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Title
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Non-representational cognitive science and realism
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Author
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Abstract
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| Embodied and extended cognition is a relatively new paradigm within cognitive science that challenges the basic tenet of classical cognitive science, viz. cognition consists in building and manipulating internal representations. Some of the pioneers of embodied cognitive science have claimed that this new way of conceptualizing cognition puts pressure on epistemological and ontological realism. In this paper I will argue that such anti-realist conclusions do not follow from the basic assumptions of radical embodied cognitive science. Furthermore I will show that one can develop a form of realism that reflects rather than just accommodates the core principles of non-representationalist embodied cognitive science. |
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Language
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English
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Source (journal)
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Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences. - Dordrecht, 2002, currens
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Publication
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Dordrecht
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2014
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ISSN
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1568-7759
[print]
1572-8676
[online]
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DOI
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10.1007/S11097-013-9310-6
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Volume/pages
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13
:3
(2014)
, p. 461-475
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ISI
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000340084400004
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Full text (Publisher's DOI)
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Full text (publisher's version - intranet only)
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