Title
Radical enactivism, Wittgenstein and the cognitive gap Radical enactivism, Wittgenstein and the cognitive gap
Author
Faculty/Department
Faculty of Arts. Philosophy
Publication type
article
Publication
Cambridge, Mass. ,
Subject
Psychology
Sociology
Computer. Automation
Source (journal)
Adaptive behavior / Massachusetts Institute of Technology. - Cambridge, Mass.
Volume/pages
22(2014) :5 , p. 350-359
ISSN
1059-7123
ISI
000342977700004
Carrier
E
Target language
English (eng)
Full text (Publishers DOI)
Affiliation
University of Antwerp
Abstract
REC or radical enactive (or embodied) cognition involves the claim that certain forms of mentality do not involve informational content and are instead to be equated with temporally and spatially extended physical interactions between an agent and the environment. REC also claims however that other forms of mentality do involve informational content and are scaffolded by socially and linguistically enabled practices. This seems to raise what can be called a cognitive gap question, namely, how do non-contentful behaviours give rise to contentful behaviours? In this paper, I show how REC can tackle a certain understanding of this question. I argue that if REC were to endorse claims made by the later Wittgenstein, then REC could deny that there is any (synchronous) gap in our intelligent behaviour.
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