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Title
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Colour
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Author
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Abstract
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| The view that physical objects do not, in fact, possess colour properties is certainly the dominant position amongst scientists working on colour vision. It is also a reasonably popular view amongst philosophers. However, the recent philosophical debate about the metaphysical status of colour properties seems to have taken a more realist turn. In this article, I review the main philosophical views eliminativism, physicalism, dispositionalism and primitivism and describe the problems they face. I also examine how these views have been classified and suggest that there may be less disparity between some of these positions than previously thought. |
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Language
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English
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Source (journal)
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Philosophy Compass. - -
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Publication
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2014
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ISSN
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1747-9991
[online]
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DOI
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10.1111/PHC3.12173
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Volume/pages
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9
:11
(2014)
, p. 803-813
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Full text (Publisher's DOI)
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Full text (publisher's version - intranet only)
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