Title
Managerial bonus systems in a differentiated duopoly : a comment Managerial bonus systems in a differentiated duopoly : a comment
Author
Faculty/Department
Faculty of Applied Economics
Publication type
article
Publication
London ,
Subject
Economics
Source (journal)
Managerial and decision economics. - London
Volume/pages
33(2012) :1 , p. 61-70
ISSN
0143-6570
vabb
c:vabb:372038
Carrier
E
Target language
English (eng)
Full text (Publishers DOI)
Affiliation
University of Antwerp
Abstract
A differentiatedCournot duopoly is consideredwhere firm owners delegate the output decision to a manager, who is rewarded on the basis of his performance. If this performance is measured in terms of (i) pure profits, (ii) a combination of profits and sales, (iii) a combination of profits andmarket share or (iv) relative profits, the latter option strictly dominates the others if the products are perfect substitutes. Recently it was claimed that this result does not hold for all levels of product substitutability. In this comment, we show however that this result is robust against the introduction of product differentiation.
E-info
https://repository.uantwerpen.be/docman/iruaauth/b39a70/73c111d34d2.pdf
Handle