Publication
Title
Managerial bonus systems in a differentiated duopoly : a comment
Author
Abstract
A differentiatedCournot duopoly is consideredwhere firm owners delegate the output decision to a manager, who is rewarded on the basis of his performance. If this performance is measured in terms of (i) pure profits, (ii) a combination of profits and sales, (iii) a combination of profits andmarket share or (iv) relative profits, the latter option strictly dominates the others if the products are perfect substitutes. Recently it was claimed that this result does not hold for all levels of product substitutability. In this comment, we show however that this result is robust against the introduction of product differentiation.
Language
English
Source (journal)
Managerial and decision economics. - London
Publication
London : 2012
ISSN
0143-6570
Volume/pages
33:1(2012), p. 61-70
Full text (Publishers DOI)
Full text (publishers version - intranet only)
UAntwerpen
Faculty/Department
Research group
Publication type
Subject
Affiliation
Publications with a UAntwerp address
External links
VABB-SHW
Record
Identification
Creation 30.05.2013
Last edited 22.11.2016
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