news reports to tell the secret historical story of "the most mysterious treasure in the East" from the era of King Bodawpaya of the Konbaung Dynasty of Myanmar and the era of Emperor Qianlong of the Qing Dynasty of China to the 1990s, which spans more than 200 years. Their comprehensive work covered a wide spectrum of issues including the relationship between the Konbaung Dynasty of the Burmese and the Kachin people, the real owners of the jadeite in the Savage Mountain (野人山, yerenshan); the role of jadeite in China-Burma tributary relations; the cognition of the British colonists on jadeite, and the expedition experience of several groups of officers sent by the East India Company to the jadeite mine. Furthermore, it discussed the relationship between the jadeite mine and the Ledo Highway, Japan, and Britain during World War II; the role of jadeite between Burmese and Kachin before and after Myanmar's independence; the role of jadeite played between the Burmese military government, the Kachin Army, the Shan State Army, the Kuomintang Army, and the rebels of ethnic minorities in northern Myanmar such as Wa State and Kokang during the Burmese Civil War. Lastly it also covered jadeite's role in the Qing government and the Republic of China government, as well as the political leaders and their families who were inextricably linked with China at that time, and so on. Although the knowledge they produce is a literary work full of the characteristics of the colonial discourse, it provides a non-national narrative, connected by objects, and a picture scroll of regional history.

Kevin Woods (2011) examines the process of Myanmar's military state-building in the resource-rich ethnic ceasefire zone along China's Yunnan border in the first decade after 2000, through the case of timber and jadeite trade and rubber plantation. He pointed out that since the early 1990s when the Burmese military government signed a ceasefire agreement with ethnic minority political groups in the Myanmar -China border area, development has replaced wars against politically dubious, resource-rich and minority-populated border regions. As an explicit post-war military strategy, the Burmese military government allocated land concessions within the ceasefire zone to manage land and population, thereby producing regulated, well-defined, militarized territories, a process of territorialization. Woods called this strategy of political and economic games "ceasefire capitalism", which not only turns the battlefield into a market, but also turns the market into a battlefield. In another article, he further strengthened the notion of "ceasefire capitalism" as an analytical concept (Woods, 2016). While the 1994 ceasefire agreement gave birth to an era of "ceasefire development" in northern Myanmar from the ashes of civil war, it also brought all the sophisticated armed actors and powers into the "development" mix. This in turn affected the ability to govern the land and the people, especially altering access to and control over resources represented by jadeite and timber. He argues that the military state-building process, rooted in the territorial expansion of state institutions and the military, lacks the sense of an "imagined state" positively associated with a sense of nation-state belonging.

Lee Jones (2016) echoed Woods' view arguing against the representation of Myanmar as a static, immutable country caught in a "time warp", but advanced the idea that Burmese society is made up of a web of dynamic and evolving social relations, influenced by wider regional and global relations. From 1994 to 2011, under the surface of repeated political stagnation, new ceasefire agreements were signed, resistance groups were demobilized, smugglers and drug lords became the country's top tycoons, the military government's overall control expanded, and popular resentment deepened. The jadeite trade as an informal exchange, together with logging, mining, and comprehensive agricultural projects, has become a key political and economic means in the process of rebuilding the power of the new nation-state by the Burmese military junta.

David Dapice and Nguyen Xuan Thanh (2013) were concerned about poverty and development in Myanmar (2013), pointing out that the historically low economic growth and high poverty rate and the excessive dependence of social development on natural resources have increased social tensions in Myanmar. Moreover, sustained military pressure on minority states that have not effectively surrendered to the Burmese military junta to support the occupation and development of these resource-rich regions is not smart political negotiation, but represents an ancient, near-feudal approach to resource extraction. They mainly obtained official data from the Myanmar government, estimated the opening process, output value, taxation and financial use of jadeite, hydropower, and copper mines, and found that low tax rates or no effective taxation are the key factors causing Myanmar's "resource curse" and the lack of rule of law makes this situation repeat itself in a vicious cycle. They argue that if the economy grows, destructive religious conflicts can be more easily resolved, and if politics are truly progressive it can reduce conflict with nation-states. In this scenario the size and role of the military will also change to support the future economy progress and national unity. Therefore, Myanmar's problems can only be solved by pursuing a political economy of growth, namely effectively through enforcement and fair taxation on the abundant natural resources. Finally, they propose a series of policy proposals to change the status quo, combining increased taxes on mineral resources with better governance to build political unity and market-based economic progress.

Global Witness' investigative report launched the idea that Myanmar's jadeite industry may be the largest resource theft in modern history (2015, 2021). The survey revolved around four main questions: What is the value of jadeite? Who benefits? Who loses? What is the relationship between jadeite and armed conflict? The research team collected data through meetings and correspondence in Kachin State, Yangon, Nay Pyi Taw and Mandalay in Myanmar and various parts of China from February 2014 to September 2015, including more than 400 public officials and industry representatives and community members, followed by an integrated analysis. The study found that Myanmar's jadeite mineral resources are mainly controlled by the families of senior officials of the Myanmar military government, arms control companies, crony companies

and ceasefire agreement groups, while the vast majority of Kachin people are deprived of power and profit from the jadeite resources originally produced on their own land, which is an important reason for its long-term civil war with the military government. Therefore, the Burmese authorities should continue to advance the rules and requirements of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) to prioritize the jadeite industry in peace negotiations with the Kachin (KIA/KIO), while the U.S. International donors represented by sanctions should continue to exert pressure on the implementation of EITI through the leverage of sanctions. To this end, targeted solutions are proposed for the Myanmar government, donor governments, international financial institutions and other partners of the Myanmar government, KIA/KIO, jadeite mining and trading companies, and current or potential international investors in Myanmar.

Renaud Egretreau (2017) used ethnographic methods to describe the migration of many Muslim groups originally living in Rakhine State in western Myanmar due to political and ethnic oppression since the 1980s. They gradually came to Mandalay to engage in the gem and jade trade, and continued east across the border to Ruili, China, where they found a new "paradise" of life through working as "middlemen" in the China-Myanmar jadeite trade and religious asylum. He believes that the reasons for this migration are firstly to seek better job opportunities and the attractiveness brought by the thriving business environment and prospects, and secondly, the discrimination and exclusion of Muslims in Myanmar society. Their survival in the border world, consists of actively shaping "neighborhood relationships" and becoming "useful neighbors" and "important outsiders" for Chinese businessmen. It is followed by a separate paper by Renaud Egretreau (2011) dismissing Western-led international sanctions as failing to stem the trade in Burmese gemstones. Due to the violent suppression of the "Saffron Revolution" in 2007 by the Burmese military government, and the increasing source of income provided by Myanmar's various gemstones, including jadeite, for the Burmese military rule, the European Union, the United States, and Canada successively promulgated the JADE Act to sanction the export of Myanmar gemstones to these countries. However, after the promulgation of the sanctions bill, the export sales of Myanmar gemstones did not decline, but surged. This is because the military government signed a fragile ceasefire agreement with ethnic rebels such as Kachin, Pa'O, and Shan in the 1990s, which gave birth to trade routes from gemstone mines to third parties. State-run conglomerates, Burmese oligarchs close to the military elite and a slew of foreign dealers have the upper hand; Last but not least China's frenzied demand for jadeite gave a tremendous boost to the trade. He is of the opinion that imposing the Kimberley Process model for tackling Africa's "blood diamonds" on Myanmar's gemstone development would be difficult, if not impractical. In contrast "creating an independent multinational regulatory body to track Burmese gemstones, starting with rubies and encouraging responsible and accountable corporate practices, especially at the local level, would be a constructive start."

Henrik Kloppenborg Møller (2018, 2019) used ethnographic methods to study the trade, the carving and the use of jadeite, discussing how the armed conflict in Myanmar, Chinese policy and economic growth, cross-border trade networks, social relations, new technologies and the materiality of jadeite itself build the jadeite market. Based on ontological observations of jade, he deployed the conceptual tools of spectrum and spectre to discuss jade in China as an object of economic investment, money laundering, and payment for illicit transactions; as a symbol of national identity and cultural sophistication; as an imaginative technique and an animated agent, it interacts with humans through processes of absorption, transmission, stimulation and shielding. He believes that the rapid expansion and contraction of the jadeite market, as well as the symbols and debates carried by jadeite, all make jadeite the object of debate and negotiation on meaning, values and morality in the changing Chinese market economy. This is also the way he discusses ontological jadeite, that is, the cognitive method of using "analogies" or "metaphors" in Chinese philosophy to recognize natural objects, so that he hopes to reflect on the understanding and interpretation of modern China.

Yi Ma (2023) conducted an ethnographic study on the jadeite market in Ruili on the China-Myanmar border, principally discussing how *qualia*, qualities, and quality-like variables of commodities, are both constitutive of a market and produced by it. By looking at the heterogeneity of a market, this research also explains how a concrete market is configured, practiced and negotiated by a diverse group of actors and agents such as states, market organizations/unions, firms, trading specialists, and street peddlers, and the specified commodities. She argued that "*qualia*" (Munn 1986) as qualities, and quality-like variables of commodities, in the process of market practice, are constantly made and remade through market agency the mutuality of heterogeneous actors and agents in a market setting (Callon 1990, 1998, 2021). In practice, the "*qualia*" of jadeite are constitutive of market management and the economics/knowledge of the market (Callon 1990,1998). Her research insights have contributed to the epistemology of market.

Tao Hsu et al. (2014) studied the statistics of China's jewelry industry since 1978. Through comparative analysis with GDP growth, investment and consumption growth, luxury brand expansion and other data, they found that China is already the global center of jewelry manufacturing and a fast-growing consumer market, and the gem and jewelry industry shows huge growth potential. While rising labor costs in China have created challenges for manufacturing, it has also led to increased domestic consumption of luxury goods, including jewelry. As Chinese citizens continue to migrate en masse from rural areas to cities, the greatest potential for growth lies in inland urban centers. Chinese consumers are becoming more gem and jewelry savvy and buying savvy. They have a keen sense of value and brand trust and have become more open to contemporary and western designs and materials. At the same time, technological advancements in manufacturing have led to higher quality standards and lower labor costs, enabling China to meet growing demand in global and domestic markets.

3.1.3 Literature Review about the Research on the Value Production and Trade of Jadeite

The existing literature provides very meaningful basic information on the value production and trade of jadeite, but there are also some limitations.

In the relevant research in China, the value production of jadeite is mainly framed and understood from the perspective of natural science and economics. Many documents show that Chinese domestic academic circles mainly classify jadeite into internationally accepted gemology and mineralogy categories. They use physical and chemical properties to distinguish the grade of jadeite and continue to try to set price range criteria to guide trade activity in the market. On the one hand, these studies may reflect the guiding results of the Chinese government's emphasis on natural science, and on the other hand, they may also reflect the neglect of social science research on actual trade activities, which may lead to a disconnect between "standards" and the market. Existing studies on the value of jadeite culture are limited to the interpretation and application of the connotation of traditional jadeite culture, and there is no research specifically discussing jadeite culture itself. The studies on the jadeite market are all economic countermeasure research, and they are research on industrial problem countermeasures for the government to govern the jadeite market and does not include observations from the perspective of other key players in the market. Even so, these studies talk about the market in terms of the market, treating sellers and buyers as indiscriminate merchants and consumers, and there is even less discussion of the Myanmar market. The jadeite trade is originally a transnational trade, with Myanmar and China each occupying a section of the trade chain. If we only discuss the Chinese market, while not paying attention to the Myanmar market, and not systematically discussing the context that affects the market, how can the countermeasures and suggestions for government governance be effective? This also confirms that during my fieldwork, whenever I met interlocutors from functional government departments, they were always troubled by the same problem, that is, the dilemma of jadeite market governance.

Research on the jadeite trade lacks an overall discussion that takes both Myanmar and China into account. The research data from the perspective of economics is sparse, and almost all of them are the collation and interpretation of second-hand data, and there is a lack of specific field investigations. The research data from the perspective of history is relatively detailed, but they do provide any insights in the contemporary context. The two papers from Zou (2005) and Gu (2007) only addressed two small problems. However, jadeite has a long history and far-reaching influence, and many problems urgently need the attention of the historians. The research from the perspective of anthropology is even weaker. Although Zhou Jinglun's autobiography (1989) is included in the category of anthropological literature, in fact he did not use anthropological theoretical methods. At present, there are only two scholars involved in the anthropological research of jadeite trade. One is Wen-Chin Chang's series of studies on the trade activities and trade

networks of Yunnan people in Myanmar, Taiwan, Hong Kong and other places from 1962 to 1988 (2004, 2006, 2013, 2014). However, the value production of jadeite is not the topic she focuses on, and her research is limited to the special period when China closed its borders and does not involve the previous historical stage and the subsequent major change stage. The other is Li Rui (2019). Her research involves historical and current jadeite flows in the Tengchong area, but she discusses a question about the relationship between the flow of materials in a certain place and the social changes in that place. However, the flow of jadeite in Tengchong is only a node on the overall flow line of the material, and the flow characteristics among other nodes and between nodes are completely different from it. Therefore, she still follows the small society, relatively isolated, and traditional economic anthropological research perspective when she studies and interprets. Then it is inevitable to ignore the factors from Myanmar, the factors of power competition among nation-states, and the factors of power competition between the state and localities, which are the most important reasons for affecting the flow of jadeite, and perhaps the main reason for shaping the relationship between jadeite and social changes in Tengchong. Therefore, most of the literature of Chinese scholars focuses on the applied research of the domestic jadeite market and the historical research of the jadeite trade, with less theoretical exploration, and there is still no complete investigation of the entire chain of jadeite commodities.

The characteristics of relevant research outside China are different from Chinese sources, and can be divided into two stages, the first and the latter, with the end of the 1980s as a node. The first stage focused on mapping various phenomena surrounding jadeite as a treasure, mineral, and trade object. Among them, the documents of the colonial period are mainly based on travel notes and investigations of the British colonial authority to explore the area where the jadeite deposits are located, while the documents of the military dictatorship period after the independence of Myanmar consist mainly of mineralogical records. Most of these documents are narrative perspectives written by the colonists, reflecting their procedures and ways of thinking about exploring unknown areas, things, and ethnic groups in the colonies, and providing valuable early textual materials for anthropological research on the value production and trade of jadeite. The literature of the second stage mainly discusses the role of jadeite, Myanmar's most valuable and striking natural resource, in the civil war, ethnic conflicts, poverty, development, drugs, and geopolitics that emerged in the process of building a modern nation-state in Myanmar. The starting point of this stage is the beginning of the transition from military dictatorship to democracy in Myanmar. Due to the closed country of the military dictatorship, research institutions or scholars outside Myanmar cannot enter Myanmar to do field work. After that, Myanmar gradually opened up diplomatic exchanges with other countries, and there were more and more opportunities for Western scholars to cooperate with Burmese scholars in research, and relevant academic achievements gradually emerged. And because northern Myanmar has always been in a situation of frequent military conflicts, especially the area where the jadeite mine is located is often in a firefighting zone, or is controlled by different military power groups, it is still difficult to

carry out field work on the ground. Therefore, the main concern of existing research is the topic closely related to social unrest and change in Myanmar, but the research achievements are not fruitful. Looking at the few literature, we can find two main flaws: one is that the interpretation of Myanmar's plight under the influence of the "resource curse" theory has become the mainstream cognitive perspective. Whether it is the theoretical tool of "ceasefire capitalism" proposed by Kevin Woods (2011, 2016), or survey assessments from Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government (2013) and the UK's Global Witness (2015, 2021), it seems that the resource curse is set as an established fact. The logic of this theory essentially means that things determine the relationship between people, that is, jadeite resources determine the relationship between related ethnic groups in Myanmar. However, a social cognitive approach that only sees things but does not see people often leads to generalizable theories and solutions. For example, the promotion of EITI in Myanmar and the Western sanctions on Myanmar's gemstone industry have had little effect, and even caused side effects - the sanctions affect the poor people in Myanmar who rely on the mining industry for a living, rather than the military elite and political elite who derive the greatest benefit from it (Egreteau, 2011). The second is that almost all of the problems explained by these studies are within the borders of Myanmar, and the investigation scope reaches as far as the border of China. The jadeite trade itself is a matter of economic practice that crosses the borders of China and Myanmar and involves multi-ethnic and multi-cultural interactions. The two countries are indispensable. In addition, when Harvard University and Global Witness assessed the value of Myanmar's jadeite mineral resources, they roughly divided jadeite ore into high, medium, and low grades for estimation, which would cause considerable errors. Because in economic activities, the evaluation criteria of jadeite prices are not divided in this way, not to mention that most jadeite ores cannot accurately judge their prices only from their appearance. I think this is because it is difficult for Western scholars to really enter and understand this special cultural commodity flow line that runs through tradition and modernity, so the estimated data must be far from the real situation.

Among all the literature, only Møller (2019) has attempted fieldwork and ethnographic research across two parts of Myanmar and China, especially discussing the relationship between the materiality, value, and trade of jadeite. But his research topic is to discuss what modern China looks like by explaining the flow of jadeite with an ontological method, and there is no shortage of Westerners' "cultural imagination" of the East in his research. Yi Ma's (2023) anthropological research on the Ruili jadeite market is instructive. Her structuralist discussion of the heterogeneity of interactive units in the market and the interaction of market formation reveals the dynamic complexity of the jadeite market, and the qualia of commodities is indeed one of the most noteworthy features in the jadeite market, which creates the temporal-spatial configuration of the market to a certain extent. However, qualia derive from the human's feeling for the non-human. Even if agents and the country participate in the construction of a quality grading system based on the qualia of jadeite, the formation of the market is not only driven by micro-level

motivation, but macro-level factors cannot be ignored. For example, the judgment of jadeite quality is based on Chinese jade culture, and those groups who cannot understand jade culture but are deeply involved in jadeite trade activities created their own methods. In addition, if we observe it on a longer timeline, we will also get a conclusion that is not quite the same as her judgment. This is because the structure, participants, and motivations of the Ruili's jadeite market are different from other markets in the jadeite trade chain, such as Tengchong, Pingzhou, Mandalay or Yangon. In any event, if Hughes (1996, 1997, 1999, 2012) used science and social investigation, Adrian Levy and Cathy Scott-Clark (2001) used history and in-depth journalism, and Møller (2019) and Yi Ma (2023) used anthropology to understand the jadeite trade, they all contributed to the Western understanding of Chinese jade culture, jadeite trade, Burmese society and Chinese society have made valuable contributions.

Based on the existing research, domestic research almost only focuses on domestic issues, and foreign research almost only investigates Myanmar issues. However, the current jadeite trade has formed a chain of huge value reproduction across national borders, and the concerns of both sides are bound to be related to each other. To address these questions urgently needs comprehensive basic research on jadeite value production and trade activities to help scholars more accurately grasp the background, field, and trend of the problem so that it will be more accurate when answering governance issues.

3.2 Research on the Flow of Things and the Value Production of Commodities

About the value of commodities and the production of value is an important topic in the study of modern economics. Adam Smith (1998), the father of economics, believed that the usefulness of things determines the exchange value. His economic value is based on the social exchange function of things and the degree of measurement of this function, but in fact there are too many examples to prove that the value of necessities of life is often not higher than the value of luxuries. Galliani (2009) proposed a value theory based on utility and scarcity. He believed that utility refers to the attribute of an object that brings happiness to people, and scarcity refers to the ratio between the quantity of an object and its use (Roncaglia, 2009). One of his explanatory dimensions is also the functional dimension, but he does not emphasize social exchange behavior, but emphasizes the psychological dimension of satisfying people's desires and needs, that is, "happiness". The second dimension is scarcity. This concept expands value evaluation from subjective conditions to objective conditions and believes that both subjective and objective factors will affect value. Based on the two conceptual tools of utility and scarcity, he distinguished the types of commodities: one is naturally scarce, and the other can be produced and reproduced. The value of such commodities is related to production costs and necessary labor. It can be seen that Galliani's value theory believes that the value of commodities comes from the degree to which certain needs of people are met and the production practices of related necessary labor. Ricardo (Piero Sraffa, 1962) denied the

importance of the utility factor, arguing that utility does not play a key role in the value production of commodities, and that scarcity and the amount of labor are the key to determining the value of commodities. Then, if scarcity is an essential characteristic of something, the part of value production is measured by the amount of labor.

Marx (1867) criticized and inherited the value theory of Adam Smith and Ricardo and put forward the classic labor theory of value. The starting point of his explanation of commodity value includes both function and exchange form, so the category of value is divided into the use value and exchange value of commodities; the calculation of value is based on the undifferentiated socially necessary labor time condensed in commodities measurement; the origin of value production is attributed to the pursuit of capitalists' inexhaustible desire for surplus value. It can be seen that value and labor are directly related in his theory, and it is impossible to discuss the value and value production of commodities without talking about labor. This theoretical paradigm can almost be used to explain the problem of commodity value production in most industrial societies, and reveals the power relationship in industrial production, that is, capitalists exploit workers—his classic critique of industrial capitalism in the 19th century is also expanded from this perspective.

Different from the macro-orientation of the labor theory of value, the marginal utility theory in microeconomics explores along the utility theory of satisfying individual needs. Turgot believes that value is a subjective thing, and the valuation of different things will change with people's needs. That is to say, things themselves have no inherent value, and the value comes from the needs of the subject. Economists Menger (2005), Barwick (2012), and Wieser (1986), who agreed with the subjective value theory, further researched and developed, and put forward the theory of marginal utility. Marginal utility refers to the degree of satisfaction or benefits consumers get from a unit of new goods or services (that is, the degree of utility). Satisfaction will decrease as the quantity of goods increases, which is diminishing marginal utility. In short, the more goods you own, the less you feel their worth (Blue and Grant, 2014).

It can be seen from the development of the above theories that modern economics discusses value under the premise of functionalism, arguing whether the objective labor factor determines the value, or the subjective utility factor determines the value, or both in the production of value. Regardless of the above positions, they are actually trying to make the intangible value tangible, the abstract value can be estimated in the form of currency, and finally seek the controllability of economic behavior, so as to provide functional guidance for human economic actions. It is true that functionality is a necessary condition for value, but it is impossible to measure the amount of absolute value, because value can be produced, as can demand and satisfaction, and both value and demand are very diverse. As Baudrillard (2014) said, merchants "*always find ways to open indicative roads, induce shopping impulses in the commodity network, and according*

to their own logic, induce, improve, and maximize investment to reach the potential economic limit". Therefore, the richness of the value presented by commodities in real material life is far greater than the conclusion of the simplified dichotomy, especially in the era of globalization, the production and exchange process of a commodity is likely to have surpassed a certain form of labor production and the type, or the nature of the exchange has shifted with the change of consumers, and the "use" of utility may also vary greatly due to the difference of subjects. Then, when we discuss the value of commodities and value production, we should not regard the theories of reductionism and universalism as beyond doubt. Anthropological holism and research methods on economic activities may be more helpful in understanding the complexity and diversity of value and value production.

Commodity exchange is a unique type of material exchange in modern society. It is an economic activity that is produced through systematic labor, uses money as an intermediary, and pursues the accumulation of profits. The economic activities of material exchange in traditional society are mainly carried out around various "gifts". Malinowski (2002) believed that the material in primitive social life is to meet the basic functional needs of human beings. His ethnographic research on the barter exchange in the Trobriand Islands is a model of functionalism research in economic anthropology. He found that people on the archipelago have two forms of exchange that have completely different functions but go hand in hand. One is the barter exchange for the basic needs of material life, called "Gimwali", and the other is the exchange of symbols (gifts), called "Kula". Kula exchange is a symbolic exchange that requires sailing and forming a large and closed loop between tribes. One of the principles of exchange is delay, that is, giving and returning the gift are not carried out at the same time, and the return of the gift lags behind the gift; the second principle is that the exchange may not be equivalent, which is determined by the gift-returning party; the third principle is that the transaction cannot be canceled. The process of Kula exchange is accompanied by a series of complex myths, witchcraft, and rituals, making the "gift" full of symbolic meanings of tribal culture. Finally, in the exchange cycle of the Kula circle, power, prestige and tribal alliance of the chieftain were generated.

Mauss (Yan, 2000) further investigated the three exchange phenomena of Kula, Gimwali and Tonga, and believed that gift exchange follows the principle of "whole gift", and the process is promoted by three stages of giving, receiving, and giving back to form a reciprocal relationship. This principle is based on an obligation that cannot be refused, theoretically voluntary but practically passive. He associated gift exchange with "spirit" and "mind" and emphasized the importance of factors such as "prestige", "honor", and "power" (Mauss, 2002). In addition, he also thought that daily gift exchange can be derived from other types of exchange, such as the exchange of kinship, marriage, social relations, and so on. Through the research on gifts, Mauss (2002) has put forward the proposition that there is no market, transaction, sale, or even contract in human society.

He found that the gift itself is likely to have no functionality, so the exchange does not fully follow Kant's "economic rationality" principle, questioning functionalism.

Based on Mauss' research (2002), Sahlins (2009) divided gift reciprocity exchange into three types: general type, equilibrium type and negative type. He believes that the concept of reciprocity associated with gift giving and the eager desire to return the gift enhance the attraction between individuals in a social group, thereby promoting the internal connection of the social group. Therefore, the value of gift exchange also includes enhancing the cohesion of social groups.

Structuralist anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss (Peng, 2010) analyzed the hierarchical relations and institutions of society through the exchange of women among related social groups and extended the gift exchange theory to the kinship system. He pointed out that both the exchange of women and the exchange of food were means of ensuring and expressing the union of social groups, so that the two phenomena can appear together or separately, and that both are processes of the same type (and are generally regarded as both aspects). Although the context and nature of marriage exchange and food exchange diverges greatly, for a social group, the "complementarity" of the two is the same. There is a fundamental difference between the women who are exchanged and the goods and services that are also exchanged: women are biological individuals, that is, natural products of natural reproduction by other biological individuals; on the other hand, goods and services are manufactured (or activities performed with technology and artifacts), that is, social products produced by technical actors on the cultural plane (Levi-Strauss, 2006). According to his analysis, whether it is a woman as a biological individual or an item produced by labor, the form of exchange and value measurement are not determined by use value, but by the way of thinking in social culture.

Bateson (2001) clarified the difference between gifts and commodities and found that the two operated along different principles. In the gift system, the relationship between gift giving and reciprocation is expressed as a relationship of identity and recognition between participants in the exchange, although in some cases in a personalized form. In principle, it should satisfy the established relationship formed between the relevant clans and relatives. The commodity system follows the commodity circulation relationship and trade principles, and most of them take the identity of individuals as the form of expression. Commodity exchange only needs to satisfy the supply and demand relationship and the principle of interest in social life. Bateson's distinction between gifts and commodities actually also distinguishes the difference in the source of value of the two. The former is the common value of social groups, while the latter is more of an individual value judgment.

The reason is that the exchange of commodities in modern society is mediated by currency, and people's pursuit of value has long surpassed meeting basic living needs or

conforming to social value norms and has even shifted from the material exchanged to money as an intermediary, which was not the case with gift exchange in pre-modern societies. Considering the typical characteristics of indirect and mediated material exchange in modern society, Simmel (2007) defined the concept of value in *Philosophy of Money*, pointing out that value is the result of the commensurate intensity of two demands, and this commensurate form is an exchange of sacrifice and gain. This definition emphasizes the objectivity of value, and advocates that value is endowed, so the things that carry this exchange value and value exchange can be called commodities.

Appadurai (2013) agreed with and reiterated Simmel's point of view, but he believed that from the perspective of the overall economic activities of human society, it does not matter whether there is currency as an intermediary for material exchange, since all things with the spirit of exchange can be included in the concept of commodities, then there are also commodities defined by Simmel in pre-modern society. He then strengthened this argument by synthesizing the cases of multiple scholars. At the same time, Appadurai broke the previous research theory and proposed that commodities, like people, also have social life, and advocated that in terms of methods, we should pay attention to the entire life course of commodities from production, exchange, distribution, and consumption. According to this theoretical method, it is not necessary to distinguish between commodities and gifts in terms of function, and the focus of attention is to examine the life change process of the material itself under different time and space value systems in economic exchange activities.

Although Sidney W. Mintz's research (2014) on sugar came out a year earlier than Appadurai's *The Social Life History of Things*, it reflected the ideological resonance of anthropologists. He used sufficient historical documents to outline the life history process of sugar from seasoning and medicine before the 15th century, to luxury goods and decorations after the 15th century, to mass daily consumption and industrially produced commodities after the 17th century, which was accompanied by the primitive accumulation of early capital, slavery production and the development and changes of social forms, reflecting the power relationship between the colony and the suzerain country. Mintz' research (2014) suggests that the exchange of objects can transcend the distinction between commodities and gifts, the content and specific manifestations of value will change according to the role of objects in specific social fields, and value production is closely related to power. Referring to Mintz's research, we will find that commodities in modern society may have currency exchange types, social exchange types, or both currency exchange and social exchange types, so the power relationship in the production of value has been subject to expansion and complexity.

In addition, Bourdieu (2017) made a series of distinctions within the concept of "capital" and believed that cultural and social capital can be expressed as symbolic capital, which can be transformed into political capital and economic capital through human practical

activities in a certain field. The key trait that embodies differences in value judgments, namely taste, can separate social classes (Bourdieu, 2015). Bourdieu's theory and critique have made considerable contributions to our understanding of contemporary concepts such as capital, power, and social distinctions: how all kinds of power are transformed into capital, how all kinds of capital empower people, how capital produces value, how the ability to judge value classifies people in society, and so on. The exploration of these deep-seated concepts brings extremely profound inspiration to the question of value and value production in material exchange in modern society or commodity exchange in the sense of Simmel and Appadurai.

In the face of abundant real cases, economists must admit that the value of commodities is difficult to evaluate by means of reduction, especially in the context of globalization as the problem of commodity value production has become highly complex. The theory of global value chains has made an important contribution to distinguish and criticize what kind of power or capital can enter the value production system and obtain income returns, while asking whether it is fair and reasonable, whether it is sustainable, etc.

It was Michael Porter (1985) who first proposed the concept and analysis method of the value chain. He pointed out that the value chain is a high-level logistics model, starting from raw materials as input assets until the raw materials that are sold to customers through different processes. Value-added activities can be regarded as an integral part of the value chain.

Gereffi et al. (1994, 2001) proposed the concept of global commodity chain (GCC), that is, in the context of economic globalization, the production process of commodities is decomposed into different stages, and a transnational production system is formed around the production of a certain commodity, and enterprises and institutions of different scales distributed all over the world are organized into an integrated production network, thus forming a global commodity chain. He divided the global commodity chain into two types: consumer-driven and producer-driven. Then he put forward the concept of global value chain (GVC) based on global commodity chain, and systematically discussed and analyzed global value chain from multiple perspectives such as governance, evolution and upgrading of global value chain, thus establishing the concept and basic theoretical framework of the global value chain. Aiming at how capital and power enter the value production of the global commodity chain, Ribot and Peluso (2003) have developed the 'Access theory', which fully complements the systematic analysis of participants' profit methods and action mechanisms in the global value chain theory. He defined access as the ability to derive benefits from things, including physical entities, persons, institutions, and symbols; these capabilities constitute material, cultural, and political-economic chains, collectively forming "packages" and "networks" that control access to resources; access mechanisms include parallel, complementary, conflicting, sequential, and nested mechanisms. He further explained that rights-based access can be

divided into formal and informal mechanisms. Based on structural and social relationship mechanisms, it can be divided into the ability to access technology, capital, markets, labor and labor opportunities, knowledge and discourse, authority, social identity, and the ability to negotiate with other relationships.

To sum up, when discussing the relationship between the flow of objects and the price of commodities, authors in the past mainly focused on the concept and attributes of value, the reasons for generating value, how to measure the value or the value of monetization, and the distinction between things that flow as gifts or commodities, etc. The reasons for value production, profitability, and price changes are all inseparable from a focus on power. Especially in *Sweetness and Power*, Mintz's (2010) explained the historical process of how the flow of sugar both from a production and consumption perspective evolved from colonial to modern times to and needless to say how in this process the functions and attributes of sugar have been subject to major shifts and changes. In my opinion, the key to observing the flow of commodities in modern society should not be limited to distinguishing the functions and attributes of value, or listing the expanded categories of power, or showing the changes of material attributes in different time and space. In the case of the cross-border flow of jadeite, we can further explore how power works.

In the current post-industrial times, the objects that are regarded as valuable transactions are no longer limited to the types of commodities produced by the European industrial society in the 19th century that Marx criticized. In addition, cultural goods, services, knowledge, emotions, etc. may update and expand the concept of goods. These commodities are likely to be grafted together with material commodities, especially those that are closely related to traditional culture, resulting in changes in the value of commodities and new value proliferation. By discussing the value production process of jadeite, a commodity that is exchanged across multi-ethnic groups and cultures, including both socialized and monetized exchange, different powers affecting the jadeite trade and thus increasing the price of jadeite change significantly can be unpacked. The continuous reproduction of commodity value through the territorialization of power is probably the fundamental driving force and operating mechanism behind the modern society's pull of many substances similar to jadeite from the altar of the traditional exchange system and back to the altar of consumerism.

4 Theoretical Approach

4.1 Methodology of Process Ontology

Ontology is a set of philosophical views on the nature of the cognitive world. It mainly studies concepts such as existence, being, becoming, and reality. Ontology mainly attempts to discuss the highest or most fundamental level in the hierarchy of categories and categories, which Aristotle called 'categories' referring to "class" or "species" or

"genus". In the philosophy of language, these categories are generally divided by substance, property, relations, state of affairs, and event. The methodology of ontology can be regarded as three types of frameworks: substance ontology, relation ontology, and process ontology.

Substance ontology is typified by Aristotle's theory that the assumption of being should presuppose the concept of substance, that the concepts of relation and becoming presuppose the concept of substance (Aristotle, 1974, 6a-8b, 15a-15b), and that relation and becoming must be explained in terms of the substance of the entity (Aristotle, 1994). That is to say, whether it is the internal relationship of the entity, the relationship between the entity and other things, or becoming, it should be premised on and explained by the substance. The first nature of the cognitive object is the substance of the object. Panpsychism, totemism, naturalism, and category theory in anthropology all embody the philosophy of substance ontology. Durkheim and Mauss's *Primitive Classification* (2000) studies the classification systems of Australia, Zuni and Sioux, and China, which embodies the methodological perspective of substance ontology. The two anthropologists believed that the so-called classification refers to the process by which people divide things, events, and facts about the world into categories and species, so that each belongs to them, and determines their inclusion or exclusion relationship. It can be seen that Durkheim and Mauss (2000) discussed classification based on the substance of the object, and the inclusion or exclusion relationship between social categories is not the premise of determining classification, but the characteristics that accompany classification. In these societies, the driving force of classification is collective consciousness, which is an affinity between things and individuals, and collective consciousness is essentially something that is drifting and changing. In addition, the origin theory when defining the concepts of ethnicity, ethnic group, and race also reflects the way of thinking of substance ontology.

The concept of relation ontology can be used to denote a theory of hypothetical relational precedence over interrelated terms and becoming (Renault, 2016), which substitutes substance thinking for relational thinking, not only acknowledging the full reality of relations, but also arguing that relations take precedence over substance. The ontological assumption of anthropology in Levi-Strauss's *Structural Anthropology* (1974) is to observe the research object from the perspective of relationship. The structure he discusses does not refer to social relations and social systems, but refers to the human thinking structure, and the thinking structure is the substance of people and society. As a method, structuralism regards relationships as the origin of a system. Researchers not only need to find out the internal relationships that make a system form a unified whole from phenomena, but also reflect on the relationships between large and small systems. Structuralism also entails dualism, which holds that all relationships are essentially binary oppositions, and each element in the relationship can define its position in society according to the opposition. To use the method of structuralism to study a problem, it is

necessary to distinguish between the conscious structural model and the unconscious structural dimension and to explain the deep structure that dominates the form of expression hidden in the latter social activities and social life. In addition, Barthes' theory of ethnic boundaries (2014) is classified as a constructivist category in anthropological circles, which actually reflects the thinking perspective of relation ontology. He believes that ethnic group identity is not a priori but formed by continuous absorption and belonging in the process of interaction with other ethnic groups. Therefore, ethnic group is not a stable group formed by a fixed cultural foundation.

Process ontology is not a third ontology that is parallel to entity ontology and relation ontology or negates the former two, but partially includes the former two. Substance ontology and relation ontology identify being as self-identity and permanence, arguing that an entity is self-identity from beginning to end and remains unchanged in becoming (Renault, 2016). Process ontology regards difference and becoming as more important features, such as Leibniz's self-differentiation theory (Leibniz, 1991), Hegel's contradiction and contradiction's sublation theory (2010), Dewey's dialectics between tendencies and obstacles (1985), and so on. As an outstanding postmodernist philosopher, Deleuze (1980) especially emphasized that the origin of the world is difference rather than identity, and the connection between different elements of reality resembles a "rhizome" that connects arbitrary points and does not follow a fixed order. He and Guattari (1980) combined anthropological data in *Anti-Oedipus*, and by criticizing capitalism as the deterritorialization extreme of a social production movement, it is the confluence of new large-scale deterritorialization and deterritorialization flows, underlying the methodological thinking of process ontology. In anthropological theory, the methodology of process ontology liberates the analytical perspective from the paradigms of functionalism and structuralism, treats the research object as a unity that is not static, culturally specific, not monogenic, and not dualistic, acknowledges, describes, and explains the reality of a series of generative processes, and argues that processes and their ontological condition are primary. In the literature of Burmese ethnic studies, Mandy Sadan (2013) explains the long-term conflict in Kachin State and the politics and history of Kachin ethnic identity, arguing that the continuous operation of the modern world system has created Kachin State, which fully embodies the thinking of process ontology.

The discussion on the value of jadeite is fundamentally the induction and explanation of the meaning construction of natural materials and the thinking structure and construction process of constructing meaning. Jadeite can be categorized as cultural good, luxury good, a non-necessity of life, etc., because jadeite has experienced a series of value becoming processes since it was recognized as jade and gained cultural significance until today, showing extremely complex value content. This social reality cannot be explained only by the thinking of substance ontology or relation ontology. Process ontology does not negate substance ontology and relation ontology but regards them as moments or stages of

process. Therefore, it is a more suitable methodology for explaining the social actions that occur in the production of jadeite value along different nodes or stages on the timeline of the process. In so doing it analyzes the relationship in the nodes or stages, and uncover the essential value of jadeite, the reproduction of attributes or meanings in value generation, and the changes in production relations. This has important theoretical implications for explaining the value of cultural commodities of the same kind or the cultural value of broader commodities. Therefore, using the theory of process ontology to study a case of cultural commodity value becoming and economic exchange breaks through the cognitive model in traditional economic anthropology research, including the single, small-scale society, relatively closed and static, and separation of traditional and modern economic types and so on.

4.2 Theoretical Paradigm of Territorialization

4.2.1 Definition of Territorialization

The word "territory" in the Cambridge English Dictionary has the meanings of landgrave, domain, possession, land, dominion, realm, field, region, border, area, etc., and is a concept closely related to social space. "-ization" is a suffix added to nouns in English word formation to transform nouns into a verb, so "territorialization" can be understood as the verbing of the aforementioned nouns. These concepts have gained importance in anthropology and human geography, while also widely appearing in the texts of Marxism, neo-Marxist critical theory, postmodernism, and other research texts. Its theoretical paradigm continues to develop in the use of scholars and case discussions but has not reached a comprehensive unified conceptual interpretation.

Territory and territorialization based on a consensus that space has social attributes have captured increasingly the attention of scholars. Foucault's "power and space" theory mainly discusses the relationship between space and body, space and power, space and knowledge, as well as the organization and distribution of space (2001). Using the analysis of the "panoramic prison" and other examples, he pointed out that space is an important mechanism for the practice of power. It is not only a tool for the ruling class to implement social control and power operation but can also reflect and influence social powers and interest patterns, and individuals are exposed to the ubiquitous disciplinary space from body to psychology. The power of spatial discipline is powerful and oppressive. In the space environment, microcosmic power is limited and temporary in relation to the domineering influence of capital and institutions (Foucault, 1975).

Deleuze critically elaborated on Foucault's theory. In *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (1972-1980), co-authored with psychoanalyst Guattari, he analyzed the problem of desire from the perspective of schizophrenia, psychosis and the social development under capitalism, and discussed the ideological connection of economics, psychology, literature, psychiatry, anthropology, history, and other disciplines, while putting forward a series of

philosophical topics. In their work, they used the concept of "deterritorialization" but did not define it clearly. For example, they discovered that Freud's definition of "sexual desire" and "polymorphic inversion" changed people's original understanding of these two concepts. As a result, the former understanding is thus de-territorialized, while the concept "Oedipus complex" that Freud subsequently conceptualized is re-territorialized (Deleuze and Guattari, 1972). At the same time, they also argue that capitalism is the movement of social production stretching deterritorialization to the extreme, producing an unprecedented large-scale deterritorialization and the confluence of deterritorialization flows, while followed by accompanying reterritorialization processes (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987) Deterritorialization and reterritorialization form one of the basic rhythms of capitalist society through axiomatic continuous cycles.

From Deleuze and Guattari's use of the word territorialization, we can find that the core elements of the concept include at least "space" and "power", but it is not clear whether it includes "boundary". That may be because thinkers in the 1970s still relied on what philosophers of the past thought about space. Aristotle (1986) saw space as the way things exist and move, and it is an infinite, eternal, empty region. Descartes thinks that space is the place where everything exists and happens; Kant regards space as an internal, conceptual, transcendental, and essential structure of the subject that is completely separated from the field of experience (Lefebvre, 1991). Due to the philosophical differences in the understanding of space, the concept of territorialization may contain various spatial cognition premises, but there is no doubt that territorialization embodies the actions of the subject, in which a territory is seen as a socialized space. This was on full display in the subsequent social turn of space studies.

Among them, the most mainstream neo-Marxist school focuses on the role of capital on space and the power of structure, mainly based on the research of Castells (1977, 1985), Harvey (1985), Lefebvre (1991), and other scholars. Castells (1977) focuses primarily on the process of capitalist urbanization. He divides the social system into three levels: economic, political, and ideological. The functions of these three levels form three spatial categories: economic (consumption, production, and circulation) space, institutional space, and symbolic (sign) space. Therefore, the basic perspective to understand urban change is the conflict between different classes in the city over the meaning of the city, the meaning of spatial form, and the content of the city. The production of space is closely related to micro-level social movements, and urban social movements are the source of urban change and innovation (Castells, 1985).

David Harvey (1985), like Castells, took urban space as the object of criticism and proposed a space-based three-level cycle theory of capital. He believes that based on the "primary cycle" of capitalist surplus value production and accumulation referred to by Marx, the transformation of urban space and investment in infrastructure are tools to realize what Harvey called the "secondary cycle" of capital. Therefore, the substance of

the urbanization process of capitalism is the urbanization of capital. At the same time, the investment of social expenditure and the consumption of goods are the basis of the "three-level cycle" of capital, which determines the formation of capital such as the reproduction of labor, taxation, and savings, etc., especially in the late stage of capitalism, urban consumption increasingly depends on the provision of urban collective consumer goods. Therefore, space has become an object of consumption, and the consumption process has a greater impact on the spatial structure.

Lefebvre (1991) discussed the concept of ontological space, and his theory of "production of space" believed that "space", as an intermediary and means of capitalist surplus value creation, was produced with intention and purpose. It is dominated by abstract exchange value and transformed by concrete use value. Therefore, urban space is a tool for the ruling class to implement social rule and power operation, a place and product of interest competition, and a political tool for the state to control society. In this context, space has become the target and place of class struggle, and disadvantaged groups will use micro-level social movements to get rid of the control of the state and obtain their own interests, thereby shaping space.

Inspired by the above-mentioned representative scholars who study socialized space, theoretical tools related to space are gradually refined, refined, and characterized into key concepts such as place, locality, and territory. Among them, territory is especially commonly used in research related to nation-states. In fact, the earliest scholar who specifically discussed the concept of territory was Gottman (1973) in the field of geography. By sorting out the evolution process of national territoriality, he believes that human beings have the need to seek a balance between safe havens (closed, isolated) and access opportunities (open, social networks) (Gottman, 1975), so territory is a "psychosomatic device", demarcated by humans and used for specific purposes, subordinate to the political process. On the one hand, Gottman's research explained from the perspective of human psychological dynamics, suggesting the contradiction between the closedness and expansion of the territory. On the other hand, the study takes the nation-state world pattern established under the Westphalian system as the background, which has an important impact on the state-centrism orientation of subsequent related research. Representative scholars include Sack (1986), Taylor (1994, 1995), Cox (2002) and so on.

Robert Sack (1986) believes that territory is a part of social space, and as an active, strategic, and dynamic spatial tool, it reflects and shapes power relations through space, so territory should be regarded as "a regulated-bounded space". Giddens (1987) regards the modern nation-state as a bounded power container, which has the functions of a power container for launching wars or organizing defenses, a wealth container for managing the economy or promoting capital accumulation, a cultural container for stimulating national identity, and a social container function that distributes benefits.

Based on Giddens' definition of nation-state, Taylor (1994, 1995) defines (state) territory as a political strategic tool for social control. When discussing the relationship between territory, state and society, Cox (2002) pointed out that territory is "a space where to seek control or gain the power of control is sought through territoriality, a place defined by power boundaries formed by a certain time section". That is to say, power assigns value to space, thus the space becoming territory, and the fundamental problem of the concept of territory is how people configure and use power through space (Cox, 2003).

The above scholars discuss the concept of territory with the nation-state as the scale. But in fact, in the context of globalization, the construction of space by subject power is not limited to inside and outside the national borders, but may also be cross-border, nested, and multi-dimensional composite spaces. Therefore, many scholars advocate that the research perspective of de-nationalism should be actively encouraged. Agnew's definition (2000) is not limited to national-scale interpretations. He believes that territory is a spatial concept emphasizing the dialectical relationship between power and space and is used to represent the spatial product of human society and its mechanisms trying to control and dominate the process of competition, conflict, and cooperation. This definition weakens the perspective of the national scale and also weakens the weight of boundary elements.

Elden (2005) emphasizes the influence of computing as a governance technology on the formation of the concept of territory. He believes that in addition to the frontier dimension in the territory, there is also a quality dimension affected by measurement (geometry, statistics, etc.) and control techniques (law, monitoring, etc.), so territory can thus be understood as a political counterpart of calculable space. Then, using Foucault's theory of govern-mentality and the genealogy method of "power-knowledge-body", he pointed out that territory is a kind of process, practice, product, strategy and technology on the basis of sorting out the genealogy of Western territory concepts (Elden, 2013). Elden's perspective suggests common features of multiple spatial scales (size) and dimensions (content and distribution of content) of globalization, both physical and virtual. Then, territorialization can be regarded as the process of continuous production and reproduction of heterogeneous properties and the quality of territorial content in composite space through territorial strategy. Most post-structuralist territory and territorialization studies revolve around the core issues of postmodern theory, focusing on issues such as identity, discursive expression, symbolic symbols, and the formation of meaning. For example, Mitchell (2006) believes that territory is a social meaning system produced by the interaction between top-down discourse, policies and initiatives, etc., and bottom-up practice.

The above-mentioned scholars have fully discussed the concept of territory. The focus of debate among them revolves around the notion of "boundary" discussing whether it can be conceived at the same level "space" and "power". In my opinion, the boundary

element cannot be ignored, but it will vary in intensity and type depending on the research object and text context. For example, in addition to national boundaries, physical boundaries also include local boundaries and road boundaries; the boundary of the human body may refer to the skin, or it may refer to the boundary of the range without physical form that can be tolerated in terms of psychological space; the boundary between the digital virtual world and the real physical world is hard to touch but does exist, and so on. The focus of this study includes not only the space between nations, but also local spaces such as provinces, cities, counties, and states, as well as virtual spaces and so on. It can be regarded as discussing the relationship between political, economic, or social and cultural power, while the flow of things and commodity price changes in the composite space of different periods at different spatial scales. Therefore, it is appropriate to use territorialization as a theoretical concept. Territorialization refers to the action process of power's social-spatial strategy; territoriality corresponds to "territoriality" and refers to the substance attribute of territory.

Based on the above analysis and definition of the concept of territory, territorialization refers to the behavioral process of constructing space as a territory, which may be legal, political, economic, cultural, historical, or other (Hogan, 1985). Paasi (2003) divides the process into four stages: 1) territory shaping, 2) symbol shaping, 3) institution shaping, and 4) position shaping. Through this process, natural physical spaces are transformed into territory of power. The concept of territorialization includes the process of deterritorialization and reterritorialization, deterritorialization mostly refers to the disappearance of (national) territoriality in the phenomenon of globalization (Papastergiadis, 2000), and reterritorialization generally occurs with deterritorialization and is based on the reconstruction of space based on deterritorialization (Popescu, 2008). For example, Brenner (1999) defines globalization as the reorganization of different scales, and global territorialization and deterritorialization are two perspectives to understand globalization; globalization is a continuous process of deterritorialization and reterritorialization, in which deterritorialization is the avoidance and destruction of national territoriality, and reterritorialization is the jumping scales or re-scaling of the national territory.

4.2.2 Discussion on the Paradigm of Territorialization Theory in Anthropological Research

In the development process of the concept of territory and territorialization, anthropology as a method provides case inspiration and empirical response for theorists from the perspectives of "small place", microcosm, concrete, action, ethnic groups, and individual cases. On the one hand, anthropological research discusses the territorial competition of power between the state and localities, and between ethnic groups within the space of the nation-state.

For example, the state power of Thailand achieves national reorganization through the establishment of territorial civil administrative units and the power to take over natural resources such as land and forests that originally belonged to ethnic minorities (Geest and Peluso, 1995). Post-Zionism is concerned with the discourse of territorial pragmatism, not with the complete disappearance of territory from the nationality-citizenship debate. It is part of a process of reterritorialization and spatial reconfiguration of political and national identities, rather than a reversal of territorialization (Newman, 2001). In the 1990s, following the reforms of decentralization and state reorganization in Colombia, the constitutional protection of local ethnic political autonomy was granted, but blacks and indigenous people in the Chocó department failed to benefit from the new rights, resulting in violent resistance (Jaramillo, 2014). As for the Karen people the threat posed by the combination of military offensive, economic concessions, and conservation activities by the Burmese authorities has brought state institutions, administration, and management into rebel forests in the southeastern part of the country chasing them away (Woods, 2019). Since Kenya gained independence from colonial rule, the materialization of age-old discourses about the “end of livestock” has been driven by a range of state and non-state actors. Through the process of privatization and commercialization of the national territory, it is combined with the history of territorial division and the introduction of wildlife sanctuaries to create more and more fences. The result of reterritorialization is an existential challenge to the wildlife in and around the Maasai Mara National Reserve, as well as to the Maasai people who depend on the presence of open public lands (Weldemichel and Lein, 2019), etc.

On the other hand, anthropology also discusses the territorialization of power beyond national boundaries, or non-physical boundaries. For example, by drawing on the concepts of desire and territorialization of Deleuze and Guattari (1972, 1987), exploring the emotional responses and attachments of the researchers themselves as “homesick” in Australia and the Czech Republic, demonstrates the extent to which place is a zone of immanence in which a continual play of de- and reterritorialization occurs, thereby implying subjectivity, as produced and transformed through emotional attachment to place, that is, embodiment. By examining the transformation of the global economy in the late nineteenth century (the establishment of a world market through trade and the monopoly through plantation farming), the division and redefinition of territories, and the classification of peoples or “national origins” (the classification of mountain peoples as opposed to peoples of the plains), the study points out that the Naga Hills border of British India between India and Burma is not a homogeneous “remote” place, but is constructed by the colonial territorialization practice of the politics of “cultural difference” and the “other”. Therefore, it should be seen not only as a product of a geographical or political construction, territorialized by the administrative and political practices of the various ethnic states, but also as a space of culture and resources.

When reviewing the discussion of the theoretical paradigm of territorialization in anthropology, it is found that only a very small number of scholars who study political geography sort out these studies for the purpose of application in this discipline. The theoretical paradigm of territorialization is also applied in political geography and geopolitics to discuss the relationship between state and locality, urban change, or power relations between states. There are a lot of gaps in the research on other spatial scales, content attribute dimensions of specific territories, relationships between territory content attributes, and how territories are generated (Liu, Wang, 2019). There are only a handful of related studies in domestic anthropological circles. It seems that only Zhao Xuan's political anthropological discussion (2018) of the territorial view of East Jerusalem can be regarded as research on issues related to territory and territorialization using ethnographic methods. Around the new concept of territory as a practical process, he proposed to re-think the "territory/land" framework of the Palestine-Israel conflict to criticize geopolitical research. He examines the daily power practices of multi-subjects such as ethnic groups, families, and families at the multi-space level, and understands territorial conflicts as struggles for order rather than simple territorial struggles (Zhao, 2019).

In anthropological research, the process of specific power operating in a certain space and implementing the control of natural resources, people and their social relations, wealth capital, culture, ideology, and other domain content attributes is territorialization. Deterritorialization and reterritorialization emphasize the power and competitive significance of the territorial process, and the latter is not a simple coverage or replacement of the former, or a cycle of the two, but the reproduction of various content attributes and the inter-embedding of multi-scale spaces. And there may be intersection, superposition, iteration, re-engineering, etc., depending on the specific situation. Most of the existing research takes the nation-state as an independent unit and the national scale as the starting point, and overlooks transnational, regional, and global capital flows, and power structure changes. As far as the field research of jadeite resources is concerned, only Kevin Woods (2011, 2016) has touched part of it. He noted that the newly expanded "ceasefire territories" are now at least in principle and to varying degrees - under the control of the country's military government. These distinct territories, however, reflect a complex set of power relationships in which state militaries and state officials wield power in arrangements that sometimes overlap or conflict with non-state authorities. These could include groups such as ceasefire groups, armed rebel groups that are still active and paramilitary groups. The result is a multilayered mosaic of political geography, rather than neatly separated territorial entities that can be classified as "government" or "rebel." In this way, military state establishment and control over land, resources, and population should be viewed as a highly contested and dynamic domain within these ceasefire zones. They are processes that include both battlefield enemies and business partners, and the distinction between the two can sometimes be unclear. It can be seen that his research has made an ingenious analysis of the power competition between ethnic minorities represented by Kachin State and the Burmese government in the

territory of Myanmar, showing the process of deterritorialization and reterritorialization of power.

Therefore, this dissertation attempts to present a heterogeneous coupling process set of deterritorialization and reterritorialization through the case study of China-Myanmar jadeite trade. The territorialization process of multiple powers exists in multi-dimensional scales such as between countries, between countries and places, between places and places, between physical space and virtual space, and between the cross-relationships of these space pairs, which continuously re-produces the value of jadeite.

4.3 Research Framework

This dissertation studies how materials that step across tradition and modernity are exchanged, their value that is continuously reproduced becoming extremely expensive commodities. This study also explains how concrete transnational trade activities are heterogeneous and isomorphic by multiple actors in a multi-scale and multi-dimensional space.

Based on fieldwork, it is found that the China-Myanmar jadeite trade presents a pattern and process of continuous role changes, that is, "new spaces are shaped by the power competition of the participants - generating new norms (constructing new structures) and symbols - rediscipline the actions and relationships of the participants". In this continuous operation mechanism, process and order, participants such as countries, institutions, ethnic groups, and individuals are constantly configuring and negotiating in practice, and the value content of the non-human material jadeite is constantly reproduced, recreated, superimposed, and accumulated. As a result, the monetary price of jadeite has reached unprecedented height. Therefore, I use the concept of "territorialization, deterritorialization, and reterritorialization" as an analytical tool to examine the strategy and operation process of multiple power subjects constructing spaces of different natures and scales into territories in order to maximize benefits. Due to the particularity of time and space, the representation of territorialization in each key economic link of jadeite flow is different, constituting a heterogeneous, multidimensional and complex dynamic configuration of international trade as a whole.

Before starting the discussion, I need to provide the general background from two dimensions: First, the main premise of the existence of jadeite consumption demand is the jade culture of the Han Chinese formed in the long historical process. The second is that before China and Myanmar, the two modern nation-states demarcated their boundaries, jadeite trade activities were relatively simple and coherent human economic behaviors that were formed naturally. Then, I first discussed the initial territorialization brought about by the demarcation of the borders between China and Myanmar at the macro level, and its consequences for the construction of the jadeite trade pattern. Next,

based on the existing social-spatial relationship pattern, I built a horizontal and vertical spatial-temporal analysis framework. Horizontally, I trace the flow of jadeite and divide key links to show the dynamic changes on the timeline. Vertically, I study the production, occupation, and control of space by powers in each key link, the competition, allocation, and negotiation relationships among different actors, and the impact of deterritorialization and reterritorialization on the value reproduction of jadeite. The spatial-temporal analysis framework could help to reveal the multi-dimensional hierarchy and dynamic interaction of the overall jadeite trade pattern, to show the nesting or overlapping of different territories, and to uncover that actors may be interrelated across spaces and levels. Such a multi-unit heterogeneous configuration with continuous deterritorialization and reterritorialization, like “rhizome (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987)”, enables the value of jadeite commodities to be continuously reproduced.

To help readers better navigate the dissertation and the main points discussed in each chapter, I provide chapter overviews as follows:

In the first chapter, I set out to discuss how jadeite as a material is acknowledged by the Han Chinese culture and others from the West, and how the most basic jadeite trade process was gradually formed. Next, I discussed that in the field of jadeite trade activities formed naturally, the origin and market of jadeite mineral resources are separated due to the division of nation-state boundaries, and they belong to the space containers of the two nation-states of Myanmar and China. In order to obtain greater benefits, the two countries have adopted different control strategies. This process is the first deterritorialization and reterritorialization of the original actors engaged in jadeite trading activities and their economic relations. As a result, a new scarcity of jadeite is artificially generated on the basis of jade cultural needs.

Next, I discuss the territorialization at different levels of the commodity chain by dividing several key links, such as origin mines, cross-border transportation routes, processing and sales locations, based on the flow routes of jadeite.

In the second chapter, I investigate the competition among ethnic groups in Myanmar around the jadeite mineral resource areas and related ethnic minority-controlled areas. The jadeite mining area is mainly located in Kachin State, and the vast majority of trade activities before the independence of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar were traded by Han people with Kachin and Shan people. However, after the Bamar people, who used to live in southern Myanmar tore up the Panglong Agreement and took control of the state power, they competed with Kachin, Shan, Wa and other ethnic minorities for deterritorialization and reterritorialization in order to achieve actual territorial control. They adopted means such as armed attack, economic competition and cooperation, and a ceasefire agreement for the exchange of mining rights. This set of power relations centered on the discourse of legitimacy, nationalist political demands, and economic

interests of the Bamar government representing the country. As a result, the relevant territories and jadeite resources that originally belonged to ethnic minorities were gradually divided up by the authorities in the process of passive territorialization, and the price of jadeite frequently fluctuated due to wars.

In the third chapter I demonstrate how jadeite's cross-border trade routes are deterritorialized and reterritorialized. The traditional trade route is the overland route from the mines in Kachin State in northern Myanmar to Yunnan, China through the border of the two countries. In order to further control the jadeite resources, the Burmese government authorities opened public auctions in Yangon, the former capital in the south, stipulating that only jadeite ores that have been traded in the public auctions can be legally exported through Yangon Port, while the ancient land route is rendered obsolete and illegal. This set of power relations also focuses on the authorities' discourse of legitimacy, nationalist political demands, and economic interests. But at the same time, China's strategy of closing the China-Myanmar border and opening up the Hong Kong Free Port, Shenzhen Port, Guangzhou Port and other national development strategies also indirectly played a role in attracting and encouraging sea transportation to the detriment of land transportation. As a result of the reterritorialization of trade routes, the spatial pattern of traditional jadeite trade has been completely rewritten. And the value content of jadeite has increased due to the incentives of trade rules and the complexity and number of participating groups.

In the fourth chapter, I elaborate on the territorial competition between Yunnan and Guangdong provinces in China's jadeite market, driven by state forces after jadeite flows into China. The traditional jadeite processing and distribution center used to be in Yunnan. However, due to the redistribution of resources implemented by the Chinese central government in the territory, strategies such as opening or closing ports, policy resource guidance and support, and cultural narratives in the consumer market have been adopted, so that the main jadeite processing and distribution center has been transferred to Guangdong. While Yunnan has transformed into the jadeite major consumer market. In the territorialization of this set of powers, social activities and spaces have achieved a large-scale division of labor under the domination of national power. This is the result of China's policy of actively promoting industrial production and expanding the consumer market. The value content of jadeite has been fully explored, produced, endowed, and realized, and jadeite has changed from a rare precious plaything to a mass cultural consumer product, so the output, sales volume, and price have all increased significantly.

In the fifth chapter, I examine mainly the sales link, that also affects the territorialization of other links, that is, the deterritorialization and reterritorialization of the existing jadeite trade pattern by e-commerce arising from the construction of digital infrastructure. Jadeite e-commerce represented by live streaming has restructured the trade order of the original participants through technological empowerment, crossing national borders,

virtual space and real space. A large part of the participating groups is excluded from entering the field, and the rules as a whole are characterized by more intensity and alienation. The value content of jadeite purchased by consumers has changed from the value based on the value of the object itself and the value of reproduction to new values such as social relations and emotional dependence. The nature of value reconstructed by territorialization expands, and as the value construction reaches bewildering heights leading to dis-embeddedness. As a result, the irrational economy reaches extreme levels of chaos and ultimately leading to chaos and collapse.

The chapters all demonstrate the territorialization of different power sets, the relationship between chapters shows the relevance of the territorialization space at all levels, and overall, it reveals that the value production of jadeite is a process of heterogeneity and isomorphism. Compared with the simplest material production and trade process structure in which traditional freedom occurred, certain powers such as politics, economy, military, culture, and ethnic relations produce and affect space, and dis-embed new key links from trade activities. That is the process of deterritorialization. This presents a new closed loop of labor aggregation, economic behavior norms, and cultural symbols, underlying the process of reterritorialization. The power operation mechanism of deterritorialization and reterritorialization has reconstructed the value of jadeite layer by layer. Although the so-called "added value" is embodied in the price, its content has rich meaning dimensions. Therefore, the reproduction of jadeite value is a configuration of a series of territorialization of power, and the rising price of jadeite is closely related to the fluctuation of territorialization of jadeite trade activities.

5 Research Method

My research method is multi-sited linguistic ethnography, including participant observation and in-depth interviews. The multiple sites are not selected at random, but each site represents the location of the key nodes on the jadeite flow route. The flow route is determined through the cross-validation method, that is, to determine step by step whether there are other flow directions through the degree of exhaustion in the experiential materials of different interlocutors. At the same time, I also used the snowball method to track side branches in specific sites, so that I could observe the horizontal power operation mode and the social network of the participating ethnic groups. The multi-sited ethnography that retraced the jadeite flow process helped me establish a spatial-temporal framework that provided insight into the interactions and relationships of heterogeneous participating units, both human and non-human. I conducted this research method for about 6 years, while paying attention to theories and research paradigms such as the flow of objects, consumer culture, value chain, and social space production.

In fact, before I decided to take the China-Myanmar jadeite trade as doctoral research, I had more than 20 years of experience in the jadeite industry. I came into contact with the jadeite trade because of my father, Yang Deli, who was the principal of a school affiliated to the Yunnan Provincial Bureau of Geology and Mineral Resources. In the 1980s and 1990s, China's government functional departments, factories, hospitals, etc. all had their own unit's schools for the children of employees to receive education. Our family life follows this governmental policy. Both my parents worked in the unit, and I studied in the unit's school since kindergarten. It was not until the early 1990s that Chinese society was further reformed towards a market economy that these schools were gradually reorganized and directly managed by the government education department. At that time, my father led the reform of the school to professional education, transforming it into the first jewelry vocational middle school in Yunnan Province and the first school in the whole of the country. The school teaches students the basics of jadeite and other jewelry, methods of identification, art of carving, marketing and other skills. After graduation, they became the first batch of practitioners with professional skills in the Chinese jadeite market. From then on, my older sister and I we began to learn and gain jadeite knowledge and experience. In addition to being one of the earliest major jadeite knowledge researchers and educators in Yunnan since the end of the 1980s, my father was an "educated youth" in a Dai village in Ruili in the 1970s, nowadays the largest jadeite distribution center on the border area of China and Myanmar. After he retired around the beginning of 2000, he started a large jadeite company, and my family gradually became involved in the jadeite business. In addition, Uncle Timothy Zong, who has a deep friendship with my father, is an expert in discovering, purchasing, and trading gems and jade around the world for a state-owned enterprise under the Ministry of Geology and Mineral Resources of China since the early 1980s. He has a great reputation in the field of China-Myanmar jadeite trade. Therefore, my father's experience and social network in the jadeite industry was shared within the family and have been part of my everyday life since elementary school. Moreover, some of my childhood friends are still in the industry today, and their parents, relatives, and my parents used to be colleagues. In short, I was exposed to the jadeite culture and industry before becoming a researcher. Some of the historical aspects of the jadeite trade activities in this study are also a part of my life experience with my family. I present this experiential material especially in Chapter 4, and in part in other chapters. So, getting into the field was not difficult entirely for me. My interlocutors have been distributed in different places and levels in China's jadeite industry. My father's experience and also my personal experience are critically integrated in the thesis.

However, there is a big gap between rigorous and abstract academic research and everyday life experience, and these empirical materials related to the life history of my family members cannot cover the complete jadeite trade chain. Therefore, before starting the academic research, I first visited several domestic industry seniors who have been in the jadeite industry for nearly forty years, to grasp the overall structure of the current jadeite market based on their knowledge and experience. Under their guidance, I

went to Tengchong and Ruili in Yunnan, and Guangzhou and Pingzhou in Guangdong to conduct pre-field investigations. In so doing gain a first overview of the domestic jadeite market. After obtaining certain materials and experience in the initial preparation and pre-investigation phase, I discovered that not one person, family or enterprise can run through the entire jadeite trade chain or value chain. It is impossible to adopt the traditional ethnographic approach of "big topic in a small place", so I decided to adopt the method of multi-sited ethnography.

When selecting sites, first of all, I divided jadeite into ore, bracelet, ring face, carving, and inlay according to the finished product category. Their trade activities are different according to geographical space. Then, based on the rough trade flow routes of each jadeite category, I compared and observed the correlation between the two groups of classifications, determined the overlapping routes and nodes between them, and marked the location of the main market. Immediately afterwards, I also identified the concentration places of the main jadeite trading formats in the previous experience, as a supplement to the marked markets. From this, I determined the general field sites of multi-sited ethnography: Hpakant, Myitkyina, Mandalay, Nay Pyi Taw, or Yangon in Myanmar; Tengchong, Ruili, Yingjiang, and Kunming in Yunnan, China; Guangzhou, Pingzhou, Jieyang, and Sihui in Guangdong. In the specific investigation, I also considered the situation on the parallel timeline, so I added Chiang Mai, Mae Sai in Chiang Rai Province in Thailand, Tachileik, and Bangkang in Wa State in Myanmar. It should be noted that due to the continuous armed conflicts and my status as a foreigner, the fieldwork of the Hpakant Mine was not possible. I have done fieldwork on all the above-mentioned field sites except Hpakant, and I have been to some field sites many times.

I adopted two ways to enter the field. One is to be directly introduced and recommended by well-known seniors in the industry who already have a social network, and to participate in the observation of trade activities and engage in-depth interviews with interlocutors after obtaining the approval of the introduction target. Next, through the "snowball" method of introducing the next company from the previous company to the parallel node or the field point of the next node in the trade activity, I succeeded in finding the following interlocutor. The second way is to directly present myself in the market, processing factory, and store in the field sites, and sometimes I purchased a little commodity in order to make a connection. My status as both doctoral student and university lecturer played a positive role in the second way, which made it easier for the interlocutors to have a positive impression and a sense of trust in the initial contact. However, when faced with mid-to-high-end goods, or jade carving factories and shops with a thriving business, this method is almost unworkable. Because the merchants in this part of the trade do not care about my identity or the purpose of academic research, as I cannot bring actual transactions and immediate profits for them. However, this also well shows that the jadeite trade is a type of trust transaction based on the relationship among acquaintances. Therefore, the former method is the most effective, especially

when entering some extremely hidden links, while the latter method, as a supplement to the former, can sometimes provide cross-validation for the former interview data.

