Title
Non-binding coordination in regulation
Author
Faculty/Department
Faculty of Social Sciences. Political Sciences
Publication type
article
Publication
Subject
Politics
Source (journal)
Network Industries Quarterly
Volume/pages
2(2010) :12 , p. 7-20
ISSN
1662-6176
Carrier
E
Target language
English (eng)
Abstract
In the post-liberalisation area, utility companies operate in a context of multilevel regulation, involving a wide set of authorities with general or sector-based competencies. At each level of authority, the competencies are divided between different organisations (for example, ministries, regulatory agencies, and competition courts). Such a specialisation within the regulatory arrangement can potentially generate overlaps and blind spots, as well as a lack of effectiveness. The aim of this article is to underline the role of non-binding coordination instruments in the potential prevention of the negative consequences of specialisation in the regulation of network industries. It shows what kinds of non-binding coordination instruments are used in multi-level, multi-players, and multi-tasks regulatory arrangements. The empirical analysis is based on a comparison of two utility sectors, energy and telecommunications, in Belgium.