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Title
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Non-binding coordination in regulation
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Author
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Abstract
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| In the post-liberalisation area, utility companies operate in a context of multilevel regulation, involving a wide set of authorities with general or sector-based competencies. At each level of authority, the competencies are divided between different organisations (for example, ministries, regulatory agencies, and competition courts). Such a specialisation within the regulatory arrangement can potentially generate overlaps and blind spots, as well as a lack of effectiveness. The aim of this article is to underline the role of non-binding coordination instruments in the potential prevention of the negative consequences of specialisation in the regulation of network industries. It shows what kinds of non-binding coordination instruments are used in multi-level, multi-players, and multi-tasks regulatory arrangements. The empirical analysis is based on a comparison of two utility sectors, energy and telecommunications, in Belgium. |
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Language
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English
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Source (journal)
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Network Industries Quarterly
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Publication
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2010
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Volume/pages
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2
:12
(2010)
, p. 7-20
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