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Title
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Overheidssteun voor religie : antiperfectionisme of perfectionisme?
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Author
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Abstract
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| I will argue that it is possible to give a neutral or antiperfectionist legitimation for state support for religion, which I consider a perfectionist good that is not in the common interest. I will argue that state support for perfectionist goods (and thus also for religion) can, in some circumstances and under certain conditions, be allowed as a second-best option in order to guarantee an adequate range of valuable options to choose among - and this range of options is a necessary condition for autonomy. Subsequently, I will argue that the bottom line - which is also the limit - for support is a sufficient range of valuable options. Furthermore, I will argue that state support for religion is only allowed if there is a democratic consensus about the value of that particular perfectionist good. Finally, I will claim that state support for religion is only allowed under certain conditions. |
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Language
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Dutch
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Source (journal)
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Netherlands journal of legal philosophy. - Den Haag, 2012, currens
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Publication
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Den Haag
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2015
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ISSN
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2213-0713
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DOI
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10.5553/NJLP/.000031
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Volume/pages
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44
:1
(2015)
, p. 62-82
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Full text (Publisher's DOI)
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Full text (open access)
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