Title 



Attending meetings : the use of mixed strategies
 
Author 



 
Abstract 



We consider a game in which each of n players is invited to a meeting, and has to decide whether or not to attend the meeting. A quorum has to be attained if the meeting is to have the power of making binding decisions. We consider all possible preferences of the players. These preferences are assumed to be the same for all players. Restricting ourselves to symmetric Nash equilibria, we identift three different classes of preferences. In a first class the game has a unique Nash equilibrium, defined in mixed strategies. In a second class the game has two Nash equilibria, defined in pure strategies. In a final class of preferences the game has a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, and possibly also in mixed strategies. If there is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, we show that the equilibrium probability of attending the meeting increases when the quorum increases. Furthermore, if the number of players becomes very large, this equilibrium probability tends to the value of the quorum. Finally, we show how the underlying game structure can also be used in other applications.   
Language 



English
 
Source (journal) 



Ekonomický časopis / Slovenská akadémia vied.  Bratislava  
Publication 



Bratislava : 2015
 
ISSN 



00133035
 
Volume/pages 



63:6(2015), p. 576598
 
ISI 



000364616300002
 