During the participatory observation of the fieldwork, except for activities in the mines and cross-border smuggling, I mostly participated in the main transaction process of all links. I even traced a huge jadeite ore that once appeared in the Nay Pyi Taw Public Auction, which was identified by me and my interlocutor in the Pingzhou Public Auction a year later. I did not really get involved in the processing, but I watched the big knife cut the jadeite, participated in the discussion on where to cut to get the bracelet, and experienced the disillusionment when the wrong decision was made. For the e-commerce part, I set out to establish a portal website and a live streaming room, although I was not successful in the end. In many cases, I also needed to change my identity and observe from the role of a consumer. Sometimes I will help friends bring goods, or matchmaking to introduce buyers and sellers to each other. In short, I try my best to participate in the process of jadeite trade, so that I am not a researcher (outsider/observer), but more of a participant (insider).

When I gained the trust of the interlocutors, conducting in-depth interviews was not difficult. I used a semi-structured interview method. After some routine questions on the trade activities, and their personal characteristics, I asked them about their personal life history with jadeite as the main factor. The corroboration of in-depth interview data is cross validated through in-depth interviews with other similar interlocutors or interlocutors with similar experience. The group interview method has proven not to be a good choice for jadeite merchants, unless it involves issues of common interests, which are not included in the data used in this study. The smoothness of in-depth interviews is closely related to the many years of experience I have accumulated as a participant in the jadeite industry before engaging in anthropological research and teaching survey interview methods to college students in university.

However, as a researcher, being an insider is not always an advantage, as an insider also faces challenges. On the one hand, during my fieldwork the recurrent oscillation between the two roles of insider and researcher engendered tension and feelings of disconnection. Most of the everyday life experiences that I take for granted are operational, fragmented, and based on the principle of facilitating business operations. These experiences have been deeply imprinted in my cognitive structure, and without conscious self-reflexivity might prevent me from questioning and viewing the daily activities in the jadeite business and culture from a different perspective. On the other hand, the life history of my family and myself is limited in time and space in the larger China-Myanmar jadeite trade. The experiences I have had tend to point to the positive aspects of the jadeite trade. But when I went to Myanmar and Thailand to do field work, the war, refugees, drug abuse, and multi-religion all brought me a cultural shock and made me rethink my initial standpoint. I even once had a deep sense of guilt, which even caused the research to

stagnate. After distinguishing clearly between the emotion of being an insider, I decided that as a researcher, I could indirectly make a difference by generating more in-depth knowledge and insights on the jadeite trade.

Another limitation is the interaction, protection, and return to heterogeneous interlocutors. According to general commodity flow theory and market theory, participants are divided into government agencies, companies, individuals, and so on. However, the types of participants in the jadeite trade are complex, and there are obvious distinctions between ethnic groups, groups, and occupational status. Other commonly used typo-logical classification methods such as gender and age only show characteristics in a certain segment. So, I classify from the perspective of power type. But inevitably, there are often competing interests and even clear conflicts between them. Since the jadeite trade involves commercial secrets, it is not only related to the livelihood of businessmen, but also it sometimes involves the local armed forces of ethnic minorities in Myanmar, which is the most obscure topic they avoid. It is therefore difficult to establish a genuine relationship of trust with interlocutors.

Then, how do I manage these contradictions in my fieldwork and still obtain credible information? In addition to the aforementioned insider advantages, I also adhere to the following fieldwork principles. The first is to always openly and transparently inform them of my identity as a researcher and the subject of my research, and fully respect their willingness to accept interviews and observations. The second is to keep the information of the interlocutors strictly confidential, especially those with conflicts of interest. In this dissertation, I have also concealed the real names of the interlocutors, and blurred some information that is likely to cause readers to be seated, so as to better protect their privacy. The third is to carry out research from the standpoint of promoting the fair and sustainable development of China-Myanmar jadeite trade. In fieldwork, different types of interlocutors have very different concerns and interests. The Kachin people would ask me how can I protect their own natural resources so that they can be the real beneficiaries? Government staff in Yunnan would ask me how to curb jadeite smuggling? The jadeite live streamers would ask me how to communicate with fans to sell more jadeite goods? Refugees would ask me when will they be able to return home? The managers of jadeite companies would look to me to predict market trends. Consumers would ask whether the jadeite they bought are real or fake, and whether the price was fair? etc. Most of the time I could not give a definite answer, I could not take care of all the concerns, and I am concerned that my answer may affect the actions of the interlocutors. The result of finding a win-win situation for the participants is to make the relationship between each other fairer, but this will not be immediate and requires long-term systematic efforts. So, I stick to this goal and standpoint when thinking about research questions, interview content, and questioning methods, and it allows me to make a certain contribution in the long run. In addition, the current expectations and needs of the vast majority of participants are generally to promote business and obtain economic benefits. So, I tried

my best to help the interlocutors to facilitate the transaction at their level according to the insider's experience and rules, although the transaction did not happen every time. To sum up, the China-Myanmar jadeite trade is a field that has so far not yet been deeply explored in academic research. The multi-sited ethnographic and document research method I adopted is a preliminary attempt to better understand this research topic, which are bound to be omissions and deviations in the details but does not affect us to have a comprehensive overview of the jadeite trade focusing on different nodes in China and Myanmar where the different territorialization processes unfold and subject to change across space and time.

Chapter 1 The Material Properties of Jadeite, Early Flow and Spatial Separation of Production and Consumption Areas

This chapter will first discuss how jadeite as a material was recognized by the Han culture and others from the West, and how the most basic jadeite trade process was gradually formed. Then, I will describe the following process in detail, namely that the division of nation-state boundaries separates the production area from the mineral resources of the jadeite market, respectively belonging to the space containers of the two nation-states of Myanmar and China. In order to gain more benefits, the two countries have adopted different governance strategies. These strategies reflect the first deterritorialization and reterritorialization processes of the original actors engaged in jadeite trading activities and their economic relations. As a result, a new scarcity of jadeite is artificially generated on the basis of jadeite cultural needs.

1.1 The Natural Material Properties of Jadeite

No matter in the Chinese or English context, there will always be several keywords: jade (玉, yu), jadeite (硬玉/翡翠, ying yu/fei cui), feicui (翡翠, fei cui). They are often used interchangeably in discussions during the fieldwork, or in the writing of documentary materials. Following the classification of the linguist Saussure (1916), it seems that the signifier "jade" symbol carries a broad meaning and represents all kinds of jade³. "Jadeite" and "feicui" are used as synonyms, while "jadeite" is often used in opposition to "nephrite (软玉, ruan yu)" to demonstrate its own particularity. But along with these inclusive or exclusive uses there is a strong emphasis on the correspondence between the symbol "feicui (翡翠, fei cui)" and the substance specifically referred to. So, what exactly is jadeite⁴?

³ The linguist Saussure proposed in his *Course in General Linguistics* that the signifier and the signified constitute a sign. A signifier refers to a symbol with a specific meaning (usually expressed as a sound or image), which can arouse people's conceptual associations to specific objects, and is a type of expression of symbols. The signified refers to the inner nature of things and the meaning represented by symbols.

⁴ Since the Chinese world uses the symbol "翡翠 (fei cui)" to represent it, but the English world almost uses the symbol "jadeite" to represent it, so this article tentatively uses "jadeite" to refer to the substance.

1.1.1 Jadeite in the Cognition of Others

From the perspective of natural science cognition, jadeite is a mineral with specific physical and chemical properties. The most representative scholar who studied jade in the early days was mineralogist Alexander Damour (1863) in Lyon, France. He began to measure the physical and chemical properties of Hetian jade and jadeite samples obtained from China in 1846. However, Damour had never been to China or Myanmar, and his jadeite samples are said to have been obtained through some of his friends, so this representation is certainly not flawless. He found that jadeite is a complex single-chain pyroxene mineral, expressed by the chemical formula $\text{NaAlSi}_2\text{O}_6$. In addition, the Mohs hardness⁵ of jadeite is about 6.5 to 7, which is harder than Hetian jade with a hardness of 6 to 6.5, so he named the former "jadeite (硬玉, ying yu, which means the hard jade)" and the latter "nephrite (软玉, ruan yu, which means the soft jade)" in 1863 (Damour, 1863). Soon after, the International Mineral Association (IMA) clearly announced in the new substance discovery table that nephrite (tremolite-actinolite) was a known mineral variety, while jadeite was a newly discovered mineral variety, and at the same time, they adopted the names jadeite and nephrite. Although jade and jadeite have almost no use value or exchange value in the western world, however, because of Damour's pioneering research and the naming of "mysterious substances" from different cultures, as well as the certification of the International Specialized Research Association, the concept symbols of "翡翠 (feicui)" from Eastern culture that did not have the right to speak in the scientific world at that time disappeared and replaced by jadeite.

There are generally two categories of mixed or ambiguous uses of related concepts at present. One category is that the world-wide single-chain pyroxene minerals containing $\text{NaAlSi}_2\text{O}_6$ are called jadeite. Taking this as a standard, there are more and more places producing "jadeite" in the world, including Russia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Guatemala, the United States, and other places besides Myanmar. The second category is to call all jade other than jadeite (硬玉, ying yu) nephrite (软玉, ruan yu), so jadeite seems to become a mineral that is completely different from most other jade. However, jadeite from other origins has been proven to be different from Burmese jadeite in terms of the crystal shape, size, and configuration structure. Judging from the visual physical properties such as texture, color, and cracks, most of them are relatively rough and cannot reach the level of gemstone, so they are not qualified to be part of the concept of jadeite acting as a cultural commodity. In addition, the meaning of the concept of nephrite jade in the Chinese jade culture system is equally vague and ambivalent. The Hetian jade tested by Damour was a variety of jade. Although the main component of other jade species is also tremolite-actinolite, the proportion will vary depending on the variety, while the visual perception is also different. What is more, the Han people do not distinguish jade species

⁵ Mohs scale of mineral hardness is a qualitative ordinal grade, 1-10, using the relative hardness of minerals to divide the mineral hardness standard. It was proposed by German mineralogist Friedrich Mohs in 1812 and is one of several definitions of hardness in materials science, some of which are more quantitative. The Mohs hardness scale is a relative standard, not proportional to absolute hardness.

by softness and hardness. Otherwise, Hetian jade would not be able to highly surpass Xiu jade, Lantian jade, Dushan jade, etc., and became "imperial jade" in history. If it is only divided according to hardness, the hardness of agate jade is 7, which is not only harder than Hetian jade, but even harder than some jadeites. As a matter of fact, in Chinese culture the naming of various types of jade does not follow the Western mineralogy classification method but is rather based on a local, cultural and sensory descriptive classification system. Therefore, "jadeite" or "nephrite" is a signifier, and an identification method in defining and representing Chinese jade culture, developed by Westerners.

In fact, it is debatable to regard the material composition of jadeite as $\text{NaAlSi}_2\text{O}_6$ as the chemical composition, or even as sodium aluminum silicate in this expression, because the expression or chemical symbol is the result of a sufficient simplification of the chemical composition of the substance. With the development of mineralogical research, the jadeite samples that can be detected are no longer limited to the characteristics of the one piece investigated by Damour, while in the meantime the general understanding of jadeite is also deepening.

First of all, the $\text{NaAlSi}_2\text{O}_6$ symbol refers to the ratio of the four atoms of sodium Na, aluminum Al, silicon Si, and oxygen O in the jadeite crystal (Jadeite), which is 1:1:2:6. It cannot represent the configuration structure as the structure is contingent on these elements in the crystal, that is, the spatial distribution of the elements, their relationship with each other and the shape of the lattice. Second, jadeite is a crystalline configuration composed of crystal chains composed of basic units and then randomly composed of crystals (Yang, 2014). Among them, the basic unit is a silicon-oxygen tetrahedron, that is, a silicon atom located at the center of a regular tetrahedron composed of four oxygen atoms. The oxygen atoms at the two corners of each silicon-oxygen tetrahedron are shared with the other two regular tetrahedrons, so that one unit can be connected with the front and rear units to form a silicon-oxygen single chain. Numerous silicon-oxygen single chains are combined by sodium and aluminum elements to form crystals.




Image 1: Silicon-oxygen tetrahedron and silicon-oxygen single chain.

Source: The author draws based on literature and fieldwork interview data.

Jadeite crystallization is very complicated. A lot of data use Na_2O , Al_2O_3 , SiO_2 to represent the chemical composition of jadeite, or think jadeite is a mixture of these oxides, which is actually wrong. These oxides do not exist in jadeite.....Single crystals in jadeite crystals are generally rare, and they are all polycrystalline aggregates, such as granular, short columnar, long columnar, and fibrous. Some crystals are big, some are small, and they are combined together, which directly affects our visual effect. Jadeite with large crystals looks rough, while jadeite with small crystals looks delicate, so it will be beautiful, and the price will be high.⁶

Third, there are a large number of isomorphism substitutions in jadeite crystals (Yang, 2014). Isomorphism is a common phenomenon in minerals produced in nature. It refers to the position of certain ions, atoms, or molecules in the crystal structure, slightly occupied by other ions, atoms or molecules with similar properties, however, the crystal structure type, chemical bond type, and the balance of positive and negative charges of ions remain unchanged or basically unchanged, and the physical properties of the crystal have certain changes⁷. In $\text{NaAlSi}_2\text{O}_6$, aluminum ions are replaced by chromium ions to become $\text{NaCrSi}_2\text{O}_6$, that is, sodium chromium pyroxene, which is another mineral called tielongsheng (铁龙生, dragon born from iron). Similarly, when sodium ions are replaced by calcium ions, because of the uneven charge, they will be replaced by magnesium ions, ferrous ions, or ferric ions, and become omphacite, which is the third mineral called mocui (墨翠, black jadeite). Therefore, a piece of jadeite ore may contain three main mineral components of jadeite, sodium chrome pyroxene, and omphacite at the same time. In most cases, jadeite accounts for the majority, but the specific proportion is full of uncertainty. Fourth, jadeite also contains secondary minerals such as hornblende (several subspecies), chromite, albite, limonite, and hematite, as well as chromogenic minerals and chromogenic ions (Yang, 2014). The higher the composition of the three main minerals, the purer the jadeite and the higher the price. The secondary minerals will increase the "impurities" of the jadeite and affect the beauty. The color-causing minerals and color-causing elements will affect the green, red, purple, blue, white, and related color variations. So many minerals form crystals, and the crystals are arranged and combined to form a piece of jadeite, which is by no means covered by the symbol " $\text{NaAlSi}_2\text{O}_6$ ".

In short, the composition and configuration of jadeite are quite complicated, which is very different from that of common gemstones. Gemstones are often crystals composed of single molecules or single elements. For example, diamonds are composed of carbon C elements arranged and combined according to specific rules, and the color-causing elements contained in them lead to pink diamonds, yellow diamonds, etc. Ruby and sapphire are composed of Al_2O_3 molecules arranged in a specific regular structure, but

⁶ Interview time: 10/2017. Interlocutor: YDL. Location: Yunnan Geology, Minerals and Jewelry Trading Center.

⁷ The isomorphism of crystals was discovered and named by German chemist Eilhard Mitscherlich.

the color-causing elements of the two are different. The crystalline crystals of gemstones are often single crystals, for example, crystals are hexahedrons composed of SiO₂. What we can conclude from the knowledge system of mineralogy is that jadeite is a combination of many minerals and polycrystals, which can be identified when subdivided into elements. However, after recrystallization, recrystallization metamorphism, hydrothermal metasomatism, dynamic metamorphism (Yang, 2014) and other natural miracles, the combination of various elements will produce a wide range of configurations, and this increases significantly the uncertainty of the final result. Therefore, no matter the texture or color of a piece of jadeite, it is definitely not evenly distributed. This feature can be described as nonhomogeneity, and these nonhomogeneous substances can be combined together to form jadeite naturally, that is, a heterogeneous existence.

1.1.2 Jadeite in The Cognition of Han Chinese

The Han people have developed a complete local knowledge system for recognizing jadeite, identifying its advantages and disadvantages, and judging its value. The knowledge is a classification system based on the intuitive aesthetic experience of jadeite as the basic category, in which visual assessment constitutes the key experience, sometimes combined with tactile, or auditory sense, while synaesthesia is often mobilized. At the same time, the Han people will also refer to symbols of common everyday objects in the local dialect with similar characteristics through analogy or metaphor. They use refinement and visualization to carry out sub-classification and present the horizontal relationship between some basic categories. Ultimately, the knowledge is characterized by a specific jargon, which is applicable to the evaluation of all jadeite product categories. In the jargon, the criteria for evaluating the quality of jadeite are divided into the bonus dimensions of *zhong* (种, type of delicacy), *shui* (水, water/ feeling of transparency), *se* (色, color), *di* (底, background), *guang* (光, light), and *gong* (工, carving), and the deduction dimensions of *lie* (裂, cracks), *xuan* (癣, ringworm), *mian* (棉, cotton), and *zang* (脏, dirt).

Zhong (种, type of delicacy) refers to the compactness of the jadeite, which is the size of the crystal grains that make up a piece of jadeite and the degree of tightness between them. The judgment of *zhong* does not consider what mineral components are in it, nor does it say the shape of the crystal, but only whether it is "cu (粗, rough)" or "xi (细, fine and closely woven)" as a whole. Cu (粗, rough) means that the crystal particles are relatively large and loosely bonded, while fine (细, xi) means that the crystal particles are relatively small and tightly bonded. The finer the better, the finer type is called *zhonglao* (种老, old delicacy), while the rougher one is called *zhongnen* (种嫩, tender delicacy), and not *zhongxin* (种新, new delicacy)..... There is no way to quantify the quality

of delicacy. There are too many types of delicacy. From good to bad, it is probably bolizhong (玻璃种, glass type), bingzhong (冰种, ice type), nuozhong (糯种, sticky rice soup type), douzhong (豆种, pea type), cidi (瓷底, porcelain background), shihuidi (石灰底, lime background), and goushidi (狗屎底, dog shit background). There are also some types called huaqingzhong (花青种, scattered green type), lanshuizhong (蓝水种, blue water), jinsizhong (金丝种, golden thread type), youqingzhong (油青种, oil green type), baidiqing (白底青, white background green), and ganqingzhong (干青种, dry green type), which are described with color, just like longzhong (龙种, dragon type) is a positive green jadeite that fluoresces like a glass type.....

Shui/shuitou (水/水头, water/water head/) are the feeling of the transparency of jadeite, but it not exactly transparency, which refers to the strength and the volume of the transparency. Good feeling of transparency is called shuitouhao (水头好, good water), shuitouzu (水头足, enough water), and shuitouchang (水头长, long water). Bad feeling of transparency is called shuitoucha (水头差, poor water), shuigan (水干, dry water), shuiduan (水短, short water), and shuimu (水木, rigid water). In fact, the water/water head/water strength is to compare the feeling of jadeite with the shape and the essence of various water movements in nature.....The delicacy, transparency, polishing process, and color will all affect the shui/shuitou, as well as the amount of impurities and the thickness of the material. If the color is too dark or too thick, it will make people feel that the water strength is insufficient. If the color is too shallow or too light, although it will show water, the price will not go up, so it must be just right. As the saying goes, "Bo zhang shui, hou zeng se (薄涨水, 厚增色, thin makes long water, thick makes more color)", which refers to the water strength will be better if the material is thin, and the color will look more colorful if it is thick.....If you have to talk about the measurement of the water head, the jargon says "Ji fen shui (几分水, how many percent of water)". The higher the percentage of the water head, the better. But it is generally only used to judge jadeite ores, but not for finished products. In fact, delicacy and water are often mentioned together, because in most cases, the better the delicacy, the better the water, and the worse the delicacy, the worse the water, but the concepts of delicacy and water are very different.....

Se (色, color) is color, which is divided into six color series: green, yellow-red, purple, blue, white, and black. The green series is the "cui (翠)" of feicui, the color with the highest value, the best in which is the green of zheng (正, positive), yang (阳, bright), yun (匀, self), nong (浓, thick) and

man (满, full), called imperial green. If the green color is buman (不满, not full), but zheng (正, positive), yang (阳, bright), yun (匀, self), nong (浓, thick), it is called sela (色辣, the color is hot) or selaola (色老辣, the color is old and hot). Green tends to be yellowish, bluish, and blackish in three directions, and the volume of yellow in green will affect the value. The order of yellowish is cuilv (翠绿, emerald green), huangyanglv (黄秧绿, yellow seedling green), pingguolv (苹果绿, apple green), and doulv (豆绿, pea green). The order of bluishness is guapilv (瓜皮绿, melon rind green), jiucailv (韭菜绿, garlic chives green), and bocailv (菠菜绿, spinach green).....The yellow-red line is the "fei (翡)" of feicui, the reddish one is called hongfei (红翡, red fei), and the yellowish one is called huangfei (黄翡, yellow fei). The orange in the middle is rare, and the value of red jadeite is higher than that of yellow jadeite. In the industry, yellow is also called zhaocai (招财色 fortune color), representing wealth.....All purples are called chunse (春色, spring colors) or ziluolan (紫罗兰, violets)⁸, and pure purples are called qiezizi (茄子紫, eggplant purple) or zichun (紫春, purple spring), which are rare. The most common ones have color casts, the reddish ones are called hongchun (红春, red spring), and the bluish ones are called lanchun (蓝春, blue spring), and the red spring is more valuable than the blue spring. There is a saying in the jargon that shichunjiumu (十春九木, ten spring but nine rigid) mean that most of the purple jadeite is short of water.....If the blue is flocculent in the ice type of jadeite, it is called piaolanhua (飘蓝花, floating blue flower), and if the blue flower is greenish, it is called shuicaohua (水草花, aquatic flower). If the blue color is not flocculent, it is more evenly distributed, and if the water head is good, it is called lanshui (蓝水, blue water) or lanqing (蓝晴, blue clear), and if it is blackish, it is called youqing (油青, oil green).....If several colors are included in a finished jadeite product but belong to different part, there will also be a special description in the jargon. The ones that contain yellow and green at the same time are called huangjialv (黄夹绿, yellow between green), and the ones that contain purple and green are called chundaicai (春带彩, spring that brings riches). If their zhong and shui are all good, the price will be much higher than that of one color. Two colors are called fushouhuangquan (福寿双全, having both luck and longevity), if there are three colors, it is called fulushou (福禄寿, luck, fortune and longevity), and if there are more than three colors, it is called fulushouxicai (福禄寿喜财, luck, fortune,

⁸ In another interview, the reporter said that the source of the name Chun is a small purple wildflower that is common in spring in Tengchong area, so "Chun" is used to represent purple. I also saw this small flower in my fieldwork in Tengchong. Interview time: 02/2018. Interlocutor: H.H. Location: Tengchong Jadeite Museum.

longevity, happiness and wealth) or mantangcai (满堂彩, standing ovation), which are generally only available for large and large ornaments.

Di (底, background) refers to the sum of other parts (feelings) of a finished jadeite product except for the main color⁹. These parts include zhong and variations of zhong, shuitou, various secondary colors, blemishes, etc. This comprehensive observation is an overall evaluation other than the color. It is used to estimate the quality, grade and price of a piece of jadeite. It is generally divided into good, average, and poor. The jargon is ganjing (干净, clean), zang (脏, dirty), or qingshuang (清爽, clear), yiban (一般, average), hui (灰, gray) and so on.....Di is often used vaguely by many people, and it will also be mixed with zhong.....

Guang (光, light) refers to the luster of jadeite after it is polished and qualified. Guang is generally described together with zhong and shui. The best kind is bolizhong (玻璃种, glass type) with fluorescent light. The light of bingzhong (冰种, ice type) is ice crystal light or ice glittering light. The light of nuobingzhong (糯冰种, ice-sticky rice soup type) is weak ice glittering light, and if it is full-colored, it will have the silky light. And nuozhong (糯种, sticky rice soup type) has the fat or oily light. If you go any lower, you can't say whether there is light or not.....

Gong (工, craft), of course, refers to the carving process. A well-crafted piece of jadeite not only has beautiful shape, smooth lines, vivid images, and good artistic conception, but also some are beautifully carved, which can make full use of or even magnify the advantages of the water-colored base of the original jadeite material.....There are also judgments on whether the workmanship is neat, regular, or polished.....The ones with rough zhong have low hardness and are easy to process, while the ones with fine zhong are very hard, so a craftsman can't polish a gaobingzhong (高冰种, high ice type) bracelet in a day.....For a good carver, the labor cost of a playthings piece is tens of thousands, and some cost hundreds of thousands.....

Lie (裂, crack) is the crack. In fact, cracks are different from grains. Cracks already have rifts. If you scratch it with your nails, you will feel it. Cracks will make jadeite drop in price significantly, but grains will not.....Xuan (癣, ringworm) is the speckled or flake-like black part, which affects the appearance like ringworm on human skin and will make jadeite drop in price. But black ringworm is often mixed with rich

⁹ According to the conclusions of many interviews and participating observations, Di may be similar to the meaning of "the context or background presented by the jadeite material itself".

emerald green, it depends on how buyers and sellers bid. Also, the black color may be cleverly used by the jadeite carver to carve a very characteristic part of a certain statue, which makes some customers like it, and that could be sold at a high price, like Zhong Kui's face¹⁰, or the pen in someone's hand.....Mian (棉, cotton) is white flecks or flocs. Mian affects zhong and shui, so it is considered a disadvantage. But in addition to being able to be carved skillfully, there is another kind of jadeite that is ice type with many cottony spots on, like snowflakes, which can correspond to Li Qingzhao's words¹¹, the artistic conception is beautiful, and the price is not low.....Cracks, ringworm, cotton, and dirt are all called defects, which will affect the price.¹²

In the above-mentioned interview records, the interlocutor introduced the identification and appreciation knowledge of jadeite in more detail. We can find that the jadeite knowledge system of the Han people has the following characteristics:

First of all, the entire jadeite local knowledge system is not based on scientific and rational cognition, but on the classification and description of perceptual aesthetics. Although the concept of "zhong" is closely related to the conclusion of crystal configuration in mineralogy, the concept of "shui" is closely related to the refraction and scattering effects of light, but they do not correspond completely. This is all about the visual perception that jadeite itself may present. For example, bolizhong (玻璃种, glass type) and bingzhong (冰种, ice type) may exist in one piece of jadeite at the same time, and there is a transition part from glass to ice, sometimes called it gaobingzhong (高冰种, high ice species). However, the extent to which the feeling of ice is reduced to that of glass cannot be accurately divided.

Second, there is no rigorous parallel logical relationship between the classification dimensions, and there is no clear boundary, and they are often nested and superimposed on each other. For example, in the division of zhong, the sequence of " bolizhong (玻璃种, glass type), bingzhong (冰种, ice type), nuozhong (糯种, sticky rice soup type), douzhong (豆种, pea type), cidi (瓷底, porcelain background)..." is mainly judged according to the size of crystal particles and the degree of compactness of the combination. However, douzhong (豆种, pea type), cidi (瓷底, porcelain background), and baidiqing (白底青, white background green) have also an added color dimension. Youqingzhong (油青种, oil green type), longhong (龙种, dragon type), etc. not only add the dimension of color but also the dimension of shui. For another example, di is used mixedly with zhong. Cidi (瓷底,

¹⁰ Zhong Kui is a god in Taoist mythology. He can guard the house and cast down demons. He has a thick black beard.

¹¹ Li Qingzhao is the most famous female poet in Chinese history, who lived in the Northern Song Dynasty. Her words are known for their gracefulness.

¹² Interview time: 10/2017. Interlocutor: YDL. Location: Yunnan Geology, Minerals and Jewelry Trading Center.

porcelain background) describes the perception type of jadeite which is the same as that of porcelain, and the meaning includes both the concept of zhong and the concept of di. In addition, the dimension of light is not a compulsory factor in the evaluation of all jadeites, and there are many middle and low-end jadeites that cannot be called qiguang (起光, luminous) at all. The jargon for a slight lack of light is "*chakouqi* (差口气, one breath short)", which seems to be often used, but this quality cannot be accurately defined. Therefore, what constitutes jadeite jargon is not a set of rigorous scientific rational knowledge but aligns more with the evocative approach in the field of artistic aesthetics, relying on perceptions, narratives and imagery-driven knowledge. When narrating a scene in which the visual center transitions or shifts to one of the two sides, one generally adds the descriptor "strong" or "weak", or directly use two adjacent ones to evoke the direction of visual change. These judgments and decisions are difficult to grasp and to reproduce if one is not often exposed to the jadeite market. It can be said that this skill does not only depend on experience, but also it requires incessantly the calibration of the senses. Therefore, if quantitative indicators are used to measure, specify, standardize or grade jadeite, it may not be possible to achieve the same result.

Third, the language symbols of jargon appear as transfer of sensations, which is not only embedded in the local languages of the Han people in Yunnan, but it reflects the features of a farming civilization, too. "Glass", "ice", "porcelain" and so on refer to the transfer of visual sensations evoked by the corresponding objects, while "lime" and "shit" encompass contempt for poor quality in addition to the visual descriptions. The semiotic system of the "shuitou (水头, water head)" dimension may be able to fully reflect the characteristics of dialects. "Shuitou" as a signifier is generally only used among Yunnan people (referring to the Han people in Yunnan and the Han people who migrated from Yunnan to Myanmar or Southeast Asian countries), and its signified not only includes the original meaning of "water", but also the meaning of "the visual feeling of water such as flowing, moistening, and aura". "Shuichang (水长, long water" and "shuiduan (水短, short water" do not refer to the size or length of the area occupied by shui but index whether the feeling of the water in a piece of jadeite can extend beyond the object itself or the picture of the object. A good feeling of extension can be described as "shuichang (水长, long water)", and a feeling of extension that stops abruptly or has no sense of extension is "shuiduan (水短, short water)". It is worth noting that the jadeite with the rigid shuitou is described as shuimu (水木, water wood), which takes the meaning of mu (木, wood) from mune (木讷, dull as wood), rather than huo (火, fire) or tu (土, earth), which are opposite or incompatible with the concept of shui (水, water) within the context of the five elements¹³ in traditional Chinese thinking. The dimension of shuitou is also limited to the evaluation of jadeite. In the evaluation system of Hetian jade, the best one looks like sheep fat, which is accordingly called yangzhiyu (羊脂玉, sheep fat jade)". Nuozhong (糯

¹³ Traditional Chinese philosophy believes that everything in the universe is composed of five elements: Metal or gold, water, wood, fire, and earth, and the relationship between them is mutual generation and mutual restraint.

种, sticky rice type), douzhong (豆种, pea type), jiucailv (韭菜绿, garlic chives green), huangyanglv (黄秧绿, yellow seedling green), bocailv (菠菜绿, spinach green) and so on reflect the agricultural civilization of the Han people.

The first people to go to the jade mine were all caravans from Tengchong. They didn't have much knowledge, and they made a living by selling things. When they discover something new and come back to tell others, the best way is to describe it by analogy with something that everyone has seen and is familiar with, so that everything is clear once they talk about it.¹⁴

To sum up, jadeite is a naturally formed material, but it is also a material with cultural attributes. Han people use a cultural knowledge system to identify it, as opposed to the Western mineralogical scientific knowledge system. The classification category of the former is more perceptual, poetic and non-quantifiable than that of the latter, but it does cover all the complexities of jadeite. The western system can explain or conceptualize the Chinese classification to a certain extent, but it has many constraints and limitations. If 150 years ago, the sample in Damour's hand was a piece of jadeite (no matter what color) that was almost entirely an ice type or glass type, then the chemical symbol is "NaAlSi₂O₆", corresponding to the mineralogical symbol "jadeite", and so his sample can be qualified as jadeite. What if that is not the case? According to the theoretical rules of mineralogy, if a certain mineral accounts for more than 60% in a multi-mineral aggregate, it can be named after this mineral. In this way, once the proportion of sodachromite produced by isotropic substitution exceeds 60% of the total, it should be recognized as another mineral and use another mineral name. If replaced by omphacite, it would also be recognized as another mineral. However, the jadeite culture system and the jadeite market recognize the two as two different zhong—sodium chromium pyroxene corresponds to the tielongsheng (铁龙生, dragon born from iron), and omphacite corresponds to the mocui (墨翠, black jadeite)—both of the two zhong are jadeite. In addition, there are many cases that in the same piece of jadeite, a certain mineral is concentrated in this part, and another mineral is concentrated in that part, and they form one piece together. Or there are many black spots like mud or white spots like snowflakes in a piece of ice type jadeite. These spots may be another mineral or the same mineral with loose crystals. Therefore, what language symbol is more appropriate to refer to this substance? This study believes that it is best to locate it in a meaningful and valuable position for people, that is, to judge its existence in the context of jadeite history, culture, and exchange. Then, it is more accurate to use the word "feicui" instead of jadeite as the former encompasses connotations steeped in history, cultural heritage and intercultural exchange. By way of illustration, the picture underneath shows a pendant with great quality and value. There are no granular crystals can be seen, so the zhong is of high quality. Its transparency is high, and the color looks like flowing water, so the shui is great.

¹⁴ Interview time: 02/2018. Interlocutor: H.H. Location: Tengchong Jadeite Museum.

Its color is cuilv (翠绿, emerald green), and the colored parts are not concentrated but coherent and scattered, so the color is also great. Generally speaking, it looks like a landscape painting, and the price is relatively high.



Image 2: Jadeite safety buckle pendant with great zhong, shui and color.

Source: Provided by interlocutor XH, August 2018.

1.2 Understanding and Acceptance of Jadeite in Chinese Jade Culture

In my fieldwork, I discovered that the local knowledge system of jadeite is composed of language symbols and cultural concepts of the Han Chinese in Yunnan. Participants in the development and trade of jadeite such as Kachin, Shan, Burmese or Burmese Muslims have not formed systematic identification knowledge, nor have corresponding language symbols. They all use the jargon of the Han Chinese in Yunnan when referring to the characteristics of jadeite. In the value assessment of jadeite products, there is also the dimension of the external carving process besides the dimension of evaluating the characteristics of the material itself. In addition to rings, bracelets, beads and bare pieces¹⁵, the jadeite objects in the market including pendants, playthings, and ornaments, etc. have undergone a series of carving and processing techniques, making jadeite a form of applied art. Almost all statues represent characters, animals, natural objects, topics

¹⁵ Bare piece (光身件, guang shen jian) is a term used in jadeite jargon, which refers to a kind of semi-finished or finished jadeite. Its surface is not carved but polished in a large area to show the beauty of the jadeite material itself. Such as saddle parts, safety buckles, drop-shaped parts, pepper-shaped parts, etc. Among them, the semi-finished products will be made into finished products by adding inlay or knotting process in the subsequent processing.

from the three main schools of Chinese thinking: Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism; by origin an Indian religion that over time has been incorporated in traditional Chinese culture. Han people had a jade culture system that had been formed for thousands of years before the more recent recognition and embracement of jadeite. Therefore, carved jadeite and other jade varieties share a long history.

1.2.1 Jade Culture of the Han People

The Han people have a history of using and venerating jade for thousands of years, and gradually construed a jade culture characterized by sacred worship, power hierarchy, personality and morality, and aesthetic concepts of poetry such as harmony between man and nature. Three different periods can be differentiated: prehistory, Zhou-dynasty and the Han dynasty.

1.2.1.1 Prehistorical period

Initially, jade was regarded as the materialized object of the gods or at least a thing with divine qualities, which marks the first phase of jade culture. According to archaeological research, the earliest jade objects in China were unearthed in the settlement sites of the ancient cultures in the northern and central eastern parts of the Neolithic period. Representative sites where jade articles have been excavated include those of the Xinglongwa (兴隆洼) Culture and Chahai (查海) Culture to be dated about 8,000 years ago, Hongshan (红山) Culture about 5,000 to 8,000 years ago, Lingjiatan (凌家滩) Culture, Longshan (龙山) Culture, and Liangzhu (良渚) Culture about 5,000 years ago. These jade stones were polished into birds and beasts, human-shaped objects, ornaments, tools, etc. Others were polished to objects with a smooth surface and then buried in the earth. Also stone structures of sacrificial altars or city walls were found. All these archeological findings reflect nature worship, ancestor worship, and production life that existed in the tribe, settlement, or country at that time. These objects made of jade imbued with godly qualities or used to serve gods can be called "divine jade" (Yang, 2011).

Ritual jade objects related to sacred worship can be roughly divided into four categories, that are the materialized entity of the gods, the object to celebrate and serve the gods, communication tools with the gods and decorations to ward off evil spirits (Yang and Yang, 2017). The first category is the materialized entity or material sustenance of the gods. This includes a large number of jade objects in the form of animals and natural elements derived from animism that are mostly found in Hongshan (红山) and Liangzhu (良渚) Cultures. To illustrate they include fish, birds, turtles but also cloud patterns. There are also jade objects derived from totem worship or ancestor worship, such as the jade tiger in the Shijiahe (石家河) Culture, the jade eagle in the Shimao (石峁) Culture, while the Jade Pig Dragon shaped like the letter "C" in the most representative Hongshan (红山) Culture, which is considered by some scholars to as a "Jade Bear Dragon", and the Jade Man for the Lingjiatan (凌家滩) Culture.

The second category is to celebrate and serve God. The idea of using jade as food for the gods comes from some records in *Shanhai Jing* which involves the mythology, geography, animals, plants, minerals, witchcraft, religion, history, medicine, folk customs and various aspects of the nation in ancient China. The *Shanhai Jing*, is the ancient book that contains one of the most comprehensive records of of jade.

.....崧山，其上多丹木，员叶而赤茎，黄华而赤实，其味如飴，食之不饥。丹水出焉，西流注于稷泽，其中多白玉。是有玉膏，其原沸沸汤汤，黄帝是食是飧。是生玄玉。玉膏所出，以灌丹木，丹木五岁，五色乃清，五味乃馨。黄帝乃取崧山之玉荣，而投之钟山之阳，瑾瑜之玉为良，坚栗精密，浊泽而有光，五色发作，以和柔刚，天地鬼神，是食是飧。君子服之，以御不祥。(Yuan, 1980)

Translation:

...On Mishan (崧山) Mountain, there are many danmu (丹木, red tree) trees growing on the mountain, with round leaves, red stems, yellow flowers, and red fruits. The taste of the fruits is as sweet as syrup, and you will not feel hungry after eating it. Danshui (丹水) River originates from Mishan (崧山) Mountain and flows westward into Jize (稷泽) Lake. There is a lot of white jade in the water, and there is also fat-like jade (玉膏). The place where the fat-like jade (玉膏) gushes out is boiling. The Yellow Emperor (黄帝) once used this jade paste as food and entertained guests. Black jade was born from the fat-like jade (玉膏). Irrigate the danmu (丹木) trees with the water from the place where the fat-like jade (玉膏) gushed out. After five years, the danmu (丹木) trees will take on five fresh colors and exude five fragrant fragrances. The Yellow Emperor (黄帝) then took the essence of the jade from Mishan (崧山) Mountain and cast it on the south side of Zhongshan (钟山) Mountain. Later, fine jade was produced, such as jin (瑾) and yu (瑜), which was hard and shaped like corn, fine and delicate, thick, moist and lustrous. The five colors it emits reflect each other to reconcile yin (阴) and yang (阳). The ghosts and gods from heaven and earth come to enjoy and eat these beautiful jade; Junzi (君子, men of complete virtue) wear it on their bodies could ward off ominous powers.

This passage in *Shanhai Jing* narrates the story of the Yellow Emperor (黄帝) who used fat-like jade from the Mishan (崧山) Mountain as a delicacy and invited guests for collective consumption and enjoyment. He also collected the essence of jade from Mishan Mountain and planted it to the south of Zhongshan Mountain, to cultivate beautiful jade such as jin (瑾) and yu (瑜). The ghosts and gods of heaven and earth came to use jin (瑾) and yu (瑜) as food. The Yellow Emperor (黄帝) is the head of the Five Ancient Chinese Emperors, who shaped Chinese mythology, history and the Han identity of the Chinese. Although at present it seems unthinkable to eat stones, it reflects the concept of divinity among the prehistorical ancestors of the Han people. In the Xinglongwa (兴隆洼) cultural site in Northeast China, we can observe the phenomenon of

"putting broken jade pieces, jade cones or jade arrowheads in the mouth of the deceased for the soul to use or using pig heads or whole pigs for the soul to eat (Yang, 2014)". The jade pigs found in the ruinous tombs ranging from big to small size. Archaeological researchers speculate that these pigs play a significant role in the afterlife, so that the soul of the tomb owner can still enjoy food.

The third category represents communication tools with the gods, including various jade ritual objects and jade masks. In the process of sacrificial rituals, the Shamans used a wide range ritual to communicate with gods including divination, worship, percussion on musical instruments, and singing and dancing (Li, 2011). The jade held in the hands of wu (巫, sorceress) and xi (覡, wizard) and used to communicate with gods are considered jade magic utensils. Jade yue (钺, ax-like weapons), zhang (璋, long and plate-shaped jade object), and dao (刀, knife) are used in sacrificial activities, while jade tortoise shells and other jade pieces are used for divination. The human-shaped or animal-shaped jade mask worn on the head can make gods, ancestors, and ghosts possess the body of the Shaman, so that wu (巫, sorceress)/xi (覡, wizard) has the power to represent the gods.

The fourth category is to ward off evil spirits by decorations worn on the body, such as yuhuan (玉环, jade bracelets), yujue (玉珮, jade earrings), jade bead tube strings, and so on.

Therefore, in the late stage of prehistoric matrilineal society, shaman mastered religious power, and further seized political, military, production, and other powers in the process of social transformation into patrilineal clan, becoming the supreme ruler of prehistoric society (Li, 2011), and the creator and promoter of Jade fetishism and jade culture (Yang, 2011). In the ancient book *Shanhai Jing*, the Yellow Emperor, regarded as the ancestor and leader of the Huaxia (华夏) people, supposedly the predecessors of the Han people, embodies the prehistoric trinity of wizard, emperor, and god with supreme ruling power. During the flourishing period of the Hongshan (红山) Culture and Liangzhu (良渚) Culture, in large tombs we find shamans "buried entirely in jade", while in small and medium-sized tombs a small amount of jade was found. Some even had no jade articles at all, which illustrates the differentiation of social class at that time. During the Longshan culture period, the political and military power of the tribal leaders became stronger, and gradually replaced the shamans, who were downgraded to priests.

1.2.1.2 Zhou Dynasty (about 11th century BC - 256 BC)

With the demise of Neolithic cultures, as a result of battles and migrations of different ethnic groups a more stratified society emerged. This also impacted the jade culture, whereby the shape and system of jade objects became more elaborated. Around the time of the Zhou Dynasty in Chinese history, a relatively complete system of royal power ruled by rites was formed in society, in which Liuqi (六器, six ritual objects) and Liurui (六瑞, six

auspiciousness) were used as symbols to represent the world view, sacrificial system and power hierarchy.

以玉作六器，以礼天地四方，以苍璧礼天，以黄琮礼地，以青圭礼东方，以赤璋礼南方，以白琥礼西方，以玄璜礼北方。.....

以玉作六瑞，以等邦国，王执镇圭，公执桓圭，侯执信圭，伯执躬圭，子执谷璧，男执蒲璧。(Ruan,2010)

Translation:

Use jade as the Liuqi (六器, six jade ritual objects) to worship heaven, earth and the four directions. Worship heaven with white and cyan-blue Bi (璧, a flat round jade object with a hole in the middle), honor earth with yellow Cong (琮, a hollow columnar jade object with a square outside and a circle inside), honor the east with cyan Gui (圭, a rectangular jade object with a sharp corner at one end), honor the south with red Zhang (璋, a long strip of plate-shaped jade object with an inner arc or branch at one end), honor the west with white Hu (琥, a tiger-shaped jade object), and honor the north with black Huang (璜, a semicircular jade object).

Use jade as the liurui (六瑞, six jade object of auspiciousness) to structure each state with hierarchy. From top to bottom, Wang (王, emperor) holds zhen gui (镇圭, the Gui held by the emperor during the ceremony), Gong (公, duke) holds heng gui (桓圭, the Gui held by dukes during the ceremony), Hou (侯, marquis) holds xin gui (信圭, the Gui held by marquises during the ceremony), Bo (伯, earl) holds gong gui (躬圭, the Gui held by earls during the ceremony), Zi (子, viscount) holds gu bi (谷璧, the Bi held by viscounts during the ceremony), and Nan (男, Baron) holds pu bi (蒲璧, the Bi held by barons).

It can be seen from the records of *Zhou Li*, the first book in China that systematically and completely describes the establishment of state institutions and the division of functions, that the liuqi (六器) are jade ritual objects used in the sacrificial system to represent the gods of the heavens and the earth, and the liurui (六瑞) are auspicious jade objects representing the human hierarchy and the division of the state's territory. In addition, *Zhou Li* also recorded in great detail the functions and occasions of liuqi and liurui, and meticulously defined the identities and positions of gods-emperors-feudatories and officials at all levels. The shape and system of jade manifestly reflect the hierarchy in social power of that time. In addition, another jade symbol developed in the Zhou Dynasty, namely the seal, a keepsake held by the ruler. The emperor's seal is called xi (玺), and the tokens or certificates issued by the emperor to appoint hundreds of officials and concubines are called yin (印). They were used when exercising their respective duties and powers (Du, 2004). Most xi seal and yin tokens are made of jade, and a few are made of gold. The integration of the jade culture into the institutional symbol system

representing power levels represents a new phase in jade culture. These jade symbols were both used in the present world, and as well in afterlife as funerary objects in tombs, representing a continuum between the living and their ancestors.

1.2.1.3 Han Dynasty (206 BC - 220 AD)

The Han Dynasty is the third important development stage of jade culture. The Han society gradually developed a symbolic system that used jade to represent personality and morality. After experiencing the prosperity of Taoism in the Eastern Zhou Dynasty (770 BC to 256 BC), Emperor Wu (156 BC - 87 BC) of the Han Dynasty ordered to "abandon all schools of thought and respect Confucianism alone", and thus Confucianism replaced Taoism as the orthodox ideology of the dynasty. This notion of social morality was reflected in jade culture as it specifically promoted the development of Confucian jade theory. Within the theory of "jade virtue" the custom of admiring jade has become prevalent from this period onwards and which endured for a long time (Li, 2011). The literati and bureaucrats elaborated the concept of a 'junzi' or gentleman by comparing him with jade and jade-like properties. In the theory of "jade virtue", the attributes of jade's delicacy, color, veins, luster, sound, and other attributes were associated with the essence of a gentleman's moral norms. For example, the core idea of Confucianism "benevolence" was placed at the top of the five virtues of jade, including benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom and trustworthiness, so the sense of warmth that was linked to "benevolence and righteousness" became the primary criterion for judging the quality of jade. Similar cultural concepts directly influenced the aesthetic preference of jade materials and the formation of value measurement standards in later generations. Secondly, the way of wearing jade was influenced by the Confucian hierarchy, and a more complicated way of using jade was added under the aforementioned idea of ritual apparatus. At that time, when Confucian scholars wore jade, they also distinguished left and right, they were concerned about matching jades, whether the monarch was present, whether it was a fasting day, and so on. The emperor rewarded the ministers not only with ritual and auspicious vessels or their derivatives, but also with various jade objects symbolizing Confucianism and Taoism. Third, it laid the groundwork for the extension of jade's symbolic power to Buddhism, which was introduced to China from the Eastern Han Dynasty. Although during the Han Dynasty, the theme of jade objects was not yet heavily related to Buddhism, in the following centuries, as Han Buddhism spread and became popularized in China, jade objects such as Jade Buddha, Jade Guanyin, and Jade Arhat gradually appeared.

From the perspective of the development of jade as a symbolic system, the symbolic meaning of jade in Chinese or Han society included sacred worship, power hierarchy, personality and morality, auspiciousness and exorcism, etc., and the aesthetic preference of "harmony between man and nature" which was a core of Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism. The symbolic social activities linked with jade strings have continuously adapted to the symbolic needs of the Han people in different historical stages, and

together constituted a jade culture with rich interpretational dimensions and deep historical memory, which has still endured in present-day Chinese society. This special custom of using jade and cultural characteristics does not exist in societies other than the Han, like the Burmese society.

1.2.2 From "Stone" to "Jade": Jadeite Entered the Jade Culture System

The jade of the Han people is mainly produced in the Central Plains, and jade mines have been found in various places in mainland China. There are more than 200 places recorded in the mythological geographical book *Shanhai Jing*. The four most famous varieties are Hetian jade in Xinjiang, Dushan jade in Henan, Lantian jade in Shaanxi and Xiuyan jade in Liaoning. In addition, there are turquoise, Qingtian stone, chicken blood stone and so on. What is called "jade" is higher and more superior in Han values, while what is called "stone" is less valuable. Jadeite was not accepted by the jade culture system of the Han people at the beginning but experienced a long evolving process from "stone" to "jade".

Location map of China's four famous jades




Image 3: Location map of China's Four famous jades. (Map of China according to the PRC.)

Source: The author draws based on literature and fieldwork interview data.

Burmese jadeite is mainly produced in the Hpakant area of Kachin State in the north, which is located in the rugged highlands south of the Himalayas, east of the Naga Hills, and west of the Hengduan Mountain Range. The Southern Silk Road, which connects Chinese and Indian cultures, passes through this area, and caravans have traveled for thousands of years. The mine is located about 140 kilometers away from Myitkyina, the capital of Kachin, and more than 200 kilometers away from Tengchong, Yunnan. There are high mountains and deep valleys, dense forests, and many tribes and ethnic groups with different cultures scattered here. The Han people call this place the Savage Mountain (野人山, yeren shan), which reflects the perceived gap between civilization and wilderness. The concept of "Zomia" with regional characteristics proposed by Dutch scholar Willem van Schendel (2002) and its subsequent spatial extension all include this area (He and Chen, 2018). "Zo" refers to mountains or remote places, "mia" refers to people, and "Zomia" refers to mountain people or people living in remote mountains, and it also has a deep sense of edge. The jadeite carved by nature for hundreds of millions of years are quietly buried in the ground, and they lived in peace with the local aborigines. It was not until the migration of the Han people to the southwest of China that jadeite gradually entered the vision of the Central of China and became a meaningful thing that was exchanged.

The history of jadeite as a jade species being discovered by the Chinese and introduced to Central of China is still unclear in the academic circles. "Feicui" recorded in ancient books can be roughly interpreted as: bird feather; emerald green; lapis lazuli; diancui (点翠, a traditional Chinese jewelry making method processed from kingfisher feathers) jewelry; jade, etc.:

哀牢.....出铜铁铅锡，光银光珠，琥珀水晶，蚶虫蚌珍，孔雀翡翠，
犀象狸虎等奇兽之类，惟腾越足以当之。《后汉书·西南夷传》

翡翠火齐，流耀含英。悬黎垂棘，夜光在焉。《后汉书·班固传》

琉璃砚匣，终日随身；翡翠笔床，无时离手。《玉台新咏》

Translation:

Ailao (哀牢, name of an ancient country in Yunnan area).....produces copper, iron, lead and tin, light silver, bright pearls, amber, crystals, oysters, clams, peacock, feicui, rhinoceros, elephant, raccoon, tiger and other strange animals. Only Tengyue (腾越, name of an ancient prefecture in Yunnan area) is comparable to it. (Book of the Later Han: Biographies of Southwestern Yi)

Feicui and huochi (火齐, colored glazes) are shining and full of beauty. Xuanli (悬黎, a jade that glows at night) and chuiji (垂棘, a kind of beautiful jade named after its place of origin) are shining at night. (Book of the Later Han: Biography of Ban Gu)

The glazed ink stone and box are always with someone; the feicui writing brush and holder are always in someone's hand. (New Odes on the Jade Stage)

The first quotation comes from the earliest ancient book in China where the word "feicui" appeared, which was written by Fan Ye (AD 398 - AD 445) in Nan Dynasty (AD 420 - AD 589). Since the "feicui" mentioned in this historical material is placed after the peacock, not after the mineral, it may refer to a bird called jade that inhabits Yunnan, northern Myanmar, and northeastern India, or a reference to its feathers. The feicui in the second and third quotations probably refers to green jade, presumingly. However, since there is no unearthed physical evidence, it can only be classified in the jade category at most, and it cannot be determined that it is *feicui* (jadeite) in the modern sense. In addition, there are other historical materials that record things about jadeite, and their age is consistent with the gradually deepening connection between Southwest China and the Central Dynasty. For example, Ouyang Xiu in the Song Dynasty mentioned in *Return to Field Records*:

余家有一玉罍，形制甚古而精巧，始得之，梅圣俞以为碧玉，在颍州时尝以示僚属，坐有兵马钤额邓保吉，真宗朝老内臣也，识之曰‘此宝器也，谓之翡翠。’……云：‘禁中宝物，皆藏于圣库，库中有翡翠盞一支，所以识也’。(Ouyang, 2012)

Translation:

There is a jade vessel in my house, the shape is very classic and exquisite, it is biyu (碧玉, green jade). When I was in Yingzhou, I once showed it to my staff and colleagues. One of them was a veteran of the inner court who was in charge of soldiers and horses during the reign of Emperor Zhenzong (宋真宗) of the Song Dynasty. He knew this kind of jade and said that this treasure is called fei cui (翡翠). He said that all the treasures in the palace were stored in the emperor's treasury, and there was a zhan (盞, lamp like a cup) made of feicui, so he knew it.

Because there is no archaeological evidence, it is difficult to say that the feicui cup mentioned in this record refers to the contemporary feicui/jadeite but at least there is a possibility. In fact, during the Song Dynasty, the Pagan Kingdom (849-1285) in central and southern Myanmar expanded its sphere of influence to most of Upper Myanmar, while Nanzhao (738-902) and Dali (937-1094, 1096-1257) in southwest China rose successively, and there were wars and cooperation between the two sides. Both Nanzhao and Dali paid tribute to the Song Dynasty, and the tribute included "Biganshan (碧玕山, a landscape-themed ornaments carved in green jade); Dali also presented the "Biyu Foxiang (碧玉佛像, Green Jade Buddha Statue)" to the King of Bagan. So far, the green jade minerals unearthed from Yunnan to Upper Burma have nothing but jadeite. From this point of view, it is very likely that the excerpt refers to jadeite, but at that time the identification of this

treasure was mainly based on its color, and it had not yet been truly included in the cognition category of the jade culture of Central China. This situation is also reflected in the subsequent historical materials of the Ming and Qing dynasties.

The Ming Dynasty (AD 1368 - AD 1644) was a critical period for the central imperial court to expand its territory in the southwest region. There is a great consensus among Chinese academics (Mo, 1993; Ouyang, 2000; Zhang, 2003; Zhang, 2005; Yang, 2014) that it was also the period when jadeite was introduced into the country. The Ming History Chronicles Taizu Pingdian recorded that in 1381, Ming Emperor Taizu Zhu Yuanzhang sent Fu Youde, Lan Yu, and Mu Ying to conquer Dian/Yunnan, and appointed Muying to guard and manage Yunnan. During Mu Ying's stay in Yunnan, the system of garrisoning land was implemented, allowing soldiers to wear armor in battles and to farm in peacetime. At the same time, he also commanded the construction of water conservancy, fixed rents and tax, built city walls, established schools, and safeguarding security. These measures not only changed the way of livelihood of people in Southwest China to family-style settlement and farming, but also introduced the cultural thought of the Central China to Yunnan. The number of Han people from the Central Plains who migrated to Yunnan exceeded one million, and some even migrated with their clans, including craftsmen and craftsmen recruited by Mu Ying when he returned to Nanjing (Li, 2005). At that time, more and more Han people went to northern Myanmar to exploit jade and gemstone mines. They called the mining area baojing (宝井, treasure well), and the caravan road from the production area to Tengyue was called baojinglu (宝井路, treasure well road). At the same time, some barter markets were formed in the Tengyue area. The mountain people carried goods and prey to the market and exchanged with the rice and cloth of the people from the plain area. Tengchong had become the most important market in jadeite transactions. Xu Xiake (徐霞客, AD 1587- AD 1641), a Chinese geographer and traveler in the Ming Dynasty, recorded in his travel notes the lively market and the story of the jadeite gifted to him by his friend Pan Sheng, a merchant of Burmese goods:

十三省物无不至，滇中诸彝物无不至。……结棚为市，环错纷纭。……男女杂沓，交臂不辨。……观永昌贾人宝石、琥珀及翠生石诸物，亦无佳者。……潘生一桂虽青衿而走缅甸，家多缅甸货，时倪按君名承来觅碧玉，潘苦之，故屡屡避客。……潘捷余以倪院承差苏姓者，索碧玉宝石，窘甚，……潘生送翠生石二块。(Xu, 2010)

Translation:

There are all kinds of things in the thirteen provinces, and there are all kinds of things in the Yi in central Yunnan.……The sheds are put up and connected to form a market, and the sheds are staggered together.……In the market, men and women are crowded together and cannot be distinguished.……Merchants in Yongchang can be seen buying and selling gems, amber and cuishengshi (翠生石, green stones).……Although Pan Sheng

went to Burma in his youth, his family had a lot of Burmese goods. At that time, Ni came to look for biyu (碧玉, green jade) according to his name. Pan Sheng was very troubled, so he kept avoiding guests.……Pan told me that he felt embarrassed when a man surnamed Su who worked in Ni's courtyard asked him about biyu (碧玉, green jade) and gems.…… Pan Sheng gave me two pieces of cuishengshi (翠生石, green stones) as gifts.

The elite class of the literati in Central China classified green jade as biyu (碧玉), and the cuishengshi (翠生石, green stones)" in the article may refer to a variety of jadeite. When I browsed through the palace files of the Qing Dynasty, including Qing Shilu and Qing Shigao (Taiwan Academia Sinica database), I found that the descriptions of jadeite including cuishengshi (翠生石, green stone), biyu (碧玉, green jade), Yongchangbiyu (永昌碧玉, Yongchang green jade), dianyu (滇玉, Dian/Yunnan jade), cuiyu (翠玉, emerald jade), feicui (翡翠, jadeite), etc., which basically coincided with Xu Xiake's expression. Therefore, biyu and cuishengshi mentioned in the article are the jadeite exchanged in the Tengchong market. The above historical data show that the acceptance of jadeite by the Central Dynasty was a long process of understanding from exotic "stone" to Chinese "jade". This process is closely related to the pace and extent of the Central Court's development of Yunnan. At first, jadeite was brought into the central Chinese dynasty as a treasure among tributes. Around the middle of the Ming Dynasty, the market exchange of jadeite as a commodity appeared among the people in Dian/Yunnan area.

By the Qing Dynasty, jadeite had been made into court beads, finger rings, feather tubes, and various decorations, which were popular in the courts and among Manchu dignitaries. During my fieldwork in the Forbidden City Museum, I discovered that there are many kinds of beaded ornaments made of jadeite in the collections, on the photos, portraits, and funeral objects of the Empress Dowager Cixi. However, Emperor Qianlong (1711 AD - 1799 AD) was the first emperor in the Qing Dynasty to regard jadeite as a treasure. After Burma's Konbaung Dynasty (1752 AD - 1885 AD) replaced the Toungoo Dynasty (mid-16th century - 1752 AD), it conquered many chieftains between China and Myanmar by force, and the tribute "Huamali (花马礼)" (Ren, 2007) was levied on them, which aroused Emperor Qianlong's "Holy Wrath". After pacifying Xinjiang, Emperor Qianlong turned his force to attack Burma in order to regain control of the vassal state Konbaung Dynasty. At the onset of 1762 and successively in 1766, 1767, and 1769, the Qing court launched four Qing-Myanmar wars, but the results did not meet the expectations of "incorporating Burma into the territory". Both sides suffered heavy casualties to the exhaustion of both parties. The war of attrition was of no benefit to both China and Burma, but the stalemate persisted, and the diplomatic war continued for 18 years after the end of the hot war. Finally, in 1788, under pressure from Siam, King Bodawpaya of Konbaung Dynasty turned to pay tribute to the Qing court to show his favor.

Two years after the British annexed Upper Burma, an expedition led by C.H.E. Adamson (Major) was sent to investigate the jade mines, and the expedition record was published

in 1890: A Short Account of An Expedition to The Jade Mine in Upper Burmah in 1887-1888 with A Map. According to Charles Crosthwaite (reigned 1887 AD – 1890 AD), then Chief Commissioner of Burma, in 1912, William Warry (1854 AD - 1936 AD) was the advisor on Chinese affairs of the expedition. He was an assistant to the British Consul in Shanghai. As he was proficient in Chinese, the Burmese and Han people trusted him without fear. Warry's translation of a passage in the Qing Dynasty ancient book "Tung Hua Lu" (Tung Hua Lu) is as follows:

In 1788, the sixth king Bodawpaya (1782-1819 A.D., the fourth son of King Alaungphaya) sent three officials to represent Ye-myauk Shwe-daung, Thiya Kyaw-gaung, and Ngwe-lu-saya to pay tribute to the Qing court. (Warry, 1890)

Adrian Levy and Cathy Scott-Clark (2001) also wrote in their book:

Accordingly, in 1788 the Burmese sent a golden letter, a gold and jade pagoda, eight trained elephants, rubies, foreign carpets, boulders of jade and other presents, to the frontier by the way of Thienni. They also returned the remaining Chinese prisoners. The King's letter was to the effect that he had not long succeeded to the Burmese throne and that he was profoundly conscious of the faults of his predecessors in levying a war against China and that he had long desired to send tribute, though redouble with Siam had prevented him from doing so.



Image 5: Jadeite earrings from the Konbaung Dynasty.

Source: Photographed by the author at the Victoria and Albert Museum (V&A), London, UK, 04/2022.

The Eight Banners troops of the Qing court took envoys and tributes across China to the capital Beijing along the wuchidao (五尺道, five feet road) along the Southwest Silk Road. They exchanged for Emperor Qianlong's "forget about the past" in the previous four Qing-Myanmar wars¹⁶. Ever since Burma has continued to pay tribute to the Qing court, while Bodawpaya has been awarded the title of "Prince of Burma". The exchange of Burmese "land product" jadeite for the recognition of the Chinese imperial court (Levy and Scott-Clark, 2001) established a tributary relationship and gradually restored private trade. It was also from this period onwards that there were more records of jadeite appearing in the Qing court.

However, no matter which period of the above-mentioned time frame jadeite flowed to the Central China it was only a treasure exclusively accessible to the royal family and the upper class. It was a mysterious and rare treasure from the distant exotic "Savage Mountain" region. This situation lasted until the middle and late Qing Dynasty, when rich folks outside Yunnan began to consume jadeite from a popular perspective.

清光绪二十八年（1902），腾冲进口翡翠271担；宣统三年（1911）628担；民国六年（1917）801担。……腾冲有宝货行14家，解玉行33家，玉肚眼匠27家，花匠22家，玉片工匠31家，玉小货匠37家。（Li, 2004）

翡翠，非经腾过无由入内，所以腾为翠藪，玉工满千，制为器皿，发售滇垣各行省。（Cun, 2005）

Translation:

In the twenty-eighth year of the Guangxu reign of the Qing Dynasty (1902), Tengchong imported 271 dan of jadeite¹⁷; in the third year of Xuantong (1911) 628 dan; in the sixth year of the Republic of China (1917) 801 dan.……Tengchong has 14 treasure goods stores, 33 jadeite cutting stores, 27 jadeite belly eye shops, 22 carving shops, 31 jadeite slice shops, and 37 small jadeite shops.

Jadeite can only enter the mainland through Tengyue, so Tengyue has become a place where jadeite gathers. There are thousands of jadeite craftsmen here, who make jadeite into vessels and wares, and sell them to Yunnan and other provinces.

These records show that at that time jade had become a consumer product, the industry had reached a large scale, and the entire market had connected mining areas, Southwest China, and even "provinces" in the mainland. Among them, several hutong (胡同, alley) outside Chongwen men (崇文门, Chongwen gate) and Qianmen (前门, Front gate) in

¹⁶ Some scholars believe that the Qing Dynasty did not really win the Qing-Burmese War.

¹⁷ Dan (担, load) is a China's municipal weight unit, one load is equal to 50 kilograms.

Beijing, and Guodian Street, inside Beimen (北门, North gate), outside Dongmen (东门, East gate) and other alleys in Tianjin have dozens of jewelry stores selling jadeite products (Niu, 1994), which clearly reflects that the demand for jade had expanded from the royal family to ordinary people. In addition, Tengchong jade merchants and jade craftsmen also established an industrial organization the Baohuo Guild during the Qianlong and Jiaqing years of the Qing Dynasty. In the first year of Daoguang (1821), they donated money to build the " Baiyu Zhenren Patriarch Hall (白玉真人祖师殿)" (Zou, 2005). The earliest Baiyu Zhenren Patriarch Hall was destroyed by the war, and the existing one was rebuilt in the seventh year of Guangxu (1881) with donations from Tengchong jade merchants. The hall is located on the right side of Laifeng Temple in Tengchong. The site of the hall was originally the Tengchong Baohuo Guild Hall. The Patriarch of Baiyu Zhenren was Bian He (卞和). The reason why he is regarded as the Patriarch of jade appraisers goes back to a famous legend:

Bian He (卞和), a native of Chu (楚国, A vassal state during the Eastern Zhou Dynasty), discovered a piece of beautiful jade wrapped in a rock shell in the mountains of Chu. He presented this piece of jade to the then monarch, King Li of Chu (楚厉王), but the Chu royal family believed that Bian He had deceived the king by presenting a stone as a treasure. Subsequently King Li of Chu ordered He's left foot to be cut off. When King Li was killed and succeeded by King Wu of Chu (楚武王), Bian He one more offered the jade to the King. After careful appraisal, the King still believed that what He offered was a stone. As a result, He's right foot was also cut off. Finally, Bian He took the jade back to Chushan (楚山) mountain, where he wept for three days and three nights. After the tears dried up, he discovered that he shed blood instead of tears. The newly enthroned King Wen of Chu learned about it and ordered to inquire the matter. Bian He said: "I am not sad because my feet were cut off, but because the jade was regarded as a stone and the loyal minister was regarded as a liar! This is about the cause of my sadness." So, King Wen of Chu dispatched craftsmen to remove the rocks wrapped around the jade, and only then did he see the jade. Then, King Wen of Chu made the jade into a beautiful bi (璧) and named it "Heshibi". (Hubei Local Chronicles Compilation Committee, 2010)

The story of Bian He and the beautiful jade heshibi (和氏璧) is familiar to Chinese society. However, Bian He honored with the title of the "Patriarch of Baiyu Zhenren", and only appeared in Tengchong located in the southwestern border area of China. This fully reflects the remote migration range of the Han people from the Central China and the profound influence of jade culture.

The study of the above historical data seems to indicate that the word "feicui" appeared very occasionally in historical materials before the Ming Dynasty, and there are almost no archaeological objects to confirm the literature records (Yang and Yang, 2017). From around the 13th century AD, along with the increasingly frequent and in-depth exchanges at the military, political, economic and cultural level in addition with people's mobilities of

the central dynasties of the Ming and Qing dynasties with the Southwest, jadeite was introduced to the central Dynasties as a new jade species originating from the far southwest. Over the course of several centuries, jadeite has been transformed from mere stone to jade endowed with deep symbolic meaning and aesthetic properties. At the same time, the attribute of jadeite had also changed from a "frontier to central" tribute to a "central to local" commodity. On the one hand, as a natural object, the process of jadeite being endowed with value and its changing attributes was accompanied by the migration of the Han people, the dissemination of jade culture and the formation of folk jadeite trade activities. On the other hand, the natural material production and trade process follows a basic commodity flow line of "jadeite mining in Hpakant - processing in Tengchong - sales in Beijing (Guangdong, Shanghai, etc.) ". Its economic and trade model links and labor division were not complicated and had not been reshaped by the political and economic system of modern nation-states.

