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Title
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Is phenomenal force sufficient for immediate perceptual justification?
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Author
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Abstract
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| As an important view in the epistemology of perception, dogmatism proposes that for any experience (e.g. perceptual, memorial, imaginative, etc.), if it has a distinctive kind of phenomenal character, then it thereby provides us with immediate justification for beliefs about the external world. This paper rejects dogmatism by looking into the epistemology of imagining. In particular, this paper first appeals to some empirical studies on perceptual experiences and imaginings to show that it is possible for imaginings to have the distinctive phenomenal character dogmatists have in mind. Then this paper argues that some of these imaginings fail to provide us with immediate justification for beliefs about the external world at least partly due to their inappropriate etiology. Such imaginings constitute counterexamples to dogmatism. |
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Language
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English
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Source (journal)
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Synthese : an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science. - Dordrecht, 1936, currens
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Publication
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Dordrecht
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2018
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ISSN
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0039-7857
[print]
1573-0964
[online]
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DOI
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10.1007/S11229-016-1233-7
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Volume/pages
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195
:2
(2018)
, p. 637-656
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ISI
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000422664200009
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Full text (Publisher's DOI)
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Full text (publisher's version - intranet only)
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