Publication
Title
Bertrand competition with an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint
Author
Abstract
Regulators and competition authorities often prevent firms with significant market power, or dominant firms, from practicing price discrimination. The goal of such an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint is to encourage entry and serve consumers' interests. This constraint prohibits the firm with significant market power from practicing both behaviour-based price discrimination within the competitive segment and third-degree price discrimination across the monopolistic and competitive segments. We find that this constraint hinders entry and reduces welfare when the monopolistic segment is small.
Language
English
Source (journal)
The journal of industrial economics. - Oxford
Publication
Oxford : 2013
ISSN
0022-1821 [print]
1467-6451 [online]
Volume/pages
61:1(2013), p. 62-83
ISI
000316754800003
Full text (Publishers DOI)
Full text (publishers version - intranet only)
UAntwerpen
Faculty/Department
Research group
Publication type
Subject
Affiliation
Publications with a UAntwerp address
External links
Web of Science
Record
Identification
Creation 05.06.2013
Last edited 29.03.2017
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