Title
Bertrand competition with an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint Bertrand competition with an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint
Author
Faculty/Department
Faculty of Applied Economics
Publication type
article
Publication
Oxford ,
Subject
Economics
Source (journal)
The journal of industrial economics. - Oxford
Volume/pages
61(2013) :1 , p. 62-83
ISSN
0022-1821
1467-6451
ISI
000316754800003
Carrier
E
Target language
English (eng)
Full text (Publishers DOI)
Affiliation
University of Antwerp
Abstract
Regulators and competition authorities often prevent firms with significant market power, or dominant firms, from practicing price discrimination. The goal of such an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint is to encourage entry and serve consumers' interests. This constraint prohibits the firm with significant market power from practicing both behaviour-based price discrimination within the competitive segment and third-degree price discrimination across the monopolistic and competitive segments. We find that this constraint hinders entry and reduces welfare when the monopolistic segment is small.
E-info
https://repository.uantwerpen.be/docman/iruaauth/ded43c/5793866.pdf
http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000316754800003&DestLinkType=RelatedRecords&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=ef845e08c439e550330acc77c7d2d848
http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000316754800003&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=ef845e08c439e550330acc77c7d2d848
Handle