1.3 The Territorialization of Nation-State Power and Jadeite as a Cultural Consumer Commodity

Giddens believes that social activities take place in time and space (2015), and the state is not only a means of producing "administrative power", but also a container of power, wealth, culture, and society (1998). Since the independence of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar in 1948 and the People's Republic of China in 1949, the division of national boundaries had cut off the traditional jadeite trade activities, and the production areas and consumer markets became disconnected and divided within the space of the two nation-states of China and Myanmar. The territorialization competition and game between the two parties had increased the scarcity of jadeite and virtually produced new value content. The specific manifestations are as follows: First, driven by the demand created by the indigenous origin of jade culture, jadeite has become an important cultural consumer product in today's Chinese society, and more and more people love and buy jadeite. The second is that the price of jadeite has further increased, even surpassing Hetian jade's long-standing status as the king of jade. Hetian jade also comes from a faraway place - Xinjiang in Northwest China. In the past, it was usually made into yuxi (玉玺, imperial seals) and jade objects favored by royal families and dignitaries. It used to be regarded as the most noble and expensive jade among all types of jade.

1.3.1 Demarcation of State Boundaries: Territorialized Competition between Chinese and Burmese Nation-States

Since the Peace Treaty of Westphalia in May-October 1648, clear boundaries of physical space have become the common criterion for nation-states to limit the reach of each other's control power. The country determines the "belonging" of a specific space through the national border (Castree, 2008), and people use this to distinguish "insiders" and "outsiders", and the subject conducts domain behaviors such as "absorption" and

"rejection" around the border (Passi, 2009). Although nation states still exist, in certain parts of the world, especially in Europe national borders are increasingly being superseded by multilateral ideals. With the establishment of the European Union, European integration has been promoted, deepened and expanded. The integration has in varying level weakened the notion of national boundaries and national identities to the rise of a supranational European identity. However, in the past, with the division of the world by colonists and the wave of national independence, this idea was gradually recognized by various countries and formed the territory of the modern world. After Myanmar gained independence from the British colonial rule, the national border separated the originally connected jadeite mining area and the consumer market.

At the end of 1885, the United Kingdom defeated the Konbaung Dynasty. On January 1, 1886, it announced that Burma became a province of British India. In 1891, it captured the Savage Mountain and Jiangxinpo areas¹⁸, and occupied and controlled the jadeite mining area. In 1892, the Qing court sent Xue Fucheng, the Siguogongshi (四国公使, the special ambassadors to the four countries of Britain, France, Italy and Belgium), to negotiate with the British Foreign Office on the China-Myanmar border and bilateral trade issues.

The section of the Wadi River, where Dusi Yuli went, was located outside the boundaries of Myanmar. It has never been under the jurisdiction of Myanmar. There are many savages in this area, and there is no government responsible for state affairs. (Xue, 2019)

The account of Xue Fucheng in Official Documents of the Mission shows that at that time, the vast area of the Savage Mountains in the upper reaches of the Irrawaddy River, including the jadeite mining area, was a "dual genus" zone of "neither Myanmar nor China". Therefore, whoever actually controls the area will manage the mining of the jadeite deposits. In 1894, on behalf of the Qing court, Xue Fucheng signed the *Continuation of the Yunnan-Myanmar Border Affairs and Commercial Clauses* with the United Kingdom. Article 4 stipulates:

Today, the boundary of the section north of 25 degrees 35ths north latitude has been agreed upon. In the future, when the situation in this place is found out in more detail, the two countries will then demarcate the boundary line.

Therefore, this region belongs to the category of "areas with undetermined borders" in international law, but on the ground it was coercively colonized and controlled by the

¹⁸ Jiangxinpo refers to the area between Enmeikai River and Mailikai River, west of Gauri Gvong Mountain, Yunnan, with an area of about 27,000 square kilometers. It starts from Zayü Zong in the southernmost part of Tibet in the north, reaches the Mailikai River in the west, reaches the Enmeikai River in the east, and ends at the confluence of the two rivers in the south.

British. On January 4, 1948, Myanmar declared independence, and the British colonial government withdrew from Myanmar. However, due to internal conflicts in Myanmar and the government's inability to govern Upper Myanmar, the jadeite mining area was not completely brought under the control of the Myanmar government authorities, and mining and trade by the Han people continued. On April 19, 1960, China and Myanmar issued a joint communiqué, signing the China-Myanmar Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression and the Agreement on the Border Issue between China and Myanmar. In October, the China-Myanmar Boundary Treaty was formally signed. Consequently, the border between the two independent nation-states had officially disrupted the jadeite trade order system that had lasted for hundreds of years.

After the China-Myanmar border was established, the two countries implemented entirely different political and economic governance strategies within the space delineated by the national boundaries. After decades of respective development, the two countries demonstrated significant divergences in political, economic, cultural and other social conditions, but they both used their respective advantages to gain benefits from the jadeite trade through territorialization practical activities.

In the era of planned economy for nearly 30 years, mainland China advocated "self-reliance and hard work", and concentrated domestic resources for unified allocation and planned development. It is hoped that the social economy that has been damaged by years of wars could be rebuilt as soon as possible in the international environment where the two camps of the Cold War confront each other. At this stage, China's border blockade had caused the total volume of international trade in goods to decline sharply. Due to the lack of material production and poor social wealth, jadeite as a non-daily consumer product was not sought after by the residents in mainland China. The transnational procurement, processing and production of jadeite ores were concentrated in the hands of major state-owned jade factories, while the sales of finished products relied on Hong Kong and Taiwan people to bring them to overseas Chinese groups.

My master was a first-class jade carver at Guangdong Nanfang Jade Carving Factory. In the 1950s, the state carried out "socialist transformation" of the handicraft industry. The former workshops were turned into cooperatives, and the halls were all turned into state-owned sales offices. They were also raised by the state and paid well.I became an apprentice after my master retired and returned to Sihui to open a factory.At that time, most of the jade materials they carved were local southern jade, and they were also imported from Fujian and Yunnan (jade raw materials). The carvings were all for the country. The country would hold arts and crafts competitions, and the best ones were great artists.There were also overseas Chinese from Hong Kong,

Taiwan, and Southeast Asia to buy, but they were few, and they were incomparable with the current (production and sales volume).¹⁹

The political and economic strategy of the planned economy did not lead to the recovery of the Chinese economy after the war. In 1978 the central government introduced reforms and implemented the strategy of "focusing on economic construction", opening up the domestic market, allowing and encouraging the development of the private economy, and gradually opening up international trading ports. In 1979 the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone was established, and international trade goods began to enter and exit China through the Shenzhen port, and jadeite ores also entered Guangdong Province by sea. With Guangdong becoming a "world factory", it became a processing and distribution center for jadeite in Guangzhou, Foshan, Sihui, and Jieyang in Guangdong. In 1992 the Ruili Border Economic Cooperation Zone was established, the ports on the China-Myanmar border were opened, and the international trade activities of jadeite gradually resurfaced.

I went to the five outer counties (Ruili, Luxi, Longchuan, Yingjiang, Lianghe) in 1991 to buy some jadeite and make samples for students to use in class. I found 3 bracelets in Ruili, but I was interrogated at the border inspection station of Lujiang Bridge. The border police said that they were not allowed to bring into the mainland for trading. I had to tell the border guards that one was for my wife and two for my two daughters. Then they just let me pass.²⁰

Due to differences in the national strategic layout and economic policies, the recovery and the upgrading of the jadeite market in Yunnan took place more than decade later than that in Guangdong. The jadeite trade route that had organically formed a distribution center in Yunnan via the China-Myanmar border for centuries had been reconstructed into two distribution centers, notably in Guangdong and Yunnan. Guangdong's processing industry and industrial subdivision are far more developed than that of Yunnan. At the same time, the reform and opening up has achieved rapid wealth accumulation in Chinese society. In order to develop the market economy, the Chinese government had formulated a series of policies to expand domestic demand and stimulate consumption, intending to use consumption to promote production. Among them, one of the most effective policies to change national consumption behavior was to implement the long holiday system. From May 1, 1995, the two-day weekend was implemented, and until May 1999, the seven-day long holiday system was implemented. A large number of citizens with spending power could go to more places and further away destinations for tourism and consumption. China's GDP growth rate had fluctuated around 10% since the 1990s, making it the fastest-growing economy in the world. The

¹⁹ Interview time: 08/2019; Interlocutor: HJJ; Location: Sihui City, Guangdong Province.

²⁰ Interview time: 01/2019; Interlocutor: YDL; Location: Yunnan Geological and Mineral Exploration and Development Bureau.

proportion of total tourism revenue had risen from 5.2% in 2001 to 11% in 2017²¹. The three 7-day long holidays of "May 1st", "October 1st" and Spring Festival every year are called "Golden Week", which fully demonstrates the contribution of tourism to consumption growth. Stimulated by national policies, Chinese society was accelerating towards a consumer society, and cultural consumer goods accounted for an increasing proportion of people's consumption content. Jadeite trade took advantage of this trend, and consumer demand exploded in the first 15 years of the 21st century, representing an iconic cultural consumer product. The rapid expansion of the market had strongly driven the continuous flow of jadeite ore from Myanmar into China.

On the other side of the country's border, shortly after independence, Burmese military leader U Ne Win came to power in a military coup in 1962. He implemented the "Burmese-style socialist road" internally, dismantled the colonial economic system, and introduced a nationalized economic system under the control of the military dictatorship. He sealed off the country with the outside world and reduced the international trade volume to quasi nil. The trading activities of jadeite were also restructured by the military government. On the one hand, the Burmese military group seized and controlled the Hpakant Jade Factory through military force, and the state-owned mining enterprises monopolized the mining of jadeite resources, pushing out other participants. On the other hand, a jadeite ore Public Auction was opened in Yangon to establish a legal trading model, while the trade route was stipulated by the authorities. Only the ores that entered China through the Public Auction through the Guangdong port by sea were considered legally traded international commodities, while the traditional trade routes that did not go through the Public Auction but cross the China-Myanmar border were classified as smuggled goods. By nationalizing economic activities under the strict control of the military government it could gain huge profits from the international jadeite trade. However, the nationalization policy has led to two detrimental outcomes for the original jadeite trade free market. Henceforth, the Burmese forces and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) had been involved in a violent battle to ensure their respective interests in the Hpakant jadeite mines. Due to the continuous skirmishes, jadeite resources could not be mined in a fair, safe, and sustainable manner. This violent struggle made the supply of ores in the market extremely unstable. Moreover, the closure of the China-Myanmar border has pushed the circulation of jadeite to the underground as a smuggled product that is traded in the black market, without any regulation or control. In other words, the trading has become highly risky for sellers and buyers of jadeite.

At that time, the kyat was unstable, and Burmese were anti-Chinese. Many of us Chinese exchange money for jadeite that we kept hidden. But we didn't know when we could get the money back, and even when we needed the money urgently. Although it is said that "gold is hidden in troubled times, and jade is hidden in prosperous times", we Chinese still

²¹ Data released by the National Bureau of Statistics of China.

took away good jadeite to be safer for preventing the Myanmar government's anti-Chinese measures. Gold is too big to take away, but a good jadeite bracelet is worth a lot of gold.I sold a piece of jadeite ore that was full of green. The buyer didn't have that much money at once, so he mortgaged it with opium first, and it took him almost a year to pay it off. I was pretty lucky, some of them wouldn't return to pay back the money at all, and they couldn't be found.²²

In the name of legitimizing the exercise of nation-state power, the Burmese military government competed with other stakeholders of ethnic groups for the benefits of jadeite resources within the national borders. Their strong intervention has greatly increased the number of participants, trade links, and the length of trade routes, which eventually increased the production and distribution costs of jadeite, resulting in the scarcity of jadeite produced.

Nearly 30 years of seclusion and civil war has led to the collapse of Myanmar's economy, making it one of the least developed countries in the world. The Burmese military government was replaced in 1988 by a new military government that advocated a market economy. The new government encouraged the development of the private economy, and jadeite mining also showed a parallel situation of state-owned enterprises, private enterprises and public-private joint ventures. Coupled with the opening of the China-Myanmar Muse-Ruili Port, some trade activities on the China-Myanmar border had been legalized, and the Myanmar-Thailand line had gradually withdrawn from the stage of history. However, the interests of the government authorities are unshakable. Jadeite ores still have to go through Yangon (now Nay Pyi Taw) to obtain legal clearance qualifications. The mining and trading companies controlled by the military group are still the largest jadeite companies in Myanmar (Global Witness, 2015). There is still a lot of smuggling between China and Myanmar, whether by land or sea, and the extremely high risk has not reduced the production and distribution costs of jadeite in Myanmar.

Against the backdrop of territorial competition between China and Myanmar, the jadeite mining area and the consumer market basically represent nodes along a transnational economic network continuum. But from a political perspective, national boundaries separate the source region of production and the consumer market. The two nodes are located in two different countries with different political, economic, social and cultural systems.

²² Interview time: 01/2019; Interlocutor: YSP; Location: A clubhouse in Saigon Wharf, Dianchi Lake Resort, Kunming City, Yunnan Province.

1.3.2 Cultural Consumption and Value Content of Jadeite in Contemporary Society

In Han society, jade was originally a material symbol carrying symbolic meanings such as sacred worship, power hierarchy, and personality. When it entered the tributary system, it also gained the symbolic meaning of "treasure". After jadeite was included in the jade culture system, it was also endowed with these symbolic meanings. However, the circulation and prosperity of jadeite in the market coincided with the transition from traditional society to contemporary society in the world (Polanyi, 2017), and China was no exception. In other words, the past cultural value remains significant in modern and postmodern times.

First of all, jadeite has become a cultural consumer product with a large consumer base. After years of war and social turmoil, the jadeite trade has been suspended in mainland China for a long time. After the national policy inclined to "reform and opening up" in the late 1970s, the living conditions of the Chinese people continued to improve, and their consumption power increased rapidly. The suppressed jade culture flourished, the customs of buying, wearing, and collecting jade became a common practice, and the jadeite market suddenly became active. In order to build a socialist market economic system and continuously stimulate economic growth, the Chinese government actively encouraged the private sector and improved domestic production efficiency. In 1978 China's per capita GDP was 317 dollars and in 2020 it has reached 10,408 dollars²³, which lead to higher consumption capacity of residents. The country also opened the ports of Guangdong and Yunnan, and the international trade of commodities became increasingly active. The objects that could be consumed by the Chinese people had shifted from daily consumer goods to cultural consumer goods, and international commodities had gradually increased in the category of consumer goods.

My father opened a factory in the 1980s to make stainless steel straps for some famous foreign watches. Later, due to business problems, the company went bankrupt and had to pay off debts. I came out to resell antiques and jade. At that time, I was only 15 years old.There is an antique street in our Yangmei Village, and there are still old people selling antique jade. The earliest tradition is that our ancestors went to Jiangxi and Hubei to collect antiques from the people and sell them. There are many large tombs of the Han Dynasty over there, and many antiques are also hidden by the people. At that time (before and after the reform and opening up), we were too poor. A porcelain bowl from Ming and Qing Dynasties cost only one or two RMB, and jade wares were a little more expensive. Buyers from Taiwan and Hong Kong came to buy them.Later, there was jade (jadeite) ore shipped from

²³ Data released by the National Bureau of Statistics of China.

Myanmar, and my friends and I started to process it. At that time, we picked and purchased the ore in the market with kerosene lamps. It's very good now, the debt has been paid off long ago, I own a (jadeite processing) factory and built a 6-story house, and my wife is from Jiangxi. They are all mainland buyers now, and our Yangmei products (full green, expensive) are the best in the country.²⁴

Large and small processing factories process jadeite raw materials into finished products such as bracelets, pendants, rings, toys, and ornaments. Some are inlaid with gold, silver, diamond, red sapphire and other jewelry and precious metals to make pendants, brooches, hair ornaments, bracelets and other accessories. They are then sold to customers through terminal sales platforms such as individual jewelry stores, jewelry chain stores, and jewelry travel shopping stores. These jewelry stores specializing in jade are mainly found in Yunnan and other central cities - mostly at the provincial capital level - in China. As the number of jadeite consumers expanded, many gold shops that originally only sold gold have added jadeite jewelry counters. At this level, jadeite has become a "cultural consumer product" as specified by Baudrillard (2019).

To be an object of consumption, the object must become a sign, that is, somehow external to its relationship as merely signified - an arbitrary and inconsistent relationship between it and this concrete relationship. And it acquires coherence and meaning in its abstract systematized relation to all other objects-signs. It is consumed - never in materiality, but in difference.

Baudrillard believes that what people consume is the difference in the symbol of the commodity, not the commodity itself. Jadeite presents a more challenging case. It is undeniable that jadeite has become a cultural consumer product in today's society, or a symbol, but the cultural value that existed before it became a cultural consumer product has not disappeared. People still wear jadeite Guanyin, Buddha, Ruyi, etc. on their chests, hoping to be blessed by the gods. Some people even take the jadeite pendants to the temple to consecrate them to become spiritual again. Although the social system of using jade symbols to represent official ranks has disappeared, the shapes of "six apparatus" and "six auspiciousness" have evolved into the source of the shape of jadeite pendants and have been given new names and meanings. People think that wearing jade is a symbol of knowledge and social status. People still appreciate jadeite with the aesthetic thought of Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism representing "the unity of man and nature", and the associate carvings with excellent modeling and carving skills with high price. Therefore, the cultural value produced by the jade culture system is still the most basic part of the transaction price of jadeite.

²⁴ Interview time: 08/2019; Interlocutor: AQ; Location: Yangmei Village, Jieyang City, Guangdong Province.

There is also bi (璧) in ritual apparatus in the past, that is, the kind with a thick circle with a hole in the middle, called pingankou (平安扣, safety buckle), to ensure safety. There are also some ganqingzhong (干青种, dry green type) jadeites, because it does not have fine delicacy, moreover they are gaudy, and the polished light feeling is not good. Many of them were carved into small pillars with a hole in the middle. Some people call them lingguan (翎管, feather tube), and they say they are dingdaihualing (顶戴花翎, the decorations with flower feathers on top of the Qing Dynasty official hat). In fact, they should have been evolved from cong (琮). Chinese still prefer to wear jade, which is considered more cultured. Those who wear big gold chains are baofahu (暴发户, upstart)²⁵! Young people like diamonds, rubies and sapphire, but there is no conflict. They all like to buy jadeite.²⁶

With the increasingly dynamic economy, the concept of "gold has a price and jade is priceless (黄金有价玉无价)" has been activated. In addition to the symbolic meaning of traditional jade culture, the core content of jadeite consumer culture has also added mystery. Thinking that the mystery of treasures is a kind of scarcity may come from people's innate desire to understand unknown things and possess unknown and beautiful things. This desire for mysterious and beautiful objects was often manifested in pre-modern societies as plunder, war, or enforcement through the tribute system, full of violence and power control. In the modern commodity society, extreme types of power gained through violence can be transformed into soft types of power that are exchanged for money. When power appears in the form of economic capital, the existence of power becomes more hidden.

As mentioned above, it is extremely difficult to estimate the price of a finished jadeite product because the expression of the natural properties of jadeite varies in multiple ways, the arrangement and combination of various index dimensions create an ever-changing material performance, and the cultural added value generated by later processing and carving. Even experienced insiders have misjudged, not to mention lay buyers, even if they have a considerable desire to buy, they dare not make a move easily. The material properties of jadeite itself bring forth mystery, which makes its price to fluctuate and therefore difficult to grasp. Therefore, "gold has a price and jade is priceless" is the most extreme concept and practice in the jadeite category.

I once sold a half black and half white ornament, which was carved as a Maitreya Buddha lying on his side with one ear half in black and white.

²⁵ Bao fa hu is a term used by Chinese people to describe people who suddenly became rich due to "speculation" in the 1980s and 1990s. In the eyes of Chinese people, people who got rich through business have no cultural knowledge and are not worthy of respect, so this word is derogatory.

²⁶ Interview time: 06/2018; Interlocutor: WY; Location: Jingxing Flower, Bird and Jewelry Market, Kunming City, Yunnan Province.

Its starting price is about 4000 RMB. I named it 'All Ears and Listening (洗耳恭听)'. A customer liked it very much, maybe it fit his mentality at that time, so he happily bought it for 80,000 RMB.²⁷

In order to develop the local economy, the Yunnan provincial government and various jadeite retailers focus on the concept of provenance "Jadeite comes from Yunnan (玉出云南)", which has been passed down by word of mouth since the Ming and Qing Dynasties. They connect narrative themes full of mysterious cultural imaginations with jadeite, such as Tengchong, the hometown of overseas Chinese on the extreme frontier, the ancient tea-horse road that runs through the north and the south, the southern silk road that connects China and India, the legend of Dali in Nanzhao, the story of Dongba (东巴, priests of Naxi ethnic group) in Lijiang, the war-torn Burma, the arduous jadeite digging process and so on. Then, a set of extremely rare, meaningful, and abundant discourse system of jadeite was constructed, that was integrated in the tourist materials of the whole province (He and Yang, 2022). Tourists from all over China get on the tourist bus, and the drivers and guides vividly tell stories about this rare and beautiful jade full of strange and unknown secrets during the long-distance drive. Concepts such as "You must buy jadeite when you come to Yunnan", "Yunnan jadeite is not found anywhere else", "Jadeite is the king of jade" and other claims are made repeatedly, so that multi-dimensional symbolic meanings have been endowed on jadeite, in so doing the narrative of the scarcity of jadeite was ingenuously crafted. The attention of audiences consuming jade has shifted to Yunnan, and jadeite has become the most distinctive and most valuable tourism consumer item in Yunnan. The mysterious construction of jadeite also widens the price gap with other jade species, because other jade species, including Hetian jade, often only have jade cultural attributes, but it is difficult to weave a similar mysterious and exciting narrative as jadeite.

In addition, jadeite as a gift is also connected with capital in a broader sense. Part of the purpose of buying jadeite is to possess jade, which can be worn, collected, and has the potential to display social identity and status. The other part is to transfer the cultural value and economic value as a gift in exchange for some other forms of compensation.

When customers come to my store, I usually ask them whether they wear it themselves or give it as a gift? If they are wearing it by themselves, I will directly ask them what they like. If it is a gift, we will also ask their gift recipient if they can kandaojia.²⁸

The so-called "kandaojia (看到价)" refers to whether the recipient can roughly see the price of this jadeite, that is, the monetary expression of value. When jadeite is exchanged

²⁷ Interview time: 10/2017; Interlocutor: YB; Location: Yunnan Geology, Minerals and Jewelry Trading Center.

²⁸ Interview time: 12/2017; Interlocutor: AX; Location: Jingxing Flower, Bird and Jewelry Market, Kunming City, Yunnan Province.

as a gift, the recipient usually only has a certain notion of its scarcity, aesthetic feeling, and rich cultural meaning, but it is difficult to have a clear estimate of the real reasonable price. Because of the hidden and flexible space of its specific price, and the untraceability of the source of goods, jadeite has become one of the best intermediaries for social exchange with economic capital, power capital, and social capital in Chinese society.

The wife of a certain provincial leader (a former secretary of the Yunnan Provincial Party Committee sentenced for corruption, whose real name is withheld here) brought a man to our jadeite jewelry store one night, who looked like an attendant. She tried on a few bracelets and left, and the man came to buy one of them the next day, 15 million. It was only after it was exposed on TV that we realized that the man got a land development project. After the leader was arrested, my husband and I were taken by the police for questioning for two days. We were just selling bracelets.²⁹

In 2013, a real estate company in Kunming was preparing to apply for a loan from Fudian Bank. Kong, the vice president, saw that Li, the legal representative of the company, was wearing an expensive jadeite pendant, and asked whether he could try it. Li followed suit and hung the jadeite around Kong's neck, and the company's loan of up to 600 million RMB was successfully approved. (Gao, 2019)

The specific economic value of jadeite as a lubricator in social exchange is not highly opaque and unequal, but often the objects obtained by exchange can produce more inestimable economic value. At the same time, jadeite itself is not a consumable. As long as it is not damaged, it can be viewed, worn, and stored for generations. Therefore, a piece of jadeite may change hands several times, and each time it is exchanged for some kind of capital with high returns. The greater the capital exchanged, the higher the social class it circulates, and the more precious jadeite is in people's minds. Such accumulation has further pushed up the price of jadeite.

In sum, after the delineation of the national border between China and Myanmar, the economic order of the jadeite trade first demonstrated a territorialization process on the nation-state scale. The entire process of jadeite from "stone" to "jade", from a treasure and a tribute in a distant place to a cultural consumer product in modern society, goes hand in hand with the formation of modern society in China and Myanmar. That is the process of the direct and violent collision between Western colonial expansion and Eastern cultures concerning the independence of nation-states, the confrontation between socialism and capitalism, and the market economy transcending nations, countries, and cultures. The unique jade culture of the Chinese is a cultural power

²⁹ Interview time: 02/2018; Interlocutor: WY; Location: A Jade Club in Dianchi Resort, Kunming City, Yunnan Province.

different from that of other ethnic groups in Burma. The resulting demand drove the Chinese to discover and absorb jadeite during the historical process of developing the Southwest and interacting with Burma, giving it the symbolic meaning of jade culture. As tributes and collections, jadeite represents the conquest and subordination relationship between the central dynasty and the southwest region, the Han nationality and the southwest barbarians. The two nation-states, China and Myanmar, have reconstructed a set of social, political and economic orders in their own space containers through border empowerment, and territorialization competed for the interests of jadeite resources through the state power, that is, to use national boundaries to cut the traditional jadeite trade chain, so that the origin and market belong to two countries. The division of national boundaries interrupted the original frontier commercial trade and tribute economic exchanges: Myanmar made profits by controlling the production of raw materials, and China by controlling the market size and consumption capacity. The national forces of the two sides joined forces to build a jadeite trade order based on a market economy.

In this context, the flow of jadeite crosses two completely different time and space value systems, and the value content would be reconstructed accordingly. In the modern Chinese market economy society, jadeite has become a typical cultural consumer product and formed the largest market. The scarcity and price of jadeite are first determined by its cultural attributes. Since ancient times, the Chinese have regarded jade as an object with rich symbolic significance, which can be worn, displayed, and collected. When society enters the process of modernization centered on economic construction, jadeite has become a cultural commodity with deep meaning, which is preferred and sought after by Chinese people. Therefore, only in the Chinese market jadeite assumes a luxury and cultural consumer product based on its scarcity. In addition, Chinese society also regards jadeite as an intermediary of social exchange, through which the gift giver and the recipient achieve the exchange of economic capital, power capital, and social capital. When the value of the exchanged capital is higher, the value content it carries is also more complex, which virtually increases the value production and scarcity of jadeite. Secondly, the natural attributes of jadeite provide a sufficiently rich material medium or carrier for the production and reproduction of cultural values. Jadeite, as a polycrystalline and multi-mineral aggregate, naturally forms ever-changing and unquantifiable material manifestations. Coupled with artificial classification and identification, artificial carving and processing, the product categories of jadeite are complex and diverse. These characteristics not only allow people to freely "make fuss" and assign value to meet various consumption needs and exchange needs, but also keep the price difficult to ascertain accurately, so as to provide the flexibility and vitality of value appreciation. Third, in the process of territorial competition among nation-states, the scale of the market expands, the labor force increases, and the division of labor is also refined on the basis of the traditional trade model. These changes will eventually be passed on to jadeite sector in the form of price increases, which is exactly the value content produced by the territorialization practice of state power.

The analysis of nation-state territorialization in this chapter presents only the relationship between power competition and rising commodity prices at the macro scale. In fact, within the two countries, there are other levels of territorialization processes generating the value of jadeite, which will be analyzed in the next few chapters.

Chapter 2 **Competition for Jadeite Ores and Territory Scramble in Northern Myanmar**

If jadeite has not been included in the jade culture system of the Chinese, it may be difficult to evolve into a thing that is strongly desired by a single social culture today, and it is difficult to become a cultural consumer product exchanged across borders, and it is even more difficult to bring a considerable amount of foreign exchange to a certain country. The development of the southwestern frontier by the Chinese in history, as well as the jadeite free trade market formed in the late Qing Dynasty and the early Republic of China provided the premise for all this. Subsequently, the establishment of the Burmese nation-state made the government authorities controlled by the Burmese military group a legitimate subject of power in the modern world system. So, they took advantage of this legitimacy to rebuild a resource management system, and gradually occupied the development and utilization rights of jadeite through military violence and economic actions, so as to seek huge profits and realize control over minority territories. However, the establishment of a new jadeite trade order did not make a smooth transition in Myanmar but intensified the contradictions between interest groups characterized by ethnic differences. The specific manifestations is the extensive confrontation and partial cooperation among the multi-ethnic groups in the competition for mineral ownership and mining rights in the minority-inhabited space with the jadeite mines as the focus. It is precisely because the jadeite mining area is often the battlefield of the Burmese civil war, and the inter-ethnic competition is fierce, the cost of jadeite raw material development remains high.

2.1 The Distribution of Jadeite Deposits in Myanmar and the Ethnic Composition in the Region

2.1.1 Overview of the Distribution Area of Jadeite Deposits

Jadeite mineral resources are roughly distributed in the area extending from northeast to southwest along the Uyu River and its tributaries, centered on Phakant Town in northern Myanmar. The area is about 250 kilometers long and 15 kilometers wide, with a total area of more than 3,700 square kilometers (Ouyang, 2000), spanning the west of Kachin State and the east of Sagaing Province.

The entire jadeite deposit can be divided into eight changqu (场区, field) according to the quality characteristics of the jadeite produced and the similar geographical location. Among them, the Phakant field is the field with the richest secondary mineral deposits of jadeite, and it is also the earliest and most famous area for mining. About eight

kilometers northeast of the Phakant site is the Lonkyin field, which is dominated by Primary mines. Lonkyin used to be the nearest jadeite distribution center to Mogaung, but it has now been replaced by Hpakant. About ninety kilometers to the northwest of the Lonkyin field is the Chindwin River field, and about forty kilometers to the north of it is the Kansi field. The two fields are located in Sagaing Province. To the south of Phakant, the field where the Uyu River is separated from its tributary Hwe river is the Kadonyat area. The Hwehka area is located in the Hwe river basin in the southeast of the Kadonyat area. The Tarmukhan field is located in the lower reaches of the Uyu River, southwest of the Kadonyat field. The Mohnyin field is located in the south of Indawgyi lake, and it is adjacent to the Mandalay to Myitkyina railway to the east. People in the jadeite industry sometimes divide jadeite deposits into four or six fields, but they are all based on the recombination of the above eight fields.




Image 6: Distribution map of jadeite deposits.

Source: The author draws based on the existing literature and oral data of the interlocutor.

Each field area is made up of several changkou (场口, deposit). Changkou is a small area composed of several mines producing jadeite ore of similar quality. It is generally named after the name of the place or the village. There are some famous mines with high quality of ore, such as Moshisa, Mowantkyi, Mona, etc. The Chinese who have mined jadeite for many years call the jadeite mining area "yushichang (玉石场, jade factory)" and the mine deposit "dongzi (洞子, hole of mine)".

2.1.2 Ethnic Composition and Changes of Population Surrounding Jadeite Deposits

In the context of the Han people who mined jadeite resources, it is customary to refer to the area where the mine is located as "Yerenshan (野人山, Savage Mountain)". Yeren (野人, savage) is the unified name of the early Central Plains dynasty for the tribes living on the edge of the dynasty and in the mountainous area. When it was used, it did not distinguish the Kachin, Lisu, or Benglong people in the modern sense, and the concept is relatively vague. According to the British anthropologist Leach's method of grouping according to the three conditions of linguistics, geography, and politics, Shan people live in the plains of northern Burma, and Kachin people (Jingpo) live in the mountainous areas (Leach, 2010). Before the British colonization, Burma's political model was not only regionally integrated, but also did not form a close political relationship between ethnic groups. Each ethnic group had its own political operation model and leaders (Josef, 1980). Therefore, both the Shan people and the Kachin people were relatively independent political entities at that time and had no absolute affiliation with the Burma dynasty in the south or the Han dynasty in the east. Therefore, from the perspective of historical evolution, the jadeite mine is located in the territory of the Kachin people who lived in the mountains of northern Myanmar for generations, and it belongs to the endowment resources of the Kachin people. However, there was a close symbiotic relationship between Shan and Kachin:

The jade mines were a major cause of the initial downfall of the 18th-century Mogaung kings, which had been in the hands of a series of Kachin Mountain officials for the past sixty years or so. These mountain officials, although considered Kachin by British colonial officials, imitated the Shan way of life and married Shan families. They also acquired the title of Duwa (山官, mountain official) in Kansi (Kanti), which indicated that they were the heirs to the original land of the Shan people. (Leach, 2010)

The "Mogaung (勐拱)" mentioned in the article was once the name of a Shan state. After it was eliminated as a political entity by the Burmese, "Mogaung" was used as a place name and gradually formed the earliest and largest jadeite distribution center in Burma. Therefore, there is reason to believe that the Shan people also participated in the early development of jadeite. They may not directly control the mines, but they were likely to

be directly involved in the jadeite trade or tax them. This is also confirmed in Chinese historical documents:

During the Kangxi (1654-1722) and Yongzheng (1678-1735) periods of the Qing Dynasty, those who mined and transported jadeite had not dared to venture into the jadeite mining area. It was not until the early Qianlong (1711-1799) period that there were no traces of the Han people in the jadeite mining area. Therefore, we Tengyue people, who went to the mountains to mine jadeite and seek treasures, have lived in Mogaung for hundreds of years. (Yin, 1974)

This record suggests that perhaps before the Qing Dynasty, the Han people did not go directly to the mine site to mine jadeite due to the difficult terrain, numerous beasts, poor mining technology, and inconvenient road transportation in Savage Mountain. It was not until the early years of Qianlong that a relatively continuous and stable economic exchange model was gradually formed. Whether it was Kachin or Shan, the buyers they traded with were Han Chinese. These jade caravans from Yunnan drove horses, went deep into the mines to contract mining, or traded in Mogaung, and then carried the jadeite ore to Tengyue of Yongchang for processing. In the 1870s, well-known Tengchong businessmen Zhao Lianhai and Mao Yingde bought the Xinshan jadeite mine from the Kachin head and mountain official of Ganxi (Kansi) Mountain. They transported the excavated jadeite ores back to Tengchong market for processing and trading and became rich and became big jadeite merchants (Li, 1944). Therefore, the early ethnic groups who were engaged in jadeite mining and trading in and around the mining area were mainly Han, Shan, and Kachin. Among them, the leader of the "savages" outsourced the mining rights of jadeite, and most of the clansmen brought mountain goods to the market to exchange rice and other items (Zhou, 1989) and did not participate in the development of jadeite deeply.



KACHINS TRANSPORTING A BOULDER OF JADEITE, HWÉKA.

Image 7: Kachin people in the late 19th century carried a huge rough jadeite in Hwehka.

Source: Hughes R.W. (1999). Burma's jade mines: An annotated occidental history. Originally published in Bleeck, A.W.G. (1908) Jadeite in the Kachin Hills, Upper Burma.

After the three Anglo-Burmese wars, the United Kingdom annexed the whole of Burma, and recognized Burma as a province of British India, and adopted a divide-and-rule policy: On the one hand, directly ruled Burma proper by strengthening the connection between village leaders and the chief executive of the colonial system; On the other hand, by retaining local leaders to continue the original social governance power and reducing the interference of the colonial system to ensure peace in regional trade, it indirectly ruled other border areas (Josef, 1980). Within this colonial governance framework, the development and trade of jadeite formed a relatively stable multi-level economic order among different ethnic groups. First of all, the ownership of the jadeite mines still belongs to the Kachin Mountain officials. The jadeite deposits are located in a vast area, with high and low terrain, and the mines are discontinuously distributed in the shape of

metallogenic belts. Different mines would be found in the territories of large and small mountain officials, so the contract tax and land tax vary from person to person (Zhou, 1989). Secondly, Mogaung and the jadeite mining area were still under the jurisdiction of Mengyang Xuanweisi (孟养宣慰司, name of a Shan chieftain) at that time, so at the same time, they had to pay the land tax to Shan Zhaopa (召帕, chieftain) (Zhou, 1989). Third, the British government set Mogaung as the general export point for jadeite and amber, and the tax office at the "national" level was located in the Guandi Temple (关帝庙) in Mogaung. Fourth, the main force in the real development of jade had always been the Han people, and at this time stage, the Tengyue and Shun people were the main force. For example, the Han Chinese jadeite merchants represented by Zhang Baoting (包岗, full contracted) the jadeite mining area (Yin, 2003), and at the same time assisted the British colonial government in managing the national taxation of jadeite, basically included the jadeite business in their own hands, and greatly revitalized the jade industry.

Zhang Deyu (Zhang Baoting, courtesy name Deyu) from Tengchong bought and mined jadeite in Mogaung, and contracted Mogaung's jadeite taxation business from the British colonial government at a price of 300,000 Indian silver dollars per year. He opened a firm specializing in foreign goods (transportation) for the British government in Myitkyina, and also opened firms specializing in Jadeite in Mandalay and Tengchong. He spanned the entire jadeite trade chain, so he was called the "Jadeite King". The British government even rewarded him with medals for his contributions to stabilizing tax payments and maintaining order in the jadeite industry.³⁰

It was not until around 1940 that the British government "purchased" the rights of Kansai's mountain official (Leach, 2010) that the British divided up the jadeite resources. However, until the retreat of the British Empire, the colonial government's actual control over the mineral resources in northern Burma was relatively weak, as shown in the report of the Frontier Areas Committee of Inquiry on the eve of Burma's independence:

The hill tracts have three main sources of wealth and.....it is going to be essential that these resources be developed in the full. Agriculture, Forests and Minerals have in the past provided Burma's wealth, yet these great resources have invariably been left in the hands of inadequate government departments.....For a country possessing Burma's mineral wealth, the Mines Department established by the British was lamentable. (NAI, 1947)

It can be seen from the records that although the British collected state taxes, their control over jadeite mineral deposits was not in-depth, and they did not reach the boundaries and limits of nation-state power in the modern sense. In fact, the

³⁰ Fieldwork time: 06/2018; Location: Narrative of Tengchong Jadeite Museum Collection.

development and trade of jadeite during this period was still achieved among the Han, Shan and Kachin, and the taxation of the British had little impact on the entire mining and trading activities.

At the beginning of Myanmar's independence, the British withdrew from the jadeite market, and the Myanmar government inherited the management model of jadeite affairs from the British colonial government. Jadeite mining and trade were mainly engaged in by Kachin, Han, and Shan people. However, shortly after the Ne Win military government came to power in 1962, the ethnic composition around the mining area changed dramatically. First of all, the controllers of mineral resources began to be dominated by state-owned enterprises controlled by the Burmese military government, followed by the Kachin people. In addition, local armed political elites of Wa, De 'ang, Lisu and other ethnic minorities are also involved. Secondly, the lower-level jadeite diggers (yei ma hsei) mainly include Burmese, Rakhine, Kachin, and Chinese. "Yei ma hsei" is the Burmese name for the grassroots level jadeite miners, means "washing with water". Because miners usually wash it with water first when checking to see if the ore belongs to jadeite ore, and when judging and estimating its quality. It is worth noting that Rakhine State is located in the southwest of Myanmar, close to Bangladesh and far away from the mining area, but many Rakhine people migrate into the Hpakant area and become the bottom-level jadeite diggers second only to the Burmese:

...The army (Myanmar government army) is also fighting in Rakhine State, the Rakhine people cannot live, the land cannot be planted, and there are many IDPs (Rakhine people). There are also mines in Rakhine State, not jadeite. Those mines are difficult to obtain and require high technology (equipment). Ordinary people simply cannot enter. Jadeite ores can be picked up without any machine, just try your luck, so they came here one by one.³¹

Thirdly, Burmese Chinese and Chinese are mostly middlemen, followed by Rohingya, Kachin, and Shan. Most of them, because of the exclusion policy of the Burmese military government, are neither qualified to mine directly, nor have land or citizenship and are forced to make a living, so they come to the jadeite mining area to become bottom-level laborers. Among them, many excluded Chinese continue their trading activities by establishing nepotism with mineral controllers. They generally participate in the value production and profit-making activities of jadeite by providing informal institutionalized methods such as technology, capital, and social network. Since the Rohingya do not have citizenship, they almost all rely on their own social networks for trade activities and do not directly participate in the mining of jadeite minerals. The tense situation of inter-

³¹ Interview time: 11/2020; Interlocutor: LYX; Location: A jadeite store near Green Lake, Kunming City, Yunnan Province.

ethnic relations has been accompanied by armed conflicts, black market transactions, increasing IDPs, drug flooding and other phenomena, which has continued to this day.

Through the analysis of the geographical spatial distribution of the above-mentioned jadeite deposits and the composition of the surrounding ethnic groups, the following conclusions can be drawn: First of all, the Savage Mountain where the mineral resources are found in the Kachin Highlands in northern Myanmar. From a traditional point of view, jadeite resources and their geographical space belong to the indigenous Kachin people who have lived there for generations. Second, the Han people, especially those from Yunnan, were the earliest developers of jadeite resources. The jadeite deposit is only more than 200 kilometers away from Tengchong, Yunnan. The jadeite trade route from Mogaung to Tengyue was one of the many trade routes on the ancient "Southern Silk Road" between India and China. Han Chinese caravans traveled on this route very early. They either directly traded with Kachin Mountain officials and headmen or bought mining rights from Kachin in jadeite distribution centers under the jurisdiction of Shan chieftains, or undertook taxation, transportation business, and took care of jadeite processing, sales and other links to obtain benefits. Third, the development and utilization of jadeite was a historically formed economic exchange activity among Kachin, Shan, and Han people. At least before the British colonization, it maintained a relatively peaceful state, and there were no obvious, violent, and large-scale ethnic conflicts caused by resource competition. After the British colonization and the early days of Myanmar's independence, the Kachin people's ownership of jadeite deposits had also been recognized. The colonial government tried to negotiate the distribution of rights among all parties through governance policies and took as much of it as possible in the form of taxation, but the proportion was very small. Inter-ethnic relations are still maintained at a relatively balanced and non-violent level. Fourth, the major change in the distribution pattern of the ethnic groups around the jadeite deposits occurred after the Ne Win military government came to power. It is manifested that the Burmese, whose main distribution area and political center is nearly 1,000 kilometers away from the location of the jadeite mine, and in the plains of the lower reaches of the Ayeyarwady River, strongly intervened in the development of jadeite, and other ethnic groups joined in one after another. The rights and interests of the former three main participating groups had all been greatly reduced.

2.2 The Burmese Government and the Ethnic Minorities in Northern Myanmar Competing for Jadeite Mining Rights

The post-colonial Burma has highlighted the legacy problems. The domestic political situation has been unstable, civil wars have continued, ethnic conflicts have been sharp, and religious conflicts have occurred frequently. So far, there has been no real unity. The most important of these is the irreconcilable contradiction between the Burmese military group and the local armed forces of various ethnic minorities, which has existed since

before the independence of the country. In the following decades, jadeite mineral resources gradually became the object of inter-ethnic competition. After two stages of territorialization, the Bamar gradually took most of the jadeite mineral resources and their areas into their own hands from the territory of the Kachin.

2.2.1 Myanmar Style Socialism and the Violent Market

Burma is a multi-ethnic country, and the British Ethnic Survey of the 1930s identified its inhabitants as 135 ethnic groups (Enriquez, 1933). At present, the main ethnic group, the Burmese, accounts for about 70% of the country's total population, with the southern plains of Myanmar as the main settlement area; Shan, Kachin, Kokang, Wa and other ethnic minorities live in the northern central plains, mountainous areas, and border areas of the country.

The Konbaung Dynasty established by the Bamar once conquered almost the entire territory of Myanmar, but its direct governance was limited to the Irrawaddy River Plain area centered on the royal city of Mandalay, and other surrounding ethnic groups established relatively loose economic and political ties with the dynasty through tribute. After the three Anglo-Burmese wars, Britain gradually annexed the entire territory of Burma. At the same time, Britain developed Burma's economy and adopted a divide-and-rule strategy with completely different logic and incompatible administrative systems for Burma's main body and border areas (Chen, 2016). First, as a province under British India, many Indian immigrants entered Burma to control power and absorb wealth with the British. Second, the Burmese had a strong sense of deprivation during the British colonial period. Because on the one hand, a large number of Burmese people were moved south by the colonial government to the delta near the sea to engage in rice cultivation, making Burma begin to become the food supply place for Britain. On the other hand, the main part of Burma directly ruled by the British is dominated by the Burmese. Most of them are excluded from the civil servants and the military system, and they are engaged in industries with extremely low returns. Third, divide and rule—a common strategy of the colonists—laid the groundwork for the subsequent ethnic separatism in Myanmar. Although most of the other ethnic minorities scattered in the northern part of Burma and on the edge of the country were included in the framework of the British colonial government, they continued to be relatively independent political units in their own territories. The British also supported the development of some ethnic minorities, allowing them to become their own agents to assist in the governance of Burma, such as the Karen ethnic group.

In 1938, Aung San, a Burmese, joined the Thakin Party (Do Bama Asiayon) that resisted the British, and devoted himself to a series of struggles for independence and national founding. After citing Japan's resistance to British colonization, and abandoning Japan to Britain to resist Japanese fascism and other revolutionary experiences and reflections, he found that only by establishing a federal state among all ethnic groups can Burma truly

escape from the turbulent situation. Therefore, in 1946, he called on and persuaded the minority regimes in the north to unite against the British and establish a completely independent nation-state and promised to protect the existing interests and internal autonomy of the regimes in the border areas after the success of independence. The complex and difficult situation that Aung San faced when he united with the ethnic minorities to establish an independent country can be seen from the following records (Lintner, 2014):

Q: What do you hope for the future of Wa people?

A: We never thought about it. We never thought about the future of the administration. We only think about ourselves.

Q: Don't you want education, clothes, good food, good houses, hospitals, and so on?

A: We are very savage people, and we don't appreciate all these things you say.

On January 27, 1947, Aung San arrived in London and was finally signed by British Prime Minister Clement Richard Attlee to sign the Charter of Independence. At the "Panglong Conference" in February 1947, many parties in Burma clearly voted that the political system after independence would be a federal system. At the same time, it would ensure the hereditary power of the upper class of ethnic minorities in Kachin State, Shan State, Karen State, and other regions, and ensure that all ethnic groups enjoy equal civil rights in democratic countries in the Union of Myanmar. Even 10 years after Myanmar's independence, some upper Myanmar ethnic minority states represented by Kachin State can vote on their own whether they want to remain in the Union of Myanmar (Panglong Agreement, 1947). These generous promises gave the ethnic minority states full freedom and citizenship, making the independent Burmese nation-state unity come true. When I was doing fieldwork in Myanmar, a key Kachin interlocutor said:

...When fighting for independence, our Kachin army was the most powerful military force at that time. General Aung San came to lobby many times...My father participated in the Panglong Conference in 1947.³²

However, the Panglong Agreement did not include all ethnic minorities. The Karen people, whose population was second only to Bamar and Shan, refused to join the new political framework due to their full autonomy under British rule. The Karenni state, which had never been fully incorporated into British Burma, nor had it ever belonged to the Konbaung Dynasty, was not at all willing to be included in the territory of the Union of

³² Interview time: 05/2020; Interlocutor: KJ; Location: A restaurant near Green Lake, Kunming City, Yunnan Province.

Myanmar. Furthermore, General Aung San, who led the Panglong Agreement, and his cabinet members were shot dead in the office at 10:37 am on July 19, 1948 (Aung San, 1994). The perpetrator was U Saw, a right-wing opponent³³. Politicians are trying to dash hopes of a peaceful transition to a democratic coalition in postwar Myanmar. On January 4, 1948, U Nu, Aung San's deputy, still established the independent Union of Burma, but at the same time, various ethnic minorities also began to build their own armed forces. In 1948, the leader of Karenni was assassinated because he opposed the incorporation into the Union of Myanmar, and the Karenni people began to resist by force; In 1949, the Karen National Union started to combat with force for national independence, and even once surrounded the capital Yangon. The Mon ethnic group also took up rebellion against the central government because they were denied autonomy demands (Matthew, 2008). Moreover, the 1st Kachin Rifles, who had always regarded their service in the Allied Forces in World War II as a "Time of Big Honor", defected when they received orders from the government to attack their fellow Karen people (Levy and Scott-Clark, 2001).

In fact, the Burmese power group was not strong internally, and dissidents quickly started anew. The Burmese military strongman Ne Win, who was the commander-in-chief of the Burmese army at the time, obtained weapons and trained the army with the support of the United Kingdom. By 1957, the number of troops had exceeded 40,000 (Maung Aung Myoe, 2009). In 1958, Ne Win shelved the "right to independence of the two states" in the Constitution of the Union of Myanmar. In 1962, after seizing power in a military coup, he directly abolished the constitution and implemented "Myanmar Style Socialist" governance path of military dictatorship (Liao, 2016), starting a military dictatorship that lasted for more than 50 years. The political framework and democratically elected system disintegrated at the time of independence. While civil unrest was suppressed, it forfeited the government's legitimacy. In the next thirty years, on the one hand, the authorities promote "Burmanism" and the concept of "one religion, one language, one nation" while pursuing military dictatorship (Sakhong, 2012), and exclude other ethnic groups in terms of politics, economy, and religious beliefs. On the other hand, internationally many countries imposed economic sanctions on the Burmese military government, while secretly supporting the development of other political forces internally, which intensified ethnic conflicts (He, 2001).

It can be seen that the basis of Myanmar's independence was the result of consultation and cooperation between the faction headed by Aung San within the Bamar and the ethnic minorities in the North. It had not reached an agreement with the ethnic minorities in other regions, and there were also strong factions at odds within the Bamar. At the same time, the Federal Constitution promulgated under the premise of cooperation in the Panglong Agreement was the basis of the government's legitimacy after independence. Therefore, the fulfillment of the promises of the Panglong

³³ According to other documents, the real culprit is actually Ne Win, who was also Burmese with Aung San but had different political stances.

Agreement had lost its guarantee and most of the agreements had not been realized. This had led to the rapid shift in Myanmar's internal policy evolving from the external anti-colonial struggle joining all parties' joint to internal disputes among various political factions and ethnic groups, which became the origin of ethnic tension and political turmoil after 1958 (He, 1992). It can be said that after World War II, Myanmar was established on the basis of the legacy of colonialism, that is, ethnic conflicts that had not been properly resolved. Therefore, the competition among various ethnic groups in Myanmar for traditional territories and resources in territories including jadeite persisted after independence.

In 1948, the Burmese authorities took over the management of jadeite deposits from the British colonial government, and the basic system remained unchanged. Due to the loose management of the Ministry of Mines of the British colonial government, the management power of the Burmese government was equally weak at this stage. After the Ne Win military government came to power, it promoted "Myanmar Style Socialism", accompanied by the nationalization of jadeite resources, and stipulated that individuals were not allowed to mine and own jadeite ores without permission. The government set up the Jade Mining Bureau ("kyawwathcaim byauu ro" of Burma) responsible for mining activities in Hpakant where the Burmese army was stationed. All Burmese Chinese in the jadeite mining area were driven away by abandoning their houses and production. Kachin, Shan, and a small number of Burmese Chinese risk their lives by staying in the jadeite mining area to engage in stealing ores. The so-called "state-owned" was actually "Burmese-owned" in disguise. The interlocutor recalled:

My uncle told me that it was too hard for them to go to the jadeite mining area at that time. They had to travel a long way and there were no roads. The only way to dig jadeite was to use iron rods. There was no machine, and they dared not make any sound! If they mined a small ore, they carried it down by themselves. When they found big one, they buried it and make a mark. They didn't dare to be detected by others because it would probably be snatched away. Later, they would see how to transport it down the mountain.³⁴

The Kachin Independence Army (KIA) or the Shanjun (山军, Mountain Army), established in 1961, immediately resisted with force in the face of the Burmese military government's actions that not only failed to fulfill its promises, but also pushed forward "Burmanism" or policy that only benefits the Burmese people and culture. Relying on their ethnic identity and local combat advantages, the Kachins quickly occupied the jadeite mining area and the vast countryside and mountains as far east as Bhamo. The competition for jadeite mining was fierce. The Mountain Army opened jadeite mines, implemented taxes, and

³⁴ Interview time: 01/2019.1; Interlocutor: SI; Location: Delong Jewelry City, Ruili City, Dehong Prefecture, Yunnan Province.

expanded financial resources, including household registration tax, toll tax, small boss tax, middle boss tax, worker tax, cave tax, ore value assessment transaction tax, and so on. In addition, the elephants, ox carts, and cars that haul ores had to pay taxes, too so they secured different sources of income forming a "Jadeite Politics" situation (Zhou, 1989). After the 1970s, there were more Kachin jadeite bosses, which were rare before, and a "Jadeite Battalion" was added to the KIA, which was responsible for the military protection of jadeite mining and transportation. On the other side, the Burmese government army set up a military garrison on the mountain highland between Mengmao (勐冒) and Mamengwan (麻檬湾), overlooking Phakant and the entire jadeite mining area, and recruited strong men from Phakant households to form a militia team to reinforce its strength. The government army often sieged the mines and inventoried the market, while the mountain army often raided Phakant, or smuggled out the big jadeite dug by the bosses who didn't want to be taxed or seized of jadeite by government forces.

...The miners hide themselves from the Burmese army after digging jadeite, because it is subject to confiscation. It was not always safe to transport jadeite through the KIA. There were checkpoints searched by the Burmese army on the roads. If the Burmese could not seize it, they would blow it up with bomb shells. They prefer to blow up the ore than let you sell it.³⁵

Protracted political struggles and civil wars had consumed a huge amount of national strength, and the long-term economic blockade had even more weakened the originally underdeveloped industrial system, and domestic material production was extremely scarce. Myanmar fell from the better-developed economy in pre-independence Southeast Asia to one of the least developed countries in the world (UNCTAD, 1996). However, regardless of whether the Burmese military group or the local armed forces of ethnic minorities wanted to continue long-term confrontation, a large amount of military expenditure must be guaranteed. Therefore, as poppy cultivation and opium trade, which were abandoned and spread by the British East India Company, could make huge profits in a short period of time, the armed forces of all parties to support their troops with poppy cultivation. At the same time, the trafficking of natural resources such as jadeite, timber, rubies, and amber, and casinos, the black markets in trading daily necessities, and arms deal had also become the main sources of huge profits (Chang, 2014). The armed forces benefiting from the violent jadeite market include not only the Burmese and Kachin, but also the remaining forces of the KMT (国民党, Kuomintang/Chinese Nationalist Party) who fled from Yunnan to Myanmar and other local armed forces of ethnic minorities on the China-Myanmar, Thai-Myanmar, and Lao-Myanmar borders. With the support of these profits, they can maintain their military strength to continue a

³⁵ Interview time: December 2019; Interlocutor: ZH; Location: Delong Jewelry City, Ruili City, Dehong Prefecture, Yunnan Province.

long-term regional confrontation with the Burmese military government and imposing political demands.

After retreating across the Chinese border into Myanmar, the remaining force of the Kuomintang set up bases in the jungles of Shan State. Since international law does not allow the establishment of troops in other countries, these troops could only stay in the jungle in the capacity of the "Volunteer Army" waiting for the opportunity to counterattack and for the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to airdrop weapons. However, the "strategy of counterattacking the mainland" had not been realized for many years. Coupled with the collapse of Myanmar's economy and the lack of material production, even basic daily necessities are hard to get to meet people's basic needs (Chang, 2004). This unrecognized army and their families faced serious problems of survival.

...Our group of people are so lonely, like duckweed, we were pushed to here and abandoned, we were not allowed to evacuate to Taiwan, and we have no (reasonable and legal) identity here, we are so pitiful. ...We fought many battles with our families to survive.³⁶

The officers of the Kachin Independence Army soon discovered that exchanging guns and ammunition with KMT remaining army with jadeite ores could just make up for their own shortage of weapons. The Kuomintang remaining army, mainly composed of Yunnanese, had sales channels for jadeite ores, and with the profits they buy daily necessities and supported troops and dependents. The exchange between the two parties matched and so they could trade.

To sum up, after the independence of Myanmar and the period of Myanmar Style Socialism, the territorial competition in the jadeite mining area was mainly manifested as follows. On the one hand, the Burmese military group first obtained the legitimacy of the military government by seizing power from the democratically elected government of an independent nation-state. Furthermore, through the strategy of changing the country's political system, they seized the jadeite resources by means of "nationalization" of all resources, including the mining areas with the resources. When the political system did not protect them, they used force to protect their own interests, violently repelled opponents, and occupied the jadeite mineral distribution area. On the other hand, in order to maintain political and economic demands concerning for example their own entitlements to the jadeite resources and the territorial control of the mine location, the Kachin people resisted the political strategies and armed attacks of the Burmese with force. When military expenditures were scarce and weapons were in short supply, they adopted a strategy of bartering jadeite and arms with other armed forces to deal with the

³⁶ Interview time: January 2019; Interlocutor: DGF; Location: Wanyang Village, Chiang Mai Province, Thailand.

Burmese offensive. Overall, the original relatively peaceful trade market had gradually transformed into a violent market. It was precisely because the Burmese legalized resource plundering in the name of nation building, which broke the balance of the original trade order and severely damaged the fairness of the free market, while the political demands of other ethnic groups were undermined, violent conflicts continued to escalate. Therefore, the violent competition for jadeite resources was actually the manifestation and result of the ethnic conflicts in northern Myanmar. The profits generated in the violent market had become an important source of military expenditure, supporting the armed forces of competitors. Such a cycle of competition between the two sides had expanded the market and intensified the conflict. Violent market competition resulted in alternate occupation of jadeite mines by competing parties, which cause labor, production tools, and jadeite ores were destroyed and consumed in the war, and the price of jadeite skyrocketed. The violent reconstruction of the economic order had concentrated and accumulated benefits in the hands of those who held violent power, further supporting the expansion of power.

2.2.2 Market Economic System and Ceasefire for Market

Long-term military operations had failed to enable the warring parties to realize their respective political goals, nor could they eliminate each other militarily. Especially for the Burmese military government, the black-market network of jadeite trade was well-developed and intricate, and the nationalization policy supported by violence could not completely control jadeite resources under its own power.

With the deepening of the international anti-drug campaign in the 1980s and 1990s, opium poppy cultivation was completely banned (The Compilation Committee of the Chronicles of the Wa State of the Union of Myanmar, 2018) and gradually replaced by economic crops such as rubber, bananas, and coffee. Compared with planting and selling drugs, jadeite and other natural resources were reasonable and legal commodities in the international market, and the consumer demand for jadeite in the Chinese community had also remained stable. The blockage of drug profit channels quickly attracted armed forces into the profitable jadeite business, causing the price of jadeite to soar. A record of the Hong Kong Christie's Jadeite Auction (Christie's jadeite catalogue, 1997) showed:

KMT (Kuomintang/Chinese Nationalist Party) bought a piece of jadeite ore weighing about 28.8 kilograms from the Kachin KIA at a price of 88,888,000 taels of silver (about 2 million U.S. dollars at the time), and it was named "8888". In 1997, a small piece of jadeite jewelry made from part of this ore was sold at Christie's for \$300,000.

The huge profits brought about by jadeite mineral resources had economically supported the resistance movement of the Kachin people, and also supported the resistance movement of many ethnic groups on the China-Myanmar and Thailand-Myanmar borders.

For the Burmese government, this passive situation was not only about the loss of natural resources and economic interests, but also about whether the fundamental goals of centralization and national territorial integrity. So, they adjusted their resource competition strategy, while maintaining military strikes and repelling competitors, while using mining rights as political bargaining chips, striving for a ceasefire in exchange for economic benefits.

In 1988, the new military group seized power through a coup. They established the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) as a legislative and executive body and dissolved the Socialist Federal Republic of the Union of Myanmar (RUM) state apparatus. In order to stabilize the domestic situation and gain political legitimacy, the new government re-amended the constitution, announced the abandonment of "Myanmar Style Socialism", implemented the "Market Economic System", and the "opening to the outside world" policy (He, 2001). At the same time, the new government had adopted a series of measures to generate goodwill in the fields of politics, economy, and diplomacy (Song, 2017). It should be emphasized that the new government was a replacement of the old and new military forces within the Burmese. The authority of the military was still maintained, and ethnic conflicts had not been resolved. Under the market economy system, Myanmar's private capital had gradually entered the development of jadeite mineral resources, forming a parallel situation of state-owned enterprises, public-private joint ventures, and private enterprises. The Chinese jadeite businessmen were finally able to return to the jadeite mining area in an open and above-board manner.

In 1989, the Burmese Communist Party (CPB/BCP) disintegrated and split into the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the Kokang National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and the Mongla National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA). The Kachin Independence Army (KIA) split into the New Democratic Army of Kachin (NDA-K). In the ceasefire agreement they signed with the Burmese military government authorities, they demand among other things jadeite mining rights. After the military government and the United Wa Army signed a ceasefire agreement, the United Wa Army, which possessed 7,564 weapons, was removed from the blacklist of illegal armed organizations (Chen, 2008). High-quality jadeite deposit mining rights were also one of the conditions for the ceasefire. The Kachin Independence Army also signed a ceasefire agreement with the Burmese government on February 24, 1994, after the military promised to protect the interests and other rights of Kachin high-level officials in jadeite mining. As a result, the northern region of Myanmar began a 17-year period of relatively peaceful development, and the mining of jadeite was in full swing:

We helped the Wa State dig jadeite in the mining area in the 1980s. Their mines were huge.We took care of technology and management. The excavated jadeite ores had to be selected, and my vision was developed at that time.At that time, it was easy to dig,

and all the ice type material was discarded at the hole, and only the color material (green and plump ore) was needed. Pulling jadeite down the mountain would not get stuck on the road, because it was approved by the (Myanmar) government. Jadeite was sold as soon as it was pulled out. The bosses in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Thailand wanted a lot.³⁷

The Burmese government had also approved these ethnic armed forces to set up "special zones" in the core areas they control, acquiescing to the development of their own army, political parties, and economy, including jadeite business. The slogan of the Wa State under the banner of "peaceful construction" is:

Do not split the country. Do not fight for independence. Do not hand over a single gun. Do not give up an inch of land. If people do not attack us, we won't attack them. If people attack us, we will definitely attack them.

Therefore, it was the fundamental purpose of the military government to bring the territory ruled by civilians and armed forces under the control of the central government through the inclusion strategy of "ceasefire capitalism" that turned the battlefield into a market and turned the enemy into a business partner (Woods, 2011). And it was accepted at the time. This was also reflected at the grass root level of society. For the ordinary people in society who had long faced the threat of war, it was much safer and more realistic to gain benefits through the market economy and improve their living conditions than to fight for survival opportunities through violence:

I was conscripted into the army right after elementary school. At first, I followed the (Myanmar) militia, then the Communist Party of Burma, and then the Wa state. I can read and write, so most of the time I did clerical work. Later, I went to the jadeite mining area to help them mine jadeite. I also had to train new recruits. Being a soldier was hard, with your head hanging on your trouser belt at all times. Soldiers were not allowed to sleep very deeply at night. I took leaves (near the head and face of soldiers) to fan them, and if they couldn't wake up, I went over and kicked them awake! Wars erupt at any time, and we must guard against sneak attacks by the Burmese government forces. They were so stupid that they marched in the jungle in phalanx. When there was a bombardment, they were all dead. We would never march like this. Who would have thought of such a day! No one knows how long they can live. It's good to be able to do business. Now I have

³⁷ Interview time: 04/2019; Reporter: XXL; Location: Bangkang, Wa State, the Second Special Zone of Myanmar.

*married my wife, and she has given birth to a son. No more wars. Just live my life well.*³⁸

As the Burmese military signed a ceasefire agreement with the local ethnic minorities in northern Myanmar, the power of all parties in the process of territorialization revived the commercial and trading activities in jadeite in northern Myanmar. Kevin Woods points out that: like the British colonialists before them, the Burmese military state failed to achieve broad power and authority in the ethnic fringes, and it was not until the ceasefire opened up new opportunities for business deals that they gained greater territorial control in the ethnic border highlands (Woods, 2011).

In 2011, after the Union Solidarity and Development Association supported by the military group came to power through the general election, the jadeite mining development policy became more relaxed. The Ministry of Mines of the government held public bidding activities for mining rights from time to time every year. The base contract price was 2 million kyats per acre. The contract period was three years, and the bid would be renegotiated after three years. Qualified mining companies could declare and bid in accordance with regulations to obtain legal mining rights. In 2015, the NLD represented by Aung San Suu Kyi won the legal general election. This NLD government still continued this policy, and the mining rights were further relaxed. As of the end of 2018, more than 300 large and small mining companies had shared 2,786 proven jadeite fields and more than 5,500 mining rights (Myanmar Chinese Network, 2018).

*The (Myanmar) government definitely does not allow foreigners to mine, but there are many ways. Chinese companies can find relatives and friends here (Myanmar) to register the company, as long as there is a private agreement. After earning money, it will be divided in half because Myanmar partner (companies) will also rely on China companies to sell jadeite goods. Both sides work together.Also, look at those big monsters (大怪手, a term used by locals refer to large excavating machines) they are Caterpillar and SANY. Some big bosses buy excavators and trucks as shares. Money can't come in, but machines can. ...The Carter Corporation itself is getting involved (jadeite mining).*³⁹

The policy of the Ministry of Mines of Myanmar only prohibits foreign-funded enterprises from directly developing the country's mineral resources, but in practice capital from abroad can be injected in various ways. For example, this capital is used for hiring local agents in Myanmar, taking core production tools such as excavators and trucks as covert shares, or providing transportation protection services, etc. Overseas capital enters the

³⁸ Interview time: 01/2020; Interlocutor: ZH; Location: Delong Jewelry City, Ruili City, Dehong Prefecture, Yunnan Province.

³⁹ Interview time: 11/2018; Reporter: ZH; Location: Somewhere near the Kok Wan (角湾, Guowan) Market in Mandalay, Myanmar.

value production of jadeite in more complex and diversified forms through these strategies. In a more open jadeite mining industry market, the focus of all parties no longer has to be concentrated only on the ownership of jadeite mineral resources, and all possible divisions of labor that can create value.

To sum up, the characteristics of the territorialization of jadeite deposits during the "market economy" period include: 1) The fierce and deadlocked military hostilities and deterritorialization activities between the Burmese military government and the Kachin during the socialist period had temporarily come to an end and emerged on the surface; 2) Instead, it was a covert reterritorialization activity in exchange for a ceasefire in exchange for laying down weapons, developing the economy, and sharing interests; 3) The "market economy" strategy of the military state had won 17 years of relatively peaceful development, reshaping the landscape of state power in northern Myanmar. Due to the complexity and diversity of the participants, each of them was connected to a cross-border and cross-ethnic financial capital network, making the value production of jadeite raw materials connected to a wider geopolitical relationship and the global capitalist market.

However, this situation of "ceasefire capitalism" could neither achieve a real ceasefire, nor form a fair, reasonable and sustainable market order. First, KIA's ceasefire agreement was based on the military government's protection of the interests of Kachin high-level officials, but the "state" and KIA's political and economic elites jointly developed jadeite resources. In other words, the "country" shaped by militarism and nationalism is not a third-party role in supervising the market, but one of the parties involved in buying and selling activities. In this way, the rules of "market economy" activities cannot be the rules of fair competition in the free market but tend to tend to safeguard the interests of the powerful. Second, the military government leased the concession rights of jadeite mining to other local armed forces of ethnic minorities, which undermined the rights and interests of the Kachin people and complicated the original ownership relationship. The intention of the military government is to exchange economic interests for territorial power, that is, to establish militarized territories (Woods, 2011). In fact, it is the Burmese who redistribute the resources and territories of the Kachin people in the name of the state. The power and interests are mainly obtained by the "state", but the price is paid by the Kachin people. The market-for-ceasefire situation may be broken when the heavy price paid by the Kachin people for the greed and shortsightedness of their political and economic elite accumulates to the point where the balance between costs and benefits is seriously tilted. Third, access to a wider globalized capital market would lead to greater wealth polarization. One is the large-scale capital injections from other countries and industries, which absorb more profits correspondingly due to capital advantages, forming the Matthew effect. The second is a more detailed and specialized division of labor, which requires more labor to enter, and the originally unskilled minority labor is increasingly reduced to a miserable bottom labor. Therefore, after power re-territorialized the jadeite

mining area and related territories in northern Myanmar at this stage, it offers a channel for forging new ethnic relations.

