Publication
Title
Bertrand competition with an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint
Author
Abstract
We study the competitive and welfare consequences when only one …rm must commit to uniform pricing while the competitor’s pricing policy is left unconstrained. The asymmet- ric no-discrimination constraint prohibits both behaviour-based price discrimination within the competitive segment and third-degree price discrimination across the monopolistic and competitive segments. We …nd that an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint only leads to higher pro…ts for the unconstrained …rm if the monopolistic segment is large enough. Therefore, a regulatory policy objective of encouraging entry is not served by an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint if the monopolistic segment is small. Only when the monop- olistic segment is small and rivalry exists in the competitive segment does the asymmetric no-discrimination constraint enhance welfare.
Language
English
Source (series)
Research paper / UA, Faculty of Applied Economics ; 2012:006
Publication
Antwerp : UA, 2012
Volume/pages
23 p.
Full text (open access)
UAntwerpen
Faculty/Department
Research group
Publication type
Subject
Affiliation
Publications with a UAntwerp address
External links
Record
Identification
Creation 19.11.2012
Last edited 23.12.2015
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