Publication
Title
CEO compensation in private family firms : pay-for-performance and the moderating role of ownership and management
Author
Abstract
Although classical agency theorists claim that pay-for-performance is not relevant in the context of private family firms, the authors provide empirical evidence of the opposite, using a sample of 529 privately held U.S. family firms. The results suggest that objective performance-based measures play a significant role in CEO compensation. Additionally, the authors find that in private family firms CEO compensation is more responsive to firm performance in firms with low ownership dispersion and in the controlling-owner stage. Furthermore, the positive pay-for-performance relation is slightly stronger for nonfamily CEOs than for family CEOs.
Language
English
Source (journal)
Family business review: journal of the Family Firm Institute. - Boston, Mass.
Publication
Boston, Mass. : 2013
ISSN
0894-4865
Volume/pages
26:2(2013), p. 140-160
ISI
000318810900003
Full text (Publishers DOI)
Full text (publishers version - intranet only)
UAntwerpen
Faculty/Department
Research group
Publication type
Subject
Affiliation
Publications with a UAntwerp address
External links
Web of Science
Record
Identification
Creation 19.07.2013
Last edited 19.05.2017
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