Title
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Belief, experience and the act of picture-making
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Author
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Abstract
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Which mental states are involved in representing the world via pictures? According to the Belief-Involving View, belief is necessary. According to the Mere Experience View, belief is dispensable; one can depict objects for which one does not possess concepts, so the mere experience of an object is sufficient. I examine Dominic Lopes' defence of, and Berys Gaut's objections to, the Mere Experience View. I argue Gaut's objections are unsuccessful since they (i) require the defender of the Mere Experience View to endorse a theory of action that is optional, at best; (ii) undermine Gaut's own positive claims and (iii) are question-begging. I argue that the real problem with the Mere Experience View is that it is too permissive in circumscribing situations in which one can depict objects. I further argue, contra Lopes, that the fact that one can depict objects for which one does not possess concepts supplies no argument for or against either view |
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Language
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English
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Source (journal)
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Philosophical explorations. - Abingdon, 1998, currens
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Publication
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Abingdon
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2014
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ISSN
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1386-9795
[print]
1741-5918
[online]
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DOI
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10.1080/13869795.2013.814802
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Volume/pages
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17
:1
(2014)
, p. 35-48
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ISI
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000329962300003
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Full text (Publisher's DOI)
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Full text (publisher's version - intranet only)
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