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Title
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Relationalism and unconscious perception
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Author
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Abstract
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| Relationalism holds that perceptual experiences are relations between subjects and perceived objects. But much evidence suggests that perceptual states can be unconscious. We argue here that unconscious perception raises difficulties for relationalism. Relationalists would seem to have three options. First, they may deny that there is unconscious perception or question whether we have sufficient evidence to posit it. Second, they may allow for unconscious perception but deny that the relationalist analysis applies to it. Third, they may offer a relationalist explanation of unconscious perception. We argue that each of these strategies is questionable. |
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Language
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English
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Source (journal)
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Analysis. - Oxford, 1933, currens
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Publication
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Oxford
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Basil Blackwell
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2016
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ISSN
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0003-2638
[print]
1467-8284
[online]
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DOI
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10.1093/ANALYS/ANW060
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Volume/pages
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76
:4
(2016)
, p. 426-433
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ISI
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000392749700004
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Full text (Publisher's DOI)
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Full text (open access)
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Full text (publisher's version - intranet only)
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