Publication
Title
Perception as something we do
Author
Abstract
In this paper, I want to focus on the claim, prominently made by sensorimotor theorists, that perception is something we do. I will argue that understanding perceiving as a bodily doing allows for a strong non-dualistic position on the relation between experience and objective physical events, one which provides insight into why such relation seems problematic while at the same time providing means to relieve the tension. Next I will show how the claim that perception is something we do does not stand in opposition to, and is not refuted by, the fact that we often have perceptual experience without moving. In arguing that cases of motionless perception and perception-like experience are still doings it will be pointed out that the same interactive regularities which are engaged in in active perception still apply to them. Explaining how past interactive regularities can influence current perception or perception-like experience in a way which remains true to the idea that perception is a doing, so I will argue, can be done by invoking the past -- the past itself, however, not its representation. The resulting historical, non-representational sensorimotor approach can join forces with Gibsonian ecological psychology -- provided that such is also understood along lines that don't invoke externalist remnants of contents.
Language
English
Source (journal)
Journal of consciousness studies. - Thoverton, 1994, currens
Publication
Thoverton : 2016
ISSN
1355-8250 [print]
2051-2201 [online]
Volume/pages
23:5-6(2016), p. 80-104
Full text (open access)
The author-created version that incorporates referee comments and is the accepted for publication version Available from 30.06.2018
Full text (publisher's version - intranet only)
UAntwerpen
Faculty/Department
Research group
Publication type
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Affiliation
Publications with a UAntwerp address
External links
Record
Identification
Creation 10.06.2016
Last edited 11.06.2016
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