|
Title
|
|
|
|
The legitimacy of using the harm principle in cases of religious freedom within education
| |
|
Author
|
|
|
|
| |
|
Abstract
|
|
|
|
| John Stuart Mill’s famous “harm principle” has been popular in the limitation of freedoms within human rights jurisprudence. It has been used formally in court cases and also informally in legal argumentation and conversation. Shortly, it is described as a very simple principle that amounts to the notion that persons are at liberty to do what they want as long as their actions do not harm any other person or society in general. This article questions whether it is legitimate to use the harm principle in cases concerning the limitation of religious freedom within education. For example, can the exemption of a learner from sex education (based on religious objections) be denied based on the argument that such an exemption will cause harm? In order to answer this question, the meaning, origin and use of the harm principle are investigated. This article also discusses four main criticisms against the use of this principle in general and in cases of religious freedom of learners in education. |
| |
|
Language
|
|
|
|
English
| |
|
Source (journal)
|
|
|
|
Human Rights Review
| |
|
Publication
|
|
|
|
2016
| |
|
ISSN
|
|
|
|
1524-8879
| |
|
Volume/pages
|
|
|
|
17
:3
(2016)
, p. 349-370
| |
|
Full text (publisher's version - intranet only)
|
|
|
|
| |
|