Title
Board monitoring in a privately held firm : when does CEO duality matter? The moderating effect of ownership Board monitoring in a privately held firm : when does CEO duality matter? The moderating effect of ownership
Author
Faculty/Department
Faculty of Applied Economics
Publication type
article
Publication
Subject
Economics
Source (journal)
Journal of small business management
Volume/pages
(2016) , p. 1-22
ISSN
1540-627X
Carrier
E
Target language
English (eng)
Full text (Publishers DOI)
Affiliation
University of Antwerp
Abstract
Drawing from agency theory and the attention-based view of the firm, this study extends the understanding of the conditions under which CEO duality is negatively associated with board monitoring in a privately held firm context. Measuring monitoring in terms of board members involvement in behavioral control, output control, and strategy control tasks (Huse 2005), results show that CEO duality is significantly and negatively related only to the behavioral control task. In addition, we show that this negative effect is contingent on whether ownership is concentrated in the hands of a controlling shareholder as well as the type of controlling shareholder.
E-info
https://repository.uantwerpen.be/docman/iruaauth/fe4b18/134062.pdf
Handle