Publication
Title
Radical enactivism, Wittgenstein and the cognitive gap
Author
Abstract
REC or radical enactive (or embodied) cognition involves the claim that certain forms of mentality do not involve informational content and are instead to be equated with temporally and spatially extended physical interactions between an agent and the environment. REC also claims however that other forms of mentality do involve informational content and are scaffolded by socially and linguistically enabled practices. This seems to raise what can be called a cognitive gap question, namely, how do non-contentful behaviours give rise to contentful behaviours? In this paper, I show how REC can tackle a certain understanding of this question. I argue that if REC were to endorse claims made by the later Wittgenstein, then REC could deny that there is any (synchronous) gap in our intelligent behaviour.
Language
English
Source (journal)
Adaptive behavior / Massachusetts Institute of Technology. - Cambridge, Mass.
Publication
Cambridge, Mass. : 2014
ISSN
1059-7123
Volume/pages
22:5(2014), p. 350-359
ISI
000342977700004
Full text (Publisher's DOI)
UAntwerpen
Faculty/Department
Research group
Publication type
Subject
Affiliation
Publications with a UAntwerp address
External links
Web of Science
Record
Identification
Creation 10.12.2014
Last edited 21.07.2017
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