Title
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Pressure and expertise : explaining the information supply of interest groups in EU legislative lobbying
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Author
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Abstract
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EU politics has long been portrayed as an elite affair in which technocratic deliberation prevails. As a consequence, information supply by interest groups has typically been viewed as part of an expertise-based exchange with policy-makers. Less attention has been devoted to whether the supply of information is also used to exert political pressure. In addition to expertise-based exchanges between interest groups and policy-makers, can we identify the prevalence of information supply that aims to put pressure on EU policy-makers? And under what conditions are different modes of information supply likely to occur? My analysis relies on interviews with 143 lobbyists who were active on a set of 78 legislative proposals submitted by the European Commission between 2008 and 2010. The results demonstrate that expertise-based exchanges are dominant in interactions with civil servants, while political information is predominantly communicated to political officials and often the key substance in outside lobbying tactics. |
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Language
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English
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Source (journal)
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Journal of common market studies. - Oxford, 1962, currens
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Publication
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Oxford
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2016
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ISSN
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0021-9886
[print]
1468-5965
[online]
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DOI
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10.1111/JCMS.12298
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Volume/pages
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54
:3
(2016)
, p. 599-616
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ISI
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000374335700007
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Full text (Publisher's DOI)
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Full text (publisher's version - intranet only)
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