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Title
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Perceptual experience and seeing that p
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Author
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Abstract
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| I open my eyes and see that the lemon before me is yellow. States like this-states of seeing that p-appear to be visual perceptual states, in some sense. They also appear to be propositional attitudes (and so states with propositional representational contents). It might seem, then, like a view of perceptual experience on which experiences have propositional representational contents-a Propositional View-has to be the correct sort of view for states of seeing that p. And thus we can't sustain fully general non-Propositional but Representational, or Relational Views of experience. But despite what we might initially be inclined to think when reflecting upon the apparent features of states of seeing that p, a non-propositional view of seeing that p is, I argue, perfectly intelligible. |
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Language
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English
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Source (journal)
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Synthese : an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science. - Dordrecht, 1936, currens
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Publication
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Dordrecht
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2013
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ISSN
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0039-7857
[print]
1573-0964
[online]
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DOI
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10.1007/S11229-013-0259-3
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Volume/pages
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190
:10
(2013)
, p. 1735-1751
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ISI
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000319748000002
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Full text (Publisher's DOI)
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Full text (publisher's version - intranet only)
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