Title
Optimal firm growth under the threat of entry Optimal firm growth under the threat of entry
Author
Faculty/Department
Faculty of Applied Economics
Publication type
article
Publication
Amsterdam ,
Subject
Economics
Mathematics
Source (journal)
European journal of operational research. - Amsterdam
Volume/pages
246(2015) :1 , p. 281-292
ISSN
0377-2217
ISI
000356742800023
Carrier
E
Target language
English (eng)
Full text (Publishers DOI)
Affiliation
University of Antwerp
Abstract
The paper studies the incumbent-entrant problem in a fully dynamic setting. We find that under an open-loop information structure the incumbent anticipates entry by overinvesting, whereas in the Markov perfect equilibrium the incumbent slightly underinvests in the period before the entry. The entry cost level where entry accommodation passes into entry deterrence is lower in the Markov perfect equilibrium. Further we find that the incumbent's capital stock level needed to deter entry is hump shaped as a function of the entry time, whereas the corresponding entry cost, where the entrant is indifferent between entry and non-entry, is U-shaped. (C) 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
E-info
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https://repository.uantwerpen.be/docman/iruaauth/5d2d47/0d1127007.pdf
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