2.3 Changes in Inter-ethnic Relations in Jadeite Mining Area

Ethnic competition in jadeite mineral resources is a process of violent market evolution. The Burmese government has three intentions to control jadeite resources: The first is to nationalize resources and manage them in a unified manner in order to curb the loss of tax sources and at the same time weaken the economic sources of ethnic armed groups; the second is to advance the agenda of the signing of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement; the third is to realize the actual control of the territory occupied by ethnic armed groups. Therefore, a new round of conflict was brewing, and the relatively peaceful situation did not last. The internal contradictions have not been fundamentally resolved. The strategy of the violent market brings did not lead to production exchange and fair competition in line with the laws of the free market whereas the number of IDPs (Internally displaced persons), poverty, and rebellious ethnic minorities were increasing.

From 1988 to 1996, the number of Burmese troops increased from 186,000 to 370,000, and in order to suppress and encircle local armed forces of ethnic minorities, the military government spent 1 billion US dollars to purchase 140 aircraft, 30 ships, and 170 tanks (Callanhan, 2004). Local armed forces of ethnic minorities with a clear banner and political appeal had risen from four or five in the early days of independence to more than 20. If all rebel armed forces were counted, there were as many as hundreds, with a total number of more than 100,000 (Aung Min, 2015). By the time of the "30th Anniversary of the Peaceful Construction of the Wa State" in 2019, the United Wa Army had 60,000 troops, making it the most powerful ethnic minority armed force in Myanmar. It not only refused to participate in the negotiation of the National Ceasefire Agreement, but also refrained from participating in the national election activities in Myanmar.

In 2011, the Burmese government army and the Kachin Independence Army fought again, making an end to the 17-year ceasefire agreement. The trigger was the reorganization plan of the border guards launched by the Burmese junta in accordance with the Constitution revised in 2008, using force to promote the establishment of a unified multi-ethnic country (Liu, 2014). The plan forced ethnic minority local armed forces to hand over military power and reorganize and integrate into the Myanmar Army's Border Guard Force (BGF). The Burmese army once captured almost the entire jadeite mining area. The Kachin Independence Army was defeated in the battle and had to abandon a large number of its original strongholds to hold its headquarters in Laza, near the border of Yingjiang, Dehong Prefecture, Yunnan Province, China. The Kachin Independence Army, which continued to resist by adopting a guerilla warfare, formed an alliance with ethnic minorities such as the De'ang Army, the Kokang Allied Army, and the Rakhine Army, and

frequently harassed the passage from Muse to Mandalay to prevent overland trade between the Bamar government and China.

During the jadeite mining process, the rounds of territorialization between the Burmese military regime and ethnic minorities reconstructed the new economic order and also reconstructed inter-ethnic relations.

2.3.1 The Living Conditions of Ordinary People at the Grassroot level and Inter-ethnic Relations

The territorialization of jadeite resources between the Burmese and the Kachin through political systems, military violence, and economic activities has worsened the original ethnic conflicts. For the Kachin people, the right to survival and property rights have been violated again and again, and they have not been treated fairly for decades, thus creating a strong sense of deprivation. The sense of deprivation comes from three levels of circular reinforcement:

First, years of war and unfair resource exploitation have made it difficult for Kachin people to survive and return to their homestead. The Burmese government's military strikes against KIA in the name of the country and the forced development of various natural resources including jadeite directly caused the displacement of many Kachin people. They fled their homes, abandoned their farmland, lost their sources of livelihood, and gathered in large numbers in several refugee camps on the China-Myanmar border, relying on international aid to live. Wars raged over their hometown and landmines are in some places. Many occupied fertile lands are leased by the Burmese government or relevant authorities to companies from China, Japan, South Korea, and other countries for "alternative planting" or "aid construction", resulting in a situation of "one house, two sales". "One house, two sales" means that after the Burmese military government occupied the land of the Kachin people, they sell or lease it to a third party when the land ownership is still in dispute, which make the ownership and lease rights of these lands even more unclear. As a result, it is difficult for internally displaced persons to return their home.

We were originally engaged in an alternative development project, hiring local people to grow bananas to replace their previous poppy cultivation. My company was regarded as a leading enterprise in Yunnan Province in those years.The land in Myanmar is so fertile that banana trees can grow well without much management. The labor is also cheap, we all hire local villagers to plant, and the wages paid to them are much higher than that of their own farming! When there is no war, the bananas are harvested, sorted, packed, and transported to China in one day. What else can I do if there is a war, all of us had to go

back to China, and I lost tens of millions (RMB)! The original banana fields were all full of landmines, some placed by the Burmese Army and some by the Kachin Army. The banana trees have grown into forests, no one dares to go in the fields to take care, and bananas are rotten on the ground. Alas, I won't plant them anymore, and I won't go there anymore.⁴⁰

The situation described by the interlocutor reflects two consequences of the junta's violent marketing strategy: One is that Before the land rights of the Kachin people could be properly resolved, the military government promoted development by a third party, further complicating the problem. The other is that the continuing military operations have made the existing economic relations unsustainable. After losing the traditional way of livelihood, the Kachin people have further lost their newly adapted way of livelihood, and there is no hope of returning to their homeland.

Second, the resources produced in the land where the ancestors lived for generations were taken away by the Burmese government, but the profits were not used to improve the medical and health care, education, and livelihood development of the local people. In the eyes of the Kachin people, jadeite is their own wealth. They call themselves "jade hunters" (jade hunters)⁴¹, not jade laborers or jade scavengers. The term 'hunter' is replete with pride and heroism of the gatherers and hunters. However, in fact, most of them are excluded from the sharing of "our Kachin wealth". The wooing method of the Burmese government only guarantees the interests of some upper elites of the Kachin people and does not benefit ordinary people. Under the global COVID epidemic that broke out at the beginning of 2020, we can get a glimpse of the IDP camp near the headquarters of the Kachin Independence Army Laiza:

People in the refugee camps cannot even guarantee a safe distance for basic living, nor can they guarantee clean water. By April, there were no masks in the camps. NGOs in Yunnan donated thousands of masks to us, all of which were allocated by the Refugee Relief Committee (IRRC), but there are more than 100,000 refugees. Because of the war, Laiza has been relatively isolated, which is also objectively helpful for the prevention and control of the epidemic. Laiza would be much safer if the roads to Myitkyina and Maijayang were blocked.⁴²

In addition, according to a survey by Global Witness (2015), most of the profits from the development of jadeite mineral resources have been collected by the top officials of the

⁴⁰ Interview time: 07/2019; Interlocutor: QJL; Location: a coffee shop in Ruili City, Dehong Prefecture, Yunnan Province.

⁴¹ Interview time: 11/2018; Interlocutor: Lasi; Location: Office Building of the Ministry of Land and Resources, Kachin State, Myanmar.

⁴² Interview time: 09/2020; Interlocutor: FGS; Location: a coffee shop in Mangshi City, Dehong Prefecture, Yunnan Province.

military government. From 2005 to 2015, the annual output value of jadeite mineral resources rose from 20.39 billion US dollars to 342.48 billion US dollars. In 2013 and 2014, the Than Shwe family and its crony companies, the chairman of the National Peace and Development Council, the prime minister, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and the minister of defense, made about 220 million U.S. dollars (Global Witness, 2015).

The jadeite mines belong to our Kachin people, and we do not object to the government's unified development, because indiscriminate digging and mining will deplete resources. But we develop for you, you should give us a reasonable return, medical care, education, and other infrastructure should be built, not destroyed... Look at us Kachin people, we got nothing.⁴³

Third, the bottom-level jadeite diggers face huge risks, and it is difficult to guarantee their livelihood and safety. The risk is first manifested in the huge difference between labor input and return, which is mainly determined by the nature and characteristics of jadeite mineral resources themselves. Although large companies exclude the bottom-level jadeite diggers from the previous rounds of jadeite ores screening, the excavation of jadeite mines does require a lot of capital costs to find and excavate as much as possible of the ore sources that are distributed in a lenticular shape. These costs include expensive contracting fees, excavation and hauling machines, human operating costs, and so on. Bottom-level jadeite diggers are only allowed to search for ores that slipped through the muck dumped by large companies or enter the mines within a few hours of the company's shutdown and use crude small pneumatic drills or shovels to manually dig. However, the shell of jadeite ore is tightly wrapped. If you want to judge the internal quality, you need long-term experience accumulation, and if you want to make a fortune, you need more luck. Most diggers have difficulty finding a piece of valuable ore throughout the year. Although the bottom-level jadeite diggers can cooperate with middlemen who provide board and lodging for them, the profits from the ore dug must be divided equally between the two parties, which reduces their labor income again. Therefore, their labor return is extremely uncertain, and the cost is likely to be much higher than the benefit. Risks are also reflected in personal safety. The Hpakant region has two distinct seasons, wet and dry. During the rainy season from May and June to November every year, the mine often collapses, and the heavy rain submerges the deep pits. The Burmese government also expressly stipulates that mining is prohibited from July 1st to September 30th every year. However, grassroot level jadeite diggers often take this opportunity to enter the mine to illegally mine. On July 2, 2020, just the second day after entering the closing period, a serious mine accident occurred in the Hpakant Hwehka field, and more than 200 people were washed away by mud and rocks in the landslide (Myanmar Chinese Network, 2020). Subsequent rescue work was difficult to advance due to huge potential safety hazards, and the actual death toll cannot be

⁴³ Interview time: November 2018; Interlocutor: Lasi; Location: Office Building of the Ministry of Land and Resources of Kachin State, Myanmar.

accurately counted. Subsequently, the Myanmar Presidential Palace established the Hpakant Mine Disaster Investigation Committee, and the military, government, Kachin Independence Organization, and all walks of life made donations. The official compensation is between 200,000 and 500,000 kyats, or about RMB 1,000 to 2,500. Life is worthless. The third risk comes from drugs. In the Hpakant jadeite mining area, the jadeite diggers are under great pressure to dream of rewards, the working environment is harsh, and there are no channels for recreation in the villages and towns. In order to relieve the painful experience, they shifted to drug use.

Taking opium in the early years could help the jade diggers refresh themselves, but the current drugs are not what they used to be. People who take drugs can be excited for a while at most, and their health will only get worse later. They are mostly for fun. In the jadeite mining area, there are people who dare to sell drugs on the street, and an injection costs a few yuan. Drug addicts and syringes can be seen everywhere. Many young people take drugs, and as a result, jadeite is not dug up, money is spent, and the health is even worse.⁴⁴

The proliferation of drugs is a common social problem among jadeite diggers, regardless of ethnicity, age, or gender, they all take drugs. In 2015, Pat Jasan, a non-governmental anti-drug organization in Hpakant, cleared the shack next to the earthwork pile of a jadeite mining company in Nanmo Village, arrested two drug dealers and 339 drug addicts on the spot, and seized 79 boxes of heroin briquettes and 5,400 ephedrine tablets (Myanmar Chinese Network, 2019). However, the drug traffickers were handed over to the local police station, but the drug users could only be educated and released without any punishment, rescue, or drug rehabilitation measures. This is nothing but a drop in the bucket to improve the severe situation of drugs in Hpakant.

The above-mentioned triple pressures formed a vicious circle, which made the livelihood of the Kachin grassroots difficult, and at the same time repeatedly strengthened their sense of deprivation. In the minds of the Kachin people, behind the 17-year ceasefire is the continuous deterioration of their recognition of the Bamar government, so they rose up to resist in 2011 and returned to the battlefield. The characteristic of this round of rebel movement is that the Kachin Independence Army split and reorganized vertically and formed new alliances horizontally with other ethnic minorities in northern Myanmar, reviving a violent rebellion against the Burmese military government.

2.3.2 Inter-ethnic Relations of Political and Economic Elites

The Kachin Independence Army (KIA), formed on February 5, 1961, is an alliance formed by Kachin students from Yangon University (7 majan hpung / 7 stars), intellectuals from

⁴⁴ Interview time: November 2020; Interlocutor: LYX; Location: A jadeite store near Green Lake, Kunming City, Yunnan Province.

Myitkyina, and Kachin veterans who participated in World War II. Its goal is to counter the repressive policies of the Burmese government that discriminate against ethnic minorities. By the end of the 1980s, the KIA had developed into the strongest ethnic minority local armed force in Myanmar, and it had been at the forefront of the struggle of ethnic minorities in Myanmar against the central government (Brenner, 2019). Its headquarters, Laiza, was once the "revolutionary holy land" in the hearts of the rebel minorities in northern Myanmar. In addition to the army, they have their own core political party, the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), and its quasi-government, the Kachin Independence Government (KIC), has also established a relatively complete administrative structure and social service system in the Kachin region. After the ceasefire agreement was signed in 1994, the Burmese military government allowed the rebels to keep their weapons and manage a considerable part of Kachin State. Then businesses such as jadeite minerals, timber, and border trade gradually prospered. However, the KIO's revolutionary ambitions and military capabilities appear to have faded over the long ceasefire years, while its leaders profited from the lucrative ceasefire economy (Brenner, 2019). The top leaders who had benefited from the ceasefire include Zao Mai, the successor chairman of the Kachin Independence Army, Enbanla, and the commander of the new Kachin Democratic Army (NDA-K) (formerly Kachin 101 Military Region), Dingying, among others. They had accumulated a lot of money through business, and have real estate in Tengchong, Kunming, Guangzhou, Shanghai, and other places in China.

In the 1990s, I bought a lot of high-end ores from Ding Ying, all of which were cut open, and the Zhong and color were quite good, full of green and dragon type, and imperial grade. We usually trade in Tengchong, and his guards are always with us. We are old friends! Now these kinds of ores are rare, and some of them are kept by the big warlords and not sold, and the high-ranking officials and big bosses of the Burmese have more.⁴⁵

Myanmar's junta has granted the Kachin Independence Organization the right to exploit its region's rich natural resources, allowing it to set up its own legal companies, sell them concessions and tax the growing cross-border trade with China. The Kachin Independence Organization emerged as one of the most docile ceasefire groups (Brenner, 2019). Kevin Woods, in his study on the capitalist economy of the ceasefire in northern Myanmar, points out that Kachin leaders developed a close relationship with the Burmese army commanders during the ceasefire and accepted the government (Woods, 2011).

The government's strategy of horizontal inclusion of high-level Kachin was effective, and many grassroots Kachin people also welcome the "border area development plan" of the Burmese military government. But with the junta arguing that its interim status did not

⁴⁵ Interview time: July 2019; Interlocutor: MT; Location: A teahouse in Jinxing Tea City, Kunming City, Yunnan Province.

dictate political matters, the Kachin had little hope of negotiating institutional arrangements for power-sharing, including a federal constitution, which was contrary to the purpose of the KIA rebel movement. The stable situation during the ceasefire period and the high reliance of socioeconomic development in the Kachin region on natural resources had enabled capital from China, the Burmese military government, and Kachin companies to develop jadeite mines on an unprecedented scale and speed.

In the mid-to-late 1990s, large excavators began to dig jadeite in jadeite mining areas. The output is too high, and the market in China can eat it. At that time, business was good, and as much as was dug up, it could be sold. How could the mine withstand so many excavators? It took less than a month for a mountain to be moved to the other side.⁴⁶

The mining enterprises of the Burmese mined directly, and their government collected taxes, so the Burmese government gradually controlled the jadeite mineral resources through the market. Only the top of the Kachin army had the strength to obtain concessions, open mining companies, and collected taxes and tolls on some border roads to China. Rebel leaders turned businessmen. The egoism, opportunism, corruption, and incompetence of the KIO leadership have weakened the KIO and contributed to the collapse of its ability to provide social services since the ceasefire (Global Witness, 2016). The Kachin grassroots people not only still had to face livelihood problems, but also bear the disappointment that the realization of the rebel fighting demands was far away in terms of the sense of deprivation. Their identification with the Kachin Independence Organization began to gradually decrease, and even resentment developed, and finally a split of vertical exclusion occurred within Kachin.

Vertical exclusion included splits among the top leadership of the Kachin military bloc, and the rise of new youth political elites generated by distrust of the former top ranks. Many Kachin leaders became close business partners with former enemies and allowed their families to take full advantage of the convenience of power, creating a tense rivalry with leaders who did not have better business interests. Then conflict ensued. In 2001, General Npanla overthrew General Zaomai in a coup and took over his power. Infighting at the top had also affected perceptions at the grassroots, with Kachin leaders enriching their own pockets rather than defending the interests of their own people, improving their lives, or continuing to pursue equal political rights at the constitutional level. The Kachin grassroots' previous hatred of the Burmese government had turned to the KIO leadership, or in other words, the leadership had lost broad grassroots support. At this point, a group of young military officers, disillusioned with nationalist ideals, gathered around the charismatic leader to re-align with the powerful Kachin Church, the only political institution that retained legitimacy among the Kachin public during the ceasefire.

⁴⁶ Interview time: 07/2019; Interlocutor: ZH; Location: Yujue Jade City, Jiegao Port, Ruili City, Dehong Prefecture, Yunnan Province.

They succeeded in mass-recruiting Kachin from the grassroots, eventually taking over the leadership of the KIO (Brenner, 2019), and the ideals of Kachin nationalism were mobilized again. The young KIA leadership placed emphasis on identity building at the grassroots level. On the one hand they continue to produce nationalist ideological discourse from the Kachin Baptist Church (KBC) and other smaller Catholic churches. On the other hand, they build social service systems such as education and medical care. As a result, they quickly established leadership legitimacy among the Kachin grassroots, and were well received by Kachin youth students (Sadan, 2016). At the same time, they formed an alliance with ethnic armed forces such as the Kokang National Alliance Army (MNDAA), the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Rakhine Army (AA) to jointly form a united front against the Burmese government. Among them, the training base of the Rakhine Army is located in the territory controlled by the Kachin Independence Army. On August 15, 2019, a coalition composed of the Ta'ang National Liberation Army, the Kokang Allied Army, and the Rakhine Army in northern Myanmar launched simultaneous attacks on five areas in Mandalay Province and northern Shan State, including the Pyin Oo Lwin Military Technical University (DSTA), the Pyin Oo Lwin Toll Station at the Naoqiu Exit, the Gut Valley Police Post in the Naoqiu District of Northern Shan State, the Naoqiu Toll Station on the way from Naoqiu to Kyaukme, the anti-drug checkpoint, and the battalion headquarters of the regional garrison (Myanmar Chinese Network, 2019). The military action resulted in a 3-day interruption of traffic at the Muse-Jiegao Port, the largest land port leading to China controlled by the Myanmar government, and seriously affected the land trade between China and Myanmar.

To sum up, during the ceasefire period from the 1990s to the first decade of the new century, the Burmese government gradually gained control of the mining area and a large part of the local armed areas of ethnic minorities in the competition for territorialization of jadeite deposits, but the peace did not come. This was because the cease-fire capitalist strategy promoted by the Bamar government was not a real free market, but a violent market without institutional norms. As one of the commodities in circulation, the competition for jadeite mineral resources was fierce and violent. Production, exchange, and distribution were all unfair. The only rule was to see whose fist is harder. The inclusion strategy of the Burmese government only superficially included high-level ethnic armed forces, to the exclusion of ordinary people. Soon, a vertical split occurred within the Kachin, and a new political elite rose to replace the old generation. They re-established the vertical alliance between the leadership and the grassroots and the horizontal alliance with other ethnic armed forces, and the war reignited. From 2011 to October 2015, the U Thein Sein government had more than 5,000 formal and informal talks with ethnic armed forces, but only reached a ceasefire with 8 ethnic armed forces (Song, 2017). Neither the KIA nor the UWSA had signed.

2.3.3 The Value Production of Jadeite in a Violent Market

It is precisely because of the increase of actors and the intensity of practical activities that a certain part of the value of jadeite has been reproduced, and the original normal resource development issue has become a political issue. The independence of the nation-state is a turning point in the transformation of Myanmar's social structure. The powerful Burmese use their military power to obtain the legal identity of the national government, even though their legitimacy is not recognized by the rebelling ethnic minority armed forces within the country. Immediately afterwards, the legitimacy of representing the "state" enabled the Burmese's practical actions in jadeite mining to be empowered by policy and violence. Whether it is "socialism", "market economy" or "counter-insurgency warfare" and other means of reterritorialization, they are all established on the basis of government legitimacy. On the other side, the ethnic armed forces represented by the Kachin expressed strong doubts and denials on the basis of legitimacy. "National independence", "ceasefire agreement", "special economic zone" and "resistance alliance" and other reterritorialization methods are based on trying to rewrite the fact that the Burmese are strong and hope to return to the distribution of power and interests negotiated in the first "Panglong Conference". The long-term confrontation between the two forces in the jadeite mining area, the ebb and flow of violent competition, has always been a stumbling block for creating a peaceful environment for the jadeite mining industry. The jadeite trade thus produced three interlocking results:

The first is that violent competition will cause damage or waste of jadeite resources, which cannot be fully utilized, resulting in increased raw material supply costs or sharp fluctuations in raw material supply prices. Countless jadeite ores were intentionally or unintentionally crushed and destroyed by bomb shells on the battlefield, and the economic losses were immeasurable. Once the war broke out, the ores supply would be interrupted and the recirculation time could not be determined, causing market price fluctuations. In addition, many undifferentiated large-scale mining companies and big entrepreneurs with considerable capital strength would hoard high-grade ores, slow down their flow into the market, in order to manipulate the price of jadeite. All of the above are man-made shortages of raw material supply, which are actually the inevitable result of the territorialization of powers.

Secondly, in order to maximize the benefits in the competition, the participants introduce modern mining technology and equipment to increase production costs. The distribution characteristics of jadeite deposits are not like coal, iron, etc., which are distributed in bands, and they cannot be refined. Therefore, mining companies purchase large-scale excavators, trucks and other equipment to carry out vertical and carpet-style large-scale mining in mountainous areas where mineral veins have been found. Compared with traditional hoes, shovels, crowbars or advanced small-scale pneumatic drills and other production tools, the mining scale, speed and energy consumption are no longer the

same. The fundamental innovation of production tools has increased production costs, which will eventually be passed on to the market price of jadeite.

The third is that the use of modern production tools has brought about the division of labor. Participants were quickly divided into labor distribution patterns in modern joint-stock and industrial enterprise mixed companies, and labor groups that could not enter the enterprise were also restructured. Overall, the number of participants has greatly increased, thereby increasing the market price of jadeite. Burmese state-owned enterprises, enterprises controlled by ethnic local armed political and economic elites, and other large private extractive enterprises combine mining rights obtained through armed force and political means with economic capital that may come from globalization. Thus formed a variety of parallel corporate investors. The managers may be talents who have been engaged in jadeite mining for many years, or they may be relatives from the Burmese army or a high-level ethnic minority armed group, or they may be Han people who control the resources of the middle and lower reaches of the trade network. Technicians are those who can manipulate industrial machinery and equipment, those who can screen the quality of ores, and the security personnel who can use weapons. The companies also have other workers and employees engaged in industrial production links that cannot be replaced by machinery.

In addition to the regular employees of the company, the wandering low-level jadeite miners are a very large group consisting of ethnic groups who have left their home fleeing war, unemployment, have no citizenship and in search of work in the jadeite mining industry as well as displaced people. The government cannot effectively improve their lives, and even the government itself is one of the instigators causing their poor living conditions. They therefore belong to the division of labor produced by structural violence. In addition, there are groups specialized in trade, which exist in all ethnic groups, mainly Han Chinese and Muslims.

The Han people in Myanmar, or Burmese Chinese, play the role of economically rational people and middlemen who are tied to the interests of all parties through nepotism and trade cooperation. Burmese Chinese had been working in the jadeite mining areas of Myanmar for hundreds of years before they were nationalized. They endured hardships and engaged in hard work, did it by themselves, or cooperated or hire local Shan people and Kachin people to dig and mine, and sold jadeite ores to the farther inland of China, forming the earliest inter-ethnic cooperative relationship. They master the exploration technology of jadeite, the identification of good and bad quality stone, value definition, consumption preference, etc. They were indispensable so that other ethnic groups must cooperate with them in the development and utilization of jadeite. Behind each political force are large and small crony companies that specifically operate the mining and trade of jadeite. Chinese jadeite businessmen are not only the earliest developers, but also a lubricant for business between the Burmese and various local armed forces of various

ethnic minorities. When jadeite ores enter the trading process, the identity of the trading partner is not determined by political status, but by market economic rules. Politically opposed groups can also do business together to make money, as long as it is profitable. The territorialization of Burmese Chinese has nothing to do with geographical space or demands for political power. Their cultural capital and economic network are enough to allow them to firmly grasp the right to make profits in the jadeite field and stand firm.

Among the Muslims in Myanmar, the Rohingya are an ethnic group that is not officially recognized by the government as citizens. They have no land and cannot normally engage in social occupations. They are positioned as refugees and wander around in Myanmar. After entering the field of jadeite trade, they cannot engage in mining, even the lowest jadeite digging work⁴⁷. Therefore, they turn to cooperate with jadeite diggers to buy ores in the hands of the workers, and after simple processing, they sell them to China through the trade network within the ethnic group. The Muslim trader group in Myanmar is also a division of labor squeezed out of the structural violence in Myanmar society and the competition for the territorialization of jadeite deposits.

It can be found from the case of the civil war in Myanmar and the competition for jadeite resources that the purpose of competing for jadeite resources is not just economic interests. More importantly, under the background of long-term ethnic conflicts, the Bamar government intends to use market economy to weaken the economic strength and war potential of ethnic armed forces in exchange for a ceasefire agreement, while expanding actual control over the land and ethnic minorities, thereby achieve its goal of establishing a unified nation-state centered on the Bamar. In essence, it is a territorial competition for power, interests, and territory between central and minority areas. Since the central government is controlled by the Burmese military group, it is actually a process of Burmese militarized nation-state construction. In this compound space, the jadeite trade has become and formed a violent market, and the structure and quantity of labor have undergone major changes. The value of jadeite is reproduced, and the price also keeps rising and fluctuating.

The ethnic conflicts in Myanmar had been foreshadowed during the colonial period. The strategy of "divide and rule" by the British colonial government has already separated the original symbiotic social relations between different religions and ethnic groups, increased differences, clarified boundaries, and provoked confrontation. Even though a broad national alliance was formed during the anti-colonial independence movement, the foundation of the alliance—the "Panglong Agreement" that guaranteed the rights of ethnic minorities through the constitution—was torn up shortly after the founding of independence, therefore, the contractual relationship among ethnic groups was fragile

⁴⁷ The low-level jadeite miners also need to present an ID card recognized by the Myanmar government to enter the field to dig jadeite, no matter what class of citizens they are. Entry is not permitted without a Citizen ID.

and violent power has become the law of the jungle in the competition for national survival. The development and trade of jadeite minerals existed hundreds of years before the founding of Myanmar, and there was no obvious violent competition for resources at that time. On the contrary, since the socialist period after the founding of the country, the Bamar government has entered the jadeite field forcefully, excluding other ethnic groups, and reconstructing market rules, which deviate from fairness and freedom. As a result, serious ethnic conflicts in the current resource competition, resource depletion, environmental degradation, and people's deprivation have resulted in consequences.

In addition, the reterritorialization of jadeite resources by the Burmese government is a process of trying to achieve a state monopoly through military operations but creating a violent market. The formation of the market is not due to some natural nature of human beings, but a form of exchange with contractual norms is formed in the process of people tending to give and exchange items⁴⁸. The violent market appears in a space open to violence⁴⁹, and what is implemented is a completely unregulated market economy and an extremely free economy⁵⁰. Long before being colonized, the northern region of Myanmar was the area where the Shan and Kachin ethnic groups lived for generations, and had independent political units, religious beliefs, ethnic cultures, and inter-ethnic interaction models. Due to the long-standing historical ethnic conflicts, when the Burmese unilaterally tried to expand the market economy to the geographical space of northern Myanmar to achieve state monopoly in the name of the nation-state, a violent market also emerged. The development of a market economy requires someone other than competitors to ensure that the rules of property rights will be enforced, and contracts will be honored. However, the Burmese military government represented the interests of the Burmese and promoted the Burmese doctrine that excluded other ethnic groups. Such an administration does not serve the society as a whole but serves the Bamar people and groups that can be included in the Bamar people who intend to be a nation. The market rules they establish are not fair at all. Therefore, the emergence of a violent market is an inevitable result, and what is built while promoting ceasefire capitalism is not a free market.

In the order reconstructed by the jadeite violence market, ethnic groups, as actors, have split and reorganized in multiple dimensions, all of which are manifested in changes in identity. Both the Burmese and ethnic armed elites have adopted identity strategies of inclusion and exclusion and are also constrained by the identity of their own social groups. Ethnic groups in ethnic conflict are often conceptualized as a single unit of action that is identical and acts according to a unified strategic rationale in order to maximize their

⁴⁸ Adam Smith. *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*. Oxford University Press: 1998.

⁴⁹ Günther Schlee. *Why the Enemy: An Outline of Ethnic and Religious Conflict*. Social Science Literature Press, 2017 edition, p. 90.

⁵⁰ George Elwert. *Violent Market: Rational Observation of the Instrumentality of Violence*. *Sociology and Social psychology*. 1997:92.

power over the incumbent state. As a political and military unit, the Kachin Independence Army was internally divided and restructured in the territorial competition with the Burmese group. Some political elites were included, while the ethnic group they originally led embraced new leaders and excluded them. The same goes for the Burmese. The military government that has always adopted military dictatorship to forcibly accommodate other ethnic groups and exclude dissidents has made Myanmar one of the least developed countries in the world. Social development and the basic livelihood of the people could not be guaranteed, and other social rebel movements besides nationalism continued to emerge. As a result, the Burmese experienced a change of power between the old and new military groups in 1988. However, the exclusion from the social structure did not end. The junta gradually changed to a political party and appeared in Myanmar's political life, competing with the Democratic League supported by most of the people in terms of ideology, governance concepts, and interest distribution. Whether it is the newly formed rebel alliance of ethnic minority armed forces, or the National League for Democracy, which intends to negotiate under the framework of a unified nation-state, they all use identity strategies to seek their own political and economic demands in the territorial competition.

Through the analysis of this chapter, it can be seen that the competition and cooperation of jadeite ores is a process of territorialization of jadeite mineral ownership, mining rights and related spaces on the internal spatial scale of the Myanmar nation-state. This process can be roughly divided into two levels that occur successively and then superimposed in parallel: The first is the territorial exclusion of the non-Han ethnic groups in Myanmar against the Han ethnic groups, and the second is the territorial competition between the Central Burmese and other ethnic groups. Then, in order to maintain their interests in the field, various ethnic groups once again cooperated with the Burmese Chinese, Chinese Han and other Han people. Through territorialization activities such as military offensives, economic trade, and ceasefire concessions, this process has shaped a territorial landscape in the Kachin Mountains where hostile combat and cooperative partners coexist and cannot be neatly divided into government-controlled or ethnic-minority-controlled domains. The reterritorialization of the jadeite trade order by the powers has reconstructed the power relationship between ethnic groups, refined the division of labor, and de-embedded the jadeite mining industry from the traditional jadeite trade activities, making it become an industry that can operate in an internal cycle alone. The value of jadeite is reproduced and the price rises.

Chapter 3 **Changes in Long-Distance Trade Routes**

Ownership, mining rights, and associated territories are only one part of the competition among ethnic groups in Myanmar for the territorialization of jadeite resources. If they want to turn ores into cash, they must sell it to China.

Jadeite ores mainly enter China from Yunnan and Guangdong provinces. When I collected Chinese customs data, I found that neither Yunnan nor Guangdong customs could find the corresponding import tariff data for jadeite ores, semi-finished products, and finished products. I only found entries with broader concepts such as "raw gemstones", "semi-finished gems and jade", "precious or semi-precious stones". Even using the data of this type of project for comparison, it is far from the data of Myanmar. For example, in 2014, China's total import of "precious or semi-precious stone products" was 770 million RMB⁵¹, while the value of Myanmar's jadeite production estimated by Global Witness was 308,590 million US dollars. A large number of official jadeite import and export data of the two countries are missing, the comparison between the existing data is too large, and there are obvious errors in the estimates of research institutions. Therefore, it is difficult to judge which route has a larger amount of jadeite trade and how much. However, when I compared the characteristics of the jadeite raw material markets in Guangdong and Yunnan during my fieldwork and observation, I found that the jadeite raw material market in Guangdong is located mainly in various Public Auctions in Pingzhou. The jadeite ores sold are larger in size and its quality is also more superior as most of them can be graded and refined. On the other hand, in Yunnan mainly Ruili's Delong Jewelry City night market and Yingjiang Public Auctions function as raw material market. Among them, the jadeite sold in the Ruili Delong market consists of mainly uncut small ores, which are sold in the form of gambling stones. It should be noted that most of the gambling stones have no value for finishing after being cut. Yingjiang's Public Auctions products are mainly cut large pieces of ores, which are similar to those in Pingzhou public offerings, but the quality is significantly lower than the latter. In terms of transportation distance, the straight-line distance from the Hpakant jadeite mining area to Ruili, Tengchong, and Yingjiang on the Yunnan border accounts for only a few hundred kilometers. Even the distance from Hpakant to Mandalay and then to Ruili is about 850 kilometers. However, it is close to 1,000 kilometers from Hpakant to Yangon. Then it starts from Yangon Port, crosses the Andaman Sea, the Strait of Malacca, enters the South China Sea, and finally arrives in Guangdong. The overall distance covers more than 4,000 kilometers. The

⁵¹ The author makes statistics based on China Customs information disclosure data.

transportation cost of taking the sea route is therefore significantly higher than the land route, and the price of finished jadeite products will accordingly increase.

Then, the question arises why more high-quality jadeite ores choose a transportation route that takes 10 times more distance, and thus disregarding transportation costs?

3.1 Maritime Trade Routes: Abandon the Near and Seek the Distant

Myanmar assumes the role of the supplier of raw materials, and China represents the destination market of jadeite. Only when the jadeite ores are successfully sold to China can the value be effectively converted into monetary capital. The jadeite ores excavated from the Kachin Mountains have been transported to China for centuries, and most of them have been diverted and transported to China by land or water.

After the three Qing-Burmese wars, the two sides resumed trade, and the number of Han people entering the jadeite mines gradually increased year by year, but overall mining was still very difficult. Two years after the British East India Company fully annexed Myanmar, the colonial government authorities sent an expedition led by Major C.H.E. Adamson into the Kachin Mountains to investigate the jadeite mines. The team specially hired Warry, an Englishman from the British Consulate in Shanghai, as a consultant on China affairs. According to Warry's narrative (Hertz, 1912), "*Exploring the North of the Yunnan Border*" and one of my Kachin interlocutors told me that there is a stone tablet in a temple of Amarapura, the ancient capital of the Konbaung Dynasty, with a Chinese inscription with the names of jadeite traders who died in Burma from the 19th century to the early 20th century, in total numbering more than 6,000. On November 11, 2018, I arrived at the Dongmiao Guanyin Ancient Temple in Amalapura Town, Mandalay City to collect fieldwork data. A few men from a nearby village were repairing the Guanyin Temple, repainting the statues and buildings in bright colors, and the abbot of the temple was so kind to invite me to drink water and eat vegetarian food. After having a vegetarian lunch with the workers and two female believers, he told me in Southwestern Mandarin:

I came from China. I didn't see this stele when I went to Guanyin Temple two years ago, but there is only this Chinese temple nearby, and the others are Burmese temples (temples and pagodas of Theravada Buddhism in the South)), so I guess the stele you mentioned may have been damaged, Myanmar has fought so many battles.⁵²

⁵² Interview time: 11/11/2018; Interlocutor: SCD; Location: Dongmiao Guanyin Temple in Amarapura, Myanmar.

In any case, even if no evidence is found, it can be assumed that the jadeite was transported to Mandalay (called Wacheng by the Han people), the center of the Konbaung Dynasty at the same time as the jadeite was transported to Yunnan. Therefore, the jadeite market in Mandalay can be traced back to that time at the latest. The jadeite trade routes described by Warry are as follows:

In 1790, the Hsimu/Seikmo mining area was discovered. The road leading to the mining area was from Momein (the Burmese name of Tengyue) to Kunyung Lien and Chansi on the Yunnan border, and then entered the Kachin Mountains. Then the caravan marched for about a week to reach Kachin-Ima on the Irrawaddy River near Drauki (A city in Kachin State). After crossing the river, it took more than ten days to travel in the Kachin Mountains to reach Hsimu/Seikmo in the Uyu River valley (now often called "Wulu River" in Chinese). At that time, jadeite could be exchanged for silver of equal weight in Tengyue Prefecture.

In 1798, starting from Ava City (Ava, the name of the ancient country and capital of Myanmar) located on the banks of the Irrawaddy River in the southwest of Mandalay, first went west along the Irrawaddy River to Monywa/Menrua, and then along the Chindwin River to the north, about to the east at Homalin, joins the Uyu River, and then followed the river north to Serua. From here it took about 2 more days to reach the mining area by land.

A few years later, the above two roads gradually declined because caravans were often robbed by Kachin people, and a new land road was opened up. The road ran northwest from Katha (located on the west bank of the Irrawaddy River near the junction of Sigai Province, Kachin State, and Shan State) on the west side of Tengyue to Mawlu, and then continued northward to Mohnyin (The capital of the ancient Shan regime Mongyang), Loastun/Lawsun, Indawgyi (now a town near Indawgyi Lake). It took about three days to walk from Indawgyi to reach the mining area.

The most commonly used commercial route for transporting cotton from Myanmar to China is from Bhamo to the north along the Irrawaddy River to Tsenbo/Sinbo or Talawgyi, and then carried into Yunnan by caravans. Jadeite was transported from Mogaung to Simbo by water, and then handed over to the caravan to be carried into Tengyue. Shortly thereafter, in 1807, the most commonly used jadeite trade route was formed on this basis. That is, the jadeite that came down from the mine to Mogaung went along the waterway through Tapaw, Hokat to Talawgyi, and then passed by land through Sima (it possibly is Xima Town in Yingjiang County, Dehong Prefecture today), Tachai,

Sanda/Santa, and finally Momein/Tengyueh. Mogaung had gradually become the largest distribution center for Myanmar's jadeite trade.
(Hertz, 1912:105-106)

At the end of the 18th century, Guangdong merchants gradually bought jadeite ores from Yunnan Province by land and brought it back to Guangdong for cutting and polishing. By the most prosperous period in the 1830s and 1940s, most of the jadeite trade in Yunnan Province was in the hands of Guangdong merchants (Hertz, 1912). When the Opium War broke out in 1840, the Treaty of Nanjing signed between the Qing Dynasty and the United Kingdom stipulated those five treaty ports be opened in Guangzhou, Shanghai, Fuzhou, Xiamen, and Ningbo. In China, due to the Sino-British Opium War, the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom Movement, and the Du Wenxiu Uprising (Panthay rebellion, Huibian) in southwest Yunnan, the jadeite trade stagnated for a time. Until 1861, when the first batch of Cantonese businessmen⁵³ arrived in Mandalay by sea, they bought all the jadeite ore in the local market, and then shipped them to the Guangzhou Port in China by sea (Hertz, 1912). By the end of the Qing Dynasty, sea transportation had become one of the most important ways for jadeite to enter China (Gu, Yang, Qiu, 2007), and Guangzhou and Hong Kong were the largest ports on the sea transportation route.

To this day, the shipping route has not been interrupted. By controlling maritime trade routes, nation states can be empowered, produce value, and obtain benefits in the process of territorialization, which is a powerful strategy for nation-states to control resources.

3.1.1 Overview of Major Ports on the Jadeite Sea Route

Starting from the Opium War, China has experienced nearly a hundred years of modern war history, and Myanmar also entered the history of anti-colonial and anti-fascist struggles in the early 20th century. In the midst of severe social turmoil, land in both China and Myanmar has been repeatedly contested and controlled by different power groups. During the British East India Company's colonization of the East, it forcibly opened ports and built commercial ports, so that rice, cotton, tea, silk, spices, opium, etc. from the East entered the colonial trade cycle through sea transportation. Yangon in Myanmar, Guangzhou and Hong Kong in China, and other places have gradually become key nodes in the sea transportation of jadeite ores.

⁵³ They may be "port merchants (Gangjiao Shangren, 港脚商人)" from Guangdong. From the end of the 17th century to the middle of the 19th century, the trade between India, the East Indies and China was called port trade, and these merchants were called port merchants. They were mainly private merchants engaged in trade chartered by the East India Company. These retail merchants are generally British as the boss, with Indians and Chinese as followers. Port merchants helped the British buy and sell tea, antiques, jewelry, silver, and opium. Therefore, port merchants in Guangdong probably became pioneers in the maritime trade of jadeite because they had come into contact with jadeite earlier.

3.1.1.1 Yangon Port

In the 1790s, the British East India Company began building factories in Yangon. After the First Anglo-Burmese War, Britain spent between £5 million and £13 million on the war (Thant Myint-U, 2006)⁵⁴. On the one hand, the high cost of the war directly triggered the economic crisis in British India in 1833 (Webster, 1998), and on the other hand, it accelerated the pace of British expansion and control of colonies. Even the Treaty of Yandaboo, signed between Britain and Burma, required huge compensation from Burma.

ARTICLE 5. In proof of the sincere disposition of the Burmese Government to maintain the relations of peace and amity between the Nations, and as part indemnification to the British Government for the expenses of the War, His Majesty the King of Ava agrees to pay the sum of one crore of Rupees.

ARTICLE 9. The King of Ava will abolish all exactions upon British ships or vessels in Burman ports, that are not required from Burmah ships or vessels in British port nor shall ships or vessels, the property of British subjects, whether European or Indian, entering the Rangoon River or other Burman ports, be required to land their guns, or unship their rudders, or to do any other act not required of Burmese ships or vessels in British ports. (Treaty of Yandaboo, 1826)

In the *Treaty of Yandaboo*, Britain demanded compensation of 10 million rupees from Burma, and at the same time abolished the taxes and fees levied by King Ava on Burma ports including Yangon and ships on the Yangon River and protect the rights and interests of Europeans and Indians, including the British, and so on. These unequal treaty rules allowed Britain to occupy part of Burma's territory, gaining more port control and shipping trade benefits, and intensified the conflict between the two sides.

In 1852, British generals clashed with the locals while handling the affairs of the *Treaty of Yandaboo*. They blocked the port of Yangon and seized the ships of the Bagan royal family. The navies of the two countries clashed head-on. This became the fuse of the Second Anglo-Burmese War. After the war, Britain annexed Bago, placed the capital of British Burma in Rangoon, and named Bago Province, Ayeyarwady Province and Rangoon Province as Lower Burma (auk tha) (Ooi, 2004). The following year, the port of Yangon, a hub in the center of British Burma, was completed.

During the British colonial period, Yangon Port gradually became the commercial and trade center of Burma. It was located on the east side of the Irrawaddy River Delta and on the west bank of the Yangon River. It was the intersection of river and sea transportation.

⁵⁴ The cost of this war to Britain was higher than that of the Sino-British Opium War, which was 4 million pounds. The data is expressed in the currency value at that time and is not equivalent to the current market value.

Excellent river port and seaport conditions allowed timber, cotton, and rice to flow down the river from the inland areas of Myanmar to Yangon, and then transported from Yangon to the destination of the British.

To this day, Yangon Port is still the best seaport in Myanmar that can connect to the inland shipping network and berth 10,000-ton ocean-going ships all year round. It is 165 nautical miles away from Mawlamyine Port in the east, 258 nautical miles away from Patheingyi Port in the west, 762 nautical miles away from Penang Port in the south, and 1117 nautical miles away from Singapore Port (Tin Maung Win, 2010). 80% of Myanmar's annual import and export trade goes through Yangon Port to all parts of the world. The main exports include mineral products (including jadeite and other precious stones), agricultural products, logs, sawn timber, etc., and the imports include chemical products, textiles, mechanical and electrical products, complete sets of equipment, and automobile and motorcycle parts (Wu, 2015). At present, there are five main companies engaged in container transportation in Yangon Port, namely MPA, MITT, AWPT, MIP and BSW (Nyan Win, 2014).

3.1.1.2 *Guangzhou Port*

Located at the mouth of the Pearl River, Guangzhou is one of the oldest ports in China and the starting point of the ancient Chinese Maritime Silk Road. The Ming Dynasty introduced the so-called 'sea ban', which refers to a series of isolationist policies restricting private maritime trading and coastal settlement. It was not until 1567 that Zhangzhou Port in Fujian as the sole open port was allowed to trade. In the 22nd year of Kangxi in the Qing Dynasty (1683), the Qing army captured Taiwan from the Zheng family who opposed the Qing Dynasty and restored the Ming Dynasty. In so doing it eliminated the hidden dangers along the southeast coast, and opened the sea the following year, officially allowing the private sector to trade by sea. The Qing government established Guangdong Customs, Fujian Customs, Zhejiang Customs, and Jiangxi Customs, among which Guangdong Customs was the predecessor of Guangzhou Port. In 1757, Qianlong restricted foreign business activities on the grounds of coastal defense and issued an edict to close all ports except Guangdong Customs, and thus Guangzhou became the only treaty port open to trading (Guo, 1979).

The emperor ordered: The ships to Zhejiang next year must be strictly prohibited.In the future, foreign ships will only be allowed to berth in Guangdong, and they will not be allowed to go to Ningbo for trading.

If they come again, the original ships will inevitably return to Guangdong. It is not allowed to enter the mouth of the sea in Zhejiang. Yu ordered Guangdong Customs to instruct the merchant to know.

The order was issued to the Fan merchants of the country, and the imperial edict should be spread throughout the Fan merchants. Later,

*the port will be located in Guangdong. They do no longer feel the urge to go to Zhejiang Province.*⁵⁵

Subsequently, the British East India Company repeatedly presented valuable gifts to the Qing court, and at the same time expressed their hope to open more ports and expand trade with China, but they were all rejected by the Qing court. At that time, Britain had completed the industrial revolution, and commodities needed a large market to export. The tea, silk, and porcelain of the Qing Dynasty were extremely popular in Europe, and the Qing Dynasty had a large surplus in bilateral trade. In addition, the Qing Dynasty used silver as the settlement currency, while Britain used gold. Britain needed to exchange gold for silver in Europe, British India, the United States and other places to buy luxury goods of the Qing Dynasty (Xu, 2017). A steady stream of silver entered China, but British goods were unsalable and currency exchange suffered heavy losses.

East India Company ships to China were often loaded with 90%—sometimes as much as 98%—gold, with only 10% of the cargo being commodities. From 1781 to 1790 (the 46th to 55th year of Qianlong), 16.4 million taels of silver flowed into China, and 26 million taels from 1800 to 1810 (the fifth to fifteenth years of Jiaqing). Before 1827 (the seventh year of Daoguang), the British tried to sell British calico, shearling, and velvet in Guangzhou many times, with a loss of more than 60%. In 1826 (the sixth year of Daoguang), the import of cotton cloth also caused a loss of about 10%. (Modern Chinese History writing group, 1977)

Facing a serious deficit, the British colonists sold opium from British India to China, which quickly reversed the situation. Under the anti-smoking order of the Qing court, opium was still secretly smuggled, sold, and purchased from Guangzhou Port, and the Qing Dynasty quickly turned from a surplus to a deficit. The outflow of silver, the rise in prices, the inability to operate normally in industry and commerce, and the debilitating effects of opium smoking made the Qing court alert to the evil consequences of the opium trade, so they decided to ban it. The imperial envoy Lin Zexu investigated opium at the Guangdong port and confiscated 7,000 boxes of opium from Jardine & Co., 1,700 boxes from Baoshun & Co., and 1,540 boxes from Qichang & Co. (Mou, 1982), which were destroyed in Humen, Guangzhou Port in June 1839. However, this move did not completely eliminate the opium trade, and the opium trade went underground. At the same time, the British side's plan to dump opium to China was seriously hindered, so in June of the following year, the fleet was sent to the sea of Guangzhou, and the first Opium War broke out.

...From now on, the Great Emperor has allowed the people of Great Britain to bring their families to live in the five ports of Guangzhou, Fuzhou, Xiamen, Ningbo, and Shanghai along the coast of the Qing

⁵⁵ *Qing Shilu*, volume five hundred and fifty.

Dynasty, and trade and commerce will not be hindered. The British monarch is allowed to send consuls, stewards and other officials to live in the five cities to deal with business affairs and communicate with the local officials. Order the Englishmen to pay taxes, bills and other fees clearly in accordance with the example outlined in the next article.

Because British merchant ships have traveled far and wide across the ocean, if there is any damage that needs to be repaired, it should be given a place along the coast to repair the ship and store the materials used. Today, the Great Emperor has given the Hong Kong Island to the British monarch and the successor of the hereditary ruler to keep in charge, allowing him to legislate and govern.

The previous 2nd article stated that the five places such as Guangzhou where British merchants lived and traded, should pay import and export taxes on goods besides various fees. It is advisable to negotiate rules and regulations in an impartial manner, and the ministry should issue notices so that British merchants can pay according to the regulations. Now it is also agreed that British goods are allowed to be transported all over the world by Chinese merchants after paying taxes in accordance with regulations in a certain port. And the tax customs that pass through the road must not increase the tax regulations but can only set a certain amount according to the estimated value, and the tax increase for every liang (两, 50 grams) is not excessive. ... (Treaty of Nanking, 1842)

The defeated Qing court signed the *Treaty of Nanjing* with Britain in August 1842, stipulating the opening of five ports of trade, the permanent ceding of Hong Kong Island, and the joint formulation of import and export tariffs by both parties, completely rewriting the history of Guangdong Customs' dominant port trade. The "Canton System" trade relationship⁵⁶, that is one port for trade, between the Qing Dynasty and Britain ended, and the import and export trade monopoly organization Cohong, which originally enjoyed the franchise rights of the Qing government, managed trade activities and supervised taxation on behalf of the Qing court, withdrew from the stage of history (Po, 2018). The maritime foreign trade of the Qing Dynasty was coming to an end in terms of space, system, size and scope of control.

After the founding of the People's Republic of China, the central government took over foreign-funded and privately-run docks and warehouses and started to build Huangsha

⁵⁶ The "Canton System" refers to a trade protection method used by the Qing Dynasty to control trade relations with the West, that is, to concentrate all trade in Guangzhou Port.

Wharf. During the first "Five-Year Plan"⁵⁷, the Guangzhou Municipal Government renovated the small wharves along the Long Causeway. In the late 1950s, Guangzhou Port built Xinfeng and Dongfeng loading and unloading operation areas and Lijiao and Yuancun wharfs and rebuilt and expanded Henan and Fangcun loading and unloading operation areas, as well as Hong Kong, Macao, and coastal passenger stations. Before 1986, Guangzhou Port was originally divided into the inner port and the outer port. Therefore, Guangzhou Port Authority and Huangpu Port Authority governed the inner and outer ports respectively. In December 1987, the Guangzhou Port Authority merged with the Huangpu Port Authority and became part of the Guangzhou Port Authority. So far, Guangzhou Port is located in the center of the Pearl River Delta, the most active export-oriented economy in China. Including the four major port areas of the inner port area, Huangpu port area, Xinsha port area, and Nansha port area and the anchorage in the Pearl River Estuary, the Guangzhou Inland River Port consists of three port areas: Panyu, Wuhe, and Xintang. At the end of 2017, Guangzhou Port had 76 berths above 10,000 tons, with a maximum anchoring capacity of 300,000 tons. Its cargo throughput that year was 590 million tons, ranking fifth in the world. In August 2018, Guangzhou Port had access to more than 400 ports in more than 100 countries and regions around the world (Guangzhou Port Authority, 2018). In July 2021, Guangzhou Port has opened 179 international container liner routes. According to the 2020 Global Container Port Performance Index (CPPI) ranking released by the World Bank and information service company ICC, Guangzhou Port stands out from 351 ports in the world, and the container port performance index ranks sixth, at the same time, the global container throughput ranks first (Guangzhou Port Authority, 2021).

3.1.1.3 Hong Kong and Free Trade Port

Before the first Opium War, Hong Kong was just a fishing village on the remote coast. The Qing Dynasty had a fort stationed in Kowloon, and the British did not recognize the value of its port⁵⁸.

The *Treaty of Nanking* gave Britain the island of Hong Kong, and soon after, the Canton Press pointed out on May 7, 1842, that Kowloon was more suitable for building a town. In 1847, Michael Seymour, Admiral of the Far East Fleet, wrote a letter to the Commander of Royal Engineers stating that the Kowloon Peninsula played an important role as a barrier to protect Victoria Harbor (Liu, 1997). After the first Opium War, the power between the two countries in the handling of some specific affairs continued to be conflicts leading to frictions, such as the Yarrow incident⁵⁹ in 1856 that triggered the

⁵⁷ Since 1953, the People's Republic of China has made long-term plans for national economic and social development, planning every five years, and each plan is for a five-year period, referred to as the "Five-Year Plan".

⁵⁸ The British originally wanted to separate from Zhoushan, Zhejiang, because the favorite Chinese silk in Europe was produced in Huzhou, Zhejiang.

⁵⁹ It originated from the search and arrest of pirates and suspects on the merchant ship Arrow by the Guangzhou Navy of the Qing Dynasty on October 8, 1856, and the subsequent strong protests and force

second Opium War. On March 18, 1860, the 44th Regiment of the British Army occupied Tsim Sha Tsui. On March 20, Lao Chongguang, Governor of Guangdong and Guangxi, agreed to "temporarily lease" Kowloon. In 1860, the British and French allied forces burned the Old Summer Palace and looted countless treasures of the Qing Dynasty royal family and signed the *Aigun Treaty* while Tsarist Russia attacked Northeast China, adding the *Treaty of Beijing* to the previous *Treaty of Tientsin*.

Article 4: On the day when the continuation of the treaty was signed, the emperor of the Qing Dynasty agreed to use Haikou, the prefectural city of Tianjin, as a trading port. All British people living and trading here are in accordance with the ratios of the regulations stipulated in the approved articles, and there is no difference.

Article 6: According to the former, on February 28 of this year, Lao Chongguang, Governor of Guangdong and Guangxi in the Qing Dynasty, handed over the first product of the Kowloon Division in East Guangdong to the British and French General Administration temporarily stationed in Guangdong Province, and bestowed the third-class treasure star Pasha gift on behalf of the State Council, the permanent lease was approved. It is hereby granted by the Emperor of the Qing Dynasty that the land will be given to the Great British Monarch and his heirs and will be included in the territory of British Hong Kong, in the hope that the jurisdiction of the port and the common people would be safe.

After the Beijing Treaty (1860) ceded the south of Boundary Street on the Kowloon Peninsula, the Convention Between Great Britain and China Respecting an Extension of Hong Kong Territory⁶⁰ was passed in 1898 to regulate the lease of the New Territories north of Boundary Street in Kowloon. Since then, Hong Kong Island, Kowloon and the New Territories have been combined into British Hong Kong.

In fact, the purpose of the British colonizing Hong Kong was to set up a trade transfer station near Guangzhou Port to maintain and support British privileges, so that Britain could dump industrial commodities and opium to China by sea, and ship China's silk, tea, porcelain, and other commodities to Europe. In order to ensure the safety of the trade transfer station, it was also necessary to control the adjacent territories. Therefore, Hong Kong has been a free port and an entrepot trade port since 1842, and entrepot trade has always been the main source of livelihood for local residents (Hong Kong Social and Cultural Department of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council, 1997). After the opening of the port, many British foreign firms were established in Hong

intimidation in the United Kingdom. Related conflicts eventually became the justification for Britain to use troops against the Qing in 1857.

⁶⁰ Also known as The Second Convention of Peking.

Kong, that is, international trading firms, companies, and agency firms for Chinese and Westerners. Foreign firms were mainly engaged in the commercial trade of export, import and re-export commodities, and were the key link in commodity logistics, supply chain and value chain. Some industries closely related to the business of foreign firms also developed, such as loading and unloading goods, transportation, warehousing, banking, finance and so on (Er and Zhou, 2007). In terms of taxation, as early as before the First Opium War, Admiral Sir Charles Elliot, a British colonial official, had implemented a free trade port policy in Hong Kong, allowing merchant ships to enter and leave freely without charging tariffs, in order to attract foreign businessmen to use Hong Kong to re-export goods. Until 1856, the Hong Kong government began to collect stamp duty to alleviate the financial crisis. After Hong Kong was colonized by the British and the five-port trade agreement was established, the monopoly position of Guangzhou Port in foreign trade was gradually replaced. In addition to re-export trade, Hong Kong's industry had also developed. The shipbuilding industry, which was closely related to shipping, was the first industrial industry to develop, and some trade goods could be processed nearby Hong Kong, where light industry benefiting from geographical advantages. Most of these industrial enterprises and factories were concentrated in Kowloon.

From the end of the 1960s to the 1990s, Hong Kong took advantage of the opportunity of transferring labor-intensive industries from developed countries to developing countries and based on the advantages of the local free trade port, financial industry, and cheap labor, it attracted a large amount of foreign capital and technology. Then it successfully ranked among the four fastest-growing economies in Asia - "Four Asian Tigers"⁶¹. In 1988, Hong Kong's total trade volume rose to the top of the four, and by the mid-1990s, Hong Kong's entrepot trade had ranked first in the world (Shi, 1996). After the transfer of sovereignty over Hong Kong in 1997⁶², the Chinese government implemented Deng Xiaoping's policy of "one country, two systems" and "Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong" with a high degree of autonomy, and promulgated the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China. The Act maximizes the protection of Hong Kong a free trade port would not change much from the previous periods:

Article 112 The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region does not practice foreign exchange control policies. Hong Kong dollars are freely convertible. Continue to open foreign exchange, gold, securities, futures, and other markets. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government guarantees the freedom of capital flow and entry and exit.

⁶¹ The Four Asian Tigers are Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong.

⁶² This is a commonly used expression in international legal circles. In the Sino-British Joint Declaration, both sides avoided the wording of "whether there is a transfer of sovereignty: The Chinese side stated that "the government of the People's Republic of China has decided to resume the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong on July 1, 1997"; The British side declared "Restore Hong Kong to the People's Republic of China".

Article 114 The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall maintain the status of a free port and shall not levy customs duties unless otherwise provided by law.

Article 115 The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall practice a free trade policy and guarantee the freedom of movement of goods, intangible property and capital.

Article 116 The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region is a separate customs territory. In the name of "Hong Kong, China", the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may participate in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, international textile trade arrangements and other relevant international organizations and international trade agreements, including preferential trade arrangements. The export quotas, tariff preferences and other similar arrangements obtained by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and which are still in force before are all enjoyed by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. (The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, 1997)

After experiencing a series of macro shocks such as the Asian financial crisis in 1998, the impact of the "September 11 Incident" in the United States on the global economy in 2001, and the SARS epidemic in 2003, Hong Kong still maintained a relatively high economic growth. So far, Hong Kong is still one of the most active cargo ports in the world. In 2015, the wholesale, retail, import and export trade, catering and hotel industries accounted for 26.5% of the GDP (Census and Statistics Department of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, 2015).

3.1.1.4 Shenzhen Port

Shenzhen is located on the east side of the estuary of the Pearl River, across the sea to the southwest is Macau, to the south is connected to the New Territories of Hong Kong by land, and to the north is Dongguan City. Shenzhen was originally just a county in Guangdong, named Bao'an. Because of its direct land connection with Hong Kong, Shenzhen has always played an important role in the entire historical process after Hong Kong became an important port city. Especially in the last century, Shenzhen has experienced four large-scale smuggling periods, that is, "escape to Hong Kong". These four times were in 1957, 1962, 1972 and 1979. According to statistics from the Office of the Frontier Port Leading Group of the Guangdong Provincial Party Committee, from 1954 to 1980, there were more than 565,000 incidents of "escape to Hong Kong" recorded in official documents (Liu, 2014). It can be said that the "escape to Hong Kong" laid the heavy groundwork for China's designation of Shenzhen as the first special economic zone opened to the outside world after the implementation of the "reform and opening up" policy in the late 1970s (Yao, 2020). And these immigrants who fled to Hong Kong have become the key labor force to build Hong Kong into the "Four Asian Tigers".

With the support of central policies, Shenzhen's marine economy has developed rapidly, represented by maritime transportation, coastal tourism, offshore oil and gas, marine fisheries and coastal industries. Among them, the state clearly requires that Shenzhen must be built into a global shipping center with a well-developed port logistics industry (Yao, 2020). At present, Shenzhen Port has 8 port areas: Shekou, Chiwan, Mawan, Dongjiaotou, Yantian, Fuyong Airport, Shayuchong, and Neihe, which belong to two higher-level port areas in the west and east. The space that divides the east and west port areas is Hong Kong's Kowloon Peninsula. Shenzhen Port is 20 nautical miles away from the main island of Hong Kong and 60 nautical miles away from Guangzhou. Through the Pearl River system, it can be connected with cities and counties in the Pearl River Delta water network area. As of October 2018, Shenzhen Port has eight container berths with a berthing capacity of 200,000 tons. The goods in Shenzhen Port are mainly containers, and also operate fertilizers, grain, feed, sugar, steel, cement, wood, sand, petroleum, coal, ore, etc. By 2021, Shenzhen's container throughput will be 28.77 million TEUs, ranking fourth in the world in terms of annual container throughput (Securities Times, 2022). Under this trend, the development goal of Shenzhen Port is to become a transshipment port in Asia, serving Southeast Asia, Europe, America, and other countries as a source of import and export goods.

In addition to the above-mentioned ports, the jadeite sea trade route once passed through the port of Bangkok in Thailand. The Bangkok port area is located on the east side of the Chao Phraya River in the Klong Toey area. It is Thailand's main international port and is a cargo-based port. From the opening in 1951 to 1991 after World War II, 98% of Thailand's imports, 60% of exports and 40% of coastal transportation were handled in Bangkok Port (Bangkok Port, 2011), which became the largest port in Thailand and one of the busiest ports in the world. The Port of Bangkok is operated by the Port Authority of Thailand (PAT), an autonomous agency established under the supervision of the Ministry of Transport and Communications. After 1991, the newly built Laem Chabang (LCB) port gradually replaced the port of Bangkok.

3.1.2 Public Auction and Distant Shipping Routes

It can be said that the opening and development of Yangon Port, Guangzhou Port and Hong Kong Port all originated from the colonial development of Southeast Asia and China by the British colonists. It objectively provides the infrastructure and conditions for the utilization and expansion of this regional trade route in the ocean space, and the jadeite trade also takes part in it.

3.1.2.1 Ethnic Relations on the Jadeite Sea Route

From the opening of the port to before World War II, Yangon had a population of about 500,000, of which Indians or South Asians accounted for 55%, the other third were

Burmese, and the rest were Karen, Burmese Chinese, and Anglo-Burmese⁶³. Due to the discriminatory control of the British colonial government, most of the Burmese could only engage in agricultural production and other labor jobs with low social status. Occupations such as government servants and traders were dominated by Indians, Karen, and Burmese Chinese. The dock workers at the Port of Yangon were composed of Burmese and Indians.

There was a long-standing grievance between Indian and Bamar laborers in Yangon Port. In the 1930s, the global economic depression hit the raw material market in Yangon, Burma. Indian dock workers went on strike to raise wages, while Burmese dock workers were used by management to prevent strikes. As a result, under the pressure of Indian workers, the management reached an agreement to raise wages and fired Burmese workers. This inter-ethnic economic entanglement and discriminatory behavior deepened the conflict between the Burmese and Indians, triggering the Yangon riots in 1930 (Brown, 2013). The riots killed more than 200 people and injured more than 2,000 (Egretau, 2009). Most of the dead were Indians.

From this social background, it can be seen that in the maritime trade activities of jadeite, the Indians and Burmese in southern Myanmar were limited to the labor role of porters due to cultural differences and division of labor. In addition, the Kachin and Shan societies in the north were not yet sufficiently developed enough to allow them to move and participate in the jadeite sea trade in the far south. Therefore, since the mid-nineteenth century, port traders from Guangdong have explored the jadeite sea trade route from Yangon Port to Guangzhou Port and Hong Kong Port, but at least until the first half of the 20th century, the main traders and beneficiaries of jadeite shipping were still Han Chinese.

Since ancient times, Han people have traveled overseas to make a living. Economic pursuits have always been their goals (Fan, 2009). Concentrating on making a living, accumulating wealth, and staying away from local politics constitute their strategy to make a living overseas. It is precisely because of this cultural characteristic of overseas Chinese that they often engage in various industries in the local social economy in the destination country, and more successful ones even control the lifeline of the local economy. The same applies to Myanmar: Indians from the west and Chinese from the east control the economic lifeline of Myanmar. Therefore, in addition to rejecting Indians, the Burmese also reject the Chinese. The Burmese call the Chinese "Deyou (德佑)", which means "treacherous people", because in the eyes of the Burmese, the Burmese Chinese are the economic "predators" of their land (Zhou, 2012).

These ethnic conflicts, which can be traced back to the colonial era that gradually but surely unfolded, became more imminent after the two world wars. Since the

⁶³ The Anglo-Burmese are a mixed Eurasian group of European ancestry and the ethnic origins of Burma.

independence of the Burmese nation-state, the Burmese military regime came to power and the implementation of "Burmese-style socialism", a new order was constructed. The seaborne trade in jadeite was also quickly deterritorialized and reterritorialized by the Burmese.

3.1.2.2 Opening of Burma Jadeite Public Auction

Myanmar implemented a Burmese-style socialist system in the 1960s. The basic ideology of the Myanmar Socialist Program Party is to support Burmese-centered nationalism and militarism. Economically, in order to reduce the influence of powerful countries on Myanmar, it began to rely on its own agriculture. As a result, Myanmar society became increasingly isolated from the outside world.

On the other hand, China was also undergoing social revolution and production reconstruction. From the suppression of counterrevolutionaries and land reform in the early 1950s to the "three major transformations" of agriculture, handicrafts, and capitalist industry and commerce at the end of 1956, the original social structure and social order were completely dismantled and restructured, and the commodity economy was replaced by a socialist planned economy. Subsequently, it experienced large-scale social movements such as the Cultural Revolution. Until the mid-to-late 1980s, the China-Myanmar border was almost closed, and the jadeite trade entering mainland China by land or sea stagnated. However, Chinese communities outside mainland China still maintain their demand for jadeite, and the jadeite market has never disappeared.

As we discussed in the previous chapter, after Myanmar's independence, the Burmese military government launched an intense and lengthy deterritorialization and reterritorialization of the violent market with the Kachin, Shan, and Han people in the Hpakant Jadeite Mine in the north. The military government could forcibly exclude other ethnic groups through national systems and policies, but it was unrealistic to completely control the mines under fierce resistance. Moreover, the jadeite consumer market originally only existed in the Chinese society. Even if nationalization and excavation tax were guaranteed by force, it is impossible to completely monopolize the jadeite resources and maximize the profits if it is territorialized only within the mining link. Therefore, it was imperative to re-establish a more controllable export trade order of jadeite raw materials, and the Public Auction set up in Yangon⁶⁴ - Myanmar Jewelry and Jade Fair - emerged over time.

