Publication
Title
Structural reform histories and perceptions of organizational autonomy : do senior managers perceive less strategic policy autonomy when faced with frequent and intense restructuring?
Author
Abstract
Through recurrent structural reform programmes governments are on a quest to design public organizations that will stand the test of their environment. One of the approaches to uncertain or sensitive issues has been to create various forms of (semi-)autonomous organizations with substantial strategic discretion. However, while governments repeatedly experiment with designs, one might simultaneously expect that such interference through repeated structural change may limit the degree of strategic policy autonomy perceived by senior managers. More specifically, we propose that intense structural reforms may inadvertently reduce strategic policy autonomy perceptions through two mechanisms. First, intense sequences of structural reforms may lead to perceptions of relatively controlling political principals. Second, they may reduce an organization's ability to accrue resources beneficial to autonomy, such as a strong internal culture, network embeddedness and expertise. Results indicate that strategic policy autonomy perceptions will indeed be detrimentally affected for organizations that experience intense sequences of structural reform.
Language
English
Source (journal)
Public administration / Royal Institute of Public Administration [London] - London
Publication
London : 2018
ISSN
0033-3298
Volume/pages
96:2(2018), p. 349-367
ISI
000434363800008
Full text (Publisher's DOI)
Full text (open access)
Full text (publisher's version - intranet only)
UAntwerpen
Faculty/Department
Research group
Project info
Bureaucracy despite reforms: does a history of intensive structural reforms make public sector organizations more bureaucratic (again)?
Publication type
Subject
Law 
Affiliation
Publications with a UAntwerp address
External links
Web of Science
Record
Identification
Creation 10.07.2018
Last edited 17.07.2021
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