Title
Response to Keith Lehrer: Thomas Reid on Common sense and morals
Author
Faculty/Department
Faculty of Arts. Philosophy
Publication type
article
Publication
Edinburgh ,
Subject
Philosophy
Source (journal)
Journal of Scottish philosophy. - Edinburgh
Volume/pages
11(2013) :2 , p. 131-143
ISSN
1479-6651
vabb
c:vabb:379912
Carrier
E
Target language
English (eng)
Full text (Publishers DOI)
Affiliation
University of Antwerp
Abstract
This paper is a response to Keith Lehrer's Reid on Common Sense and Morals. I start by defending the general claim that it is appropriate to call Reid a moral realist. I continue by discussing three aspects of Reid's account of moral ideas. First, our first moral conceptions are non-propositional mental states that are essential ingredients of moral perception. Our first moral conceptions are not gross, indistinct and egocentric but are uninformed mental states that might be about others. Second, moral perception functions like perception of aesthetic properties and of the mental states of other humans, and this kind of perception is both immediate and informed. Third, I discuss the role of moral feelings in moral motivation.
E-info
https://repository.uantwerpen.be/docman/iruaauth/6283fb/c49a2e30cf1.pdf
Handle