Publication
Title
Unconscious perceptual justification*
Author
Abstract
Perceptual experiences justify beliefs. A perceptual experience of a dog justifies the belief that there is a dog present. But there is much evidence that perceptual states can occur without being conscious, as in experiments involving masked priming. Do unconscious perceptual states provide justification as well? The answer depends on one's theory of justification. While most varieties of externalism seem compatible with unconscious perceptual justification, several theories have recently afforded to consciousness a special role in perceptual justification. We argue that such views face a dilemma: either consciousness should be understood in functionalist terms, in which case our best current theories of consciousness do not seem to imbue consciousness with any special epistemic features, or it should not, in which case it is mysterious why only conscious states are justificatory. We conclude that unconscious perceptual justification is quite plausible.
Language
English
Source (journal)
Inquiry : an interdisciplinary journal of philosophy. - Oslo
Publication
Oslo : 2018
ISSN
0020-174X
Volume/pages
61 :5-6 (2018) , p. 569-589
ISI
000434400500007
Full text (Publisher's DOI)
Full text (publisher's version - intranet only)
UAntwerpen
Faculty/Department
Research group
Project info
The diversity of unconscious mental processes.
Perception, Action and What's in between?
Seeing things you don't see: Unifying the philosophy, psychology and neuroscience of multimodal mental imagery (STYDS).
Publication type
Subject
Affiliation
Publications with a UAntwerp address
External links
Web of Science
Record
Identification
Creation 10.07.2018
Last edited 20.09.2021
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