|
Title
|
|
|
|
Action-oriented perception
|
|
|
Author
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Abstract
|
|
|
|
| When I throw a ball at you, do you see it as catch-able? Do we perceive objects as edible, climbable or Q-able in general? One could argue that it is just a manner of speaking to say so: we do not really see an object as edible, we only infer on the basis of its other properties that it is. I argue that whether or not an object is edible or climbable is indeed represented perceptually: we see objects as edible, and do not just believe that they are. My argument proceeds in two steps. First, I argue that in order to perform an action Q with respect to an object, we need to represent this object as Q-able and, second, I argue that we represent objects as having these properties perceptually. |
|
|
|
Language
|
|
|
|
English
|
|
|
Source (journal)
|
|
|
|
European journal of philosophy. - Oxford
|
|
|
Publication
|
|
|
|
Oxford
:
2012
|
|
|
ISSN
|
|
|
|
0966-8373
|
|
|
DOI
|
|
|
|
10.1111/J.1468-0378.2010.00407.X
|
|
|
Volume/pages
|
|
|
|
20
:3
(2012)
, p. 430-446
|
|
|
ISI
|
|
|
|
000307951200005
|
|
|
Full text (Publisher's DOI)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Full text (publisher's version - intranet only)
|
|
|
|
|
|