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Title
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Reid's non-Humean theory of moral motives
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Author
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Abstract
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| Contrary to the widespread view that Reid and Hume agree that reason, alone, is inert, I argue that they disagree on this point. Both accept that reason plays a role in forming moral sentiments, and that affections are components of moral evaluations. However, I show that for Reid moral evaluations (comprised of moral judgments and moral affections) are different from moral motives (which are not comprised of affections). Moral motives for Reid are mind-independent states of affairs that are grasped by reason and do not require affections to influence human beings. Reid hence holds a non-Humean theory in which reason, alone, is not inert. |
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Language
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English
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Source (journal)
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Pacific philosophical quarterly. - Los Angeles, Calif.
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Publication
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Los Angeles, Calif.
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2018
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ISSN
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0031-5621
0279-0750
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Volume/pages
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99
:s:[1]
(2018)
, p. 205-224
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ISI
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000430829000010
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Full text (Publisher's DOI)
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Full text (publisher's version - intranet only)
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