Publication
Title
Sympathy and affectuum imitatio : Spinoza and Hume as social and political psychologists
Author
Abstract
This paper starts from the premise that Spinoza and Hume share a realisticnaturalistic approach to human nature. Human beings are finite parts of nature, and as such strongly interdependent creatures. This interdependence is reflected in the central social-psychological principles that Hume and Spinoza employ, respectively sympathy and affectuum imitatio. Both principles show the immediacy of the communication of passions, and the strong influence that other people's passions exert over our own affective lives. Central to this paper are an analysis and comparison of the working of sympathy and imitation of affects. As it turns out, both philosophers consider humans to be limitedly social beings. Social, because we tend to be moved by the pains and pleasures of our fellows. Limitedly social, because our egoistic side limits the scope of our fellow-feeling, and may turn the other's pain into our pleasure and vice versa. This puts a pressure on (larger) groups; their living together can never be truly harmonious without external interference. Spinoza and Hume, therefore, regard a further stabilisation and harmonisation of collective affective life as a key political concern. As will finally be argued, the precise way in which this concern is fleshed out in their political theories makes them occupy a shared, distinctive position in early modern political thought.
Language
English
Source (journal)
South African journal of philosophy. - Pretoria
Publication
Pretoria : 2014
ISSN
0258-0136
Volume/pages
33:1(2014), p. 1-18
ISI
000334184700001
Full text (Publisher's DOI)
UAntwerpen
Faculty/Department
Research group
Publication type
Subject
Affiliation
Publications with a UAntwerp address
External links
Web of Science
Record
Identification
Creation 03.07.2014
Last edited 21.07.2017
To cite this reference