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Title
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The Representationalism versus Relationalism debate : explanatory contextualism about perception
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Author
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Abstract
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| There are two very different ways of thinking about perception. According to representationalism, perceptual states are representations: they represent the world as being a certain way. They have content, which may or may not be different from the content of beliefs. They represent objects as having properties, sometimes veridically, sometimes not. According to relationalism, perception is a relation between the agent and the perceived object. Perceived objects are literally constituents of our perceptual states and not of the contents thereof. Perceptual states are not representations. My aim is to argue that if we frame this debate as a debate about the individuation of perceptual states, rather than the nature of perception, then we can reconcile these two seemingly conflicting ways of thinking about perception. |
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Language
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English
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Source (journal)
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European journal of philosophy. - Oxford
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Publication
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Oxford
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2015
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ISSN
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0966-8373
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DOI
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10.1111/EJOP.12085
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Volume/pages
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23
:2
(2015)
, p. 321-336
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ISI
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000358166900007
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Full text (Publisher's DOI)
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Full text (publisher's version - intranet only)
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