|
Title
|
|
|
|
Photographic phenomenology as cognitive phenomenology
|
|
|
Author
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Abstract
|
|
|
|
| Photographic pictorial experience is thought to have a peculiar phenomenology to it, one that fails to accompany the pictorial experiences one has before so-called 'hand-made' pictures. I present a theory that explains this in terms of a common factor shared by beliefs formed on the basis of photographic pictorial experience and beliefs formed on the basis of ordinary, face-to-face, perceptual experience: the having of a psychologically immediate, non-inferential etiology. This theory claims that photographic phenomenology has less to do with photographs themselves, or the pictorial experiences they elicit, and is a matter of our cognitive response to those experiences. I illustrate this theory's benefits: it is neutral on the nature of photography and our folk-conception of photography; it is consistent with photographic phenomenology's being contingent; and it accounts for our experiences of hyper-realistic hand-made pictures. Extant theories of photographic phenomenology falter on one or more of these issues. |
|
|
|
Language
|
|
|
|
English
|
|
|
Source (journal)
|
|
|
|
The British journal of aesthetics. - London, 1960, currens
|
|
|
Publication
|
|
|
|
London
:
2015
|
|
|
ISSN
|
|
|
|
0007-0904
[print]
1468-2842
[online]
|
|
|
DOI
|
|
|
|
10.1093/AESTHJ/AYU098
|
|
|
Volume/pages
|
|
|
|
55
:1
(2015)
, p. 71-89
|
|
|
ISI
|
|
|
|
000356622800005
|
|
|
Full text (Publisher's DOI)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Full text (publisher's version - intranet only)
|
|
|
|
|
|