Publication
Title
Colour
Author
Abstract
The view that physical objects do not, in fact, possess colour properties is certainly the dominant position amongst scientists working on colour vision. It is also a reasonably popular view amongst philosophers. However, the recent philosophical debate about the metaphysical status of colour properties seems to have taken a more realist turn. In this article, I review the main philosophical views eliminativism, physicalism, dispositionalism and primitivism and describe the problems they face. I also examine how these views have been classified and suggest that there may be less disparity between some of these positions than previously thought.
Language
English
Source (journal)
PHILOSOPHY COMPASS (ELECTRONIC)
Publication
2014
ISSN
1747-9991
Volume/pages
9:11(2014), p. 803-813
Full text (Publisher's DOI)
Full text (publisher's version - intranet only)
UAntwerpen
Faculty/Department
Research group
Publication type
Subject
External links
Record
Identification
Creation 06.04.2016
Last edited 11.03.2017