Title
CEO compensation in private family firms : pay-for-performance and the moderating role of ownership and management CEO compensation in private family firms : pay-for-performance and the moderating role of ownership and management
Author
Faculty/Department
Faculty of Applied Economics
Publication type
article
Publication
Boston, Mass. ,
Subject
Economics
Source (journal)
Family business review: journal of the Family Firm Institute. - Boston, Mass.
Volume/pages
26(2013) :2 , p. 140-160
ISSN
0894-4865
ISI
000318810900003
Carrier
E
Target language
English (eng)
Full text (Publishers DOI)
Affiliation
University of Antwerp
Abstract
Although classical agency theorists claim that pay-for-performance is not relevant in the context of private family firms, the authors provide empirical evidence of the opposite, using a sample of 529 privately held U.S. family firms. The results suggest that objective performance-based measures play a significant role in CEO compensation. Additionally, the authors find that in private family firms CEO compensation is more responsive to firm performance in firms with low ownership dispersion and in the controlling-owner stage. Furthermore, the positive pay-for-performance relation is slightly stronger for nonfamily CEOs than for family CEOs.
E-info
https://repository.uantwerpen.be/docman/iruaauth/de5009/5d14048.pdf
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