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Title
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The affective experience of aesthetic properties
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Author
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Abstract
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| It is widely agreed upon that aesthetic properties, such as grace, balance, and elegance, are perceived. I argue that aesthetic properties are experientially attributed to some non-perceptible objects. For example, a mathematical proof can be experienced as elegant. In order to give a unified explanation of the experiential attribution of aesthetic properties to both perceptible and non-perceptible objects, one has to reject the idea that aesthetic properties are perceived. I propose an alternative view: the affective account. I argue that the standard case of experiential aesthetic property attribution is affective experience. |
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Language
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English
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Source (journal)
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Pacific philosophical quarterly. - Los Angeles, Calif.
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Publication
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Los Angeles, Calif.
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2019
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ISSN
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0031-5621
0279-0750
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DOI
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10.1111/PAPQ.12245
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Volume/pages
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100
:1
(2019)
, p. 283-300
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ISI
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000461378600013
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Full text (Publisher's DOI)
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Full text (publisher's version - intranet only)
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