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Title
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Hierarchical minds and the perception/cognition distinction
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Author
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Abstract
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| Recent research in cognitive and computational neuroscience portrays the neocortex as a hierarchically structured prediction machine. Several theorists have drawn on this research to challenge the traditional distinction between perception and cognition - specifically, to challenge the very idea that perception and cognition constitute useful kinds from the perspective of cognitive neuroscience. In place of this traditional taxonomy, such theorists advocate a unified inferential hierarchy subject to substantial bi-directional message passing. I outline the nature of this challenge and then raise two objections to the cognitive architecture it proposes as a replacement: first, standard ways of characterising this inferential hierarchy are in tension with the representational reach of conceptual thought; second, there is compelling evidence that commonsense reasoning is structured around highly domain-specific intuitive theories that are difficult to situate within a single hierarchy. |
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Language
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English
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Source (journal)
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Inquiry : an interdisciplinary journal of philosophy. - Oslo
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Publication
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Abingdon
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Routledge journals, taylor & francis ltd
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2019
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ISSN
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0020-174X
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DOI
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10.1080/0020174X.2019.1610045
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Volume/pages
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23 p.
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ISI
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000470615200001
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Full text (Publisher's DOI)
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Full text (publisher's version - intranet only)
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