Title
Sensorimotor theory and enactivismSensorimotor theory and enactivism
Author
Faculty/Department
Faculty of Arts. Philosophy
Research group
Centre for Philosophical Psychology
Publication type
article
Publication
Dordrecht,
Subject
Philosophy
Psychology
Source (journal)
Topoi: an international review of philosophy. - Dordrecht
Volume/pages
(2015), p. 1-15
ISSN
0167-7411
Carrier
E
Target language
English (eng)
Full text (Publishers DOI)
Affiliation
University of Antwerp
Abstract
The sensorimotor theory of perceptual consciousness offers a form of enactivism in that it stresses patterns of interaction instead of any alleged internal representations of the environment. But how does it relate to forms of enactivism stressing the continuity between life and mind (and more particularly autopoiesis, autonomy, and valence)? We shall distinguish sensorimotor enactivism, which stresses perceptual capacities themselves, from autopoietic enactivism, which claims an essential connection between experience and autopoietic processes or associated background capacities. We show how autopoiesis, autonomous agency, and affective dimensions of experience may fit into sensorimotor enactivism, and we identify differences between this interpretation and autopoietic enactivism. By taking artificial consciousness as a case in point, we further sharpen the distinction between sensorimotor enactivism and autopoietic enactivism. We argue that sensorimotor enactivism forms a strong default position for an enactive account of perceptual consciousness.
E-info
https://repository.uantwerpen.be/docman/iruaauth/ea6a45/0bab8d6832d.pdf
Handle