Title
Explaining our choices : Reid on motives, character and effort Explaining our choices : Reid on motives, character and effort
Author
Faculty/Department
Faculty of Arts. Philosophy
Publication type
article
Publication
Edinburgh ,
Subject
Philosophy
Source (journal)
Journal of Scottish philosophy. - Edinburgh
Volume/pages
5(2007) :2 , p. 187-212
ISSN
1479-6651
Carrier
E
Target language
English (eng)
Full text (Publishers DOI)
Abstract
Libertarians, like Thomas Reid, hold that motives do not causally necessitate our choices. The problem that arises is to explain how the agent decides to act according to one motive and not the other. In light of some objections brought up by Leibniz and Edwards but also by contemporary compatibilists such as Haji and Goetz, I examine Thomas Reid's possible answer to this problem. I argue that to explain our choices Reid would appeal not only to motives and character traits but also to the amount of effort needed to choose what is best. I also address Reid's criticism of the implicit presupposition of the Principle of Suffi cient Reason. My aim is therefore to explore, clarify and defend Reid's account of agency in choicemaking.
E-info
https://repository.uantwerpen.be/docman/iruaauth/886303/68ed6aabb85.pdf