Publication
Title
Reid's non-Humean theory of moral motives
Author
Abstract
Contrary to the widespread view that Reid and Hume agree that reason, alone, is inert, I argue that they disagree on this point. Both accept that reason plays a role in forming moral sentiments, and that affections are components of moral evaluations. However, I show that for Reid moral evaluations (comprised of moral judgments and moral affections) are different from moral motives (which are not comprised of affections). Moral motives for Reid are mind-independent states of affairs that are grasped by reason and do not require affections to influence human beings. Reid hence holds a non-Humean theory in which reason, alone, is not inert.
Language
English
Source (journal)
Pacific philosophical quarterly. - Los Angeles, Calif.
Publication
Los Angeles, Calif. : 2018
ISSN
0031-5621
0279-0750
Volume/pages
99 :s:[1] (2018) , p. 205-224
ISI
000430829000010
Full text (Publisher's DOI)
Full text (publisher's version - intranet only)
UAntwerpen
Faculty/Department
Research group
Publication type
Subject
Affiliation
Publications with a UAntwerp address
External links
Web of Science
Record
Identification
Creation 12.06.2018
Last edited 20.09.2021
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