Title
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Bertrand competition with an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint
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Author
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Abstract
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Regulators and competition authorities often prevent firms with significant market power, or dominant firms, from practicing price discrimination. The goal of such an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint is to encourage entry and serve consumers' interests. This constraint prohibits the firm with significant market power from practicing both behaviour-based price discrimination within the competitive segment and third-degree price discrimination across the monopolistic and competitive segments. We find that this constraint hinders entry and reduces welfare when the monopolistic segment is small. |
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Language
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English
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Source (journal)
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The journal of industrial economics. - Oxford
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Publication
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Oxford
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2013
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ISSN
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0022-1821
[print]
1467-6451
[online]
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DOI
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10.1111/JOIE.12011
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Volume/pages
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61
:1
(2013)
, p. 62-83
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ISI
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000316754800003
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Full text (Publisher's DOI)
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Full text (publisher's version - intranet only)
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