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Title
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Can mechanisms really replace laws of nature?
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Author
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Abstract
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| Today, mechanisms and mechanistic explanation are very popular in philosophy of science and are deemed a welcome alternative to laws of nature and deductive-nomological explanation. Starting from Mitchell's pragmatic notion of laws, I cast doubt on their status as a genuine alternative. I argue that (1) all complex-systems mechanisms onto-logically must rely on stable regularities, while (2) the reverse need not hold. Analogously, (3) models of mechanisms must incorporate pragmatic laws, while (4) such laws themselves need not always refer to underlying mechanisms. Finally, I show that Mitchell's account is more encompassing than the mechanistic account |
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Language
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English
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Source (journal)
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Philosophy of science : journal of the Philosophy of Science Association. - East Lansing, Mich., 1934, currens
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Publication
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East Lansing, Mich.
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2010
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ISSN
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0031-8248
1539-767X
[e-ISSN]
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DOI
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10.1086/652959
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Volume/pages
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77
:3
(2010)
, p. 317-340
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ISI
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000278592100001
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Full text (Publisher's DOI)
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