Title
Action-oriented perceptionAction-oriented perception
Author
Faculty/Department
Faculty of Arts. Philosophy
Research group
Centre for Philosophical Psychology
Publication type
article
Publication
Oxford,
Subject
Philosophy
Source (journal)
European journal of philosophy. - Oxford
Volume/pages
20(2012):3, p. 430-446
ISSN
0966-8373
ISI
000307951200005
Carrier
E
Target language
English (eng)
Full text (Publishers DOI)
Affiliation
University of Antwerp
Abstract
When I throw a ball at you, do you see it as catch-able? Do we perceive objects as edible, climbable or Q-able in general? One could argue that it is just a manner of speaking to say so: we do not really see an object as edible, we only infer on the basis of its other properties that it is. I argue that whether or not an object is edible or climbable is indeed represented perceptually: we see objects as edible, and do not just believe that they are. My argument proceeds in two steps. First, I argue that in order to perform an action Q with respect to an object, we need to represent this object as Q-able and, second, I argue that we represent objects as having these properties perceptually.
E-info
https://repository.uantwerpen.be/docman/iruaauth/0d5a36/3463422.pdf
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