Publication
Title
Perceptual experience and seeing that p
Author
Abstract
I open my eyes and see that the lemon before me is yellow. States like this-states of seeing that p-appear to be visual perceptual states, in some sense. They also appear to be propositional attitudes (and so states with propositional representational contents). It might seem, then, like a view of perceptual experience on which experiences have propositional representational contents-a Propositional View-has to be the correct sort of view for states of seeing that p. And thus we can't sustain fully general non-Propositional but Representational, or Relational Views of experience. But despite what we might initially be inclined to think when reflecting upon the apparent features of states of seeing that p, a non-propositional view of seeing that p is, I argue, perfectly intelligible.
Language
English
Source (journal)
Synthese : an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science. - Dordrecht, 1936, currens
Publication
Dordrecht : 2013
ISSN
0039-7857
Volume/pages
190:10(2013), p. 1735-1751
ISI
000319748000002
Full text (Publisher's DOI)
Full text (publisher's version - intranet only)
UAntwerpen
Faculty/Department
Research group
Publication type
Subject
Affiliation
Publications with a UAntwerp address
External links
Web of Science
Record
Identification
Creation 04.09.2013
Last edited 02.08.2017
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