Publication
Title
Belief, experience and the act of picture-making
Author
Abstract
Which mental states are involved in representing the world via pictures? According to the Belief-Involving View, belief is necessary. According to the Mere Experience View, belief is dispensable; one can depict objects for which one does not possess concepts, so the mere experience of an object is sufficient. I examine Dominic Lopes' defence of, and Berys Gaut's objections to, the Mere Experience View. I argue Gaut's objections are unsuccessful since they (i) require the defender of the Mere Experience View to endorse a theory of action that is optional, at best; (ii) undermine Gaut's own positive claims and (iii) are question-begging. I argue that the real problem with the Mere Experience View is that it is too permissive in circumscribing situations in which one can depict objects. I further argue, contra Lopes, that the fact that one can depict objects for which one does not possess concepts supplies no argument for or against either view
Language
English
Source (journal)
Philosophical explorations. - Abingdon, 1998, currens
Publication
Abingdon : 2014
ISSN
1386-9795 [print]
1741-5918 [online]
Volume/pages
17:1(2014), p. 35-48
ISI
000329962300003
Full text (Publisher's DOI)
Full text (publisher's version - intranet only)
UAntwerpen
Faculty/Department
Research group
Publication type
Subject
External links
Web of Science
Record
Identification
Creation 12.11.2014
Last edited 20.07.2017