Yangon is not only the political and economic center of the Burmese, but also the largest port in Myanmar. Yangon is located at the southern tip of Myanmar and on the impact plain of the lower reaches of the Ayeyarwady River. Surrounded by rivers and developed

⁶⁴ After Myanmar moved its capital from Yangon to Naypyidaw, the Burmese fair was changed to Naypyidaw in 2010.

water systems, there are 12 inland rivers connecting the inland to the north, and the estuary can be reached by 35 kilometers along the Yangon River to the south. Therefore, the ores excavated from the Hpakant mines can continue the domestic waterway developed in the early stage and enter the Chindwin River or Irrawaddy River along the Uyu River to Mandalay first or go directly south to Yangon Port to participate in the Public Auction organized by the Myanmar government. Jadeite ores need to complete the transaction through bidding and auction in the Yangon Public Auction and pay taxes in order to obtain the government's customs clearance approval. Next, they would be transported from Yangon Port to Hong Kong by sea, or after a short stay here, they would enter the Guangdong Jadeite Market via Shenzhen Port or Guangzhou Port. This route presents many benefits. First, it avoids the northern military conflict area and the Mandalay jadeite market dominated by the Han people. The military government cannot only ensure the safety of jadeite transportation, but also further exclude other ethnic groups, and more effectively control tax sources. Second, even though water transportation takes a long time, the cost is lower than that of land transportation. Compared to the reliance on armed forces to compete for the trade route of China-Myanmar land ports, the risk cost is greatly reduced. Third, the Burmese government makes full use of the basic principles of the legality of commodity transactions between the two countries stipulated by international law in international trade and excludes cross-border trade through other channels labeled as "smuggling" and illegal activities. In so doing it can not only guarantee the sustainability of benefits, but also gradually support the political legitimacy of the Burmese military government in Myanmar through external forces that establish international trade relations. Therefore, it is an excellent strategy of the Burmese government in the cross-border jadeite trade link to set up a Public Auction to control the trade route in Yangon and force all jadeite ores to be legally exported through this channel. In March 1964, the first Public Auction of jadeite ores was held in Yangon, only two years after the military government came to power.

The Burmese government opened Public Auction and dredged water transportation routes, abandoning the near and seeking the far away. It was also using political and military means to forcefully intervene in the free market cycle, which was contrary to the operating laws of the market economy. Therefore, the Burmese government also made a great effort to facilitate public trading to attract as many sellers and buyers as possible to stabilize the market and thus ensuring high tax revenue.

'The finest pearls and gemstones in the world come from Burma.' That's what New York-based jewelry designer Arthur King had to say in Yangon recently. It is his thirteenth time to participate in the annual jewelry fair held in Yangon. Jewelry worth US\$9.3 million was sold in Myanmar this year, including a rough stone (jadeite ore) weighing more than 26 pounds that fetched US\$210,000. The annual jewelry fair attracts many jewelers from various countries to come to Myanmar to bid for goods. In

addition to the automatic participants, this year the Myanmar government invited 363 jewelers and collectors. At the trade fair, the jewels are sorted and displayed in piles. The merchants first inspect the samples, and then formally bid for them the next day. Since the world's major jewelers gather in Yangon at the same time, the international market prices of some jewelry are basically determined at the Yangon Fair. (People's Daily, 1985)

Public Auction is a special auction transaction method, the official name is 'Myanmar Jewelry Fair'⁶⁵, while 'Public Auction (公盘, Gongpan)' is a term used by people in the industry. The jewels traded in the Public Auction are all raw materials of precious gemstones from Myanmar, of which more than 95% are jadeites, and also include a small number of rubies, sapphires, spinels and other gemstones. The Public Auction is a trading platform built by the government for endorsement, and the organizing committee directly managed by the Myanmar Ministry of Mines is the permanent office. Myanmar's state-run, public-private joint ventures and private jewelry companies jointly form the seller, and the ores can be displayed and auctioned by paying the booth fee to the public auction organizing committee according to the size of the booth. The Public Auction is not open to the general public, and bidders need to be invited by governments at all levels, jewelry associations and jewelry companies, and can only enter the venue with the invitation letter for formalities and certificates. They are generally jadeite processors of various sizes, mostly from China. Uninvited buyers will also be able to participate but must post a 50,000-euro deposit to enter. The security deposit will be refunded at the close of the auction provided there are no violations throughout the auction. The ores participating in the public offering must be guaranteed to be A-quality, that is, pure natural jadeite⁶⁶, and must be cut in a large area to provide buyers with a reference for valuation. 'A product' refers to pure natural jadeite that has not been processed by any chemical process and does not represent the quality level. The auction rules distinguish between open bids and hidden bids, most of which are hidden bids, as open bids do not exceed 20% of the total number of bids. The hidden bidding rules imply that bidders 'look at the bid' during the opening period of the Public Auction, and repeatedly evaluate the value of the ores in this phase. Three days before the opening of the bid, bidders need to fill in the serial number, bidding price and name of the bidder on the bid form, and deposit the bid form into the bid box, without knowing the bid and the price from each other; On the day of the bid opening, the results of the winning bids will be broadcast on the large electronic screen, and the bidder with the highest bid will win the lot. The rule of open bids is that the seller clearly marks the price, and the buyer can trade as long as the bid price is reached.

⁶⁵ Since 1992 and 1995, the "Myanmar Mid-term Jewelry Fair" and "Myanmar Jewelry Special Fair" have been added. The nature and trading methods of the three fairs are the same, but the opening time and cycle are different.

⁶⁶ A product refers to pure natural jadeite that has not been processed by any chemical process and does not represent the quality level.

Jadeite is a "heterogeneous body" composed of polycrystals and multiple minerals. Unlike other jade species, which are relatively single and predictable, the internal conditions of jadeite ores are changeable and completely unpredictable. In order to recognize jadeite, traditional industry standards evaluate its quality according to zhong (种, delicacy), shuitou (水头, water head), color and other dimensions, and each dimension is divided into many levels. These criteria can be permuted and combined into countless material representations, and the visual representation of the material before and after polishing can be very different. In addition, the size of ores is different, and a piece of ore may range from a few hundred RMB to tens of millions of RMB. In this way, the value judgment of the ore is full of risks. Although jadeite ores in the Public Auction have been cut out according to the regulations, and the cut surface is generally polished, the basis for the buyer to judge the basically irregular overall content based on the performance of a section is actually extremely limited. If you continue to cut, there may still be great changes. At the same time, the hidden bidding rules prevent buyers from having any external data for reference, such as who is bidding, their economic strength, the number of bidders, the amount of the bid is, and so on. Therefore, deciding whether to acquire a piece of ore and how much to pay for it requires not only years of experience and lessons, but also good luck. There is often a saying in the industry that "one cut will make you poor, and one cut will make you rich (一刀穷, 一刀富)". In fact, it is not just a description of the rules of the game of gambling on jadeite ores⁶⁷. The nature of jadeite stones is naturally the same. Maybe the jadeite ore looks like having a color band after the first cut, which belongs to the "cut up (切涨, the price is increased after cut)" in the jargon, and then resell at a high price to the next buyer; The second buyer might find that the color band disappeared after cutting again, and only the porcelain background or sticky rice soup type emerges, and even some cracks, which is called "cut down (切垮, accompanied by the collapse of the price after the cut)"; If you are lucky, you can buy at a lower price, and this time it may be cut up again. When it cuts up, it may gain hundreds of times the investment amount, and when it cuts down, it may lose all the accumulation of ten years of operation. Many jadeite ore merchants will suddenly become rich, but most of them are at a loss. Nonetheless it is the story of the rich man that stands in the industry, firing the ambition and dream for successive participants.

The rules of the Public Auction actually protect the interests of the government and sellers to the greatest extent. First of all, the auction rules are based on hidden bids which share many characteristics with gambling, and the final selling price can often reach ten times or even dozens of times the starting price, which invisibly greatly expands the profit margin of jadeite ores and maximize the interests of the seller. Secondly, by setting up the Public Auction trading platform, the Burmese government, as a third party, can kill three birds with one stone. One of them is that the Public Auction has gathered a

⁶⁷ Stone gambling is a special form of jadeite transaction. It means that when the shell of the jadeite ore is not cut at all, or only a very small window is opened, the buyer will go out to bid, and bet whether the content inside will rise or fall compared with the bidding price after cutting.

relatively stable source of customers, attracting large mining and trading companies to trade through legal channels, enabling the Myanmar government to effectively control the circulation of jadeite ore in Myanmar, thus ensuring the acquisition of high taxes. The other is that the Burmese government does not need to directly participate in public auctions, which avoids the risks of ore cutting, transportation, and trading that may exist in specific trading practices, thereby maximizing the profits of accessing jadeite resources. More importantly, when the scale of trading in the Public Auction creates the Matthew effect, it will accumulate a combination of advantages in various market factors, thereby forming a strong competition with other jadeite ore markets. More and more buyers are willing to participate in the Burmese public offering due to the large volume of goods to be auctioned, a large number of choices, the government's guarantee of the authenticity of the jadeite ores, and the safety of the shipping route.

3.1.2.3 *Competition from Public Auctions in Pingzhou*

As the scale of the Public Auction organized by the Burmese government increased, it gradually emerged that some unfair rules contradicted the organic development of the market, and a new adaptive trade order emerged. The Pingzhou public auctions are the result of the reterritorialization of the shipping route.



Image 8: Buyers in one of the Pingzhou public auctions are discussing and looking at the ores.

Source: Photographed by the author in Pingzhou Myanmar-China Public Auction. August 2018.

The interests of the government and sellers in Myanmar's Public Auction are protected, while buyers almost bear most of the risk costs in the trade process. First of all, the natural characteristics of jadeite ore itself lead to a lack of basis for judging the value of the entire ore even though the Burmese government has guaranteed that the ores entering the Public Auction are not fake and must be cut open for buyers to judge. Secondly, due to the hidden bidding rules, the reference bids from other buyers are hidden, which further increases the possibility of buyers making mistakes in judging the price and bidding too high. Third, the penalty rules for public trading are very harsh on buyers. The rules stipulate that buyers are not allowed to return or exchange goods after winning the bid and must settle 10% of the total price within one month, and pay the remaining sum within three months, otherwise the security deposit will be confiscated; If you evade the bid, the organizing committee will disqualify the Burmese businessmen indefinitely, and foreign businessmen will be disqualified from participating in the public auctions for ten times. Fourth, high tariffs for cross-border trade are all borne by the buyer. After the successful Public Auction transaction, the buyer pays a 10%-15% transaction tax to the Myanmar government⁶⁸, and also has to pay a 33.9% luxury goods tariff when entering the Chinese customs. Taxes paid to the governments of the two countries account for a disproportionately high proportion of the cost of the jadeite ore trade. In addition, although the cost of sea transportation is not high, it takes a long time, which greatly lengthens the cycle of commodity processing and sales, and limits the circulation efficiency of monetary capital and the efficiency of value production and accumulation:

Shipping time is too long. For the batch of more than 10 million yuan two years ago, I only received the first one in five months, and I waited for the last one for more than a year. I can't sleep well, I can't sleep day after day, I can't see the goods, and I can't find out where (the goods) are. I feel very depressed.⁶⁹

In addition to the time-limited profit-making actions of buyers, this problem also exists on the seller's side. In the Public Auction, the buyer does not directly pay the seller. The transaction money must first be remitted to the relevant account of the organizing committee in accordance with the regulations, and the owner of the goods receive the money after about half a year. An overly long settlement cycle is also not conducive to the flow of funds for the seller. As a result, in order to reduce risks, avoiding the unreasonable rules of the Myanmar government, adapting to the new international trade situation, and obtaining more profits, buyers and sellers each created a series of new flow

⁶⁸ The Burmese government's 2015-2016 Fiscal and Taxation Law increased the original ore transaction tax from 10% to 15%, but the current field survey shows that the public offering is still implemented at 10%.

⁶⁹ Interview time: 08/2019; Interlocutor: JYG; Location: A jade shop in Pingzhou Jadeite City, Foshan City, Guangdong Province.

and transaction orders, which has resulted in the launching of the Pingzhou public auction. It formed a territorial competition with the Myanmar public auction.

For buyers, in order to effectively control and diversify risks, almost all buyers adopt the method of joint investment to bid for the auction. Especially Teochew people in Guangdong are making use of this method. Teochew people are the most active group of migrants who venture overseas in search of a better livelihood. So far, Teochew people are distributed almost all over in the world in countries with Chinatown. Teochew immigrants in Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and other places in Southeast Asia are even more powerful in the destination country. Because Burma is located on the west side of the southeastern peninsula, it is relatively far away from the Teochew people from southeastern China. Therefore, a stable maritime trade migration route was not formed until the British colonized the entire territory of Burma (Li, 2015). Although there is no evidence to prove that the earliest jadeite sea merchants were from Teochew, Guangdong, they must be members of this huge sea caravan. The livelihood mode of Teochew people's internal cooperation and ocean-wide business has a long history. They have already formed a non-governmental economic cooperation method closely related to their social culture, similar to the joint-stock cooperative system in modern enterprises, called "yuelinghui (月零会)".

In the past, we had a lot of floods and bandits here, and the food we planted was hit by disasters, so life was hard. People in the village would join together to pool money for capable young people to go out and do business. And they would share their earnings with the villagers. This is the yuelinghui.None of them will renege on their debts, they are all fellow villagers and relatives, and they strive all for the good of the village.At that time, everyone pooled money to open a processing factory for my father, but it went bankrupt, and my father paid off the debts one after another for many years.⁷⁰

This business tradition and cooperation mode are advantageously applied by Teochew people in the jadeite trade. Membership is determined by origin in terms of surname or coming from the same village but also on geographical proximity with other members. With membership comes along trust joint stock investment. Generally, 3 to 5 people participate in the shares but not exceeding 10 people. Within the small group that forms a joint stock, each person will provide a professional assessment opinion on the quality, price and risk of a certain piece of ore according to his own expertise. Then, the discussion revolves on whether or not to bid and in the former case, followed by the amount of the bid. In addition to the jadeite carvers who specialize in buying jadeite ores for large-scale ornaments, the team is generally headed by those who specialize in cutting bracelets, followed by those who specialize in processing high-end rings, beads and other

⁷⁰ Interview time: 08/2019; Interlocutor: AQ; Location: Yangmei Village, Jieyang City, Guangdong Province.

smooth bare pieces. This is because bracelets have the highest economic value among jadeite products of the same quality, followed by color materials that can be processed as bare pieces. These two categories almost determine the maximum value and profit margin of a possible finished product after a piece of ore is processed.

Bracelets are the most profitable, so first estimate how many bracelets you can cut out. Cutting a bracelet depends on both luck and experience. Slice first, and then use the circle you see to cover the material, taking into account the color band and water head, and avoiding cracks and ringworm. If you can take care of all, then cut a round bracelet with thick meat, if you can't, you have to choose. Whether to reduce the size of the ring or change it to a guifei bracelet (贵妃镯, An oval flat bar bracelet shape). You have to evaluate it yourself, and the market prices are different. After making a decision, draw a circle on it. The processing factory has a machine for cutting bracelets. A good bracelet can't see small cracks without polishing, cotton and ringworm can't be seen, and there will be changes after polishing. The bracelet core and leftover materials are used for other purposes. If the bracelet is cut reluctantly, it will be used directly for other purposes. Anyway, it is negotiated, and it can be solved according to the most profitable solution.⁷¹



Image 9: Jadeite Bracelet Blank just cut from the flake.

Source: Photographed by the author in the store of reporter JYG, August 2018.

⁷¹ Interview time: 08/2019; Interlocutor: JYT; Location: Myanmar-China Jadeite Fair, Pingzhou Town, Foshan City, Guangdong Province.

In the trade group of Teochew people, all parties do not need to sign an agreement, and the final profit and loss are distributed according to the proportion of the shares. Such an economic cooperation strategy can not only highly concentrate economic capital, but also allows for sharing experience, strengthening trust, and sharing risks. Even if it loses money, it will generally not hurt the peace, and the cooperation within the group is relatively stable. After years of collective experience accumulation and inter-generational transmission, Teochew people have gained irreplaceable experience and technology in jadeite ores investment. Moreover, they transported the jadeite ores obtained from the Public Auction in Myanmar back to Guangdong, and collected them in Pingzhou Town, Foshan City, within the water system of Guangzhou Port, to form the largest primary refined processing market in China. It is mainly engaged in the processing of raw materials and bracelets and bare parts here.

On the other hand, for the seller, the ideal state of profit accumulation is fast delivery, high selling price, and short payment cycle, so they invented a new coping strategy within the scope of public auction trading rules, called 'bid intercepting (拦标, Lan biao)'. Although the hidden bid auction rules are extremely beneficial to the Myanmar government and cargo owners, they often lead to excessively high bidding prices, sometimes even more than ten times the initial assessment price of the Myanmar Ministry of Mines⁷², which on the contrary tends to make the auctioned ores lose bids. Therefore, many sellers deliberately set a high starting price, voluntarily discouraging potential bidders, and then auctioned it at a price slightly higher than that of the Ministry of Mines, resulting in the fact that "the transaction has been legal", that is, intercepting their own bid. Then they bear all the taxes and all the risks in the transportation and transport the jadeite ores into China. Before the 1980s, these jadeite ores were mainly shipped to Hong Kong and Taiwan. The ones in Hong Kong are concentrated on Canton Road in Kowloon, while the ones in Taiwan were the largest on Jianguo Road in Taipei City. There were also jadeite markets in Taichung, Tainan, Kaohsiung, and other places in Taiwan. After mainland China opened up to the outside world, rough jadeite shipped into China often entered Shenzhen or Guangzhou ports via Hong Kong re-export or entered through the smuggling channel between Hong Kong and Shenzhen, and then gradually gathered in Pingzhou. Thus, the Pingzhou market continues to expand.

You guys have to learn to surf now. When I was young, I saw big winds and big waves! We brought smuggled goods from Hong Kong. When the waves were big, even the stones (jadeite ores) could not hold the boat steady. We call it 'sitting the waves (坐浪, Zuo lang)'. I am very good at

⁷² The Ministry of Mines of Myanmar has set up a mining tax in the mining process. After the jadeite ore is mined, it needs to be roughly evaluated by the Ministry of Mines, taxed, numbered, and registered before it can be shipped out of the mine. The valuation method of the Ministry of Mines is very simple. It only roughly distinguishes colored (C) or colorless (NC) without cutting the ore, plus volume and weight, and the combination of the two produces a price result.

water!Of course, it could only be a small boat, and we have to hide from the anti-smuggling police. Getting caught is terrible!I definitely do not do it now, everyone in our village runs farmhouses (农家乐, Nong jia le) and fishinghouses (鱼庄, Yu zhuang).⁷³

Most of the large jadeite ores merchants from Myanmar are Burmese Chinese, or Burmese who have a strong bond with the Chinese. They have a deep understanding of the pulse of the jadeite market in China and Myanmar. In order to take the initiative to control the sales methods and profits of raw materials, they simply cooperated with Chinese jadeite merchants to set up public auctions in Pingzhou, so that those who buy raw materials can buy directly at their doorstep without going to Myanmar.

Here (Pingzhou) we have nine major Biaochang (标场, bids markets/public auctions), Jiyu, Hengsheng, Kaiheng, Jingu, and the Burmese China we are in now. They are all run by big bosses. They have a lot of goods and great influence.Every year, there are 20 or 30 auctions in Pingzhou, large and small. Ores worth tens of billions in the large public auctions and a few billions in the small ones. For the bids that are sold, 4% will be taken by the bidding market.⁷⁴

Pingzhou public auctions are currently the largest jadeite public auctions in China. Their organizer is not the Chinese government, but an industry association in Pingzhou, namely the Pingzhou Jade Association (平洲玉器协会). Pingzhou public auctions adopt the membership system, and buyers participating in public auctions must have joined the Pingzhou Jade Association. The condition for joining the association is to have two members who have been in the association for more than three years as guarantees. If there is no guarantor, you can also pay 100,000 RMB as a deposit. After becoming a member, you need to pay a membership fee of 400 RMB per year. At present, the Pingzhou Jade Association has more than 60,000 members, mainly composed of jadeite processing factories in Pingzhou, Jieyang, Sihui, Guangzhou, Ruili and other places, as well as jadeite merchants in other parts of the country. All transactions in Pingzhou public auctions adopt the hidden bidding rules. The owners of the goods will mark the reserve price on the brief introduction card of each target. After selecting the bid, the buyers need to fill in the corresponding information and bid, put it into the bid box, and wait for the announcement of the result on the bid opening day. The ores traded here are clear materials, that is, ores that have been cut, and some good-quality flakes also participate in the bidding. Buyers in Pingzhou public auctions do not need to be responsible for paying taxes, and there is no customs duty for cross-border trade, and it also eliminates the cost of going to Myanmar for the Myanmar Public Auction and the risk of transporting

⁷³ Interview time: 09/2019; Interlocutor: HG; Location: A fishing village in Dongchong, Shenzhen City, Guangdong Province.

⁷⁴ Interview time: 08/2019; Interlocutor: JYT; Location: Myanmar-China Jadeite Fair, Pingzhou Town, Foshan City, Guangdong Province.

jadeite ores. Therefore, even if the price of jadeite ores is relatively higher than that of the Myanmar Public Auction, more and more jadeite processors are attracted to Pingzhou, thus forming a strong competition with the Myanmar Public Auction.

3.2 Multidimensional Network of Overland Trade Routes

Faced with the situation that the Burmese government diverts more and more rough jadeite to the sea through public auctions, the ethnic minorities in northern Myanmar did not sit still either. They started anew and took advantage of their geographical advantages to actively open up and expand land trade routes. Land trade routes were originally formed gradually and spontaneously. After the border demarcation of nation-states, jadeite trade activities embedded in different cultural, political, and economic containers were gradually reconstructed, and land routes formed a new landscape. Generally speaking, jadeite ores in the land routes generally do not enter the Yangon (Nay Pyi Taw) Public Auction, but either pass through Myitkyina or Mandalay, or directly cross the border between China and Myanmar, and arrive at Yingjiang in Yunnan, China, Ruili, Tengchong, Lincang and other border jadeite markets. These jadeites often do not have legal export approval documents from the Myanmar government, and generally avoid tariffs when they enter China, so they are considered smuggled goods.

3.2.1 Border Closure and Combined Land and Sea Transport: Another Route Through Thailand

Before the current land route for jadeite flow was formed, the jadeite trade experienced a period in which land and sea transportation were combined and paralleled with the Myanmar Public Auction shipping route. That is the Thailand route mentioned briefly above. This route had existed for about 30 years: jadeite came out of the Hpakant Mine, along the Myanmar side of the China-Myanmar border to the Golden Triangle, and then enters Thailand's Chiang Rai, Chiang Mai and other places to form a market, whereafter it goes south to Bangkok to form a next-level market, and then from the port of Bangkok to Hong Kong and Taiwan by sea. According to the World Bank statistics, during the socialist regime, Myanmar's illegal smuggling trade accounted for 40% of the national economy, but the actual figure may be closer to 80% (Lintner, 1988). The jadeite sold to neighboring countries via this route was a very important part of this trade. The most important participants in the Thai route were the remaining members of the Kuomintang army and their families, as well as Yunnan Muslims⁷⁵, Kachins, Shans, Awas, Kokangs and other ethnic groups who were closely related to them.

⁷⁵ The Burmese language calls this group the Panthay, and they call themselves "Hui" or "Hui Hui", which can be attributed to the Burmese Chinese. This dissertation mainly uses Yunnan Muslims and Yunnan Hui to refer to them.

3.2.1.1 *Jadeite Trade Activities of Yunnan Muslim Caravans*

The "Southern Silk Road" connecting Southwest China to India, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and the "Tea Horse Road" connecting the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau to the Melan Valley⁷⁶ are all ancient commercial routes with a long history. For thousands of years, mule and horse caravans (马帮, mabang) have flowed in this fringe area where the Chinese and Indian cultures meet⁷⁷.

Before the Yuan Dynasty, there were few Han Chinese, who settled in the Nanzhao Dali Kingdom and the west. After the Mongols conquered Dali in 1274, Sayyid Ajall Shams al-Din Omar al-Bukhari, who was of Persian descent (Wang, Wang, Zhang, Yao, Jin and Li, 2013), was sent to Yunnan as governor. During his tenure, his eldest son Hisson Nasir al-Din served as the traffic commissioner, opened up many roads to western Yunnan, and personally commanded the Yuan Dynasty's first invasion of the Bagan Dynasty in Burma. After the eldest son succeeded the governor, the third son, Husayn al-Din, also served as the traffic commissioner. During the rule of Yunnan by the Sayyid Ajall Shams al-Din family, a large number of Muslim soldiers of Central Asian descent were transferred to Yunnan as garrison troops. Their descendants became the core components of Yunnan Muslims and Burmese Chinese Muslims. Besides serving in the army, their main livelihood was in business. As soldiers and merchants, they were well-equipped to trade successfully in rugged, mountainous regions (Forbes, 1987). Therefore, they became an important part of the caravans that flowed in Burma, Yunnan, and even other areas after the Yuan Dynasty.

By the middle and late Qing Dynasty, the Hui people had almost monopolized the caravan trade activities between Burma and Yunnan, mainly transporting jadeite, cotton, silk, tea, and other commodities. At the beginning of the 19th century, more and more Han people who migrated to Yunnan occupied the living space of the Hui people. Coupled with the discrimination and oppression of the Hui people by the bureaucrats of the Qing government, the conflict between Muslims and the authorities intensified. In 1853, the Qing court massacred the Hui people because of the dispute over the Hui-Han Jianshui tin mine. This move triggered the anti-Qing uprising led by Hui leader Du Wenxiu in 1855, which temporarily interrupted the trade route and border trade between Bhamo, Burma and Yunnan. In 1875, the Hui rebellion was completely suppressed by the Qing Dynasty. Many Yunnan Muslims and their families fled Yunnan to seek refuge in the Awa Mountains of Burma and settled in Panlon (Panglong/Pan Nawng, 盘龙)⁷⁸. Hui refugees quickly established their traditional occupations as merchants, caravans, miners, restaurateurs, smugglers, and mercenaries, and penetrated deep into Burma expanding

⁷⁶ Melan Valley means the valley area of the Lancang River and the Mekong River Basin.

⁷⁷ The livestock carried in the caravan include mules, horses, and donkeys, and mules are the main ones. "mabang (马帮)" is the caravan's self-proclaimed term and its official name in Yunnan dialect.

⁷⁸ Panlon is located in Wa State, the Second Special Zone of Myanmar, which is now in Shan State of Myanmar. It belongs to a township under Hopang Town in Wa State.

settlements to almost the entirety of the Shan State. In addition, on the Burma side, due to experience of caravans consigning jadeite, some Yunnan Hui people in Myanmar worked as jadeite appraisers in the Konbaung Dynasty Palace. They competed with the Burmese Han Chinese jadeite appraisers who entered the royal service before them, and there were even incidents where disputes led to conflicts and resulted in death. In order to mediate conflicts and separate the two ethnic groups, King Mindon Min of the Konbaung Dynasty rewarded the Yunnan Hui people with the campsite of the caravan camp in Mandalay, the capital, as a settlement⁷⁹, and allowed them to build a mosque and an open trading company. The company, called HAO, was dealing in exactly the kind of consignments that caravans often consigned jadeite, precious stones, cotton, silk and other goods from China and Burma (Anderson, 1876). The Yunnan Hui people had penetrated into more places in Burma with the increasing demand for labor in the ruby mines in Mogok, the Baldwin silver mines in Namtu in northern Shan State and the jadeite mines in Mogaung in Kachin (Hertz, 1912) expand. They had settlements along the Salween River in Lashio, Kyaingtong (Kengtung), Bhamo, and Taunggyi.

In the middle and late period of British colonialism, the caravan business in Panlon continued to expand southward. In the 1920s, conflicts broke out between the Yunnan Hui people in the Awa Mountains and the aboriginal Awa people. After the conflicts, Muslims strengthened their control over caravan transportation in this area and expanded their business to Chiang Rai, Chiang Mai, Mesa Liang in Thailand, and Laos, and so on. British colonial historian G E Harvey found when he visited Panlon in 1931:

In addition to legal trade, the Panthay people in Panlon at this time have become the "nobility of the opium business" in what is now commonly referred to as the Golden Triangle area. They left the local small business of selling this high-risk but high-profit commodity to Shan and Han opium dealers, and instead led large and well-equipped caravans to travel long distances in Siam, Laos, Jingdong and Yunnan.Panthay's numbers had risen to 5,000 ("including local recruits"). Funded by Singaporean Chinese, they owned 130 Mausers and 1,500 mules, each mule cart escorted by two infantrymen, and exported hundred cattles of opium to France, Siam, and the British colonies. (Harvey, 1933)

In addition, French scholar Forbes (1987) also mentioned in his research on trade caravans between China and India from the 13th century to the 20th century:

Raw cotton, a royal monopoly, was in great demand in China. Extensive trade in this commodity existed between the Burmese kingdom and Yunnan. It was transported along the Ayeyarwady River to Bhamo,

⁷⁹ This is the current Panthay Compound/Chinese Muslim Quarter, located in the area surrounded by 35th Street, 36th Street, 79th Street and 80th Street in Mandalay.

where it was sold to Chinese traders, and then transported partly by land and partly by water to Yunnan, and from there to other provinces of China. Most long-distance caravans consisted of fifty to one hundred mules and employed ten to fifteen drivers. (Forbes, 1987)

It becomes clear that, first, the Hui people in Yunnan had become the most powerful long-distance traveling caravans in southwest China and northern Southeast Asia since the mid-to-late 19th century, as almost the entire network of caravans was under their rule. Second, there had been a specialization of labor between them and other ethnic groups. At least in this area, caravans and merchants belonged to different ethnic groups. Third, the scope of this trade is manifested by the number of weapons, the number of mules, and the equipment configuration of the convoy, etc., reflected that the transportation industry relying on caravans could make enough profits to expand its scale. Fourth, they transported silk, tea, and daily consumer goods from China to Burma, and then transported back raw cotton, European products, seafood, etc. from Burma to China, and these goods included jadeite and opium.

By the time of the Japanese invasion in World War II, the traditional monopoly of Yunnan Hui caravans in this large area gradually declined. In 1938, the Yunnan-Burma Highway from Lashio, Burma to Kunming, Yunnan was completed, which to a certain extent weakened the transport capacity of caravans in trade. Due to the needs of the war, the caravans turned into transporting materials for the war of resistance. For example, in 1941, the Yunnan provincial government commissioned the Hui caravan to form a mule and horse transport brigade to transport anti-war supplies to the front lines (Huizu Study Network, 2022). In 1942, Aung San led the Japanese army back to Yangon. The Japanese army captured and burned Panlon, and more than 200 Hui families were deported as refugees (Chang, 2015). Some of them returned to Yunnan, some went to Kokang, and some migrated to northern Thailand.

3.2.1.2 *The Remaining members of the Kuomintang and the Route Through Thailand*

The establishment of the jadeite trade route in Thailand, as well as the birth of new jadeite distribution centers as Chiang Mai and Bangkok, were closely related to a group of Yunnanese who were driven to the Golden Triangle area by the war.

Shortly after the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the People's Liberation Army gradually gained control of the frontier regions of mainland China. At the beginning of January 1950, the defeated KMT remaining army in Yunnan and their families⁸⁰ fled south one after another, crossing Jinghong, Menghai, Daluo and other

⁸⁰ The main forces in the early days were the 237th Division of the Eighth Army led by Li Mi (李宓) and the 93rd Division of the 26th Army led by Yu Chengwan (余程万). They were mainly from Yunnan, and also include Guangxi, Guizhou and so on.

places, and escaped into Myanmar. At the beginning of March, they gathered in Mengbang, east of Tachileik, Myanmar. This area is located at the junction of Myanmar, Thailand, and Laos. It is the "Golden Triangle" that will soon afterwards be known far and wide. Due to the weak control of the Burmese government in northern Myanmar, and the fact that the local Shan chieftains had gotten along well with the Chinese expeditionary force during the war of resistance (People's Political Consultative Conference Network, 2013), this remnant army gained a foothold for survival. However, keeping other countries' troops in a sovereign state is not allowed by the Charter of the United Nations, so the Burmese government exercised its legal power to reject them. Ne Win, then chief of staff of the Burmese National Defense Forces, demanded that the remnants of the Kuomintang army be disarmed but to no avail, and threatening with force the withdrawal of the remnant army. It stated that they did not have the intention to occupy the territory of Myanmar, but they only planned to stay temporarily. What they really wanted to chase was the territory of mainland China. Negotiations between the two sides failed to reach a conclusion. On June 18, the Burmese army began to encircle and suppress the remnants of the Kuomintang army, but the result was that they were repelled by the latter, who survived from many battles in August.

Beginning in February 1951, the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) airdropped weapons and supplies to the KMT remnants through the Overseas Southeast Asia Supply Corporation in Bangkok. In April 1953, after the Burmese army failed to attack the remaining Kuomintang army again, they complained to the United Nations that they had been "invaded" and that the invaders cooperated with the rebels in Shan State. The United Nations unanimously passed a resolution at the 428th plenary meeting, requiring the remnant army to lay down their arms and withdraw from Myanmar (UN General Assembly, 1953). Under pressure, the Central Committee of the Kuomintang in Taiwan decided to carry out the first batch of operations to withdraw from Taiwan at the end of the same year but ordered the elite troops of the remnant army to change their identities and stay there under the status of "volunteers", and they had to solve the problem of survival by themselves. As a result, the remaining soldiers settled in the Awa Mountains, continued guerrilla warfare, and made a living by themselves (Qin, 2009).

The geographical scope of Awa Mountain roughly includes: from the south of the lower reaches of the Nanting River in the north, to the confluence of the Salween River and the Namka River in the south, and bounded by the Salween River in the west, the northeast and southeast include Mengjiao, Mengdong, Aishuai in Cangyuan County, Longkan and Fuyan in Menglian County, and the watershed between Nujiang River and Lancangjiang River in the east (You, 1987). This area includes part of what is now China's territory. In 1960, China and Myanmar signed the Border Treaty between the People's Republic of China and the Union of Myanmar, which clearly demarcated the country's borders, and the remnant army of the Kuomintang no longer had the basis for armed occupation. In 1961, with the approval of the Thai side, the United Nations temporarily allowed the

remnant soldiers and their families to stay in the Golden Triangle on the Thailand-Myanmar border to the Maesle area in Chiang Rai, waiting for the Taiwan KMT to implement the second retreat in batches. During this retreat, the Third Army and the Fifth Army chose to stay and became a special armed group.

Most of us are from Yunnan, either Han, Wa, or Dai. Our ancestors have lived in this area for generations. Taiwan is too far away, so it's not good to live there. We don't want to go. Another reason is that many soldiers have already married wives. Fleeing while fighting, but soldiers can still marry a wife. The families of the wives are local, and there are a lot of family members, how can they leave? We thought about it at the time, forget it, isn't it necessary to make a living wherever we go?⁸¹

The Thai side was afraid of this armed force with American equipment and considerable combat effectiveness but needed them as a strategic buffer on the Thailand-Myanmar border, so they proposed to use them as the main force to attack the territories of the Thai Communist Party and the Miao Communist Party together with the Thai army in exchange for the right of residence in Thailand. In order to seek living space in Thailand, the solitary army (孤军, gujun)⁸² assembled the remaining main force and won after many rounds of bloody battles with more than half the cost of casualties, and finally obtained the right of residence in the mountainous area of Thailand on the Thai-Myanmar border granted by the King of Thailand. Over the next 20 years, they gradually formed villages in Chiang Rai, Chiang Mai and other places in northern Thailand as mercenaries and refugees and survived and developed.

We have fought for more than ten or twenty years, and there have been casualties, wounded, and recruits. In the final battle of survival, the earliest soldiers are all old, but what else can we do? The old and the young are hiding on the Burmese border (on the Myanmar side of the Thailand-Myanmar border). We have nothing to eat, we can only hide wherever possible. We are not allowed to live at all, even if we die in battle, we have to fight. We all followed the older soldiers to the battlefield first. The Thai army sent out helicopters to fight from the air. Our people carried ropes on their backs and climbed up the cliffs behind the mountain to be able to make a sneak attack. Too many people died

⁸¹ Interview time: 01/2019; Reporter: DGF; Location: Van Yang Village, Chiang Rai Province, Thailand.

⁸² The Thai side called them "refugees from the Kuomintang Chinese army (国民党中国军队难民)", the Chinese side called them "the remnants of the Kuomintang army (国民党残军)", and they called themselves "the solitary army in northern Thailand (泰北孤军)". The armed forces mentioned here have changed from their past status to the status of refugees living in Thailand, so I use their own name.

(tears and sobs).Poor, no one cares about us, if we don't fight to the death, how can we survive?⁸³

From the 1950s to the 1960s when the right of residence was obtained, and even for a long time after granted the right of residence, the foremost challenge faced by this group of Yunnanese, both armed forces and refugees was survival. Constant fighting and migration made it difficult for them to stay in one place long enough to cultivate and produce food. The available resources were external supplies of arms and a network of relationships with other local ethnic groups, while there was no living assistance whatsoever. Therefore, they resort to certain commercial transactions that could make huge profits in a short period of time. There was still a lot of opium left by the British colonists in this area, so this group of stateless army refugees started the drug smuggling trade in the black market by "supporting the army with drugs and protecting drugs by the army". In addition, there was another commodity that could also provide huge profits notably jadeite.

Tell me, there are wars and battle fights everywhere, what do you take with you when you flee? Gold or jadeite? At the same price, how big is a jadeite bracelet? How much does a pile of gold weigh? Which is easier and better to bring along?Yes! The Yunnan people must take along the jadeite. Once the bracelet is worn and the pendant is hung around the neck, it is convenient to run away. Gold is heavy and easily robbed.⁸⁴

At that time, jadeite had been popular in Southwest China and even the whole country for nearly a hundred years. Especially in Yunnan, which is the closest to the place of production, jadeite was already a common jewelry treasure in the homes of high-ranking officials and nobles. Most Yunnan who took flight were military officers and local gentry at that time. When they fled, they chose to take along the most valuable and portable jadeite jewelry. In addition, this force had a lot of connections with the Yunnan Muslim caravans distributed in the Awa Mountains and northern Thailand. The Chinese Expeditionary Force that went to Burma has repeatedly recruited caravans of human and animal power to transport supplies. Especially during the first expedition before the completion of the China-India Ledo Highway, the expeditionary military supplies crossed the Savage Mountain and the Hukawng River Valley to India, and the caravans who were familiar with the ancient trade routes in these mountainous jungles significantly facilitated the transportation of supplies. In addition, when the Japanese army attacked Panlon, Ma Guanggui, the leader of the caravan, led the Panlon Hui Self-Defense Force formed by the Kuomintang government to resist the Japanese invasion (Chang, 2015). When the remaining army stayed in Myanmar, they also sought weapons and ammunition support from Ma Shouyi, the leader of the caravan in Thailand, to deal with

⁸³ Interview time: 01/2019; Interlocutor: DGF; Location: Van Yang Village, Chiang Rai Province, Thailand.

⁸⁴ Interview time: 2019.1; Interlocutor: YSP; Location: A clubhouse in Saigon Wharf, Dian Lake Resort, Kunming City, Yunnan Province.

the attack of the Burmese army and won (Zhao and Xie, 1994). The jadeites that they had brought along were used as transaction currency in the transportation trade of the caravan.

...They (people in the refugee village) call my mother Bai Matai (白马太, Mrs. Ma with fairer skin). She was very famous. She collected jadeite (worn by refugees) in the refugee villages, and then sold to Chiang Mai. Some of the collected jadeites were exchanged for some food with the local villagers, not much, and the jadeite trade was still an internal business among the Chinese.⁸⁵

However, the business of traveling through the perilous jungle of the Golden Triangle was by no means smooth sailing. The transaction cycle of jadeite was too long, and jadeite trading alone was not enough to maintain a stable livelihood of this army and its dependents. Therefore, the "special goods (特货, tehuo)" (opium/drug) business that can make quick profits remains indispensable.

I was only 14 years old at the time, and I was only driving mules. Jadeite did not sell as fast as opium, and I had to go to Hong Kong to find a buyer, but selling opium was illegal and the risk was high. Opium was often transported, and jadeite was transported every two or three months, not fixed.Generally, the stones carried by mules were not large. If the stones were too large, they have to be cut, otherwise the mules cannot carry them.We had to hide wherever possible in the jungle, and we had to guard against being robbed by other armed forces, so the forward speed was very slow.There were no tigers, but there were leopards, constrictors were common, and leeches were everywhere.As long as they were shipped to Thailand (Mae Sai, Chiang Mai), Hong Kong buyers would come to buy them. Rich people in Hong Kong would come to gamble on stones but they also directly buy opened stones.⁸⁶

Unlike the labor division of the Hui caravan, which was only responsible for transportation, this group of soldiers with sophisticated weapons and jade culture was involved in both transportation and selling in the jadeite business, besides also operating in the opium business. As a result, the jadeite market in Mae Sai on the Thailand-Myanmar border and Chiang Mai started to develop. The four largest jadeite trading companies in Chiang Mai were Qiu's company established in 1966, Li's company in 1973⁸⁷,

⁸⁵ Interview time: January 2019; Interlocutor: MXS; Location: Chiang Mai University, Chiang Mai, Thailand.

⁸⁶ Interview time: 01/2019; Interlocutor: YHX; Location: Tangwo Village, Chiang Rai Province, Thailand.

⁸⁷ This company belonged to the family of Li Wenhuan (李文焕), commander of the Third Army of the Kuomintang Remnant Army.

Zhang's company in 1974⁸⁸, and Lin's company in 1980⁸⁹. They dominated the jadeite trade throughout Thailand from the 1960s to the late 1980s (Chang, 2004). In fact, when Taiwan withdrew for the second time in 1961, the opium business of the remaining army of the Kuomintang, the local Shan people, and the Kokang Self-Defense Forces they had made the Golden Triangle into one of the world's three major drug sources. With financial support, the trade network could expand further. Bangkok, the jewelry center of Thailand, also had their jadeite trading company branch. When the Kachin people in the Savage Mountain in the far north were violently chased away by the Burmese military government in jadeite mining, they began to exchange jadeite ores for arms from them as coping strategy because they did not have weapons or other means to resist. The result was the intricate connection between jadeite trade route with the illegal opium trade. Therefore, after the jadeite was mined from the Kachin Mountains, they were transported to the Thailand-Myanmar border by armed caravans organized by the Hui, Shan, Kokang, and Han people. Henceforth, they entered the markets of Mae Sai, Chiang Mai, Bangkok, and other places in Thailand after going through a series of legal procedures at a jewelry and jade trading company in Thailand. Buyers from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and other places were among the most avid customers. This route flourished until the mid-1990s.

To sum up, the opening of the jadeite trade route in Thailand is the result of the reterritorialization of ethnic minorities in the vacuum of state power through violence empowerment and ethnic/social network empowerment. At the onset, the route started with a group of Yunnanese who were constantly excluded from the territory of the nation-state and thus incessantly looking for living space and sources of livelihood. They possessed advanced weapons and strong combat power at that time, so they could re-territorialize the jadeite trade through armed forces. Second, the route was developed on the basis of the traditional trade and transportation network established in distant times by the Yunnan Hui caravans. The Hui people themselves are not the holders of jade culture, but the relatively mature geographical routes, post stations, strongholds, means of transportation, experience, etc. controlled by the Hui caravans all provided crucial conditions for the smooth transaction of goods. The division of labor and inter-ethnic cooperation was rapidly formed among the Han, Hui, Kachin, and some other ethnic minorities, and in this process a new economic order was gradually reconstructed. Third, the prosperity of trade activities had benefited from the "frontier" Golden Triangle area that was difficult for national powers to reach in the early days of the establishment of the nation-state. The area is located at the junction of Myanmar, Thailand, and Laos, and is adjacent to Yunnan, the southwest frontier of China. Even though the national borders have been demarcated, except for China, the central governments of the three countries

⁸⁸ This company belonged to Khun Sa, the notorious Golden Triangle drug lord and the commander-in-chief of the Mawng Tai Army (MTA) of Shan. His Chinese name is Zhang Qifu (张启富/张奇夫).

⁸⁹ This company belonged to the family of Luo Xinghan (罗星汉), the notorious Golden Triangle drug lord and the commander-in-chief of the Kokang Self-Defense Forces, who was close to the Burmese government.

have extremely weak border control capabilities, and the Greater Golden Triangle has been in a state where state power has been unable to reach for a long stretch of time. Therefore, in this well-connected and easy-to-hide jungle, the armed forces of ethnic minorities were able to survive and grow stronger, providing a free and fertile soil for the growth of the jadeite trade.

The Thailand route not only sought far away routes such like the Myanmar public auction route, but also relied on caravan delivery. However, the road was tortuous and dangerous, and armed conflicts might erupt any time during the transportation process, which greatly increased the circulation time and cost. The life history of jadeite being transported together with drugs also provides a new cultural narrative for the increase of its value content.

3.2.2 The Cross-border Transportation Network and Public Auctions at the Border

Ne Win's "Myanmar-style socialist road" pursued a centralized Burmese doctrine, extreme conservatism, isolationist policies, and the economic crisis caused by the two exclusive "demonetization orders", which pushed Myanmar society to collapse. There were actually three times of banknote abolition in 1964, 1985, and 1987, during the Ne Win period. At that times the large-denomination kyats were suddenly announced to be invalid by authorities, and the conversion into small-denomination kyats was restricted within a short period of time. The purpose of the first abolition of banknotes was to exclude Indians and Chinese who hold the lifeline of Myanmar's economy from Myanmar. Although the purpose announced by Myanmar officials for the last two abolitions was to combat the black market and profiteering activities, in fact it was the same as the first time that the military government centralized and excluded other economic means. The final result not only failed to repel success, and many Chinese, Thais, Indians and border minority rebel armed forces who had learned their lessons and did not use kyat for settlement were not affected, but also made the domestic economy that had already lost its vitality worse, ordinary people bear the consequences, and the black market is more prosperous.

The "8888" incident broke out in the late 1980s, and large-scale demonstrations were held across Myanmar. Ethnic minorities, Buddhists, Christians, Muslims, students, workers and young and old all took part in the march (Tucker, 2001). Although the social movement was eventually violently suppressed, the people's basic demands for survival and development were called out loud and clearly. Consequently, Myanmar experienced a change of power between the old and new military governments. The new military government aimed to break away from the closed-door policy of the past, advocating the development of a "market economy" in Burmese society to improve the collapsed

economy and the disintegration of the social fabric, and the so-called "market" in a society that aims to build a modern country.

At the same time, nearly ten years after the Chinese government announced the "reform and opening up", the China-Myanmar border ports have been gradually opened up, and the traditional jadeite trade route between Yunnan and Myanmar, which had been blocked for decades, had been reopened. Other ethnic groups who have been excluded from legal trade routes by the Bamar government since the 1960s have not been forced out of the jadeite business. They took advantage of their armed forces, geographic location, cultural proximity, kinship, blood relationship and other internal relationship networks to actively promote the flow of jadeite ores to Yunnan. Around the late 1990s, the land route across the Yunnan-Myanmar border began to compete with the sea route mainly controlled by the Myanmar government, and the Thai route leading to the south was in rapid decline.

3.2.2.1 Reterritorialization Actions of Ethnic Minorities on the China-Myanmar Border

Shan State and Kachin State in northern Myanmar border Yunnan Province in southwest China, and the common border between the two sides is as long as 2,129 kilometers. In addition to these two most important groups, there are also other ethnic minorities in this area belonging to "Zomia", including Wa, Kokang, De'ang, Lisu, Hui and so on. Many of them live across the border, and the national border runs through their farmland, villages, and even houses, and there are their blood relatives, in-laws, or clansmen on both sides of the border. When mainland China shifted from a planned to a market economy, these ethnic groups began to participate in the cross-border trade of jadeite by seeing an opportunity in the geographical proximity. Their reterritorialization actions can be distinguished according to the different types of power they hold:

The first is the armed forces. In the long-term confrontation with the Burmese military government, the ethnic minorities in Myanmar have evolved from a dozen armed forces to hundreds of armed forces. However, apart from their initial numerical advantage, they have increasingly gained the upper hand (Liu, 2015). In 1964, the strength of the Burmese army was 134,529, in 1988 it was 198,681 (Maung Aung Myoe, 2009), and by 2012 it reached 500,000 (Zhong, 2004). Before the Burmese Communist Party split in 1989, there were 29 minority armed forces with a total of 40,680 people. Among them, 15,000 are from the Burmese Communist Party, 8,000 from the Kachin Independence Army, 6,000 from the Karen National Union, and 3,000 from the Shan State Progressive Party and various national liberation organizations (Smith, 1999). The local armed forces of ethnic minorities have many branches and uneven in strength. Although they are unable to fight positional warfare with the Burmese army, the geographical conditions of the mountainous areas and the living customs of the mountain people provide local advantages for long-term guerrilla warfare. They either raided and attacked the jadeite

mines on a small scale or collect transportation fees or seize jadeite ores by controlling the roads within their sphere of influence or form a more complicated nepotism-driven partnership with jadeite traders or other armed forces or even the Burmese army. Either way, the jadeite trade is re-territorialized through armed forces. Behind the violent market is a picture of the power division in the border areas, which is crisscrossed and multi-layered.

The second is geographical advantage. The most important ethnic minority armed forces in northern Myanmar (there are more factions inside) all occupy territories bordering China, including Kachin State, Kokang Autonomous Region (the first special zone of Shan State), Wa State (the second special zone of Shan State), and Mongla (Fourth Special Zone of Shan State). Among them, Kachin State has the longest national border with China, and the trade ports include Kanpitetee-Houqiao, Laiza-Napang, Lweje-Zhangfeng, Datianba (Pangwa)-Pianma. There are two ports between Kokang and China, namely Qingshuihe-Mengding and Laukkaing-Nansan. There are also two ports between Wa State and China, namely Bangkam-Meng'a and Shaopa-Cangyuan. The port between Mongla and China is Mongla-Dalok. The other two ports in Shan State are Muse-Jiegao and Kugu-Wanding.




Image 10: Map of China-Myanmar border ports.

Source: The author draws based on the fieldwork data.

In fact, Myanmar, Laos, and Vietnam bordering Yunnan have a total of 18 ports, of which five are Sino-Vietnamese ports, two are Sino-Laos ports, and the remaining 11 are Sino-Myanmar ports. Among the 11 China-Myanmar ports, only the ports connect with Jiegao and Wanding ports in Ruili are under the actual control of the Myanmar government authorities, and the other nine ports are all within the territory of the minority local armed forces. However, the roads leading from these two ports to the interior of Myanmar are not smooth and are often harassed by armed forces from different ethnic minority areas.

The 105 Yard Joint Inspection Center in Muse was built in 2006 and is directly managed by the Ministry of Trade of the Union of Myanmar. It is composed of trade department, customs, police station, immigration bureau, anti-narcotics department, and garrison. China's goods exported to Myanmar can enter Myanmar from Muse, Kugu, Nankan and other places on the border and then reach the 105 Yards, where they can declare at the customs and then enter Myanmar. Goods are not considered imported until they have entered the 105 Yard checkpoint. The goods from Myanmar can be transported to the 105 Yards, apply for export approval, and go through export procedures before entering China. At present, the Myanmar government has opened up the entire Muse area, and Chinese personnel and vehicles can freely enter and exit Muse up to the 105 Yards; Chinese goods can be stored and traded at the 105 Yards, while Myanmar trucks are only allowed to load and unload goods at the 105 Yards (He, Wu, Huang and Li, 2018). However, the management situation of the 105 Yards is not as ideal as in the document plan, and even the safety of personnel is difficult to guarantee. In August 2018, an interlocutor took me from the Jiegao Port through the national gate to the Muse Port. Along the way, she repeatedly told me that the situation was unstable recently, and I must not go near the 105 Yard trade zone, let alone go to Mandalay by land.

The road from Muse to Mandalay is relatively wide, and it is still smooth most of the time, but not now. Roads and bridges are often bombed by local militias. Once bombed, the traffic is paralyzed, and vehicles are blocked and there are long queues. The fruit trucks had to throw away the destroyed fruits. There are many inspection booths in Lao Myanmar, and vehicles passing by must be inspected. I can only take you to see the temple in Muse. It is not safe at the 105 Yards. There are explosions from time to time and people are robbed. You must not go.⁹⁰

⁹⁰ Interview time: 08/2018; Interlocutor: XM; Location: Muse Port, Myanmar.

Before the above-mentioned ports were opened, the border residents of China and Myanmar had already formed many bazaars on the border. The black market mainly traded daily necessities. Since mainland China banned and fought against everything related to capitalism during the Cultural Revolution, jadeite did not appear on the black market in this region. In the early 1990s, when Myanmar's new military government released private mining and resumed jadeite trade cooperation with the Chinese, the ever-fragmented mining rights were used to suppress or bribe local militias, the market development was exchanged for a ceasefire to gradually promote the actual control of the country. China opened up these ports step by step, jadeite quickly gathered towards the China-Myanmar border. The local armed forces of ethnic minorities take advantage of their geographical advantages on the border line with almost no natural barriers, and sold jadeite to Yunnan through the special zones, passages, ports, border residents' exchange points, and countless mountain trails and farmland trails under their control.

The third is the network within the ethnic group. There are many ethnic groups living across the border on the China-Myanmar border, and the markets formed in this area are not the free market model in modern society with the spirit of contract at its core. Each ethnic group's participation in economic activities rely on strong ethnic culture and habits. Compared with inter-ethnic cooperation, it is easier to strengthen intra-ethnic cooperation due to trust during economic interactions and collisions. Therefore, the internal network formed by kinship, blood, and ethnic ties has become a more common form of inter-ethnic competition for power, and when applied to economic activities in cross-border spaces, it becomes a means of territorial competition. In the cross-border trade of jadeite on the China-Myanmar border, the practice of reterritorialization within ethnic groups is most represented by Burmese Muslims.

The early Muslims on the China-Myanmar border was the Hui from Yunnan. During their migration and development in Myanmar, they came in contact with Muslims of Indian-Pakistani descent from the west. Therefore, the consanguinity composition of Muslims in jadeite trade activities is relatively complex, including Muslims of Yunnan Hui, Muslims of Indian and Pakistani descent, and Muslims of mixed blood among them, as well as Muslims of mixed blood with other ethnic groups in Myanmar⁹¹. In the Yunnan dialect, Muslims from Myanmar with Indian-Pakistani faces are referred to as "gala (嘎啦)", which is actually a term in a social sense, rather than a scientifically accurate division of descent. When the China-Myanmar border gradually thawed in the 1980s and 1990s, it was this group of mobile jadeite merchants who brought high-quality jadeite ring faces (戒面, jiemian/gaimian, the core jadeite stone inlaid on the ring) from Myanmar to the jewelry and antique market in Kunming with simple satchels on their backs. Their first stop in China was Ruili, where the largest Muslim community in Dehong Prefecture was formed near Ruili Old Jewelry Street. With the development of Jiegao Port, more and more

⁹¹ The Rohingya people mentioned in many documents involved in the jadeite trade are actually one of these Muslims.

Burmese people came to Ruili. Muslims mostly gather near the jadeite markets of Jiegao Jade City, Jinxiang Jade City, and Shunjue Jade City, as well as Delong Jewelry City, Jinxin Jewelry City, and Zhanqian Jewelry Trading Center in Ruili City. Among them, the wealthy bosses are usually merchants with fixed jadeite shops or stalls, while others are wandering merchants selling jadeite.



Image 11: Distribution map of main jadeite markets in Ruili.

Source: The author draws based on the fieldwork data.

The cross-border trade network of Muslims forms a pyramid-shaped organizational structure with members of their own extended family. The top level are core entrepreneurs who control the supply of goods. Depending on the type of jadeite they sell, they may be merchants in Ruili, or they may be important businessmen in Myanmar. They often have been in the jadeite trade for many years, and their subordinate networks are intricate and deeply rooted. The middle level consists of the managers who are responsible for the division of labor and control of sales and transportation. They may be relatives of the big boss. At the bottom specific transportation and trading personnel distributed on large and small transportation routes generally mobile merchants can be found. Unlike the national borders located in deserts, snow-capped mountains, and forests, there are many parts of the border area between China and Myanmar that pass

through vast farmlands and villages. Even if they do not go through customs clearance at the port and do not go to the border people's mutual market for transactions, they can still carry small ores, a few pieces of jadeite, and a few bags of ring faces with them, pass through the villages and fields, and transport them to China. Muslims who temporarily enter China as border residents can stay in the port area for one to two weeks, and they usually gather in simple hotels near jadeite markets. From about 7:00 every morning, they go to the shopping area near Jiegao Jade City and Jinxiang Jade City to sell semi-finished jadeite products, then move to the old jewelry city in the afternoon, and then head to Delong Jewelry City in the evening⁹². When the jadeite live streaming sales emerged, they may also return to Jiegao Jade City in the evening until midnight. In order to save the cost of accommodation, some mobile merchants carry goods with them from Myanmar to the port of China very early in the morning, and then return to Myanmar at night.

On August 22, 2018, I made an appointment with interlocutor PJ to meet him at his store in the Muslim community next to Old Jewelry Street after the Eid al-Adha event. Before the big Eid al-Adha prayer, he and several other elderly Muslims sat at the gate of the mosque (Ruili Muslim Service Station in Ruili) until the gate was closed before the ceremony. On that Eid al-Adha, 139 cows were slaughtered, and the men who participated in the ceremony distributed them according to the number of households and heads, and transported them to Muslim households by people, bicycles, electric packs, and three-wheeled motorcycles. Due to the grand festival activities and the large number of participants, the narrow and congested road outside the gate of the mosque was congested for a while, and the local traffic police were helpless. Soon, a dozen or so Muslim men came out of the mosque to maintain order on the road. Some of them unblocked motor vehicles, and some coordinated with the Muslims who transported beef. The road was cleared in about five or six minutes, which was extremely efficient. There was no congestion after that, until all the Muslims who participated in the festival left.

Muslims come from Myanmar every day, and most of them are relatives, helping each other to bring them here.For Muslims, they all sell jadeite rings and ores, but not other objects.....I often come here to see if there are any new faces when everyone goes to the mosque to worship, and newcomers are asked to register with the local government department. I saw you as soon as you arrived, obviously.I also started from the jadeite ring faces business. Sell them by myself or consign them to friends to sell. I don't do this business anymore. I sell ores now.⁹³

⁹² They need to go to the Muslim service station for worship activities at 6:30, 14:30, 18:30, 20:00, and 21:00 Myanmar time.

⁹³ Interview time: 08/2018; Interlocutor: PJ; Location: A store in the Muslim community in the Old Jewelry Street area of Ruili City, Dehong Prefecture.

As one of the first group of Burmese Muslims who came to Ruili to do jadeite business, PJ is a Rohingya from Rakhine State. Now he is one of the jadeite big bosses who mainly deal in ores. His whole family is involved in the jadeite business, except for his youngest son, who attends university in China's inland province of Henan. At present, he is the chairman of the Ruili Burmese Jewelers Association⁹⁴, and he is also an elderly member with high status among local Muslims. In addition to his own jadeite business, one of his important tasks and several other Muslim elders is to organize and manage the mobile Muslim merchants at Ruili Port, counting the number of people, assessing the basic working conditions of the personnel, and assist the government to regulate the transactions and managing foreign ethnic groups in Ruili in a legal and orderly way. As an industry representative, he helps to coordinate some jadeite trade and economic disputes involving Burmese people, and at the same time help Burmese to fight for rights and policies that are more conducive to living in Ruili from the local government. As an important entrepreneur with social and economic capital in the local area, during the interviews in his shop, I saw that there were constantly "little myrmidons" riding electric bicycles to report on the movement of business transactions, hand over documents for him to look at, pass his orders and so on.

From the case of Muslim traders in PJ and their network organization form, it can be found that the network formed by them is not at all the organizational structure and organization mode of modern enterprises. Instead it is an ethnic group organization constituting an internal basic network based on common religious beliefs, ethnic ties, kinship, and blood ties, and then constructs economic practice relationships on top of it, and also undertakes a certain function of political consultation. The power to construct the internal network of this ethnic group enables them to realize the reterritorialization of jadeite trade activities for their ethnic group in the China-Myanmar border area even if they do not have armed forces or separate territories like other ethnic minorities. Through this ability, they produce new living space and economic territory, form new labor aggregation and division of labor, and thus produce activities to meet the needs of livelihood.

3.2.2.2 Reterritorialization Actions in the Border Areas of Yunnan

In addition to the reterritorialization of cross-border ethnic minorities, several related border counties (cities) in Yunnan, China, are also undergoing territorial competition, mainly including Ruili, Tengchong, and Yingjiang. At present, Ruili is the largest jadeite distribution center in Southwest China, while Tengchong is a traditional jadeite trading center, and Yingjiang is the home of the most important public auction houses on the China-Myanmar border.

⁹⁴ Although the signboard of the Chamber of Commerce is Burmese, it actually mainly refers to Burmese Muslims. Representatives of jadeite traders from other ethnic groups such as Burmese, Shan and Kachin also participate in the association, but have their own other, more closely organized organizations.

After the founding of the People's Republic of China, the passage from southwest China to Myanmar was through Wanding, an important transshipment point of the Yunnan-Burma Road (滇緬公路). In 1951, Ruili, not far from Wanding, established the Mengmao Branch, which was subordinate to the Wanding Branch of Kunming Customs. It was renamed Ruili Branch in 1956. In 1984, it was separated from Wanding and directly subordinated to Kunming Customs, which was renamed Ruili Customs in 1985 (Chen, 1996). In 1978, the People's Government of Yunnan Province approved the establishment of the Ruili border workstation (battalion level), and in 1979 the Ministry of Public Security approved the upgrade of the Ruili border inspection station (regiment level) (Chen, 1996). The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council approved Ruili Port as a national first-class open port in July 1987 (He, 2012). On July 9, 1990, Ruili Port was approved to open to third countries. In June 1992, Ruili became an open border city, implementing the border economic development zone policy, and approved the establishment of Jiegao Border Trade Zone in 2000, implementing the management mode of "domestic customs and foreign borders" (He, 2012). In 2001, the expanded opening of Ruili Port was approved, allowing personnel from third countries to enter and exit China through Ruili Port (The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council, 2001). According to the data in 2019, the total import and export value of Ruili Port was 11.64 billion US dollars, the import and export freight volume was 17.458 million tons, the entry and exit personnel were 16.724 million person-times, and the entry-exit transportation vehicles were 4.846 million vehicle-times (Yao and Liu, 2020). From 2014 to 2019, more than 16 million people entered and exited China through Ruili Port every year, most of whom were Burmese citizens, accounting for 92.2% in 2018 (Yang, 2019). According to statistics in 2018, Ruili Port has become the fifth highway port for entry-exit personnel in China (after Gongbei, Huanggang, Luohu, and Shenzhen Bay in Guangdong), the second-ranked entry-exit transportation means (after Guangdong Huanggang), and both indicators rank first among border ports (China Port Association, 2020).

It can be seen from the opening history of Ruili Port that Ruili is one of the earliest inland trading ports opened in mainland China. Due to the support of the state power and the particularity of its geographical location - the Yunnan-Burma Road is a major channel for the flow of goods and people in the modern China-Myanmar society - Ruili soon became one of the busiest ports in inland China. In addition, the management mode of "domestic and outside the customs" of the Jiegao Border Trade Zone not only has the symbolic meaning of "Paukphaw (Baobo, 胞波) relationship" which means that friendship is like brotherhood between China and Myanmar, but also has the practical function of expanding the traditional border residents' mutual market points and transforming them into a modern national management system with a more standardized management system. The Jiegao Border Trade Zone is located on the east bank of the Ruili River, and most of Ruili City is located on the west bank, with the central horizontal line of the Jiegao Bridge in the middle as the customs supervision line. The China Port Joint Inspection

Center was withdrawn to the west of the Jiegao Bridge. Therefore, the Jiegao Border Trade Zone is within the borders of China and outside the supervision of the customs. In the 1980s, goods imported and exported from Ruili traveled between China and Myanmar by small boats from Tunhong and Homen ferry crossings in the form of small-scale trade. In 1989, the steel bridge leading to Jiegao was completed, and the goods began to gradually divert to Jiegao. Today, China's goods exported to Myanmar are exported immediately after customs clearance, and goods imported from Ruili Port can be carried out in general trade, processing trade and entrepot trade in Jiegao territory without declaration (Li, 2007).

At the same time, the overland trade of jadeite was swiftly redirected to Ruili, and the Burmese military government also approved the export of jadeite raw materials to China from Muse Port in the late 1990s. Ruili currently has several jadeite markets. There are Jiegao Jade City, Jinxiang Jade City, Shunjue Jade City, Jimao Jade City and so on in Jiegao. In downtown Ruili, there are Old Jewelry Street, Huafeng Jewelry Market, Delong Jewelry City, Jinxin Jewelry City, Zhanqian Jadeite Jewelry Town, etc., as well as "City of Treasures (多宝之城, Duobaozhicheng)" of Jadeite Dynasty Company built with jadeite live streaming as an emerging industry model, and the "Everything Good (样样好, Yangyanghao)" Taobao Live Streaming Base, etc. In these jadeite markets, there are not only the rules and regulations of industry organizations, but also the newly emerging business forms and related economic rules developed by different types of markets, as well as the management regulations of the government's market supervision department and taxation department. On the whole, it has formed a large-scale comprehensive jadeite distribution center that integrates logistics, rough and fine processing, traditional sales and emerging sales models, labor training institutions, agency quality inspection institutions, and other forms of organizations generating symbiosis the jadeite industry. Practitioners in the Ruili jadeite market include Burmese, Kachin, Shan, and Burmese Muslims, as well as people from Guangdong, Fujian, Hunan, Jiangxi, and the three northeastern provinces of China, covering almost all parts of the country. So far, Ruili has always been the central market with the largest scale, with the most abundant business types, the largest amount of jadeite imports, and the most labor-intensive among several jadeite markets on the China-Myanmar border.

Tengchong was originally a traditional jadeite distribution center known as "the first city on the extreme edge", and it was the first stop on the traditional jadeite trade route entering the territory directly under the jurisdiction of the central court. After experiencing historical changes such as World War II, the War of Liberation, the three major socialist transformations, and the Cultural Revolution, Tengchong is now a county-level city under the jurisdiction of Baoshan City. At present, Tengchong mainly develops tourism and health care industries based on natural and cultural resources such as the hometown of overseas Chinese in Heshun, geothermal resources, and the main battlefield of the China-Myanmar-India war zone of World War II, which is very remote

from the status of the jadeite trade distribution center and the local characteristics led by China-Myanmar trade. The local government, jadeite merchants and many citizens all made significant efforts to restore the prosperity of the Tengyue jadeite market of the past, investing significantly in the jadeite cultural industry, and accumulating many bright and competitive sites. For example, Heshun Overseas Chinese Township engages in the preservation and sorting out of past jade merchant trade history and historical sites; the processing industry development of Hehua Town, a jade carving cooperative; the protection and development of jadeite and amber market in Tengchong once every five days; and the construction of Tengchong Jade Museum and Jade Town, etc. But so far, Tengchong's jadeite industry has not made the processing industry a pillar, and it is still essentially a tourism industry, which is completely incomparable with Ruili's jadeite industry structure, scale, and labor force. This is probably closely related to the spatial location characteristics of the port.

The Houqiao Port, opened in 2000 (The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council, 2000), is the only national first-class port in Baoshan City, whose level was once the same as that of Ruili Port, but this did not bring the same conditions for the development of the jadeite industry in Tengchong. First of all, the Houqiao Port was opened more than ten years later than the Jiegao Port and lost the opportunity for industrial agglomeration. Secondly, Houqiao Port is 70 kilometers away from Tengchong City. Compared with the seamless connection between the jadeite distribution market at Jiegao Port and the national gate, this distance has become a major obstacle for border residents to enter the traditional jadeite distribution market in Tengchong. Even if the management policy of "inside and outside customs" is implemented at Houqiao Port, it is no longer a port when entering Tengchong City, and the same policy cannot use to control the activities of border residents. And Houqiao Town itself has not yet developed a large-scale jadeite market. Thirdly, several main development projects of Tengchong Jadeite are scattered in subdivision areas, making it difficult to form a joint force. For example, the Jadeite Museum and market are located in Tengchong City, Heshun Town is five kilometers west of the city, and Hehua Township is located 24 kilometers southwest of the urban area, the traffic is not convenient, and it is even further away from the Houqiao Port. Fourth, the port connecting Houqiao Port to Myanmar is Kanpitetee, which belongs to the territory of Kachin State. The Burmese military government has long been at odds with Kachin. Except for the 17-year period of peaceful development between the signing of the ceasefire agreement in 1994 and the renewed fighting in 2011, it has almost always been in a state of civil war. Even if it is not a large-scale war, there is constant harassment of each other, and there is no peaceful environment for the large flow of goods and people across borders. According to the interlocutor, a large company intends to establish a cross-border logistics base and related systems in Tengchong leading to Myitkyina, Myanmar, but it has always suffered heavy losses. Therefore, it can be inferred that Tengchong, which was once a leading distribution center for Han Chinese jadeite trade, in the process of local reterritorialization, even with the support of the Chinese central government and local

governments, the most suitable for the current situation is still to develop the jadeite industry in the form of tourism.

