Title
Belief, experience and the act of picture-making Belief, experience and the act of picture-making
Author
Faculty/Department
Faculty of Arts. Philosophy
Publication type
article
Publication
Abingdon ,
Subject
Philosophy
Source (journal)
Philosophical explorations. - Abingdon, 1998, currens
Volume/pages
17(2014) :1 , p. 35-48
ISSN
1386-9795
1741-5918
Carrier
E
Target language
English (eng)
Full text (Publishers DOI)
Abstract
Which mental states are involved in representing the world via pictures? According to the Belief-Involving View, belief is necessary. According to the Mere Experience View, belief is dispensable; one can depict objects for which one does not possess concepts, so the mere experience of an object is sufficient. I examine Dominic Lopes' defence of, and Berys Gaut's objections to, the Mere Experience View. I argue Gaut's objections are unsuccessful since they (i) require the defender of the Mere Experience View to endorse a theory of action that is optional, at best; (ii) undermine Gaut's own positive claims and (iii) are question-begging. I argue that the real problem with the Mere Experience View is that it is too permissive in circumscribing situations in which one can depict objects. I further argue, contra Lopes, that the fact that one can depict objects for which one does not possess concepts supplies no argument for or against either view
E-info
https://repository.uantwerpen.be/docman/iruaauth/0475d3/5e278b95e74.pdf