Publication
Title
Attending meetings : the use of mixed strategies
Author
Abstract
We consider a game in which each of n players is invited to a meeting, and has to decide whether or not to attend the meeting. A quorum has to be attained if the meeting is to have the power of making binding decisions. We consider all possible preferences of the players. These preferences are assumed to be the same for all players. Restricting ourselves to symmetric Nash equilibria, we identift three different classes of preferences. In a first class the game has a unique Nash equilibrium, defined in mixed strategies. In a second class the game has two Nash equilibria, defined in pure strategies. In a final class of preferences the game has a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, and possibly also in mixed strategies. If there is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, we show that the equilibrium probability of attending the meeting increases when the quorum increases. Furthermore, if the number of players becomes very large, this equilibrium probability tends to the value of the quorum. Finally, we show how the underlying game structure can also be used in other applications.
Language
English
Source (journal)
Ekonomický časopis / Slovenská akadémia vied. - Bratislava
Publication
Bratislava : 2015
ISSN
0013-3035
Volume/pages
63:6(2015), p. 576-598
ISI
000364616300002
UAntwerpen
Faculty/Department
Research group
Publication type
Subject
Affiliation
Publications with a UAntwerp address
External links
Web of Science
Record
Identification
Creation 15.01.2016
Last edited 09.06.2017
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