A place similar to Tengchong is Yingjiang. After the signing of the Burma Trade Treaty between China and Britain in 1894, the Yingjiang area once became an important trade route between Yunnan and Burma. The British consulate and customs agency were established in Mangyun, and goods from the southwestern interior of China were also sold to Burma from here. From the late 1980s to the early 1990s, Yingjiang formed the prototype of a port with the county town of Pingyuan Town as the center, leading to the China-Myanmar border via Zhina, Sudian, Kachang, Xima, and Mangyun respectively. In June 1992, Xiaopingyuan (Nabang) was opened as a national secondary port, that is, a provincial port (Dehong United Daily News, 2020). However, the port connected to Nabang is Laiza in Kachin State, Myanmar, where the headquarters of the Kachin Independence Organization is located, and it is also a sacred place in the hearts of Kachin, Karen, and other ethnic minority rebel forces in Myanmar (Brenner, 2019). In other words, the large area west of the national border of the Xiaopingyuan Port is located in one of the centers of ethnic armed forces in Myanmar. Such geopolitical relationship conditions make it difficult for local border residents to stimulate the aggregation of jadeite trade activities by opening and developing treaty ports, thereby re-territorializing. However, it is only 100 kilometers away from Myitkyina, there are 32 roads connected to Myanmar, and many border residents' exchanges near the national border. The daily flow of border residents is frequent, so it is very common for them to carry or hide jadeite into the black market of China. This also makes the type of jadeite market in Yingjiang very single, that is, the trading of jadeite ores accounts for the vast majority, and the local banner is also the "First City of Jadeite Ores in China".

Yingjiang has the largest and most frequently held jadeite public auctions in the China-Myanmar border area, mainly including Yujin Auction, Baoyu Auction, Dufa Auction, Wangli Auction, etc. In January 2009, Yingjiang held the first public auction. As of July 2020, a total of 60 sessions have been held, of which 22 jadeite public auctions have been held from 2009 to 2012. However, the main source of jadeite in Yingjiang does not rely on the smuggling channels of border residents but comes from the transportation network formed by the kinship of Xima people across many major land routes between China and Myanmar. Before the country's borders were demarcated, Nabang and Laiza were actually in the same basin, and Xima was 10 kilometers away in a straight line to the east.

Our Xima used to be a small village with only two or three surname clans, all of whom were Han. Farming on the mountain is too difficult, and it often collapses. We young people came out to do business with Boss X⁹⁵. He has a different surname from me in the same village, and we young people are all called him Uncle X.I studied at Kunming

⁹⁵ To protect the key reporter, the real name is withheld here.

University of Science and Technology for three years (junior college), but was expelled from school for fighting. It was people who bullied me because I came from the countryside. I went back to my hometown to work for Boss X, helping him manage the bidding field and live broadcast. I can earn tens of thousands a month.Don't just look at our boss's ordinary appearance, he is the president of Yingjiang Jewelry Association and half of Yingjiang City belongs to him. We are one of the three largest transport companies coming from Myanmar (entry by land), the other owner is also from Xima, and the third one is a company from Myanmar, so we have sufficient supply, all of which are first-hand.Muse is the most common way to enter China. Don't ask me about other routes.He also does timber business, grows coffee, and has two hydropower stations.⁹⁶

From the description of the interlocutor, it can be found that the land transportation companies for jadeite are currently mainly controlled by the big bosses of jadeite from Xima, Yingjiang County. They provide the main and stable source of jadeite ores for the Yingjiang public auctions. It can be seen that the jadeite market in Yingjiang is dominated by ores trading, which can be roughly divided into public auction transactions and ore bazaar transactions. In fact, its reterritorialization is not based on the establishment of ports as the main driving force, but on the basis of the intra-clan network constructed by the kinship of local big businessmen.

A horizontal comparative analysis of the practice of reterritorialization in cross-border jadeite trade in Ruili, Tengchong, and Yingjiang found that, although ports have been opened, the actual motivations of the three are different. First of all, the reterritorialization of Ruili was promoted by the opening of a land treaty port space under the leadership of the state powers. The national powers here include both China and Myanmar because Muse Port is the only port under the actual control of the Myanmar government among the eleven ports on the China-Myanmar border, even the road from Muse to Mandalay is still in danger of being harassed by local armed forces of ethnic minorities. Regardless of whether they have legal documents recognized by the Burmese military government, jadeite ores, semi-finished products, and finished products that pass-through Muse are easier to enter the Chinese market in a legal capacity, which is more in line with the basic operating rules of trade between modern nation-states. Second, the reterritorialization of Tengchong mainly comes from the power of the local government to create a space for tourism consumption. Although Tengchong Houqiao is a national first-class port like Ruili, the physical distance between the port and the market and the political situation on the other side of the national border hinder the port-pull reterritorialization. Therefore, the Tengchong local government used the local jadeite history and culture and the relics of traditional trade material entities such as jadeite

⁹⁶ Interview time: 01/2021; Interlocutor: ZPD; Location: a bar in Yingjiang County, Dehong Prefecture.

bazaars and processing villages to reconstruct a tourist resort space symbolized by "Tengyue Jadeite", thus territorial competing with Ruili and Yingjiang. Third, the reterritorialization of Yingjiang is driven by local economic elites by developing their hometowns. Yingjiang port is secondary port, that is, port managed at the provincial level, without special policy support for national ports, and Yingjiang's geopolitical characteristics are even more unfavorable for port-driven territorialization. As the economic elite among the border residents, the local big businessmen continue to develop their hometown, and build economic networks for cross-border transportation and public auctions of jadeite ores with kinship and reterritorialized with Ruili and Tengchong. However, no matter which one of the three scenarios, through reterritorialization, they have formed their own new ways of labor aggregation and economic action, reproducing the new value content of jadeite.

To sum up, there are at least two times and two levels of reterritorialization of powers and reproduction of jadeite value in the development of jadeite shipping routes. The first time and first level of reterritorialization is from the Burmese government. The Burmese government took advantage of the external environment of several ports that the British colonists had developed and built, internally empowered itself through violence, opened up the water transport route from the jadeite mines to Yangon Port, and deterritorialized the traditional land route from northern Myanmar to Yunnan. Then, by opening the Public Auction in Yangon to anchor the seaborne trade route, the Burmese government used international trade rules and laws to empower and re-territorialize the cross-border trade of jadeite. As a result, on the one hand, it controls the benefits of resource development and trade in its own hands to the maximum extent, and on the other hand, it gradually solves the problem of its own political legitimacy in the country. The rule system of "the Public Auction and designated location of the Public Auction" was creatively generated by power, and it was dis-embedded from previous trade activities, forming a new way of labor aggregation and economic action, and the value of jadeite was reproduced.

The second time and second level of reterritorialization is by the largest ores businessmen from Myanmar and merchants represented by Teochew people from China. These participants are motivated by the pursuit of profit, and they are unwilling to submit to the rules of the Myanmar Public Auction to be robbed of profits by the Burmese government. Therefore, on the one hand, they use the intercepting bids strategy to compete with the existing rules, so as to control the supply of jadeite ores to a greater extent, reduce the circulation links in Myanmar, and weaken the profits distributed by the Burmese government, so as to protect their own interests. On the other hand, through the empowerment of economic capital and ethnic relationship capital, they set up public auctions in Pingzhou to rebuild an economic order formulated and controlled by themselves, avoid risks, and attract new participants. This process is the deterritorialization and reterritorialization to the Myanmar Public Auction. The Pingzhou

public auctions have been de-embedded from the order of the Myanmar Public Auction trade and have become the complete secondary public auction market. In addition, the reterritorialization enables the formation of new divisions of labor. Large jadeite ores traders specialize in cross-border ores trade, while raw material processors can save the cost of cross-border trade and specialize in ores quality identification, price evaluation, and rough processing.

Reterritorialization activities on land trade routes are much more complex than those on sea trade routes. The sea trade routes are led by the Burmese government, and factors such as participating ethnic groups, routes, ports, and economic action orders all belong to a single system. On the contrary, the trade routes on roads have parallel, superimposed, nested, and gradual multi-level relationships in different time and space stages and at the same time and space. There is a multi-scale and multi-dimensional re-territorial coupling between the country and the country, the local and the local, and the national and local. Reterritorialization has brought new and rich links de-embed from the original trade order, competing with each other and constantly updating and iterating, and the value of jadeite is also constantly being reproduced. Since 2017, the "China-Myanmar Ruili-Muse International Marathon" would be hosted by the Ministry of Health and Sports of Myanmar, the Sports Bureau of China's Yunnan Province, and the People's Government of Dehong Dai and Jingpo Autonomous Prefecture on December 31 every year. It is a symbolic sports event for the establishment of friendly economic and trade exchanges between China and Myanmar. And the track runs through Ruili and Muse. In 2019, the Central Committee of China and the State Council approved the establishment of a new "China (Yunnan) Pilot Free Trade Zone". Ruili is the key development target of the Dehong area, focusing on the development of cross-border e-commerce, cross-border production capacity cooperation, cross-border finance, and other industries, and building a pioneering area for opening up along the border and a gateway hub for the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor. This indicates that state power is undergoing a new round of reterritorialization.

Chapter 4 **Spatial Separation: Processing Space and Sales Space of Jadeite**

After entering the territory of mainland China, jadeite ores will go through more important links, that is, refined processing and sales. No matter how many kinds of value reproduction brought about by the territorialization of powers experienced in the process of flow, the most basic value content of jadeite is still the meaning given to jade by the Chinese ethnic group. Therefore, ores cutting, carving and processing, and sales and appreciation are the key links in the production of basic value and the realization of final value—monetization—and they must exist in Chinese society.

After the jadeite market had gone through stages from the frontier to the center of the imperial court to the treaty port, and then to the overseas market, since the 1990s, it has recovered and prosperity in mainland China as the Chinese central government implemented a market economy. The two most important markets are located in Guangdong and Yunnan, which are thousands of miles apart. On the whole, the current situation of China's domestic jadeite market is quite different from the past. The markets in Guangdong and Yunnan serve two different functions. Guangdong mainly focuses on processing and wholesale, while Yunnan mainly serves as a consumer market. The driving force behind the formation of this spatial pattern lies in the spatial utilization and production of territory, resources, and labor by state power after China's reform and opening up, as well as the territorial competition and cooperation among localities.

4.1 The State of the Art in Jadeite Processing and Sales in China from the Qing Dynasty to the Reform and Opening Up

The earliest jadeite processing industry was concentrated in the Tengyue area, and the activities of buying, selling, gift-giving, and tribute were also mainly in the Yunnan area. In the middle and late Qing Dynasty, jadeite was gradually introduced to the central court and became an upstart, and Beijing became the core processing and consumption place. During the late Qing Dynasty and the Republic of China, the processing and consumption areas of jadeite expanded to Tianjin, Shanghai, Guangdong, Hong Kong and other treaty ports with prominent development of handicraft industry and commerce. In the era of China's planned economy after 1949, jadeite processing and sales were first removed from mainland China, and then turned to Hong Kong, Taiwan and Chiang Mai, Thailand.

4.1.1 Overview of Jadeite Processing and Sales Market in Qing Dynasty

The mid-to-late Qing Dynasty was the beginning of China's dramatic change from traditional society to modern society. It happened to be the key period to jadeite to evolve from exotic "stone" to "jade" recognized by the court, and then to become a popular ornamental object among dignitaries. Traditional jadeite processing requires processes such as drawing, sanding, drilling, engraving, and bamboo tube polishing. The entire processing process relies on simple jade-cutting machines made of wood or bamboo, supplemented by ropes, leather sheaths and other equipment at the tool end, and then polished with prepared gemstone sand of different thicknesses. During my fieldwork in the Tengchong area, I found that these abandoned processing tools can still be seen in Tengchong Jadeite Museum and in the homes of folk craftsmen. In addition to the jade cultural factors of the Han people, the complex, time-consuming, and material-intensive manual jadeite processing technology requires a lot of laborers who do not need to engage in agricultural production and a wealthy social class as prerequisites. The Tengyue area was not only the first stop for rough jadeite entering China from the Kachin Mountains, but also the farthest and most important border pass, administrative center and economic center in the southwestern frontier region of the Central China. As a result, the earliest jadeite processing industry was formed in Tengchong. The raw jadeite stones were processed here and then gradually entered the Chinese palace and dignitaries.

Qing Dynasty writer, Minister of Rites, and Crown Prince's Shaobao⁹⁷ Jiyun (styled Xiaolan) wrote in "Yuwei Thatched Cottage Notes Volume 15: Guwang Tingzhi" written in the fifty-seventh year of Qianlong (1793):

The price of things is high or low, depending on the times and fashions, and there is no exact and constant price. Remember when I was youngThe feicui yu (翡翠玉, jadeite) from Yunnan was not regarded as jade at that time. It is just like the ganhuang (干黄, one type of Lantian jade) of Lantian jade, and the name "jade" is imposed on it. Now it is regarded as a rare treasure, and its price is much higher than that of real jade.A total of 50 or 60 years from now, the difference in prices has already been like this, let alone hundreds of years. (Ji, 1980)

Emperor Qianlong was born in 1711 and ascended the throne in 1735, and Ji Yun was born in 1724. When Ji Yun was young, it can be estimated that it was the early years of Emperor Qianlong. Therefore, the turning point when jadeite began to be accepted by the central court as jade was around the Qianlong period. However, it was discovered from the surviving jade seals of Emperor Qianlong that almost all the jade seals were made of Hetian jade, and there were no jade seals made of jadeite. Comparing with Ji

⁹⁷ Prince's Shaobao was an official in the Eastern Palace of the Qing Dynasty, responsible for teaching the prince.

Yun's article description, it can be inferred that jadeite was accepted into the jade cultural system during the Qianlong period, and its market price began to increase sharply, but the social hierarchy order it symbolized did not reach a level comparable to that of Hetian jade. During the Tongzhi period, Empress Dowager Cixi was in charge of the government and held the power alone. She personally preferred jadeite with brighter and stronger colors. During her time in power, she continued to ask for tribute from weaving and salt administration and local customs (Qiu, Wu, Meng and Wang, 2007), and demanded the Qing Palace Manufacturing Office to make all kinds of jadeite jewelry:

I would like to submit to Empress Dowager Cixi the list of Jin Shan⁹⁸ jewelry made according to the drawing: Four pairs of green jade flat hairpins. ...Six pairs of green jade tassels, six pairs of green jade rings...
(Xu, 2004)

In addition, Guangdong Customs recorded in the message sent to the Manufacturing Office in April of the thirteenth year of Tongzhi:

Green jade originally came from Burma, and white jade was not produced in eastern Guangdong ... (Yang, 1982)

Comparing the two documents, it can be seen that "green jade" refers to jadeite. As for jadeite collected by the Palace Museum in Beijing, the National Palace Museum in Taipei and the British Museum, almost all are ornaments, including accessories such as flat squares, hairpins, pendants, rings, bracelets, as well as furnishings such as toys and ornaments. Most came from the period when Cixi was in power. Empress Dowager Cixi's strong preference for jadeite and her influence on the court dignitaries also appears in the memoirs of her personal female officer Yu Deling (Princess Deling):

...My father and Zhang Zhidong⁹⁹ became very close friends. ...The uncut jades he collected are rarely vessels or ornaments that have been hand-carved, but whole or large strips of unprocessed jade. ... Moreover, there are several master jade craftsmen in his home, who serve him all year round. As long as he happens to think of what to make that piece of jade into something, they can always do it according to his ideal. ...Li Lianying¹⁰⁰ went out in person and brought in the things he was holding. ...This is the raw material for a pair of earrings, and it

⁹⁸ Jin Shan (金鑲), a traditional Chinese craft, is the name of a craft that uses pure natural materials to repair incomplete objects.

⁹⁹ Zhang Zhidong (Sep 2, 1837-Oct 4, 1909), an important minister in the late Qing Dynasty, who along with Zeng Guofan, Li Hongzhang and Zuo Zongtang, were the four most famous officials of the late Qing dynasty.

¹⁰⁰ Li Lianying (Nov 12, 1848-Mar 4, 1911) was a Chinese imperial eunuch who lived in the late Qing dynasty. He was the most favored eunuch during the Regency of Empress Dowager Cixi.

must be the purest and most beautiful jadeite. Jadeite is originally a kind of jade, so it is collectively called jade. The Empress Dowager Cixi picked them up carefully, held them up to the side facing the light, and then carefully examined them. From this angle, Her Majesty the Empress Dowager couldn't help but become more and more happy and turned around and said to us: "Really, none of the various jade wares in our collection can compare with it!" The Empress Dowager Cixi praised proudly. (Yu, 1994)

In addition to being made into ornaments, jadeite was also made into ornaments with symbolic meanings of power and status, the most representative ones are jadeite court beads (朝珠, chaozhu) and jadeite feather tubes (翎管, lingguan). According to the Qing History Draft Yufu Zhi, the princes and nobles in the Qing Dynasty had a strict dress code:

Below the princes, civil servants of the fifth rank, military ranks above the fourth rank, princesses and Fujin below, and women of the fifth rank official orders can wear chaozhu; All the ministers and guards who participated in the ceremony, regardless of their grades, wore court beads to adorn their appearance. The Imperial Academy edits and reviews, and also wears court beads, respecting the meaning of classics. (Niu, 1994)

The court beads are made of jewels and jade, including six parts: body, Buddha head, back cloud, big pendant, commemoration, and pendant angle. To wear court beads, you need to have a certain official rank or title, regardless of gender, and a person can have multiple sets of court beads. Jadeite was a popular material for court beads, especially during the Cixi period. Similar to court beads is the feather tube. The feather tube is a tube-shaped utensil for inserting feathers on the top of the official hat in the Qing Dynasty, about seven or eight centimeters long. The feather tubes have no clear rules, but feathers have:

All peacock feathers with three eyes at the end of the feather are worn by beizi (贝子). Those with two eyes are worn by zhenguocong (镇国公), fuguogong (辅国公), and heshuo efu (和硕额駙). . . . Those with one eye, internal ministers, first-, second-, third-, and fourth-class shiwei (侍卫, imperial bodyguard), qianfeng (前锋, forwards), hujun (护军, senior military officer), tongling (统领, commanders), canling (参领, vice commanders), qianfengshiwei (前锋侍卫, forward guards), zhangshi (长史, chief of staff) of various princes' mansions, sanqilang (散骑郎, advisory officer), second-class huwei (护卫, guards), all have to wear it. . . . The root of the feather tube is also decorated with blue feathers. . . . The chief of ceremonies of the Baylor House, the second and third-class

guards below the prince, the forwards, the pro-army, and the guards all wear blue feathers. (Zhao, 1828)

Like court beads, feather tubes are made of white jade (Hetian jade), jadeite, lapis lazuli, turquoise, red coral, crystal, ivory and other precious jewelry and jade materials. Unlike the power hierarchy system symbolized by "six apparatus" and "six auspices", jadeite itself did not form a fixed set of symbol system corresponding to official ranks and did not expand the symbolic meaning of jade in this respect. However, it was added to the existing relevant clothing system as an emerging popular object.

Driven by Empress Dowager Cixi's personal preference, jadeite became popular in the imperial capital of Beijing. It was integrated into ornaments, decorations or accessories representing power status, while the jewelry industry also gained importance. By the end of the Qing Dynasty and the beginning of the Republic of China, there were hundreds of jadeite shops in Beijing, mainly distributed in two areas:

Some of them are in Hutong No. 1, No. 2, No. 3 and No. 4 outside Chongwenmen, and some are in No. 1, No. 2 and No. 3 Hutongs of Langfang outside Qianmen. Most of the shops outside Chongwenmen are inner court houses without facades; Outside Qianmen, the shops in the No. 1 and No. 2 Hutongs of Langfang are with facades, and the shops in No. 3 Hutong are inner court houses. (Niu, 1994)

From the above literature and physical evidence, we can deduce that first, the Empress Dowager Cixi was the key historical figure who made jadeite popular among the royal family and dignitaries during the Qing Dynasty. Cixi's personal preference stimulated the flow and dissemination of jadeite from the far southwestern frontier to the center of the dynasty in the capital following a movement from the bottom to the top. Later, because the dignitaries paid tribute to please her, and because jadeite has become a popular item in the royal family, jadeite flowed and spread from the top to the bottom. Second, jadeite is incorporated in the jade culture system mainly as luxurious and rare decorations, or as a precious jade material that can be made into ornaments representing official ranks. However, it is not directly a symbol of power rank. This type of identity is closer to the people and more flexible paving the way for jadeite to become a consumer product among people in modern society. Third, in addition to the traditional jade carving workshops in the Tengyue area, the Qing Palace Manufacturing Office and other professional institutions or departments that provided jade processing services for the royal family, as well as folk jewelry stores in Beijing, became mainstream in the processing and production of jadeite. These institutions have highly skilled and exquisite jade carvers, who not only inject creativity and novelty into the jadeite processing technology, but also lay the foundation for the future cluster development of the jade carving industry and the historical foundation of jade carving technology.

4.1.2 Overview of the Jadeite Market in the Late Qing Dynasty and the Republic of China

The late Qing Dynasty and the Republic of China were the most turbulent periods in modern Chinese history. The invasion of external colonial countries and the internal problems of thousands of years of imperial society have resulted in repeated regime changes, warlords, recurrent wars, and the collapse of the original social structure and order. As the colonial powers forcibly opened China's treaty ports, a series of commercial trade activities that were closely linked to the European capitalist world were introduced in China, which was basically an agricultural society with scant interest in business for a long time. Moreover, capital was concentrated in certain circles, such as warlords, bureaucratic capitalists, comprador capitalists, national capitalists, and so on. The other form of capital was determined by location, in addition to the imperial city of Beijing. In other words, it was mainly concentrated in the treaty ports with concession land. So, jadeite hailing from Yunnan and Guangdong became highly popular in the capital and treaty ports among these circles. In addition, the decline of the imperial family in the Qing Dynasty caused the jadeite treasures collected by the royal family to flow to these places among certain subjects.

Besides Tengchong in Yunnan, Guangzhou and Hong Kong in Guangdong, and Beijing, the capital of the Qing Dynasty, Tianjin and Shanghai, the two cities with the most concessions, had become emerging jadeite markets. Concessions were residence and trade areas opened and operated by the Western colonial powers in treaty ports after the successive Opium wars in the second half of the 19th century. Its spatial scope was smaller than that of a treaty port, but in the area the colonial powers enjoyed extraterritoriality referring to the entitlements of setting up the own institutions and own jurisdiction undermining the governance of the Qing emperor. One can argue that these areas serve as a "window" that was not subject to the administrative management of the Qing government and can autonomously communicate with the world (Fei, 1991). The concessions at the end of the Qing Dynasty and the beginning of the Republic of China were divided into two types according to their development and management status. One type was developed and managed by one country alone, called "specially managed concessions", and the other type was developed and jointly managed by many countries, called "public concessions" (National Qing History Compilation Committee, 2012). Obviously, the administrative power in the public concession belonged to different concession countries, which easily caused disagreements, but the confusion of management rights was also conducive to the emergence of illegal activities.

From 1860 to 1945, the United Kingdom, France, the United States, Germany, Italy, Russia, Japan, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Belgium and other countries signed treaties and agreements, and successively established concessions on both sides of the Hai River in the southeast of the old city of Tianjin. Around the early years of the Republic of China, jade and jewelry stores in Beijing began to develop in Tianjin.

At that time, China was politically unstable, just like changing shifts on a stage, with politicians taking turns to play: After the Qing Dynasty was overthrown, the nobles of the Qing clan thought it was safer to live in the Tianjin Concession, even though they had a comfortable mansion in Beijing. Although the Revolution of 1911 forced the Qing emperor to abdicate, the military and political power was still in the hands of Yuan Shikai¹⁰¹. After Yuan Shikai's death, all his accomplices who cheered him fled to the concession. Then came Zhang Xun's restoration. Zhang Xun failed, and he and his accomplices also hid in the concession. Another war was the Zhiwan War, in which Duan Qirui failed, and the Anfu gang also ran into the concession. Cao Kun lost in the second Zhifeng war, and he also sought refuge in the concession. The concession thus became a haven for frustrated politicians. (Niu, 1994)

Politicians must have fled with valuable gold and silver possessions. Regardless the occasions such as children's marriage, or political and economic capital transactions, they were likely to buy jewelry and antiques, which had contributed to Tianjin becoming the largest jewelry and antique sales market in North China. Some jewelry and antique shops in Beijing set up branches in Tianjin, and some moved directly to Tianjin. Most of them were concentrated in Guodian Street, inside the North Gate, outside the East Gate, etc., with a total of more than 20 (Niu, 1994). Soon after, the famous markets Daluotian Jewelry and Antique Shopping Mall, Tianxiang Market, Taikang Shopping Mall, and Quanyechang were formed, with more than 100 large and small shops in them.

From 1845 to 1943, the United Kingdom, France, and the United States set up concessions in Shanghai. "Ten Mile Foreign Market" is just a description of the grand occasion when the Shanghai Concession was full of foreign buildings, foreigners, and foreign goods. Unlike the Tianjin Concession, where Qing Dynasty veterans and frustrated politicians were the main consumers, Shanghai is more similar to Guangzhou. The concessions are populated by various warlords, bureaucratic capitalists, comprador capitalists, national capitalists, and gang leaders, most of whom come from Beijing, Tianjin, Nanjing, Suzhou, and other places. In addition, jewelry merchants who were originally concentrated in Suzhou and Nanjing also moved to Shanghai and established

¹⁰¹ Yuan Shikai (Sep 16, 1859-June 6, 1916), a famous political and military figure in modern Chinese history, and leader of the Beiyang warlords. During the New Deal period in the late Qing Dynasty, modernization reforms were actively promoted. During the Revolution of 1911, Qing emperor Aisin Giorro Puyi was forced to abdicate and became the interim president of the Republic of China. In 1913, he suppressed the Second Revolution. In the same year, he was elected as the first president of the Republic of China. In 1914, he promulgated the Constitution of the Republic of China. In December 1915, he declared himself the emperor, changed the name of the country to the Chinese Empire, established the Period Hongxian, and was known as the "Hongxian Monarchy" in history. This move was opposed by all parties, which triggered the movement to protect the country. Yuan Shikai had to announce the abolition of the imperial system after being emperor for 83 days.

the Shanghai Sijing Gang Chamber of Commerce, the earliest jewelry and antique industry association in Shanghai. Shanghai's jewelry and antiques market has four areas:

The county seat: centered on Town God's Temple and Yu Garden, adjacent to the French Concession to the north, has the atmosphere of traditional Chinese society that is quite different from the Concession. The French Concession, connected to the public concession in the north is a long and narrow area that crosses the county seat and the public concession. The central area and the west area of the public concession, that is, the old British concession, are the central part of the four spaces and the area where the antique market was most concentrated in its heyday. In the North and East Districts of the Public Settlement lies the old American Concession, a vast area along the Huangpu River to the north of Suzhou Creek. Although it is called the American Concession, actually a large number of Japanese lived there. (Dai, 2007)

These four regions did not evolve at the same time and space but changed successively according to the time stages of development, prosperity, decline, and recovery. In the markets, jadeite and antiques were often mixed and sold together, but there were also cases where the market was divided and concentrated. For example, the "Simeixuan (四美轩, four beautiful galleries with windows)" in the Town God's Temple was divided into two parts, the front and the back. The "Front Simeixuan" teahouse drinkers mostly came from the Antique Gang, and the "Back Simeixuan" teahouse drinkers mostly originated from the Jadeite Gang (Shanghai Commercial Press Compilation Office, 1909). The market consisted of shops and stalls.

In the markets of Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai, shops that sold both antiques and jewelry may not include processing workshops, but shops specializing in jadeite generally had processing ateliers. Jadeite processing in this period was very specific divided into three types. The first type refers to processing with supplied materials, that is, buying ores from Burmese merchants or jadeite merchants in Yunnan and Guangdong, carving and processing them into finished products. The second type is to renovate old pieces, that is, to change some jadeite products from the Qing Dynasty into styles popular in the Republic of China. The Republic of China was a historical era in which the imperial dynasty was overthrown, and a democratic republic was established. It was also an era in which the Han Chinese regained political power from the Manchus. The society of the Republic of China not only abandoned the social system of the Manchu court, but also embarked in a wholesale modernization process. With regard to the material culture this is reflected in hairstyles, clothing, accessories, and daily necessities. The popular shape and style of jadeite also underwent a major transformation. However, the original jadeite culture was not discarded, as it could create new value after adaptation. For example, the flat square favored by the Empress Dowager Cixi belongs to the headgear of the Manchus has changed. The same was true for feather tubes, which were generally changed to smoke

pipes, etc. The third adaptation was the creation of the Japanese zhuang. "zhuang" is jadeite jargon, which carries the connotation of both objectivity and subjectivity. If the buyer looks at a certain piece of jadeite, it is called "duizhuang (对庄)", which roughly means "The zhuang is right, the taste is right, it is suitable". Reversely in case the piece does not resonate with the buyer, it is said "buduizhuang (不对庄)", which means "the zhuang is wrong, it is unsuitable". Japanese zhuang refers to the jadeite style that Japanese buyers like. Different from the preference of Europeans and Americans for antiques, due to their cultural affinity, the Japanese also like to make jadeite into accessories that could be matched with kimonos, such as oriental hairpins in different shapes and forms. However, after the "September 18th" Japanese invasion of China, the processing of Japanese zhuang was discontinued.

During this period, many renowned jadeite merchants and firms appeared. Those in Beijing and Tianjin mainly included Tie Baoting, Liu Qizhen, Sha Yunwu, Chang Xingyuan, Gao Jichuan, Li Jichuan and so on. The ones in Shanghai mainly included Ye Shuzhong from Yugong Antiques, Zhang Xuegeng from Xuegengzhai, Dai Fubao from Fuyuanzhai, and Hong Yulin from the Shanshanlin Ancient Logistics Department, and Ma Qingshan, Ma Gongfu, Lu Junren, Ma Jinqing, Zhong Yonglin, Shen Mingqing, Liu Xixiang, Ma Jihong, etc. A large part of these merchants were Hui people, especially in the Shanghai market, but Tie Baoting, the "Jade King", was Beijing resident with a Hui background¹⁰².

Most of our Muslim merchants are jewelry, jadeite, and antique dealers, except for a few who are engaged in foreign goods, hardware, paint, and silver shops. Most of these merchants are wealthy and powerful enough to be the leaders of this industry in Shanghai. (Dan, 1992)

In addition, many famous jadeite collectors emerged, such as Zhang Wendi, Huang Huilan, Song Meiling, Zhang Xueliang, Zhang Xun, Feng Guozhang, Cao Kun, Wu Peifu, Sun Chuanfang, Duan Qirui, Xu Shuzheng, Yan Xishan, Xu Yuanquan, Song Ziwen, Dai Li, Du Yuesheng, Huang Jinrong, Yu Qiaqing and so on. They belong to the class of capitalists, politicians, and warlords. In the exchange activities between China and foreign countries, jadeite was traded trans-nationally and inter-culturally. In addition, businessmen, firms, and corporate groups in Europe, America, and Japan also joined the trade with a particular preference for jadeite collections with antique value and exquisite craftsmanship. Examples are Barbara Hutton, HSBC Bank, Citibank, Yamada Corporation, etc.

¹⁰² Tie Baoting was the most famous jadeite merchant in Beijing. He had been involved in the business of pawning royal jewels (including jadeites) and antiques many times after Puyi, the last emperor of the Qing Dynasty abdicated, to support his expenses. He also competed with Japanese consortiums to auction royal treasures to avoid the flow of cultural relics overseas. In addition, Song Meiling's jadeite bracelet and Barbara Hutton's jadeite bead chain were also rumored to be from Tie Baoting.

The jadeite market from the late Qing Dynasty to the Republic of China had specific characteristics: A shift from the capital city of Beijing to newly emerged commercial cities had taken place, particularly in cities with concessions. These new cities witnessed a concentration of economic capital, powerful and wealthy businessmen, and privileges in different fields. This marks a new flow in jadeite trade and culture from the central court in Beijing to the citizens, after the previous shift from the bottom at the Southwestern frontier to the central court in Beijing; Moreover, the processing and sales of jadeite in the market were generally conducted by the same firm, with no industrial division of labor and separation as in the previous stage. Last but not least there was a high degree of diversity both in terms of social class among the participants but also in ethnicity and nationality. That is to say among the participants there were Han, Manchu, Hui but also foreigners hailing from Europe, the US, Japan, etc.

4.1.3 Overview of the Jadeite Market from the Founding of the People's Republic of China until Reform and Opening Up.

After Japan invaded China, China entered in a long war, and its industry and commerce suffered a devastating blow. After the founding of the People's Republic of China in October 1949, the jadeite industry did not have the time to recover from the long-term war. The confrontation between the two camps, which were represented by the United States and the Soviet Union, led to the closure of the China-Myanmar border. The “Three Major Transformations of socialism” began in 1953, followed by the Great Cultural Revolution. A series of geopolitical standoffs and domestic political campaigns had kept the jadeite industry out of mainland China. Instead, it developed and flourished in places like Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Chiang Mai. The most prosperous jadeite market was incontestably located in Hong Kong.

Under the British rule, Hong Kong received an inflow of Chinese mainlanders to escape the war. There were two major gangs in the jadeite industry in Hong Kong: the Shanghai Gang and the Guangdong Gang. The Shanghai Gang arrived in Hong Kong in successive waves during the early of 1920s. The Guangdong Gang came later, starting around the end of the 1940s, especially when mainland China began the socialist public ownership transformation of agriculture, handicrafts, and capitalist industry and commerce in the early 1950s. The former Guangdong jadeite merchants promptly decided to flee to Hong Kong. Initially they engaged in the antique jewelry business. Around the beginning of the 1960s, when the Myanmar Public Auction was opened, Hong Kong jadeite merchants went to Yangon to participate in the jadeite trade, and then shipped the jadeite ores to Hong Kong for processing and sales via the sea route. Another jadeite ores trading center that territorially competed with Yangon in the mid-1960s was Chiang Mai, Thailand, which is discussed in the previous chapter. Hong Kong jadeite merchants also venture into Chiang Mai to purchase jadeite ores, while at the same time buying rubies, sapphires, pearls and other jewelries in Bangkok, the jewelry center of Southeast Asia. When US President Nixon visited China in 1972, he opened a window for the world to understand

China, a so-called mysterious socialist China after World War II, and a China craze emerged in Europe and the United States. The antiques, jewelry, and jade that were brought into Hong Kong in the early days of the late 1970s and the 1980s suddenly became highly expensive, which promoted the development of the local jadeite processing and sales industry. The Hong Kong Jade Association was established in 1974¹⁰³. In the 1970s and 1980s, Hong Kong became the largest jadeite processing and sales center in the world. When Taiwan's economy took off in the 1980s, most of the high-end jadeite produced in Hong Kong was purchased by Taiwanese collectors, and Chinese from Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and other places.

Since the 1950s, many jade merchants have gathered on Canton Road (the section from Jordan Road to Saigon Street) to sell jade articles. In those days, besides the jade shops, there were also many jade stalls on the sidewalks in front of the shops, and because of the large concentration of shops and stalls a jade market emerged. For the sake of convenience, jade merchants also set up jade processing factories in nearby buildings, thus forming a wholesale center for jade raw materials and jade articles. Until the end of the 1990s, the supply of jade raw materials and finished jade products in Canton Road accounted for more than 80% of the world. (Hong Kong Jade Chamber of Commerce. 2009)

The jadeite market in Hong Kong was first concentrated on Canton Road between Nanjing Street and Jordan Road, especially the area at the intersection of Canton Road and Nanjing Street. Later, it expanded to the north to Ningbo Street, until Saigon Street. At its peak, there were more than 300 jade shops along Canton Road.

The early jade stalls closed at 1:00 p.m., and in the 1980s, vendors specializing in afternoon business began to surface. Most of them were jade carvers. They carved in the morning and sold the carved objects in the afternoon. The source of tourists is different in the morning and afternoon. The customers in the morning are mainly shop owners and tourists, and the customers in the afternoon are mainly cart vendors.

(Zhang, 2011)

In 1984, the Hong Kong Municipal Council set up a new Gansu Street Jade Market in an open space north of Gansu Street and south of Liang Xianli Community Service Center (Formerly a pre-war tenement building commonly known as "The Boat House") for the sake of easy management and traffic improvement, catering to about 440 stalls. Most of the middle and low-end jade shops had moved to the new market, while a small number of high-end and expensive jade jewelry shops still remained in the Canton Road area. In addition, there were also jadeite shops on Hollywood Boulevard, Lascar Street, and Lok

¹⁰³ It was named "Jade Industry and Commerce Association" when it was established and changed its name to "Hong Kong Jade Chamber of Commerce" in 2007.

Ku Road Antique Street in Sheung Wan on Hong Kong Island. However, they only sold jadeite but did not process it.

This period is marked by the shift of the jadeite market from Mainland China to Hong Kong. Although the space of processing has been partially separated from that of retail in most cases they remain in each other's proximity. The customers were mostly wealthy overseas Chinese from East and Southeast Asia but also from Europe and the US.

4.2 The Processing Space Guangdong and the Reterritorialization of Jadeite Trade

At the end of 1978, Deng Xiaoping, the second-generation supreme leader of the People's Republic of China, put forward the theory of "reform internally and open up to the outside world" and "emancipate the mind and seek truth from facts" (Deng Xiaoping Memorial Website, 2019), which was a major turning point in the course of social development. China has begun to change from the relatively closed state it had experienced nearly 30 years after the founding of the People's Republic of China. The central government first implemented the "household contract responsibility system" in the agricultural field, which provided a precedent for privatization in other fields. Later, a "dual-track price system" was implemented in industry and commerce, that is, goods were sold at dual prices in the plan and the market, and at the same time, private business activities gradually opened up. The market economy in mainland China was slowly re-emerging.

In the early days of reform and opening up, few individual jadeite merchants in mainland China went to Myanmar to buy ores. Moreover, they were mainly state-owned enterprises (Reference News, 1983). They processed the purchased jadeite ores into exquisite works of art, to be sold abroad at several times the price, generating foreign exchange income for the country.

Xinhua News Agency, Yangon, February 14 (Reporter Zhao Xinkao). The 22nd Myanmar Jewelry Fair closed here on the 13th, and the total amount of various jewelry traded at the meeting was about 9.333 million US dollars. This is the highest turnover achieved since the first jewelry fair was held in 1964. Gemstones, jadeites, and pearls produced in Myanmar are famous all over the world, and Myanmar holds such a jewelry fair every year. This year's trade fair is called the "Year of Jadeite", and a large number of high-quality Burmese jadeites are sold at good prices at the fair. The jewelry fair opened on February 4th, and more than 370 jewelers from 16 countries and regions participated in the fair. A team from the China Arts and Crafts Import and Export

Corporation participated in the jewelry fair and purchased jadeite worth US\$355,846. Since Myanmar held the first jewelry fair, the total amount of jadeite purchased by China has reached 6.82 million US dollars, making it the largest buyer of Myanmar's jadeite. Since Myanmar held the first jewelry fair, the total amount of jadeite purchased by China has reached 6.82 million US dollars, making it the largest buyer of Myanmar's jadeite. For this reason, this trade fair presented a silver vase to Chinese guests to express the close and friendly relationship between the people of China and Myanmar. (People's Daily, 1985)

In 1985, when Deng Xiaoping met with a delegation of high-level American entrepreneurs organized by Time Inc., he said: *Some regions and people can get rich first, and drive and help other regions and other people to gradually achieve common prosperity.* This point of view has gradually become the guiding line of thought for China's reform and opening up. In 1992, Deng Xiaoping made a series of important speeches during his southern tour in Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Guangzhou, Shanghai and other places, and reform and opening up became China's basic national policy. The following year, the concept of "socialist market economy" was enshrined in the *Constitution of the People's Republic of China*.

China implements the principles and policies of building a nation-state with a socialist market economy, implementing Deng Xiaoping's theory of "letting some people get rich first" on the ground. Therefore, the development of the country was not synchronized in terms of space. The strategic layout took the eastern coast as the first echelon, the central part as the second, followed by the development of the western region. National powers have immediately restructured the new pattern of the jadeite industry, separating and creating a huge gap between the space of production and sales. In this process Guangdong became the largest processing and distribution center market, while Yunnan was transformed into the largest consumption center market.

4.2.1 The Factory of the World: Guangdong as a Part of International Division of Labor

The post-Cold War period from 1989 onwards is marked by neoliberalism and globalization, championing a global market that allegedly will replace war and conflict by trade and thus creating development, prosperity and wealth; nation-states supported the idea that through close economic exchanges, they may avoid the outbreak of a new world war, while increased trade would benefit all nations. Therefore, "peace" and "development" became buzzwords in the global discourse. Transnational corporations have developed rapidly beyond national borders, and the production system was restructured with the allocation of natural resources, labor, technology, capital, and information across the globe, forming a clearer international division of labor and international economic connections than in the colonial times and the era of the industrial revolution. This is what sociologists such as Giddens (2013) refer to as a major

feature of modernity. If we say that modern European society began with the enlightenment of the Age of Discovery and stabilized with the combustion of the Industrial Revolution, then, the "great transformation" of China's modern society began with the overthrow of the imperial system in 1912 and stabilized by making "concentrating on reform, opening up, and modernization" the fundamental task of national development and enshrining it into the Constitution in 1993. Henceforth, China has adopted a state-driven strategy to implement internal social reforms from top to bottom, promote industrialization and urbanization, and actively integrate itself into the external world, participate in the world division of labor, and in so doing become an indispensable link in the global value chain. The central government's specific positioning for Guangdong is to "take 20 years to catch up with the Asian 'four tigers' and take the lead in realizing modernization in the whole country."

On July 1, 1992, the Guangdong Provincial Party Committee and the Provincial Government submitted the "Request for Instructions on Accelerating the Development of Guangdong and Strive to Catch up with the Asian "Four Tigers" within 20 years" to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council, proposing to divide the 20 years into two stages with the year 2000 as the boundary: In 2000, some areas (referring to the Special Economic Zone and the Pearl River Delta) reached or approached the level of the "Four Little Dragons"; The overall economic development of the province reached the level of the "Four Little Dragons" in 2010. ·····On May 21, 1993, the report of the Seventh Party Congress of Guangdong Province "Struggling for the Basic Realization of Modernization in Guangdong in Twenty Years" specified the goals and tasks of the two stages: By 2000, the gross domestic product will reach 500 billion yuan, an average increase of 13.4% in 10 years, and the per capita GDP will reach 7,200 RMB; By 2010, the GDP will reach 1.6 trillion RMB, with an average annual growth rate of 12.4%, and the per capita GDP will reach 20,000 RMB. ·····Subsequent developments showed that the goals of both phases were greatly exceeded: Calculated at current prices, Guangdong's GDP exceeded 1,000 billion RMB in 2000, and exceeded 4,500 billion RMB in 2010, with a per capita GDP of 46,990 RMB. (Guangdong Reform and Opening Up History research group, 2018)



Chart 1: The GDP of Guangzhou in the main years from 1949 to 2018. (Unit: 100 million RMB).

Source: "Guangdong Reform and Opening History" research group. *History of Reform and Opening up in Guangdong (1978-2018)*. Social Science Literature Press, 2018.

Under the spatial distribution of state power, Guangdong, as one of the first regions to open to the outside world, has achieved rapid development in industry (see Table 2), manufacturing, and service industries, soon became the province with the fastest GDP growth and the most active place in economic activities in China, and enable China to join the international division of labor smoothly. The basic motivation for multinational companies to invest in China is abundant and low-cost labor resources. There are two types of entrusted processing and direct investment: entrusted processing includes processing with supplied materials, processing with supplied samples, processing with supplied parts, and compensation trade, and direct investment includes establishing sole proprietorships, joint ventures, or cooperative enterprises (Jin, 2003). In the early Guangdong "world factory", clothing ranked first among the commodity categories produced and exported. Iron and steel, machinery, and transportation machinery accounted for a very low proportion. The level of industrial products consists of mainly home appliance assembly and testing products and does not include well-known brands nor high-tech products. Basically, they are all labor-intensive and low value-added products (Feng, 2002). In the following ten years, this situation would gradually improve to a certain extent with the production upgrade of photovoltaics, new energy vehicles, smart phones and other products and brands. Generally speaking, unlike "comprehensive

supporting type¹⁰⁴ of world factory, Guangdong is characterized as a link in the international division of labor and belongs to the low-end link of value production.




Chart 2: Changes in the proportions of the three industries in Guangdong from 1978 to 2017. (Unit: %).

Source: "Guangdong Reform and Opening History" research group. *History of Reform and Opening up in Guangdong (1978-2018)*. Social Science Literature Press, 2018.

At the same time, the largest jadeite processing area and distribution center was also formed in Guangdong. Modern jadeite processing methods are quite different from those in the past. Not only are there specialized industrial machinery for almost every process, but there is also the industrial technology of computer-designed three-dimensional blueprints and digitally controlled machinery to carve out finished products. The production of these machines requires materials, component assembly, technicians, workshop workers and other production factors, all of which depend on the foundation laid by the development of Guangdong's modern industrial system.

For a long time before the reform and opening up, the processing center and distribution center of jadeite were mainly located in Hong Kong. Opening a foreign trade port in Guangdong and providing preferential policies for free trade greatly facilitated the setting up of trading markets for the transfer of raw jadeite materials and processing centers in Guangdong. Guangdong Province has the longest a coastline in China measuring 3,368 kilometers. The coastline of Guangzhou Port alone is more than 400 kilometers long. The throughput of 12 major ports reached about 2.2 billion tons by 2020. The two ports of Guangzhou and Shenzhen are the main ports for foreign trade containers. Raw materials

¹⁰⁴ Historically, "world factories" have successively appeared in the United Kingdom, the United States, and Japan. "Comprehensive supporting type" is represented by Japan, which means that the categories and value chain links of industrial products can be completed within the same country, which reduces the dependence on products from other countries, and the international trade of industrial products is more exported than imported.

imported from abroad mainly enter Guangdong through these two ports (see Table 3). Jadeite raw materials entering China through shipping lines also mainly takes place through these two ports. Thus there is a continuous supply of sufficiently voluminous raw materials to Guangdong, providing a guarantee of production materials for this world processing center. After Myanmar's independence, exchanges between countries follow international laws and conventions, with corresponding legal protections and policy support between Yangon Port and Guangdong ports. Jadeite ores are shipped from Guangdong ports to China.




Chart 3: Comparison of container throughput of Guangzhou Port, Shenzhen Port and Hong Kong Port.

Source: Drawn by the author based on the data of the world's top 100 ports published by Lloyd's List Intelligence.

Furthermore, the rapid development of Guangdong's secondary and tertiary industries has led to a rapid increase in per capita GDP among the residents of Guangzhou, who became "some of the first to get rich". People with disposable income do not only have means to consume but also to invest and promote the secondary circulation of funds, providing a fertile soil for the consumption and the flow of non-daily consumer goods. Thus, jadeite has become of these non-daily consumer objects.



Chart 4: Guangzhou's per capita GDP in major years from 1949 to 2018. (Unit: RMB).

Source: "Guangdong Reform and Opening History" research group. *History of Reform and Opening up in Guangdong (1978-2018)*. Social Science Literature Press, 2018.

Becoming a "world factory" and a part of the international division of labor as part of China's national policy is the result of the top-down territorialization of central power. Unlike most industries in Guangdong located at the lower end of the global value chain, the jadeite industry is more similar to the "comprehensive supporting" feature of processing supplied materials and belongs to the segment of the highest value-added production.

4.2.2 "Comprehensive supporting" Type in the Division of Labor: Reterritorialization and Cooperation among Localities

The transfer of jadeite processing and distribution centers from Hong Kong to Guangdong took nearly two decades, and four major processing and distribution centers have been formed, namely Pingzhou, Jieyang, Sihui and Guangzhou. The development time of the jadeite processing industry in these four places is different. The division of labor among them was not obvious, and the jadeite ores were collected from the public market in Yangon, Myanmar, or from the border markets in Ruili and Tengchong, Yunnan. After the opening of the Pingzhou public markets in 2003, a large number of jadeite ores began to gather in Pingzhou first, from where it was disseminated to other places. In the process, a "3+1" jadeite industrial cluster landscape including Pingzhou, Jieyang, Sihui and Guangzhou with division of labor links belonging to different places started to gradually take root. The "3+1" jadeite industrial cluster consists of three processing centers in Pingzhou, Jieyang and Sihui, and a wholesale center in Guangzhou. The four places have formed distinctive and complementary characteristics. Thus, this process of reterritorialization clearly shows local features.

At present, jadeite ores entering Guangdong are generally first gathered at the markets in Pingzhou Town, Foshan, or first participated in the Pingzhou public markets or directly processed for the first time. Pingzhou public markets have been discussed in the previous chapter. The primary processing mainly refers to the part where the ore is sliced and removed to make a bracelet. This part constitutes the most uncertain part in jadeite processing and thus prone to gambling. As the key natural attribute is heterogeneous and the internal conditions difficult to assess, it is not easy to make the right bid. If the bid is low, it cannot be successful, and if the bid is too high, it will lose money. However, there are always jadeite merchants who buy ores back and make a lot of money, and most of them have experience in cutting bracelets. Compared with other finished products, bracelets have much higher requirements on the quality of the material itself, because a complete bracelet is larger and more regular. However, it is common to find natural jadeite raw materials mixed with cracks, locks, ringworm and other interferences. Carvings can deliberately avoid or remove flaws during creation and processing, but the probability of cutting a flawless bracelet is much lower than other finished products.

People in the past (traditional society) didn't pay much attention to flaws, "flaws don't cover up goodness".Of course, it is also related to the processing capacity at that time. The market only wanted colored goods (green, bright, and plump jadeite), and no one wanted ice type or glutinous type jadeite. If other varieties couldn't be sold, the processing cost would be high, so no one did that business, and they were all thrown on the (jadeite) mines, and some were buried back.Now the market is hot, and people buy everything. There are a lot of people who like ice type and glass type, and the price is very high. A little bit of flaw is obvious, and the selection becomes finer and finer.¹⁰⁵

Secondly, in addition to the visual effect, bodily features such as palm size and wrist thickness need to be taken into account, which makes the transaction process of the bracelet more meticulous and demanding. Finished products such as pendants, toy pieces, and bead chains do not need to have such requirements. Therefore, the price of bracelets made of the same quality, or even the same piece of jadeite ore, is much higher than that of pendants. In other words, the key to judging the price of a piece of ore is to estimate how many bracelets it can be made into and how much these bracelets can be sold for, and then estimate the cost and profit of other finished products. In all ores and slice material markets, we can see circles drawn one by one on the cut surface of the ore, which is actually the seller's indication: "A bracelet can be cut here". If you look carefully, a certain part of the circle is often set on the place with the most beautiful color or the best water head of the cut surface, which means: "The bracelet cut here is very valuable, you can earn a lot of money, come and buy it." Third, there will be a large discrepancy between estimates and actual conditions. The uncertainty of the process to cut a bracelet

¹⁰⁵ Interview time: 08/2019; Interlocutor: JYG; Location: Yuqi Street, Pingzhou Town, Foshan City, Guangdong Province.

fulfilling the visual needs –that is as flawless as possible - and the corporal condition of the customer is so high that it cannot be measured by any science. It can only have a chance of success by relying on expert experience passed down from generation to generation and from master to apprentice, as well as the painful lessons accumulated over time through continuous error and trial. This is a kind of "paying tuition" Therefore, it is gradually dis-embedded from the value production chain and generates a specialized division of labor. The public markets are located in Pingzhou, and there is a direct and urgent need for experts who analyze the value of ores and bid. Thus, this dis-embedded link has given rise to a bracelet processing market in Pingzhou.

The rest of the material after the bracelet is taken is called *daoxia* (刀下, undercuts)¹⁰⁶, which can be roughly divided into three categories and flow in three directions: The first category is medium-quality *daoxia* made locally in Pingzhou as bare-body finished products. Finished products do not require complicated carving and processing, and are aimed at demonstrating the superior quality of jadeite materials, including buckles, beads, saddles, etc. The processing factories are located in the Yuqi Street area of Pingdong Village, Pingzhou Town, and are now under the jurisdiction of Guicheng Street, Nanhai District, Foshan City. Jade Street is about 1,000 meters long. There are shops selling jadeite and small jadeite processing workshops. There are also Pingdong households. Almost every household is a processing business model with a store in front and a factory in the back. Some families have no storefronts, so they live in private houses in alleys near the main street. They divided the house into two simple upper and lower floors, with beds for sleeping people on the top, and two or three machines placed against the wall below, either jade carving machines or polishing machines. The living space in daily life is also on the lower floor, mixed with the processing space. Usually the door is open, and signs such as "Bare Body Processing" and "Polishing" are hung on one side of the door. In the middle of the door is the name of the shop, and sometimes a fortune-telling talisman will be pasted, which means the business is booming.

In 2009, in order to promote the further development of the local jadeite industry, Guicheng Sub-district attracted investment from Myanmar and Yunnan, and built the Cuibao Garden block at the southern end of Pingzhou Jade Street to develop jadeite tourism projects. Cuibao Garden covers an area of more than 50 mu, with more than 45,000 square meters of antique architectural complexes combining the Lingnan water town and the architectural style of the Bai nationality in Dali, Yunnan, and nearly a thousand shops. The jade articles on sale are not limited to jadeite, but also include other kinds of jade, colored gemstones, pearls, corals, and other jewelry. In 2014, it was rated as a national 4A-level scenic spot¹⁰⁷ in China, creating a value production model

¹⁰⁶ The term "*daoxia*" is mainly a habit in Guangdong, and it is generally called "*bianjiaoliao* (边角料, leftovers)" in Yunnan.

¹⁰⁷ In 2012, China promulgated the "Administrative Measures for the Quality of Tourist Attractions", which divides the quality of tourist attractions in mainland China into five levels, from high to low, they are

combining cultural tourism and business to attract consumption. In 2017, Foshan City built Pingzhou Jade Town to promote the transformation and upgrading of traditional industries, giving birth to a new business model of "Internet + Jade" and a capital flow model of "Finance + Jade".

The second category is the highest quality daoxia, which generally flow to Yangmei Village, Jieyang City, Chaoshan area, where they are processed into high-end ring faces, beads, bare pieces, pendants, and other finished products. The jadeite processing markets in Jieyang are located in the northwest of Rongcheng District, consisting of Yangmei Village, three villages of Guqiao (Qiaonan, Qiaodong, Qiaoxi) and other villages. Among them, Yangmei Village takes jadeite processing as the leader, Qiaodong and Qiaoxi mainly process Hetian white jade, and Qiaonan processes both. Yangmei Village is now under the jurisdiction of Pandong Street, Jiedong District, Jieyang City. There are more than 3,000 people in the village and more than 550 households, of which more than 80% are engaged in the jadeite industry. Xia, Lin, Chen, and Hong are the four major clans in Yangmei Village, and everyone in the village knows each other. The Old Street in the village was the earliest jadeite market, and it was also engaged in antique business at the time. Antiques can still be seen for sale in the shops of some old people. Now it has expanded to a length of more than 400 meters, with more than 200 pavements on both sides. The jadeite market has been expanded into an area, including Yangmei Yudu Market, Qiaonan International Jade Center, Qiaoxi Guqiao White Jade Market, and some other retail stores. The International Jade Center is a jade market opened by the villagers of Qiaonan, which is located just south of Yangmei Village, following the development of the jadeite industry by Yangmei people. And the Guqiao White Jade Market was developed by the villagers of Qiaoxi to the west of Yangmei Village. It mainly sells white jade and is much smaller in scale than the Yudu Market and the International Jade Center. In recent years, Jieyang has also opened some public auctions, but the influence is not as strong as that of in Pingzhou. The Yangmei region only processes high-grade jadeite materials that combine best delicacy, water, and color. Most of them come from Pingzhou or directly from Myanmar, and there are slices, undercuts, or whole pieces of ores.

I took the materials back to my own processing factory (a small workshop composed of several machines), and I had to think carefully about how to deal with them. High-grade materials are inherently expensive, so it must be carefully considered. Try not to grind too much, or you can grind a bead on the cut part. If there are not enough to grind beads, you can also grind ring faces. In short, it should not be wasted. ……I started to learn how to grind jade with my father when I

AAAAA, AAAA, AAA, AA, and A-level tourist attractions. The signs and certificates of the quality grades of tourist attractions shall be uniformly stipulated by the national tourist attraction quality grade assessment agency.

was a teenager. We process it very carefully, grinding it a little bit by a little, and we have to be very patient. If the force of the hand is slightly different (onto the material), a large piece will be worn off, and it will be a big loss! I am only in my thirties and my eyes are not as good as before.

Forty or fifty-year-old masters can no longer do (this work) with their eyesight.¹⁰⁸

Some processing factories are located in the market, some in the residential area around the market, and some are on the first floor of the houses built by themselves in the village. Some of the finished products processed in the back factory are sold in the front store, and some are sold in the store facing the street. The store may be owned by oneself or a friend. The customers are generally regular customers with long-term cooperative relationships. The jadeite merchants who come to Yangmei to buy goods are all very powerful big entrepreneurs, because only a jadeite ring face the size of a thumbnail here costs tens of thousands of RMB, and the industry regulations does not allow to buy by piece but by yishou (一手, a set of) goods at a time. Yishou is the jargon of jadeite wholesale, which means that one transaction must be bought and sold in batches or in groups, and absolutely not a single commodity transaction. The quality and size of goods in a group are generally not uniform, and there are both good and bad. The best ones are called "heads of goods", and the worst ones are called "tails of goods". When buying goods, you need to estimate the overall value before bargaining. This wholesale transaction rule applies in any wholesale link. That is to say, you have to buy at least a dozen pieces, and spending hundreds of thousands RMB each time is the minimum investment. The wealth of Yangmei people cannot be seen from their rather shabby appearance. They often have unkempt hair, wearing T-shirts and shorts, old cloth shoes with holes or even slippers. They may be squatting on the side of the stall to observe the material carefully, or maybe squeezed under the leaking tin shed to wait for new materials. If they had not opened the doors of luxury cars such as Porsche, Maserati, Bentley, etc. after leaving the jade market, you would never have imagined that the green jadeite they put on a stainless-steel plate might be worth millions of RMB.

The third category is those that cannot be made into finished bare pieces, but whose value can be increased through exquisite jadeite carving techniques or inlay designs, or relatively low-quality daoxia. They will flow to Sihui in Zhaoqing City to be made into carved pieces, including pendants, play pieces, ornaments, and inlaid finished products. In addition, some ores with characters that are more suitable for carving into large ornaments will also go directly to Sihui. In the 1980s and 1990s, the earliest jadeite market in Sihui was a bazaar with tarpaulin stalls in a muddy street. Small ores, slices, processed semi-finished products, and finished products were all sold here. Because the market started selling stalls every morning before dawn, it is named "Chenxu Yuyu (晨墟玉宇)". Xu (墟), which means bazaar, is usually opened every few days. It is often called

¹⁰⁸ Interview time: 08/2019; Interlocutor: AQ; Location: Yangmei Village, Jieyang City, Guangdong Province.

“Ji (集)” in northern China, “Xu (墟)” in south of Lingnan, and “Gaizi (街子)” in southwest China. So, “Chenxu Yuyu (晨墟玉宇)” means the bazaar selling jade in the early morning. In 2001, a nearby factory went bankrupt due to poor management, and the Sihui Municipal Government organized the open-air bazaar to move into a factory building for operation and renamed it “Jade Tianguang Xu”. In addition, several other relatively concentrated markets had formed, such as Yubo City across the road from the main entrance of Tianguang Xu Market, Jade Street about 300 meters away from Tianguang Xu Market, and Rifeng Slices Market, etc. The residential areas near all the markets are full of processing workshops, forming a large industrial area. Tianguang Xu Market covers an area of about 70 acres, and there are more than 6,000 migui (米柜, a stall about one-meter-wide) with a length of 90 cm. Each stall is generally run by two different merchants in shifts, and the goods are different. They mainly display wholesale middle and low-end finished products and unpolished semi-finished products. Every day, the first batch of stall owners starts business around 2:00 in the morning, to be followed by successive groups arriving respectively around 10:00 in the morning, in the afternoon, and in the evening. In general, Tianguang Xu Market has the largest product density, number of owners, number of buyers, and the overall scale among all semi-finished and finished wholesale markets in the jadeite industry.

A few years ago, before Tianguang Xu Market was transformed into what it is now, the conditions were extremely poor, the ground was full of bumps and holes, and there were no electric fans. Every year from the 15th day of the first lunar month to May is the peak season. There were so many people in such a large shed that you can only follow the flow of people. You must immediately decide whether to buy something or not. There was no way to stop and choose, if you hesitated, you would miss it. It is definitely possible to lose money on the purchase. It was like this at the time, and there was no other way. You know that the climate here is very hot. Every year (peak season) in those years, some merchants died of heat.¹⁰⁹

The most representative main business of Yubo City is that of high-end decorations, including large decorations carved from single jadeite, jadeite furniture, jadeite screens and so on. Their craftsmanship is extremely exquisite, and the staggering price accounts for at least one million RMB. Jade Street is a market with shops in front and factories in the back, where various carved pieces are processed and sold by wholesale. Rifeng Market is a market specialized in trading slices. There are shops in old-fashioned houses on both sides of the irregular lanes, and there are two rows of stalls in the middle. Every morning around 7:30, jadeite merchants come to set up stalls. There are bracelet cores, daoxia, leftovers, etc., of various qualities and grades, mainly low-to-medium. In some

¹⁰⁹ Interview time: 09/2019; Interlocutor: HHJ; Location: Tianguang Xu Market, Sihui City, Guangdong Province.

booths, more than a dozen people gathered in front of the stalls, scrambling to see the goods. The rumor went around that new materials have arrived.

*The rest materials from Pingzhou were brought to Sihui for sale. If someone who has no hands-on experience goes there for the first time, they are likely to be swarmed by people who see the goods, saying that they want to take them to see, but they will never come back. In the end, they can't figure out who took them. So, it must be handed over to only one of them when seeing the goods at the beginning, so that he can guarantee to return them in the end.*¹¹⁰

Finished products processed in Pingzhou, Jieyang, and Sihui mainly leave for the finished product wholesale markets in Guangzhou, including Hualin Jade Street and Liwan Plaza. Hualin Jade Street is located near Xiajiu Road, Liwan District, Guangzhou City, including jade shops on the first floor of old residential buildings such as Xilaizheng Street, Hualin New Street, Hualinsiqian Street, Maolinzhi Street, and Xinsheng Street, and Blocks C and D of Hualin International Jewelry Building on Kangwang Middle Road. The Liwan Plaza building is located about 600 meters south. With a total area of more than 65,000 square meters, it is the world's largest wholesale central market for jadeite products. The wholesale of jadeite products in Guangzhou is not displayed in e stores but the place is densely packed with one-meter-wide stalls arranged neatly in rows, and the vendors sit behind their stall. The booth is generally composed of a horizontal and a slanted platform. On the horizontal platform goods are displayed, whereas the hung items were to be found on the the slanted platform. Although the booths are very small, some of even less than one square meter, and the counter-tops very simple, the value of the goods in each stall easily reaches millions of RMB. Booths with more delicate and bright color goods, the value may be worth tens of millions of RMB. Wholesalers who sell finished products of similar varieties or quality generally gather in one area, such as the toy area, carving pendant area, bracelet area, bead area, or tourist products zhuang (旅游庄, lvyouzhuang) area, spring color area, glass type area, etc. Only a very small number of high-end boutique owners will own a complete shop. Retailers who purchase goods can choose suitable (对庄, duizhuang) jadeites in corresponding areas according to their own customer conditions.

When the buyer and the seller quote, it is not allowed to let the owner of the adjacent stall know the price. In the past, buyers and sellers used their hands in their sleeves to make gestures, but now they are typing on calculators, never speak out with mouth. I type you a price, and you type it on the calculator when you make a counteroffer. If the price is not agreed upon, you can say "budui zhuang (不对庄, wrong

¹¹⁰ Interview time: 09/2019; Interlocutor: HHJ; Location: Tianguang Xu Market, Sihui City, Guangdong Province.

Zhuang/unsuitable)". If you agree on the price, you can now pay by credit card, WeChat, Alipay, with no refunds or exchanges services.¹¹¹

Retailers usually do not buy right away when they find a suitable product, but they inquire on the price once, then stay in a nearby hotel and shop around in the market every day. They wait about the last few days of a week or ten days before finalizing the purchase. Therefore, wholesalers need to memorize the face of potential buyers, how much their inquiries and counteroffers are, how many times they have been here, whether they have visited before, etc., so as to judge when and at what price the goods should be sold. There are many gold and silver jewelry shops on the periphery of the market, and they also do match inlay processing at the same time. There are also some knitting craft booths, which also provide supporting services such as hanging rope weaving and hand string weaving.

It should be noted that the order in which dao Xia flows in Pingzhou, Sihui, and Jieyang is not absolutely fixed and one-off. Jadeite itself has the special property of changing color and delicacy, which is difficult to predict. After many materials are further decomposed, new situations will appear, so all kinds of dao Xia would go between the three places. The wholesalers of finished products in Guangzhou will go to these three places to keep abreast of the market and purchase goods. However, the distances between the four places are not close. Taking Guangzhou as the center, Pingzhou is nearly 30 kilometers away, Jieyang 377 kilometers away, and Sihui 83 kilometers away. In order to facilitate the flow of people and things between the four places, the local government has also specially set up a public transport bus to provide convenient services for traders.

To sum up, the "3+1" industrial landscape formed after the transfer of jade from Hong Kong to Guangdong means that Pingzhou, Jieyang, and Sihui represent the main processing markets, while Guangzhou is the largest wholesale market for finished products. The division of labor in the four places has formed a specialized division of labor and comprehensive support for the processing part of the upper and middle reaches of the jadeite global value chain, in addition to the upstream raw material production and downstream retail. However, the logic behind the local division of labor in Guangdong's jadeite processing industry is entirely different from the logic of specialization in modern industry.

Pingzhou is the location of the jadeite ores public auctions, and the processed products are bracelets and middle and low-end bare pieces; The categories processed in Jieyang include ring faces, beads, bare pieces, pendants and other common finished products in the market, but only high-grade jadeite raw materials are processed in terms of quality; The processing categories of Sihui are medium to low-end carvings and high-end large-

¹¹¹ Interview time: 07/2018; Interlocutor: HBS; Location: Hualinsi Street, Guangzhou City, Guangdong Province.

scale ornaments. Through the analysis and research of fieldwork data, it can be found that the formation mechanism of the three processing areas is neither divided according to the category of jadeite products. For example, if bracelets are processed in a certain place, then pendants, ornaments, and beads will be processed in other parallel places. Nor is the division of labor based on the quality of jadeite. For example, high-grade materials are processed in one place, while mid-grade and low-grade materials are handled in two other places. In the current division of labor in the three regions, the subsets of both the horizontal category and the vertical variety are crossed, but there is no regular correspondence between them. So, what is the mechanism behind the current division of labor and classification? From the general perspective of the processing flow of jadeite, after the ores come out of the Pingzhou public markets, the first processing choice is generally to slice and take out the bracelet, and the remaining parts are divided into high, medium and low grades where after it is sent to the three places; The second processing option is to make bare body pieces with fewer carving marks, and the remaining parts will go to Sihui; the third processing option is to carve the piece carefully. In the ranking of jadeite's aesthetic value, if the quality of the material itself is optimal, smooth and flawless surface is left as such without unnecessary and superfluous carvings. Although it is not ruled out that some high-end materials will be subject to carvings, the carving process is often employed to avoid or mask ringworm, cracks, and dirt, so that some imperfect materials can increase its value through ingenious carving. Therefore, the current industrial division of labor is the sequence of links gradually formed by processors from ores to finished products in accordance with the principle of value-maximizing processing selection. In other words, the principle of processing a piece of jadeite ore is to try to maximize the value-added possibility of each processing. Driven by this principle and motivation, participants who are good at cutting bracelets, those who are good at handling high-end materials, and those who are good at carving gather in groups, which is called the "specialization" of their respective division of labor, form their own set of systematic closed loops in the three places. The establishment of the Guangzhou Wholesale Market is actually the outcome of the traditional jade market, the well-connected transportation, and the need for all categories of finished products to be concentrated in one place to facilitate retailers to purchase goods, thus forming its own specialized division of labor. Thus, the formation of the jadeite processing industry in Guangdong is part of the reterritorialization of national power, but the division of labor within the industry is the result of the reterritorialization of specific participants based on the essential attributes and cultural characteristics of jadeite. The formation of the overall pattern is the result of the reterritorialization superposition of the upper and lower powers in different dimensions.

