Publication
Title
Aid tying and donor fragmentation
Author
Abstract
This study analyzes theoretically and empirically the impact of aid fragmentation on donors' decisions to tie their development aid to purchases from contractors based in their own countries. Building on collective action theory, it argues that a donor with a larger share of the aid market in a country has stronger incentives to maximize the development impact of its aid, by tying less of it. Empirical tests strongly and consistently support the prediction that higher donor aid shares will be associated with less aid tying. This finding is robust to recipient controls, donor fixed effects, and instrumental variables estimation. Furthermore, it contradicts other studies suggesting that when a small number of donors dominate the aid market in a country, they may exploit their monopoly power by tying more of their aid. (C) 2012 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
Language
English
Source (journal)
World development. - Oxford
Publication
Oxford : 2013
ISSN
0305-750X
Volume/pages
44(2013), p. 63-76
ISI
000317149000005
Full text (Publisher's DOI)
UAntwerpen
Faculty/Department
Research group
Publication type
Subject
Law 
Affiliation
Publications with a UAntwerp address
External links
Web of Science
Record
Identification
Creation 07.06.2013
Last edited 13.11.2017
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