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Title
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The fragmentary model of temporal experience and the mirroring constraint
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Author
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Abstract
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| A central debate in the current philosophical literature on temporal experience is over the following question: do temporal experiences themselves have a temporal structure that mirrors their temporal contents? Extensionalists argue that experiences do have a temporal structure that mirrors their temporal contents. Atomists insist that experiences don't have a temporal structure that mirrors their contents. In this paper, I argue that this debate is misguided. Both atomism and extensionalism, considered as general theories of temporal experience, are false, since temporal experience is not a single undifferentiated phenomena as both theories require. I argue for this conclusion in two steps. First, I show that introspection cannot settle the debate. Second, I argue that the neuroscientific evidence is best read as revealing a host of mechanisms involved in temporal perception - some admitting of an extensionalist interpretation while others admitting only of an atomistic interpretation. As a result, neither side of the debate wins. |
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Language
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English
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Source (journal)
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Philosophical studies: an international journal for philosophy in the analytic tradition. - Dordrecht
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Publication
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Dordrecht
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2019
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ISSN
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0031-8116
[print]
1573-0883
[online]
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DOI
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10.1007/S11098-017-1004-4
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Volume/pages
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176
:1
(2019)
, p. 21-44
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ISI
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000454838100002
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Full text (Publisher's DOI)
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Full text (publisher's version - intranet only)
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