4.2.3 The Flow and Convergence of Labor Force and the Value Reproduction of Jadeite

The participants form a specialized division of labor based on the principle of value maximization dispersed across different places. The local government has strengthened

the localization of the division of labor units through various measures, and then reconstructed the landscape of local jadeite industry clusters in Guangdong. Thus, the value of jadeite is continuously reproduced by the territorialization actions of the state, localities, and specific actors. Further analysis can also find that the more detailed division of labor layout and value reproduction methods such as the capillary network that is constantly being updated, which jointly promotes the jadeite processing industry to be firmly entrenched in Guangdong. Here, there are three other ways of value reproduction:

First, in parallel with the development of the Guangdong processing center is the assembly of a large number of professional laborers, who brought jade carving skills of different styles and trade networks, both reproducing the value content of jadeite.

The jade carvers in Guangzhou, Sihui, and Jieyang are mainly from Guangdong, Henan, and Putian, Fujian. The local jade carving craft in Guangzhou was emerged in the middle and late Tang Dynasty (AD 755 – AD 907). After 1949, the small traditional handcrafted jade workshops merged into the Yingguang Jade Production Cooperative and the Biguang Jade Production Cooperative. After the reform and opening up in 1978, the state-run South Jade Carving Factory, Guangzhou Decoration Factory, and Guangzhou Jade Factory became the largest jade production departments in the province. The foundation of Guangdong's jade carving industry provides important labor and technical support for the transfer of the jadeite market. Among them, four jade carving masters from the Nanfang Jade Carving Factory returned to their hometown Sihui after retirement and set up a local factory to recruit apprentices. This constitutes the original cornerstone of the Sihui Jadeite Processing Zone. Jade carvers from Putian, Fujian were originally stone and wood craftsmen. They were attracted by the jadeite industry in Guangdong and moved to Sihui and Pingzhou in large numbers.

We are from Putian, with my parents, wife, son, and my younger brother, we all carve jadeite here. My son is in elementary school, and my parents are helping out to take care of him. We are too busy.I have been doing it for more than ten years, mainly my brother and I do the carving, and my wife does the polishing. Women are weak and can't do the carving with their hands. The first floor is full of (jadeite carving) machines, this floor (second floor) is the living room, and the upper floor (third floor) is the bedrooms.I have won the Tiangong Award¹¹² and been on CCTV¹¹³. Now it is very difficult for people order a carving piece with me. Some friends come to ask me to help (on the carvings

¹¹² The Tiangong Award selection activity is a professional selection activity established by the "China Jewelry and Jade Jewelry Industry Association (中宝协, Zhongbao Association)" in 2002. It is currently the highest award in the jade and stone carving industry in China.

¹¹³ CCTV is China Central Television, the national television media of the People's Republic of China.

*they made) to sign my name, and if I signed them, it would be easy to sell them.*¹¹⁴

The jade carving craft in Nanyang, Henan Province also has a long history, which can even be traced back to the Qin and Han Dynasties. Nanyang Jade, also known as Dushan Jade, is one of the four famous jades in China. Nanyang jade carving industry is very highly sophisticated. Among them, a group of jade carvers discovered that jadeite was a new type of jade in the trade, and its profit was higher than that of any other jade species, so they went south to Guangdong to join the jade carving industry, and many of them became master-level jade carvers. In addition, Shanghai-style jade carvers from Yangzhou and their counterparts from Northeast China who are good at carving Xiuyan jade also ventured into Guangdong.

*I am from Zhenping, Henan, and I have been here for more than ten years. I started carving jadeite in Henan in the 1990s. At that time, I went to Ruili to buy ores. Around 2000, when the Public Market in Myanmar became official, I went to Yangon to bid for materials, and now I am going to Nay Pyi Taw. At about that time, I came to Sihui, but every year the International Jade Carving Festival in Nanyang will invite me back to participate.My master didn't carve jadeite, and I didn't carve jadeite when I was an apprentice.There are 200,000 people in the jade carving industry in Nanyang, including carving Hetian jade, jasper, agate, Nanyang jade, xiuyu, and marble. Hetian jade is now mined in Russia and enters China from the Heihe Port in Heilongjiang, while Hetian jade in Xinjiang has been exhausted.*¹¹⁵

The inflow of jade carvers not only brought the support of key technical labor force to the formation of Guangdong's jadeite industry, but also introduced different styles of jade carving skills, making the artistic expression of jadeite products more vibrant and diverse. Jade carvers have their own concepts and explanations for carving jadeite, which aligns with the attainment level of their jade carving skills. The high level of skills will directly affect the appearance and price of a piece of jadeite ore.

I have to ponder for a long time when I get a piece of jadeite material. Jadeite has the particularity of its own. It hides quietly in the leather shell, but you want to open it and give it life. You have to first ask it what kind of life it wants to be. Everyone can carve a Guanyin or a Buddha, but the effect is different. You have to carve, grind, and follow its grain. We have to respect its natural appearance. A patch of white

¹¹⁴ Interview time: 08/2019; Interlocutor: CQL; Location: A jadeite carving studio in Sihui City, Guangdong Province.

¹¹⁵ Interview time: 08/2019; Interlocutor: XDS; Location: A seafood restaurant in Sihui City, Guangdong Province.

suddenly appeared here, and a touch of green suddenly added there, and I would think about how to express these natural things more artistically. ...I call this process "dialogue", a dialogue with a stone. Only through dialogue can we understand it, and only by understanding it can we make it more charming.Generally, the labor (fee) for me to carve a piece of material the size of a fist costs tens of thousands of RMB, and many people line up to look for me to carve. The Su Dongpo¹¹⁶ ornament over there (about 30 centimeters in height and width) was ordered by a private client.

He talked about some artistic conceptions, and then we went to the market to find materials together. The material costs more than 100,000 RMB, but my labor cost is close to 300,000 RMB.¹¹⁷

Jadeite carvers develop their own personalized styles, and their value production methods and profit methods are full of artistry, which is very different from those of the participants in other nodes. The groups of jadeite carvers are not only divided into sources and genres, but also divided into regional characteristics after gathering. For example, the jadeite carvers in Jieyang have one of the most sought-after skills in the industry. As the jadeite carvers in Jieyang handle high-end materials, they cannot make mistakes at the risk of a great loss. Harsh conditions lead to more exquisite skills, so that "Jieyang Craftsmanship (揭阳工, Jieyang Gong)" has gained a comprehensive high-level reputation in the industry that includes both high-level skills and high-quality materials. Generally speaking, jadeite carvers need not only the experience of identifying jadeite materials, but they also have a high attainment in carving art, so they can endow jadeite with abundant symbolic meaning and aesthetic value, which translates into higher benefits.

Second, the processing links are further subdivided and dis-embedded to increase the value of jadeite. The division of labor in Pingzhou, Jieyang, Sihui, and Guangzhou is only the main feature or link of the division of labor. In fact, there are a more detailed divisions of labor in each place, and each division of labor forms a new labor force and produces new value. For example, the bracelet business of the bracelet owners in Pingzhou can be divided into several types: 1) cooperation with others to slice and cut the bracelets, 2) selling the bracelets without grinding the four right-angled sides after cutting them off, 3) selling the bracelets after the right-angled sides are ground and finally 4) selling the polished and polished finished products, and finally selling the leftover scraps. The next

¹¹⁶ Su Shi (Jan 8, 1037-Aug 24, 1101), courtesy name Dongpo, was a famous writer, calligrapher, statesman, painter, and gourmet in the Northern Song Dynasty. His political career was full of ups and downs, but he always maintained an attitude of not being alarmed but brave and peace by changes, so he was regarded as a model of life attitude by later generations of Chinese.

¹¹⁷ Interview time: August 2018; Interlocutor: LAW; Location: Near Shuiyue Guanyin Temple, Pingzhou Yuqi Street, Foshan City, Guangdong Province.

level of buyers is different for every business. They all need to accumulate a lot of experience in their own division of labor, and also need to a relatively stable sales method and next-level customers.

There are people who specialize in collecting leftovers, and they will sort them after they take them. Some of them are directly sold at the Sihui slices market. Larger and more complete ones are taken to correct the corners and polish part of the surface making them look like small raw materials, which can be sold in the material markets of Pingzhou, Ruili, and Tengchong, and they are likely to fetch a good price.¹¹⁸

For another example, the carvings such as pendants, toys, and small ornaments sold in Tianguang Xu Market in Sihui are divided into “maohuo (毛货, rough goods)” and “sihuo (死货, dead goods)”, each accounting for half of the total merchandise. Rough goods are not raw materials, but semi-finished products that have been carved but not polished. The visual effect of them looks like frosted, and the real quality of the goods can only be distinguished after polishing. Dead goods refer to finished products after polishing. The reason why they are called dead goods means that “the answer has been given” as there is no possibility to increase its value. Therefore, polishing opens the opportunity for added value. The polishing workshop has thus become a newly added specialized division of labor for exclusively processing the content of rough goods. In addition, the same process may change hands once or multiple times, which may depend on the speed of the seller's capital flow and the purchasing power of the customer group held. A batch of goods may have been backlogged in the hands of merchant A for a period of time, and he/she may sell them with only a little profit. And the customers of merchant B or merchant C can pay a higher price to take over the goods due to various reasons, then B or C will be the middleman of this reselling. They may buy the goods directly from merchant A, or they may only be responsible for identifying a customer. Middlemen are ubiquitous in any link in the entire jadeite industry, and buyers do not know how many middlemen have changed hands at a time, and how many times the middlemen have changed in total.

Third, each processing site has developed a corresponding peripheral supporting division of labor according to the actual processing characteristics and needs. For example, lanyard weaving and bracelet weaving for bead strings, ring setting production for inlays, processing of crushed gemstones, etc., and even special processing such as punching the hole. The division of labor is extremely complicated and intricate. In the outer circle, the transportation service specially opened up to connect the four places includes not only government-operated buses, but also privately-operated taxis, minibuses, buses, and online leasing vehicles operated by platforms. The most common, most frequent, and

¹¹⁸ Interview time: 08/2019; Interlocutor: JYG; Location: Yuqi Street, Pingzhou Town, Foshan City, Guangdong Province.

cheapest means of transport are privately operated shuttle buses. Take the shuttle bus between Sihui and Pingzhou as an example. Under normal operating conditions, double-decker buses run 14 times a day, shuttling between Tianguangxu Market, Rifeng Market and Pingzhou Cuibao Garden Market. The interval between each trip is half an hour to 45 minutes. There will be an agreed stop for parking, and the fare is 30 RMB. The bus fleet is contracted by the same operator, and they have also established a WeChat group, connecting people who need rides. The WeChat group is not only convenient for the shuttle bus to notify the departure time or change the departure time, but also serves as a platform for the group friends to publish product advertisements, because the group friends are all practitioners running on this jadeite value chain.

四会平洲玉器街穿梭时间表

四会-平洲		平洲-四会
日丰 对面	天光墟对面 中国电信公交站	翠宝园三面观音 门口
6:30	6:40	5:30
7:15	7:40	6:50
7:45	8:10	7:50
8:15	8:40	8:40
8:50	9:10	9:40
9:30	9:50	11:00
10:45	11:00	12:00
11:30	11:45	13:00
12:30	12:45	14:00
13:30	13:45	14:50
14:30	14:50	15:30
15:45	16:00	16:00
16:45	17:00	16:40
	18:00	17:40
21:00	21:30	19:00

电话: 13822676019 黄金短号76019 欢迎乘坐

Image 12: Shuttle bus schedule for Pingzhou Yuqi Street in Sihui.

Source: Data collected by the author during fieldwork in Pingzhou, August 2018.

To sum up, the presence and reterritorialization of state power promote the connection and interaction of raw materials, labor, and technology in space, making Guangdong the most active area in industrial production and economic trade in the process of China's modernization process, and thus also a part of value production in economic globalization. Parallel to the role of national power, local reterritorialization is also at play. In the reterritorialization competition with Hong Kong and Yunnan, Guangdong has formed an industrial division of labor in Pingzhou, Jieyang, Sihui, and Guangzhou. Together, they

form a processing industry production order that can be regarded as a "comprehensive supporting type", rather than a link in the jadeite global value chain. It is diverging greatly from the general industrial production division of labor, and the characteristics of the division of labor between them are not standardized, clear, nor single scale. Their division of labor is based on the principle of value maximization, and the classification of different dimensions is interlaced and superimposed, forming a natural aggregation of division of labor. The configuration of the processing industry presents the characteristics of complexity, heterogeneity, vagueness, and uneven division of labor in different regions. The characteristics of value production is high utilization of the specificities of jadeite material subject to continuous changes and complexities. Changes in the processing links and artistic styles of jadeite carving enhances its appeal while making the supporting industries more comprehensive and sophisticated.

We don't want to go back to our hometown, nor do we want to go to Ruili, Yunnan. It's not that there are no supporting industries there, it's mainly because the hospitals in Guangdong are in good condition and there are many good universities. I hope that my son will go to college in the future and then find a stable job with a higher social status. Don't be a jadeite carver, it's very hard.¹¹⁹

In 1978, the GDP of Guangdong Province was RMB 18.6 billion, in 1990 it was RMB 155.9 billion, in 2000 it was RMB 1,074.1 billion, and in 2010 it rose to RMB 4,601.3 billion. The multiple growth of GDP shows that Guangdong has accumulated a large amount of social wealth within a decade or two. On the one hand, this would play a positive role in promoting reinvestment in the luxury goods production and processing industry, and on the other hand, it can support the better development of other basic social sectors such as medical care and education. The positive effect of the two has retained talents, and such a virtuous circle has enabled the jadeite processing center to develop steadily in Guangdong.

4.3 The Sales Space Guangdong and the Reterritorialization of Jadeite Trade

In the new era of reterritorialization of the jadeite trade, when the term "opening up" becomes a window of opportunity to open the gate of the national space container, Yunnan's position is completely different from that of Guangdong's situation. Located deep in the southwestern frontier of China's inland, Yunnan borders Myanmar, Laos, and Vietnam, with a border line of more than 4,000 kilometers and more than ten ports. Unlike Guangdong province that started to develop during the first phase of the opening up policy, and thus becoming prosperous much earlier than other parts of China, Yunnan

¹¹⁹ Interview time: 08/2019; Interlocutor: XLX; Location: Jade Carving Industrial Park, Sihui City, Guangdong Province.

has faced a different reality. Yunnan does not belong to the first-tier cities or regions. However, as the province with the most abundant natural and cultural resources, Yunnan also has unique conditions for the development of tourism. Therefore, the state power has designated different functions to Yunnan, that is, the development of a consumption market driven by tourism. At the same time, after experiencing a short-lived renaissance of the jadeite processing industry, Yunnan's traditional jadeite processing center was replaced by Guangdong. Then, the local government launched a campaign encapsulated in the slogan "Jade Comes from Yunnan (玉出云南, Yu chu Yunnan)", underlining the provenance of the jadeite stone and culture.. In so doing it turned Yunnan into China's largest jadeite consumer market.

4.3.1 The Recovery of Yunnan Jadeite Industry and the Pre-Consumer Society

Historically, Tengchong in Yunnan was the most prosperous jadeite distribution center during the Qing Dynasty and the Republic of China. The ensuing protracted war and hostile geopolitical relations led to its decline, and the jadeite trade took a different route. This stage lasted until the re-emergence of the mutual market between the border people on the China-Myanmar border in the early days of reform and opening up in the 1980s. About 10 years later, the jadeite raw material trading market gradually recovered in Tengchong, and merchants from all over the world found their way to Tengchong to purchase goods from Hong Kong, followed by markets such as Yingjiang, Longchuan, and Ruili. However, due to the complicated political relationship between China and Myanmar, and the national borders involving national security issues, the opening of land border ports was slow due to delays. Coupled with the delay in the introduction of supporting population mobility management rules and preferential tax policies, as well as the lack of land transportation infrastructure, the development of Yunnan's jadeite industry had been greatly restricted.

When the jadeite processing industry in Tengchong was most developed, there was already a set of organically formed industrial division of labor. This division includes workshops specializing in ore cutting, in drilling holes, in making small pieces, in carving flower plaques, in making beads or smaller accessories, and treasure stores specializing in selling finished products, etc. There were more than 3,000 jadeite processors (Zou, 2005). The war hindered the jadeite industry, and until 1978, the jadeite processing industry developed to a certain extent in Hehua Town, Tengchong.

I am the fourth oldest (at home). ...Tengchong was the battleground, and all the jadeite carvers fled to other places. My father followed my grandma and left Tengchong to escape the war. Later, in 1951, when the handicrafts-men were sent the countryside, they came to Hehua, which was called Hehuachi at that time. The craftsmanship of Hehua

jadeite carving was taught by my father. ...Originally, the people here were just farming, raising pigs and chickens, they were very poor. My father thinks that if he teaches apprentices jadeite carving, everyone can increase their income. ...During the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976, jadeite carving was definitely prohibited. It was not until 1978, my father set up the first Hehuachi jadeite carving training group, and probably brought along more than 40 apprentices, most of whom were women. Later, the director of the commune (later restructured into an enterprise) asked him to conduct training courses in the name of the commune, and he brought along more than two hundred apprentices. ... Villagers who knew how to carve jadeite could do so during the slack season and farming during the busy season, so life was much easier.In the 1980s, when the rural joint production contract responsibility system was implemented, the enterprise office was disbanded, and the jadeite carvers all returned to Yusan Village and Xiaozhuang Village, and then trained their apprentices. The jadeites they carved were sold on the Gaizi (街子, local bazaar) of Tengchong, and the bazaar was once every five days. ...Later, Hehua Town became famous, and many people rented out their fields to do jadeite carving only. Basically, men carve jadeite, and women keep the shop and sell finished products.¹²⁰

From the personal life history of the respondent's father, it becomes apparent that the budding and initial development of the jadeite carving industry in Hehua Town was driven by individuals, choosing an adaptive livelihood in a special environment. The first is the strong destructive power from the outside, that is, the outbreak of the war, which pushed the jadeite carvers, the core actors in the processing industry in Tengchong, to nearby villages in search for peace and security. The second is the power of the state, which drove the handicrafts-men with a capitalist mindset to the margins of society. They took root in situ, enabling the jadeite processing industry to survive as a supplement to agricultural livelihoods. The third is also due to the changes in the power of the state, which had transformed the original jadeite processing industry system of a commune-run cooperative system into a more flexible family workshop system. The livelihood of the local people had also changed from agriculture, which was highly dependent on the land, to the jadeite processing industry with division of labor within the family.

From the 1980s to the 1990s, in addition to the jadeite processing industry in Tengchong Hehua Township, the border business activities in the "Outer Five Counties" of Dehong Prefecture in southwest Yunnan gradually became active, and jadeite was also among he traded items. "Outer Five Counties" is the common name of the local people for the five

¹²⁰ Interview time: 04/2018; Interlocutor: LSN; Location: Hehua Township, Tengchong, Baoshan City, Yunnan Province.

county-level places under the jurisdiction of Dehong Prefecture before the 1990s, including Ruili, Luxi, Longchuan, Yingjiang, and Lianghe. Among them, Luxi was renamed Mangshi in 2010 and became the capital of Dehong Prefecture. Only the east of these five places is adjacent to the jurisdiction of Baoshan City, which belongs to Tengchong. The rest of the west, south, and north are surrounded by Myanmar, and are mainly populated by many cross-border ethnic minorities. After Ne Win came to power in 1962, he leaned politically towards the Soviet Union and started the geopolitical and ideological confrontation between Myanmar and China that lasted for more than two decades. The Outer Five Counties of Dehong Prefecture had become border areas that are treated specially by the central authorities of the two countries. LBZ, interlocutor who used to be the educated youth¹²¹ in Ruili, recalled:

We are high school students of Laosanjie (老三届, Old tree) who went to the countryside in 1969. It took six days and nearly 1,000 kilometers to travel from Kunming to Ruili by truck. You can only go to Chuxiong on the first day, Xiaguan (Dali) on the second day, Yongping on the third day, Baoshan on the fourth day, Luxi (Mangshi) on the fifth day, and Ruili on the sixth day, ...too far away. At that time, there were winding mountain roads, and the roads were so narrow that only one car could pass. When meeting or overtaking, you had to wait for a slightly wider place, or one of the cars stopped by the side of the road, and the other moved carefully, and there was a cliff and deep valley next to it. The road surface is mostly gravel roads, and the asphalt road seems to be gone in Xiaguan (Dali) at most. It was built by the Americans at that time, and it was only in the 1980s that some new roads were gradually built.We would stand by the Ruili River every day after finishing work, shouting to the Myanmar side (on the other side of the river) "Down with the Ne Win reactionary government!", then knock off and went back to the village. The Dai people could hardly understand what we shouted, and we dare not go to Myanmar. Some had been caught and convicted of treason.Until the 1980s, there was no ID card at that time. To go to the five outer counties, you must first go to the Public Security Bureau in Kunming to apply for a border pass. If you went to Tengchong, you didn't need it. It was very troublesome to apply for this certificate, and you had to submit many relevant materials of your units. As soon as you crossed the Lancang River Bridge, there would be

¹²¹ The educated youth (知青/知识青年, Zhiqing/Zhishiqingnian) or known as the sent-down youth, rusticated youth, were the young people who willingly or under coercion left the urban districts of the People's Republic of China to live and work in rural areas as part of the "Up to the Mountains and Down to the Countryside Movement (上山下乡运动)" which began in the 1950s until the end of the Cultural Revolution.

*checkpoints for verification. Without a border pass, you would not be released at all.*¹²²

From this account of the interlocutor, it seems that the journey from the provincial capital Kunming to Dehong Prefecture in the 1970s and 1980s was very “distant, difficult, dangerous, and unfamiliar”. Second, the political confrontation and the hostile relations between the two countries could be strongly felt in this frontier area that is, although it belonged to China, the features were very different from the interior. True, it was safer than neighboring countries but far more dangerous than the interior. Third, China's national policy treated this place differently. The complexity of the formalities and procedures for going to the border had largely blocked the mobility from the inland this area, further strengthening the sense of tension in the border region. Therefore, the five counties in Dehong Prefecture had gained a regional reputation of belonging to the “outside” realm as opposed to “the safety, familiarity, and convenience” of the “inside” area. Notwithstanding, the Outer Five Counties constituted also the frontiers of border trade. After entering the 1980s, border trade gradually became active.

Until the end of the Cultural Revolution, we in Ruili didn't recognize jadeite at all, and we had never heard of it, let alone someone selling it.In the 1980s, the city gradually became more open, and started to sell refugee clothes¹²³, cosmetics, including small nail clippers, and small handicrafts on the border. There were also some nylon mosquito nets, five-star lighters, and flints. The small commodities to eat included condensed milk and red-skinned peanuts. If you went to the Outer Five Counties, you must bring some to your family. It would also be distributed to neighbors and friends when they were taken back to Kunming. Everyone thought that were too rare.There were also Shuangshi (双狮, Double Lion, a Japanese watch brand) watches, but if Shuangshi watches were discovered by the checkpoint, they would be counted as smuggling and sentenced to five or six years. These things were all from Japan, and Myanmar couldn't make them.Some jadeites were also on sale. To buy ores, you still had to go to a shanghao (商号, store). At that time, they were called baoshui shanghao (保税商号, bonded store), which means that you only need to pay tax if you sell it, and you don't have to pay if you can't sell it.There were people

¹²² Interview time: 02/ 2018; Interlocutor: LBZ; location: a teahouse in Jinkangyuan Community, Kunming City, Yunnan Province.

¹²³ Refugee clothes refer to unwanted old clothes that have been worn by people in developed countries and regions. Since the reform and opening up had just begun at that time, foreign clothing styles such as suits and coats were introduced to China. At the same time, China is short of materials and its productivity cannot keep up with demand, so places with open borders, including Yunnan and Guangdong, have been experiencing a fever for refugee services for a period of time. Later, after the country implemented measures to crack down on smuggling and boycott foreign garbage, refugee uniforms no longer appeared.

selling ore in Longchuan, Yingjiang, and Tengchong, but there were no finished products. There were a few bracelets in Ruili, which were sold on the same street as those who sold groceries on gaizitian (街子天, bazaar day), and some were sold in tin sheds, not many. Bracelets didn't look like Burmese craftsmanship, and Ruili didn't have a processing factory at that time. They were mainly courageous people from other provinces (who sell jadeite), and there were very few Gala, Dai, and Jingpo (ethnic). The finished products in Tengchong were sold by people from Hehua Town, which were different from the channels here.¹²⁴

It can be seen that the goods traded at the border in Dehong Prefecture were mainly daily necessities, and the jadeite trade had also restarted. In fact, in the 1980s, Myanmar was still closed to the country by the Burmese military government. The domestic trade market did not develop, but it promoted the prosperity of the border black market trade. The most representative example was the underground trade market in the Thailand-Myanmar border area that had been active since the military government came to power. There, the remaining members of the Kuomintang army and local ethnic minorities engaging in nepotism led a trade network that transported drugs and jadeite from Myanmar to Thailand, and then continuously transported consumer goods such as rice and daily necessities from Thailand to Myanmar. At the same time, black market trade also supplemented the living needs of Burmese people who were short of materials (Chang, 2014). The China-Myanmar border in northern Myanmar has always been out of the reach of the Burmese military government. At that time, the destitute Chinese people had a strong demand for the necessities of life. The slightest loosening of the border blockade directed buyers and sellers and goods from the two countries to the border and a mixed trade market surfaced offering both legal and smuggled goods. Jadeite despite being a non-necessary item of life appeared in the market almost at around the same time. In addition to the ores, judging from the respondent's reference to the finished jadeite bracelets these goods might have come from processing factories in Guangdong, Hong Kong, or Thailand. In any case, it showed that the cross-border trade of jadeite in Yunnan had resumed after being suspended for about 30 years.

Due to the gradual opening of border trade in Yunnan and the formation of the modern jadeite processing industry in Guangdong, in the 1980s, the Jingxing Street Flower and Bird Market, which was the traditional jewelry and antique market in Kunming, the capital of Yunnan Province, also began to recover. Bazaars began to develop in the area around Qianwang Street, Shenglitang, and Guanghua Street connected to Jingxing Street as early as the Yuan Dynasty. Shengli Hall used to be the office of Sayyid Ajjal Shams al-Din, the governor of Yunnan Province in the Yuan Dynasty. People from various counties who

¹²⁴ Interview time: 01/2019; Interlocutor: YDL; Location: Yunnan Geological and Mineral Exploration and Development Bureau.

came to the provincial Yamen (衙门, official office) to work in the provincial government settled nearby and waited to meet with the great officials, which formed a post station. All kinds of specialties brought by them can be traded here, forming a commercial bazaar with restaurants, inns, and shops. The earliest antique jewelry, calligraphy and paintings, flowers and birds, and snack streets in Kunming were here. It was even more lively during the Ming and Qing Dynasties, especially during the Qing Dynasty when a large number of jadeites were traded here. Tan Cui, a scholar in the twenty-sixth year of Qianlong (1761), served as the magistrate of Luquan County near Kunming. In his 1799 book “Yu Heng Zhi of the Dianhai Sea”, he described the jadeite market in Dian Province, which he saw was the view on Qianwang Street and Jingxing Street in Kunming.

Jade comes out of the Jinsha River in the south, Jiangxi (江昔) belongs to Tengyue, more than two thousand miles away from the state, and there are many jades in it. The barbarians dug them up and left them in piles on the banks of the river. The rough ores had thick shell, the size of which were like pebbles. They didn't know that there was jade in it, and they didn't know whether the quality of jade was good or bad, so traders bought it at will and shipped it to Dali and Yunnan Province, where jade workshops all over there. When you cut to open it, you could see jadeite, then you would get rich suddenly! There are also situations when the profit is poor but nonetheless it can be profitable. At the bottom, there are stones at the in- and outside, and this will result in a loss. These stones are wrapped in felt and mat, shipped from afar. If it is valuable, one need to put it in the secret room; if it is not valuable, throw it away off the fence or use it to block the door. However, people who care more often cut it and it turns into white stone, while people who don't care cut it and it turns into jadeite. Even a seasoned practitioner cannot anticipate the outcome in advance. This is why Bian He was crying. If you carve it into a vessel, it can be used for anything, but the form of ruyi should be the first to be considered, and it can be used as a tribute. (Tan, 1799)

By the end of the 1980s, besides Jingxing Street, a jewelry street gradually formed on Baita Road near the Yunnan Provincial Bureau of Geology and Mineral Resources. At that time, Chinese society was in the early stage of transition from a purely public-owned planned economy to a private-owned market economy. Various government departments also began to carry out reforms in enterprises and institutions, pushing production departments to the market, and encouraging employees to venture into business and contract enterprises. The employees of various field teams under the Yunnan Provincial Bureau of Geology and Mineral Resources who had been in contact with jewelry and jade had also begun to explore jewelry business.

On both sides of the gate of the Bureau of Geology and Mineral Resources on Baita Road, there were many jewelry stores with iron sheds. There were about fifty or sixty jewelry stores, and one shop had an area of 8 to 10 square meters. Most of them were related personnel of various field teams, who were engaged in minerals, not exploration, so they understood it very well. Part of the profits earned from operations must be returned to the unit.There were many people from Henan who delivered goods here. They went to Guangdong Pingzhou, Sihui Jieyang, and Tengchong to get goods and came here. They came to the store with bags on their backs and asked merchants if they wanted jadeite and delivered them to their door.Later, those who did this business could stay without pay, and almost all of them had come out.They all made money under the dual-track system¹²⁵. By the time the government reacts and formulates many regulations to restrict it, you have already made a lot of money.¹²⁶

Therefore, in the period of the Pre-Consumer society, the recovery and initial development of the jadeite industry in Yunnan was the result of state forces constantly adjusting and controlling the social and economic operation order within their own space container. Different participating groups adjust their economic participation methods in order to adapt to the environment and seek livelihood. They included jadeite carving cooperatives with strong local characteristics, a group of non-governmental businessmen who were sensitive to business opportunities in border trade, and employees of relevant departments who "do business" under the encouragement of privatization transformation and dual-track system, etc. At the middle level, they used their own controllable spatial forms to conduct territorial competition, formed the economic action mode of the group and the division of labor among groups, and jointly constructed the ecology of Yunnan jadeite trade at this stage.

4.3.2 Yunnan's Consumer Market: Tourism as the Engine

In the process of China's construction of a market economy system, Guangdong is the first echelon in the East that is responsible production, while Yunnan in the West is designated as a consumption area with tourism as the core driving force.

The Chinese central government has made long-term plans for national economic and social development since 1953. The plan is made every five years, and each plan applies

¹²⁵ The (price) dual-track system is a price transition mode from the planned economic system to the market economic system implemented in the early stage of reform and opening up in mainland China. Under this system, the same commodity has a fixed price within the state's planned economic indicators, and another price that can be freely adjusted according to the market supply and demand mechanism outside the planned economic indicators.

¹²⁶ Interview time: February 2018; Interlocutor: WZR; Location: Geology, Minerals and Jewelry Trade Center in Kunming, Yunnan Province.

for a five-year period, referred to as the "Five-Year Plan. In 2000, the Chinese central government launched the "Western Development" policy, which aimed to use the surplus economic development capacity in the eastern coastal areas to improve the economic and social development level of the western region, and to consolidate military and national defense. In the link between regional economic development and social activities, the construction of transportation infrastructure has been proven to play a significant role in boosting the flow of various production factors among regions, and its spatial spillover effect can effectively promote regional economic growth. Thus, the construction of transportation infrastructure in Yunnan has developed rapidly.

Yunnan's first expressway was opened to traffic in 1996. The highway is 45 kilometers long connecting Kunming to Songming. From 1978 to 2012, the mileage of highways in Yunnan increased by five times to 219,000 kilometers, and the mileage of water transport augmented by 3.35 times to 3,374 kilometers. During the 13th Five-Year Plan period (2016-2020), Yunnan added 5,000 kilometers of new expressways, which was 1.25 times that during the 12th Five-Year Plan period (2011-2015). The mileage of expressways reached 9,006 kilometers, and 16 cities and 110 counties were connected to expressways. In 1949, the railway mileage in Yunnan was only 650 kilometers, but it has reached to 4,233 kilometers in 2020, an increase of 6.5 times. Among them, the high-speed rail has reached 1105 kilometers from scratch. In 1949, the Yunnan Railway relied on meter gauges to transport about 1.7 million passengers throughout the year. In 2019, the number increased to 65 million, an increase of 38 times. By the end of 2020, Yunnan has opened a total of 666 passenger and freight routes, reaching 169 domestic and foreign cities, and has opened a total of 55 passenger and freight routes and 33 navigation cities in South Asia and Southeast Asia. It has basically achieved full coverage of capital routes in South Asia and Southeast Asia. (Kunming Daily, 2021)

These astonishing amounts of transportation infrastructure construction not only make up for the rugged plateau terrain and inaccessible road traffic, but also accelerate the mobility of people, things and information among regions. In 2000, the per capita consumption expenditure of urban residents in Yunnan Province was 5,185.31 RMB. In 2010, this figure was 11,074 RMB. In 2020, it has reached 24,569 RMB¹²⁷. Excluding factors such as inflation and price increases, the per capita consumption expenditure of urban residents more than quadrupled. This trend was common in the entire Chinese society in the last three decades of the 1990s, but the pace and dynamics varied in different places. When social products are abundant and per capita disposable income is expanding, the content of consumption will shift to non-necessities of life, that is, consumption of luxury goods and services, among which tourism.

¹²⁷ The data comes from the official data released by the China Statistical Information Network over the years in the "Yunnan Province National Economic and Social Development Statistical Bulletin".

Yunnan's regional capital in rich natural and cultural resources, has boosted tourism as the principal driver of local economic growth. Among the twenty-five ethnic minorities in Yunnan, fifteen are unique to Yunnan, making it the most diverse region in China both in terms of number and in characteristics. From the snow-capped mountains in the northwest to the river valleys in the southeast, the altitude difference is more than 6,000 meters, the topography and climate conditions are diverse, and therefore flora, fauna, and mineral resources abound. Therefore, Yunnan is one of the regions with the highest concentration of ecological diversity in the world. The beautiful scenery and abundant resources just provide the inherent conditions for the development of regional tourism. The Chinese government also makes full use of its advantages to actively promote the development of tourism in Yunnan. The most effective first step is the successful bid for the 1999 Kunming World Horticultural Exposition. From May 1st to October 31st, 1999, the World Horticultural Exposition was held in the capital city Kunming, Yunnan Province. This was the first professional world exposition held after China's reform and opening up, and it was also the first A1-level world horticultural exposition authorized by the International Association of Horticultural Producers (AIPH/IAHP) and the Bureau Internationale des Expositions (BIE)¹²⁸. At the same time, the Kunming World Expo was also a world-wide exhibition with the highest standard and the largest scale held in Kunming, Yunnan Province and even the southwest region.

During the Kunming World Expo, five foreign heads of state and government, 115 foreign missions and delegations from international organizations came to visit. 69 countries and 26 international organizations participated in the Expo. Among them, 84 countries and international organizations participated in indoor exhibitions, 35 countries and international organizations built 34 outdoor exhibition gardens, and 51 countries and international organizations held pavilion day activities. The Kunming World Expo lasted for 184 days, and the number of domestic and foreign visitors reached 9.5 million. (People's Daily Online, 1999)

The Kunming World Expo 99 is not only a window for China to open to the outside world, showing its friendly will to connect with the world, and letting the outside world understand China's specific developments, but also a key measure to promote the development of tourism in Yunnan in the spatial layout of building a market economic system. According to incomplete statistics, 23 million Chinese and foreign tourists visited Yunnan from January to July 1999, and Yunnan's tourism revenue was 11.5 billion yuan,

¹²⁸ The World Horticultural Exposition is divided into four categories: A1, A2, B1 and B2. Among them, the A1 World Horticultural Exposition is not only approved by AIPH, but also recognized by the Bureau Internationale des Expositions (BIE). It is the highest level and most influential horticultural exposition. The duration of the A1 World Horticultural Exhibition is 3-6 months, and it must cover all areas of the entire horticultural industry. In 1988, the "International Exhibition Convention" classified the A1-level World Horticultural Exposition as a professional World Expo.

an increase of nearly 50% over the previous year (CCTV, 1999). After the World Expo, Yunnan has become a "paradise for tourists, a capital of experience, and a paradise for leisure" in the eyes of tourists.

Following the guiding force at the national level, the Yunnan Provincial Tourism Bureau decomposed the specific facts and rules of the province's tourism development plan in the implementation of each subsequent Five-Year Plan. For example, during the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-2010), Yunnan Province formulated the province's 11th Five-Year Tourism Industry Development Plan and the "Yunnan Provincial Tourism Industry Development and Reform Planning Outline". The document put forward the slogan of "Second Entrepreneurship", further formulated and adopted more open policies, broadens the market mechanism, strengthens investment promotion, and actively strives for social, enterprise and private capital to invest in tourism project construction. Specifically, it planned to invest 50 billion yuan in the development and construction of more than 300 tourism projects, and so on. From 2005 to 2009, the number of domestic and foreign tourists received by the province increased from 70.11 million to 126 million, and the total tourism revenue increased from 43 billion yuan to 81 billion yuan. The added value of tourism accounted for 6.16% of the province's GDP and 16.7% of the added value of the province's tertiary industry, and 137,000 new jobs were created in the tourism industry (Yunnan Daily, 2010). Such policies and regulations take five years as a period to continuously stimulate the expansion of Yunnan's tourism market (see Figure 5). During the "12th Five-Year Plan" (2011-2015) period, Yunnan Province put into operation 638 tourist attractions, more than 3,000 accommodation facilities, and 424 star-rated travel agencies; It had five world heritage sites, six 5-A-level scenic spots, seventy six 4-A-level scenic spots, and three national tourist resorts, forming a number of well-known domestic and foreign tourist destinations such as Dali, Lijiang, Tengchong, and Shangri-La, and the popularity and influence of "Colorful Yunnan, Tourism Paradise" had been further enhanced; The added value of the tourism industry increased from 45 billion yuan in 2010 to 90.7 billion yuan in 2015, accounting for 6.6% of the province's GDP and 14.7% of the added value of the tertiary industry; Tourism directly employed 2,489,400 people, driving indirect employment to 4,490,800 people (Yunnan Provincial Tourism Development Committee, 2016). During the "Thirteenth Five-Year Plan" (2016-2020) period, the main governance goal was to rectify the market order, and to continue to expand the tourism market.

Driven by the joint promotion of national power deployment and local government implementation, Yunnan had become the most popular tourism consumption destination for Chinese travelers. At the end of the "Thirteenth Five-Year Plan", the total number of tourists in Yunnan was more than 15 times that of 2000. The Yunnan provincial government recently issued a slogan to attract tourists: "*There is only one scenic spot in Yunnan, and this scenic spot is called Yunnan!*". The influx of tourists from the eastern and central affluent areas had expanded, and the strong consumption power had indeed

effectively driven the local economic growth of Yunnan, and Yunnan had swiftly become a regional consumer society.

Obviously, Yunnan is a very representative place in western China in the construction of socialist market economy. It has transformed from a space intertwined with multi-ethnic traditional cultures, remote and closed, and with weak internal mobility into the most active tourist consumption area in China, first of all due to the power of the state. The central government relied on domestic reform and opening up to rapidly develop a market economy throughout the country. At the same time, it constructed a landscape characterized by the division of labor in regional economic activities based on national defense needs and local resource advantages that were different from those in the east. That is to say, the east is the production engine, and the west is the consumer market. The combination of the two forms a complete domestic economic cycle. The temporal and spatial positioning of Yunnan in the internal circulation is arranged as a consumer market with tourism as its pillar industry.

4.3.3 Reconstructing the Jadeite Culture: The Territorialization of the Yunnan Jadeite Consumer Market

In the face of Guangdong's territorial competition in the jadeite industry, Yunnan has lost the opportunity and advantage to restore the jadeite processing industry in terms of the national reterritorialization strategy, but it can take advantage of its advantages in the jadeite consumer market.

According to the external manifestations, luxury goods can be divided into physical luxury goods and service luxury goods. Tourism consumption includes both the consumption and the purchase of tourism-related services and products. Traveling to Yunnan and purchasing jadeite on the side can meet the consumption needs of two dimensions at the same time. At the same time, shopping is the largest consumption expenditure for tourists besides food and accommodation. In order to induce tourists to spend more on purchasing tourism-related products, merchants have designed many models. The most representative tourism shopping (jadeite) mode in Yunnan is that drivers and tour guides cooperate with merchants to bring tourist groups to special tourist shopping stores to buy jadeite. Then, merchants give drivers and guides commissions based on the number of people entering the store and the specific consumption amount spent.

Kunming's tourism shopping model is not the earliest in the country, and Guilin in Guangxi is even earlier. About 95 years before the World Expo, on the halfway from Tangchi to Yiliang on the old Shi'an Highway (Shilin to Anning), there were four or five tourist shops opened by Guangxi people in the old valley. The one I remember most was Guorui.He

(the boss) sold them fakes, using Malay jade (马来玉)¹²⁹ ring faces as jadeites, the jades worth only 10 yuan but he sold for 3,000 yuan. In those days, 3,000 yuan was a lot, as the monthly salary of an employee was only 1,000 yuan. Later, this shop was exposed by CCTV, and the (Yunnan) Provincial Technical Supervision Bureau came to seal the store, fined it 200,000 RMB, and the owner disappeared from the jewelry industry¹³⁰.

By the time of the World Expo in 1999, Kunming's jadeite market had suddenly expanded. The tin shed jewelry store on Baita Road was shut down due to the city's beautification movement, and they were all relocated to form a market near Nanyao Railway Station. After reorganization for the World Expo, Kunming has formed three jadeite retail markets: Jingxing Street, Baita Road, and Nanyao Railway Station. In 2000s, many large-scale markets such as Bailong Road Flower and Bird Jewelry Market, Xiaolong Sifang Street Jewelry Market, and Yunfang Southeast Asia Mall were built. The area around Cuihu Lake in the city center became area of high-end jadeite shops. From about 2010 to 2018, the most prosperous period, the city's jadeite market had a total of more than 36,000 retailers and more than 100,000 employees¹³¹. Simultaneously with the vigorous development of self-employed households was the prosperity of tourist shopping stores. In the year of the World Expo, Colorful Yunnan (七彩云南, Qikai Yunnan) opened the road from the old Kunming to the Stone Forest Scenic Area, and its main business was jadeite, silverware and other tourist commodities. There were four or five jadeite tourist shopping stores such as Fudi Jewelry, Cuixi Jewelry and Bihui Jewelry on Bailong Road, which was next to the main entrance of the Expo site. Each store measured about 1,000 square meters and was dedicated to receiving tourist groups visiting the Expo. However, the jadeite tourist store which made the tourism shopping model exploded was in Dali. It is exactly the tourist store that I mentioned at the beginning of this dissertation, where I personally experienced the frenzy of tourists rushing to buy jadeites.

¹²⁹ Malay Jade (马来玉), also known as Malaysia Jade (马来西亚玉), Malay Cui (马来翠), Luzon Jade (吕宋玉), Nanyang Jade (南洋玉), etc., is an imitation of high-grade jadeite due to its bright color and high transparency. Malay jade is actually a kind of artificially dyed quartzite (or glass) variety, which is not produced in Malaysia, but was brought to the China-Myanmar border for sale by Indian-Pakistani merchants from Myanmar (locals in Yunnan call them Gala).

¹³⁰ Interview time: 07/2019; Interlocutor: YDL; Location: Kunming Convention and Exhibition Center, Yunnan Province.

¹³¹ Facing the international financial crisis in 2008, China's economic growth rate dropped rapidly, exports showed negative growth, and a large number of migrant workers returned to their hometowns. The economy faced the risk of a hard landing. In order to cope with this crisis, the Chinese government launched ten measures in November 2008 to further expand domestic demand and promote steady and rapid economic growth. Preliminary calculations show that the implementation of these ten measures will require an investment of about 4 trillion yuan by the end of 2010, referred to as the "Four Trillion Plan". Soon afterwards, part of the 4 trillion yuan quickly entered the Chinese market through SME loans, and the jadeite market also reflected obvious explosive growth at this time.

...Our company started in 2000 as a jadeite tourism shopping mall. The old store was in Zuoyi (a village next to the road near Dali), and later moved to Butterfly Spring (a famous scenic spot near Dali Ancient City). In 2006, the store has expanded to 10,000 square meters, and it was built on the halfway from Dali to Heqing (a county on the way from Dali to Lijiang), called Tai'an. After 2009, the annual total turnover has exceeded RMB 300 million. ...In 2008, another 12,000-square-meter (tourist shopping) shopping mall was opened in Lijiang, called Lijiang Yunnan-Myanmar Jade City. At the beginning, the business there was not as good as that of the Dali store. After the opening of the Dali (Dali to Lijiang) expressway, it still had a turnover of 200 to 300 million yuan a year. We must be the largest in the country. Around 2011, the Dali store was closed, and the two stores on the same road would definitely compete for business, so only the Lijiang store remained. But at the same time, there were three other similar tourist shopping stores. Although the scale was not as big as ours, they still diverted a lot of customers.¹³²

Judging from this interlocutor's description and my fieldwork experience, the scale of this tourist shopping mall was more than ten times that of a single store in Kunming. So, why was the World Expo located in Kunming, but the explosion point of the tourist shopping store model was in Dali? This is related to the efforts of jadeite entrepreneurs reconstructing jadeite culture exploiting the historical provenance of jadeite and the specific cultures of local ethnic minorities. This interlocutor also told me:

...The situation of Dali (the history of jadeite trade) has long been recorded by Tan Cui, and the situation of Lijiang is inferred by my research. ...Before preparing the guide words, I went to the local library to check historical materials, and then went to Sanyue Street in Dali and Sifang Street in Lijiang to see if there were any women wearing jadeite bracelets and collect what you call field materials. There were also some Bai and Naxi employees in the company, so I asked them if they have the custom of wearing jadeite. ...In such a small place as Lijiang, there are 15 places named after jade, including Jade Dragon Snow Mountain. ...There is a waterwheel at the entrance of Sifang Street in the ancient city of Lijiang, and there are three Naxi female wearing bracelets on the red sandstone wall sculpture next to it. Lijiang does not produce jade locally, but Lijiang people like to wear jade bracelets, why? In front of Sifang Street is Jade River Square, where a word 'Yu (玉, jade)' was carved on a huge stone. The difference is that

¹³² Interview time: 04/2018; Interlocutor: YDL; Location: Jingxing Jewelry Flower and Bird Market, Kunming City, Yunnan Province.

the dot is not in the lower right corner, but in the upper right corner. I heard the guide next to me say "that's a typo"! Oh, she doesn't understand at all! Random explanation!.....I wanted to find Li Qunjie, a Naxi calligrapher who wrote this character. He knew both Naxi and Dongba scripts and Chinese characters, but he passed away, so I had to explain it myself. Yu (玉, jade) is the word Wang (王, king) plus a dot. The top of the three horizontal lines represents heaven, the bottom represents land, and the middle represents people. The king is in the middle who ordered by the sky and manages people and land. In Chinese characters, the Chinese believe that jade is produced from the earth, so the dot is on the ground. Naxi calligraphers who were proficient in two kinds of hieroglyphs believed that the spirituality of jade is the representation of heaven and gods, and it is produced from the earth, but it is ultimately enjoyed by people, so it should be dotted on people. Of course, I checked the information later and found that Chinese characters also have this way of writing. The hieroglyphs of the Naxi people in Lijiang have a character for jade, which is three circles staggered and stacked in one place, with a horizontal string in the middle. This character was later used in Lijiang's jadeite identification certificate.I saw a lot of photos of caravans taken by Rock¹³³ in the small bar in Lijiang, telling the stories of the three major caravans in Heqing, Dali and Tengchong in western Yunnan. I was very interested. The materials they transported included jadeite. In order to set up a cultural atmosphere in the shopping mall, I also went to inquire about the stores that sell the real objects of Maguotou (马锅头, the leader of the caravan), and bought a lot of saddles, scales, and horse packs.I found that the forefathers of the ethnic minorities along the route of the caravan also like jade, so it shows that jade culture was spread along the way by transporting jadeite. Moreover, Dali and Lijiang are both on the "Tea Horse Ancient Road", which is a very important site for the transmission of jadeite. No one has studied this before. I am the first one!¹³⁴

We can find that before rewriting the narrative of jadeite culture, the key respondent made an extremely detailed and comprehensive field investigation and data collection on

¹³³ Joseph Francis Charles Rock (1884–1962), Austrian-American explorer, botanist, geographer, linguist, and ethnologist. From 1922 to 1949, he traveled to Northwest Yunnan, East Tibet, Southwest Xichuan, Gansu, Qinghai Lake, and other regions to explore and collect plant specimens and conducted in-depth research on the Naxi people in Lijiang. In 1933, James Hilton created the adventure novel "Lost Horizon" based on a series of articles and photos he visited in Northwest Yunnan from 1924 to 1935 and published in "National Geographic Magazine". The book spread the concept of Shangri-La to the whole world, so Lijiang's cultural tourism development is full of related memory symbols.

¹³⁴ Interview time: 04/2018; Interlocutor: YDL; Location: Jingxing Jewelry Flower and Bird Market, Kunming City, Yunnan Province.

the relationship between local ethnic culture and jadeite trade. The two characters as discussed in the statement of the interlocutor are written in this way:



Image 13: Characters of jade in Lijiang.

The left character is written by the Naxi calligrapher Li Qunjie. The right character is written in Dongba language of Naxi people.

Source: The author draws based on the fieldwork data in Lijiang.

Although his purpose was not to do academic research, but to promote his merchandise, he nonetheless went to the site to find first-hand materials for the reconstruction of the jadeite culture.

At the same time, unlike systematic academic research, he had added subjective inferences and personal wisdom to the textual research and interpretation of some cultural and historical facts, and the interpretation of commercial goals had replaced the interpretation of the intrinsic nature of cultural phenomena. Therefore, the discourses related to jadeite have been connected with narrative themes replete with cultural imagination, such as Tengchong, the hometown of overseas Chinese, the ancient tea-horse road, the Southern Silk Road, Dali in Nanzhao, Dongba in Lijiang, and war-torn Burma, gradually reproduce the samples of jadeite culture propaganda.

When I came back, I sorted out the materials, wrote them into explanatory notes, and made up some jingles. The company offered free training courses to train tour guides and drivers, and taught them to recite proficiently, so that they can directly use them with tourists! If you can't say anything, how can tourists buy it? Later, I also specially produced two CDs called "Feicui Shenyun (翡翠神韵, Jadeite Charm)", which contain all the promotional content about Dali Lijiang and jadeite culture. The cameraman and the narration were the best professionals from Yunnan Radio Station. I also provided many videos of the mines in Myanmar, which used to be made into video tapes by video recorders,

*and then converted into DVDs and edited into them. The CDs were provided free of charge to all tour guides and drivers, and they could play it to tourists in a loop on the tour bus. The CDs were also copied into pirated CDs by some bad guys and sold at the gates of tourist attractions for 10 yuan a disc, and even tourists would buy them.*¹³⁵

In the next stage of the narrative building, the reconstructed cultural samples were concretized into a series of discourse systems that can be disseminated, including language symbols and physical symbols such as posters and CDs supporting a certain discourse, then through special training, language symbols were disseminated to drivers and tour guides at key marketing nodes. When the tourists embark on the tourist bus, the driver and guide would vividly tell stories about this mysterious, rare, and beautiful jade during the long-distance drive. Through consistent storytelling and recurrent presentation of physical symbols, the origin myth of "Jade comes from Yunnan" that had been passed down orally since the Ming and Qing Dynasties has been consistently and recurrently recycled and disseminated. As a result, this narrative has entered and shaped the imagination of tourists towards jadeite culture as highly appealing and desirable. Needless to conclude that this has whet the appetite for jade acquisition. Coupled with the recommendation and explanation of specific finished products by the shopping guides in tourist shopping malls, and the herd mentality brought about by rushing to the group, impulsive and comparison consumption hinted and infected each other among consumers a shocking consumption scene has emerged as described in the chapter.

The success of this enterprise model had found many followers in Kunming, and henceforth several large tourist shopping malls had been opened in Kunming. Cuixi near the World Expo was moved to the Kunming Convention and Exhibition Center around 2008, and the shopping mall was expanded by 10 times. Yunyu Jewelry was newly opened in the Expo, completely occupying one of the exhibition halls. In addition, there were several stores opened around Xishuangbanna in southern Yunnan. The discursive promotion of jadeite consumption along the entire province's tourist routes became ubiquitous with mutually strengthening effects. Jadeite has become the most distinctive tourism-driven product in Yunnan, and tourists in search of jadeite are all diverted to Yunnan. Before the vigorous rejuvenation of the tourism market in Yunnan Province in 2017, almost all medium-sized and above-sized tourist shopping stores on major tourist routes sold finished jadeite products, and some almost only sold jadeite, and other tourist commodities were mostly embellishments. In the 28 years since 1999, it is roughly estimated that more than 10 million tourists visit the store every year to buy jadeite. Undoubtedly, the tourist shopping malls in Yunnan have played a decisive role in promoting jadeite culture, and Yunnan has also formed the largest jadeite consumption market in China.

¹³⁵ Interview time: 04/2018; Interlocutor: YDL; Location: Jingxing Jewelry Flower and Bird Market, Kunming City, Yunnan Province.

At the same time the expansion of large tourist shopping malls, the development of the entire jadeite consumption market in Yunnan has driven the development of Tengchong and Ruili, the original processing and wholesale distribution centers. By the end of 2007, Tengchong Hehua Town had more than 550 self-employed jadeite carving households, more than 900 employees, and realized an output value of over 100 million yuan. With an investment of more than 5 million yuan, the jadeite carving processing based in Yusan Village, Hehua Town, with 120 shops, opened on July 12, 2008. In 2012, with an investment of more than 50 million yuan, covering an area of 53 acres, the community-style Hehua Town jadeite carving processing based with 286 sets of commercial and residential antique buildings was officially inaugurated. Around 2015, there were nearly 300 jadeite carving workshops in the county, with more than 20,000 employees, and almost every household was carving jadeite (Wang, 2015).

As long as you walked on the old jewelry street, Gala would come up and ask if you want to buy jadeite ring faces. If you showed some interest (indicating that you wanted to see the goods), they would swarm up to show them. You must buy it as long as you bargain, otherwise they will keep pestering you. The local wholesalers were mainly Baoshan people, a few Fujian people, and some people from other provinces. If you bargained with them and didn't buy it, you would not be allowed to leave, or you had to buy firecrackers to set them off. If you make someone pocai (破财, lose money), you have to blow up the firecrackers to make him get rid of bad luck. Neither the asking price nor the counter-offering is spoken, and the deal is concluded by touching the hand in the pocket of their clothes. At that time, only Gala could cheat, and neither could anyone else.¹³⁶

From the interlocutor's account, it is clear that in the few years after the World Expo, the jadeite market in Ruili City had been completely separated from the department store market in the past, and the jadeite market in the old jewelry street has emerged. The merchants in the market were mainly from Yunnan, although there were also merchants from Fujian and other provinces who had migrated here. And the Galas, Muslims from Myanmar with Indian and Pakistani faces, walked up and down the street lined with jewelry shops, randomly selling half-real and half-fake jadeite ring faces¹³⁷. After 2005, the jadeite wholesale market at Jiegao Port began to develop. Around 2008, the retail market near the gate of the country also gained traction with the expansion of tourism projects such as cross-border sightseeing, cross-border one-day tours, and one country and two villages. They were completely separated from the market in Ruili City, forming their own emerging jadeite sales market with specific spatial characteristics.

¹³⁶ Interview time: 12/2019; Interlocutor: ZH; Location: Delong Jewelry City, Ruili City, Dehong Prefecture, Yunnan Province.

¹³⁷ Real refers to natural jadeite, and fake mainly refers to Malay jade.

On the whole, Yunnan has become the most important sales and consumption area of jadeite, rather than a processing area, which stems from the construction of jadeite consumption culture in this area. Just as Baudrillard (2014) criticizes merchants in the consumer society for always being able to direct consumers to the path of impulse shopping, large tourist shopping stores have a very strict, effective, and perfect operating order for this process. Large-scale tourist shopping stores first construct the imagination of jadeite culture and turn imagination into purchasing motivation. Next, they provide a field where purchasing actions can be put into practice. Then they spread the imagined and purchased products to all parts of the country through tourists, thereby achieving a wider publicity effect. Once consumers enter the Internet, they will be deeply involved in the vortex of hypnosis. It is difficult to break free, and even forget the original intention of consumption. Around the frenzied consumer center, according to their own prerequisites and innate resources as the method of reterritorialization, Kunming, Tengchong, Ruili and other places became prosperous, each with its own characteristics.

To sum up, the reterritorialization of the jadeite market in Yunnan is a multi-scale and multi-dimensional composite system. In the transformation of the social order from planned economy to market economy led by state forces, Yunnan's rich tourism resources were used to re-territorialize it as a tourist consumption market that matches the industrial production in the eastern coastal areas. Regional Yunnan at the provincial level implements and adapts to the discipline and empowerment of state power. On the one hand, it actively attracts a large number of tourists, and on the other hand, it develops road facilities to increase the flow rate of people, goods, information, funds, etc. within and between regions, so as to promote the formation of a consumer society. Yunnan is colliding with national power in the re-territorial competition with Guangdong's jadeite industry, and the successful sales model of jadeite tourist shopping malls has promoted the prosperity of jadeite consumption. The large-scale consumption practice of tourists has formed a characteristic tourism consumption area and formed the largest jadeite tourism consumption market in China.

In a nation-state with a high level of centralized policy, its economic structure and macroeconomic practice order of production, exchange, distribution, and consumption can be reconfigured by nation power through spatial production within its borders. The central power supported the opening of the eastern coastal areas with ports earlier than the western inland ports, and mobilized funds and policies to give strong support, restoring the prosperity of the domestic jadeite processing trade market. Yunnan has been trying to restore the jadeite processing industry, but the supporting facilities such as education, medical care and detailed market division of labor are far from the level of Guangdong. Even with the deepening of border opening and cheap labor and raw materials from Myanmar, it is difficult to secure the skilled labor force engaged in jadeite cutting and carving, and the recovery of the centrality of traditional jadeite processing and distribution centers has fallen into a bottleneck. However, Yunnan actively responds

to the trend of the central government's western development policy, uses historical and cultural accumulation to construct a discourse system of "jade from Yunnan", builds local jadeite consumption space, and realizes the reterritorialization of jadeite sales. The separation of processing and sales spaces is the result of state power allocation and re-territorial competition between Yunnan and Guangdong provinces. The separation of processing and sales spaces is the result of state power allocation and competition between Yunnan and Guangdong provinces. The mutual cooperation of the two will rotate the phenomenon of China's jadeite consumption under the depth of a sufficiently broad national economic strategy and become the reterritorialization of the initial jadeite trade activities. The value content of jadeite has been fully explored, produced, endowed, and realized, and it has changed from a rare precious plaything to a mass cultural consumer product, so the output, sales volume, and price have all increased significantly.

However, capital has its limitation. Due to the over-expansion of the jadeite tourist shopping mall, a series of vicious circles had been caused. As homogeneous competition intensifies, in order to compete for tourist resources, various tourist shopping malls promised drivers and guides excessive commissions, which directly led to commodity prices skyrocket high. After calming down, tourists often found that a 10,000-yuan bracelet was just a stone without beauty from the perspective of intuitive aesthetic judgment, and the feeling of being deceived offset the frantic impulse to buy it. In order to recruit more tourists in a group, the driver guide would zero or negative group fees. Many tourists, greedy for petty gains took the offer. Once there although they were not only forced to enter the store, but they may also be insulted by the driver and tour guide if they did not buy. This situation undermines the fundamental purpose of tourism, namely touring and shopping for leisure and relaxation. The consumption of jadeite had also been separated from its cultural consumption attributes, as jadeite had become a scapegoat for limitless greed and unlawful profit-making. In 2017, the Yunnan provincial government carried out a major rectification of the tourism market, banned zero or negative group fees, controlled the infinitely high prices of jadeite tourism commodities, and brought the tourism market back to a benign track with real "service" content. Subsequently, all large tourist shopping malls were closed. Since then, the jadeite consumer market in Yunnan was about to enter the next stage of reterritorialization.

Chapter 5 **Digital Technology and Reconstruction of Jadeite Trade Order**

In this chapter, I discuss the deterritorialization and reterritorialization of the existing jadeite trade pattern by e-commerce based on the construction of digital infrastructure. Jadeite e-commerce trade represented by live streaming empowers participants through technology and changes the traditional transaction model. It crosses national boundaries, virtual space and physical space boundaries, reconstructs the trade order of original participants, which determines the access to the territory or the lack thereof for participants, making competition of territorialization even more intense. The value content of jadeite has changed from the value based on the object itself and the value of reproduction to the value of social relationships, emotional dependence and other dimensions that are external to the object. The value reconstructed by the territorialization of power changes from an increase in the quantity of content to a transformation in the nature of the content.

5.1 China's Digital Infrastructure Construction Restructures Jadeite Trade Order

In China, nation power has promoted connections in physical space such as roads, bridges, and transportation vehicles, and accelerated the construction of material infrastructure for the flow of people, goods, and information, reconstructing China's economic order and the Chinese people's way of life. Similarly, the "information highway" that the central government began to build across the country in the mid-1990s was a new brand revolution in the state-owned communications industry. It promoted the research, development and popularization of mobile terminals in the physical space, setup base stations, and covered large areas with optical fiber. It provided policy support, rules, regulations, and supervision for the development of digital platforms in the virtual space. When the development of digital infrastructure affected the field of jadeite trade, the traditional trade pattern became gradually platformed. New participants in the jadeite trade were empowered by technology. After several rounds of deterritorialization and reterritorialization between virtual space and real space, the jadeite trade order has been reconstructed into an e-commerce model based on live streaming. Currently this new mode of economic action and labor aggregation, newly de-embedded from the traditional trade order, not only spans physical and virtual spaces, but also crosses territorial boundaries, shaping the China-Myanmar jadeite trade into a more complex mix of multi-scale and multi-dimensional structure.

5.1.1 Reterritorialization of State Power: China's Digital Infrastructure Construction and Digital Platform

Before proceeding further, we need to clarify the concept of infrastructure. The concept of infrastructure is widely used in economic, political, and personal research, which also provides different paths and methods for understanding infrastructure. More widely accepted is the definition from an economic perspective proposed by Jochimsen in 1966:

The sum total of physical, institutional, and personal facilities and data available to economic agents that, with an appropriate allocation of resources, contributes to the equalization of remuneration for comparable inputs, i.e., full integration and maximum economic activity. Includes 1. The sum of all profitable assets, equipment, and working capital in an economy serving energy supply, transportation services, and telecommunications; we must increase 2. Structures etc. to protect the widest range of natural resources and transportation routes. 3. Buildings and facilities for public administration, education, research, healthcare, and social welfare. (Jochimsen, 1966)

Torrise and Gianpiero (2009) also define infrastructure in an economic sense:

1. is a capital good (provided in large units), which means that it originates from investment expenditure and is characterized by long duration, technological indivisibility and high capital-output ratio; 2. Infrastructure is also a public (sometimes a merit) good, not necessarily in the sense that it is owned by the public sector, but in the appropriate economic sense, that is, it satisfies the criteria that economic agents exhibit real (in the case of merit goods) or opportunistic (in the case of public goods) "false" preferences that are non-excludable and non-rivalrous in consumption.

According to their interpretation and the induction of previous studies, infrastructure can be divided into binaries such as economic and social (Hanson, 1965), core and non-core (Aschauer, 1989), basic (main) and supplementary (Sturm, Jacobs, et al., 1995), material and non-material (Mazziotta, 1998), network-like and core-like (Biehl, 1991), and many other ways to classify.

Hansen (1965)	Aschauer (1989)	Sturm, Jacobs et al. (1995)	Di Palma, Mazziotta et al. (1998)	Biehl (1991)
Economic	Core	Basic (main)	Material	Network
Roads highways airports naval transport sewer networks aqueducts networks for water distribution gas networks electricity networks irrigation plant structures dedicated to commodities transfer	roads highways airports public transport electricity networks gas networks network for water distribution sewer networks	(main) railways (main) roads Canals harbours and docks electromagnetic telegraph drainage Dikes land reclamation	transport network water-system energy network	roads railroads “water highways” networks of communication systems for energy and water provisioning
Social	Not-core	Complementary	Immaterial	Nucleus
Schools structures for public safety council flat plant of waste disposal Hospitals sport structures green areas	residual component	light railways tramways gas networks electricity network water supply local telephone network	structures dedicated to development, innovation and education	schools hospitals museums

Table 1: Classification of infrastructure.

Source: Torrisi, Gianpiero (2009). *Public infrastructure: definition, classification, and measurement issues*.

The classification of infrastructure by early scholars allows us to understand the scale, ubiquity, and temporality of infrastructure. With the development of media technology and the widespread increase in access to the Internet by countries and individuals, media and communication technology have also become a category of infrastructure. The development of media infrastructure has become comparable to that of roads, electricity,

gas and other projects. On the other hand, infrastructure has become a key concept in current media and communication studies, which mainly discusses the social, material, cultural and political dimensions of infrastructure that support and sustain communication networks and media cultures around the world (Mattern, 2016; Parks and Starosielski, 2015; Peters, 2015; Plantin, 2018). Insights into media from an infrastructure perspective can help us understand how power relations between stakeholders and users shape how communication networks are imagined, established, and mobilized to achieve different purposes (Plantin and Punathambekar, 2019).

Digital infrastructure is a type of infrastructure that only emerged after the rise of the Internet. It brings together and interconnects physical and virtual technologies such as computing, storage, network, application and cloud computing, including IaaS (Infrastructure as a Service), PaaS (Platform as a Service), and SaaS (Software as a Service) platforms. It has features such as participation, programmability and modularity. Digital technologies enable "*Platforms can exist at many different levels - platforms can exist on platforms built on top of platforms*" (Stevens, 2019). Classified from the services provided, platforms that constitute digital infrastructure include service platforms with physical entities in physical space, digital service platforms in virtual space, and composite service platforms that provide both online and offline services. Each platform has a set of rules and order, which can form a set of elements, including platform owners, service providers, users, as well as platform functions and rules. Modularization enables platforms that provide different functional services to be interconnected, forming a multi-level relationship of parallel, affiliation, superposition, expansion, supplementation and support. Therefore, the platform as a whole has formed a situation where centralization and decentralization coexist. In addition, the extended nature of the platform prevents it from existing alone, so when rule orders come into contact or collide, a new rule order will be formed through friction and negotiation. The elements of a platform constitute the ecosystem of the platform (Kretschmer, 2020), and the larger ecosystem formed by multiple platforms is the digital infrastructure system. More importantly, because platforms have been deeply intertwined with people's economic interactions and social lives, these rules and orders will reconstruct people's social relationships, living habits, ways of thinking, consumption concepts, etc. in real and virtual spaces. Therefore, around the world, digital platforms with huge scale and influence have become increasingly indispensable in users' everyday lives, thus constituting user-level social and material infrastructure.

