Publication
Title
National or political cake? The political economy of intergovernmental transfers in Nigeria
Author
Abstract
Rule-based intergovernmental transfers are often presented as the panacea to avoid the manipulation of transfers for political motives. We question that assertion in the case of Nigeria, where these transfers are highly dependent on natural resources and likely to be subject to elite capture. In this article, we use oil windfalls as a source of exogenous variation in the political discretion an incumbent government can exert in rule-based transfers. Exploiting within-state variation between 2007 and 2015 in Nigeria, an increase in VAT transfers induced by higher oil windfalls is found to improve the electoral fortune of an incumbent government. Our results question the promotion of rule-based transfers as a one-fits-all institutional solution in resource-abundant countries with relatively weak institutions.
Language
English
Source (journal)
Journal of economic geography. - Oxford, 2000, currens
Publication
Oxford : 2019
ISSN
1468-2702 [print]
1468-2710 [online]
1468-2710 [online]
Volume/pages
19 :5 (2019) , p. 1119-1142
ISI
000493373400006
Full text (Publisher's DOI)
Full text (open access)
UAntwerpen
Faculty/Department
Research group
Publication type
Subject
Affiliation
Publications with a UAntwerp address
External links
VABB-SHW
Web of Science
Record
Identification
Creation 10.09.2018
Last edited 24.08.2021
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