Title
Colour Colour
Author
Faculty/Department
Faculty of Arts. Philosophy
Publication type
article
Publication
Subject
Philosophy
Source (journal)
PHILOSOPHY COMPASS (ELECTRONIC)
Volume/pages
9(2014) :11 , p. 803-813
ISSN
1747-9991
Carrier
E
Target language
English (eng)
Full text (Publishers DOI)
Abstract
The view that physical objects do not, in fact, possess colour properties is certainly the dominant position amongst scientists working on colour vision. It is also a reasonably popular view amongst philosophers. However, the recent philosophical debate about the metaphysical status of colour properties seems to have taken a more realist turn. In this article, I review the main philosophical views eliminativism, physicalism, dispositionalism and primitivism and describe the problems they face. I also examine how these views have been classified and suggest that there may be less disparity between some of these positions than previously thought.
E-info
https://repository.uantwerpen.be/docman/iruaauth/02658a/132364.pdf