China's digital infrastructure is constructed by the intertwining and territorialization of the government and platform companies. This is different from the platform evolution process in which well-known Internet companies such as Facebook or YouTube first provide online services and then connect to the economic and social fields and gradually become digital infrastructure. Although the authorities actively reformed China from a planned economy to a market economy after the 1980s, the construction and operation

of infrastructure are still dominated by state-owned enterprises and public institutions affiliated with government departments. In terms of media infrastructure, traditional mass media such as television, radio, newspapers, and magazines are state-owned, and the media system is centralized. This situation lasted until the market-oriented media restructuring in the 1990s, when state-owned and private media appeared in parallel in China, supplemented by a certain degree of censorship. The same is true in the field of civil communications. China's three major communications companies, China Mobile, China Telecom and China Unicom, are all state-owned enterprises. Before the advent of the Internet era, almost all residents using mobile phones to make calls and send text messages had to go through the signal networks of these three communication companies.

When digital technology is having an impact around the world, the authorities actively promote China's interconnection with the world. On the one hand, the Chinese government has begun to digitally reform government agencies. In the 1990s, the Chinese government began to introduce information technology and network technology into the political governance system and gradually built an "e-government system", which mainly consisted of twelve "Golden Projects." The twelve projects are Golden Shield (or Golden Shield) (national public security work information project), Golden Customs (customs taxation operation), Golden Tax (taxation), Golden Macro (macroeconomic management), Golden Financial Supervision, Golden Audit, Gold securities, Golden Agriculture (agricultural information), Goldden Quality (quality supervision information), Golden Water (water conservancy information), Golden Credit, and Golden Discipline projects. Although the purpose of the "Golden Project" as infrastructure construction was to provide basis and technical support for government decision-making, its actual impact at the time seemed to be limited to the digitization of government affairs offices within government agencies.

At the same time, the government continues to increase investment in physical digital infrastructure. In 2000, the Chinese government embarked on a national informatization strategy to build an "Information Superhighway" that included Golden Projects" and articulated through several "five-year plans" that invested heavily in telecommunications infrastructure (Tse, 2015). The country's information technology industry quickly promoted the rapid development of two types of physical elements, one is smart mobile terminals, including laptops and smartphones, and the other is the basic equipment for Unicom signals, including domestic base stations, cables, and submarine optical cables that cross national boundaries, etc. By the 2010s, 4G mobile Internet had become popular in China, and the smartphone penetration rate rose from 46.9% in 2013 to 59.9% in 2019 (Newzoo, 2020). According to data released by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of China, as of June 2022, China has built more than 1.6 million 5G base stations, accounting for more than 60% of the world's total, and 5G mobile phone users reached 410 million.

On the other hand, the Chinese government has begun to actively promote the development of China's Internet platforms. Also, around the critical year 2000, some Internet companies that started as portals appeared in China, including Sina, Tencent, NetEase, and Alibaba. Following the example of emerging Internet companies far away in Silicon Valley, they continued to develop functional services such as instant messaging, blogging, video, games, and e-commerce that are closer to the habits and needs of Chinese netizens, and gradually grow into a largest platform group in the current Chinese virtual world. For example, Tencent was the first to focus on instant messaging (QQ), providing users with a platform for personal display and social interaction (Qzone provides services such as blogs, photos, music, games, and making friends), and at the same time providing news and information services on portal websites. Subsequently, Tencent launched the WeChat project, creating a social media platform that is more suitable for Chinese people's social habits. On this basis, it added extended functional modules covering all aspects of daily life, gradually becoming a digital infrastructure. In 2017, WeChat opened the "WeChat Mini Program" interface so that applications from other service providers can access it. WeChat has thus become a giant public service platform with a multi-dimensional ecosystem. Alibaba started with an e-commerce website and expanded its Alipay project to provide services such as mobile payment, finance, and social networking. It also built a platform that fully cooperates with offline warehousing and logistics and established a series of standards and rules for China's online consumer market. Together with Baidu, which provides search engine services, the two companies are called China's Internet triumvirate BAT (Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent), similar to Google, Amazon, Facebook, the global Internet platform leader. Around 2015, after streaming media Internet companies providing video services such as Tudou, Youku, and iQiyi had cultivated video users for many years, Internet companies specializing in video social services such as Kuaishou and Douyin emerged. Among them, ByteDance, which owns the Douyin app, took the lead in introducing big data algorithm technology to collect user data for user profiling, and then push users their preferred classification information according to the results of big data analysis, which has become an Internet company that can compete fiercely with Tencent and Baidu¹³⁸. Platforms such as Douyin and Kuaishou based on streaming media technology have become new battlefields for e-commerce companies, that is, live streaming e-commerce has begun to prosper. Accompanied by the development of the platform, according to data released by the World Bank, Chinese netizens accounted for 1.8% of the Chinese population in 2000, rose to 34.3% in 2010, and reached 70.6% in 2020. In other words, the services provided by the platform penetrate more than 2/3d of the population. If children and the elderly who cannot actively access the Internet and directly use platform services are excluded, the proportion of Chinese netizens may exceed 4/5.

¹³⁸ Baidu, Tencent, and ByteDance's main source of income is advertising, while Alibaba's income is mainly from e-commerce platform commissions, so ByteDance will not be compared with Alibaba for the time being.

Of course, national power is by no means just a big ship carrying a heavy load. It only plays the role of building infrastructure and providing services for platforms and users. Instead, state power determines the boundaries of China's Internet virtual space, the basic principles of order within the space, and the Internet's ecological landscape. The Chinese government has been leading the development of ICT (information and communications technology) in the field, making related projects show the characteristics of technological nationalism (Qiu, 2010).

These infrastructural efforts are touted as an essential part of building an effective e-government framework that prioritizes the stability of the Chinese Communist Party and state authorities over the technological empowerment of citizens,which intricately intertwined with techno-nationalist rhetoric and the government's desire to build China into a modern and developed country. (Kluver, 2005)

The territorialization of virtual space by the nation power is mainly reflected in the control and supervision of two aspects: First, the construction of the Great Firewall has become the national border in the virtual space, making China's virtual space independent and different from the global Internet to a considerable extent. The Great Firewall, which began with the "Golden Shield" project, is a system for monitoring domestic network traffic, a collection of social media regulations, IP blacklists, keyword filters, data gateways, and human review (Plantina and Setab, 2019). Beginning in the 2010s, under political pressure from the outside world, the Chinese government implemented an increasingly stringent registration system for websites hosted within the country, and repeatedly blocked foreign Internet (mainly the United States). What does not match the increasing number of Internet users in China is that Internet giants such as GAFA (Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple) are insulated from this resource pool of billions of calculations. Therefore, emerging domestic platform companies do not have strong competitors and are able to grow and thrive within the boundaries defined by the Great Firewall and within a digital ecosystem with strong local characteristics. The establishment of the Great Firewall is the territorialization of the Chinese government in the virtual space of the world's Internet.

Second, the authorities first allowed the development of digital financial services and then tightened supervision, which completely changed the daily life and consumption patterns of Chinese people. The unique and rapid development of China's technology and online industries is partly due to its relatively low path dependence in the technology, finance and retail sectors (Cunningham, Craig and Lv, 2019). Alipay was generated on the e-commerce platform in 2004, and WeChat Pay was generated on the social media platform in 2013. They not only provide services such as online payment and transfer between users, but also allow users to scan codes to pay for consumption through QR code gateways placed in physical merchants. The two payment methods bypassed the "Golden Credit (or Gold Card)" system in the "Golden Project" in a very short period of

time, which is a cross-bank, cross-border electronic payment and cardholder credit system provided by banks and UnionPay, established its own payment system and user credit system.

Users only need to bind their bank cards to the payment program, and then they can pay merchants through a piece of paper printed with a QR code. From large shopping malls and hotels to small vegetable market vendors, I have even seen QR codes placed in front of beggars' stalls. The paper of the QR code is sometimes over-plasticized. Anyway, there is no need to find a delicately decorated table base to set it off, it is so convenient. When Europeans and Americans still use credit cards to pay, we Chinese only need to bring a smart phone with multiple platforms when we go out, and we can complete most of the social interaction activities in daily life.¹³⁹

Digital financial services platforms such as Alipay and WeChat Pay have flourished in the context of China's state-owned banks being inefficient and retailers never expanding widely enough to serve the fast-growing middle class (Mozur, 2016). However, digital financial services platforms bring many cross-border payment issues. Previously, the banking system had a series of rather cumbersome software and hardware programs at the nodes of merchant credit evaluation, payment terminal operations, and account settlement. Alipay, WeChat Pay, etc. are third-party payment platforms. They are grafted between banks and merchants by directly negotiating payments with banks and extracting transaction commissions. They intercept user data, and neither commercial banks nor the central bank have control of this data. In other words, the third-party payment platform has reterritorialized a new closed loop of economic order that is de-embedded in the country's original financial infrastructure in the virtual space. However, due to the extremely low threshold, the end of this order, that is, the merchants and consumers themselves have great mobility. They can still pay when they move across the border in physical space, but the goods bought and sold may not be supervised by customs, taxation and other departments, and the identity of the merchants is not guaranteed by a legal license. Therefore, problems such as money laundering, smuggling, and financial fraud are extremely prone to occur. In August 2017, the Payment and Settlement Department of the People's Bank of China issued the "Notice of the Payment and Settlement Department of the People's Bank of China on Migrating the Online Payment Business of Non-bank Payment Institutions from the Direct Connection Mode to the Network Union Platform for Processing", requiring that from June 30, 2018, all online payment services involving bank accounts accepted by payment institutions should be processed through the Nets Union clearing platform¹⁴⁰. From July 1, all third-party

¹³⁹ Interview time: July 2018; Interlocutor: QQ; Location: Tencent Building, Shenzhen, Guangdong Province.

¹⁴⁰ Non-bank payment institution network payment clearing platform, referred to as Nets Union, is a unified settlement platform for third-party payment institutions operated by Nets Union Clearing Co., Ltd. of the People's Republic of China. It was initiated and established by the China Payment and Clearing

payment platforms and bank settlement accounts will be "disconnected". So far, national power has established a gateway in the commercial and financial order within the boundaries of virtual space, which collects payment data of all passing online users and supervises payment and settlement activities. The digital financial market is regulated by the central bank, China's highest financial institution, which fully illustrates the reterritorialization of the digital infrastructure of the domestic financial system by state power.




Image 14: Schematic diagram of "disconnect direct connection".

Source: The author draws based on literature and fieldwork interview data.

In summary, the development and construction of China's digital infrastructure is a process of intertwined authority, commerce, and publicity. A brief history of it can provide insight into the territorial competition between the government and platforms in virtual space. When digital technology and the Internet spread from the West to China, the Chinese government and the platforms that provide software and hardware services first used technology empowerment to get what they needed in the new continent of virtual space. The government needs to build a digital governance system, cultivate the Internet market, and promote interconnection between China and the world under the basic goal of building a modern socialist country with "Chinese characteristics." Technological nationalism promotes the development of the information highway and the information technology industry. Platforms need to operate and make profits, so various composite platforms have been built by providing users with services such as information acquisition, social media, e-commerce, and digital finance. Then, within the scope of the virtual space where national power is territorialized, the platform uses technological nationalism to innovate its services locally. The services provided by the platform have developed together with the physical and virtual facilities built by the government, so

Association, and mainly deals with online payment services involving bank accounts initiated by non-bank financial institutions. The institution is regulated by the People's Bank of China.

that they are as fine as capillaries and deeply embedded in every aspect of Chinese people's daily life, building China's digital infrastructure. When platforms and national power move from cooperation to competition, the government becomes the force to supervise and control the platform, or it can be said to be the upper limit or boundary for the development of the platform in time and space.

5.1.2 Platformization: Territorialization and Order Reconstruction of Jadeite Trade in Virtual Space

The concept of platformization refers to the general process by which previously fairly open online domains are colonized by proprietary interests (Cunningham, Craig and Lv, 2019). Specifically, it refers to “how the political economy of cultural industries changes through platformization: the economics and infrastructure of online platforms extend into the network, affecting the production, distribution and circulation of cultural content” (Nieborg and Poell, 2018). In China, the uniqueness of digital infrastructure and platform ecosystems has brought significant changes to a variety of traditional industries and industries. The jadeite trade is one of them. Currently, Chinese Internet giants such as Taobao, WeChat, Douyin, and Kuaishou are the main platforms for jadeite online transactions. They mediate the supply side and demand side through digital technology (Parker, Alstynne and Choudary, 2016), that is, jadeite's e-commerce merchants and consumers. Suppliers and platform owners jointly provide services to create value (Schreieck, , Wiesche and Krcmar, 2016). Since jadeite e-commerce merchants are new participants in the business empowered by digital technology, fierce competition for interests has begun between them and traditional merchants. Specifically, there have been three stages of field competition between e-commerce merchants and traditional merchants in the physical and virtual spaces. E-commerce merchants have gradually become strong players from weak players.

The first stage is the portal period. After the establishment of Taobao in 2003, the consumption logic and methods of e-commerce began to develop in Chinese society, and gradually the same type of e-commerce platform websites and e-commerce websites of special categories appeared. Jadeite has special properties and is a luxury product not for daily consumption and a product not produced by industrial standardization. This makes platformization enter the field of jadeite trading relatively late, and the development of jadeite e-commerce websites is slower than that of most consumer goods. Therefore, when e-commerce companies were still in the early stages of experimentation, two types of jadeite e-commerce websites have been roughly formed. Two groups of participants with very different power and capability configurations have also been formed. The first category is independent websites that specialize in selling jadeite, including independent websites and stores based on e-commerce platforms, such as opening a virtual store on the Taobao platform.

I started to build the jadeite website in 2010. I used to occasionally sell some goods to friends outside the province. I have friends who specialize in selling jadeite. To open a website, you first need to buy a domain name, and then find a specialized website design company to make several overall design plans, involving appearance, function, information layout of product introduction, etc. You can also choose where the function keys are placed. Website design companies generally have templates, and you can adjust the details after selection. This is also the way to run Taobao stores. Taobao also has stores that directly sell templates. The goods were basically not my own. I borrowed them from my friends. I took pictures of these goods and upload them. If you are not a good friend, they would not lend them to you at all. You need to set up a small studio, and prepare enough cameras and miniatures. Pay attention to the later retouching, try to be as real as possible. The cost of opening an online store is much lower than that of a physical store, but the problem is that there are too few visitors, unlike a physical store where there are people who come to shop, not to mention regular customers, even random visitors. To advertise, you have to go to a big website to buy advertising space, which is not cheap. Taobao stores can buy advertising space on the homepage from the (Taobao) website or pay for Taobao to attract traffic (users browsing on Taobao). In short, it was not easy to sell at the beginning, and customers still wanted to see the real thing before they dared to buy it. Many e-commerce companies had collapsed. I had only been doing it for two or three years and quit.¹⁴¹

From the experience of the interlocutor, it appears that most of the first batch of jadeite e-commerce merchants were not originally engaged in jade trading activities, nor were they jadeite consignors. However, they are very sensitive to the e-commerce sales method of the Internet and hope to seize the opportunities of digital technology to enter the jadeite value chain. They have dual properties. On the one hand, they are the suppliers of jadeite trade in the virtual space. Their sources of consumers depend on the size of the resource pool generated by the platform and the cooperation agreement with the platform. On the other hand, they fulfil a middleman position. The jadeite merchants in physical stores are the owners, and they have the right to buy and sell, set prices, and distribute profits. Jadeite e-commerce provides sales technology, models and channels. Therefore, they have to establish strong social relationships with traditional jadeite merchants in order to become agents. The power relationship between the two parties is consistent with the relationship between the owner and the middleman in the traditional jadeite trade, that is, the former is stronger, and the latter is weaker. Therefore, e-commerce merchants were not yet a threat to traditional jadeite merchants at that time.

¹⁴¹ Interview time: 04/2018; Interlocutor: YMY; Location: Golden Horse and Jade Rooster, Kunming City, Yunnan Province.

The other type is the online sales branch developed by large physical jadeite enterprises, relying on the existing set of offline trade models of physical companies. Large entity jadeite companies, such as Qicai Yunnan Jadeite and Orient Jinyu, have opened branches in places other than their origins in the form of physical chain stores, so the flow of goods, funds, and management within the entire enterprise itself is a complex organizational system. Therefore, there are two advantages for large physical enterprises to open e-commerce websites in virtual space: One is to optimize the efficiency of the enterprise organization system across time and space. For example, if a customer fails to find the desired product at a branch in B, he can browse a larger product library through the company's website. Even if the desired product is in A, the company can internally dispatch it to B to achieve sales. The second is that the website has become an advertisement to show the strong strength of the enterprise and enhance the credibility and popularity. Since digital technology represents an emerging high-tech industry, it symbolizes a set of value evaluation system that closely aligns with the discourse of modernization, technological innovation, advancement, and excellence. Portals that provide online consumer services subscribe to this discourse. "You can go to our company's website to take a look"¹⁴² seemed to be a statement that proved the seller's confidence at that time. Even if the number of actual online sales was only a handful, it did not matter, because building a website is not the goal, but opening a website is. When smartphones became popular in China, the portal immediately turned into an application (app), with an icon symbol representing the company appearing in the user's mobile phone menu. Therefore, for large physical jadeite enterprises, at that time, platformization only added a virtual space sales model. The fundamental purpose of this sales model was to promote sales in the real space, and the profits were not obviously divided by other participants outside the organization.

What should not be ignored is that during this period, most traditional individual jadeite stores were not directly involved in e-commerce. They often operate offline for many years and have accumulated a certain number of regular or repeat customers. These tourists plus random consumers were sufficiently profitable in the first decade of the 21st century with a booming tourism industry. In addition, individual physical stores are often mom-and-pop stores, that is, the couple hires one or two clerks just enough to keep the store running, without redundant labor. If a new e-commerce business branch would be developed, it must require more capital and labor costs, as well as more complex management costs, so they were not inclined to add e-commerce websites that generated little profit.

The second stage is the WeChat business period. WeChat business refers to operating jade business on the WeChat platform. Tencent first developed and operated a social software called QQ that was very popular in China, specifically providing instant

¹⁴² Interview time: 04/2019; Interlocutor: TB; Location: Digital Technology Industrial Park, Kunming High-tech Zone, Yunnan Province.

messaging services for PCs. When 4G and smartphones became popular, Tencent immediately developed an application called WeChat with more open functions and services, which was launched in 2011. The initial function of WeChat was mainly a communication service for posting text and voice instant messages. It also provided chat groups and a circle of friends that can post and display pictures and text. Later, video calls, emoticon stores, games and other functions were added. In August 2013, the WeChat payment function was launched. Since Alipay, the online payment function developed based on the e-commerce platform Taobao at that time, already occupied the majority of the market share, WeChat Pay has not yet been able to win over more Chinese Internet users. Since Alipay, the online payment function developed based on the e-commerce platform Taobao at that time, already occupied the majority of the market share, WeChat Pay has not yet been able to win over more Chinese Internet users. Since then, the services provided by the WeChat platform have reorganized users' economic and social activities so that they can benefit from the company's advantages and profits (Plantin and Seta, 2019). Building a platform for selling goods on the WeChat platform has become the most effective emerging e-commerce model.

Fieldwork observations revealed that at eight or nine o'clock every morning, in the alley between Jiegao Jade City and the stall area, there was a row of micro-businessmen sitting on the roadside with their own small benches, about twenty or thirty people. The frames on their legs contained borrowed goods, and they were carefully photographing them with their mobile phones, accompanied by sales pitches. One of the interlocutors told me:

Every morning, I go to Jiegao Jade City to pick up the goods. I'm an acquaintance. I will take photos and videos under the sun over there (the road on the side of Jiegao Jade City) and send them to Moments of WeChat. It must be taken under natural light, otherwise the customer will definitely return the product if the color is different after buying it. After each item is photographed, the size, price, and (theme) description must be written. ...I have been in the jadeite business for many years. At the beginning, the customers were all acquaintances, and over time more and more customers came along with them. I also have three WeChat groups with nearly 500 members. Daily photos and videos will also be posted in it. I will also engage in some activities, vouchers, flash sales, promotions. If there is any news in the group, I will reply immediately. During promotions, customers look at each other and rush to buy. Business is good. ...Stallholders generally do not borrow goods. One is that I have acquaintances (good stall owners), and the other is that I sell quickly, so the stall owner allowed me to shoot. There are many micro-businesses that cannot be sold, and the stall owners do not give the permission to shoot. ...When the market is good, I can sell hundreds of thousands of RMB of goods a month, and when the market

*is not good, it also about hundreds of thousands of RMB. I started a stall here by myself in less than two years, and now these goods are all mine. ...I will definitely continue to engage in WeChat business. The stall is also busy. Customers add me on WeChat when they are satisfied with their purchases. If they want more goods after returning home, I can directly deliver them by express. After meeting and dealing with each other, the credibility of each other is very good!*¹⁴³

Therefore, jadeite merchants based on the WeChat platform are the first group of successful e-commerce merchants, and they have made sufficient profits in the virtual space through technological empowerment. The successful ones among them changed the power relationship with traditional jadeite merchants to a certain extent and start their own business. This trend was also reflected in fieldwork of businessmen:

*Now there are more and more WeChat merchants, and their business is quite good. Many customers stopped coming the last time they came, and directly contacted the merchants on WeChat to purchase goods, saving travel and accommodation expenses when they came to Ruili. As long as the color of the goods is not too different, they (retailers who purchase the goods) will sell them as they are, as long as they match up with their customers and the goods sell quickly, it is not a big problem if the price is more or less acceptable. We don't allow them to shoot high-end products (high-end products), but welcome to shoot other products, let's make money together. ...We also take pictures and post them on Moments, but if they sell well, we will sell them to them. Give yourself multiple paths. ...They also take pictures of Burmese products. This industry is about doing business and eating together. ...In the beginning, we would not return sold goods. Later, if WeChat merchants sold well, we would also return them if they returned them, as long as they sold more. WeChat business is incredibly flexible, even Taobao stores may not be able to do it better than them, there is no cost, and it is a net profit.*¹⁴⁴

The possibility of transactions across physical distance brought by digital technology and platforms also gives consumers the opportunity to skip retailers and purchase goods directly from the wholesale link. Therefore, traditional jadeite merchants who originally invested a lot of money in stocking goods have their control over the goods restricted and gradually lost the competitive edge. The territorialization of virtual space began to appear, and the order of the jadeite trade began to change.

¹⁴³ Interview time: 07/2018; Interlocutor: XM; Location: Jiegao Jade City, Ruili City, Dehong Prefecture, Yunnan Province.

¹⁴⁴ Interview time: 07/2018; Interlocutor: LJZ; Location: Jiegao Jade City, Ruili City, Dehong Prefecture, Yunnan Province.

The third stage is the live streaming period. The evolution of digital technology has brought about video capabilities and streaming media platforms, and the territorialization on platforms has become very obvious. It had linked the transition of jadeite e-commerce's trading field to streaming media platforms. As early as around 2005, Internet companies such as Tudou and Youku established the earliest video websites in China. They mainly provide online video browsing, commenting and other services. Five years later, iQiyi, a video service of a similar nature but with its own programming, was launched, belonging to Baidu Inc., the most widely used search engine in China. Another video service platform that was also launched at the same time is called Kuaishou. Its predecessor was to make and share GIF pictures. Since 2012, Kuaishou has been transformed into a short video community, providing users with online short video social sharing services, which has the attributes of social media. Users began to expand from the 15-second limit for posting videos on the WeChat platform to the 15-minute limit on the Kuaishou platform. At the same time, the continuous innovation of smartphone technology provides users with software and hardware conditions such as clearer cameras, faster and more stable operating systems, larger storage space, and richer editing and editing software for shooting and editing videos. Internet users in China can express themselves and share with others in a richer, comprehensive, and intuitive way, so they have moved from social media platforms that share text, pictures, and very short videos to short video social media platforms. The real big turning point came about another five years later when another highly competitive short-video social media platform was launched, the Douyin app launched by ByteDance in 2016. Douyin provides users with short video sharing services ranging from 15 seconds to 10 minutes in length, as well as live streaming services based on streaming media technology. Different from Kuaishou, ByteDance adopts emerging big data technology and has a unique set of decentralized logic algorithms in the background.

We chose to cooperate with ByteDance because their background algorithm is so good!.....When you upload a video, the background will use the machine to detect the keywords in the title of the screen. If it violates the rules, it will enter manual detection. If it is true, the account will be banned immediately. If there is no violation, enter the second link, that is, check whether there are any repetitions by matching keywords in the database. If there are duplicates, push them with low flow, and only share them with yourself and your fans. If there are no duplicates, the background will push them to two or three hundred other users. The system usually collects the users who are pushed, their viewing habits, what topics they like to watch, how long they watch, speculate on their profiles, and then label them. When pushing in the background, it is pushed according to the user tags of big data. Then the third link is to look at user feedback. If the likes, retweets, comments, and completion rates are all good, they will be superimposed and pushed, and they will enter a larger flow pool step by step. If the feedback is not good, the

system will calibrate the label and push it again. If it is still not good, it will stop recommending. Whether the feedback is good or not can increase the collection of big data, and user labels will become more and more accurate. This set of algorithm logic is completely different from that of the Big V¹⁴⁵ on Weibo. Everyone has a chance, and you won't have a chance to be seen just because you are not a Big V.¹⁴⁶

According to statistics from the global APP STORE and Google Play, the total global downloads of Douyin and its overseas version of TikTok exceeded 2 billion in 2017. This figure does not include the statistics of Android mobile terminals. Douyin's user base increased dramatically in the second year after its launch, and the content push communication method it adopted played a vital role. In the past, the most influential people on Weibo were often those Big Vs who had been in business for many years and had millions of fans. In terms of e-commerce, they also had the best delivery effect, but it was very difficult for newcomers to enter and make profits. WeChat follows the social rules of acquaintances, that is, the information posted in the circle of friends can only be forwarded by WeChat friends in order, and the social relationship between forwarders can be traced. The platform system cannot push through big data algorithms to break the information communication restrictions and boost to strangers to achieve large-scale communication effects. The Douyin algorithm not only completely breaks down the barriers of these two types of social media, but also breaks the centralization of Big Vs. It actively encourages newcomers to create newer and better video content and captures users' selective acceptance of information and pushes familiar and favorite information to them. It enables more ordinary people to participate. Some of the users become "Internet celebrities", as long as they can shoot, edit and create popular videos. The success of this video social media has enabled e-commerce merchants on platforms to taste the sweetness of decentralization, and jadeite field is no exception.

I came from the tourist shopping mall. In 2014, the boss found that the market for operating large-scale tourist jewelry shopping malls was overheated, so he transferred the shopping mall to others, and we employees had to find jobs again. I came to Ruili to be WeChat merchant, and my monthly net profit was at least 20,000 to 30,000 yuan, which was about the same as when I bought it in the mall. Since 2017, a sister and I we went to the Mandalay Kok Wan Market to do live streaming. It was very hard. We had to do live streaming for 6 to 8 hours a day. We had to keep talking and keep active on the platform. We both

¹⁴⁵ 大 V (Big V) refers to verified Weibo users who have obtained personal certification on Weibo platforms such as Sina, Tencent, and Netease, and have many fans. Since Verified Weibo users will have an icon similar to a capitalized English letter "V" attached to their Weibo nicknames, netizens refer to such Weibo users who have been personally certified and have many fans as "Big V".

¹⁴⁶ Interview time: 01/2021; Interlocutor: YMR; Location: Mobile Communication Building, Kunming, Yunnan Province.

had accounts on TikTok and Taobao, so it was fine to shoot on different phones at the same time. We live stream bracelets and ring faces, but there was no business in the first four months. The Burmese didn't believe it at first, and they didn't know what it was, so they didn't come to deliver the goods. Things got better after selling some. We directly helped fans negotiate prices with Burmese people in the live streaming room. The price on the hand was the price I told the Burmese, and the price on the calculator was the price I told the fans. Once the transaction was completed, it would be packaged and sent back to China by SF express. Our commission was small, but we can earn exchange rates. The sum was good, and we can earn up to 200,000 to 300,000 RMB a month!The sold goods cannot be returned, so many live streamers were bragging, and the market was very chaotic. Burmese people felt that their business has been robbed and they would not allow us to live stream it. We returned to Ruili in 2019.¹⁴⁷

Jadeite e-commerce has produced secondary territorialization in the territorialization of different platforms, that is, attracting jadeite owners and consumers to their own e-commerce space, such as Taobao stores, WeChat groups and Douyin live streaming channels. Since accounts are not restricted by location, as long as users can access China's Internet, they can access the platform's resource pool. In addition, the location of live streamer is not restricted. They can move across national borders with mobile terminals that can access the Chinese Internet. Therefore, they can participate in any link of the traditional jadeite trade chain, which directly leads to the formation of a multi-dimensional territorialization of the composite space among the subjects involved in profit-making.

In fact, the Chinese have already brought the e-commerce trade model into the Kok Wan Market in Mandalay, Myanmar during the WeChat business period. The newly entered live streaming groups have more powerful influence and have overtaken a large part of the business of Myanmar merchants. Myanmar merchants face many obstacles as they cannot speak Mandarin, nor register an account on a Chinese platform, nor operate platform service functions, nor deal with the company that operates the account. It is even difficult for them to write down the customer's mailing address. Therefore, the Myanmar people alone cannot make profits on China's platforms, so they strongly oppose Chinese e-commerce merchants. In September 2018, more than 7,000 Myanmar jadeite merchants jointly signed a letter and submitted a report to the Legislative Designation Committee of the Union Parliament of Myanmar, demanding that relevant departments would prohibit foreign merchants from selling jadeite in the market through live streaming (Myanmar Chinese Network, 2018). In October 2019, the Preparatory Committee of the Mandalay Jadeite Exhibition held a press conference, stating that

¹⁴⁷ Interview time: 12/2021; Interlocutor: CLX; Location: Douyin Live Streaming Base in Duobao City, Ruili City, Dehong Prefecture, Yunnan Province.

merchants were prohibited from conducting live streaming at the exhibition, and those who violate the regulations will be blacklisted and will not be allowed to participate in similar exhibitions (Myanmar Chinese Network, 2019).

The territorialization of live streaming not only affects jadeite merchants in Myanmar, but also traditional jadeite merchants in China. An interlocutor in Ruili who was in the wholesale business of jadeite rough stones and bracelets since the late 1990s shared the following story with me:

After the live streaming started, the industry has changed, and they (live streamers) have the final say, and even the boss who sells high-quality products would let them to proceed. As long as the goods are sold can be sold, who doesn't want to sell. But some goods are really difficult to sell. So why should I pay the rent, if the profits are all made by the live streamers.We also have to follow the "7-days no reason to return and exchange" rule, and we have no other choice. As a result, it takes a long time, completing a transaction, and the turnover of funds is also slow. We carry the risks, the live streamers don't need to overstock, so many people are squeezed out.Some of the screens of Burmese people delivering goods to the live streamers are real, and some are fake, they just follow the live streamers. When the live streamer sells the goods, the Burmese can get some money, and everyone is happy. Many of them are not engaged in jadeite but come to China to work!¹⁴⁸

Following the observation of this interlocutor, the power relationship between the online business and the e-commerce has been entirely reversed at this time. E-commerce merchants who mastering new technologies and platform have restructured the jadeite's trade structure and main profit methods through territorialization, and as a result the middleman has taken gained an important position. At the same time, the comprehensive basic service platform companies that provide connections between the physical world and the virtual world for jadeite live streaming have also developed rapidly. They further refined and specialized the division of labor in the jadeite e-commerce industry, making profits by platforming and standardizing commercial activities in virtual space and physical space to provide regular, guaranteed, and integrated services. They are actors who territorialize in both types of spaces at the same time.

We are cooperating with Douyin, and everything as bracelets, pendants, and rings can be live stream. The entry requirements must be guaranteed to be A goods. We also provide professional warehousing, quality inspection and logistics services. The live streamer only needs to

¹⁴⁸ Interview time: 12/2019; Interlocutor: LQS; Location: Jiegao Jade City, Ruili City, Dehong Prefecture, Yunnan Province.

concentrate on its core activities, and we will take care of the other supporting facilities. We have a large volume, so it is easy to negotiate with large express companies, provincial and municipal quality inspection agencies, whether it is a good price or a special work site, and these service details are in place. We also help Douyin manage 80% of the rules of the jadeite live streaming room. It is necessary to formulate management rules and improve them. In a new industry, new difficulties will always arise. In 2020, the turnover through our platform will exceed 10 billion (RMB).¹⁴⁹

Our company is a jadeite e-commerce platform that cooperates with Taobao, mainly engaging in jadeite ores. One is to regulate the ores live streaming market, including registering the live streamers who enter our platform, and marking each of their ores and betting stones, so that they can be traced and prevent fraud on both sides. The other is to help the government to make this part of the market rules. The “7-day no reason return and exchange” is Taobao's rule, and we implement it in jadeite live streaming to protect the rights and interests of consumers. Most people engaged in ore business is willing to come to our Live streaming Base, because the environment is good, and the rights and interests of buyers and sellers can be protected.¹⁵⁰

In summary, the three stages of territorialization between jadeite e-commerce merchants and traditional merchants demonstrate the process of platformization reconstructing the traditional trade industry. The owners of the platform are not jadeite merchants, but the digital services they provide in the virtual space make them participants in the jadeite trade and change a series of rules and norms of the jadeite trade. Jadeite traders are divided into e-commerce merchants and traditional merchants. In several rounds of sectoral territorialization, their power relationships have been exchanged. Traditional merchants who need to bear greater processing and stocking costs have become the weaker parties, and their risks and returns are becoming increasingly precarious. E-commerce merchants who are empowered by digital technology and provide convenient services to consumers have become powerful parties. They not only share a large amount of profits, but also create new frictions and conflicts among groups and ethnic groups. The territorialization of jadeite merchants also makes platform users to enjoy the convenience of transactions, the possibility of high-quality and low-price products, and more protection of consumer rights. Therefore, platformization has reconstructed the structure of the traditional jadeite trading industry and formed new factors aggregation rules and consumption methods.

¹⁴⁹ Interview time: 01/2021; Interlocutor: YMR; Location: Douyin Live Streaming Base in Duobao City, Ruili City, Dehong Prefecture, Yunnan Province.

¹⁵⁰ Interview time: 01/2020; Interlocutor: CX; Location: Yangyanghao Taobao Live Streaming Base, Ruili City, Dehong Prefecture, Yunnan Province.

5.2 Live Streaming: Jadeite Trade Relations, Consumer Culture and Value Production in Virtual Space

Jadeite live streaming is an e-commerce model based on streaming media technology, digital financial technology, big data algorithms and video social media platforms or video service platforms. Live streaming as a digital technology empowers those with the power to manipulate through technology. It transforms the relationship between sellers and consumers from "connected presence" in the portal era and WeChat business era to "panoramic presence", reconstructing the relationship between trade participants and the jadeite trade order. What is even more striking is that the labor performance of live streamers is very different from that of traditional jadeite trading middlemen. Although both engage in relational labor, the live streamers supervised online relational labor and therefore their agency becomes their main means of creating value. The original consumption object focused on the jadeite material commodity itself and its reproduced value, while the consumption object in live streaming has shifted the focus to social relationships and emotional values such as interaction with the live streamers, emotional attachment, and community belonging. Therefore, live streaming has changed the configuration of jadeite consumer culture and jadeite value content to a considerable extent.

5.2.1 Panoramic Presence: Inter-ethnic Relations and Value Production among Jadeite Live Streamers

Platformization impacts communication habits and methods of consumers as digital technologies generate affordance in terms of quality, functionality, or prompting the restructuring of social time and space (Nagy and Neff, 2015; Wellman, Quan-Haase and et al., 2003). The free mobile instant messaging (MIM) app has a richer representation of symbols, such as text messages, voice messages, group chats, emoticons, photos and short videos, further expanding users' online communication capabilities (Yu, Huang and Liu, 2017). In MIM networks and social media networks, netizens manage different levels of social relationships and connections through mobile digital technologies. Licoppe (2004) proposed the concept of "interconnected presence" to understand this interaction pattern of managing and maintaining relationships. It consists of two modes: "conversation mode", which refers to "an open and relatively long conversation in which people ask each other how they are doing and usually set aside time for this purpose, and "connective patterns," which refers to "brief and frequent communication gestures: irregularly timed conversations or sounds or text messages" (Licoppe, 2004).

The impact of "connected presence" on the jadeite trade order is mainly to facilitate instant communication among participants during actions, but it is still far from reaching a transaction. In particular, the relationship between the natural attributes of jadeite and its value judgment is complex and difficult to standardize, which requires both the buyer

and seller and the goods to be present together in the physical world during transactions. In the portal era and WeChat business era, jadeite e-commerce merchants can demonstrate the superiority of the goods' value on the platform by using a series of attribute terms, parameter data and carefully processed attractive advertising images. The discourse composed of these symbols promotes the presentation of goods to a certain extent albeit with some limitations. Consumer feedback requires additional connecting channels, and the interaction between the two parties is not close enough. Therefore, "connected presence" only enhances the flexibility, timeliness, and interactive methods of social contact between ethnic groups, within ethnic groups, and between buyers and sellers in the jadeite trade, but does not directly manage transactions. The way transactions are combined in time and space has not changed significantly.

However, another impact of platformization involves the exposure of more information, which can be called "panoramic presence" (Silcock, Payne and Hocking, 2015). In streaming media platforms that provide short video and live streaming services, e-commerce companies can completely present themselves, their products, and agent scenarios in real time, and consumers can generate instant feedback. The interaction between the two parties can be infinitely close to the common presence in the physical world.

Generally speaking, there are two to three live streamers online taking turns to perform in a live streaming room, while being assisted by one or two assistants doing field control work. Field control work refers to adjusting the atmosphere in the live streaming room, motivating fans, and matching the rhythm of the live streamer. Consumers are divided into random flow consumers and fans. Random people are consumers who might have a fixed account on the platform and enter the live streaming room through active search keywords or platform push, similar to customers who enter the store when they go shopping randomly in the mall. Fans are customers who have a fixed account on the platform and pay special attention to the live streaming room or anchor. Live streaming images can be divided into spatial scene content and screen surface content that partially covers the scene image: The content of the space scene is generally the scene where the live streamer is introducing and displaying jadeite products, or the live streamer is purchasing and bargaining; The surface content of the screen includes basic information and functional symbols such as the name of the live streaming room, the number of people online in real time, and the hyperlink button for confirming the purchase; A scrolling message area where consumers communicate with the live streamer in real time through text or emoticons; Animation special effects that appear on the screen when consumers tip the live streamer; And the hyperlink window for the host to send red envelopes, vouchers and other promotional services, etc. Different from the TV shopping in the past, the live streamers in the live streaming rooms will immediately respond in spoken language when they see consumers' questions typed on the screen, thus maintaining a two-way interaction, so as to give consumers the feeling of being immersed

in the sales service and the environment they are in is a performance space carefully created by the live streamers.

The interlocutor, CLX, is in her early thirties. Her live streaming room has its own independent fixed physical space. It is located in a Live streaming Base in Ruili. It is an open counter less than two meters long. The wires, cables and lights provided by the basic service platform company are hung from the ceiling, and the lines are connected from both sides to the necessary operating electrical sockets in the counter. There were two ring-shaped lamps for professional live streaming live streamers on the left and right of the counter. The cameras of the two mobile phones are aimed at the jadeite bracelet in her hand, as well as her delicately manicured hands and the calculator placed next to her. She sits at the counter, crowded with a dozen or so Burmese vying to deliver her wares to display, quoting and haggling all the time. In the live streaming screen of the mobile terminal, her hands are constantly turning the angle of the jadeite bracelet, allowing consumers to see the product more completely and intuitively. At the same time, she is introducing and guiding consumers how to appreciate the bracelet, disclosing the price, and answering consumers' questions. The camera sometimes focuses on the Burmese people in front of the counter, and the live streamer asks them to make a price. After the disclosure of the price, she turns the camera back, uses a calculator to type out the quotation in kyat, and quickly types the conversion rate to convert the price into RMB, and then help consumers to bargain an "appropriate" price. During the bargaining process, she will sometimes help consumers communicate with the Burmese, and sometimes persuade consumers to buy according to her own suggestions by emphasizing that "*the price is very cost-effective*".

You can see where the crowds are, that means that live streamer sells well.The Burmese people know it, they all randomly quote high prices. The live streamer must know how to negotiate an acceptable price, and if the price is too high, they will definitely not be able to sell.There are several Burmese people who come here every day. After a long time, they have matured and joked with me. They all accept the "seven-days no reason to return and exchange" rule, so if you are familiar with them, they are willing to accept return and exchange. Now they are all very good at performing with me. Fans love watching Burmese. When you bargain with them, they will act on the screen to the fans as they feel very distressed by the bargain but in the end, they would still sell but reluctantly. These back-and-forth negotiations, fans love to watch. Moreover, there are Burmese people on the screen which proves that my live streaming room is on the border, and the goods are "source goods".Fans also know that some are acting, but they just like to watch ! These Burmese are all routines!Some Burmese are not the owners either. If the Chinese boss wants to sell the bracelet,

*he/she will hand it to them. Anyway, if the bracelet is sold, he/she will give them a small amount of money.*¹⁵¹

The interconnection mode of "panoramic presence" simulates physical space scenes in virtual space to the high extent. It not only exposes e-commerce and product information more comprehensively, but also creates scripts to simulate a "real" scene that is not real. Myanmar elements appear more and more in jadeite live streaming. For consumers the "original goods" represent the enigma of Myanmar, the mysterious origin of Hpakant, and genuine jadeite. Some live streamers even brought one or two Myanmar people along to act out the scene of digging jadeite stones in the Uyu River on the banks of the Ruili River. Or they rent an excavator on a nearby hillside and pretend to be buying freshly dug jadeite from Burmese miners at the Hpakant jadeite mine. These scenarios provide credibility to the live streamer's agency status, reinforcing consumer trust. In order for these scenes to be shown in the live streaming for a long time like a TV series, it is necessary for the live streamers to maintain good social relations with the Myanmar people on the ground.

Another interlocutor AL in her early twenties, is not live streaming in one fixed place. AL arrives at the shopping mall in Jiegao Jade City every morning at 7:00 a.m., puts her mobile phone on a wearable cradle, and wanders among the Burmese mobile merchants. These Burmese merchants have dark complexion, laomianfen (老缅粉)¹⁵² on their faces, wearing longyi¹⁵³ and flip-flops. When they see her coming, they surround her. They hand over a small bag of ring faces in their hands, quoting in Burmese in their mouths, and gesticulating with their hands for assistance, signaling her to show these goods in front of the camera. In AL's virtual live streaming room, she switched the camera of her mobile phone back and forth between her face and that of Burmese merchants, while yelling at consumers. After working hard for two or three hours, the shopping area become more and more crowded, so she moves to the open space near the flow merchant area to set up a hand phone holder. At this time, a very handsome Burmese boy becomes the main deliverer, and other Burmese merchants no longer appear on the scene, but hand over the goods to him and he cooperate with AL to display them. They live stream until about 2 pm and go to Jiegao Jade City Snack Street for lunch together.

I am from Jiangxi Province.The two of us met in Jiegao Jade City. He is only 17 years old. He is very handsome. He doesn't look like other

¹⁵¹ Interview time: 12/2021; Interlocutor: CLX; Location: Douyin Live Streaming Base in Duobao City, Ruili City, Dehong Prefecture, Yunnan Province.

¹⁵² Laomianfen is a skin care product commonly used by Burmese people to cool sunscreen and prevent mosquito bites. It is made by grinding the trunk of the neem tree into powder and adding other spices. Laomianfen is what the Chinese call it.

¹⁵³ Longyi is a tube skirt worn by the Burmese, consisting of a rectangular piece of cloth tied around the waist, sometimes folded to the knees for more comfort. The tube skirt worn by Burmese women is called Tamane.

Burmese people. He can debut act as a star. The fans in my live streaming room clamoring every day to watch him, to watch "Xiaogege (小哥哥, Little brother)"¹⁵⁴. He can't speak Chinese, but it doesn't matter. Actually, it is the better that he does not speak the language, it proves that what I sell is "source goods", fans also like to let him speak Burmese. Anyway, we can understand by gestures with our hands, and he helped me sell a lot of orders! He is my younger brother now!¹⁵⁵

There are many live streamers like CLX and AL in Ruili. They skillfully create a real-time performance space in the virtual space through smartphones, connecting Burmese goods owners who are physically far away with consumers in a certain place in China. As agents, they staged scenes in the real space to spread the knowledge of jadeite culture, show the process of cross-ethnic economic exchanges at the border, and help consumers fight for their interests. After the transmission of digital technology, consumers can move from purchasing desire to purchasing action, and they can get a commission from it and get rich returns. In order to gain the trust of consumers and promote more sales, they spontaneously cooperated with the Burmese people driven by interests, in addition they form a community of other live streamers to make joint profits. Among live streamers, the relationship among different ethnic groups on the platform is regulated in such a way that it serves "panoramic presence". No matter what the script is in the live streaming scene, it is a collaborative performance for the purpose of concluding a deal.

In addition, the reterritorialization of virtual space brought about by digital technology has produced a more dis-embedded, detailed, and professional division of labor. The live streaming itself is part of jade's sales, but the division of labor among participants has become increasingly complex. In addition to Chinese live streamers and Myanmar cargo owners, there are also specialized Myanmar "actors" in the live streaming room, and they even become more organized and professional. Live streaming rooms have been increasingly professionalized, and companies specializing in operating live streaming rooms have emerged. The live streaming company operates multiple live streaming rooms, and is internally divided into sales department (i.e., live streamer), field control assistant, customer service department, marketing department, finance department and other departments, forming a complete enterprise. The live streamer does not need to inspect or select the goods, as the marketing department staff will screen them in advance. Live streamers do not need to be distracted by after-sales service. Customer service will be online 24 hours a day to help consumers solve after-sales issues such as returns and exchanges. Professional live streaming companies classify the initially mixed live streamer group into good and bad ones. Live streamers with good sales ability are sought after by different live streaming company, while live streamers with poor sales ability or cheating are discarded. The emerging comprehensive service platform

¹⁵⁴ Xiaogege is a buzzword on the Internet in China, specifically referring to handsome young men.

¹⁵⁵ Interview time: 08/2018; Interlocutor: AL; Location: Jiegao Jade City, Ruili City, Dehong Prefecture, Yunnan Province.

companies are larger level platforms than live streaming companies. They provide live streaming venues, cargo warehousing, quality testing, logistics and transportation and other services, and each link has a new division of labor. With so many groups participating organized or unorganized, a more complex jadeite live streaming ecosystem has formed, and the market price of jadeite has increased.

5.2.2 Relational Labor: The Social Relationship and Value Production Between Jadeite Live Streamers and Fans

The concept of “relational labor” was proposed by Nancy Baym to emphasize continuous communication over time, thereby building social relationships and providing monetary rewards for cultural workers (Baym, 2015). This ongoing interaction, “perhaps more akin to friends and family than customers and clients” (Baym, 2015), is enabled through contemporary use of social media, which promotes a rhetoric of connection that obscures the hardships of connection (Ye, Dong and Kavka, 2022). Live streaming was originally a special mode of cultural production on the platform. During showroom live streaming, anchors mainly monetize through the virtual gift mechanism. Some anchors may sign a contract with an operating company to obtain a basic salary. However, all anchors are engaged in emotional economy (Berryman and Kavka, 2018). They must perform relational labor through performances, instant chats, and interactions outside of live streaming to maintain emotional interpersonal relationships with the audience in order to earn income.

As China's live streaming industry has become highly professionalized, a series of business models have also been developed, including cooperation with e-commerce (Cunningham, Craig, and Lv, 2019). Jadeites live streaming e-commerce is no exception. The jadeite live streamers and the middlemen in the traditional jadeite trade are both agents. Therefore, judging from the content and nature of the value produced, the labor production of the two is similar, and both belong to relational labor. However, judging from the way of maintaining relationships, the channels and frequency of interaction, the cost of relational labor of anchors is higher than that of ordinary middlemen, and live streamers are more professional. Live streamers need to integrate performance and product sales, and constantly create new social relationships and maintain existing social relationships to promote sales and obtain returns. They must not only attract the audience's attention through stylized performances, but also devote appropriate attention to keep the audience engaged.

According to the rules of the live streaming room, an interactive channel is opened between live streamers and fans, but the two-way communication is not equal: The live streamer expresses through the audio-visual language in the live screen, including a series of language symbols and non-language symbols; Fans can only express themselves by typing out text and queuing up for display on the public screen, or by giving virtual gifts of

varying prices to the live streamer for display. This rule greatly limits the way fans can express and the amount of information they express, but this unequal information exchange field strengthens the effect that the live streamer may have on consumers when they respond.

I often go to the live streaming room, including Douyin, Kuaishou, and Taobao.I don't like that the live streamer only talks about how much the jadeite is or that jadeite is very beautiful. It's not that the price is not important, but because it's too boring. I like jadeite very much, but I don't understand it. I want to visit the live streaming room to learn how to distinguish good from bad and value. We ask the live streamer questions, if the live streamer answers patiently, I will be very impressed. Fans can follow many live streaming rooms, which live streamer answers you, you must feel that you are valued by that live streamer, especially for those live streamers with a lot of fans, if she tells you a few words, you will be very happy, and you will buy it more or less.¹⁵⁶

Users who follow the live streaming room on the client side are called fensi (粉丝, fans), following the way of addressing in existing social media, including Facebook, Twitter, Weibo, and so on. This appellation is a transliteration of English fans, and in the field of social media, it refers to fans or enthusiasts of the object of attention. It symbolizes a positive, affectionate, looking up, curious, and even passionate emotions and social relationships. For fans, the live streamer's communication model is one-to-many, and once the live streamer responds based on the above-mentioned relationship and emotion, the fans can easily be inspired to have a sense of self-worth of being paid attention to, seen, responded to, and recognized by the loved one. This has a positive effect on promoting sales. Live streamers are not unreachable idols that appear on TV screens, radio frequency, posters, and other media, but a close friend who can chat with fans in real time, meet their communication needs immediately, and return their immediate feedback and gratitude for the gift fans give. Familiarity enhances trust and facilitates the conclusion of transaction contracts in e-commerce. Therefore, in terms of the way of maintaining interpersonal relationships, the relationship labor of jadeite live streamers is more diverse and richer than that of ordinary middlemen.

However, some fans have a more direct and strong social connection and sense of belonging with jadeite live streamers, and the object of fan consumption has already pointed to social networking itself. Social consumption in jadeite live streaming can be roughly divided into two types. The first may be called emotional consumption.

¹⁵⁶ Interview time: 09/2019.9; Interlocutor: CY; Location: Jingxing Flower and Bird Market, Kunming City, Yunnan Province.

My live streaming room is in Kuaishou, and I haven't been a live streamer for a long time, so the benefits are good. There is a fan who has come to my live streaming room almost every day since September and October last year. Every time, he bought tens of thousands of pieces of goods, and he didn't even bargain. It might be several million yuan. He came very late. I didn't have many fans, only a few hundred. At one or two o'clock in the night, there was almost no one there. He only came at that time. He didn't speak at first, but once told me that he thought I was an honest young man, and it was interesting to hear me chatting with others, and he didn't have anyone around him to chat with, so he asked me to chat with him.Just chatting ordinary stuff, we can talk about Yingjiang County, jadeite, any topic. He said that he could still buy jadeite from after chatting for so long, he thanked me!I don't know where he is from, fans are typing, I can't hear their accents. I am good at chatting, and I can chat a few words about any topic. The more he buys, the more I am sure I will chat with him.He might be lonely, and thinks I'm interesting.¹⁵⁷

This interlocutor is not the one with the most sales among the live streamers, but his experience suggests the type of emotional consumption of jadeite live streaming. His fan actively chose to establish more frequent and in-depth social relationships with him during special time periods in the live streaming room, such as late at night when there are few people. We have no way of questioning the motivation of this fan, but it is obvious that he needs companionship, and the live streaming e-commerce platform provides him with a convenient channel to exchange currency for companionship, and even better, he can also get a piece of jadeite at the same time. And because of the consumption behavior, it also stimulates the live streamer to provide better accompanying services to continuously meet the needs of this kind of fans, which in turn makes the fans emotionally dependent. Therefore, the purpose of establishing social relationships is to consume relationships themselves, and relationships play a major role in economic exchanges. On the contrary, jadeite has become an intermediary to maintain relationships and an economic transaction only in a secondary instance. Direct emotional consumption in jadeite live streaming is made possible by the live streaming platform that creates the possibility of multi-channel connection in the virtual space, allowing fans and live streamers to act out in super diverse ways, as the platform encourages this diversity. When the channel provides enough wide and rich possibilities, and the currency can continue to act as an intermediary of economic exchanges in the virtual space through digital technology, the special needs from individual fans becoming more manifested while the substance that was originally peddled has been rendered less important.

¹⁵⁷ Interview time: 02/2021; Interlocutor: ZPD; Location: Yingjiang County, Dehong Prefecture, Yunnan Province.

Another type of social consumption is the consumption of community belonging, which is also an emotional consumption. However, fans' needs are not met only through the interpersonal relationship with the live streamer, but also through the community established by the live streamer. Fans gain a sense of group identity and construe a community through this kind of consumption, because the consumption object, the live streamer, and the atmosphere in the live streaming room created by the live streamer allow fans to immerse in this community. By entering a specific live streaming room to interact with the live streamer, interacting with other fans, and purchasing jadeite recommended by the live streamer, contribute to identity formation.

All the bracelets sold in my live streaming room cost more than 100,000-yuan, so they are high quality. Now most of the people who come to buy bracelets are well-to-do women, and there are fewer men.....I tell them, "You all can go to the hall, go to the kitchen, earn a lot of money, be a rich lady, get rid of scumbags, and catch up with lovers! No matter how hard working or capable we are as women, we should treat ourselves better. We wonderful women we deserve good jadeites!" They like my message very much, and many are rushed to buy.This year, I can sell goods worth eight or nine million yuan a month, and 90% of the sales are from female fans.¹⁵⁸

Undoubtedly, from the interlocutor's narration, we can almost feel the enthusiasm of the fans in her live streaming room: rich, these 30 something, successful and independent women. Her words have struck a responsive nerve with her fans in the live streaming room. Repressed, hard-working, and talented women have the duty to adorn themselves with precious and high-end jadeite bracelets. The cultural symbolic meaning of their jadeite consumption is intricately entangled with traditional jade culture, mysterious exotic Myanmar and jadeite mines, and in some cases also with the scenery of Yunnan, but these meanings are merely secondary. What they really consume is to feel and display the power of successful women through a special material symbol. Entering the live streaming room, admiring jadeite bracelets, interacting with the live streamer, chatting with other fans, all these activities revolve around finding a resonating peer group where both the individual as the collective enactment of professional success takes place. The act of consuming jadeite continuously nurtures this sense of belonging and solidifies the identity and representation of the successful career women, that furthermore is extended and reinforced in the real space.

All in all, the value reproduction in jade live streaming is significantly different from the value reproduction in the industrialization period. On the one hand, it continues the refinement and specialization of the division of labor of industrialization. On the other

¹⁵⁸ Interview time: 12/2021; Interlocutor: CLX; Location: Douyin Live Streaming Base in Duobao City, Ruili City, Dehong Prefecture, Yunnan Province.

hand, it creates new business formats in digital technology platforms that go beyond the original development logic and intensifies the division of labor itself. However, the labor performance of live streamers diverges significantly from the traditional Marxist understanding of alienation (Ye, Dong and Kavka, 2022). It is a type of labor in which interpersonal relationships, institutional supervision and economic rewards are complexly entangled. Because of this, jadeite consumer culture has also been completely reconstructed. Although the material entity of consumption is still jadeite, the purpose of consumption is no longer simply related to the objects. One can even argue that objects are just media, or souvenirs for emotional satisfaction and social relationships. The reproduction of cultural value has changed from excavating and reconstructing new writing and narratives in the hotbed of jadeite culture itself to being completely dis-embedded in this hotbed, incorporating and creating irrational consumer demand in broader and common social psychology and public issues.

Conclusion

The value of a luxury item is not objective, measurable, and constant, but, subjective, immeasurable, dynamic and artificially constructed. It is not a necessity of life, but people are willing to pay a much higher price for it than a necessity, and the item retains its desirability. How does the worship of something go to extremes in a commodity society? Since ancient times, different tribal groups in human society have begun to communicate with nature, discover special objects from the environment, and endow them with meanings closely related to people themselves. Those who are more relevant are more admired, those who are less easy to understand are more mysterious, and those who are more mysterious are more likely to be given more complicated reasons for worship, and these reasons contribute to these effects. In modern society, the making of scarce objects of worship has not only come from the cultural system, and the main body participating in the pursuit of profit is not limited to businessmen, or in other words, the nature, connotation, and extension of businessmen have been fully expanded, and as a result the ways of value production and profit have become diversified.

Jadeite is just such a thing. In several centuries, with the expansion of the territory of the Central Plains Dynasty to the southwest, it has been successfully integrated into the jade culture of the traditional Chinese Han people. At the same time, one can posit with the metaphor that it both represent the aesthetic preference for the gentle, introverted, simple and impeccable personality as well as to bright and bright physical character symbol that seeks to be promoted, seek wealth and prosperity. It comes from the remote borders, not from the hinterland of the Han people. It is transported by caravans across the mountains, and the involved people walked long distances, while undergoing hardships. Therefore, the farther the border is, the more mysterious the region becomes, and the farther it is, the more expensive it is. This process not only includes China's transition from a traditional society to a modern society, but also includes multiple historical stages of national boundary changes. The frontier is the expansion and contraction of multiple meanings. The borders of countries are not equal to the borders of nations, and the borders of culture are not equal to the borders of trade. When national borders clearly separate the origin and consumption of jadeite, the mysterious treasures from remote borders become more difficult to obtain, while the nation-state can control and shape the value production mode of jadeite in its own national space container, which promotes the scarcity of jadeite to be greatly constructed.

In Myanmar, the demarcation of nation-state boundaries has brought about fundamental changes in the tenure of jadeite resources that originally belonged to the Kachin people in pre-modern society. Whether this natural resource belong to the Kachin people, or to the state under public ownership controlled by the Burmese, these are thorny questions that

have not been resolved. The two parties could not reach a consensus on this issue, thus engendering a disorderly and unscrupulous violent market: The purpose of those in power is not only to pursue profit accumulation, but also to pursue the control of minority territories. When profits are continuously concentrated among those in power, the jadeite diggers at the bottom of the society only suffer from wars, drugs, poverty and disease, and displacement. This not only renders the trade of jadeite more important but make it more dangerous and darker, leading to even more scarcity.

The construction of the modern state of China and Myanmar has also squeezed the traditional cross-border trade. In the thirty years before China's reform and opening up, the traditional trade route from northern Myanmar to Yunnan was blocked, and the jadeite market in mainland China went out of existence, so jadeite dealers sought markets outside of mainland China. It was difficult for the Burmese government authorities to completely control the mining areas and jadeite resources in northern Myanmar in the violent market, so they used state power to change the national economic policy and jadeite trade rules, and applied international trade laws and regulations to create a new seaborne trade route which abandoned the local and pursued the transnational. Space has become a tool in competing for jadeite resources. At the same time, the Jadeite Road to Thailand passed through areas where the national powers of China, Myanmar, and Laos could not control at that time, paralleling the fight against drugs and the jungle, and the jadeite trade sought markets outside mainland China such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia. These regional changes in jadeite trade based on the division of national boundaries have created even more scarcity with the flow of jadeite.

When both China and Myanmar reformed and opened up, the closed borders were gradually opened, and the traditional jadeite trade routes were accordingly restored and rebuilt, but the value production methods of jadeite were no longer the same. In China's national space container, Yunnan's position in the traditional jadeite trade has been subject to incisive change, becoming a sales market dominated by tourism consumption. The processing and distribution center formed in Hong Kong during the closure of the Chinese border was deterritorialized due to the national leading force of reform and opening up, while Guangdong benefited from the situation to become a comprehensive jadeite processing area through reterritorialization. The separation of production and sales and the refinement of labor division are the basic laws of industrial society, and they also provide opportunities for creating scarcity in every link. Whether it is the cultural attachment of processing technology, or the blurring of the certainty of jadeite price in the subdivision link, or the construction of a discourse system shaping cultural imagination during sales, the scarcity of jadeite is meticulously produced.

Information technology has promoted the construction of China's digital infrastructure. In the newly opened virtual space of the Internet, new powers continue to reterritorialize

the jadeite trade. National space and borders in virtual space are no longer physical entities, but a fluid and abstract concept composed of citizens, mobile devices, and online social activities. The borders of power may transcend national borders with the flow of citizens beyond the physical borders, so the reterritorialization of jadeite trade presents a more complex situation in practice. Traditional sellers have been largely replaced by a new wave of technologically empowered laymen. In the new mode of fetishism, what power creates is not limited to the scarcity of jadeite, and the object of consumption is not only the distant and mysterious object itself and the symbolic meaning of the object. Objects become a more indirect intermediary, and connecting social relationships and emotional belongings, and the focus of consumers' worship has deviated. But in any case, it is still reflected in the increase in the scarcity of jadeite.

The flow of jadeites, the production of value and the change of price reflect the spatial strategy process of multiple powers, that is, the historical process of territorialization. The cultural differences between China and Myanmar have resulted in the inclination of cultural power, which has generated the most basic dimension of jadeite value interpretation. Cultural power contributed to the simplest jadeite material production and trade model that occurred freely at first, which is also the basic field of the jadeite trade order afterwards. After the independence of the two nation-states of China and Myanmar, jadeite trade activities were subject to the process of territorialization-deterritorialization-reterritorialization, in which the current economic order is formed. Therefore, the China-Myanmar jadeite trade is a process in which power is continuously reterritorializing and reproducing value in multi-scale and multi-dimensional spaces. Most of the reterritorialization is not a zero-sum game competition, but involves ever more participants to gain profits, forming an increasingly complex and subdivided labor aggregation, and dis-embedding from the original order. The value of jadeite is thus continuously reproduced and highly complex. In this ongoing process, the types of power are political (such as representing the state, representing the nation), military, cultural, technical, ethnic relations, etc., and the territorialization of each power operates very differently. In addition, the new economic order formed by reterritorialization has different characteristics, and the relationship among participants in economic exchanges is not arranged in a linear way. Each set of economic relations is enclosed, but it has blurred boundaries given the various inter-group connection channels. This entails that any participant or participant group has the possibility of direct connection. To sum up, due to the complexity and variety of variables in the early stage, the value of jadeite produced by power has huge differences in quantity and is even more complicated in quality or content reaching the level of irrational madness.

Through the anthropological analysis of China-Myanmar jadeite trade, we can re-examine the categories of the three elements of the "territory" concept in the domain theory paradigm. First, the types of power are multiple and often compound. The national power of the nation-state is the most powerful power reflected in the case, but at the same time

there are also the political powers of various levels of government or political units. In addition, armed forces, economic capital, advanced technology, special culture, kinship, social network, etc., are all powers that can make space become their territory. The same subject may have one or more powers, or have or use different powers in different scenarios, time, and space. Second, the scope of the concept of space has expanded. On the one hand, space is not limited to physical space, but also includes virtual space, and the scope of the two does not necessarily coincide. On the other hand, the types of space are also more diverse. Countries, localities, national regions, transnational regions, roads, virtual communities, virtual live broadcast rooms, etc., are all spaces where power can territorialize. Third, borders are not necessarily clear and definite. Similar to previous research, if the research object is a nation-state, then the national border is a clear border. However, the borders of spatial concepts such as place, region, etc. may vary from context to context. The borders in spatial concepts such as roads, ports, and shipping routes are difficult to map in absolute terms. The border between virtual and material space can exist in concept or practice, and there can also be material equipment to prove the existence of a boundary between the two, but it seems impossible to clarify where the specific border is; The borders of communities, groups, and live streaming rooms in social media are equally difficult to establish. From the perspective of these three elements, the concept of territory emphasizes the power of the participants and the space in which power is exerted. Territorialization is the use of power by subjects to produce social space to achieve their goals. By analogy, globalization is the competition, manipulation, and utilization of various spaces by multiple power subjects to achieve their goals. The post-modern stage of the Anthropocene is the value orientation of capitalism, so globalization can be regarded as a process of continuous territorialization, deterritorialization, and reterritorialization of the global multidimensional space by multiple powers for political and economic purposes.

Going back to the case, if we regard the overall order of China-Myanmar jadeite trade as a procedural system, then Deleuze's "rhizome" theory is more appropriate as a metaphor. However, I prefer to use the specific attributes of jadeite as a metaphor for the trade order and value production process of jadeite, that is, the configuration of configurations composed of "heterogeneous and isomorphic" complex elements. This is because the "rhizome" theory focuses on complex connections, while the "heterogeneous isomorphism" of jadeite emphasizes the complex configuration presented by the connection of elements. Jadeite itself is a natural multi-mineral multi-crystal material formed under the action of natural forces. It has heterogeneous isomorphic and heterogeneous physical characteristics. From the sensory point of view, it is manifested as countless natural configurations of evaluation indicators such as the ever-changing species of delicacy, water head, color, background, and feeling of light of jadeite. Man-made activities may be just the extension of jadeite differences rather than the same natural attributes in human society. In this sense, the economic order formed by the reterritorialization of power at a certain node in the China-Myanmar jadeite trade is only configuration in the heterogeneous whole. And the value production of jadeite, from the

initial recognition, giving meaning, polishing and carving, chanting and appreciation, to the current exploding value production system is just a process of continuous complexification and intensification.

Jadeite had been discovered by the Han people as a mysterious stone in the remote borderlands, to being favored and by the royal family of the Dynasty in the Central Plains, making it widely popular among the people. It became continuously reterritorialized by different powers promoting continuous value production after the establishment of the nation-state. The whole process shows that its price is skyrocketing, based on idolatry and profit-seeking inclinations. In this process, people are becoming more and more obsessed with jadeite, so much so that they are willing to pay a price far beyond its basic aesthetic value and cultural significance. Some even regard it as a rare treasure. Ethnic groups use violence to compete for the profits of jadeites, so that people in the social life history of jadeite are clearly divided into classes, such as rich buyers and sellers, the merchants who try to create scarcity, the impoverished Burmese jadeite diggers, and other classes, reflecting the injustice in society. In the jadeite mining area, people completely mine one mountain after another, search for jadeite on every inch of the ground, and do not hesitate to seriously damage the ecology of forests, rivers, lakes and the survival of animals and plants, threatening the ecological balance between man and nature. Objects themselves may not have meaning, and it is people who give meaning to objects.

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List of tables

Table 1 : Classification of infrastructure..... 221

List of images

Image 1 : Silicon-oxygen tetrahedron and silicon-oxygen single chain.....	52
Image 2 : Jadeite safety buckle pendant with great zhong, shui and color.....	61
Image 3 : <i>Location map of China's Four famous jades</i>	67
Image 5 : Jadeite earrings from the Konbaung Dynasty.....	72
Image 6 : Distribution map of jadeite deposits.....	89
Image 7 : Kachin people in the late 19th century carried a huge rough jadeite in Hwehka.....	92
Image 8 : Buyers in one of the Pingzhou public auctions are discussing and looking at the ores.....	138
Image 9 : Jadeite Bracelet Blank just cut from the flake.....	141
Image 10 : Map of China-Myanmar border ports.....	156
Image 11 : Distribution map of main jadeite markets in Ruili.....	158
Image 12 : Shuttle bus schedule for Pingzhou Yuqi Street in Sihui.....	198
Image 13 : Characters of jade in Lijiang.....	214
Image 14 : Schematic diagram of "disconnect direct connection".....	227

List of charts

Chart 1 : The GDP of Guangzhou in the main years from 1949 to 2018. (Unit: 100 million RMB)	182
Chart 2 : Changes in the proportions of the three industries in Guangdong from 1978 to 2017. (Unit: %)..	183
Chart 3 : Comparison of container throughput of Guangzhou Port, Shenzhen Port and Hong Kong Port.	184
Chart 4 : Guangzhou's per capita GDP in major years from 1949 to 2018. (Unit: RMB).....	185